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The Phaedo of Plato
By Richard Dacre Archer-Hind
Preface. So many editions of the Phaedo are already in existence that the appearance of a fresh one would seem to require a word of explanation. The object of the present edition is to assist those who are beginning in earnest the study of Plato’s philosophy, and who have advanced far enough to appreciate the peculiar difficulty of his writings. Accordingly my chief aim has been to elucidate the philosophical contents of the dialogue, to indicate as clearly as I was able the consecution of its thought, and to determine its position in the Platonic system. It has therefore been no part of my purpose to enter minutely into points of language for their own sake. But since it is utterly impossible to follow Plato’s thought without a thorough mastery of his language, I have not abstained from dealing with such points, so far as seemed necessary for the right understanding of Plato’s meaning, or where I thought that they had been insufficiently treated by previous editors.
Finally and above all my thanks are due to my friend Mr. Henry Jackson, to whose untiring kindness I owe far more than I can possibly acknowledge: the references to him in the notes very imperfectly indicate how fully he carries out the principle κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.
Trinity College, Cambridge
3 November 1883
Preface to the Second Edition
This edition is substantially the same as the first, but contains some few additions and corrections. In making the latter I have again to thank Dr. Jackson for valuable assistance. Only one important change in interpretation has been introduced, which will be found in Appendix II.
The text still closely follows Schanz. I have made no change of reading on the authority of the papyrus fragment recently discovered. Such changes would of course only be justified on the ground either that the papyrus is a higher authority than the other manuscripts, or that it gives readings which are intrinsically superior to those of the received text. That the first alternative has been proved, few, I think, will care to maintain. As to the second, it is matter of opinion; for my part even the few variants which are approved as almost certain by so distinguished a Platonic scholar as Prof. Lewis Campbell (Classical Review v 364.) fail to carry conviction to me. Accordingly, so far as the papyrus is concerned, I have thought it best to leave the text in peace.
The chief novelty in this edition is the contribution of the publishers and printers. It is, as I understand, the first book in which Messrs. Macmillan have used their new Greek type. One glance is enough to show how bold a step they have made in the direction of a long-desired reform. It may be indeed that not all scholars will bestow upon the new fount the unstinted approval with which it is welcomed by Dr. Rutherford in the Classical Review: but none, I conceive, will fail to acknowledge that Messrs. Macmillan, in thus lifting our Greek typography out of the rut in which it has lain so long imbedded, have earned the cordial thanks of all who think that a printed page ought to aim at being a work of art.
12 May 1894
Introduction and Analysis of Plato’s Phaedo
§ 1. Scope of the dialogue. A careful student of the Platonic dialogues can hardly fail to notice a certain peculiarity in their structure: he will observe that for the most part we find not one but several motives underlying the whole composition and artistically interwoven; so that if we put the question, what was Plato’s object in writing any one dialogue, the answer can rarely be a simple one. These several motives are indeed formally subordinated to one definite end—for a Platonic λόγος is always ζῷον συνεστός—but this end is not always, nor indeed often, the most important result of the dialogue or that which Plato had most at heart in its composition. A very good and simple illustration of this is supplied by the Sophist. The declared object of that dialogue is to define the sophist (218b); and this object, amid all the intricacies of the argument, is held steadfastly in view until its final accomplishment, when the sophist is tracked down, captured, and bound hand and foot in the humorously labyrinthine paragraph which closes the Eleate’s discourse. But as a means of obtaining this definition Plato employs his method of διαίρεσις {diaíresis, “division”}; and the extreme elaboration with which this process is worked out, together with the high value which we know Plato set upon it, leaves no doubt that the exposition and illustration of this dialectical method is one of the motives of the dialogue. Thirdly, a point suddenly turns up, quite by accident, as it were, and without the slightest premeditation (236d): the sophist, on the point of being convicted as a dealer in shams, takes shelter in the old puzzle about μὴ ὄν: which puzzle must be solved before the definition can be accomplished. Now it will be observed that the material and formal importance of these three motives are in reverse order. The definition of the sophist, the formal object of the dialogue, is simply a piece of pungent satire; but the method by which this object is attained is a matter of high interest and significance. By far the most momentous issue, however, is that which turns upon μὴ ὄν: the searching criticism of ὄν and μὴ ὄν, as conceived in various philosophies; the masterly
Bearing this in mind, let us see what is the result of a similar analysis applied to the structure of the Phaedo. Most persons who should be asked to describe this work would probably reply that it was a treatise in which Plato endeavours to prove that soul is immortal; and this is no doubt a correct account of one motive of the dialogue. But the demonstration of immortality is neither the express purpose nor the most important philosophical result; it holds a position more nearly corresponding to that of διαίρεσις in the Sophist. As to the main subject of the dialogue Plato leaves us in no uncertainty, Sokrates makes two statements, which appear to Kebes to be mutually conflicting: (1) in this life we are under the protection of good and wise gods, (2) the philosopher will be glad to quit this life. Simmias adds that it seems a little unkind of Sokrates to be pleased at leaving his friends. Sokrates admits that it is only fair that he should clear himself on both these charges. Then, after an interruption on the part of Kriton, which is clearly designed to mark that the serious business of the dialogue is now about to begin, Sokrates proceeds in the following words: ‘Now I desire to render an account to you my judges and to show that it is reasonable for a man who has passed his life in the true love of wisdom to be of good cheer on the threshold of death and to be hopeful of enjoying the greatest blessings, when he is dead, in the other world. How this may be the case, Simmias and Kebes, I shall try to tell you’ (63e). Thus we see that the leading motive is
Now let us observe how the other subjects are connected with this. The line of defence adopted by Sokrates is as follows: The philosopher is not concerned with the gratification of bodily appetites nor with the pomps and luxuries of this world; the pleasures of the intellect alone are precious in his sight, and to the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom his whole life is devoted. Such being the case, the body which is his soul’s constant companion not only brings him no advantage but is a positive hindrance and annoyance, impeding by its importunate affections the free action of the soul in her search for the truth. Accordingly he accustoms his soul to be as independent of the body as is possible, to withdraw from communion with it, and to act by herself—by processes of pure thought without aid of the senses. But this deliverance of the soul, her purification from all corporeal taint, can never be perfectly accomplished during this earthly life; consequently in this life the perfect fruition of intelligence can never be attained. There is but one thing which separates soul from body altogether; and this is death: death extricates the soul from her corporeal entanglement and sets her free to exert her unfettered powers upon the highest objects of cognition. Death then is the realisation of the philosopher’s dream; it is the fulfillment of that intellectual enfranchisement which by a lifelong struggle he has but in some scanty measure attained: how then can he fail to be of good cheer when the hour arrives of his release from the close confines of his bodily prison into the wide pure air of free intellectual life?
Very well, replies Kebes, but you are assuming that the soul continues to exist as a conscious and intelligent being after her separation from the body. How do we know that she is not extinguished at the moment of dissolution? Before we can accept your defence it is absolutely necessary that you should satisfy us on this point. Sokrates freely admits the justice of this criticism and says he will do his best to fill up the lacuna in his theory.
We see then that immortality is a distinctly secondary issue, subordinate to the principal theme of the dialogue. The particular mode in which Sokrates has chosen to defend his main proposition demands a demonstration of the soul’s immortality as a necessary condition, and that is all; so far as regards the purposes of this dialogue Plato is concerned to prove the soul immortal only in order to prove that the
Having thus determined two motives, let us see whether an inspection of the pleadings for immortality will disclose any more. Sokrates begins with two arguments which are to be regarded as two halves of one proof. The first is based upon a law of alternation or reciprocity in nature: given two opposite states, all things which have come to be in either state have passed into it from the opposite state; thus what is now better has become so from being worse; and between every such pair of opposites we have transition in either direction, between hotter and colder, greater and less, sleeping and waking, etc. Now the opposite to living is dead: between these two we daily see the process in one direction, from life to death, the other we do not see. But though we see it not, it must exist. For since living souls are continually being born into the world, and since they cannot come out of nothing, clearly they must come from the souls which have quitted this life. These then must exist after their departure from the body; for if they ceased to be, they could not come again into being. Therefore our souls exist after death. The second argument rests upon reminiscence. All sensible objects remind us of certain ideal types, whereof they are likenesses: they are but adumbrations of these types, faintly reflecting them but incapable of representing them with perfect accuracy. We compare these objects with their types and judge that they fall short of them; whence it is evident that at some time we must have had apprehension of the types. Now we cannot possibly have gained this knowledge since our birth; we must then have possessed it before we were born. Therefore our souls possessed intelligent existence before birth. Putting these two arguments together, we find that our souls existed as intelligent beings before we were born and will continue so to exist after we are dead.
Seeing that his young friends are still doubtful whether the conditions for the operation of this law of reciprocity are necessarily satisfied in the case of soul, Sokrates pushes forward to new ground. He urges that if a thing is to be decomposed, it must first have been composed; that which has no parts therefore cannot be subject to dissolution. This is the fundamental distinction between the objects of sense and the objects of intelligence; the former are composite and perpetually suffering resolution into their constituent parts; the latter are simple and therefore indissoluble. Ideas are changeless and eternal, particulars
Before proceeding let us pause to mark the stress laid on the affinity of the soul to the ideas, for this will presently play an important part.
We may pass over the objection of Simmias with its refutation as being immaterial to the main argument, and proceed at once to the criticism of Kebes on the foregoing theory. It amounts to this: the above reasoning only makes it probable that soul is much more durable than body and may last a very long time; it does not show that she is actually imperishable nor that she has in her own essence an inalienable principle of vitality. This takes us to the very heart of the matter; Sokrates must trace the causes of generation and destruction down to their very roots.
I do not mean in this place to give any analysis of the marvelously subtle reasoning which serves for the final demonstration, but only to call attention to its fundamental principles. After pointing out the inadequacy of all previous and contemporary theories of causation, Sokrates declares the Ideas to be the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge. The truth of the Ideas is eternally sure, and whatever inference can be certainly drawn from the ideal theory is verily true. Now everything in nature is what it is by virtue of the immanence of some idea informing it: and so intimate is the connexion of particular with idea, that the former can never give admission to an idea incongruous with the latter. Accordingly if we take any pair of opposite and mutually exclusive ideas, a particular informed by such opposite, or by any idea involving such opposite, can never receive the other opposite: we cannot have cold fire or even three. But soul—vital principle—is soul by virtue of the idea of life inherent therefore she can never admit the opposite to life, which is death; else we should have dead soul, which is no less impossible and irrational than even three. Soul therefore has in her inmost essence a source of life that can never fail her.
A very moderate familiarity with Plato’s ways of working will now enable us to see where we are to look for the very heart of the dialogue. The assertion of the Ideas as the causes of existence and the objects of cognition; the affirmation that they constitute the ultimate reality
Such being the three strands intertwined in the thread of which the fabric of the Phaedo is woven, let us examine their relations a little more narrowly.
The question of immortality is interesting and important just so far as it is connected with the cognition of the ideas. True knowledge, says Plato, is concerned with the ideas alone, because they are simple, changeless, and abiding: concerning the complex, changeful, and fleeting objects of sense there can be nothing better than opinion. Soul alone, acting by processes of pure thought, can apprehend the ideas, because of her likeness to them: she too is simple and self-identical; and like is known by like. But during her association with the body she never has free play for her own activity:
Such then is the value of immortality, as promising us an existence under conditions more favourable to intellectual activity. I think however Plato intends to turn it to another not unimportant, though minor, use. In the true Platonic system of ethics immortality plays no part, Plato’s morality is founded in the very depths of his ontology; for the principle of good and the principle of being are one and the same. It matters nothing whether we live or die: that alone is good which is like the idea of good. But to deduce ethical science from the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν {the good itself} calls for a most consummate philosopher: for the great mass of mankind it is simply out of the question. So then, since they cannot frame a moral code for themselves because they do not know the idea of the good, the best they can do is to accept one from the philosopher who does know it, as Plato insists in the Republic. But the philosopher must hold out some inducement for the people to receive his teaching; and this inducement may be derived from immortality. Sokrates himself says if the soul is immortal, she needs our care not only during the period to which we give the name of life, but for all time; and now it is that we see how grave is the danger of neglecting her. The philosopher will persuade the people to follow his precepts by showing that a life of intelligent virtue is the forerunner of free intellectual enjoyment in the invisible world, but a life of vice can only lead after death to helpless cravings for bodily pleasures which are out of reach. So by deducing immortality from the ideal theory, Plato uses that theory to provide a working code of morals for those who are incapable of rising to the only true and rational virtue.
But while we affirm that the chief result of the Phaedo is the establishment of the ideas as the true principles of causation and objects of knowledge, in place of the superficial physical laws and incogitable phenomena which did duty for causes and realities with the Ionian philosophers; and while we recognise that the proof of immortality derives its sole value from its bearing on the cognition of the ideas, we must not leave out of sight the original proposition, that the wise man will cheerfully meet death. This, though overshadowed by the superior interest of the metaphysical issues to which it gives rise, is yet far from unimportant in Plato’s sight; and this is what gives artistic unity to the dialogue. As a framework in which to set his vindication of the dignity of the ideas Plato could have chosen nothing better than a description of the cheerful fortitude displayed by a man whose life has been devoted to intellectual research. The lesson which Sokrates inculcates by his precepts and arguments he enforces still more vividly by his living example. From his first pleasant moralising on his own fetter-cramped
§ 2. The relation of the several arguments for immortality. How the several arguments are mutually related, and how many proofs of immortality are contained in the Phaedo, is a question on which most diverse opinions have been entertained: on one estimate all the proofs are reduced to one, while another reckons as many as seven. I do not propose to criticise these various enumerations, which have been ably treated by Bonitz in his admirable ‘Platonische Studien’: I shall simply examine the relation of the several arguments, and then from the results thus obtained consider whether they are to be regarded as constituting one or more demonstrations. With
First then as concerning the argument of ἀνταπόδοσις {correspondence} 70c-72e. This seeks to deduce the soul’s immortality from a universal law of nature, or rather from two laws. The first is γένεσις ἐξ ἐναντίων {origin from opposition}, which is simply an application of a principle with which we are already familiar in preplatonic philosophy, e.g. the ο͑δὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω {the road up and the road down is one and the same} of Herakleitos. A γένεσις is a process between opposite states; whatever we see at one pole, as the result of a γένεσις, has passed over from the other pole. The two poles with which our argument is concerned are ζῶν {alive, living} and τεθνηκός {dead, dying}: ζῶν we define as a state of union between soul and body, τεθνηκός as a state of separation. We know that the soul passes to the state τεθνηκός from the state ζῶν, and we deduce from the law of alternations that she passes to the state ζῶν from the state τεθνηκός. Therefore the soul must have existence in the state τεθνηκός, in virtue of our second law, which is that the sum of all things is constant; in Aristotle’s words οὐδὲν γίγνεται ἐκμὴ ὄντος πᾶν δ΄ἐξ ὄντος. This principle, which the physicists, as Aristotle goes on to observe, agreed in affirming of matter, is here affirmed of thought by Plato, for whom matter is but a phase of thought. It is this which is the most important element in the present argument, and to which we shall hereafter have occasion to recur. The result we obtain then is that our soul in passing from ζῶν to τεθνηκός is not annihilated in the process, but retains her existence in the state τεθνηκός: in popular language ἔστιν ἐν Αἵδου {is in Hades}.
But, it might be asked, what more do we gain by this argument of ἀνάμνησις? For though the only result which Plato expressly draws from ἀνταπόδοσις {recompense} is that the soul exists after death, it would also be a perfectly fair inference that she existed before birth: for the soul that became ζῶν at a human birth must previously have been τεθνηκός, that is, existent in a state of separation; else we should have γένεσις ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. This is true; but ἀνάμνησις makes two important contributions: (1) what we have to prove is ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ δύναμιν καὶ
In fact there is no more surprising feature in the literature to which the Phaedo has given occasion than the fact that many scholars, not only in the face of Plato’s explicit declaration (77c), but in the face of plain reason, have accounted these two arguments as two distinct proofs. For if we allow that ἀνταπόδοσις furnishes a proof ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Αἵδου, and ἀνάμνησις a proof ὡς δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει, it is self-evident that the two must be combined in order to constitute a proof ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Αἵδου καὶ δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει. We derive from ἀνταπόδοσις evidence that the soul exists in the same state (τεθνηκός, death) before birth and after death; from ἀνάμνησις we have evidence that this is a conscious and intelligent state.
So then, whatever number of proofs we may finally decide to exist in the Phaedo, it is clear that the two foregoing arguments do not amount to more than one. But even before any objections have been urged, Sokrates proposes to offer further evidence, as though what he has already brought forward were inadequate. Let us see then in what particulars the demonstration seems to be incomplete, in order that we may know what we should expect to be supplied in the sequel.
A severer scrutiny will detect a weakness in each member of the proof. In the first the soul’s continued existence is a simple deduction from a natural law, which is assumed to work with invariable uniformity. But we must recollect that the operation of any cause depends upon the conditions under which it acts: by the same law lead falls earthward and vapour streams upward; and it is conceivable that somewhere in the universe there might exist a set of conditions under which the same law might produce exactly the opposite results. Now if in addition to our knowledge of the law we had a perfect and exhaustive acquaintance with the conditions under which it acts in every conceivable instance, we might be certain of its operation in all cases. But as a matter of fact we have not and never can have such an acquaintance with the conditions. An astronomer, from the data before him, calculates that a planet ought to revolve in an orbit of
1 That such is the defect of the argument is indicated by Plato himself at 77d-e in the words μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνῄσκων. That is to say, our law may be perfectly sound, but there may yet be disturbing forces, on which we have not calculated, which interfere with its operation: the accident of a tempest at the time of the soul’s egress may produce conditions which render the law null and void in the case of that particular soul.
Such I conceive to be the cause of the dissatisfaction felt with the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις. I have dwelt upon it at some length, because, though by no means obvious, it has hitherto, I believe, failed of being noticed. I now pass on to ἀνάμνησις.
We have already seen that ἀνάμνησις does not by itself prove the imperishability of the soul; and now since ἀνταπόδοσις has proved insufficient to accomplish this satisfactorily, the original defect remains unsupplied. We may have enjoyed apprehension of the ideas before our birth, but it does not follow that we shall exist to apprehend them again after our death. But the point to which I would draw attention is that we have so far failed to make the proper use of the soul’s cognition of the ideas: the only conclusion we have drawn is that the soul must have existed to apprehend them; this is far short of the inference which on Platonic principles is not only justified but peremptorily required. What this is, we shall presently see.
