Lecture IV. Construction of the Supreme Rule of Human Action

I have hitherto been employed, in this course of lectures, in dealing with preliminary difficulties and objections to such a system of Morality as that to which I wish to draw your attention. I hope I have succeeded in removing the objections, so far as they may have existed in the minds of any of my hearers: I hope I have satisfied them that there is nothing inherently incongruous or absurd, in the notion of a System of Morality; — that it is consistent with the common habits of human thought: — with the utmost earnestness in right action: — with the most zealous imitation of the goodness of good men: — that it is, in short, if rightly built up, not a mere pedantic and useless toil, but a great and valuable work. I trust I have dwelt so copiously and so clearly on the preliminary objections to Systematic Morality, that I may now go onwards, and point out the leading steps in the System which I have to offer you. I shall accordingly proceed to do so, as simply as I can.

The System of Morality which I have here to offer you, is the same in its import and connection as that which I have published in print: but I shall present it to you here in a different form: or rather, shall give a brief sketch of it from another point of view; for here, my object is to point out the mutual dependence of the parts: but in the book, my object was to give the due expansion of each part. I shall be glad to have this opportunity of exhibiting, I hope -76- in a clear manner, the mutual dependence of the leading propositions of the System: for I have reason to believe that the connection of these propositions with each other has been, by some persons, missed or mistaken, in a manner which I could not have supposed possible, but which I hope may, by explanation, be obviated in future.

I have already stated that, according to my view of Systematic Morality, it must include, or rather must consist of, the common moral convictions of mankind, expressed in the language usually employed for that purpose, only taking care to avoid ambiguity and laxity: and that it must connect their convictions by such reasons and arguments as are commonly used to convince men: arranging these reasons and arguments in a coherent and orderly manner. I do not conceive that it is the business of a moral system to discover new duties, or new reasons for duties; but to point out, in the best order which can be devised, the duties which are generally acknowledged as belonging to men: and to assign, for these duties, the reasons which make men acknowledge them as duties, arranging these reasons in such a way that they rise out of one another in a connected order. It would not fall in with my view of the Moral System at which I aim, that it should startle us by new and strange assertions: — by new precepts, or new and paradoxical reasons for old ones. There may be moral systems in which all moral rules are deduced from a certain principle or principles, by paths of reasoning which, though ingenious and logical, express propositions different from the common belief of men thinking calmly on such subjects. If there be such systems, I give no judgment respecting them. They may be good or may be bad: but the system I seek is not of that nature. It is to be a system in which common propositions are to be expressed in common words: common words are to have their common meaning: and the connection of the -77- truths of which the system consists is to be contained in this meaning of common terms: the meaning being rendered distinct and steady, as is requisite for this purpose. And this being the case, we shall naturally often have to consider what the meaning of words is: and how it may be fixed and made clear: and how, when this is done, the meanings of different words are related to each other.

To begin our task then. What are the most general and simple terms in which those matters are spoken of, which are the business of Morality? I have just used one of them; — Duty. But what is Duty? We can express its meaning more simply and idiomatically by another term. It is what we ought to do. But what is that which we ought to do? We cannot, I think, express this more simply: but we may express it otherwise, by saying it is that which it is right to do. And this adjective right with its opposite wrong, expresses, in the most general and simple manner, that quality of actions in virtue of which they are the subject of moral consideration. Morality is the consideration of actions as right and wrong. This, I think, corresponds to the common notion of moral differences of actions: and is, for us, a complete description of the field of contemplation with which we are here concerned.

But now that we are arrived at this great fundamental distinction of right and wrong, how shall we proceed? We shall have to determine what is right, and what is wrong: and how shall we arrive at such a determination? Will any consideration of the ordinary meaning and use of the words help us here?

I think it will. I think everybody will assent to this character of the adjective right: — it renders a reason for actions. Why must I do this or that? keep my word for instance? Because it is right. That is a sufficing reason, -78- if it be true. There may be other reasons; but that at least, is a good one. You may doubt whether it be right: but if it be right, you cannot doubt that that is a reason for doing it.

Not only so, but it is a reason which leaves us nothing to ask beyond. If you ask, why I am to do what is right, I reply, because it is right. The reason for that is in itself. It being right, is the best reason for doing anything.

No other reason is thus final and sufficient. If I ask why I must keep my word, and you say, because otherwise I shall be blamed, I still ask why I should avoid being blamed! You tell me perhaps that it is unpleasant. But this is not an ultimate reply, for it may often be right to do what is unpleasant: and if so, its being right is a reason for doing it, in spite of its being unpleasant. I speak of right absolutely used. For right may be used relatively: as if I say that to keep my word is the right way to make men trust me. Here right does not express any ultimate and final reason of actions, but only a reason relative to the object there mentioned, the making men trust me. But right, used absolutely, expresses an ultimate reason. This, I also say, is a supreme reason: it may have others subordinate to it, but it has no reason to which it is subordinate. A man labours in order that he may get money. He wishes to get money in order to educate his children. He wishes to educate his children because it is right. This is the supreme reason.

You may say that the man wishes to educate his children because he loves them: and that this is his ultimate reason. But this cannot satisfy the Moralist: for it would equally be a reason for his indulging them when they torment and injure their neighbours. The mere affection is not an ultimate reason for the Moralist, except the act be also right. -79-

In our speculations, then, actions are contemplated as right or wrong: and the meaning of right has this character: — that, used absolutely, it renders an ultimate and supreme reason for actions.

The Reasons of actions thus given may be spoken of also as Rules; the Rule being related to the Reason, as the means to the end, or as the way to the object. Hence the Reasons given in what I have said may be expressed in Rules such as these, "Labour that you may get money." "Get money that you may educate your children." And the Moral Rule in such cases is that the action is right. "Educate your children because it is right": and thus right, the adjective, means conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Action.

We are thus led to perceive that there is a Supreme Rule of Human Action; without, as yet, at all being led to see what the rule is. To determine that, must be our business hereafter. But for the present, I hope you will allow that such a Rule is supposed and pointed at in the meaning of the adjective right. When we say that an action is right, we mean that it is conformable to a supreme, ultimate rule, which requires and admits of no further reasoning.

But we are not alone in the world: we have, each of us, to act as a man among men. Our actions are important, only as they are concerned with men. They have no moral value or meaning, except that which they derive from their bearing upon men. And each of these men, like ourselves, is a subject of the Supreme Rule of Human Action. He, too, can do what is right; and if what he does is right, there is no further reason to be asked or rendered by the moralist for his doing.

But men have various concerns, by means of which they come into contact, and it may be, conflict. Each man -80- is the center of a sphere, and these spheres may intersect each other. Or rather, each man is the center of various concentric spheres: first, the sphere of his own bodily being, his person: — next, the sphere of his having, his property: — then, the sphere of his close affections, his family; — then, the sphere of his wider affections and regards, his town, his tribe, his nation. And all these spheres, round all these centers, intersect in innumerable lines and points: and give rise to the endless complexity of human affairs and human interests and human actions. But all these actions, interests, affairs, are to be ultimately governed by the Supreme Rule. That is everywhere to be, which is right. Such is the requirement of Morality. It is of no avail to tell her that this never can be. That is not the question for her. It is her business to pronounce what ought to be: and that which ought to be, is simply what is conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Action. Each man must do what it is right he should do: — must have what it is right he should have: — must abstain from that which it is not right that he should have. This is the universal Rule, which Morality cannot help continually uttering, however many deviations from it, and violations of it, there may be.

But what is this Rule, in this application? How are we to construct a Rule, or to make any progress towards constructing a rule, for such a world? How are we to establish equilibrium, or an approach to equilibrium, in so vast and complex a system of things? However difficult this may be, we must not despair: for this is our very task. This is the very business we have before us.

The Rule, whatever it be, must, as I have said, direct that each man should have what it is right that he should have, and abstain from the rest. It determines, if I may so say, the extent of each of those spheres of which I have spoken. By the consequences of the Supreme Rule, it is -81- determined what is included within each of these spheres for each man. There is that within it which is his, and all without it is not. And when the Supreme Rule has distributed the world into these spheres, which no longer intersect: — when it has placed each man so that he may be, not out of contact with other men, in property, or family, or social interests, but out of conflict with them: — then, indeed, the aspect of Rule becomes apparent through the complexity: then the equilibrium, or at least the moderated motion of this system, becomes no longer manifestly impossible.

Now that which is assigned to each man as his, by the Supreme Rule of Human Action: — that, in short, which it is right that he should have: — is described by a cognate word: and this word, also, is of importance in our progress towards the determination of the Supreme Rule: and the adoption of this word, and the fixation of its meaning, forms our next step. That which it is right that each man should have, is his Right. Right the substantive includes right the adjective, embodied, referred to each man as a center, and made a possession. Each man is to have what is his Right.

As I have already said, I am not inventing a new system of the world, but analyzing the actual system, which exists, and always has existed. Men have always tried, more or less, to conform their actions to the Supreme Rule. They have required of each other to do what was right; and as a condition of this, they have allowed each other to have Rights. Each man has had a Right to his own person, his own property, his own family, his own place among his fellows. These Rights have been made Realities among men. The Supreme Law has, to a great extent, actually reigned and been obeyed. Men, by their combined actions, have given it a Reality. They have balanced the impulses which tended to violate the Rule, by stronger impulses which -82- they themselves supplied. They have restrained desire by fear, and confined each man within the limits of his due sphere, by the application of external force. They have thus determined men's Rights, shaping out the Supreme Rule by subordinate Rules of their own: defining what was indefinite, fixing what was loose. Man's Rights have been determined and enforced by human Laws; but still, by Laws which aimed at being right.

But there may be many things which it is right that men should have, — love of children, gratitude, pity, for instance, — which human Laws cannot give: are we to call these Rights also? We might do so: this is one of the points on which the usage of language has differed. Men have called these sometimes Imperfect Rights; by this form of expression, distinguishing them from Perfect Rights, which are defined and enforced by Human Laws. This phraseology is not an essential matter. I think it tends to clearness and simplicity, to confine the term Rights to those Rights which Human Laws have made real. I shall so use it. But you will recollect that I mean by Right, so used, what those who use the term Perfect Rights mean by that term.

Right and Obligation are corresponding terms, and it is convenient to keep them so. As I use Right for Perfect Right, established by Law, I use Obligation for Perfect Obligation, established by Law.

Law, thus determining Rights and Obligations, determines also a portion of the Supreme Rule of Action. We are to discharge our Obligations; — to regard the Rights of others. It is right to do this. It is a part of our Duty.

It is a part of our Duty, but it is only a small part. Duty is far wider than Law. Many things are right, which are not mere regard to the legal Rights of other men. How is this? We see plainly that it is so: but how does this view bear upon the problem of the determination of the -83- Supreme Rule of Human Action, which is our object? What guidance do we obtain from thus comparing the narrow range of Rights, with the wide expanse of what is right? What is the reason of the great difference of compass in the terms?

The reason is plainly this: that men, in determining Rights, have selected only such portions of the Supreme Rule as bear upon visible and tangible things; and upon such actions relative to these, as are of an external and obtrusive character, introducing evident disturbance into the system of which men are parts. Hence they forbid theft, but not covetousness: adultery, but not lust. They are content to keep men's material interests in tolerable balance: they do not deal with the heart and mind. They regulate the external conduct, but do not attempt to reach the internal principle of action.

This satisfies them. It is well that it does so: for it is all that they can do. Human Laws cannot do much, in the region of internal principles. But though this satisfies Law, it does not satisfy Morality. She must go deeper than this. That she must do so, is evident from what I have said already, of the extent of her domain, Every thing which is or may be right or wrong, belongs to her. Hence, she must have something to do with intentions, as well as acts: for those, too, may be right or wrong. It is wrong to intend to steal, though I do not: — to put my hand in a man's pocket for that purpose, though I find nothing there: — to watch him with that intent, though the eye of the policeman withholds me. Not only intentions, but desires and emotions are wrong. It is wrong to grudge another man's happiness: to have a spite at him. There is a vast and varied field of desires, affections, sentiments, mental processes, all which must be subject to Morality, for all may be right and may be wrong; and the Supreme Law must -84- include all these; and must, according to the case, decide which of these two, right or wrong, each of these things is.

Now how are we to make our next step to the determination of the Supreme Rule of Human Action? We have got, I will suppose, all that Law can do for us: how are we to obtain that vast addition which we still want? We have found the footsteps of the Supreme Rule, visible on the earth, in the shape and order of Human Societies, the text of codes of Law. But these are merely the marks of the soles of her feet; how shall we, from these, delineate her form, as she towers up on high and fills an infinite space?

Is it possible that, from such a small fragment, we can determine a figure so large? May we hope that, in morality as in astronomy, the narrow basis which the earth affords us, will enable us to measure the heavens? Can we look to divine, from the external physiognomy of human nature as seen in Law, the deep-seated thought, the central Idea of that which is right?

These are important questions for us, in the course in which we are engaged: for everything, in the construction of our system, depends upon our being able to answer them in the affirmative. It appears to me, then, that we can, by starting from the points we have already established, proceed towards the establishment of that which we seek: — not founding Morality upon Law, but using Law as an indication, knowing that Law is a portion of Morality. I think we may, by proceeding from commands of Law, be able to discern the shape of precepts of Morality. Students in mensuration are taught to determine a distant point, by looking along a short ruler, laid in different places on a table, and noting where the lines converge. We may determine, I think, the central Idea of Morality, in a manner of which this is a kind of image; for, short as is the canon of law compared with the sphere of morality, -85- still it points in the right direction: and if we take this direction, and study its tendencies, we shall, I think, be led towards the proper center.

But at the same time that I thus hold, that we may find in positive Laws, indications of the form and structure of Morality, which it must be our business to interpret; I also hold that the power of interpreting these indications is something which we possess entirely in virtue of our Moral Nature. Laws are indications of our moral nature, for they are parts of it: but they are indications of the coarser and more outward parts of it only: and the subtle analysis which our consciousness enables us to apply, is requisite, that we may detect the finer elements in these coarse materials. Laws are a part of the language of our moral nature: and the study of these may help us to decipher the rest of that nature, and to read it into coherent sentences: but Laws themselves are the least significant part of that language. They are like the key to a forgotten language, which the men of our own time found, in the names of sovereigns which it contained. How we are to read our Obligations, so as to see, beyond them, Duties: — how we are to pass from Legality, the Title-page, to Morality, the Contents of the book, I shall soon endeavour to explain: but I observe, beforehand, that to read these, implies that we have a knowledge of the import of such words as Duty and Morality, — a knowledge which no legal teaching could impart: implies that Obligations are most intelligible, when they are discerned to be limited and contracted Duties: — that the title-page must interest us, because it points to the matter of the book. I believe it has been said, that in my published Treatise I make Morality depend upon Law. I think that no one, reading the work, with attention, could make such an assertion; but at any rate I hope that now, and as we proceed, you -86- will see how little foundation there is for such an accusation.