In the argument extending from 78b to 80d we have the universe divided into the visible and invisible worlds: the former includes all sensible objects, which are composite, and therefore subject to dissolution and change; the latter contains the ideas, which are incomposite, and therefore changeless and indissoluble. Now the body is visible, and obviously belongs to the class of things which surfer change and dissolution; the soul, being invisible, should naturally seem to belong to the world of real existences, incomposite and indissoluble. This belief is confirmed if we consider the soul’s attitude in regard to the sensible and intelligible worlds respectively. When dealing with sensible objects she is filled with bewilderment and strays giddily through the ever-fleeting stream of inconstant phantasms, where she can find no rest for the sole of her foot: but when she turns to the ideal world she feels herself at home; the ideas she can contemplate in serene repose, seeing that she herself is akin to them; and she then shares the constancy of the objects of her meditations. Additional confirmation is supplied by the observation that
With reference to this argument it is to be observed (1) that it is professedly a sequel to the preceding, ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν 78a-b: (2) that the requisite inference from cognition of the ideas is now expressed in the words I have italicised: (3) that the proof now rests upon the essential nature of the soul. Like knows like: therefore since the soul knows the ideas, she must be like the ideas. But the attributes of the ideas are simplicity, unchangeableness, and imperishability; the soul then must resemble them in these attributes. We are no longer dependent upon an external law, with whose workings we are imperfectly acquainted, to establish the soul’s immortality; for we are able to class her with an order of substances to whose essence belongs eternity; and this we are enabled to do by realising that the soul’s antenatal cognition of the ideas involves not merely her existence before our birth, but her likeness and affinity to the ideas themselves. Thus by |13| following to its logical conclusion the train of thought suggested by ἀνάμνησις, Plato has raised the theory of immortality from the dim and doubtful twilight of physical speculation to the clear sunshine of metaphysical certainty. This present argument is in fact intended both as a correction and a development of the previous reasoning. We no longer put our trust in the physical law of γένεσις ἐξ ἐναντίων, which, although it may be perfectly sound and may afford a strong presumption of the soul’s immortality, yet is incapable of offering us the assurance we require; and we have legitimately deduced from ἀνάμνησις a result which may serve as a secure ontological basis for our proposition.
But now we are suddenly brought to a stand. The whole edifice which we have been at such pains to erect collapses in a moment before the criticism of Kebes: we have been building it upon sand. There can be no mistake about this: the objection raised by Kebes is utterly destructive of the theory in its present form. Let us put it to the test.
Surveying the demonstration which has last been summarised, we see at the first glance that it is purely tentative and approximate; it does not even pretend to be more than an argument from probability.
In the first place the eternal objects of intelligence are invisible, while the perishable objects of sense are visible; the soul is invisible, and therefore we have assumed that she belongs to the rank of intelligible and eternal existences. But this assumption is unwarrantable. All that is eternal is invisible; but it does not follow that all which is invisible is eternal. We may say that the soul’s invisibility affords a certain presumption in favour of her eternity, but nothing more. Secondly, the soul apprehends the ideas, therefore she is like the ideas. True; but we are not justified in concluding that this likeness necessarily includes the attribute of eternity: she may, for aught we know, be sufficiently like the ideas to apprehend them and yet not possess all their properties. Thirdly, the plea that she is like the divine because she rules over the body is still less satisfactory: she may possess many divine qualities without sharing the divine attribute of eternity. Fourthly, when we argue that, since body may last a very long time and since soul is far more potent and permanent than body, soul must last a yet longer time, the conclusion is most inadequate of all. In fact the argument, considered as a proof, breaks down at every point: the most that can be obtained from it is in fact the very inference that Plato draws: προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου {natural for the body to meet with speedy dissolution and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or nearly so}. But this is very different from the certainty we were seeking. Moreover
Is then all the discussion up to this point utterly fruitless? Most assuredly not. The case stands, as I conceive, thus. The objection of Kebes divides the debate on immortality into two distinct portions, the former of which is purely preparatory to the latter. It would have been impossible to proceed at once to the actual demonstration, which on Platonic principles is conclusive, without clearing the way and preparing the ground for it by these preliminary investigations. In them we gradually feel our way to the right standpoint from which to attack the question. Starting from the notion of immortality as a consequence of a natural law, we soon make an advance so far as to connect it with the cognition of the idea—ἀνάμνησις {memory} gives us the germ of the principle which ultimately grows to reasoned certainty; and this nascent conception assumes form and substance in the psychological argument that immediately follows: thus, though we fail to gain the assurance of eternity which we seek, we now see pretty well in what direction to look for it. We do not flee all empty-handed from the ruins of our fallen theory; we carry with us two priceless possessions, first the principle that the sum of existence is constant, next the consciousness that the proof of the soul’s immortality must stand or fall with the existence of the ideas. Still what I desire specially to emphasise is that not one of the arguments in the first half of the dialogue is a proof of immortality, and not one of them is intended by Plato to be so. Plato never wastes his words. Had he believed that any of these arguments in the first part demonstrated the soul’s immortality, he would have stopped there; the addition of the final argument shews that the former were not conclusive. On the other hand Plato would not have introduced the preliminary arguments, had they not been necessary: they do not indeed directly demonstrate immortality, but they enable us to rise to that standpoint from which the demonstration is possible: they are a necessary propaedeutic for the proof which is based directly on the theory of ideas. The long interval which intervenes
3 A detailed analysis of this demonstration is reserved for the commentary upon the passage in question.
This demonstration, which is worked out with a completeness, clearness, and subtlety peculiarly Plato’s own, is on Platonic principles perfectly incontrovertible: given the eternal ideas as causes of existence, the eternity of soul is an inevitable inference. But though complete in itself it utilises some of the materials of former arguments: the principle that the eternity of soul is inseparably bound up with the existence of the eternal ideas has been the chief feature of ἀνάμνησις and the psychological argument: in this last proof it is precisely formulated, handled in a new manner, and pushed to its logical conclusion. Secondly, the whole argument has for its ultimate premiss the constancy of the sum total of existence: σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται {106d nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable}. And this we saw to be the fundamental proposition laid down in the argument of ἀνάμνησις. Moreover ἀνάμνησις is still valid to prove the existence of the ideas and the soul’s intelligent activity apart from the body.
I conceive then that there are in the Phaedo three arguments, culminating in a single proof: but that a continuous connexion can be traced through all. The first, consisting of two portions, bases immortality partly on a natural law, partly on the soul’s connexion with the ideas: the second, being a development of the first, drops the natural law and lays
In conclusion I must briefly advert to two views which are in my opinion gravely erroneous and misleading. Steinhart treats the ethical passages, founded on the doctrine of immortality, as intended to furnish additional proof of that doctrine. The direct proofs, according to him, are in themselves inadequate, and require a surer foundation in ethics. This is a vicious circle so obvious that criticism is superfluous: we are establishing the soul’s immortality in order to justify certain ethical principles, and then we employ these very principles as evidence for the theory whence they are deduced. Moreover this view involves a radical misconception of the purpose and structure of the dialogue.
The second opinion against which I feel bound to protest is that the refutation of the objection raised by Simmias constitutes an argument for immortality. This is propounded by Ueberweg, with whom I am sorry to find Prof. Geddes agreeing, Surely nothing can be more untenable than such a proposition. Simmias suggests that all the facts established by Sokrates concerning soul—viz. that she is invisible, in corporeal, divine, etc.—are compatible with the theory that she is a harmony. Now if soul is a harmony, it is clear that she cannot be immortal: therefore it is absolutely necessary that Sokrates should show that this theory is inconsistent with the conclusions on which they are already agreed. But in disproving this proposition Sokrates does not prove the soul’s immortality, nor is he one inch the nearer to proving it. If I wished to ascertain that a certain crystal was not soluble in water, I should gain very little by a chemical analysis which assured me simply that the substance was not saltpetre: and similarly it is no evidence for soul’s immortality that she is not identical with one particular thing of which immortality can never be predicated. Even could we make an exhaustive list of all things known to be mortal, and could we prove that soul was not identical with any one of these, we should still not have established her immortality: she might yet be an additional kind of mortal existence, different from the rest. It is therefore illogical to
§ 3. Plato’s attitude regarding immortality. (1) The form in which Plato upholds the soul’s immortality next demands our attention: it is of all the most scientific and most philosophical: it is that for which there is the most to be said, and against it the least. His theory predicates eternity of universal soul, and of particular souls metempsychosis {reincarnation}. ‘The Metempsychosis,’ says Hume, ‘is the only system of this kind that Philosophy can hearken to’:
Not only on metaphysical grounds has Plato’s conception so great an advantage; but from the standpoint of practical ethics its superiority is equally decided. The fundamental law of Platonic morals is δράσαντι παθεῖν {just retribution}. There is indeed no such thing as vengeance in his scheme, but there is an immutable and inexorable sequence of cause and effect. No impunity exists for vice: every act of indulgence is another bar in the soul’s prison-house; it drags her from the pure intellectual sphere which is rightfully hers down to the gross and pestilent atmosphere of sensual delight. From this doom none may escape; the consequences of every action are as inevitable as the laws of the universe. If a man sin, he shall pay for his sin in spiritual degradation; repentance avails nothing, reformation alone can slowly recover the lost position. Now within the span of a single life we know that a man often suffers in his latter days for the vices of his youth: how infinitely wider then is the application of this principle, if we regard that single life as but one out of an endless series. As Plato himself says, we have to consider the effects of our actions not only for this life but for all time: our present state is conditioned by causes stretching we know not how far back into the remotest past, and what we do now will influence
Thus the theory of metempsychosis supplies not only an explanation of this inequality in human affairs but also a most powerful incentive to virtuous action.
Among theories then which maintain the personal immortality of particular souls it would seem that Plato’s is metaphysically the most defensible and ethically the most fruitful; and while it attaches the heaviest penalties to immorality, it offers the strongest encouragement to any endeavour after improvement. It is not of course contended that this view is exempt from objections and difficulties; merely that these apply with greater force to any other method of defending individual immortality.
(ii) But how far do Plato’s arguments tend to prove the immortality of particular souls, as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul? It must, I think, be replied that they go but a very short way indeed. If we examine the several demonstrations, we shall find that what they amount to is that vital principle is indestructible, not that its manifestation in this or that personality is permanent. The result of the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις {recompense} is that, if all things are not to be brought to nought, the sum of vital essence can suffer no abatement; but it offers no shadow of proof that this constant amount of vitality will continue to be distributed into the same conscious personalities: we know by experience that separate conscious personalities continue to be produced in the world, and therefore we conclude that the vital force which constitutes them cannot perish at the dissolution of soul and body; but we have no right to conclude that these personalities retain their individual consciousness after death. Indeed from this argument we cannot infer that vital force will always continue to exist in the form of particular intelligences: that belongs to another aspect of Plato’s metaphysics. Proceeding to ἀνάμνησις {soul memory}, although on a bare literal interpretation Plato’s language may imply that the soul existed individually before birth, yet this is not at all involved in the principle of the theory: the particular soul retains the knowledge of truths which are the possession of soul at large, not necessarily of this soul in a former personal existence. A similar examination of the remaining arguments of the Phaedo will show that individual immortality is not fairly deducible from any of them. The same applies to the brief but pregnant demonstration in Phaedrus 245c following. There the case for the eternity of soul is stated with unequalled force and clearness; but it applies to the universal soul alone, and nothing can be
(iii) Such being the case, it is not irrelevant to raise the question, did Plato really and literally maintain the personal immortality of particular souls? This certainly would seem to be the teaching of the Phaedo, and this is the view of the vast majority of Platonic students: but the contrary opinion is supported by the great authority of Hegel and has recently been defended with much ingenuity by Teichmüller; it is not therefore to be dismissed without ceremony. I will discuss the statements of the two critics separately.
First however I must point out a difficulty under which an editor of the Phaedo labours in approaching this question: it does not belong to the treatment of the Phaedo at all, but to that of the Timaeus; and we can hope to attain a satisfactory solution only after a minute investigation of the profound and difficult metaphysics of the latter dialogue. Such an investigation is obviously out of place here, since ὁ λόγος πάρεργος ὢν πλέον ἂν ἕργον ὧν ἕνεκα λέγεται παράσχοι. At the same time it does not seem desirable to leave the subject altogether unnoticed, and I shall therefore treat it as briefly as I am able.
In his statement of the Platonic philosophy
But with Plato the immortality of the soul is
Now it appears to me that the foregoing criticism amounts to something like this. Hegel, analysing the conception of immortality, seizes at once upon that which he regards as essential to the Platonic philosophy: this kernel he instantly drags to light, rejecting the husk of ‘Vorstellung.’ Whether an individual consciousness shall continue to exist as such is to Platonism of no metaphysical importance whatever: what is of importance is to grasp the true nature of eternity. The soul’s real immortality lies in the operation of thought: eternity is in the nature of thought and has nothing to do with duration. Such, I conceive, is Hegel’s point. Now that the duration of the individual is of no metaphysical importance I am willing to admit: Plato’s philosophy in no way involves it. I do not however see that it is thereby excluded; provided the really essential point is maintained, it seems to me that the question of individual duration is an open one for Plato; whether a particular consciousness continues for one life, or for a score, or for an unlimited time, does not appear to affect the question.
Teichmüller however goes further, and declares that Plato could not maintain individual immortality without grave inconsistency; from which premiss he most justly draws the conclusion that Plato did
Teichmüller’s criticism seems to resolve itself mainly into two points: (1) Plato’s reasoning applies only to universal, not to particular soul, (2) the admission of individual immortality makes Plato’s philosophy into a system of monadism, not monism. The first point has been already conceded; but it is no proof that Plato did not believe in the permanence of individual souls. The second objection, if sustained, I should regard as fatal, holding as I do that
Moreover, although I am convinced as firmly as any one of Plato’s consistency, I hold it for certain that we have represented in the dialogues a regular development of Plato’s thought, whereof the Phaedo does not belong to the latest stage. We cannot therefore bring everything in the Phaedo into severe conformity with the matured pantheism of the Timaeus. In the latter it is probable that personal immortality does more or less recede into the region of the mythical: it enters only in an extremely allegorical guise. But while in the matured Platonism all is coherent and consequent, in the still maturing Platonism of the Phaedo there are to be found views, as we shall see, which Plato afterwards considerably modified: and even were it shown that personal immortality is inadmissible in the Timaeus, it does not follow that it is so in the Phaedo.
In the interpretation of a writer so much addicted to figurative speech as Plato there must needs be here and there difference of opinion as to where the line is to be drawn between symbolism and substance: and in this case I cannot but think that Teichmüller has drawn the line too high. And I cannot acquiesce in his naive assumption that the mere fact that a doubt exists is decisive in favour of a non-literal interpretation. The onus probandi, I take it, lies with those who do not interpret literally; and in general the proof is not hard to find. We have no hesitation in regarding the creation of the universe by the δημιουργός {demiurgos, a creator, but not The One} as purely mythical, because a literal acceptation would reduce Platonism to a chaos of nonsense: we pass a similar verdict on the endless punishment of criminals in the νέκυιαι of the Phaedo, Republic, and Gorgias, because it is incongruous with the just and benevolent spirit that pervades Plato’s ethics, and because it only appears when Plato is clothing his thoughts in a legendary form. In the
I have made this defence of the literal interpretation not because I consider that the continued existence of the individual is of any real importance in the Platonic system—I should not go so far as to affirm that it was retained to the last—but because, in order that we may follow historically the development of Plato’s thought, it is important for us to determine precisely what he means to set forth in each dialogue. And the conclusion which seems to me the soundest is that, although Plato knew very well that neither he nor any one else could demonstrate the immortality of individual souls, yet he was strongly disposed to believe, at least at the time the Phaedo was written, that
§ 4. Theory of Soul in the Phaedo.
11 The substance of this section appeared in a paper printed in the Journal of Philology, vol. x, p. 120, to which I may refer the reader for a more detailed statement.
In the Phaedo (α) the soul is essentially simple and incomposite; and this simplicity is urged as an argument for her imperishability (compare 80b, with 78c following): (β) ἐρώτες δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι and the like are referred to the body as their origin, whence arising they intrude upon the soul and trouble her contemplations, (66c). On the other hand (α) in certain passages of the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus
(i) Of the first problem only two solutions seem possible, (α) that two distinct views were entertained by Plato at different periods, (β) that the tripartition of the soul is purely metaphorical.
The first alternative cannot be accepted. For reasons which will be discussed hereafter it is impossible to regard the Phaedo as belonging to a different period from the Republic; and there are good grounds for assigning the Phaedrus to the same group. We are bound therefore to expect that these dialogues will agree in all important doctrines.
Moreover there is a remarkable fact to be noticed. The simplicity of ψυχή, so far from being a theory peculiar to the Phaedo, is one which pervades the whole series of the Platonic dialogues from beginning to end, not even excepting those in which the triform nature appears. This is not only conclusive evidence that we are not dealing with doctrines held at successive periods, but it affords strong presumption that the tripartition of ψυχή is a figurative expression.
Let us examine the nature of this tripartition. In the myth of the Phaedrus the soul is likened to a car driven by a charioteer and drawn by two winged steeds. Of this pair one is vicious and unruly, the other generous and docile, aiding the charioteer in subduing his refractory companion. This parable is thus explained in the Republic.
But if this analysis is to be understood as literally signifying that the soul is composed of three distinct parts, the results are truly bewildering. The entire argument of the Phaedo is not merely demolished root and branch, but is shown utterly unmeaning and irrelevant. For
But the case is still further strengthened by the statement in the Timaeus. The created gods are described as implanting in a body the human soul, imitating the manner of their own creation by the δημιουργός. The divine element, θεῖον, which they received from the hands of the creator, they placed in the head: this is the λογιστικὸν of the Republic. Then, Plato proceeds to tell us, they fashioned another kind of soul, to which he applies the remarkable term
If this too is to be understood literally, confusion is tenfold worse confounded. For to the three parts are assigned different habitations in the body; all three therefore have extension in space: yet we know very well that for Plato ψυχὴ is unextended and immaterial. Again the lower εἴδη are mortal; that is, vital principle can admit destruction: a declaration not only subversive of all the reasoning in the Phaedo, but
All this constitutes not merely justification but positive necessity for treating the tripartition of soul as wholly metaphorical; and the interpretation of the metaphor is simple enough.
Soul, as such, is simple, she is pure thought; and her action, which is thinking, is simple. But soul immanent in matter has a complex action; she does not lose, at least in the higher organisms, all the faculty of pure thought; but she has another action consequent on her implication with matter: this action we call perception or sensation. The main division is, as we have seen, dual: λογιστικὸν expressing the action of soul by herself, ἄλογον has action through the body. The πάθη belonging to ἄλογον Plato classifies under the heads of θυμοειδὲς {spirited; forceful, willful} and ἐπιθυμητικόν {appetitive}. We see too that the terms of the Timaeus, θεῖον and θνητόν, are abundantly justified. Soul is altogether imperishable: but when she enters into relation with body she assumes certain functions which are terminable and which cease when the relation comes to an end. Θνητόν {mortality} then is the name given to soul acting under certain material conditions; and soul may in that sense admit the appellation, not because she ever ceases to exist qua soul, but because she ceases to operate qua emotional and appetitive soul. Soul exists in her own essence eternally, in her material relations but for a time.
13 See Timaeus 77a following.
We now have reached a standpoint whence it is easy to solve the difficulties which we encountered at the outset. Once recognise that Plato knew of but one kind of soul, and all is smooth. The essential nature of soul is simple, as much in the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus, as in the Phaedo. Hence it is beside the point to ask which of the three parts is immortal: Plato is seeking to prove that soul herself is eternal, not that certain relations and functions of soul are perpetual.
(ii) The answer to the second question is to be found with no less ease. The whole argument of the Phaedo, as we have seen, deals with soul qua soul. With this of course bodily appetites have nothing to do: accordingly Plato assigns them to the body, because they only belong to soul in her bodily relation and through this affect her. Nothing would be gained by pursuing the analysis further; rather the course of the discussion would be hampered by the introduction of matter which had no bearing on the question at issue. In the Philebus it is different; there it is Plato’s business to give a psychological analysis of the passions in question: accordingly they are assigned to soul, which is the only seat of consciousness.
I conclude this section with a brief summary borrowed from the paper to which I have already referred.
In Timaeus 69c-72d we have a θεῖον εἶδος {divine form} and a θνητόν εἶδος {mortal form} of ψυχή {soul}: of which θεῖον {divine}, λογιστικὸν {rational}, θνητόν {mortal}, θυμοειδὲς {forceful, willful} + ἐπιθυμητικόν {appetitive}. Now ψυχή {soul}, as such, is ἀθάνατον {immortal}: therefore the word θνητόν {mortal} can only refer to a particular relation of ψυχή {soul} and σῶμα {body}, or operation of ψυχή through σῶμα. Θυμοειδὲς {forceful, willful} therefore and ἐπιθυμητικόν {appetitive} are not different parts of ψυχή, but only names for different modes of its action through σῶμα: thus θυμοειδὲς {forceful, willful} and ἐπιθυμητικόν {appetitive} are θνητά {mortal}, because, when the conjunction between ψυχή and σῶμα ceases, they cease also.
Thus the apparent discrepancy between the Phaedo and Philebus is reconciled. In the one ἐπιθυμίαι are ascribed to σῶμα, as arising from conjunction of ψυχή and σῶμα: in the other they are more accurately ascribed to ψυχή because they are an affection of ψυχή through σῶμα. Also the argument of the Phaedo is entirely unaffected by the threefold division.
§ 5. Position of the Phaedo in the Platonic System. The whole philosophy of Plato is, as I am fully convinced, set forth in his extant dialogues. It is a system which in its final development forms a harmonious and consistent whole, worked out with unfailing
From this point of view we should expect to find in Plato’s exposition of his system (1) a phase wherein the necessity of such a conciliation is recognised and its accomplishment more or less effected, while at the same time imperfections and gaps yet remain, (2) a phase in which Plato’s severe self-criticism has revealed to him the weak points in his earlier theory, and his unparalleled metaphysical insight has suggested to him the remedy. To leap at once from the one-sided crudeness of preplatonic thought to so profound and comprehensive a philosophy as the later Platonism would seem beyond the power even of such a genius as Plato’s: there are few indeed who could have reached the intermediate stage. We may expect to see, and I believe we do see in the dialogues evidence of development in Plato’s thought, which passes through definite stages, enabling us to distribute the Platonic writings into three distinct
Upon the precise nature of this development an entirely new and most important light has been thrown by Mr. Jackson in a masterly series of essays recently published in the Journal of Philology, vols. x and xi. His results, so far as he has yet proceeded, I cordially accept in the main; and it is from the standpoint which his researches have empowered us to reach that I now propose to indicate a classification of the Platonic dialogues. I am only concerned to give such a general outline as will enable me to define the period to which I conceive the Phaedo to belong; a full analysis would not serve the present purpose.
At the time he first met Sokrates, the unsatisfactory result of previous speculation had in all probability inclined the young Plato, like most of his contemporaries, towards philosophic scepticism. Sokrates gave a new impetus to his thought; it was from him that Plato derived, along with the interrogatory method, the principle which afterwards bore such abundant fruit—the principle that knowledge is of universals. This is the great contribution of the unmetaphysical Sokrates to metaphysics; but it is in the hands of Plato, not of Sokrates, that it attained its true significance. And even with Plato it at first remained barren. In his earlier dialogues Plato exercises the exuberant strength of his growing thought in the Sokratic method of definition: we find abundant promise of the matchless artistic power that is to come, but little or no advance on the position of Sokrates. Such dialogues are the Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches, and others, mostly of small compass and of slight philosophical importance. They culminate in the Protagoras, the longest and most brilliant of the series. These dialogues constitute the Sokratic period; in them we do not yet find Plato.
But Plato was a true scholar of Herakleitos: he saw that in things which abide not, but ever fluctuate and fleet away, there can be no stable truth nor basis of knowledge. Knowledge is of that which abides firm and changes not, if there exists such in the universe. And now Plato despairs no longer of finding this existence, he sees it in the principle of universals. But not in the universals as he received them from Sokrates; a change must pass upon them before they will serve his end. Sokrates had said, if we would know a thing we must clear our conception of it from all accidental attributes which may be peculiar to particular specimens of the class: if we would know what is a tree, we must obtain from the completest comparison that
This is the stage of the middle Platonism: as yet the ideas are simply hypostasisations of every logical concept. Consequently we find in the Republic an idea of every group of objects denoted by a class-name. We have at the top of the scale the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, we have ideas of καλὸν δίκαιον, etc., ideas of natural objects, ideas of σκευαστά, beds, tables, etc., ideas of relations, great, small, equal, etc., and ideas of κακὸν ἄδικον and the like. The particulars in every group derive their nature and existence from the immanence, παρουσία, of the idea. The Republic is the chief exponent of this phase of Plato’s metaphysics: it is also represented by the Phaedrus, Symposium, and others: its main distinguishing characteristics are the assumption of an idea for every group of particulars, and the inherence of the idea in the particulars, also expressed as the participation, μέθεξις, of the particular in the idea.
But Plato presently finds reason to be dissatisfied with this expression of his theory: the difficulties and deficiencies he sees therein are stated with overwhelming force in the earlier part of the Parmenides. The points which chiefly demanded correction were the contents of the
The second point is no less important, the relation between the ideal and the material world. In the middle period the idea exists (α) transcendentally, ἐν τῇ φύσει, (β) immanent in the particulars. In the period to which we have now come, the transcendental existence of the idea alone is allowed: the particulars no longer participate in the idea, but are regarded as copies, μιμήματα, of the ideal type, παραδείγμα. In this way the objections formulated in the Parmenides against the earlier account of the relation between idea and particular are avoided. Other characteristics of the later Platonism, as the analysis of ὂντα into πέρας and ἄπειρον in the Philebus, and the still subtler analysis of the Timaeus, need not detain us here; since the object of the foregoing statement is merely to indicate the development of Plato’s system so far as is necessary for fixing the position of the Phaedo. The later metaphysic is unfolded in the Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus, and consummated in the Timaeus.
Guided by these landmarks we shall find it no hard matter to determine the bearings of the Phaedo. In this dialogue we have an idea of ἴσον (74a), μέγα. (100b), σμικρότες (100e), etc. Also we have the idea described as ἐν ἡμῖν as well as ἐν τῇ φύσει (102d). That is to say, in the Phaedo (1) we see ideas of relations, though ideas of σμικρότες do not occur, and (2) the ideas are immanent in particulars. These are two unmistakable marks that the dialogue belongs to the Platonism of the Republic.
The metaphysical doctrine of the Phaedo is in fact identical with that of the Republic, although it is less precisely formulated. The cardinal point in each dialogue is the existence of the ideas as the sole principle of causation and the one object of true knowledge. In the Phaedo indeed Plato does not bring out in definite language the subordination of the other ideas to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν as the supreme source of all existence. But this is not due to any discordance of theory, but only to
The thoroughly Herakleitean conception of the phenomenal world is also quite in keeping with the Republic. In the shadowy realm of the sensible the soul goes astray bewildered and befogged in the whirling eddy of unsubstantial phantoms—ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα—that throng around her. In this doubtful region,
The position of the Phaedo with respect to the vexed question of predication is very interesting. In the earlier days of philosophy, for fault of adequate logical analysis, the perplexity surrounding this subject was so great that thinkers of most opposite tendencies had been forced to deny the possibility of predication altogether—at most identical propositions could be admitted. From the first Plato perceived that there could be no sound logical or metaphysical basis for a dogma which
14 A confusion of course arises from the assumption of ideas of relation: but with this we are not at present concerned.
Now however superior this conception may be to that of Antisthenes and others who denied predication, it is plain that it does not really touch the vital point. The whole puzzle arose from erroneous notions about ὂν {being} and μὴ ὄν {not being}; the copula ἐστί was conceived to denote identity and veritable existence, while οὔκ ἐστίν implied absolute negation—abstract non-existence. This is the problem which is handled with such consummate skill in Sophist 240b onwards. But in the Phaedo Plato is so far from approaching this question that he does not even betray the slightest consciousness that just herein lies the difficulty; he has in fact evaded, not solved, the ἀπορία {question}. Here again the Phaedo ranks itself with the Republic. In the latter (477a following) we have the division into ὂν, μὴ ὂν, and τὸ μεταξὺ, being respectively the objects of γνῶσις, ἀγνωσία, and δόξα. In this classification ὂν signifies absolute existence, μὴ ὄν absolute non-existence, while τὸ μεταξὺ comprehends all phenomena. Now although a sensible object is declared to be ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν (478d), this is simply because it lies μεταξὺ τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος—it is an ambiguous semi-reality: but there is no glimmer of the significance in which Plato afterwards declares (Sophist 259b) that it πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν. When the Sophist was written, he did not shrink from affirming that τὸ ὂν ἄρ’ ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἓν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τἆλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ (257a). But in the Republic. and Phaedo there is not the slightest evidence either that Plato had made the logical analysis which led him to this conclusion or that he was alive to the necessity of making it.
15 The difference between Plato’s earlier and later views on predication is very clearly brought out by Mr. Jackson in his paper on the Parmenides, Journal of Philology, vol. xi p. 287 following.
The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις {soul memory}, though it does not occur in the Republic, is conspicuous in two other dialogues of the middle period, to wit the Meno and Phaedrus. It is remarkable that this thought, dormant through nearly all the later period, finally reappears, under an altered form, but still easily recognisable, in the Timaeus.
So much for the metaphysical relations of the Phaedo, which enable us with perfect certainty, if we accept the theory of development which I have indicated, to assign it to the middle Platonism; in fact it constitutes, along with the Republic, our chief source of information upon the fundamental principles of that period. Its ethical relations are discussed in Appendix I, and therefore need not here be dwelt upon: moreover they are of very slight comparative importance for our present purpose. It is absolutely impossible to fix the position of any Platonic dialogue by its ethical contents: the metaphysical significance alone constitutes the very soul of Plato’s works; and this is the guide we must follow, if we would determine the order of their development.
§ 6. Persons of the dialogue. (i) Echekrates the Phliasian is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (viii 46), along with his countrymen Phanton Diokles and Polymnastos and the Chalkidian Xenophilos, as the last of the Pythagoreans. These
16 Echekrates, a Lokrian Pythagorean, occurs in Cicero de finibus v § 87: if Cicero is correct in saying that he was one of Plato’s teachers, he is obviously a different man.
Plato’s choice of Echekrates as the auditor of Phaedo’s narrative is judicious. A hearer was required who should be in sympathy not only with the character and fate of Sokrates, but also with his teaching. The theory of ideas plays the most important part in the arguments ascribed to Sokrates, and none would be so likely as a Pythagorean philosopher to turn a friendly ear to this theory. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, as Aristotle tells us, bore a considerable resemblance to Plato’s ideal theory: and we may well suppose that a due amount of σκέψις ἐν τοῖς λόγος {examination of the word that embodies an idea} would render an intelligent Pythagorean a ready recipient of Platonism.
(ii) Phaedo was a man of much greater note. A native of Elis, he was taken prisoner in the war waged by Sparta and Athens upon his country, BC 401. He is said to have been brought as a slave to Athens; but his servitude cannot have been of long duration, since in 399 we find him a member of the Sokratic circle: according to Aulus Gellius (ii 18) he was ransomed by Kebes {who gave him the opportunity of studying philosophy. And he afterwards became a distinguished philosopher}, and, in the words of Diogenes {from that time onwards he studied philosophy as became a free man}. He seems to have possessed genuine philosophic ability; and after the death of Sokrates he returned to his own country, where he founded the Elean school; the same which, after its transplantation by Menedemos, became better known as the Eretrian. Nothing definite seems to have been recorded regarding the views of Phaedo; but probably they bore a considerable resemblance to those of Eukleides, with whom he is classed by the satirist Timon in a passage quoted in Diogenes Laertius ii 107:
ἀλλ᾽ οὔ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου οὐδενός, οὐ Φαίδωνος, ὅτις γένετ᾽, οὐδ᾽ ἐριδάντεω Εὐκλείδεω, Μεγαρεῦσιν ὃς ἔμβαλε λύσσαν ἐρισμοῦ. {But I care not for these babblers, nor for anyone besides, not for Phaedo whoever he be, nor wrangling Euclides, who inspired the Megarians with a frenzied love of controversy.}
Phaedo was evidently a special favourite with Sokrates and seems to have been highly esteemed by the other Sokratics: of whom Aischines is said to have composed a dialogue called by his name. The chronology of his life is unknown; at the death of Sokrates however he appears to have been little more than a youth.
(iii) Concerning Apollodoros of Phaleron we know little beyond what Plato has told us. He was a man of impulsive and passionate temperament, which had gained him the name of ὁ μανικός {the madman} (cf. Symposium 173d), fervently attached to Sokrates, but frequently, it would seem, not very good company to others (Symposium l. 1. σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους.) Xenophon refers to him twice: once in Memorabilia in xi 17, where he is said to be inseparable from Sokrates; and again in the Apology 28, where Xenophon again testifies to his strong affection for his master, but stigmatises him as ἄλλως εὐήθης {otherwise foolish}. He is of no philosophical importance.
(iv) Simmias was a native of Thebes, where he attended the lectures of the Pythagorean Philolaos. How long he had been a companion of Sokrates is unknown, but both he and his friend Kebes were at the time of their residence in Athens very young men (νεανίσκων, 89a: afterwards he seems to have acquired a considerable reputation. He is mentioned in the Phaedrus 242b: Sokrates vows that no one has caused the production of more λόγοι, whether composed by himself or by others, than Phaedrus; always excepting Simmias—Σιμμίαν γὰρ ἐξαιρῶ λόγου. In Crito 45b Simmias is said to have brought to Athens a sufficient sum to effect the release of Sokrates. The meagre notice of him in Diogenes Laertius ii 124 is merely a catalogue of twenty-three dialogues of which he was said to be the author. In Plutarch De Genio Socratis § 7 Simmias is made to say that he studied philosophy at Memphis in company with Plato and Ellopion of Peparethos.
(v) Of Kebes equally little is known, beyond what we learn from the Phaedo. Diogenes says merely Κέβης ὁ Θηβαῖος: καὶ τούτου φέρονται διάλογοι τρεῖς: Πίναξ, Ἑβδόμη, Φρύνιχος. A composition purporting to be the Πίναξ of Kebes is still extant; but there can be no doubt that it is spurious. Xenophon mentions him twice (Memorabilia I ii 48, iii xi 17), but adds nothing to our knowledge. He, like Simmias, offered to furnish funds to secure the release of Sokrates (Crito 45b). And this is all there is to tell of him.
Yet this Theban pair, little as is known of their lives, will always be full of interest in our eyes, because of the important part they play in this dialogue. They are both alike painted as ardent lovers of philosophy, keen and eager searchers after truth. Both evidently enjoyed the esteem of Plato in a high degree; but the philosopher has succeeded with a few light and subtle touches in thoroughly individualising the two men: we cannot read the Phaedo without being conscious of a marked difference in their temperament. Simmias is somewhat dreamy and prone to mysticism; he is intelligent and sympathetic, but not free from vagueness; he is apt to be misled by superficial likenesses, e.g. on the subject of harmony; and he sometimes λανθάνει ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών, as in 76d. But the intellect of Kebes is bright and keen as a sword: he has an admirable faculty of seeing the point and making straight towards it; all his criticisms are definite and precise and aimed at the heart of the matter; he possesses the invaluable quality of always knowing exactly what he himself means, and he will not put up with any haziness of thought in others. He is notable for his πραγματεία, for tenaciously clinging to the question until it is sifted to the very bottom: he is the hardest of all mortals to convince, yet perfectly open to conviction when once a satisfactory argument has been found. It is always Kebes who at every important point influences the course of the dialogue: he gives the message from Euenos which starts the whole discussion (60d; he insists on being told why suicide should be unlawful (61d), and how Sokrates can welcome death without contradicting his own principles (62c); he points out that the question of the soul’s immortality must be raised (70a); he suggests the theory of ἀνάμνησις (72e); and finally he brings forward the objection in 87a, which shows that he has fully grasped the previous argument in all its bearings and perceives exactly what is required for its completion. Thus every important issue turns upon some pertinent remark of Kebes. The chief contribution of Simmias is the discussion
(vi) Of a personage so well known as Kriton it is needless for me to say much: a few words concerning him will complete this account of the interlocutors. He was the oldest and dearest friend of Sokrates, a man of wealth and position and of high character. His sympathy with Sokrates was probably much more personal than intellectual; Plato’s picture of him is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentle man, but without any capacity for philosophy. Indeed, if the anecdote in Euthydemus 304d following, has any foundation on fact, he may sometimes have remonstrated with his friend for his philosophical eccentricities. Diogenes Laertius however (ii 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues attributed to him, some of which have such ambitious titles as Περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι, τί τὸ ἐπίστασθαι: we can hardly suppose that they contributed much to the solution of these problems. Diogenes sums up the true interest of the man when he says οὗτος μάλιστα φιλοστοργότατα διετέθη πρὸς Σωκράτην, καὶ οὕτως ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μηδέποτ᾽ ἐλλείπειν τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν.