I will state, very briefly, the steps by which, having proceeded so far, I determine the general import of that Supreme Rule of Human Action of which I have spoken. Having shewn, as I conceive, that, as a condition of such a Rule, Rights must exist among men, I find it is necessary, in order to proceed with my plan, to distinguish and classify these Rights. This, again, makes it necessary for me to distinguish and classify the main springs of that human action which these Rights are established to balance and control. I have attempted to point out the most powerful and universal of these springs of action. In doing this, I am not making any strange or novel attempt. I am doing what many others have done before me: and my view does not differ very much from that of some of my predecessors: of Dugald Stewart, for instance. I find that the main springs of action are the Appetites, Affections and Desires: but that the Appetites and Affections may, in their tendency and effect, be summed up and included in certain Desires of a more abstract and general kind; namely, the Desire of Bodily Safety and Wellbeing, the Desire of Having, the Desire of Family Society, and the Desire of Civil Society; and to these must be added, the Desire, or Need, of mutual Understanding: which, though rather a Need than a Desire, is, in its effects, so powerful that we must give it a place coordinate with the others. These five Springs of Action may be considered as occupying a primary place in man's nature. Other Desires exist, but they may be looked upon as only collateral to these. Now each of these Springs of Action is kept under control, as we have seen that somehow it must be, by a corresponding form of Rights; and thus we have five kinds of Rights: — Rights of the Person to immunity from violence: Rights of Property; Rights -87- of Family; Rights of Civil Authority; and Rights of Contract. These five Classes of Rights appear to me to be distinct from each other; and, taken altogether, to include the whole field of ordinary Jurisprudence, or as we may term it, taking the simpler Latin name, Jus. Each of these kinds of Rights is the source of jural precepts or commands: Do no violence: Do not steal: Do not commit adultery: Do not disobey authority: Do not break a contract. These primary jural commands have each of them a number of accompanying ones, forbidding other forms of the like offences: but these, as primary laws, appear to me to extend over the main field of human action, so far as it is defined by Law.

But I have already said, while Law deals only with external action, Morality, of which Law is a part, has to do with the internal Springs of Action; — with intention, affection, and desire. And as violation of any of the above jural commands is a Wrong in the eye of Law, so the intentions and desires which lead or tend to such violation must be wrong in the eye of the Moralist. And, therefore, to each of these jural commands, there must be a moral precept, or a line of moral precepts, corresponding. Behind and above each of the Obligations, there must be a Duty.

Thus the jural command, do no violence, points to the moral precept, bear no malice.

The jural command, do not steal, points to the moral precept, do not seek what is another's.

The jural command, do not break your contract, points to the moral command, do not deceive.

The jural command, do not commit adultery, points to the moral precept, do not desire her who is another's.

The jural command, do not disobey authority, points to the moral precept, do not desire to break the Law. -88-

And thus, we have five classes of actions from which the moral law warns us: — Five things which are wrong; — Five points from which Morality tends, — Malice, Injustice, Fraud, Lust, Lawbreaking.

I do not know whether anything in this statement appears to you doubtful or insecure: but at any rate, I hope that what I say is simple and intelligible. I express it barely, without any attempt at ornament or variety, that you may see, as plainly as I can enable you to do, the real import of what I am saying.

I hope, too, now, that you will not accuse me of making Morality depend upon Law: since you again see that I use laws, not as the ground, but only as the indication of the position of what I seek. It is not the foundation of my house, but only a guidepost, a long way off it, which points towards it. And if you allow that this is the case so far, you must acquit me of the accusation altogether. For I have now done with Law. I have made all the use of it I intended or intend, in the establishment of my doctrines. I have found five classes of Wrongs, I have hence been led to see five classes of actions which are wrong. I am already on the road to my object: — out of the domain of Law, and in the province of Morality. Let us see if we cannot advance onwards.

Five classes of moral Precepts: Bear no malice: Do not seek another's goods; Do not defraud; Do not lust; Do not break laws. Five points from which Morality tends: Malice, Injustice, Fraud, Lust, Lawbreaking. We are on our way to Morality, but we are yet but little advanced on the way. We must get beyond these negative precepts, — these points of repulsion. We must know what we are to do, as well as what we are not to do. We must discover what Morality tends to, as well as what it tends from. This is our problem. Let us try to make another step. -89-

Let us look at the things that Morality tends from, and see whether there be not, in these, something which points out what she tends to. There must be some antithesis in this case: and an antithesis which is perhaps not very difficult to discover. If Morality, — if this supreme Rule of action, tends from Malice, from 111 Will, it must, it would seem, tend towards Good Will, towards Benevolence. If it tend from Injustice, it must tend towards Justice. If it tend from Fraud and Falsehood, it must tend towards Truth. If it tend from Impure Desires, it must tend towards Purity of the Desires. If it tend from Lawbreaking, it must tend towards Lawkeeping and Social Order.

Here, then, we have, it would seem, made a great advance. We have made our way to five points which are much nearer the spot we seek, than those former five points: to Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order. The converging lines of morality, so widely spread before, are here brought near to each other. The Supreme Rule appears to be within our reach. Indeed may we not say, that we have already expressed it? Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; — surely these constitute the Supreme Rule. The Rule of Human Action is expressed by saying Be benevolent, be just, be true, be pure, be orderly. To be this in our actions, is to act rightly.

We have then, at least in an approximate form, what we sought. From the assumption, or rather from the evident truth, that there is a Supreme Rule, we have determined what the Rule is. And the steps of our deduction are few and simple. The truth, that there is a Supreme Rule, is implied in the term right. The necessity of realizing, in human society, some results and portions of this Rule, gives rise to Rights. By considering what these Rights really established among men are, we obtain glimpses and indications of the general character of what is right: and -90- these indications, though faint and distant shadows of the Idea of Rightness, may yet serve to direct and guide us to that Idea. For in making use of this guidance, we have this advantage, that we know in what direction we are to proceed. In going from Law to Morality, we know that we are to go from outward to inward acts; from doing and having, to intending and desiring; from words and motions, to thoughts and feelings. It is these internal acts, which Morality requires to be right; and knowing that this is the relation of Law and Morality, we can see that, while Law forbids Violence, Theft, Fraud, Adultery and Rebellion, the Morality to which Law points, however blindly and distantly, must be a Morality in which reside Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order.

Such is the Supreme Rule of Human Action: and thus is it collected from the meaning which we imply in the term right: from the classes of Rights which exist among men: and from the necessary universality of the Supreme Rule, which must extend to all parts of man's nature; — to his internal being, as well as to his external doing. And having thus arrived at the Supreme Rule, I do not suppose that its import can appear to any one otherwise than natural and familiar. We have been led to it by our classifications of Springs of Action, and of Social Rights: and I do not know that the Rule has commonly been presented in this form: but the import has nothing in it but what you have often heard. "Be kind, be just, be true, be pure, be orderly"; — these are the commands of the most common and everyday Morality; — the Morality of friendly counsel and paternal injunction. And this scheme of Morality is not only familiar, but, I think, tolerably complete. When we have enumerated these five virtues, — Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order, — I think it will be found difficult to add any other which can fitly stand as coordinates with -91- these; or which is not, for the most part, included in them.

How far this is the case, you will better judge when you examine the scheme of special Duties which we may derive from those five general Duties: but "if this be so, — if these Virtues do thus, in their combined extent, occupy the whole field of Morality, — we may, for the sake of distinction, call them our Cardinal Virtues. And we may the more readily adopt this term for our purpose, inasmuch as the ancient scheme of the four Cardinal Virtues, and the modern versions of it, are quite useless for the purposes of Morality. Justice, Temperance, Fortitude and Prudence, the old heads of the family of Virtues, give us a division which fails altogether: since the parts are not distinct, and the whole is not complete. The portions of Morality, so laid out, both overlap one another, or are undistinguishable: and also, leave parts of the subject which do not appear in the distribution at all. How shapeless is the moral system thus produced, we may see in Cicero's Offices, and other works: and we cannot wonder at this defect, when we trace the history of these Cardinal Virtues: — when we see how necessarily incomplete the scheme was at first, on account of the nature of the speculations out of which it arose: and how its first form has been misunderstood and misrepresented, in subsequent systems of Morality.

But you may say, perhaps, that these five names of Virtue help us little to be virtuous: — that whether we have that old quaternion, or our new circle of five, placed at the head of our Morality, is a matter of small consequence, in making us moral: — that these precepts: " be kind: be just: be true: be pure: be orderly:" are no doubt right and wise, but they are also vague and ineffective. You will ask, perhaps, how we are to profit by them; — how -92- we are to discover their import in particular cases: — how we are to learn what it is, to be just, to be pure, and the like. You may say that except we can learn this, our Rule is no Rule: — our solution of the Problem fails: — we have all still to do. You will enquire where we are to get such help as will make this Rule significant: — as will give to our result a real value.

Undoubtedly these are the next enquiries to which we are driven; — What it is to be just, to be true, and the like. And these are enquiries to which we shall proceed. But because we have to make these enquiries in particular cases, it does not follow that we have yet made no progress in our original enquiry. It is something, to have the enquiry put into a new and more especial form; — to have the question, What is right? resolved into these other questions, What is just? What is true? and the like: and this is so especially, if the new questions be really a complete and consistent distribution of the original question. And that this is a step in the enquiry, we are confirmed in believing, by finding that such a resolution of the enquiry into parts, agrees with the course which men follow, when they wish to ascertain whether actions be right. To show that they are such actions as Justice or as Truth require, is that which they attempt to do, in their moral examination of their own and other men's actions: and if we can frame a system of which the reasonings fall in with, follow, and complete, the spontaneous course of their moral reasonings, we shall have such a system as I, from the first, declared to you we ought to seek to form.

And if we turn to these questions, What is Benevolence? What is Justice? What is Truth? And what do they require in particular cases, so that they may be consistent with themselves? we have no ground, in our course of proceeding, for deeming the questions hopeless: — nor do -93- we fail to find some indications of the nature of their solution, in the previous part of our progress. We have already been led to doctrines which may afford us assistance in this new part of our task. For instance: — if our question be, What is required, in any particular case, by Truth? meaning thereby, of course, Truth in the person who has to act: — Subjective Truth, as it is called: — Truthfulness, or Veracity? this question naturally leads us to turn back in our thoughts, and consider how this idea of Truth enters into our system. And we then recollect that we found, among the Desires and Needs of man, the Desire, or rather the Need, of a mutual understanding with other men, which we must have, so that we may depend upon their actions, and they upon us. Without such an understanding, it is easy to see, and to show, that no moral, nor indeed human society, could subsist. This mutual understanding is established by the use of Language: and in some cases, the Law enforces . this understanding, making the fulfilment of it a Right on one side, and an Obligation on the other; — namely, in Contracts. But this Right of Contract, although, being a Right, it is a result of the Supreme Rule of Human Actions, is only the jural result of that Rule. The moral result of the Rule, followed in the same line, must go much further, much deeper. It must forbid, not only breach of contract, which the Law forbids, but every violation whatever of that mutual understanding of men which is the origin of the jural Rule: and even every intention to violate it. The Moral Rule will forbid, not only breach of contract, but simple breach of promise, fraud, deceit, lies, and falsehood in every form. These are the results of the establishment of Truth as part of our Supreme Rule. These are the Duties which belong to Truth. We have already, here, as you see, a part, and not a small part, of a System -94- of Morality, so far as we give that name to moral Rules of action.

And we may follow out and define these Rules still further. For example: in the case just referred to, — the Duties of Truth. I am to do what I have promised: I am to tell no lie. But though all grant this in general, difficulties often occur in particular cases. Language is indefinite often, often ambiguous. Circumstances are complex: — some of them are overlooked or forgotten, when we promise, or when we narrate or assert: some of them change unexpectedly: some are mistaken. Hence, it may often become a question, What have I promised? Is what I have said a lie? — How are we to answer such questions? For an answer to them is plainly necessary, to complete our Rules of Action.

Here, again, we shall find guidance in the course of deduction by which we have been led so far. What have I promised? The words I used were ambiguous. I employed them in one sense. You, to whom I uttered them, received them in another. Which of these, or what, is the sense in which the Rule applies to them; — that promises are to be performed by him who makes them? Let us look back. The promise was an example of the establishment of that mutual understanding which is a universal need of mankind. It is, then, as a mutual understanding, that the promise is to be viewed. What we two in common understand by the words, — that it is which I have promised, and must perform: — not, that which I meant, and which you did not suppose me to mean, but what you understood; — not that which you understood, but which I could not suppose you to understand: but the mutual understanding: — that which I understood you to understand. This, then, it thus appears from our principles, is the rule of interpretation of promise?. It is, as you know, the -95- Rule commonly given by Moralists: — by Paley, for instance. It is the rule of the common sense of mankind: and it follows, as you see, from the views to which we have been led, and the course of reasoning which we have pursued. Do not let us be reproached, then, with a barren and unprofitable treatment of our subject, which makes no progress, and leads only to truisms and identical propositions. It leads to such propositions as have always had a place, both in the moral systems of philosophers, and in the morality of common life; and if it give, as I trust it will be found to give, its due place and bearing to each of these propositions: — if it arrange in an orderly shape, and refer to first principles, those reasons for such propositions, which men in general accept as satisfactory, and as the true reasons: it is such a system as I seek, and such, I hope, as you will approve.