(vii) The other companions of Sokrates who were with him at the last, but who do not speak, are Kritobulos, the son of Kriton; Hermogenes, son of Hipponikos, a speaker in the Cratylus; Epigenes, son of Antiphon; Aischines, son of Charinos a sausage-seller, or, by another account, of Lysanias; he was a noted Sokratic and the author of eight dialogues (Diogenes Laertius ii 64); Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics; Ktesippos, a youth introduced in the Euthydemus; Menexenos, son of Demophon, who gives his name to a dialogue; Phaidondes, of whom we know only that he was a Theban; Eukleides, founder of the Megarian school; and his friend Terpsion, also a Megarian. Of these all but the last three are Athenians.
I append a list of editions of the Phaedo and other works of which I have made use.
Platonis Phaedo ed. Wyttenbach
Platonis Phaedo ed. Heindorf
Platonis Phaedo ed. Ast
Platonis Phaedo ed. Geddes
Platonis Phaedo ed. W. Wagner
Platonis Phaedo ed. Stallbaum’s edition as remodelled by Wohlrab. This is really a
variorum edition, containing notes by most previous editors and by Wohlrab himself.
Platon’s Phaedon fur den Schulgebrauch erklart von Martin Wohlrab.
Schanz’s critical edition of the Phaedo.
Hirschig’s critical edition of the Phaedo.
Schleiermacher’s introduction translation and notes.
Plato’s Phaedo literally translated by E. M. Cope.
Olympiodori Scholia in Phaedonem.
Hermann Schmidt. Kritischer Cornmentar zu Plato’s Phaedon.
Bonitz. Platonische Studien.
Ast. Plato’s Leben und Schriften.
Hegel. Geschichte der Philosophic, Plato.
Zeller. Philosophic der Griechen.
Teichmiiller. Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, and Die platonische Frage.
Schanz’s critical writings on Plato’s text.
Since this in no wise pretends to be a critical edition I have thought it needless to give the mss. readings in full: this would have been merely a reproduction of other men’s work. For all who are interested in the text of Plato the edition of Schanz is indispensable; and the readings of other mss. are given by Stallbaum and Bekker. Remembering nevertheless how much it is to the reader’s convenience that he should know exactly how far he can trust the text before him, I have drawn attention in the notes to every case in which my reading materially differs from the mss. I have also marked all noteworthy points of difference from two of the editions which are in most common use,
B = Clarkianus sive Oxoniensis sive Bodleianus.
C = Crusianus sive Tubingensis.
D = Venetus 185.
E = Bessarionis liber sive Venetus 184.
Stallbaum and the Zurich edition are denoted by St. and Z. respectively. Where I have deserted Schanz, it has usually been in the direction of a return to the mss. The chief blemish in the text of the Phaedo is interpolation, which is not wonderful, considering that few products of Greek philosophy have been read more widely and less intelligently. There are no small number of instances in which words or sentences have indubitably been inserted by some copyist or annotator out of sheer inability to grasp the connexion. But this cannot justify the reckless handling of Hirschig, who cancels or rewrites passages whole sale, for no apparent reason but that they are not such Greek as he would have written himself. The result in many such cases is a deep thankfulness in the reader’s soul that Plato, not Hirschig, was the author of the dialogues. Schanz, though a far sounder critic, has, I think, in several cases unduly deferred to Hirschig; and in others has himself bracketed passages without having in my opinion sufficient cause. In matters of orthography I have for the most part followed his guidance. And I cannot conclude without an expression of gratitude for the invaluable work he has given us: indeed only those who have engaged in the task of editing any of the dialogues can fully appreciate the boon which has been bestowed on Platonic students by Martin Schanz.
The Phaedo of Plato
Persons of the Dialogue: Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius; Sokrates, Apollodorus, Simmias, Kebes, Crito and an Attendant of the Prison.
Scene: The Prison of Sokrates.
Place of the Narration: Phlius.
Phaedo, Part 1.
—
—Phaedo: I was there myself, Echecrates.
—Echecrates: Then what did he say before his death? and how did he die? I should like to hear, for nowadays none of the Phliasians go to Athens at all, and no stranger has come from there for a long time,
—Phaedo: Did you not even hear about the trial and how it was conducted?
—Echecrates: Yes, some one told us about that, and we wondered that although it took place a long time ago, he was put to death much later. Now why was that, Phaedo?
—
—Echecrates: What ship is this?
—Phaedo: This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen
—
Φαιδων, Part 1.
—
—Φαίδων: αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες.
—Ἐχεκράτης: τί οὖν δή ἐστιν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων
—
—Ἐχεκράτης: ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον
—Φαίδων: τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη: ἔτυχεν γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.
—Ἐχεκράτης: τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;
—Φαίδων: τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς ‘δὶς ἑπτὰ’
1 αὐτός: Echekrates merely desires to know whether he can depend upon the account of Phaedo as that of an eye witness: this remark would have been needless, but for the strange comment of Hermogenes the rhetorician: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἢρετο ὡς θαυμάζων καὶ μακαρίζων τὸν παραγενόμενον, ὁ δὲ ἀπεκίνατο σεμνυνόμενος καὶ μέγα φροῶν.
2 Φλιασίων: in apposition to τῶν πολιτῶν. The insertion of τῶν is altogether needless; the article is continually omitted before national names by all Attic writers. Stallbaum compares Apology 32b, Meno 70b.
3 ὅστις ἂν: ‘who would have been able to tell us’. In a phrase of this sort I conceive that no definite protasis is in the mind of the writer. I cannot see what is gained by supplying ‘si venisset’ with Rückert, or ‘wenn er gefragt worden wäre’ with Wohlrab. The words which follow show that communication between Athens and Phlius did exist, for some Athenian visitor brought the news of Sokrates’ death. It seems needless therefore to speculate whether intercourse was suspended by the war with Elis (Stallbaum), which ended in the year Sokrates died; or by the Corinthian war (C. F. Hermann), which began five years afterwards. The events of the last day in prison were of course known but to a small circle.
4 πολλῷ ὕστερον: Thirty days: Xenophon Memorabilia IV viii 2.
5 τοὺς ‘δὶς ἑπτὰ’: the seven maidens and seven youths, according to the legend, who were delivered every nine years to the Minotaur.
6 μηδένα ἀποκτεινύναι: So Xenophon l.l.
Phaedo, Part 2.
Φαιδων, Part 2.
—Echecrates: What took place at his death, Phaedo? What was said and done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present, so that he died without his friends?
—Echecrates: Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy.
—Phaedo: I am not busy and I will try to tell you. It is always my greatest pleasure to be reminded of Sokrates whether by speaking of him myself or by listening to someone else.
—Echecrates: Well, Phaedo, you will have hearers who feel as you do; so try to tell us everything as accurately as you can.
—
—Echecrates: To be sure I do.
—Phaedo: He was quite unrestrained, and I was much agitated myself, as were the others.
—Echecrates: Who were these, Phaedo?
—Phaedo: Of native Athenians there was this Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epiganes and Aeschines and Antisthenes; and Ctesippus the Paeanian was there too, and Menexenus and some other Athenians. But Plato, I think, was ill.
—
—Phaedo: Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Kebes and Phaedonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion.
—Echecrates: What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?
—Phaedo: No. They were said to be in Aegina.
—Echecrates: Was anyone else there?
—Phaedo: I think these were about all.
—Echecrates: Well then, what was the conversation?
—Ἐχεκράτης: τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἴων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;
—
—Ἐχεκράτης: ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα.
—Φαίδων: ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι: καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον.
—Ἐχεκράτης: ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἑτέρους
—
—Ἐχεκράτης: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
—Φαίδων: ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.
—Ἐχεκράτης: ἔτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;
—Φαίδων: οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης: ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ
—Ἐχεκράτης ξένοι δέ τινες παρῆσαν;
—
—Ἐχεκράτης τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος [οὐ] παρεγένοντο;
—Φαίδων: οὐ δῆτα: ἐν Αἰγίνῃ
—Ἐχεκράτης ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;
—Φαίδων: σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.
—Ἐχεκράτης τί οὖν δή; τίνες φῂς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;
Phaedo, Part 3.
—Phaedo: I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days
—And some of Crito’s people took her away wailing
Φαιδων, Part 3.
—Φαίδων: ἐγώ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι.
—
—
—καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν
1 περιμένειν: This reading seems to me certainly right. Bonitz, quoted by Wohlrab, accurately distinguishes between the usages of περιμένειν and ἐπιμένειν in Plato: the former means ‘to await,’ the latter ‘to remain’ in a given condition. Cf. below 80c, and Theaetetus 179e. So far as I am aware, the nearest approach of ἐπιμένειν to the meaning of περιμένειν is in Republic 361d-e ὄντοιν δὲ τοιούτοιν, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ οἷος ἑκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει. If ἐπιμένειν be read with Hermann, we should translate: ‘he bade us stay where we were and not come in until he summoned us.’
2 παραγγέλλουσιν: I agree with Prof. Geddes in taking these words: ‘are giving directions that he may be put to death today’; the directions being given to the officers of the prison. If, as is usually done, we take Sokrates to be the object of παραγγέλλουσιν, the clause ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾷ becomes nonsense. Wohlrab (in his Latin edition) has a note which is utterly beyond my comprehension.
3 τὸ παιδίον: no doubt his youngest son Menexenos.
4 τὸ ἅμα μὲν: The usual reading is τῷ, and this is confirmed by Stobaeus, who cites this passage, Eclogue I 1104. This would = by refusing. But τὸ is found in the Bodleian and two other mss. and is abundantly justified by Riddell, Digest of Idioms 85. I have therefore followed Schanz in retaining it. ‘How wondrous is the relation between pleasure and its seeming contrary, pain; that the pair will never come to a man together.’
5 Αἴσωπος: It is worthwhile here to notice the consummate skill with which Plato allows the dialogue to unfold itself as in the natural course of conversation. By this simple reference to Aesop Kebes is reminded that Euenos was anxious to know what was the object of Sokrates in versifying the fables of Aesop. In answering the question Sokrates sends a kindly message to Euenos and bids him follow to Hades as soon as he may. The surprise of Simmias at this message draws from Sokrates an expression of his belief that the true philosopher will meet death gladly in the hope of being happier in Hades than on earth; and in support of this opinion, as we shall see, the whole argument that occupies the remainder of the dialogue is evolved.
6 ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον: In these observations of Sokrates we may find the germ of the Platonic theory of pleasure as a κατάστασις. See for instance Timaeus 64c-d τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἁθρόον παρ’ ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ’ εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἁθρόον ἡδύ. Cf. Philebus 31d etc. The καθαραὶ ἡδοναὶ are exceptions, Philebus 51b; but, so far as concerns physical pleasures, only apparent exceptions, Timaeus 65a.
Phaedo, Part 4.
—Phaedo: Here Kebes interrupted and said, “By Zeus, Sokrates, I am glad you reminded me.
—“Then tell him, Kebes,” said he, “the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems,
Φαιδων, Part 4.
—ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβών, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ᾽ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν
—λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τἀληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος
1 ἐντείνας: ‘putting into verse.’ The term is used of setting words to music, Protagoras 326b; of putting thought into words, Philebus 38e. The last example seems to me conclusive that the notion of the word is not, as Prof. Geddes considers, derived from stretching a string, but implies fixing in a certain form or position. Cf. Meno 87a, where it is used of inscribing a triangle in a circle.
2 προοίμιον: This word is applied by Thucydides, in III 104, to the Homeric hymn to Apollo: such προοίμια were strictly speaking preludes either to a longer poem (οἴμη) or to a religious celebration. Specimens of verses attributed to Sokrates are to be found in Diogenes Laertius II 42.
3 Εὔηνος: Euenos of Paros was a sophist and poet. From Apology 20b we learn that he taught ἀρετὴ for five minas; from Phaedrus 267a that he was the inventor of new rhetorical figures: τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐηνὸν ἐς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσίν τε πρῶτος ηὗρεν καὶ παρεπαίνους—οἱ δ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν—σοφὸς γὰρ ἁνήρ: where see Dr. Thompson’s note. From both passages we may infer that Plato did not think much of him. The few fragments that remain of his elegiac poems are given in Bergk’s poctae lyrici. Bergk however remarks ‘quae hic unius Eueni nomine comprehendi, rectius duobus attribui videntur’; and the other epigrams, chiefly erotic, given in the Anthology under the name Euenos, are undoubtedly the work of different authors.
4 ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον: After ὡς BD give ὅτι, which Schanz brackets and I omit.
5 εἰ πολλάκις: ‘if perchance’; as in 61a.
6 παρακελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν: ‘to urge and cheer me on.’ Each of the three compounds used by Plato in this passage has its distinct shade of meaning. παρακελεύεσθαί, which is the term frequently applied by Thucydides to a general’s address to his soldiers, means ‘urge to make an effort’; ἐπικελεύειν, which is a much rarer word and occurs nowhere else in Plato, ‘encourage while the effort is being made’; as in Euripides Electra 1224. In διακελευόμενοι, the preposition has a distributive force: ‘as the partisans of different runners cheer on their favourites.’ Cf. Herodotus IX 5 διακελευσαμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυναικὶ.
7 ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς: Wagner well quotes Laches 188c following. See also Laws 689d ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιότατ᾽ ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία. Cf. Republic 411c following, 548b-c διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων 548c τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἠμεληκέναι.
8 τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν: in the ordinary Greek sense of artistic and literary culture; whereas Sokrates understood by μουσικὴ the philosophic life.
9 ἀφοσιώσασθαι: ‘to satisfy my conscience.’ This anecdote well displays the simply religious character of Sokrates not without a tinge of superstition. ἀφοσιώσασθαι is to clear oneself from all taint of impiety; cf. Phaedrus 242c; Philebus 12b ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιοῦμαι, ‘I wash my hands of it.’
10 καὶ πιθόμενον: Schanz brackets καὶ.
11 εἰς τὸν θεὸν: Another mark of Sokrates’ old-fashioned piety. Prof. Geddes has some interesting remarks on the special connexion between Sokrates and Apollo, cf. 85a. I cannot however agree with his suggestion that the προοίμιον was a thanksgiving for the thirty days reprieve; which would be totally inconsistent with the attitude of Sokrates in the face of death: cf. 116e.
12 μύθους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λόγους: ‘fiction and not fact.’ This distinction is established by Gorgias 523a, ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον: ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν; then follows the myth about the judgment of souls; cf. Laws 872d. μῶθος is defined by Aphthonios, quoted by Wyttenbach, as λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν. Plutarch, De Gloria Atheniensium 4, says that Pindar was rebuked by Korinna, ὡς ἄμουσον ὄντα μὴ ποιοῦντα μύθους, ὃ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἔργον εἶναι συμβέβηκε {his writing lacked refinement, since he did not introduce myths, which are the proper business of poetry, but used as a foundation for his work unusual and obsolete words, extensions of meaning, paraphrases, lyrics and rhythms, which are mere embellishments}; further on he says ὁ δὲ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος, ψευδὴς ἐοικὼς ἀληθινῷ {a myth aims at being a false tale, resembling a true one}. Compare Aristotle’s distinction between ἱστορία and ποίησις, Poetica 1451b 4, τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. Of course λόγος in its wider sense includes μῶθος, as we have in 60d τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους.
13 οὓς προχείρους εἶχον: i.e. in his memory; there is no evidence that the fables of Aesop had been published in writing up to this time. Aesop is said to have been a contemporary of Solon; and the story of his death is told by Plutarch, De Sera Numinis Vindicta §12: there is also an allusion to it in Herodotus II 134.
Phaedo, Part 5.
—Phaedo: “So tell Evenus that, Kebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can.
—And Simmias said, “What a message that is, Sokrates, for Evenus! I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it.”
—“Why so?” said he. “Is not Evenus a philosopher?”
—“I think so,” said Simmias.
—“Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy. Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted.”
—
—Then Kebes asked him: “What do you mean by this, Sokrates, that it is not permitted to take one’s life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying?”
—“How is this, Kebes? Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?”
—“Nothing definite, Sokrates.”
—“I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting,
Φαιδων, Part 5.
—ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα.
—
—τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὔηνος;
—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
—ἐθελήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὔηνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος
—ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης: πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ᾽ ἂν τῷ ἀποθνῄσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἕπεσθαι;
—τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ
—οὐδέν γε σαφές,
—ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω: ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοὼς φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως
1 ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα: This injunction must be considered as modified by the proviso added below, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὑτόν. Schmidt finds a ‘dilogia’ in the words, and Prof. Geddes takes the same view. But it appears to me that such a premature reference to the μελέτη θανάτου is thoroughly unplatonic. It is futile to omit the words ὡς τάχιστα with Heindorf; in any case they must be implied, else we make Sokrates give Euenos the superfluous advice to die some time or other.
2 τούτου τοῦ πράγματος: Sc. φιλοςοφίας.
3 οὐ γάρ φασι: It is worthy of note that the whole of this rather superficial reasoning against suicide, which is quite outside the main argument of the dialogue, is carefully and repeatedly marked as secondhand. It seems as if Plato wished to avoid any prejudice and misrepresentation which his panegyric of death might bring upon him; while his slight and rapid treatment of this subject would show that he did not feel strongly upon it. That he did not in all cases disapprove suicide is certain: cf. Laws 854c καὶ ἐὰν μέν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφᾷ τι τὸ νόσημα: εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου. Also 873c-d ὃς ἂν ἑαυτὸν κτείνῃ, τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης βίᾳ ἀποστερῶν μοῖραν, μήτε πόλεως ταξάσης δίκῃ, μήτε περιωδύνῳ ἀφύκτῳ προσπεσούσῃ τύχῃ ἀναγκασθείς, μηδὲ αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἀβίου μεταλαχών, ἀργίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀνανδρίας δειλίᾳ ἑαυτῷ δίκην ἄδικον ἐπιθῇ.