It would be easy to give other instances of the application of our mode of dealing with Moral questions; and especially, questions concerning Duties of Truth. For instance; take a common question: — May I tell a lie to preserve my secret? I am the author of an anonymous work, — Junius, Waverley, an article in a Review: — it is important to me to remain unknown as the author. I am asked if I am the author: or I am charged with being so. Am I compelled to confess? am I allowed to deny? To this I reply negatively to both enquiries. I am not compelled to confess: but I am not allowed to deny. I am not allowed, by the Rules of Morality, to say what is not true, because to tell the truth is inconvenient or disagreeable. The Rule of Truth, the Conception of Truth, admits of no such exception. The Rule cannot be, Never tell a lie except when to tell the Truth is inconvenient or disagreeable to you. Such a Rule would destroy the very nature of Truth. -96- It is not what we mean by Truth. It is a rejection of the universal understanding which prevails among mankind. It is using words in a sense in which I know mankind do not understand me to use them. I may not, therefore, deny. I may not say No, when they ask me if it is so. But must I say Yes? must I confess? By no means. I am under no such necessity. I may be silent. I may refuse to answer. I may put aside the enquiry. You say that this would be really to confess, or at least to disclose the truth; that it would be so interpreted: and that I am, in this way, robbed of my secret. I reply, that whether my answer is understood as a disclosure, must depend upon the skill with which I frame it, and put the question by: but that if it is so understood, that is a necessary consequence of writing an anonymous book, and then associating on familiar terms with acute and inquisitive friends. If I am not a match for them in the light skirmish of colloquial attack and defence, I had better keep out of their way, when I am laden with such a secret. To say that I may lie, in order that I may not be robbed of my secret, is to say that I may preserve an unrecognized possession by violating recognized rules. It is as if I should claim, as my own property, a field which other people look upon as common, and protect myself in it, not by a visible fence, but by invisible pitfalls.

I have followed these views somewhat into detail, not on account of the importance of the question which I have referred to, but to shew that those views lead us into details, and give us solutions of little questions, as well as of great ones, — guidance in the lesser morals, as well as the larger. The question I have last considered is a very inadequate specimen of the great questions with which Morality is most concerned; — but Morality, if it be complete and systematic, must also extend to and solve such questions as this. -97- Whenever the question. What is my Duty? can be asked, our Morality ought to be able to give an answer; or at least, to point out in what direction we are to look for an answer, and on what kind of principles it must depend. And I hope you see that our System complies with the conditions of a System, in doing this for us;— in giving us counsel and direction in such a case.

Cases of the inquiry, What is our Duty? such as that which I have just discussed, are called Cases of Conscience: for Conscience is the Faculty, whether real or acquired, however formed and improved, by which we judge what is our Duty; and to instruct the Conscience, so that it may rightly answer such questions of Duty, is the business of the Moralist. To pronounce upon such Cases of Conscience, has long been a leading part of the scheme of Moral Systems, and has been termed Casuistry. Yet this subject, of Cases of Conscience, and this term Casuistry, have often been looked upon, by those who think of such matters lightly and loosely, with suspicion and dislike, as if such discussions had really an immoral tendency. The poet speaks of

Morality by her false guardians drawn,
Chicane in furs, and Casuistry in lawn.

This result has arisen, I think, from this cause: — that in many cases, those who were interested in such questions did not simply ask the question, but wished to wrest the answer to one side: — they did not merely want to hear what was their Duty, but to find that their Duty was consistent with their inclination: — they did not ask what they ought to do, but what was allowable: — as in the case which I mentioned, it was asked, whether it be allowable to tell a lie in order to guard a secret. I think that this disposition of the interrogators has tended to bring Casuistry into disrepute: — and justly, if the Moralist, in his reply, has ever lent himself to -98- indulge this disposition, and has moulded his response so as to gratify his client. But this is no fault of Morality. So far as any one has done this, he has not been a true Moralist: he has been a bad Casuist. The true Moralist answers all such questions according to the form I have referred to: You ought to do this: Here lies your path of Duty. He does not willingly adventure himself into the region of things allowable. He is constantly employed in narrowing that region. He is constantly discovering reasons why things, at first seen as indifferent, are right or wrong. As his light increases, all things take a moral colour. And by this light he answers Cases of Conscience, that is, Questions of Duty. It appears to me that such light is best obtained by proceeding as we have done: — by going to the central Ideas of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order, and by tracing where their rays fall. But whether a Moralist adopts this course or any other, he must, somehow, attain a light for this purpose. He must be able to answer Questions of Duty. He must have some method of solving Cases of Conscience. When a man, wishing to do right, and labouring in the agony of a struggle of apparently conflicting Duties, asks the Moralist, what he ought to do: it will not suffice that the Moralist should tell him that Cases of Conscience are mischievous and corrupting things: — that they arise out of some sinister influence, some vicious propensity lurking in the heart. This may be so: but this, uttered in general terms, with whatever vivacity of imagery and vehemence of manner, does not help the poor enquirer in the particular case. He wants to learn which is the sinister side of the question: which is the worse and which the better way. If the Moralist cannot tell him this, how is he a Moralist? or what is the value and application of his speculations?

Do I then mean that the Moralist is to have, his collection -99- of numbered Questions, and his ready-made answer to each? — that he is to give his replies, — Under such circumstances, you must do this: under such other circumstances, thus otherwise? Is this the amount of our Morality? Very far different indeed is it. Our replies to moral enquiries cannot be merely, You must do thus and thus. We know well,— our whole scheme is derived from our knowing, — that doing is but a small part of Morality: — that what we do, is but the outgrowth of what we intend, and desire, and are: and that in these, the essence of Morality consists. Our replies to questions as to what men must do, will necessarily take this aspect:— They must do that which will tend to make their moral being most truly moral. They must do that which will most tend to fix and fasten in their hearts Operative Principles of Benevolence, of Justice, of Truth, of Purity, of Order. What they must do, must depend upon their internal being, as well as upon their external circumstances. What they must do, will not be the same for all; for all are not at the same point of moral progress. What men must do, will indeed be governed by general Rules, because the Supreme Rule is the same for all: but the terms in which the results of this Rule are expressed, will have a different significance in the cases of different persons. The same light of heaven is requisite for the development of every flower; but yet how different are the colours and the shades which it assumes, as it works in the living veins of one flower and another!

This, then, is our Casuistry. In giving this slight indication of its character, I have used several phrases which may seem to point at matters lying beyond that field over which I have travelled in the previous part of these lectures, and which really do so point. But those phrases have not been used at random. The notions to which I have thus rapidly referred have not been brought in idly and loosely, to fill a -100- place in a sentence. This Limitation of Things Allowable: — these Conceptions of Moral Progress, and of Operative Principles of Truth, Purity, and the like, which are constantly to be cultivated and fostered in our hearts: — these are parts of the System. Some of you may be aware that they are: all, I think, will see that they may be so, in full consistency with the course which we have been following.

I trust then that I have, in this rapid view, made it apparent, that the method which I have pursued does lead, in succession, to the conviction that there is a Supreme Rule of Human Actions: to the perception of the nature of this Rule: the determination of its elements: the deduction of its results in particular cases: the solution of questions of Duty in a manner, which though definite, is truly moral. If you find that our System does this, still conforming to those characters which, in the outset, I pointed out, as the conditions of a satisfactory system, you will perhaps have something not without its value; but at any rate, you will have that which it was my hope and ambition to bring before you.

Lecture V. Law and Morality

In my last Lecture, I gave a rapid view of the course which my speculations followed, in framing a System of Morality, and of the general aspect of the System thus resulting. As I then said, the fundamental notion of Morality is that it is the Doctrine of actions as right and wrong. But to speak of actions as right, implies the actual and legal establishment of Rights among men. This leads us to the Doctrine of Rights and Wrongs. And without going into the details of that Doctrine, we see, from its general classification of Rights, what must be the shape of a portion of Morality, for Law is a portion of Morality. But we know that Morality must go far beyond Law, and must do this in an inward direction. It must go to virtues of the heart, as well as actions of the .hand. And thus we are led to see that Morality must have, for its elements, these Virtues, — Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order. These are the component parts of that Supreme Rule of Action, of which, from the first, we saw the necessity, and of which we wished to determine the substance.

One step of the process by which we arrived at the Rule of Human Action was, as I have just intimated, that Rights, and Obligations, the correlatives of Rights, necessarily exist among men: and that these are of five kinds, Rights of the Person, of Property, of Contract, of Family, and of Civil Condition. The course of our Moral speculations requires us to assume so much as this, of the Doctrine -102- of Rights and Obligations: — so much, and no more. But though no more be necessary for us, I have, in the Elements of Morality, to which I have already referred, pursued the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations a good deal further. I have traced many of the subordinate classifications and definitions of Rights, according to the laws which have actually existed among men: especially according to two schemes of Law; — the universal Law of the ancient world, and the actual Law of our own country: — the Roman, and the English Law. I have done this, because, legal Definitions being a necessary condition in the determination of the moral qualities of actions, it appeared desirable to give a considerable number of examples of such Definitions; and also, because though this Doctrine of Rights and Obligations, Jus or Jurisprudence, is a part of Morality, it is a part of a distinct character from the rest; and a part which it is very necessary for the Moralist to keep separate from the higher provinces of Morality. This separation has often been neglected, and great confusion thereby caused: as when Moralists have mixed together the discussion of the Legal Rules concerning the Obligation and Interpretation of Contracts, and the Moral Rules concerning the Duties of Truth, or the results of such Rules in special cases. This mixture and confusion I wished to avoid: and as in the course of our determination of Rules, Jus necessarily comes before Morality, I treated those jural, before I treated properly moral questions. But no one, looking with any care at the course of my reasoning could find any ground for asserting that I have, in this way, made my Morality depend upon the details of Law: — upon the decisions of judges and praetors; — the sentences of Roman Tribunals and English Courts. That this is not the case, the very structure of my book, if I may be excused an instant for referring to it in detail, most evidently shews. -103- For though, after establishing certain general principles in the First Book, I treat, in the Second, of Roman and English Jurisprudence, for the reasons which I have mentioned: yet when, in the Third Book, I proceed to Morality, and establish the Rule of Human Action which I have stated: the Second Book is no further made the foundation of this Rule than that, in a single Article (229), the five Classes of Obligations are referred to, and it is inferred, from the known and necessary relation of Law and Morality, that there must be five Classes of Duties, corresponding to those Classes of Obligations. In no instance are the special Maxims of Law referred to in determining our Duties, except in a few cases to suggest the limitations of Duty; as (409) the Law which does not permit us to kill the diurnal thief, or the flying robber, is referred to for the purpose of showing that moderate danger does not justify acts of violence and blood: and the inference is, not that Morality is to be guided by Law, but that, if Law require so much of moderation and humanity, Morality must require much more. And this is the very principle of the reasoning by which we established our Moral Rule: namely, that Morality must be something far beyond Law: — something deeper, higher, wider, purer, brighter; — the precious metal of which law is a fragment of the rude ore: — the living tree of which law is the dried fruit.

There is one sense, indeed, in which Morality depends upon Law, according to our System; and just as much, according to every scheme of Morals that ever was recognized among men. Law supplies the definitions of some of the terms which Morality employs: and without these definitions, Moral Rules would be indefinite, unmeaning, and inapplicable. Morality says, You shall not seek another man's property: Law defines what is another man's property, and what is mine. Morality says, You shall not -104- desire her who is another's wife: Law determines whether she be his wife. Morality says, Willingly obey or wisely rule, according to your station in civil society: Law determines what your station is. In this way, certainly, our Moral precepts depend for their actual import upon Law. But I do not see how we can have any moral precepts which do not depend upon Law in this sense. To what purpose does Morality say to me, Do not desire the house, or the field, or the wife, or the authority, which is another's: if I am allowed to take out of the hands of the Law the decision of the matter, what or who is another's, and to determine it for myself, in some other way? I, certainly, do not pretend to make Morality independent of Law to this extent. Our Morality does not think it a degradation to listen to the voice of Law, when Law pronounces about matters which especially belong to her: — matters which no other voice can decide, and which must be decided. So far, we accept from Law the determination of certain fixed points in the external world of things, in order that, in the internal world of thought and will, there may be something to determine the direction which thought and will must take.

I cannot but think it strange that I should be accused (the accusation has been made) of making Law the basis of Morality in any other than this, the necessary and universally-allowed sense: for in my published work, I have repeatedly and laboriously, — I should have thought almost importunately, — explained this relation of Morality and Law. I will quote a few sentences that this may be apparent.

"460. Law deals with matters external and visible, such as Objects of desire, (Things,) and Actions, and thus creates Rights. Morality has to do with matters internal and invisible: with Desires and Intentions, as well as with Laws and Rights. Desires and Intentions cannot be defined or described in any way, without some reference to Things and -105- Actions: and therefore, cannot supply a basis of Morality independent of Law: and thus Morality, in the first place, is dependent upon Law. Rights afford the fixed points by which moral positions are determined. Rights also supply some of the principle forces by which the moral sentiments produce their effect. Law affords a support to the framework of society: but Law does not suffice for the social life of man, without Morality. Law and Morality coincide in their general form and outlines: but Law is stiff and hard: Morality of a more flexible, yet more pervadingly active nature. Law is the rigid skeleton, which Morality clothes with living flesh and acting muscles. Law supplies the fixed positions, on which the Machinery of Duty can rest, so as to move the world.

"461. But though Morality rests upon Law, Law is subject to the Authority of Morality: Law is the Basis of Morality, but yet Morality is the Standard of Law. Law is fixed for the moment, and Morality supposes its fixity: but Morality is a supreme and eternal Rule, which Law must recognize. Law must always attempt to conform to Morality. Thus, though the Law is, in the first instance, assumed to be fixed, and though its commands are accepted as absolute and peremptory; it is not to be considered as entirely and finally unchangeable. The commands of Law are themselves liable to be judged of, as good or bad. They, and their application in particular cases, may be morally wrong, as well as right."

I have spoken to the same effect when describing the relation of Law and Justice: (494, 495) and in other places.

And thus, I trust I have made it appear that though, in my order of proceeding, I pass through Law to Morality, I do not make Morality substantially depend upon Law. But here I may perhaps be met by an objection of an opposite kind: — that though I profess to be governed in my progress -106- by the classification of Law, I really am directed by other trains of thought: — that while I speak of being guided by Property, Contracts, and the like, to Justice, Truth, and the other forms of Virtue, I really knew my way to those points perfectly well without such guidance; and arrived at my object, by means of my previous knowledge, not by aid of the information derived from my guides. You tell us, it may be said, of the spectacles you have used, but nothing of the eyesight which made them available. How were you led, from the mere external arrangements of Property, to the elevated idea of a complete and universal Justice! How did the provisions and limitations of men with regard to the performance of Contracts conduct you to the idea of absolute and perfect Truth? Law alone could not do this for you. You must have had something within, not without, to tell you where to find what you were seeking. You had your Morality already in your mind, when you pretended to go abroad to seek it. It was a Moral Faculty of your own which enabled you to find Morality in Law, or to seem to do so. It was a Moral Sense which led you to your Pentad of Virtue: — your Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order.