4 φιλολάῳ: From this it is evident that Philolaos spent some time at Thebes, where Kebes and Simmias attended his lectures. We have absolutely no authentic information about the life of this eminent Pythagorean; and the genuineness of the fragments ascribed to him has, I think, been once for all disposed of by Mr. Bywater, Journal of Philology vol. I p. 21 following.
5 οὐδέν γε σαφές: ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις δι΄ αἰνιγμά λέγειν, says Olympiodoros, whom the editors all repeat. I think Plato’s meaning is that the arguments of Philolaos against suicide were not conclusive enough to satisfy the πραγματεία of Kebes.
6 διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν: This is an accurate description of the conversation that is to come: when reason has done all she can, fancy comes to her aid with a myth.
7 τῆς ἐκεῖ: Schanz brackets these words: Hirschig proposes ἐκεῖσε.
8 μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν: before which execution was not legal; cf. 116e.
Phaedo, Part 6.
—“Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Sokrates? I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this; but I never heard anyone say
—“You must have courage,” said he, “and perhaps you might hear something. But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human beings for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor.”
—And Kebes, smiling gently, said, “Gawd knows it doos,” speaking in his own dialect.
—“It would seem unreasonable, if put in this way,” said Sokrates,
—“Yes,” said Kebes,
—“Well then,” said he, “if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?”
—“Certainly,” he replied.
—“Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me.”
Φαιδων, Part 6.
—κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ᾽ ἡμῖν διῃτᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν: σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.
—
—καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἴττω Ζεύς,
—
—ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης.
—πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη.
—ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην
1 εἰ τοῦτο μόνον: Of this locus vexatus I shall first give my own interpretation before mentioning other views that are held upon it. I accept the text precisely as it stands without alteration or omission. The first thing to be done is to fix the meaning of τοῦτο. It can hardly be doubted that τοῦτο means here exactly what it does in 62c, ἀλλ᾽ εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται: where the context clearly requires that τοῦτο = μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι. Taking it in that sense here I should translate: ‘perhaps you will be surprised if this question alone of all admits a simple answer—if the same thing does not happen to man in this as in all other cases; I mean that to some men at some time death is better than life: and for whom death is better, you will perhaps think it strange that they may not do themselves a good turn but must wait for some other helper.’ I conceive the clause καὶ οὐδέποτε…ζῆν to show how it is that the question is not ἁπλοῦν. Unless death were sometimes better than life the question whether suicide were sometimes lawful would never be raised, for no one would dream of committing it. ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, i.e. as in other cases either of two opposites may be better according to circumstances. The whole sentence amounts to this: you will think it strange if in the case of suicide we can lay down an invariable rule; that there are no persons for whom it is better to die than live; and if there are, that they may not release themselves from life.
Mr. Jackson, in a paper read before the Cambridge Philological Society Dec. 1, 1881, has a most searching examination of this passage. Understanding τοῦτό as I do, he is of opinion that the clauses καὶ οὐδέποτε…ζῆν and θαυμαστὸν ἴσως…ἀνθρώποις are interpolations. My interpretation, which differs from all those that he criticises, seems to me to meet many of his objections; and though I am far from affirming that he may not be right in rejecting these words, I am loth to do so when I believe they afford a reasonable sense. As regards certain phrases to which he objects, I think οὐδέποτε is simply in antithesis to ἔστιν ὅτε; and may we not with Mr. Cope translate τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ‘mankind,’ a universal expression which is afterwards qualified by ἐστιν οἷς?
Prof. Geddes has an elaborate note, but I am entirely unable to agree with his view. He seems to regard καὶ οὐδέποτε as beginning an independent sentence. There is no difficulty about οὐ after θαὐμάσιον ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ, cf. 97a.
Schanz places a full stop after τἆλλα and inserts ἆλλα before ἐστιν. If the text is to be altered, I should prefer Mr. Jackson’s plan.
2 μὴ ὅσιον: Z. and St. add ἔστιν, which is wanting in B pr. m.
3 Ἴττω Ζεύς: This little provincialism was doubtless a favourite mode of emphasis with Kebes, and well known to his friends as characteristic.
4 ἐν ἀπορρήτοις: The ancient commentators explain that the Orphic traditions are meant. This seems more probable than any reference to the Eleusinian mysteries.
5 ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ: ‘in ward.’ We might translate ‘on a sort of garrison duty,’ following Cicero, Cato maior 20: vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere. But the common Pythagorean notion was that the body is the soul’s prison, whence she may not come forth until her term is fulfilled: compare Athenaeus IV xlv 157 c {In answer to her Carneius said: “Euxitheus the Pythagorean, Nicion, as the Peripatetic Clearchus tells us in the second book of his Lives, was wont to say that the souls of all beings are imprisoned in the body and in this hither life as a punishment, and that the god has ordained that if they refuse to abide in these until he of his own will releases them, they will then be plunged in more and greater torments. Wherefore all persons, dreading the violence of the higher powers, are afraid to depart from this life of their own motion, and gladly welcome only the death which comes in old age, being persuaded that this release of their souls comes with the approval of the higher powers. To these principles we ourselves subscribe.”}. Cf. Phaedrus 250c, with Dr Thompson’s note; Cratylus 400c, Gorgias 493a.
6 οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν: ‘not easy to see through.’ Sokratic εἰρωνεία {irony}: evidently he does not think this theory worth much. Olympiodoros, with perhaps unconscious sarcasm, observes ἀνάδκη οὖν μῦσαι τὸν μέλλοντα θεάσασθαι αὐτόν.
7 ἓν τῶν κτημάτων: Cf. Laws 906a ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες: also 902b. Elsewhere man is called the plaything of the gods: Laws 803c ἄνθρωπον δέ, ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἔμπροσθεν (644d-e), θεοῦ τι παίγνιον εἶναι μεμηχανημένον, καὶ ὄντως τοῦτο αὐτοῦ τὸ βέλτιστον γεγονέναι.
8 πρὶν ἀνάγκην: Although ἀν may very easily have dropped out before ἀνάγκην, I have not thought proper to insert it against all the mss. I am not satisfied that Plato could not write πρὶν alone with the subjunctive; and in Timaeus 57β it is not easy to account for the loss of ἂν: λυόμενα οὐ παύεται, πρὶν ἢ παντάπασιν ὠθούμενα καὶ διαλυθέντα ἐκφύγῃ πρὸς τὸ συγγενές, ἢ νικηθέντα, ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ὅμοιον τῷ κρατήσαντι γενόμενον, αὐτοῦ σύνοικον μείνῃ. Cf. Laws 873a.
Phaedo, Part 7.
—“That,” said Kebes, “seems sensible. But what you said just now, Sokrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems
—When Sokrates heard this
—And Simmias said, “Well, Sokrates, this time I think myself that Kebes is right. For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them? And it strikes me that Kebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as
—“You have a right to say that,” he replied; “for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court.”
—“Precisely,” said Simmias.
Φαιδων, Part 7.
—ἀλλ᾽ εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν
—
—ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ
—καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης: τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς
—
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
1 τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι: Sokrates had used the plural, as Kebes himself does directly afterwards. Plato, when he uses the word popularly, without any metaphysical significance, seems to employ θεὸς or θεοὶ indifferently.
2 φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου: Schanz brackets these words.
3 πραγματείᾳ: ‘insistence.’ The word is used in a somewhat unusual manner here. Plato frequently denotes by it a pursuit followed with care and earnestness, generally philosophy, but sometimes the ordinary business of life, as in Republic 500c. Compare πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν, Parmenides 137b.
4 λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ: ‘he is always hunting for some principle or other.’
5 ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς: should be taken together.
6 εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον: Olympiodoros remarks, not without acuteness, ἀναφαίνεται ἐντεῦθεν ὅτι τελειότερος Κέβης Σιμμίου, because Kebes raises a universal question, while Simmias συνάγει ἐπὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους.
Phaedo, Part 8.
—“Well, then,” said he, “I will try to make a more convincing defence than I did before the judges. For if I did not believe,” said he, “that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death. But as it is, you may rest assured
—“Well,” said Simmias, “do you intend to go away, Sokrates,
—“I will try,” he replied. “But first let us ask Crito there what he wants. He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time.”
—“Only, Sokrates,” said Crito, “that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little as possible. He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison;
—And Sokrates said: “Never mind him. Just let him do his part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three times.”
—“I was pretty sure that was what you would say,” said Crito, “but he has been bothering me for a long time.”
—“Never mind him,” said Sokrates. “I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is naturally of good courage
Φαιδων, Part 8.
—φέρε δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους
—
—τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων
—ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα
—τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν
—καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν: ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
—ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μέν τι ᾔδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων: ἀλλά μοι πάλαι
—ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται
1 παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους: Sokrates follows the popular distinction between the οὐράνιοι and χθόνιοι θεοί. Mr. Cope translates ‘in the company not only of Gods wise and good, but next also of men.’ I think however the meaning is settled by Laws 958d τὰ μὲν περὶ τὰ θεῖα νόμιμα τῶν τε ὑπὸ γῆς θεῶν καὶ τῶν τῇδε: and soon afterwards, 959b, we have exactly the same phrase as here; παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον, where θεοὺς ἄλλους can only mean ‘other gods.’
2 παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε: The proper apodosis to the re has been displaced by the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην, which modifies the form of the succeeding clause. The meaning of the parenthesis seems to be that Sokrates does not feel sure enough as to the exact condition of souls after death to make any positive statement about their association with one another: all he is quite sure of is that, whatever their condition, they are under the care of good and wise gods.
3 ἥξειν: We cannot supply ἐλπίζω, because Sokrates is confident that he will be in the company of gods, not that he hopes to be. But the infinitive construction is carried on from the previous sentence, although the particular force of the governing verb is no longer appropriate. Perhaps however Schanz is right in bracketing ἐλπίζω.
4 πάλαι λέγεται: in the current traditions of Greek religion.
5 αὐτὸς ἔχων: ‘are you minded to depart keeping this persuasion to yourself?’
6 πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα: This little episode serves to mark the conclusion of the introductory matter.
7 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ: is needlessly bracketed by Schanz.
8 πάλαι: The mss. are uncertain about this word, which Schanz brackets. Z. and St. retain it.
9 ὥς μοι φαίνεται: At this point the main business of the dialogue begins: all that precedes has been merely preparatory to this thesis, and all that follows is logically evolved in its defence.
10 63 E—64 a. After the interruption Sokrates restates the thesis which he has to defend: that the philosopher will meet death with good courage, in the confident hope that he will enjoy the greatest blessings in the other world.
Phaedo, Part 9.
—“Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practicing.”
—And Simmias laughed and said, “By Zeus,
—“And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is.
—“Certainly,” replied Simmias.
—“We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?”
—“No, it is this,” said he.
—“Now, my friend, see if you agree with me;
—“By no means, Sokrates,” said Simmias.
—“How about the pleasures of love?”
—“Certainly not.”
—“Well, do you think such a man would think much of the other cares of the body—I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal adornments? Do you think he would care about them
—“I think the true philosopher would despise them,” he replied.
—“Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, so far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul?”
—“Yes.”
—“To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates
—“It is.”
—“Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn’t deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead.”
—“That is very true.”
Phaedo 64a-67b, cc. ix-xi. The philosopher’s whole life is nothing else than the study and practice of death; how then shall he be dismayed when that comes for which he has always been striving? This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Now the philosopher’s aim is the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. But the body is forever thwarting his endeavours; (1) by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by its weaknesses and maladies. All these hinder the free action of the soul and prevent her from gazing calmly on the truth. Accordingly so long as the soul is in union with the body, she can never attain to perfect wisdom; only death, by setting her free, enables her, if ever, to reach the truth. But the true philosopher will do all he can during life to anticipate this condition: he will withdraw his soul, so far as may be, from all communion with the body: its pleasures and pains he will scorn, its perceptions he will ignore; and so when the hour of release arrives the soul will be pure and unsullied by material taint; she will be fit to enjoy the free life of intelligence that is now before her.
Φαιδων, Part 9.
—κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.
—καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
—καὶ ἀληθῆ γ᾽ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι.
—
—πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας.
—ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι 5 ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι
—οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη.
—σκέψαι δή, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί:
—ἥκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
—τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;
—οὐδαμῶς.
—τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν,
—ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος.
—οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ,
—ἆρ᾽ οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ
—φαίνεται.
—καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγύς τι τείνειν
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
1 ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι: ‘dying and being dead,’ ἀποθνῄσκειν represents the philosophic training, the gradual emancipation of the soul from bodily passions; τεθνάναι the perfected philosophic ἕξις, the complete independence of soul, so far as is permitted by the conditions of corporeal life.
2 τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν: In the mouth of Simmias I think these words must refer to the Thebans: cf. Sophist 242d τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος. ‘The majority would think what you say of philosophers excellent—my countrymen would give an especially cordial assent.’ Simmias is glancing at the proverbial dulness of the Boeotian mind.
3 καὶ σφᾶς: Sc. τοὺς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν.
4 λεληθέναι…εἶναι: Note the significant change of word.
5 ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι: If ἢ be right, it can only be a deliberative subjunctive. For in a question we can hardly accept Heindorf’s suggestion, ‘ante μὴ intelligi potest δεδοίκατε.’
6 περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς: Olympiodoros classifies those here mentioned as (1) ἐνεργεῖαι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, (2) φυσικαὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, (3) οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι. This however, as Wyttenbach points out, is an Epicurean distinction: cf. Cicero De Finibus I xiii §45, and Diogenes Laertius x 149: where the examples do not correspond with the present passage.
7 ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ: With the whole of these three chapters should be compared Timaeus 87c-90d. It would be an error to suppose that Plato, with all his contempt for the body, was a friend of asceticism. In the passage of the Timaeus above mentioned he says that a due balance should be maintained between soul and body; a vigorous soul ought to have a vigorous body for its vehicle. Accordingly the body should be kept in good health and condition for the sake of the soul: for no less emphatically than in the Phaedo he declares that all is to be subordinate to the free exercise of intelligence; see especially 90a following.
8 ἐγγύς τι τείνειν: ‘verges pretty closely on the state of death,’ Cope. Here Plato marks the vulgar error already referred to in 64b λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. The majority have no conception of the philosophic τεθνάναι {death}; if one lives without bodily pleasures, they think he may as well be dead. Such is the judgment of Kallikles, Gorgias 492e οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν. Sokrates retorts that the life of the pleasure-seeker is a πίθου βίος and afterwards χαραδριοῦ, 494b. Cf. Philebus 21c.
9 διὰ τοῦ σώματός: This phrase would indicate that there is no real discrepancy between the doctrine of the Phaedo and of the Philebus on the subject of pleasure. For the preposition διὰ implies ‘those pleasures [which the soul feels] by means of the body’: see introduction §4.
Phaedo, Part 10.
—“Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom?
—“Certainly I do,” he replied.
—“Then,” said he, “when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it.”
—
—“In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?”
—“Yes.”
—“But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality.”
—“That is true.”
—“In this matter also, then,
—“Evidently.”
—“Now how about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?”
—“We certainly think there is.”
—“And absolute beauty and goodness.”
—“Of course.”
—“Well, did you ever see anything of that kind with your eyes?”
—“Certainly not,” said he.
—“Or did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence
—“Certainly.”
—“Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in
—“That is true as true can be, Sokrates,” said Simmias.
Φαιδων, Part 10.
—τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει
—
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
—πότε οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ.
—
—ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων;
—ναί.
—λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ,
—ἔστι ταῦτα.
—οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα
—φαίνεται.
—τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;
—φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία.
—καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν;
—πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
—ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες;
—οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
—ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι,
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
—ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ
—ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
1 οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν: e. g. Empedokles 49-53 (Karsten).
2 φαυλότεραί: Sight is distinguished as the noblest of the senses in Timaeus 474a ὄψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελίας γέγονεν ἡμῖν {Vision, in my view, is the cause of the greatest benefit to us, inasmuch as none of the accounts now given concerning the Universe would ever have been given if men had not seen the stars or the sun or the heaven. But as it is, the vision of day and night and of months and circling years has created the art of number and has given us not only the notion of Time but also means of research into the nature of the Universe.}: hearing comes next, 47c-d. Cf. Phaedrus 250d ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων {sight is the sharpest of the physical senses}.
3 παραλυπῇ: annoys by its intrusion: this sense of παρὰ is not uncommon in Plato: cf. below 66d παραπῖπτον; Timaeus 50e παρεμφαῖνον.
4 μηδέ τις ἡδονή: This is the reading of the Bodleian, and seems to me
right. ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή all belong to the last μήτε. Z. has μήτε τις.
5 ὀρέγηται: ‘reaches after.’
6 καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν: Here the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν; seems placed on the same level as the other ideas. This however is merely because for the present purpose Plato is not concerned to differentiate it: the criticism of Anaxagoras, 98c following, shows that in the Phaedo the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν must occupy the same position as in the Republic. In the Republic itself ἀγαθὸν is several times apparently classed with the inferior ideas, e. g. 476a.
7 μεγέθους πέρι: Here is the first decisive indication that the Phaedo beongs to the middle phase of Platonism, along with the Republic. For μεγέθους is τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἶναι καθ’ αὑτὸ γένος. (Aristotle Metaphysics I ix.)
8 διανοηθῆναι: is opposed to αἰσθάνεσθαι: ‘to apprehend intellectually the essence of each object of his investigation.’
9 αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ: The distinction of the Republic between νοῦς {mind} and διανοίᾳ {thorough reasoning} is not drawn here, since for our present purpose it is unnecessary.
10 ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν: is objective truth, φρόνησις {understanding} the mental πάθημα {strong emotion}. which apprehends it; cf. Republic 511b.
Phaedo, Part 11.