To this I reply, that undoubtedly it was in virtue of my being a moral creature, capable of moral Ideas, that I proved those Ideas by such a course as I have described. Undoubtedly, it was in virtue of my having eyesight that I was enabled to use such spectacles. When a man speaks of visible things, he supposes it to be generally understood that he and his hearers can see. And when a man speaks of moral matters, he supposes that he and his hearers recognize a difference of right and wrong: this being a supreme and universal difference, as I said from the beginning: not growing out of human institutions, but out of which all human Law grows, and to which it tries to conform. If any one says, that to make such a supposition to proceed upon a -107- Moral Faculty, I offer no objection to such a form of expression. I have not found such phrases necessary in constructing my System: but any one may say, without my contradicting him, that it is in virtue of a Moral Faculty that I recognize, in the Laws of Property and Contracts, a manifestation of Justice and Truth; and that from these imperfect manifestations, to the perfect and complete Ideas of these qualities. I have all along said that Law only pointed my way, and did not go with me. For ought I know, it may be reasonable to say that a Moral Faculty was my unseen companion, which enabled me to see and interpret the external movements which I saw.

But if you were to say that I had already in my mind, when I began the speculations which have led to the System, the Pentad of Virtues of which I have spoken; — the fivefold division of Duties: I can only reply that I believe this not to be the case: and that, so far as my own knowledge of the course of my own thoughts may be trusted, I was led to this division of Duties by what I found to be a necessary division of Obligations when I gave my attention to the subject of Jurisprudence. I might perhaps refer to the recollection of some of you, who may have attended in former years, lectures in which I explained this my view of the distribution of Morality, as directed by the distribution of Rights, while the view was still new in my mind, and while it was yet incomplete. But I do not wish to insist upon this point with any tenacity. It is a matter of individual history, not essential to my plan. Let it only be allowed that my division of Duties into these five Classes, is a good systematic division, and that the Principle which I have, in my Elements, stated as the fundamental Express Principle specially belonging to each class, is a solid, indubitable moral Truth (which I think no thoughtful moralist will deny), and the rest of the System, the deduction of the modifications of these Duties, which -108- result by combination with each other, and with external circumstances, will proceed equally well: and will offer to you, I believe, doctrines and determinations of the kind which most moralists have professed to give; and which I, in common with them, think the proper business of a Systematic Morality.

The Express Moral Principles of which I have spoken, as the basis of Duties, are those which express, in an imperative form, the five Cardinal Virtues: namely, the Principle of Humanity, that Man is to be loved as Man: the Principle of Justice, that Each Man is to have his own: the Principle of Truth, that We must conform to the universal Understanding which the use of Language among men implies: the Principle of Purity, that the Lower Parts of our nature are to be governed by the Higher: and the Principle of Order, that We must obey positive Laws as the necessary conditions of Morality. I have, in a former Lecture, spoken of the degree and kind of the evidence of the first of these Express Principles; and the like remarks might be made upon the others. They commend themselves to our assent, in proportion as our moral nature is cultivated and educed: they become evident to us when we think and feel as really moral creatures. The perception of them may be obscured by the influence of the ferine part of our nature: — by savage rudeness, passion, partiality: but in proportion as the ferine element is subdued, and the human element brought out in its proper force, these Principles are accepted. When man judges as man and for man, he is enabled to see their full meaning: and with their meaning, their truth.

From these Principles — Express Principles, as I have been in the habit of calling them, to distinguish them from Benevolence, Justice and the rest, established as Operative Principles in our hearts, — we may deduce, as you will not have much difficulty in supposing, the greater part of our obvious Duties: and from the Duties, or along with them, -109- the Virtues, which are those habits of internal feeling or action from which the performance of Duties naturally proceeds; — that internal circulation of wholesome juices, by which are outwardly put forth blossoms and fruit. The list of Virtues to which we are thus led is not marked by anything original or striking. Our Virtues are those which are commonly so called. We make no pretensions to discover new Virtues. It is enough for us if we can arrange those which the lovers of Virtue have always in a convenient and orderly way; so that their connection with each other, their shades and combinations, may become apparent.

And perhaps the common and familiar names of Virtues, which are in everybody's mouth, may suggest to us that our list of the Principles from which we were to derive Duties and Virtues is imperfect. For instance, we all speak of Earnestness, Zeal, Energy in a good cause, as Virtuous. And yet perhaps these Virtues do not necessarily result from the five Principles already stated, nor from any combination of them. For Zeal in its commonest shape, is rather at variance, than at one, with Benevolence; it takes the form rather of anger at the enemies, than of love of the friends, of what is right. And the Principle of Justice may be pure in us, and yet so feeble, as not to amount to shall not be satisfied, as Moralists, with a mere preference of what is just and right. We require an earnest love of it, and vigorous efforts to bring it into being; in short, we require Virtuous Zeal. This Virtue, and those which are connected with it, will find a place in our series, if we lay it down, as a moral postulate, not only that the Principles above stated, Benevolence, Justice, and the rest, shall exist, but that they shall be strong and vivid. And hence, I am led to assume among the necessary foundations of our Morality, what I have called the Principle of Earnestness: and what, as an Express Principle, I state, by saying that -110- The Affections and Intentions must not only be rightly directed, but energetic. Perhaps this Principle may seem to be so self-evident that it need not be stated. It would be taken for granted in our reasonings, even if it were not put into words. But it is precisely on this account that I state it: for I wish to put into words the moral Principles which are self-evident, and which we necessarily take for granted in moral reasonings. Be they Principles, or Postulates, or Axioms, or whatever you would prefer to call them, (which I have little concern about,) my plan requires me to state them, and this accordingly I have done.

But again: I believe the very thought of doing that to which I am now referring, is distasteful to some persons: — namely, making an enumeration or list of Virtues. They image to themselves the Moralist who does this, as a kind of dealer, who makes up his wares into different packets, and recommends them to his customers. They dislike language which seems to imply that Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Compassion, Meekness, Candour, and the like, are things that can be got hold of, once for all, and kept by us or in us. And indeed, if this really were intended or implied, they would be offended with very good reason. And it very much concerns us so to express ourselves, and so to construct our system, that it shall not labour under the defect of teaching any such doctrine, or conveying any such opinion, as this. It is very important for us to teach that we can possess virtues, only by being virtuous; and that to have been virtuous is not necessarily to be so: — that Virtue in general, and every virtue in particular, is a living thing, which is only while it grows: — that the current of Duty must flow from a perennial spring of right thoughts and affections and desires, of which no words can reach the bottom. And since we can act, not only upon external things, and upon other persons, but also upon ourselves, we have here, too, a sphere -111- of duty. We have it for our business to form within ourselves these springs of duty: or at least, if it is not ours to form them, we have to draw them forth, to encourage their flow, to carry their clearness further and further into the depths of our minds and hearts. We have to cultivate Virtues, as well as to perform Duties: — to become, and to be, as well as to do. It is this recognition of the Duty of Moral Culture, which will prevent our Virtue from being stagnant. We are not only to try to be benevolent and just and true and pure: but always to be more benevolent, more just, more true, more pure: to carry these qualities deeper and deeper into our hearts, so that they may more and more give their colour to our intentions, desires and affections. (See Elements of Morality, (300).)Thus only can we save our Morality from being of that rigid and contracted kind, which the expanding heart of man cannot bear; — of that stationary and finite extent, which the progressive soul of man soon leaves behind.

Since this must be so, — since our moral education must be continually going on, — since every action and occasion of action must be a step in this education, — all our means of action must be looked upon as instruments of this education. External things, possessions, condition, society, law, must be used as means of this moral education. All external goods, all objects of desire and affection, may thus acquire a value which of themselves, as merely objects of desire, they have not. They acquire a moral value. We call them goods when we speak of them as objects of our desire, but they are not therefore morally good. We desire food, wealth, pictures, music, but there is nothing moral in these desires. Yet these desires may be guided so as to become means of our moral education: — may, at any rate, be restrained so as not to be inconsistent with our moral progress: and this must be done, if we are to accept the guidance of Morality: — if we are -112- not to violate the Supreme Law of our nature. Painting and Music may be so enjoyed as to soften the affections, to refine and elevate the mind: at any rate they must not be so enjoyed as to corrupt the heart, and to dissipate all serious thought. The possession of wealth may be a discipline of internal justice. Each man may have his own. Each man desires his own, by a natural desire, in which there is nothing moral, any more than there is in hunger or thirst. But each man may also desire to possess his own, because he desires that all men should possess their own: and thus, the desire acquires a moral character. (See Elements of Morality, (307).) And except the love of wealth and the use of wealth tend to this character, it cannot enter as an element into our moral education, as these, along with all other desires and actions, ought to do. The love of equal and steady Laws, in the progress of man's moral culture, tends to supersede the love of the wealth which such laws give him. This is evident; for in a moral man, if it once appear that such laws give a portion of his wealth to another, the love of justice at once overcomes the love of riches, and he resigns without a struggle what he so possesses. And in order that this may be clearly brought into view, as a consequence of our Principles, I would place, among those Principles, this: — that all External things are to he desired as means to Moral Ends: and this I would call the Principle of Moral Purpose.

In my published Treatise (Elements, 271), meaning to express this by saying that Things are to be desired universally as means to Moral Ends, I have said: Things are to be sought only as means to Moral Ends. But this form of expression may occasion mistake, by seeming to imply that all desires of things for their own sake are to be suppressed. This certainly would be to make our Morality impossible: for we cannot exterminate our desires and affections and -113- appetites; — our love of food, and property, and friends. Nor does our Morality require us to do so. But it does require us to gratify our desires and affections and appetites in such a way, that not only the Rules of special Duties are not transgressed, but that these very gratifications may enter as fit elements into our Moral Education. As I have said (Elements, 433) "it does not appear that the ascetic [sic] course in which the mortification of the desires of the body is made a direct and primary object, is really well suited to the culture of men in general." Such a moderate: and legitimate gratification of natural desires as keeps the mind and body in healthful and cheerful activity, without allowing the desires themselves to occupy the thoughts, is a favourable condition of Moral Action, and hence, of Moral Education: and as I have stated (Elements, 433), we are to aim in our moral culture, not at the ascetic struggle, but at the Disciplined Spontaneity which follows this course without effort.

Perhaps I have already sufficiently illustrated the relation of Morality to Law: — namely, that Law is not the foundation of Morality, but an indication of its place and form; — not the groundwork, but the guidepost. In our Code, Law is a portion of the Letter, Morality is the whole of the Spirit. But there is an application of this view of the two which it appears to me to be sometimes convenient to make, and of which I will here say a word. Because Morality extends from acts, which are the subjects of Law, to intentions, affections, and desires, its own especial domains: the Duties which Morality points out have a much wider range and deeper root than the Obligations which Law enjoins. But yet the intentions, desires, and affections, derive their moral character from the act to which they tend. Hence to Obligations, there must be Duties corresponding, -114- though reaching much further into our being. The Obligations are superficial, but they may serve to mark the direction and position of the Duties: they are like buoys, which float on the surface, and mark the place of the anchor below. They are like some of the easiest words in an inscription which we are trying to decipher: the inscription speaks of things the most profound and abstract, but there are also terms which signify wood and stone, loaves and houses. If we succeed in discovering the key to this inscription, we probably find out, first, the meaning of these terms of common use: and these thus understood, confirm us in our belief that the alphabet and vocabulary which we have adopted are the true ones. And thus we hold that our moral alphabet and vocabulary are true, because according to them, the laws which have universally prevailed among mankind have a moral meaning. Our Duties, I have said (Elements, 279), give significance, — a moral significance, — to our Obligations: and we must have such Duties as shall give meaning to our legal Obligations. Our moral system must be such that the Obligations between men, acknowledged as binding by the law of all societies, shall correspond to Duties of the affections by which such men are bound according to their social relation.

Instead of saying that our Duties give significance to our Obligations, I might have said that our Duties find significance in our Obligations. Perhaps this would have been the more exact phrase, and you may adopt it, if you think that it better expresses the sense I have been explaining. I think the phrase I have used is more commonly employed in such cases. We speak familiarly of an alphabet which gives meaning to an inscription: yet we might, no doubt, speak of the alphabet being one which finds meaning in the inscription. The sense would be the same; and as I have said, in the case with which we are concerned, I have no -115- objection to any one preferring the latter expression. Certainly the moral meaning existed in the Laws before Moral Systems gave it. Moral Systems discern and arrange: they do not make the results of man's Moral nature, either in Laws or anywhere else. And I shall be quite content to say that we must have such Duties as find a moral significance in our Obligations.

But turn for a moment to another objection. I think you will understand that when I say we must have such Duties, I mean that we must have them in our Moral System; not that the reason I have assigned is the ground of the affections which such Duties regulate. The reason which I give is not the reason why we have such Affections, but why we recognize them as Duties. The Affections may be natural: but their being natural does not make them Duties. Filial Affection is natural: so is Revenge: but we call the former a Duty; we deny this name to the latter, in our system. Why do we do so? For this, among other reasons: that the Laws of all those countries where Law has made any progress, enjoin certain Obligations, certain mutual services between Parent and Child: — guidance and support, obedience and submission. We believe that these Laws are indications of man's true moral tendencies: — utterances of his moral faculty: and therefore we believe in and admit, as a part of our Moral System, a Duty which goes beyond the Law. When Law only says obey, Morality says honour thy father and thy mother. Do we thus make the Law the foundation of filial obedience and respect? Surely no person giving a reasonable degree of attention to what has been said, would be likely to make such an assertion. But the Law and the Duty are both results of man's moral nature, and we read in the one a summons to acknowledge the other: we read in it, not an explanation of Filial -116- Obedience as a physiological fact, but a commendation of Filial Obedience as a right habit of heart and mind.

But the habits of the heart and mind may be regarded also in other ways: and may in other ways, also, be proved to be right. Acts of obedience, respect, honour, love, like all other acts, may be elements in our moral education: and we ought to perform acts of this kind, which may tend to forward such an education. And in this consideration, we may find additional reasons for approving of some affections and disapproving of others, although both classes be alike natural. We approve of a man's love to his father: we condemn a feeling of revenge entertained towards his brother. Why do we do this? Revenge is as natural to man as the love of the members of his family. Yes: but we are not to content ourselves with our natural feelings. We are to cultivate and mould them so that they may tend to conform to Moral Conditions. We are to bring our affections into harmony with Benevolence and Justice. We are to seek, in the circumstances of our social position, the means of carrying on this purpose; — of constantly fostering what favours, of repressing what thwarts it. And we can easily discover some ways in which affection does thus tend to a coincidence with virtue. Love grows by loving. By bestowing its affection, the heart becomes affectionate. It is softened by a contact with the nearest objects. To love our brethren, is a step towards loving all mankind as brethren; a step which helps us to the next. We see then that family love, besides the recommendation of being natural, which taken simply, is not a moral recommendation, has the recommendation of being capable of forming a part of a moral progress which leads us towards that universal love to which Morality points as one of her cardinal objects. To love well the members of our especial family, is a good -117- way of learning to love all the members of the great human family.

In saying this, again, do I offer this universal benevolence as a consideration which is to lead us to the love of the members of our family: — of father or of brother I Plainly not. As I said before, it is not the reason why we love, but it is one of the reasons why we know our love to be a Duty, — a Virtue. The love of child to parent, of brother to brother, springs up in the heart spontaneously. We f do not plant it. But we do cherish it. And we do so, because we know, from such considerations as I have stated, that it has a moral value. Vindictive feelings spring up in the child's bosom spontaneously. But we do not cherish them. We repress the thought of vengeance between brother and brother, between man and man. Why? Because these tend to Violence, Malice, Wrath: the opposites of Benevolence. But you tell me that Revenge is a wild Justice: that its being natural shows that it has a rightful office in man's nature. I reply: — Take the Justice, and leave the Wildness. Resentful affections, I grant you, have a rightful office in man's nature. That office is, to give energy to the love of Justice. This is done, when such affections are no longer personal, but simply moral: when our swelling heart no longer impels us to the revenge of our own injury, but to the redress of all wrong: when resentment for offenses is absorbed in indignation against all injustice. This is the office of the angry affections; and in this direction, they are to be permitted and confirmed. Yet even in this direction, with caution: and ever with care that they do not overgrow the kindly affections: — that the fire of Zeal do not scorch up the dews of Love.

I do not think you will see, in this attempt to determine which of our natural Affections may be recognized as being also Duties, and which may not, any extravagant -118- asceticism, or unnatural coldness. This is, I think, a mode in which moralists have very commonly argued, and had their arguments assented to. "If a man do not love his brother, how shall he love a stranger whom he never saw!" This question does not sound very strange or novel. "Beware of nourishing resentment, for you are very likely to be a partial judge in your own case." This is not an unheard-of and preposterous warning. My fear might rather be, that a Morality which renders such reasons for its rules and arrangements, might be accused of being common-place: but, as I have already told you, that is an accusation which I am not at all careful to avoid: for it must often seem applicable to that kind of system of Morals which I should deem the best.

There is indeed another objection which might be made to a system of morals, such as I have described, which seems to include in its doctrines the common moral judgements of mankind. It might be said: You profess to frame a Moral System by reasonings from self-evident principles: and yet you bring, as supports to it, judgments of Legislators and Jurists and Moralists of all ages, and of mankind in general. You promised an independent Morality, and you give us a Morality dependent upon the general agreement of mankind. You described your doctrine beforehand as if it were to be scientific and demonstrative, and it turns out to be a mere assemblage of popular opinions and national customs. You spoke of your Morality as aiming at the rigorous form and clear evidence of Geometry, and it is, after all, only a collection of practical Rules of Mensuration, which are indeed current in different countries, but which may be right or may be wrong. What would be thought, the objector might ask, of a Geometer who should begin his treatise on his subject by telling us that "it is -119- generally allowed that an equilateral triangle is also equiangular": or that "we know, on the authority of Pythagoras, that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the squares on the two sides!" And is it not much the same procedure to begin to establish Moral propositions by referring to the universal customs of nations, or the authority of Roman and English jurists or moralists? Such an objection might, I think, naturally be alleged against our scheme, on the ground of the part which positive Law holds in the exposition of it. It might seem that though, as I have endeavoured to show, not based upon Law, it still adopts so much of actual Law and Custom and common Opinion, that it must in some measure be affected by the variableness and vagueness of those materials; and must fall far below its pretensions to exact reasoning.

To the objection thus urged we reply, that we take the opinions which we thus include among our doctrines, not as authorities, but as examples of moral doctrines. We look with a moral interest at the structure of the laws, the administration of justice, the expressions of moral judgments in all ages and countries, not considering these as necessarily, or as universally, entitled to our deference: but as specimens of the results of man's moral nature by comparing and weighing which, we, also having within us our share in the moral nature of man, are led to the perception of moral truth.

We do not accept with equal regard the laws of barbarous and civilized, of savage and of humane countries. We deem ourselves capable of judging what laws are barbarous and savage, what are wise and good; what contain a trace of the ferine nature, what lead to the truly human standard. We do not accept, as guides in our Morality, the laws and customs of countries where men devour their parents, or have their wives in common, or punish their -120- citizens with death or exile for the crime of being rich or wise or just. We can see that such laws do not point the way to Morality. We perceive that they are not pure results of our moral nature: and that we are not to frame our moral scheme so as to include such decrees. But laws which are the laws of long-enduring, tranquil, prosperous States, composed of thoughtful men: — States advancing continually in social comforts, art, culture, humanity; — these laws, or rather the principles which are involved in all such codes of law, and which we see to be necessarily involved in them: — these we do accept and adopt, as fundamental principles of Universal Morality. Will it be said that there is an arbitrary assumption, in thus making a difference between some nations and others, as savage and civilized: — in presuming that we are able to say when nations advance in culture and humanity I Undoubtedly there is an assumption in this, but not an arbitrary one. There is the assumption that there is, and that we can perceive, a difference between men and brutes; and that we can perceive when man in his social changes departs further from the condition of the brute, and approaches more nearly to the true condition of man. Brutes feel appetite, desire, affection, as well as man does; but brutes do not conceive Rules, — understand the abstract and general terms in which Rules are expressed: — discern the Ideas involved in such terms, in virtue of which we can connect Rule with Rule and Law with Principle; and as we find that men, in their social arrangement, have done this, we deem them to have acted truly as men, and we take them for our guides; or rather, we look upon them as men who went a little way, in a path in which it is our aim to go much further.

When we formerly spoke of taking certain fundamental Principles of Morality as self-evident, we spoke also of an -121- objection which might be made to this procedure, namely: — that our supposed self-evident Principles would not be self-evident to all men; would not be seen and granted to be true if we took a promiscuous jury to pronounce upon them. And we replied, that a promiscuous jury, taken, for instance, from savages, or from rude, or prejudiced, or thoughtless men, were not competent judges of Truth in this case, or in any case. Vox populi vox Dei, or Vox populi vox veritatis, must be held with some limitation. Vox populi feri is not vox veritatis. It would be more suitable to say, Vox humani generis vox veritatis. I cannot consent to refer the truth of moral principles to a jury of cannibals or kidnappers, voluptuaries or swindlers; but if you have a desire that we should follow this course of referring the matter to a jury, let us see if we cannot agree upon a jury who may be fit to try the cause. Where then shall we look for such jurors? Who are likely to be properly gifted and to be deferred to in what they pronounce? Who more likely, than the great lawgivers of peaceful nations? — men speaking in the name of their fellow-men, with the impression, we must suppose, of a weighty responsibility, as acting on the part of the nation, for the present and future generations; — seeking to secure to their citizens peace and the enjoyment of worldly goods at least, perhaps also aiming at higher objects, the social, moral, and intellectual culture, of their nation: — these, indeed, may be supposed worthy to form a jury who shall pronounce whether our fundamental moral principles are true and evident. And many too who come after these: judges, whose passions and prejudices naturally die away in the fine air of an elevated judicial position: — jurists, seeking in their closets the principles of right judicial decision; — moralists, tracing such principles still further into the nature of men:— of such men indeed, if you collect a jury, we may listen with some respect -122- to their sentence, as to what are universal principles of morality: — listening, even to them, with no slavish submission, as if they could make that to be true and right which in itself was not so: — but listening, in the confidence that their sentence would be true and right, and would correspond to the best and purest whisperings of the moral nature within us. Surely if you wish to refer the matter to a jury, you will be content with such a jury as this. They are men, as well as the first twelve you might take at Temple Bar, or at Timbuctoo [sic]: they are not promiscuous men indeed: that is, not men promiscuously mixed of brute and man: but true men: or, at least, men who have laboured and toiled, under favourable circumstances, to be true to their humanity. Do you then agree to go before such a jury? — Let it be so — But it is to such a jury as this, that I have all along been appealing. I have been referring the matter to legislators and judges and jurists: and I have been endeavouring, as well as I can, to extract from them a verdict, on the points in question. It seems to me that they pronounce on my side: — that they decide such fundamental Principles as mine to be true and universal Principles of Morality. But if any one thinks that their decision is otherwise, let him point out those sayings of theirs which he so interprets. Let him show us when he finds them contradicting either the truth, or the evidence, of these principles. If he cannot do this, surely I may presume that I have established my case, and that the jury to which we have agreed to refer have pronounced in favour of the principles on which our Morality is built.

But you will perhaps, say that, after all, this is not the way to get at self-evident principles: — that we are to see what is self-evident, not with the eyes of other people, but with our own: — that in Geometry, for instance, we do not take our axioms on the authority of the ancient Greeks, but -123- see them to be true for. ourselves: — that we do not extract them from Rules of Mensuration, but contemplate them in their native simplicity of form. That thus, our mode of obtaining our first principles shews that they are not self-evident.

To this I reply, that I require, in Morality as in Geometry (I hope I may without offense follow out the analogy which has been urged against me), I require that we should know our First Principles to be self-evident by seeing them to be so: — that I call in jurists, not to see self-evident Principles for us, but to fix our attention upon First Principles, that thus we steadily looking at them may see whether they are to us evident or not. I say, further, that this is the procedure which Geometry followed in its formation: — that though we do not take our axioms on the authority of the ancient Greek mathematicians, we take those which they have stated and we have assented to: some of them being far less immediately self-evident, than others which they have passed by: and this we do, because we can, by that means, build up, from our principles, systems of Truth, like those which they have transmitted to us, and taught us to admire, by the skill with which they have performed the like task. I say, moreover, that Geometry, — speculative Geometry, — was extracted from practical Land-Measuring. History informs us that this was so: — that the Geometry of the Greeks arose out of the Land-Measuring of the Egyptians. And this is of itself most likely: for in every subject, Practice comes historically before Theory; Art before Science. Man acts first by the guidance of his practical Reason, and afterwards unfolds his convictions before the eye of his speculative Reason: thus striving to discern the Truths on which his action depends, and the Ideas which it involves. He constructs Squares and Pyramids and Ellipses, directed by his practical Geometrical Faculty; and then, by the aid of -124- the same Faculty in a speculative form, he discovers the properties of Squares and Pyramids and Ellipses, and finds out demonstrations of these properties, and "resolves these demonstrations into their simplest shapes, till he makes them depend upon Axioms, which all are ready to acknowledge after a little reflection, but which no one saw the true place of before. These Axioms are assented to by all thoughtful persons: and to say that they are assented to by all who have steadily considered them, is one of the simplest ways of saying that they are self-evident. And in like manner, — if, as I have said, I may without offense illustrate a part of the possible progress of Morality by a reference to the progress of Geometry: — in like manner Morality begins with Practice: with Laws and Rules. It is an Art before it is a Science. It guides people in ordering and governing families and tribes and nations, before they construct ethical systems, and seek to analyze such systems into their elements. But this time, too, comes: the season comes for systems and principles, theories and analysis. Men had, by the help of their Practical Moral Faculty, constructed Codes and Tribunals, States and Constitutions: they now, by the aid of this Moral Faculty in a speculative application, try to discover the principles of Codes of Law, and Constitutions of States. They have already established Rights and Obligations: they have discerned that there are Duties and Moral Rules: they have approved men's Virtues and condemned their Vices: but they now wish to see what is the exact relation between Obligation and Duty: between Duty and Virtue: what is the most clear and coherent arrangement of Obligations; what of Duties; upon what Principles, what fundamental and comprehensive Truths, this coherence must depend: — Truths, implied in what they had before done: but still, needing to be brought into light that they may see what they are doing. And thus, they are led from jural -125- Rules to Moral Precepts: from Moral Precepts to Moral Principles; and from Principles to Principles, until they arrive at some on which they can build up a System of Morality.

If those Principles which I have stated can be made to answer this purpose, of affording a foundation for a coherent System, I hope what I have now said will satisfy you that in the mode by which I have been led to them, there is nothing contrary to the analogy of the most successful provinces of speculation in which the human mind has ever employed itself.

Lecture VI. Virtue, Happiness, Conscience, The Will of God

I hope that the lectures already delivered here have made it unnecessary to explain further the manner in which, according to our system, we are led to establish our moral Rules. We find that the recognition of a difference of right and wrong, which is the first step in Morality, implies a Supreme Rule of Human Action. We find that, in order that such a Rule may have validity, certain of its results must be vested in persons as Rights. These may be considered as fragmentary and external portions of the Supreme Rule: and from these, knowing that they are fragmentary and external, and possessing within ourselves the Faculty or Faculties of which these fragmentary Rules are the expressions, we are able to ascend to the complete and interior Rule, the general scheme of Morality. We found that this Rule might be constructed by the convergence of five elements. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order. These may be taken as our Cardinal Virtues, which, modified by external conditions, and by combination with each other, produce the other virtues; and which, manifested in act, appear as Duties.

In this mode of proceeding, we assume, or rather, we find the nature of man's mind to be such, that he must recognize a Supreme Rule of Action: and we assume too, or find, that external jural Laws are indications of internal moral Rules. These views of man may be called views of man's constitution; and the System of Morality so established -127- may be said to be founded upon the constitution of man.

It is perhaps sufficiently evident from the first, that the notion of actions absolutely right and wrong implies a Supreme Rule of Action: as the notion of actions relatively right and wrong implies subordinate Rules of action. That course of action is relatively right, which leads to its object; as to labour, is the right way to grow rick That course of action is absolutely right, which is right without mentioning the object; as when we say, "it is right to be honest." If we might use a geometrical illustration, we might say that rightness in the one case is direction, in the other, straightness. A southward direction is the right way to London: but a straight line is the right way wherever we go. And as Geometry begins her reasonings by asserting the necessary properties of a straight line, so our Morality begins her Reasonings by considering the necessary conditions of right action. And thus, we are led to Moral Rules which may be considered as derived from the nature of right action itself; — to a Morality growing out of an internal principle.