—
—“Most assuredly, Sokrates.”
Φαιδων, Part 11.
—
—παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
1 ὥσπερ ἀτραπός: Olympiodoros insists that this refers to a Pythagorean maxim φεύγειν τὰς λεωφόρους, whereby he has largely contributed to the perplexity of this passage. I believe ἀτραπός properly means not so much a byway as a short cut: what then is this shortcut: We are here drawing an inference ἐκ πάντων τούτων, i.e. from the various considerations which induce the philosopher to withdraw his soul from communion with the body. Now to this state of separation, towards which the philosopher struggles during life by a long and tedious process, there is but one short cut, namely death; which therefore I hold with Schleiermacher is meant by the ἀτραπός. So far then we get a perfectly good sense: ‘the inference which genuine philosophers will draw from the foregoing considerations is this: it seems that death is a shortcut to the goal of our life’s endeavour.’ But what of μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει which in the mss. Follow ἐκφέρειν? The unmeaning superfluity and intolerable clumsiness of this addition surely ought not to be laid to the charge of Plato. A glance at the notes of the various editors is enough to show the hopelessness of extracting any sense from the phrase as it stands in the texts. Again, as I think, the acuteness of Schleiermacher has solved the difficulty. If, as he proposes, we place the words after ἔχωμεν, they are perfectly appropriate and restore the balance of the sentence, which will then run ‘it seems that a kind of shortcut brings us to our goal; because, so long as we have the body as a partner with the reason in our search for truth, and our soul is mixed up with this plague, we shall never fully attain the object of our desires.’ Cf. 65e-66a μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. As evidence of confusion in the mss. it may be noted that the position of ἡμᾶς varies; on which account Hermann brackets it. Possibly we should translate τοῦ λογισμοῦ ‘our theory’, not ‘reason’, because in the latter sense Plato usually says μετὰ λογισμοῦ, not μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ: cf. Timaeus 28a, Protagoras 324b. But in Timaeus 70a we have τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον. I still feel doubtful whether some words have not fallen out: ἀτραπός seems to require definition; and possibly the misplaced phrase extruded something like ὁθάνατος after ἐκφέρειν. For the use of ἐκφέρειν Heindorf quotes Sophocles Aias 7: and somewhat similar is the use of the passive in Cratylus 386a.
2 διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν: Compare Timaeus 43b-44a.
3 οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι: This, as indicated by τὸ λεγόμενον, was no doubt a common phrase, to which Plato has given a turn of his own. Wyttenbach observes ‘nondum satis cognitum, ὡς ἀληθῶς et item τῷ ὄντι citatis locis addi’. He might have added that Plato uses these words when he is giving the popular phrase a deeper meaning, as here and in Phaedrus 256b τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν.
4 διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν: cf. Republic 373d.
5 αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα: ‘the realities of things’, i.e. the ideas. For this use of πράγματα compare 99e βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.
6 ὁ θεὸς: Z. and St. add αὐτὸς.
7 μετὰ τοιούτων: I take this to be neuter; i.e. the contents of the ideal world. Cf. Phaedrus 249c πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεί ἐστιν μνήμῃ κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστι.
8 τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές: I have bracketed these words, which I believe to be a mere gloss on εἰλικρινές, derived from 66b φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές.
9 μὴ καθαρῷ: ‘for I doubt it is not lawful for the impure to reach the pure’.
Phaedo, Part 12.
—“Then,” said Sokrates, “if this is true, my friend, I have great hopes that when I reach the place to which I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, attain fully to that which has been my chief object in my past life, so that the journey which is now
—“Certainly,” said Simmias.
—“And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now
—“Certainly,” said he.
—“Well, then, this is what we call death, is it not, a release and separation from the body?”
—“Exactly so,” said he.
—“But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not?”
—“Obviously.”
—“Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly
—“Of course.”
—“In fact, then, Simmias,” said he, “the true philosophers practice dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining
—“Very foolish, certainly,” said he.
Φαιδων, Part 12.
—οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
—κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
—οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;
—παντάπασί γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
—λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι
—φαίνεται.
—οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα
—γελοῖον: πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
—τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δή
—πολλὴ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
1 ἐκλυομένην: notice the present: ‘working out her deliverance’.
2 ὥσπερ δεσμῶν: Z. has ἐκ δεσμῶν
3 μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι: chiefly, nay only, the philosophers’.
4 τούτου δή: δέ, corr. Madvig. I follow Schanz in adopting δή, since the vulgate gives a somewhat ill-balanced sentence: thus we may translate, ‘if they are at feud with the body on every issue and desire to keep the soul to herself, then, should they fear and fret on attainment of this object, were it not the height of perversity, not to go thither with gladness, where on their arrival they hope to possess that which they loved all their life long? Z. and St. retain δέ.
5 ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον: referring to οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη.
Phaedo, Part 13.
—“Then is it not,” said Sokrates, “a sufficient indication, when you see a man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body?
—“Certainly,” said he, “it is as you say.”
—“Then, Simmias,” he continued, “is not that which is called courage especially characteristic of philosophers?”
—“By all means,” said he.
—“And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body
—“Necessarily,” said he.
—“For,” said Sokrates, “if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men, you will see that they are absurd.”
—“How so, Sokrates?”
—“You know, do you not, that all other men count death among the great evils?”
—“They certainly do.”
—“And do not brave men face death—when they do face it—through fear of greater evils?”
—“That is true.”
—“Then all except philosophers are brave through fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice.”
—
—“And how about those of seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible, nevertheless their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for they fear that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others. And yet being ruled by pleasures
—“So it seems.”
—“My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things
Φαιδων, Part 13.
—οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός, ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ᾽
—πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις.
—ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία
—πάντως δήπου, ἔφη.
—οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἆρ᾽ οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν;
—εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις,
—πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;
—οἶσθα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν;
—καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν;
—ἔστι ταῦτα.
—τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει
—
—τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν: ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην: φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν
—ἔοικε γάρ.
—ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν
1 φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος: Cf. 82c: these correspond to the ὀλιγαρχικὸς and τιμοκρατικὸς ἀνὴρ of Republic IX.
2 ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία: The philosopher faces death with calmness and abstains from bodily indulgence; therefore he is courageous and temperate even in the popular sense, although his courage and temperance arise from a widely different source to that of the vulgar. τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις, i.e. the character described in the preceding chapter, τοῖς τῷ σώματι διαβεβλημένοις.
3 ἐθέλεις: Z. has ἐθελήσεις.
4 τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει: Schanz well compares 78c τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ.
5 ἄλλων…ἡδονῶν: Schanz brackets ἄλλων, which, he says, is omitted in the citation of this passage by Iamblichos. I think however it is wanted.
6 πρὸς ἀρετὴν: ‘in respect to virtue’: the preposition is not used in quite the same sense as in the words that follow.
7 καὶ τούτου μὲν: ‘and that all that is bought for this and with this that and that alone is in reality, whether it be fortitude or temperance or justice; and in a word that true virtue only exists when accompanied by wisdom’. Cope, μετὰ τούτου = along with this: it is the presence of φρόνησις {phronesis, understanding} which gives all virtue its value. If we press the metaphor too hard, it breaks down; for money is of value only for the sake of what it can buy. Plato however merely means that φρόνησις {understanding} is the only true currency; all else is base coin.
8 ἀληθὴς ἀρετή ᾖ: I have followed Schanz, after Heindorf, in adding ᾖ after ἀρετή, although it is not in 69b, and is not absolutely required. But the ἀρετή of 69c-d is in favour of it, and it certainly improves the sentence. St. omits it.
9 μετὰ φρονήσεως: The true nature of the philosophic ἀρετὴ can only be understood by studying the latter part of the sixth book of the Republic. φρόνησις is cognition of the truth, that is, of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν {one’s own good, personal good}. Plato found his escape from utilitarianism by identifying the source of morality with the source of existence; his ethics are the outcome of his ontology. All things are good in so far as they are like the idea of the good; therefore to him that would be really good knowledge of the idea is indispensable. With the conception of ἀνδρεία {andreía, courage, valor} in this passage compare the definition in Republic 442b-c Καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ οἶμαι τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασῴζῃ διά τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή. {Republic 441d-b-c Each of us also in whom the several [soul] parts within him perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair.…it belongs to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally.…the blending of music and gymnastics will render them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm.…And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase, will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to its own work perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting that it should, and so overturn the entire life of all.…these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel, the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler’s designs. Brave…we call each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared.…But wise by that small part that ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three.}
10 σκιαγραφία: ‘a rough sketch’. σκιαγραφία was a kind of painting meant to produce its effect at a distance and not to be inspected close at hand: see Theaetetus 208e ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφειστήκη πόῤῥωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι. Also Parmenides 165c-d οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἓν πάντα φαινόμενα ταὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι. πάνυ γε. προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς. Compare Republic 523b. From Aristotle Rhetoric III xii 1414a 8 it seems to have been a sort of scene-painting, as Mr. Cope translates it: ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικεν τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ: ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ᾖ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρώτερον ἡ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περίεργα καὶ χείρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις {The deliberative style is exactly like a rough sketch, for the greater the crowd, the further off is the point of view}. Cf. Metaphysics Δ xxix 1024b 23 τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἔστι μὲν ὄντα, πέφυκε μέντοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἃ μὴ ἔστιν (οἷον ἡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια: ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστι μέν τι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὧν ἐμποιεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν). The meaning therefore is that on a superficial view the popular virtue seems identical with the philosophic, but on closer examination is found to fall far short of it.
11 ἀνδραποδώδης: cf. Republic 430b δοκεῖς μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, τήν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Olympiodoros says καλεῖ δὲ ὁ Πλάτων τὰς μὲν φυσικὰς ἀνδραποδώδης, ὡς καὶ ἀνδραπόδοις δυναμένας ὑπάρχειν, τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς σκιαγραφίας· τὸ ὅτι γὰρ μόνον ἔχουσι, σκιὰ δὲ τὸ ὅτι τοῦδιότι. The distinction between ἠθικαὶ and φυσικαὶ however is not made in the present passage. For a discussion of this whole subject of popular virtue see Appendix I.
12 οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς: After this some mss. insert εἶναι, which Schanz retains within brackets. It is obviously wrong and ought not to cumber the text.
13 τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς: ‘but the reality is actually a process of purification from all such things, and temperance and justice and wisdom itself are a completed purification’. τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. the worldly considerations on which the δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ is based. κάθαρσίς is explained above in 67c; κάθαρσίς is a completed κάθαρσίς. Τὸ ἀληθὲς is opposed to σκιαγραφία.
14 τὰς τελετὰς: It seems probable, as Stallbaum says, that the Orphic traditions are in Plato’s mind, not the Eleusinian mysteries. The line πολλοί μὲν βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι is said by Olympiodoros to be Orphic. Plato is fond of borrowing terms of ritual, as in Phaedrus 250c, Laws 759c, Timaeus 44c.
15 ἐν βορβόρῳ: cf. Republic 363d τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἅιδου.
16 ὧν: ‘of whose number’.
17 ἠνύσαμεν: I have retained the reading of the best mss., which also seems to give the best sense: ‘if I have been right in my desire to join the company of philosophers, and if we (οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες) have profited aught by our philosophy’. In this way we avoid any harshness in the change from singular to plural. Schanz and Z. give ἠνυσάμην.
18 τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει: Ast is undoubtedly right in bracketing these words, which are utterly pointless, and clearly interpolated from 70a.
Phaedo, Part 14.
—When Sokrates had finished, Kebes answered and said: “Sokrates, I agree to
—“What you say, Kebes, is true,” said Sokrates. “Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?”
—“I do,” said Kebes. “I should like to hear what you think about it.”
—“Well,” said Sokrates, “I do not believe anyone who heard us now,
Thus we distinctly see that the question of the immortality of the soul turns up, not as the main subject of the dialogue, but as arising out of the principal thesis.
—εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη: ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι,
—ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης: ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή;
—ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν.
—οὔκουν γ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν
1 μή, ἐπειδὰν: Various devices have been resorted to by several editors to avoid the intolerably harsh asyndeton in this sentence. The mildest remedy is that of Heindorf, who puts a comma after τοῦ σώματος, thus joining ἀπαλλαττομένη; with the previous clause. But it seems to me that we cannot divorce ἀπαλλαττομένη and ἐκβαίνουσα. Schanz brackets οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ, the last words closely resembling οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ just above and being repeated verbatim at 84e. But this subsequent repetition seems really in their favour, where Sokrates is expressly referring to the apprehension which is uttered here and which then seems to have been lulled to rest. Moreover if these words are omitted the rhythm of the sentence halts lamentably. I agree with Hirschig in suspecting διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται to be the intruders: the words are superfluous and suspiciously like a gloss.
2 παραμυθίας: ‘reassurance’. Cf. 115d ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ᾽ ἐμαυτόν. And see Euthydemus 290a, Laws 720a, 773e.
3 ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχὴ: Note that there are two distinct propositions to be proved, (1) that the soul exists in Hades, (2) that she has faculties and intelligence.
4 κωμῳδοποιὸς: Notwithstanding the friendly treatment of Aristophanes in the Symposium we see in Apology 18b following, how deeply Plato resented the attacks made by the comedians upon Sokrates: cf. especially the reference to the Clouds in 19c.
5 Eupolis, quoted by Olympiodoros, calls Sokrates τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην, and no doubt it was a favourile epithet with the comic poets. Plato has adopted the word, apparently in sheer defiance; and wherever ἀδολεσχεῖν, ἀ- δολέσχης, ἀδολεσχία occur in the dialogues, we may be sure the term is applied to the genuine philosopher. A very notable instance is Sophist 225 D, where in seeking the sophist we stumble upon somebody very like Sokrates: compare too Theaetetus 195 B, C, Phaedrus 269 E (where see Dr Thompson’s admirable note), Cratylus 401 B, Parmenides 135 Ὁ, Republic 488 E, Politicus 299 B. The strict meaning of the word is fairly given in οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦ-μαι.
Phaedo, Part 15.
—“Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there,
—“Certainly,” said Kebes.
—“Now,” said he, “if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated
—“Yes.”
—“And if it becomes smaller,
—“That is true,” said he.
—“And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the slower from the quicker?”
—“Certainly.”
—“And the worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust?”
—“Of course.”
—“Then,” said he, “we have this fact sufficiently established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites?”
—“Certainly.”
—“Now then, is there between all these pairs of opposites what may be called
—“Yes,” said he.
—“And similarly analyzing and combining, and cooling and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the other?”
—“Certainly” said he.
Phaedo 70c-72d, cc. xv xvii. Tradition says that the souls of the dead come back from Hades and live again on earth. That this belief is reasonable we may argue in the following way. All nature shows the generation of opposite from opposite; thus greater arises from less, worse from better, swifter from slower. And between each of such pairs of opposites there are two processes, one in either direction; as between greater and less are increase and decrease, and similar processes between every other pair. Therefore since life and death are such a pair of opposites, we shall expect to find two similar processes between the living and the dead. We see one such process take place before our eyes; the living pass over to the dead: if then nature’s work is not here left incomplete, there must be the other process that we do not see, and the dead pass over to the living. A yet stronger confirmation is this: did all things travel in one direction and were there no return, in the end all living things would die and remain dead, and life would be swallowed up in death. But if it be true that souls return again from the dead, they must be somewhere after their departure from the body; for certainly if they perished utterly, they could return again no more.
We have here one half of the first stage of the argument, which is complemented by the inference from reminiscence that follows. It is true, this argument of ἀνταπόδοσις {antapódosis, recompense} implies the ante natal existence of the soul, but it is used mainly as evidence of her existence after death. Note also that it proves ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Ἅιδου, not ὡς δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει.
Φαιδων, Part 15.
—σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτ᾽ ἄρα ἐν Ἅιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
—μὴ τοίνυν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν,
—ναί.
—οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον
—ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη.
—καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον;
—πάνυ γε.
—τί δέ; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου;
—πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
—ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα;
—πάνυ γε.
—ί δ᾽ αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις,
—ναί, ἔφη.
—οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
1 παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος: Herodotus II 123 states that the Egyptians believed in the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and adds: τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἳ Ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἳ μὲν πρότερον οἳ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν ἐόντι: τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα οὐ γράφω {There are Greeks who have used this doctrine, some earlier and some later, as if it were their own; I know their names, but do not record them.}. He doubtless refers, as Grote says, to the Orphic and Pythagorean sects; to whom may be added Empedokles.
2 ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν: It is true, as Olympiodoros remarks, that we cannot from this particular sentence infer τὸν Πλάτωνα πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀθανατίζειν. But since Olympiodoros implies that Plato did not hold all soul to be immortal, it may be as well to point out that he did; cf. Phaedrus 245 c. Moreover a glance at any passage treating of metempsychosis (e. g. Phaedrus 249b will show us that Plato was not so irrational as to deny immortality to the souls of beasts, while conceding it to those of men; and Timaeus 77a following, proves that he was not so unscientific as to draw a hard and fast line between animal and vegetable life.
In the present passage Plato appeals to the uniformity of nature. If the presence of a given condition in any of the γιγνόμενα is the result of a γένεσις {génesis, origin, birth, source}, it must be a γένεσις from the opposite condition, where such an opposite exists: if a thing has become cold it must have been warm and so forth. We observe moreover that in all instances there exist γένεσις in both directions, whence we infer that alternation is a law of nature. And since we see that this law is in force in all cases which fall under our experience, it is fair to assume that it is in force in all cases where our experience fails us. Accordingly when between a pair of opposites we observe one occurring, while the other γένεσις is from the nature of things beyond our observation, we may infer that the latter also occurs though we cannot perceive it.
3 τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου: I see no necessity to read αὐτῷ with Z. from Baiter’s conjecture.