But Rules may also be expressed otherwise, namely, by the object to which they tend. All subordinate Rules are governed by their object: thus the Rule to labour is determined by its object, to grow rich. But is there any object which can properly be assigned to the Supreme Rule? Or are we unable, because it is the Supreme Rule, to describe it as having any object? as a straight line in general does not tend to any particular point. Our Supreme Rule of action is: Be benevolent, just, true, pure, and orderly: but what object are we to attain by being this? I have already said that if we are asked, why we should do what is right, it is a sufficient answer to say, because it is right: for rightness contains its own reason, as straightness -128- contains its own proof. But if any one ask to what object does right action tend, can we give no answer? Is there nothing in the circuit of men's desires or thoughts, no abstract or general notion, which can be mentioned as the object of right action?

It is not at all necessary for us, in our System, to discover or describe such an object. We have constructed our Rules without any reference to such an object. We have constructed them by considering that there must be Rules, with some other conditions. And therefore it is not requisite for the completeness of our System, nor for its application to special cases, that we should describe the Supreme Rule of human action, and, included in it, all other Rules, as having some object, external to the Rule, from which object it derives its direction and efficacy. That mode of expression is not necessary for the completeness of our System: but nevertheless it may be admissible, and even eligible, on other grounds. And if admissible, it may be eligible, perhaps, on this ground: — if such a mode of expression be very usual in the common language of men, and in the writings of a great many Moralists. For, as I have said, it is the aim of our Morality to express the Moral Truths which are universally acknowledged among men, in the most simple and familiar terms in which they are commonly expressed: only excluding from our language all ambiguity, laxity, and false assumption. If, then, there be, commonly current, any particular mode of expressing Moral Truths and Moral Rules, even if this be not necessarily a part of our scheme, we may still give it a place in our exposition; only taking care to show that it is not an essential element, and pointing out the bearing of this mode of expression upon those forms of expression which the System necessarily requires. Such an adoption and systematic interpretation of common language respecting -129- human actions and reasons of action, is, indeed, very desirable: for though a System of Morality may be complete without it, a Treatise of Morality could hardly be so. A book professing to be a Treatise on Morality could hardly be complete, if it excluded as insignificant or inadmissible a number of the most familiar and current modes of expressing Moral Propositions. As Moralists, it is our business to understand and explain such expressions. We may refuse to adopt them as the only, or as the best modes of expressing such Propositions. We may even deny their propriety, and may perceive that they involve false assumptions or erroneous analyses of human nature. But still, we must notice and examine them: — must point out their errors, or explain the relation of the popular to the systematic form of expressing the Truth. This, I say, it belongs to us, as Moralists, to do, in general: and this, in particular, if there be any popular mode of expression, or any one employed by special schools of writers on morals, in which mode of expression all Rules of human action, and the Supreme Rule especially, are spoken of as governed by and directed to an object.

Now there are such modes of expression. Certain schools of moralists use, and consider it very important to use, expressions of this kind: and expressions more or less resembling those of these schools, form a part of the popular language on moral subjects. What are these expressions? What is the universal object of human action? Why, according to these schools, are men to be benevolent, to be just, to be true, to be pure? What do such teachers assign as a reason for acting rightly, for which we require no reason? What is asserted by them to be the object of Virtue? What is it that is accepted, even by men following the common course of thought and language, as a -130- sufficient reason for our actions, as a solid ground for our Duties?

You will probably have already answered these questions in your own minds. — Happiness. Even according to common apprehension, it is a sufficient reason for us to act thus and thus, that we shall so promote our real and final Happiness: it is a sufficient ground for Virtue, that it is the basis of all human Happiness. And Moralists have arisen among ourselves who have made such expressions the keynotes of their system: — who have deduced all the Rules of human action from this one principle, that the pursuit of happiness is the universal and necessary spring of action; — who have represented Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order as means, directed towards Happiness as an end.

Shall we reject those popular modes of expression as false, because they are not necessary parts of our system I Shall we deny all the propositions asserted by other schools, because they are obtained by a process different from that which we follow? By no means: — I have already said, we must pursue a very different course from this. We must try to show, not that such propositions are false, but in what sense, with what explanation and expansion of the meaning of their terms, they are true. We must not contradict them, if they say the same things, or nearly the same things, in different language from ours; we must rather attempt to show how nearly they are the same things, and how their language is to be translated into ours. Happiness is, as I have said, their keynote: and if, in this key, the strains of their moral doctrine sound to our ears, harsh and somewhat out of tune; still if the music really be good, let us consider whether it may not be transposed into a sweeter and more harmonious key? -131- Happiness is to them all in all: what then must Happiness be, in order that they may so speak of it, without essential err our?

It seems to me that this attempt to find meaning and truth in other expressions and other Systems besides our own, is not unreasonable or unprofitable: and this attempt, therefore, I have made. I have asked, as I have just said, what Happiness must mean, in order that it may properly be said to be the object of all actions, and of all Rules of action, even of the Supreme Rule. This I have asked: and this is the answer I am led to give: — Since, all Rules of action having their corresponding objects, the Supreme Rule also has its object, this object must be the Supreme Object of human action. Happiness, then, which is the Object of the Supreme Rule, must be the Supreme Object of human action. And if in our notion of Happiness whatever also we include, we include this also, that it is sought as the Supreme Object of action, the expressions which I have noticed, that Duty and Virtue are means to Happiness as an end, though not such expressions as we should have chosen, are admissible; for, inasmuch as Duty and Virtue are conformable to the Supreme Rule, they must be means to the Supreme Object.

Happiness then is the Supreme or ultimate object of human action, including all other objects. And this I think falls in very exactly with the common notion of happiness. Men in general will assent to what we say, if we tell them that "To be happy includes or supersedes all other gratifications. If we are happy we do not miss that which we have not: if we are not happy, we want something more, whatever we have. The Desire of Happiness is the Supreme Desire. All other Desires, of Pleasure, Wealth, Power, Fame, are included in this and are subordinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate objects, but -132- we can do so only by identifying them with this. Happiness is our being's end and aim." (Elements of Morality, (544).) These expressions are merely echoes of the most usual and familiar language current among men.

Bearing this in mind, we can speak of Happiness, of the pursuit of Happiness, and of Moral Rules being the way to Happiness, in the same language which is used by the Moralists of common life, and even by the Moralists of those schools which make this word their badge. But because we thus willingly avoid useless wrangling about different modes of expressing the same truths, do we therefore accept the special doctrines, or follow the characteristic courses, of those schools? Surely not. The distinction is, surely, plain enough for any body to see, between assenting to their conclusions, and adopting their principles and reasonings. Men may come to right conclusions, setting out from the most absurd and extravagant assumptions; especially in a subject in which they have an inward practical conviction of what is right and true, acting as a natural guide, and correcting the vagaries of their artificial system. I believe this to be the case with almost all Moralists, in treating of their subject. There are not many Moral Teachers whose ultimate general results are not in a great measure agreeable to true Morality. We see that, however various and distant be the principles from which they set out, their paths gradually converge, and ultimately approach each other. That they agree in their final doctrines, is no proof at all that they are closely Connected in their initial assumptions.

In our System, we allow that Happiness is the ultimate end of human action; — the supreme point to which all Rules tend: — the object of Virtue. But we make no use of this declaration. It does not enter at all into the reasoning by which our Rules are established. In my -133- published Treatise, in which I have, I believe, put propositions in the order in which they are coherently deduced from each other, the consideration of Happiness does not enter, until Duties and Virtues have been fully discussed and disposed of. It comes at the end of all that relates to Morality in its most definite sense: and comes then, for the very purpose which I have now been explaining: — the purpose of illustrating the relation of our System to Systems which we do not follow. The word is discussed and explained, along with other terms, also describing objects of human action: as Pleasure, Interest, Utility, Expedience: and this discussion is accompanied by a statement of the difference between our System, and those which have these objects for their guiding points. And as the whole of our Scheme of Morality had been established in the preceding part of the book, and would have been as complete without this chapter as with it, it can be no fault of ours, if any one make such a confusion as to find, in the little which is said about Happiness, the basis of our whole System, and the evidence of its identity with those Systems which we reject.

But you will perhaps ask, Why do we reject the System which makes Happiness the basis of Morality? Accepting the conclusion, why do we reject the premises? If Happiness be the supreme object of human action, why should not men, why should not we, build our systems upon this truth, as their fundamental principle? What need of any other system, if the fundamental principle of this be true?

To this I reply, that the reason why I do not erect my Moral System upon the principle, that Happiness is the supreme object of human action, is, simply, that I cannot. I cannot, from that principle, obtain definite Rules of action, by any proofs which appear to me at all satisfactory -134- or intelligible. If I were to try to construct a System of Morality upon this principle, I must necessarily begin, in the first place, by such a definition, or measure, or analysis of Happiness, the object of action, as should lead me to determinate rules of action: and I can discover no such definition, measure, or analysis as shall put this in my power. I have no objection to any one else trying to do this: — trying to take a definition and analysis of Happiness such as shall, by just reasoning, lead to a coherent body of moral rules. I suppose everyone must allow that this is the proper course of proceeding, in order to frame a system on this basis: — that if our Morality is all to be extracted out of the principle that Happiness is the supreme object of human action, the leading term in this fundamental truth must be defined, or its meaning ascertained, in some secure way. And indeed the Moralists who have proceeded upon this principle, appear, by their mode of procedure, to have generally acknowledged the reasonableness of this expectation. They have usually begun by professing to give some account of what Happiness is, when they had to treat it as the proper guide of human life. But I am compelled to say that I do not find, in the results of their labours, anything which satisfies me that this course can be productive of any solid moral truth. We have, as I conceive, a most remarkable instance of failure in one of the most illustrious of the Moralists who have gone in this track: — an acute and able writer, if ever there was one: — our own Paley. He makes the pursuit of Happiness the basis of his system. He has, at the outset of his book, a chapter on Human Happiness, which seems to hold out a promise of telling us what, in his opinion, Happiness is. His account of it seems to me very incomplete. I think that a man might be very unhappy, although in the possession of all the elements of Happiness which Paley enumerates. I -135- think be would be so, for instance, if along with all these, be were labouring under remorse for some secret crime. But let that pass. How does Paley perform the next step? Having got his definition or analysis of Happiness, how does he use it? How does he make it answer the purpose of his undertaking? This question seems very natural. The reply to it seems to me very remarkable. Paley makes no use whatever of his own account of Happiness. He never once refers to it again. He talks about Happiness, indeed, very soon after. The word, occupies a prominent place in the next chapter. But it does not there derive its influence on his reasonings in any degree from the explanation he had just given of it. On the contrary: the use of it, in this chapter, is irreconcilable with the explanation he had given. He says, now, "Virtue is the doing good to mankind for the sake of everlasting Happiness." Here, his own previous exposition of the meaning of the word must go for nothing: for everlasting Happiness cannot consist in the prudent constitution of the habits, health, and tranquil nerves. Here, our account of Happiness would very well agree with his view: for of everlasting Happiness, we confidently say that it is, and ever should be, the supreme object of action, and therefore the guide of Virtue. But I think I speak with no unreasonable severity of criticism, — as I certainly speak with the most cordial reverence for the abilities of the writer, and the many striking merits of his work, — when I say that there is in such reasoning, or rather, such absence of reasoning, as this, nothing to lead us to think that a coherent System of Morality can be deduced from the principle that Happiness is the supreme object of human action. At any rate, as I have said, I cannot frame such a System, and therefore I have taken an opposite course. The term Happiness appears to me to be so entirely relative to our desires and affections, that it cannot regulate them. Men pursue -136- happiness as boys pursue the rainbow. But woe to him who makes the rainbow his guide! It is where he looks, and it flies as he pursues. Its place is governed by his own, and therefore cannot help to fix his position or direct his course. Our procedure, on the other hand, may, I think, be represented by the image of the process by which men determine the place of the magnetic pole. They observe the direction in which the needle points in various countries: they consider to what point all these directions converge; and though the place be distant and unseen, they can still make their calculations by their knowledge of this point of convergence, and so guide themselves aright on the surface of the earth.

And thus, comparing our system with those which are in any way based upon Happiness, we say (Elements of Morality, (552).) that "They seek to deduce the Rules of Action from a Supreme Object of Desire, whereas we have deduced them from a Supreme Rule of Action," determined, not by the objects of Desire, but by the conditions of a Rule. "They direct men to aim at Happiness, we direct them to aim at Acting Rightly:" and though we assent to them when they say that Rightness points to Happiness, we do not use this proposition in establishing our Rules.

Other Systems which determine Moral Rules by some general object, are still more evidently incomplete. For instance, if any one professes to deduce a system from the Utility of actions as the test of their being morally right, we ask, Utility for what? To be useful, an action must be useful for some purpose. What is the general object to which the utility of actions is referred I whatever this object be, that, and not Utility, is the Supreme Object in this System, and ought to be so stated. -137-

All systems which establish Moral Rules by their tendency to some external object; — Happiness, Utility, Pleasure, Interest, or whatever else; may be called Dependent, Systems, in contradistinction to those which deduce Moral Rules from the constitution of man, not, indeed, overlooking the objects of human desires, but not governing themselves by these: — such Systems may be termed Systems of Independent Morality: and you will perceive, from what I have said, that the System which I have laid before you, aspires to to be one of these.

The controversy between these two classes of Systems has gone on through ages, and has been one of the principal points of interest in the history of moral philosophy. Upon former occasions I have, in my lectures, traced the history of moral philosophy, in this point of view. Other writers also, in modern times, have divided moral philosophers into two opposite schools, and have traced the progress of each. In doing this, some, I think, have spoken of these two opposite schools as the Utilitarian and the Sentimental. The latter term, I cannot help thinking peculiarly inappropriate and indeed offensive. The word has, in modern times, been so generally used to a self-indulgent display of unregulated emotion, that we can no longer confine its meaning to the etymological sense. We are not allowed, by the common usage of English writers, to employ, in serious writing, a word in the sense which its derivation would give it, when it has already been appropriated to a different meaning. We are not allowed to call a man a physician, because he studies physics, or a methodist, because he treats of methods: and, for the same reason, we ought not to call a school of moralists sentimental, because they refer to an internal sentiment as the leading point in morality. But even if the word were not thus improper, it is utterly inappropriate to describe that school to which it is applied. Why should -138- Butler be called a sentimental moralist? Inasmuch as he professedly makes morality depend on the constitution of our nature, you might call him a constitutional moralist: but such a term, however descriptive, would not serve us in a division of schools. And what are we to say of the assertors of Immutable Morality, Cudworth and Clarke, and the like? Certainly, they are not of the utilitarian school, but with just as little propriety can they be reckoned as members of a "sentimental" school. Or if we turn to the ancient Moralists, Plato for instance, with what intelligible use of words, can we place him either in the utilitarian or the sentimental school?

The distinction which I have stated, that of the Independent and the Dependent School of Morality, is easily traced in the ancient, as well as the modern world. In Plato's Dialogues, the question is repeatedly discussed, whether the Rule of Action for man be the pursuit of pleasure and gain, or the internal harmony of his nature. You will, many of you, recollect the lively and dramatic dialogue at the beginning of "The Republic," in which the former of these opinions is asserted by one of the interlocutors, and the acute and decisive Socratic refutation which it encounters. You will recollect, too, that the doctrine of Independent Morality is announced in the most distinct terms at the close of the fourth book, as the result of the previous discussion. "Virtue, then, as we are thus led to see, is a health and beauty and wellbeing of the soul. Vice is a disease, and foulness, and infirmity." And when the original question is, at this point of the argument, again asked: — Whether it is better to be just or to be unjust, even if the injustice is to remain unknown by all and to meet with no punishment: — the person to whom the argument is addressed, and who is, by this time, brought to a conviction of the truth of the doctrine which it is the object of the -139- dialogue to inculcate, says, "Nay, Socrates, this question is now ridiculously superfluous." And in the ninth book, the discussion being really concluded, the speakers, playfully mimicking the practice of pronouncing, by the voice of a public crier, a solemn judgment upon the merit of a theatrical spectacle, agree to proclaim: — "The son of Aristo gives his judgment that the most virtuous and just is also the most happy, and the wicked and unjust the most unhappy:" and further, "that this is so, even if their deeds are hidden from all, men and gods."

I think there can be no question in applying to such doctrines as these, the term Independent Morality. Nor is there any difficulty in finding examples of schools of Dependent Morality among the ancient writers on Morals. All those who declare Pleasure to be the end of Human Action, as Epicurus and his followers, belong to this class: and they have had a numerous tribe of successors in modern times: who have however differed very widely in their doctrines, according to their various measures and analyses of pleasure.

But, it may be asked, in this division of Schools of Morality as Dependent and Independent, in which class are we to place the ancient Moralist whose writings have, perhaps, had the greatest influence of all? To which side do Aristotle's Treatises on Moral Subjects belong?

At first sight, it might appear as if he were to be classed with the assertors of Dependent Morality: for he begins his Treatise on Ethics with Happiness: — εὐδαιμονία' — and appears to intend to make the whole of his System depend upon his explanation of what Happiness is, and his analysis of it into its elements. And this does appear to me to be his intention: and this, in a great measure, he appears to have done. Do I then place him among the teachers of Dependent Morality? I do not: and for this reason: — He analyzes Happiness, as the first step of his discussion of -140- Morality, but this step forthwith throws him back upon the constitution of man, the peculiar ground of the opposite school. What is Happiness, he asks? It is not pleasure, nor honour, nor wealth, nor inactive virtue. Happiness, the Supreme Good of man, the necessary object of action, is, if we consider it carefully, found to be the active exercise of the soul in the way of virtue — τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀρετήν. [The function of a good man is "an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue or excellence." trans. by W.D. Ross (1925)] And thus, in order to determine what modes of action tend to this ultimate and supreme good, he has to consider what the active powers of the soul are: how they are related to each other: what are commonly called Virtues, and how these can be classified and arranged, limited and defined, so that they may form a coherent system. I think any one who carefully examines the Nicomachean Ethics, will see that a large portion of it is employed in discussing the import of the various terms which composed the moral vocabulary of the Greeks: and in pointing out how the application of those terms was to be regulated and bounded, in order that they might express true propositions in a consistent manner. That in the greater part of cases in which moral propositions come before us, we can, without the application of any peculiar principle, discern which are true and which are false, is, throughout, taken for granted. Aristotle's occupation, in the Ethics, is therefore in a great measure the same as that which in the outset of these lectures (Lect. ii.) I ascribed as a necessary part of our task: — namely, so to define and determine the significance of common moral terms, by means of their natural relation and connection, that they may express familiar moral truths, but in a more precise and steady manner than is commonly practised: — so that they shall convey the popular convictions, but without the vulgar laxity and vagueness. Take the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, in which Aristotle discusses the various senses in -141- which Justice and cognate terms are used; and the conditions which are implied in such usage. And I may mention, merely for the purpose of illustrating what I have said, of the agreement of our method to a certain extent with that of Aristotle, that in my published treatise on Morality, also, there is a chapter on Justice (the twenty-first Chapter of the Third Book), in which the same course is followed: and that this Chapter on Justice is followed by one upon Equity: as Aristotle's discussion of Δικαιοσὺνη is followed by a similar discussion of Έπιεικεί.

I place Aristotle, then, among the teachers of Independent Morality: although he has not asserted the doctrine so strongly as Plato has done: and although he begins by speaking of Happiness. For, as I have already said, the difference of the two schools of Morality is not whether they do or do not speak of Happiness: nor whether they do or do not allow happiness to be the supreme object of human action; but whether they do or do not establish their Moral Rules by their reference to some object considered as distinct from the human faculties themselves: be it called Pleasure, or Happiness, or Utility, or by whatever other name.

I may observe, too, that Aristotle, at the end of his Ethics, turns to the subject of the views which have been taken by other writers: and warns us of the dangerous consequences of rejecting too vehemently other ways than our own of expressing moral doctrines. He suggests that in a certain sense, and with a certain enlarged understanding of the phrase, we need not deny that Pleasure is a Good; — that those Moralists who make it their business to decry pleasure, run a chance of being disregarded, as unmeaning or hypocritical talkers: since all are moved by pleasure. But to follow this sound and reasonable advice, is quite a different thing from establishing our System of Morality upon the -142- foundation that Pleasure is not only a good, but is the chief and only good. And accordingly, this account of Pleasure and Happiness comes in the last Book of the Ethics, after the whole of the author's system has been expounded: as in like manner, and under like circumstances, I have inserted in my published work, at the end of the part concerning Morality, a chapter respecting Pleasure, Interest, Happiness, Utility, and Expedience: all of which are, by different persons, asserted to be the supreme ends of human action.

Turning now, for a moment, from the greatest philosophers of the ancient world, to the moral writers of modern times; those with whom we here are at present most familiar are Butler and Paley. Of these, Butler evidently belongs to the school of Independent Morality. He asserts that man has, among his active Principles or Springs of Action, a constitution, according to which some of those Principles have a natural authority over others: — Prudence over Appetite, for instance, and Conscience over Desire. His teaching agrees entirely with what I have said (Elements of Morality, 67) of Reason being our necessary guide: and (56) of the moral sentiments of Approbation and Disapprobation which are universally conjoined with our judgment of actions as right and wrong: and (359 — 364) of Conscience as the law of our nature. Butler's writings have been of the greatest value in preserving and restoring among us true views of Morality: but there are some expressions used by him, which, if not duly limited, may lead his followers into mistakes. Thus, he sometimes speaks, not only of the Authority, but of the Supremacy of Conscience. Now if by calling Conscience supreme, it were meant that the Principle so described is something possessing sovereign and original authority over man's other springs of action, this Principle would necessarily be the proper ground of Rules of action: -148- and all such Rules must be derived ultimately from this Principle. We should then, in order to frame Rules of Morality, or to decide any moral question, have to enquire how we can learn the decisions of Conscience on such subjects. Conscience is our guide: where are we to learn what she says? Conscience, the Law on the Heart, is supreme over all Laws: how are we to read this Law? Conscience is the test of right and wrong: but whose Conscience? for Conscience belongs to a person. As these questions cannot be answered in any satisfactory manner, so long as we ascribe to Conscience an original authority and separate existence among our Principles of Action, it has been found easy for the opponents of Independent Morality to embarrass and silence, and, as seems to me, to confute those who gave this representation of Butler's ethical views. The opponents have constantly said, "You tell us that Conscience is the proper guide of action; but whose Conscience? ours, or yours? Our Consciences point different ways; — can both be right? And if not both, how are we to know which?"

These are familiar and popular arguments; but they appear to me to be decisive against all who ascribe to Conscience a Supremacy, in the proper sense of the term: — namely, a sovereign and ultimate authority over all other Principles of action, so that when a decision is pronounced by Conscience, there is no further reason to be rendered for it, nor any higher decision to be sought. From those who take this view of Conscience, as an authority distinct, permanent, and ultimate, I think the opponents have a right to demand to have a clear and definite code of Moral Rules exhibited to them as the dictates of Conscience; and to be allowed to disprove the pretensions of this code, and thus to overthrow the theory of Independent Morality in this form. If Butler asserted the doctrine of Independent Morality in this sense, I think that we cannot maintain his -144- doctrine: nor work out, into a complete system, the specimens of his method of moral reasoning which he has given us, and which are very far from forming a System of Morality. But I think it is very plain that this was not Butler's view; — that he did not thus hold an original and independent Faculty of Conscience, whose decisions would form a permanent body of Moral Rules. I think that, with him, Conscience was not a body of truths, but a process by which Truth is to be obtained; — a Faculty, if you choose, but a Faculty which must be trained and exercised in order to be used: — which may be improved, instructed, and enlightened; — which may be blinded and perverted in individual men. Conscience is a Faculty of man, as Reason is a Faculty: — a Power by exercising which he may come to discern Truths, not a Repository of Truths already collected in a visible shape. Conscience, indeed, is the Reason, employed about questions of right and wrong, and accompanied with the sentiments of Approbation and Condemnation which, by the nature of man, cling inextricably to his apprehension of right and wrong. This is the view that we have been led to take of Conscience. This is, as I conceive, Butler's view also. That by Conscience, he does not mean any special independent Faculty, distinct from the Reason with its accompanying moral sentiments, is, I think, evident from the whole current of his language. He does not confine himself to the single term Conscience, in his account of the superior principle of our nature: on the contrary, he perpetually uses, for this term or with it, other terms, which give the same view of it which we have taken. He calls it "Reflection or Conscience, an Approbation of some principles or actions, and a Disapprobation of others"; — and again, "Reflex Approbation or Disapprobation": all the phrases which he employs manifestly point at a Principle or Faculty, not by which we necessarily have but by which we -145- may get, a true knowledge of the course which we ought to take under any given circumstances. We are, to use another of his phrases, "to act suitably to our whole nature, and especially to the higher and better part of our nature: "the constitution of human nature being such that there is in it a higher and better part. This higher and better part tells us that injustice is worse than pain: but it does not tell us what acts are unjust, except through the process of reflection. The notion of injustice is necessarily the object of disapprobation to the Conscience: but to unfold this notion of injustice into detail, so as to see what special acts are included in it, — this is the office of the Reflection, that is, of the Reason. We, in our system, have tried to see and to show by what operations of the Reason we may arrive at this special application of the general conceptions of injustice; and I conceive that if Butler had gone on to construct a System of Morality upon his own principles, he must have proceeded in something of the same manner. For instance, in his ninth Sermon, he makes it his object to prove that Revenge is unlawful, that is, immoral, and Forgiveness of Injuries, a Duty. But in order to do this, he does not refer to Conscience as a supreme internal guide, which directly tells us that this is so. And indeed with good grounds does he abstain from doing this; for the voice within, which seems at first to tell us that Revenge is a Duty, and Forgiveness a Weakness, is so loud and imperious, that it requires some care, some reflex habit and comprehensive thought, to distinguish that lower but better voice, which is really the teacher of Duty. We must employ our reason, in such a case, to instruct our Conscience; and this is what Butler does. He bids us to recollect "That mankind is a community, that we all stand in a relation to each other, that there is a public end and interest of society, which each -146- particular is obliged to promote;" and that "resentment must never be indulged or gratified for itself, by any one who considers mankind as a community or family, and himself as a member of it.(This, I may remark, is a ground on which I also have placed the Duties of Benevolence (Elements of Morality, 291), among which I might have enumerated Forgiveness of Injuries, as a Duty included in the Morality of Reason: although I have more distinctly spoken of it (599) in speaking of that Christian Morality by which this Duty is more emphatically enjoined.)

Again; as another mode of establishing the Duty of Forgiveness, he traces the general consequences which would follow if no such Duty were recognized. "Put the case then that the law of retaliation was universally received, and allowed as an innocent rule of life by all: and the observance of it thought by many (and then it would soon come to be thought by all) a point of honour: this supposes every man in private cases to pass sentence in his own cause; and likewise that anger or resentment is to be the judge. Thus from the numberless partialities which we all have for ourselves, every one would often think himself injured when he was not: and in most cases would represent an injury as much greater than it really is; the imagined dignity of the person offended would scarce ever fail to magnify the offense. And if bare retaliation, or returning just the mischief received always begets resentment in the person upon whom we retaliate, what would that excess do? Add to this that he likewise has his partialities — there is no going on to represent this scene of rage and madness: it is manifest there would be no bounds nor any end."

Another mode of reasoning which Butler employs in order to determine our Duty with regard to this feeling of Resentment is to consider the end for which this feeling was implanted in us; namely, as a prevention or remedy -147- to irregularity and disorder:* which he says, "plainly shews it ought never to be made use of but only in order to produce some greater good."

*I have also employed this consideration. Thus (Elements of Morality, 666), "That man was intended by God, or by Providence, to follow this or that course, if the intention be allowed, is universally accepted as proving it right that he should follow such course."

And thus, according to Butler, the mode of learning our Duties is not by referring directly and at once to any repository of them which we call Conscience, but by employing our Reason in the best manner we can, to discern the nature of man and the intention of God. That which we thus learn, is the dictate of Conscience. This is Conscience, — the Law written on the Heart. The Law is written there, but to read the writing is a matter, often at least, requiring a careful and continued study. And this being so, Conscience is no permanent body of Rules or ultimate Tribunal. Conscience, as I have said (Elements of Morality, 361), is the stage at which we have arrived in the Moral Culture of our minds: and cannot therefore be referred to as an Ultimate and Supreme Authority (368). I do not here dwell upon these points; for I have given this view of them more fully in the published work; in which also I have distinguished Conscience in the sense here spoken of, the Law of the Heart, from Conscience, the Witness of our own actions, and Conscience, the Accuser of our own crimes. By Conscience in these latter senses, that Law of the Heart really finds its application to the special cases which our own conduct supplies.