4 μεῖζον: The use of the comparative throughout denotes that the condition is the result of a γένεσις. We shall presently see the application of this. The positive, in such terms as μέγα—σμικρόν, ταχύ—βραδύ, though these all express relations, implies no self-regarding relation. We must therefore use the comparative to denote a relation between two successive conditions of the same object. But any positive which necessarily implied a relation of one and the same object to itself in another condition would answer just the same purpose as the comparative. Such a positive we actually find in the word τεθηκός, which logically implies ζῶν as a previous condition of the object. Therefore whatever generalisation we establish between μεῖζον—ἔλαττον, θᾶττον—βραδύτερον etc., holds good also of ζῶν and τεθηκός. And since we affirm that between every pair of these comparatives two γένεσεις take place, therefore between ζῶν and τεθηκός, besides the γένεσις that we see, viz. Ἀποθνήσκειν {apothnēskein, death}, there must be another γένεσις that we do not see, viz. Ἀναβιώσκεσθαι {regeneration, resurrection, to the living}; if we are to suppose that the operation of nature is uniform. The comparatives in fact show under what circumstances γένεσις take place, i.e. between opposite conditions of the same thing.
5 κἂν εἰ μὴ: i.e. the processes exist, even in those cases where we have no names to describe them. The argument is that were there no alternation of processes we should have all things at last stationary on one side or the other.
6 ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἑκατέρου: Schanz brackets these words: they are not indeed necessary but the pleonasm seems to me Platonic, and their omission seriously impairs the rhythm.
Phaedo, Part 16.
—
—“Certainly,” said Kebes.
—“What?”
—“Being dead,” said he.
—“Then these two are generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them are two; is it not so?”
—“Of course.”
—“Now,” said Sokrates, “I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its intermediate processes; and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake,
—“Certainly.”
—“Now do you,” said he, “tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?”
—“I do.”
—“And that they are generated one from the other?”
—“Yes.”
—“Now what is it which is generated from the living?”
—“The dead,” said he.
—“And what,” said Sokrates, “from the dead?”
—“I can say only one thing—the living.”
—“From the dead, then, Kebes, the living, both things and persons,
—“Evidently,” said he.
—“Then,” said Sokrates, “our souls exist in the other world.”
—“So it seems.”
—“And of the two processes of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?”
—“Certainly,” said he.
—“Well then,” said Sokrates, “what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying?”
—“Certainly we must,” said he.
—“What is this process?”
—“Coming to life again.”
—“Then,” said Sokrates, “if there be such a thing as
—“Certainly.”
—“So by this method also we reach the conclusion that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life.”
—“I think, Sokrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions.”
Φαιδων, Part 16.
—
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
—Tί; <
br>—Tὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη.
—Oὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστιν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν;
—πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
—τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ,
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
—λέγε δή μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;
—ἔγωγε.
—γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων;
—ναί.
—ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον;
—τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη.
—τί δέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος;
—ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν.
—ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται;
—
—εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἅιδου.
—ἔοικεν.
—οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἥ γ᾽ ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, ἢ οὔ;
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
—πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν;
—πάντως που, ἔφη.
—τίνα ταύτην; τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν
—πάνυ γε.
—ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ
—δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.
1 ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ: Sokrates pursues the same plan in 105b following, καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ.
2 ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος: It is necessary to remember the exact sense of the two opposites, according to the definition given in 64c καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶναι. ζῶν then is applied to soul and body united, τεθνηκὸς to soul and body asunder. A very similar use of the word ζῶν is to be found in Sophocles Oedipus Colonus 999, οἷς ἐγὼ οὐδὲ τὴν πατρὸς|ψυχὴν ἂν οἶμαι ζῶσαν ἀντειπεῖν ἐμοί. The soul of Laios is certainly not regarded as extinct, therefore ζῶσαν can only mean ‘if it returned to bodily life.’
3 καὶ ταύτῃ: i.e. by demonstration as well as by tradition; cf. 70c.
4 ἐδόκει: 70d.
Phaedo, Part 17.
—“Now here is another method, Kebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions.
—“What do you mean?” said he.
—“It is not at all hard,” said Sokrates, “to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep,
—“I see none, Sokrates,” said Kebes. “What you say seems to be perfectly true.”
—“I think, Kebes,” said he, “it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead
Φαιδων, Part 17.
—ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως,
—πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.
—οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω: ἀλλ᾽ οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ᾽
—οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
—ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς
1 ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως: In this chapter we have a statement of the fundamental principle on which not only the foregoing argument but all Plato’s reasoning in favour of immortality is based; viz. that the sum total of spirit is a constant quantity. Plato has seized upon this principle of conservation of energy as the only rational method of defending the indestructibility of soul: he has applied to spirit the axiom which previous philosophers laid down for matter; as Anaxagoras expresses γινώσκειν χρὴ ὅτι πάντα οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω ἔστιν οὐδὲ πλέω· οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλέω εἷναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα αἰεί{nothing comes into being or passes away, but there is mingling and separation of things that are. So they would be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away separation}. Similarly the τύκνωσις καὶ ἀραίωσις {The process by which things grow is twofold, condensation (πύκνωσις) and rarefaction (ἀραίωσις)} of Anaximenes, the ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω {The road up and the road down is one and the same} of Herakleitos, the σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις {condensation and dissolution; There is no substance of any of all the things that perish, nor any cessation for them of baneful death. They are only a mingling and interchange of what has been mingled. Substance is but a name given to these things by men} Empedokles, all implied that γένεσις was not creation out of nothing but a passing from one form into another. Cf. Aristotle Metaphysics XI vi 1062 b 23 τὸ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος [25] γίγνεσθαι, πᾶν δ᾽ ἐξ ὄντος, σχεδὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν περὶ φύσεως {that nothing comes from what is not, but everything from what is, is a doctrine common to nearly all natural philosophers}.
2 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ: ‘for if there were not a perpetual correspondence between the two in generation, just as if they revolved in a circle’. Cope. ἀνταποδίδοίη is here intransitive, as in Aristotle Meteorolgica xi 347b 32 ὡς δ’ ἐκεῖ χάλαζα, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀνταποδίδωσι τὸ ὅμοιον. Cf. below 72b.
3 εὐθεῖά τις: This of course implies that the straight line is finite, i.e. there is not an indefinite quantity of soul in existence, nor can fresh souls be created out of nothing. Plato has taken his metaphor from the δίαυλος δρόμος.
4 τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα: compare Phaedrus 245d-e 77 ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν [245e] πᾶσάν τε γῆν εἰς ἓν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται.
5 πάντ᾽ ἂν: I have followed Schanz and others in supplying ἂν. ἀποδείξειεν could hardly stand without it, since the subject of φαίνοιτο is different. Z. omits it.
6 καθεύδειν: This seems to be a gloss, and it was condemned by Dobree: the editors however retain it.
7 ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα: The ὁμοιομερῆ of Anaxagoras, infinite in number and infinitely divisible, were mixed in formless confusion until νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν.
8 ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων: i.e. ἐκ τῶν μὴ τεθνεώτων, as Heindorf saw. If τὰ ζῶντα were derived from a reserve store of existence which had not passed through life and death, in time this store would be exhausted and all be absorbed in death. The converse is stated in Republic 611a τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω: εἰ δ᾽ ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς ὅτι [αἱ ψυχαὶ] ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί. οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐλάττους γένοιντο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε αὖ πλείους: εἰ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα.
9 τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι: After these words the mss. have καὶ ταῖς μέν γε [or μέν] ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον. The inconsequence of this stupid interpolation is so glaring that I have ejected the clause bodily from the text: its author, whose memory is sounder than his logic, was doubtless prompted by 63c πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. The words are retained by Hermann and the Zürich editors, bracketed by Stallbaum and Schanz.
Phaedo, Part 18.
—“And besides,” Kebes rejoined, “if it is true, Sokrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember. But this is impossible if
—“But, Kebes,” said Simmias, “what were the proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now.”
—“Briefly,” said Kebes, “a very good proof is this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them
—“And if you are not convinced in that way, Simmias,” said Sokrates, “see if you don’t agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?”
—“I am not incredulous,” said Simmias, “but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Kebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear
—“It was this,” said he. “We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?”
—“Certainly,” said he.
—“Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that
—“What do you mean?”
—“Let me give an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre.”
—“Of course.”
—“Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Kebes, and I could cite countless such examples.”
—“To be sure you could,” said Simmias.
—”Now,” said he,
—“Certainly,” he replied.
—“Well, then,” said Sokrates, “can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Kebes?”
—“Surely.”
—“And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded
—“Yes,” said he.
The argument from ἀνάμνησις {recollection, soul memory} proves the existence of the soul before birth; thus supplementing ἀνταπόδοσις which is chiefly used to show her existence after death. Moreover ἀνάμνησις shows, what ἀνταπόδοσις did not, that the soul δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει apart from the body.
—καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας
—ἀλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με: οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι.
—ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ,
—εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθῃ, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τῇδέ πῄ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν;
—ἀπιστῶ μέν σοι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν
—
—πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη.
—ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε. ἐάν τίς τι [πρότερον]
—πῶς λέγεις;
—οἷον τὰ τοιάδε: ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας.
—πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
—οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο: ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις: ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη.
—μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
—ί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς: ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι;
—πάνυ γε.
—οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα
1 ὃν σὺ εἴωθας: This must not be regarded as true of the historic Sokrates.
2 ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ: Olympiodoros’ explanation of καλῶς deserves perpetuation: ὀρθῶς καὶ Πλατωνικῶς καὶ μὴ βωμολόχως. Plato’s views will be best understood by comparing Theaetetus 149a-151d with Republic 518b-d.
3 ποιῆσαι: I have followed Schanz in adopting Hirschig’s emendation. I cannot believe in such a construction as οἷοί τε ποιήσειν, and not a single instance has been adduced in its defence. The fact that κινδυνεύειν sometimes is followed by the future infinitive is quite irrelevant. Z. and St. have ποιήσειν.
4 ἐπεί τοι: So Heindorf for ἔπειτα. This seems absolutely required by the sense: surely the geometrical demonstrations are meant to furnish an instance, of what Kebes has just been saying, not an additional piece of evidence for ἀνάμνησις. H. Schmidt has much to say against Heindorf and for the vulgate; but the cogency of his argument is not proportionate to its length. ἔπειτα is retained by Z. St. and Schanz.
5 τὰ διαγράμματα: mathematical diagrams. The interrogation of the slave in Meno 82b following, is of course a case in point.
6 κατηγορεῖ: Subject the same as of ἄγῃ: it has been suggested that κατηγορεῖ is impersonal, but there is not a shadow of authority for such a use.
7 παθεῖν: mss. μαθεῖν, which is retained by Wohlrab and defended by Schmidt. But παθεῖν is so much more pointed and the alteration is so slight, that I have followed Schanz and most of the later editors in adopting it. ‘I desire personal experience of the very thing we are talking about’.
8 ἐάν τίς τι [πρότερον] It is possible to defend πρότερον, since the perception must precede the reminiscence. But there is no point in this, and the word seems to have crept in from πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι above.
9 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ: This is probably the earliest mention of what has been known since Locke as ‘association of ideas’. Compare Aristotle περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως II 451b 16, where he refines upon the simple classification of Plato (ἀφ’ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίων) by starting the sequence ἀφ’ ὁμοίου καὶ ἐναντίου καὶ τοῦ σύνεγγυς: he deals too with the process as an act of volition.
10 ἐπελέληστο: Compare the definition in Laws 732b ἀνάμνησις δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως ἀπολειπούσης {where there is a constant efflux, there must also be a corresponding influx, and when wisdom flows away, the proper influx consists in recollection}.
11 οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα: The order in which these illustrations are arranged seems at first sight strange. For instead of working up from the simpler and more direct cases of association to the more complex, we have, as it were, a descending scale: it is surely more remarkable that the picture of a lyre should remind us of some particular human being than that a picture of Simmias should remind us of the living Simmias. But the explanation is simple, if we remember how Plato intends to apply his analogy. The particulars, by which we are reminded of the ideas, stand in much the same relation to the ideas as the painted Simmias to the real Simmias: hence by this arrangement of his examples Plato emphasises exactly the right form of the analogy. This is one of ten thousand proofs of the astonishing carefulness of Plato’s writing. Also it is worth noticing that although the relation between ideas and particulars is in the Phaedo, as in the Republic, still undefined (see 100d), this passage distinctly foreshadows the doctrine of μίμησις {mīmēsis, “to imitate”}, imitation cannot be the ideal, or true}, which is evolved in the Philebus and Timaeus.
Phaedo, Part 19.
—“All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?”
—“Yes.”
—“And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?”
—“Inevitably,” he replied.
—“Now see,” said he, “if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?”
—
—“And do we know what it is?”
—“Certainly,” said he.
—“Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?”
—“Certainly.”
—“Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or
—“No, Sokrates, never.”
—“Then,” said he, “those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract.”
—“Not at all, I should say, Sokrates.”
—“But from those equals,” said he, “which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?”
—“Very true,” he replied.
—“And it is either like them or unlike them?”
—“Certainly.”
—“It makes no difference,” said he.
“Whenever the sight of one thing
—“Surely.”
—“Now then,” said he, “do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?”
—“They fall very far short of it,” said he.
—“Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, ‘This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short
—“We must.”
—“Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?”
—“It certainly is.”
—“Then we must have had knowledge of equality
—“That is true.”
—“And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike.”
—“Yes, Sokrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument.”
—“Then it is through the senses that we must learn
—“Yes.”
—“Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it.”
—“That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Sokrates.”
—“And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?”
—
—“But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?”
—“Yes.”
—“Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born.”
—“It does.”
Φαιδων, Part 19.
—ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίων,
—συμβαίνει.
—ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνῄσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη;
—ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
—σκόπει δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον: φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;
—
—ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν;
—πάνυ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
—πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
—
—οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα
—οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ᾽, ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας;
—ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.
—οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος
—πάνυ γε.
—διαφέρει δέ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐδέν: ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
—τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς: ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν, 9
—καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ.
—οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων,
—ἀνάγκη.
—τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ οὒ περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον;
παντάπασί γε.
—ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ
—ἔστι ταῦτα.
—ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων: ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.
—ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρός γε ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος.
—ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι
—οὕτως.
—πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα.
—ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν;
—πάνυ γε.
—
—ναί.
—πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.
—ἔοικεν.
1 εἶναι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίων: as in the last example of the previous chapter. Reminiscence of the ideas by means of the particulars is ἀνάμνησις ἀφ’ όμοίων {recollection of the similar}.
2 λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην: This does not mean that the knowledge of the idea is derived from the particulars, which is in itself impossible and is contradictory to 75b: but the knowledge that we possess of the idea is awakened by the perception of the particulars. ἔννοια is the more accurate word used later on. Cf. 74c τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας. The simile of the aviary in Theaetetus 197d would not be unapt here: knowledge of the idea is our possession, but it is not actually in our grasp until awakened by ἀνάμνησις.
3 σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε: The following sentences furnish proof of the independent existence of the idea; in 74d begins the proof that our knowledge of it must have been prior to our observation of the particulars.
4 τῷ μὲν: So Schanz with B. The ordinary reading is τοτὲ μὲν…τοτὲ δέ, which Schleiermacher approves on the ground that the defective equality of the particulars appears in their seeming to the same observer now equal now unequal. Prof. Geddes takes the same view: ‘Plato is not reasoning from the variety of judgments among men generally: his argumentation proceeds as if there was but one soul in the universe to hold converse with the outer world’. Surely this is quite unnecessary. The existence of a conflict of opinion is sufficient to establish the difference between the particulars and the idea: in the case of the latter no such conflict does or can exist. τοτὲ has inferior ms. support and is clumsy after ἐνίοτε.
5 αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα: This very strange phrase has a parallel in Parmenides 129b εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν οἶμαι ἦν. In the present passage various explanations have been given: (1) that of Olympiodoros, that the plural represents the idea as thought by several minds; this is adopted by most commentators: (2) that it represents the idea as exemplified in several sets of equal particulars; to this approximates the view of Schneider, that αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα means the separate ideas of equal logs, equal stones etc. But whoever heard of the idea of an equal log? (3) Doederlein supposes that αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα means perfectly equal objects, such as can be conceived but do not exist in nature. But this makes Sokrates ask ‘do things, which ex hypothesi seem to you equal, seem to you unequal?’ besides there is no point in the introduction of these imaginary equals. (4) Heindorf seems to me to come much nearer the truth. After quoting the Parmenides he adds ‘multitudinis numerus adhiberi in his potuit, quoniam aequalitatis vel similitudinis notio non unum continet, sed ad duo certe refertur’. When Plato asks ‘does the idea of equality seem equal or unequal?’ the implied comparison compels him perforce to use the plural; not that he thinks there are more ideas of equality than one, but because to ask whether one thing is equal or unequal is sheer nonsense. He immediately explains the unusual phrase in the following words, ‘I mean, does equality ever appear to you inequality?’ By the time Plato wrote the Parmenides he had got rid of these unfortunate ideas of relations: for in the passage quoted Sokrates is stating the earlier form of the ideal theory: and probably he there used the plural not without the intention of pointing to the contradiction which such ideas involve. Schleiermacher takes αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα to be the particulars; but his explanation is in itself very unsatisfactory and requires an alteration of the text.
6 ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα: i.e. the equal particulars.
7 ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας: ‘you have recalled and gained’; see on 73 C.
8 [οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος]: From the passage enclosed in brackets I have utterly failed to extract any meaning. Plato has just completed his proof that equal particulars carry back our minds to an idea of equality which is distinct from the particulars: next he is about to show that our knowledge of the idea must have been prior to our observation of the particulars. But between these two necessary links in his argument we find interposed an irrelevant remark to the effect that the process is called ἀνάμνησις whether the object of perception is like or unlike the object of reminiscence. In the present context the repeated definition of ἀνάμνησις is surely pointless; and worse than pointless is the reintroduction of the ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον: for the reminiscence of the idea by means of the particulars is necessarily ἀφ᾽ὁμοίου. I am therefore compelled to treat the words πάνυ μὲν οὖν as an interpolation: a conclusion at which I find Susemihl and Schmidt have also arrived. Stallbaum has an elaborate defence of the words, which might possibly have been more successful had he understood the difficulty. Prof. Geddes (not however on this passage) suggests that particulars may remind us of other ideas besides that to which they belong. But the whole force of the argument comes from the fact that this kind of reminiscence is ἀφ᾽ὁμοίου, for in this case alone are we conscious of a defect in the resemblance (74a); and our consciousness of this defect is our sole warrant for inferring that we must have known the ideas before we perceived the particulars (74e).