The Ethical Works of Butler, though valuable as a philosophical defense of Independent Morality, contain, as I have said, nothing but small and imperfect fragments of a System of Morality; and could not, I think, be made with any profit, the principal work on Morals in our university -148- studies. This place has of late been occupied by Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy: a work of the opposite school. Paley's work has the merits of great clearness and simplicity, and an idiomatic vivacity of manner which fastens its sentences upon the mind with an irresistible charm. But even if we were indifferent to the question between independent and dependent Morality, we ought not, I think, to be indifferent to the gross violation of connection and logic which is to be found in the beginning of the work, as I have already stated in speaking of his definition and use of the term Happiness.

Probably Paley's book obtained for the Rules of a moderate and equitable Morality more assent than, at that time, in that generation, any work constructed upon principles more really moral would have received. But at present I think there exists very generally, and especially among ourselves, a feeling of repugnance to the Principles on which Paley's system is constructed. I have in several places in my published work (550, 551, 555) attempted to shew that Paley's mode of expressing and reasoning about Moral Truths is not satisfactory: and I will not here pursue the subject.

I must notice one other view of the subject of Morality. I have spoken of the different ways in which the Rules of human action may be presented; namely, as the results of a Supreme Rule, or as modes of seeking a Supreme Object. But there is another way in which such Rules may be presented, and which it is important to notice, for a similar reason to that already alleged; — namely, because, though this mode of presenting Moral Rules does not exhibit the course of reasoning by which we have been led to them, it is nevertheless a truth of the deepest and most comprehensive kind, and one to which men's minds naturally and continually turn. -149- Our Moral Rules, our conceptions and convictions of Duty, are arrived at by the exercise of a Faculty or Faculties of our minds, which we have described as a combination of that Reason by which we see what is right, with that sentiment by which we approve of what is right. And whether or not this account of the Moral Faculties by which we are led to moral Rules be accepted: at any rate we are, in our mode of proceeding, led to moral Rules by such Faculties as we have. But, besides the subordination of means to ends, and of Rules to objects, by which we are led to a Supreme Rule, we are also necessarily led to regard all existing things and objects of thought in the light of effects and causes, and of a successive series of effects and causes. And this continued subordination of effects to causes, which causes are themselves the effects of other causes, leads us to the recognition of a Supreme Cause: — the Cause of all things that are, and of their being what they are. Our thoughts are thus led to God, the Supreme Cause of all: and, as included in this all, of man and his Faculties, whatever those are. God, the Supreme Cause to which our contemplations are irresistibly directed, is not merely a physical cause of natural things: but a cause, also, of man's personal being, of his social relations; of the powers by which he reflects upon his social relations: of the convictions he thus acquires: of the rules of action to which he is thus led: of his classification of actions as right and wrong: and of the moral sentiments which accompany this distinction of actions. He is not only the cause of man's physical, but of his moral nature, and of its being what it is. He is the Supreme Cause of Personality and Will in man: and is himself the Supreme Seat of Personality and Will. The Supreme Rule, thus regarded as an existing object of thought, is an effect of the Supreme Cause; — is an act of the Supreme Cause; — or, in other words, is the Will of God. The Supreme Rule, being the -150- act of the Supreme Cause, is identical with the Will of God. The Supreme Rule, considered as an object in a world of Effects and Causes produced by the Supreme Cause, is itself derived from the Supreme Cause: — is thus derived from the Will of God. But we have, in natural Morality, no means of learning the Will of God except that process of reason by which we are led to the Supreme Rule: and hence, for us, the Supreme Rule is not derived from the Will of God, but is identical with it. The Will of God is the cause of the Supreme Rule in the process of divine creation: but the Supreme Rule is the Will of God in the process of human reasoning. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Wisdom, in some degree or other, are possible attributes of man, because God has made man what he is: but Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Wisdom, in the highest degree, are necessary attributes of God, because they are the Supreme Rule of action, according to such conditions of action as we can alone conceive. We can say that God is benevolent, just, true, pure, wise, because it is by directing our thoughts in the direction in which these qualities point, that we fix our thoughts upon God.

To the expression, that Moral Rules depend upon the Will of God, it has been objected, that this makes Moral Rules arbitrary, and the Moral Attributes of the Deity unmeaning, since on this supposition, they merely express the identity of this Will with itself. But these objections do not touch us. For though we say that, as a work of creation, Moral Rules originate in the Will of God, the origin of all things; we say, too, that, as a process of manifestation, the Will of God is known by having Moral Rules. We know what is the Will of God, by knowing what is right. And when we apply to God the terms which describe moral qualities, we do so, in order to form, -151- or to approach to, however imperfectly we may be able to do this, some Idea of the Will and Personality which we must conceive to be conjoined with that Supreme and Central Causality of which the whole world, moral as well as natural, persons as well as things, is the effect.

I would avoid as much as possible the introduction of that great and awful name and Idea of the First and Supreme Cause of all things into discussions of a controversial character. But I have hoped that I might be allowed to refer to it so far as I have now done, in order to remove objections which might occur to men's minds, on seeing the Supreme Rule of Action presented as a result of the Supreme Cause; and thus, as it might appear, no longer Supreme. From what has been said, it will appear that it is Supreme in the series of rules and reasons, of means and ends; but not Supreme in the series of Effects and Causes.

But there is still another remark which it is important to make on this subject. The Supreme Rule of Human Action, as we have seen, must necessarily point to the Supreme object of human desire; namely, Happiness. Happiness must be the consequence of Right Action, or Virtue. But the Happiness of man, as well as his Moral Faculties, is the result of his being that which the Supreme Cause has made him; and the coincidence of Happiness and Virtue, if it exist, must exist in virtue of that Will which is combined with the Supreme Cause; — in virtue of the Will of God. And when we act with reference, in our thoughts, to the Supreme Object, Happiness, and with reference also, in our thoughts, to the Supreme Cause, we shall necessarily look upon these as connected and coincident: — shall look upon the Supreme Object as to be attained in ways appointed by the Supreme Cause: — shall look upon Happiness as to be sought -152- by conforming to the Will of God. But this, though a different mode of expression from that which we have commonly employed, is not at all at variance with the other. For the Will of God, being known to us by our power of discovering Moral Rules for human actions, we then conform to the Will of God, when we do what, by the best exertions of our Faculties, we see to be right. And to seek Happiness by acting rightly, which, as we have seen, is what Morality teaches us to do, is to seek Happiness by conforming ourselves to the Will of God.

And thus, we have three Supreme points, which, existing in different regions, coincide in direction, and lead men to express moral truths in different, yet consistent ways. We have a Supreme Rule, a Supreme Object, and a Supreme Will: — we must act rightly: we must seek our happiness: we must conform to the Will of God: — we have the regions of Duty, Felicity, and Deity. We may express the rules of action in ways derived from any of these three regions. We may say that we must do what is right: or what will make us truly happy: or what God commands. All these Rules coincide. They all express the same result. What we, following our method, have to say of the three regions, is this: — that the first is the only one in which we can find the means of establishing definite Rules. We grant you that that is right action which leads to Happiness: but we do not know anything of Happiness exact and profound and comprehensive enough, to enable us to deduce, from this principle, rules of right action. We agree with you that we must obey the commands of God, and conform ourselves to his Will: but we cannot discern what are his commands, or what is his Will, except by considering what is right, — what is our Duty. Hence, we have begun by exploring this region of Rightness or Duty. We have -153- thus obtained Rules of human action, both general and particular. We know that these Rules, thus determined in the region of Duty, point also to those other objects: — to the perfection of human Felicity: — to the favour of the Deity. We think that our method is the best. It is the independent method of proof, establishing moral Rules by the condition of their being moral Rules. But at any rate, it is satisfactory to us; while other methods which have been proposed are not. And men mistake us altogether, if they think it any objection to our mode of proof, that in its results, even in its most general results, it agrees with the results of other modes of obtaining moral Rules, and that we assent to the general propositions in which this coincidence is asserted.

Lecture VII. International Law

I have endeavoured to explain, in the last three Lectures, the mode in which, as I conceive, we naturally construct the Supreme Rule of Human Action, including all the Rules of Morality discoverable by the Reason: and also, to explain some degree of confusion, and to remove some difficulties, to which the first exposition of the method here followed may have given rise. I have attempted to show that, in this method, we do not make Morality depend upon Laws, except in the sense in which all mankind necessarily make Morality depend upon Laws: — that in requiring that all external things shall be desired as means to moral ends, we are not propounding any ascetic rule, but expressing a necessary condition of man's moral progress; — that we may properly say that our Duties give significance to our Obligations, or find significance in them: — that the reasons which the Moralist gives for virtuous Affections, are not the reasons why man has such affections, but the reasons why they are reckoned virtuous: — that by our method, we do not make Morality depend merely upon the authority or custom of preceding ages; but that we do refer to the agreement of Moralists and Jurists as the best external evidence which Principles of Morality can have. We have further seen that in our System, we can readily agree in their result with those who say that Duty is the road to Happiness; but that we do not agree in method with those who deduce our Duties from this principle, because -155- we cannot find any independent measure or analysis of Happiness, which enables us to do so; — that moreover we agree with those who say that the Supreme Rule of Human Actions is the Will of God: but that this does not make our Morality cease to be independent; since the Will of God is identical with the Supreme Rule, and is known to us, so far as mere Reason is concerned, only by our knowing the Supreme Rule of Human Action.

These are the principal difficulties which, so far as I know, are likely to occur to the minds of those to whom this system is presented: and having, as appears to me, sufficiently noticed these, I shall not now pursue the subject of Morality into detail in particular points. I have already stated what is the general course which our discussions take when we thus apply our method to special questions of Morality. We endeavour to fix the meaning of the leading terms which enter into such discussions:— terms necessarily general and abstract, and often, in the common usage of mankind, loose and vague. We attempt to state the fundamental principles, the axioms or postulates, if any one chooses so to call them, which are assumed and referred to in such discussions. For instance, in order to determine the meaning of Justice, in its applications to particular questions, we are led to lay down these two principles, as both universally assented to by those who use the term (Elements of Morality, 481, 484); — that Rights cannot be founded on Injustice: and that Rights are regulated by existing conditions. And in like manner, other terms of prominent value in moral discussions are taken into consideration, and the fundamental principles which they imply are examined with a view to this application.

Among the general and abstract terms which it thus becomes proper to examine, there is one in particular, which is the means of extending the Rules of Morality into a new field, larger and more splendid than the sphere of private -156- life, or even of a citizen's political activity: I mean the term State, used to designate a Nation or Community regarded as one agent; acting, of course, in the manner which belongs to its political constitution. For the State, in this sense, is a Moral Agent, since it may act rightly or wrongly: and it is a Moral Agent, not only with regard to its own citizens, to whom it neglects its Duty if it do not attempt to make its Laws just, and the administration of them pure and effectual: but it is also a Moral Agent, with regard to other Moral Agents of the same kind, namely, other States. State is bound to State by the ties of Obligation and Duty, as man is to man. States have their Rights, which other States are under an Obligation to respect. States have their Duties, which being performed often include an acknowledgement of the Moral Claims of other States.

But we have here two sets of phrases which, in speaking of the morality of individuals, we very pointedly distinguished: Obligations and Duties on one side; Rights and Moral Claims on the other. Obligations and Rights, which are jural conceptions, — conceptions which the Law enforces and realizes: Duty, which is a moral conception, — a conception which is realized by the Conscience, and the hope of Happiness here and hereafter. Do both these sets of conceptions apply to this new class of moral agents, — to those collective agents which we call States?

At first sight, it might appear as if neither of these two sets of conceptions could be applied to States; — not the former, the jural conceptions of Rights and Obligations between States; for there is no superior authority which makes and enforces Laws for transactions between States, as a State makes and enforces Laws for transactions between its citizens; — nor again, can the latter, the moral conception of Duty, be applied to States in their transactions with each other; for Conscience and Hopes of Happiness, are -157- conceptions which appear hardly to be applicable to States. And thus, the moral agency of States appears to elude our grasp, for want of the conditions which give to moral agency its reality. What is the solution of this difficulty?

The solution is this: — that there is, for States, a common Law, a body of International Law, which, though not made and enforced by any Superior Authority, is, to a certain extent, made and enforced by their common consent; and though the import and application of International Law is very far from complete, in consequence of the imperfect degree of this common assent, yet there is a constant tendency operating to make this consent more perfect: this tendency resulting from the assumption that the Law is identical with Justice, and that it is to be determined in each case by determining what is just: for this being assumed, those who act on the part of States, are constantly labouring to complete the Law where it is incomplete: and, so far as they are moral men, to act upon it and to cause others to act upon it. And thus, though for States there is no positive Law, and consequently, it might seem to follow, no Morality (for where there are no Rights there can be no Obligations), yet there is something which is compounded of both, and takes the place of both. There is an International Law which, though not made and enforced by any superior authority, is Law because it is Justice. There is a Justice for States, which requires them to respect each other's Rights, though these are defined, not by rigorous and authoritative Rules, but by Rules often obscure and wavering, often violated with impunity.

The general Code of Law, which is Law because it is just, and in which the positive Rules made by particular States are admitted, not as necessary principles, but as definitions of terms, is called Jus: and the Laws which are to be referred to by the Moralist in considering the intercourse -158- of nations being of this kind, we may more properly describe this Code as International Jus than as International Law.

There has been a good deal of confusion in the use of the terms which describe International Jus or International Law. These two phrases are of recent origin, and appear to be free from ambiguity: but instead of them, the term commonly used in English has been The Law of Nations: and this again has often been supposed to be a phrase of the same import as the Latin phrase Jus Gentium. I have, in the Morality explained the distinctions between Jus Naturae, Jus Gentium, and Jus Feciale, according to the Roman Jurists.

"1139. International Law is sometimes called The Law of Nations: meaning, by this phrase, the Law between Nations. But this phrase may create confusion, from its resemblance to the phrase Jus Gentium, which is used by the Roman Lawyers, to denote, not International Law, but Positive or Instituted Law, so far as it is common to all Nations. When the Romans spoke of International Law, they termed it Jus Feciale, the Law of Heralds, or International Envoys.

"1140. The Jus Gentium, the Instituted Law common to all Nations, is sometimes put in opposition to Jus Naturae, the Law of Nature, a Law which it was conceived might be deduced from necessary principles. Thus Grotius* asserts that jure naturae, subjects are not bound by, nor responsible for, the acts of the Sovereign, but that jure gentium, they are."