9 ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν: St. adds ἴσον, which Z. has within brackets: but the word is absent in the best mss.
10 ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου: ‘or does it fall short of the idea, that is of being similar to it.’ This is the reading of Schanz, which seems quite satisfactory and is very close to the mss. The common reading is τῷ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, which is excellent sense, but μὴ is almost destitute of authority. Madvig would read ἐκείνῷ τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ‘does there lack anything to that quality of being like’: a specimen of Greek composition which one would not rashly impute to Plato.
11 τοιοῦτον εἶναι: The mss. Add ἴσον, which is clearly a gloss. Schanz retains it within brackets.
12 ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω: ‘I count all these sensations as the same thing’; as is shown by the following sentence; not, as Wagner says, ‘I say the same of all these.’
13 πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν: Since all sensuous perceptions do not remind us of equality, Madvig would insert ἴσα after αἰσθήσεσιν, Schanz brackets ἴσον. Against bracketing ἴσον I would urge that it is premature to apply the present argument to all ideas: that is first done in 75c: while the notion of equals so exclusively engrosses our attention throughout the present chapter that Madvig’s insertion seems needless.
14 ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα: Schanz following Hirschig brackets these words: Dr. Jackson independently takes the same view. The objections to them are (1) that they are irrelevant and inapposite, (2) that the use of προθυμεῖται is most strange. I fully acquiesce in the judgment of these scholars that the clause is an unintelligent gloss upon ἐκεῖσε.
15 πρὸ τούτων: i.e. before our perceptions of sight, hearing, etc.
Phaedo, Part 20.
—“Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short,
—“That is true.”
—“And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?”
—“Certainly,
—“But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?”
—“Assuredly.”
—“For we found that it is possible,
—“That is certainly true, Sokrates.”
Φαιδων, Part 20.
—οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες
—ἔστι ταῦτα.
—καὶ εἰ μέν γε λαβόντες ἑκάστοτε
—
—εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα
—πάνυ γε.
—
—καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
1 οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες: ‘if then, having received this knowledge before birth, we were born in possession of it.’ As yet Plato is merely putting the case, without expressing an opinion about it: presently we shall find that we were not born possessing it, except in a dormant state. We now go on to apply the results gained for ἴσον to all the other ideas.
2 ὅπερ λέγω: just above, ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
3 οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα: ‘on which we stamp the character of essence.’ ὃ ἔστι’ is Plato’s technical term to denote the essentiality of the ideas. Plato never descends to forms like αὐτοάνθρωπος, which are common in Aristotle: he would say αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.
4 ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι: i.e. in our dialectical discussions. The conversational method was as distinctive a peculiarity of the form as the ideal theory was of the substance of Plato’s philosophy; and so intimately are the two connected that διαλεκτική, properly ‘the science of dialogue,’ means nothing less than ‘the science of ideas.’ The Sokratic method of examination was distinctly aimed at obtaining a definition or λόγος of the object in question; and this definition was peculiarly the outcome of the method. Plato, in developing the logical concept into a metaphysical essence, scrupulously preserved the method by which the former was attained.
5 ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν: Z. adds εἶναι with some mss.
6 ἑκάστοτε: i.e. ‘and if after receiving it we have not, in every instance of our doing so, forgotten it, we are always born in possession of this knowledge and retain it through life.’ I do not think it necessary to insert γιγνόμενοι after ἑκάστοτε with Heindorf, although I fully agree with his interpretation. Prof. Geddes’ rendering can hardly stand, and he, rather than Heindorf, seems to have mistaken the argument. ‘If we have,’ he says, ‘in all the crises of our history, retained this knowledge.’ But Plato does not say ‘if we have retained,’ but ‘if we have not forgotten’: and though it is sense to say ‘if we have retained it in all the crises,’ it is not sense to say ‘if we have not forgotten it in all the crises’; since we have forgotten it once for all, and that, as Heindorf says, at our birth. I think in fact that ἑκάστοτε is to be taken in close connexion with λαβόντες: ‘in every instance of our receiving it, we have not forgotten.’ (Prof. Geddes is also scarcely accurate in saying that ἐπιστήμη is ἀνάμνησις: Plato says μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις, which is another thing.) The perfect ἐπιλελήσμεθα, as Wohlrab rightly observes, shows that Plato still expresses no opinion.
7 περὶ ταῦτα: This reading seems necessary, although αὐτὰ has stronger ms. authority, ταῦτα means the objects of sense, in antithesis to ἐκείνας. Wohlrab retains αὐτὰ but does not inform us how he proposes to make sense of it.
8 οἰκείαν: ‘a knowledge that is already ours.’
9 ἐφάνη: in 73c.
10 ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου: ‘to derive from this a conception of something different that he had forgotten, with which this was associated, whether unlike or like.’—Cope. ᾧ refers to ἕτερόν τι ἐπιλελήστο, τοῦτο to τούτου. I see no sufficient reason for bracketing the second ᾧ with Schanz. Here there is nothing amiss in the introduction of the ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον, for Plato is expressly repeating the statement in 73c.
Phaedo, Part 21.
—“Which then do you choose, Simmias? Were we born
—“I cannot choose at this moment, Sokrates.”
—“How about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it: When a man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?”
—“Certainly he can, Sokrates.”
—“And do you think that everyone can give an account of the matters about which we have just been talking?”
—“I wish they might,” said Simmias; “but on the contrary I fear that tomorrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly.”
—
—“By no means.”
—“Then they recollect the things they once learned?”
—“Necessarily.”
—“When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human beings.”
—“Certainly not.”
—“Then previously.”
—“Yes.”
—“Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence.”
—“Unless, Sokrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time
—“Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?”
—“None whatever, Sokrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense.”
Φαιδων, Part 21.
—πότερον οὖν αἱρῇ, ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι,
—οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑλέσθαι.
—τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον
—πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων
—βουλοίμην μεντἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας: ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ᾖ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.
—
—οὐδαμῶς.
—ἀναμιμνῄσκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον;
—ἀνάγκη.
—πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ᾽ οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν.
—οὐ δῆτα.
—πρότερον ἄρα.
—ναί.
—ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων,
—εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας: οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος.
—
—οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.
1 δοῦναι λόγον: ‘to give an account’; that is an accurate description of the thing defined, marking its logical differentia. A passage quoted by Wohlrab, Republic 534b, explains the phrase very well: ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; where we may translate λόγον τῆς οὐσίας ‘the principle of its being.’ Compare also 531e. Below, 99e, there will be more to say about λόγος.
2 περὶ τούτων: i.e. the ideas.
3 χωρὶς σωμάτων: This does not necessarily follow: Plato however simply means apart from the human bodies in which they now dwell: cf. 114c, where the purified souls are said to live ἄνευ σωμάτων τὸ παράπαν, although the conditions of their existence are obviously conceived as material. The body from which they are freed by death is the γήϊνον σῶμα of Phaedrus 246c. In the following words καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον Plato marks the additional result he has gained by the appeal to anamnesis.
4 ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ: Simmias suggests that the knowledge may be acquired just at the moment of birth; Sokrates replies, it is impossible, for that is the very moment at which we lose it: we cannot gain and lose it simultaneously. Compare Republic 621a, where the souls that are on the point of returning to earth must drink of the river Ameles. In comparing this passage, as Prof. Geddes does, with Wordsworth’s famous ode, it ought not to be left out of sight that there is a fundamental opposition between them. According to Wordsworth we are born with the ante-natal radiance clinging about us and spend our lives in gradually losing it; according to Plato we lose the vision at birth and spend our lives in gradually recovering it.
Phaedo, Part 22
—“Then, Simmias,” said he, “is this the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these,
—“Sokrates, it seems to me that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that
—“But how about Kebes?” said Sokrates. “For Kebes must be convinced, too.”
—“He is fully convinced, I think,” said Simmias; “and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals. Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed
Φαιδων, Part 22.
—ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν,
—ὑπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε
—τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης: δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν.
—ἱκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι: καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι
1 ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον: Mr. Jackson, in the paper before mentioned, maintains that the words from ὑπάρχουσαν to ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως are spurious. In this opinion I concur for the following reasons: (1) the clause ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν would seem just the same kind of clumsy misapplication of Plato’s phraseology of which we have already seen too much: Plato says (75e) that the knowledge of the ideas is our own; but where does he say that the ideas themselves are our own, and what is the sense of saying so? (2) ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν is a pointless repetition of ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀναφέρομεν: (3) ταῦτα there means sensibles; presently ταῦτα three times refers to the ideas. Wyttenbach, on this very ground, proposes to read αὕτα ἔστιν: (4) though the repetition of οὕτως may be defended, it certainly sounds very awkward here. Accordingly I have bracketed the words. With this omission the sentence will stand: ‘if these ideas exist which are forever on our lips, absolute beauty and goodness and all other absolute essence, and if it is to this essence that we refer all our sense-perceptions, as this surely exists, so surely did our soul exist before our birth’, εἶναι will then depend upon οὕτως ἔχει.
2 εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα: ‘if these ideas do not exist’; not as some take it, ‘if this is not so.’ Cf. below ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι.
3 εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε: i.e. if the ideas do not exist, neither did our souls exist before birth.
4 εἰς καλόν γε: ‘and our argument has found an excellent refuge in the position that the pre-existence of our soul rests on the same assurance as the existence of the ideas.’ Wagner should not have supplied καιρὸν with καλόν, which is explained by the sentence in apposition, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶνα.
5 ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις: νῦν is omitted in some mss. and Schanz brackets it.
6 καὶ ἔμοι δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται This reading has the best authority, and Schanz defends the parenthetical use of ἔμοι δοκεῖ by citing 108 B, Protagoras 314c, Menexenus 236b. Z. and St. give ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.
Phaedo, Part 23.
—“However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved, Sokrates, but the common fear, which Kebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains. For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?”
—
—“It has been shown, Simmias and Kebes, already,” said Sokrates, “if you will combine this conclusion with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and,
Φαιδων, Part 23.
—εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνῄσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαννῦται
—
—ἀποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ ‘θέλετε συνθεῖναι
1 διασκεδαννῦται: The indicative can hardly be right here because we have ᾖ in the next clause, and the change of mood would be meaningless. A parallel form is the optative πήγνυτο in 118a. I do not see on what ground the accentuation διασκεδάννυται (as subjunctive) and πηγνῦτο can be defended, since the forms are clearly contractions. Z. and St. have διασκεδάννυται.
2 τί γὰρ κωλύει: ‘What reason is there why she should not come into being and union from somewhere or other and exist before she enters a human frame, but when she has entered one and is in act of leaving it, she should not at that moment herself come to an end and perish?’
3 ἁμόθεν ποθέν:This is Bekker’s correction of ἄλλοθέν, which is retained by Z. and St.
4 εἰ ‘θέλετε συνθεῖναι: I do not understand how, in the face of this express statement of Plato’s, some have regarded antapodosis {retribution} and anamnesis {recollecton} as two distinct demonstrations of immortality. As he says, they are two halves of a demonstration; one showing the pre-existence, the other the after-existence of the soul.
Phaedo, Part 24.
—“However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially
—And Kebes laughed and said, “Assume that we have that fear, Sokrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin.”
—“Ah,” said Sokrates, “you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear.”
—
—“Hellas, Kebes,” he replied, “is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also. You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could spend your money. And you must seek among yourselves, too, for perhaps you would hardly find others better able to do this than you.”
—“That,” said Kebes, “shall be done. But let us return to the point where we left off,
—“Oh, I am willing, of course.”
—“Good,” said he.
Φαιδων, Part 24.
—ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον,
—καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν: μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς
—ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε.
—
—πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐν ᾗ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη,
—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης: ὅθεν δὲ
—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε: πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;
—καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.
1 διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον: I think the misgivings of Simmias and Kebes arise thus. We have indeed seen that the recurrence of soul is a law of nature; but we are not sufficiently acquainted with the laws of nature and the conditions of their interaction to be perfectly sure how they will work in every particular case. So we are still haunted by the doubt that a soul may, under certain circumstances, be dissipated and destroyed: this doubt can only be satisfied by proving that the eternity of soul can be deduced not only from a universal law but from her own inherent nature. Next anamnesis has placed the eternity of soul on the same footing of assurance as the existence of the ideas: but this is done indirectly; we desire to be convinced that soul not only has had cognition of the ideas, but that she possesses such an affinity with their nature as will justify us in believing that she shares their attribute of eternity; see introduction § 2.
2 διασκεδάννυσιν: Hirschig would read διασκεδαννύῃ. But here the indicative is clearly right. What we fear is, not lest the wind should blow the soul away, but lest it is a fact that it does so.
3 ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς: ‘there is a child within us’; not of course ‘among us.’
4 ἐξιᾴσηται: ‘until you have charmed him out of you.’ This reading is due to Heindorf; the old editions and the best mss. have ἐξεπᾴσητε. Heindorf’s admirable emendation is confirmed by one ms.
5 ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη: For the repetition of ἔφη Wohlrab compares 89c, 103c, 118a.
6 τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη: Plato’s travels had caused him to form a more liberal estimate of barbarian possibilities than was usual in his time. Compare Republic 499c-d εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεώς τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἔν τινι βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ, πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἕτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστιν καὶ γενήσεταί γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. Cf. Symposium 209e.
7 ἂν ἀναγκαιότερον: So Schanz with c: bd omit ἂν. Z. and St. give ἂν εὐκαιρότερον with E.
Phaedo, Part 25.
—“Well then,” said Sokrates, “must we not ask ourselves some such question as this? What kind of thing naturally suffers dispersion, and for what kind of thing might we naturally fear it, and again what kind of thing is not liable to it? And after this must we not inquire to which class the soul belongs and base our hopes or fears for our souls upon the answers to these questions?”
—“You are quite right,” he replied.
—“Now is not that which is compounded
—“I think,” said Kebes, “that is true.”
—“Then it is most probable that things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things?”
—“Yes, I think so.”
—“Let us then,” said he, “turn to what we were discussing before.
—“It must,” said Kebes, “necessarily remain the same,
—“But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?”
—“The latter,” said Kebes; “they are never the same.”
—
—“Certainly,” said he, “that is true.”
Φαιδων, Part 25.
—οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ,
—ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
—δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης.
—οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ
—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.
—ἴωμεν δή, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ᾽ ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν
—ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, ὦ
—τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν,
—Oὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης:
—παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
1 τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὔ: οὔ is not in the mss. but was supplied by Heindorf. It is certainly necessary.
2 καὶ συνθέτῳ: As Prof. Geddes remarks, συνθέτῳ denotes the state which is the result of the process expressed by συνθέντι. Wagner wrongly takes φύσει with συνθέτῳ: it belongs to προσήκει.
3 εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ: It is to be noticed that the present line of argument aims at nothing more than establishing a probability that soul is immortal; and as Kebes afterwards points out, it merely shows that soul should be much more durable than body, not that she is inherently eternal. I consider the chief importance of this part of the dialogue to consist in the opening it gives for the objections of Simmias and Kebes. The former brings in a theory of soul which would be fatal to Plato’s view, were it not refuted; the latter necessitates the final investigation, to which I conceive the present argument is merely preliminary. At the same time we are here first endeavouring to establish a direct connexion between the soul’s nature and that of the ideas.
4 οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ: Change in any object is the result of transposition, compression, or separation of its parts, or of increase or decrease in their number. Consequently that which has no parts cannot suffer change. All material things have parts, therefore the immaterial objects of reason are alone changeless.
5 ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ: 75d.
6 ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι: ‘as whose principle we assign being.’ λόγον = its definition, notion. τοῦ εἶναι is descriptive genitive after λόγον. Madvig proposes τὸ εἶναι, which Schanz adopts: but ms. authority is entirely against him, and there is no real difficulty in the genitive. Here again we have a marked association of the ideal theory with the conversational method.
7 τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν: καλῶν is an obvious interpolation: we are not concerned merely with beautiful particulars; and presently we have ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων, ‘all the particulars which share the name of the ideas.’ The particulars are ὁμώνυμα as being copies of the ideas: see Sophist 234b μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ. Cf. Timaeus 41c.
8 οὔτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς: ‘they hardly ever preserve any constant relation either to themselves or to each other.’ This is one of many passages which show that Plato thoroughly accepted the doctrines of Herakleitos and Protagoras so far as regards the material world.
9 οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης: Z. and St. have οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη, ταῦτα, ὁ Κέβης.
10 τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ: Cf. Phaedrus 247c ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ. See also Timaeus 28a.
Phaedo, Part 26.
—“Now,” said he, “shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?”
—“Let us assume them,” said Kebes.
—“And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?”
—“Let us assume that also,” said he.
—
—“Yes,” he replied.
—“Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?”
—“To the visible,” said he; “that is clear to everyone.”
—“And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?”
—“Invisible, to man, at least, Sokrates.”
Φαιδων, Part 26.
—θῶμεν οὖν βούλει,
—θῶμεν, ἔφη.
—καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀιδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά;
—καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν.
—οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη.
—ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαμὲν ἂν εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα;
—παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ.
—τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀιδές;
—οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.
—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν: ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἴει;
—τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
—τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι;
—οὐχ ὁρατόν.
—ἀιδὲς ἄρα;
—ναί.
—ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ.
1 θῶμεν οὖν βούλει: Z. and St. have εἰ βούλει.
2 τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές: Compare the division of the universe into ὁρατόν and νοητὸν in Republic 509d.
3 ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν: ‘of ourselves is not one part body, the other soul? ’ I agree with Heindorf and Stallbaum in taking ἡμῶν αὐτῶν with tὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ. Ast would join it with ἄλλο τι, on account of the reply, οὐδὲν ἄλλο. But why should special emphasis be laid on the exhaustiveness of the division?
4 οὐχ ὁρατόν: No distinction is intended between οὐχ ὁρατόν and ἀιδὲς. Plato has made his division into ὁρατόν and ἀιδὲς, and since soul is not ὁρατόν, it is ἀιδὲς. No doubt the motive which led Plato to choose ἀιδὲς instead of the direct verbal opposite ἀὁρατόν was the etymological connexion of the former with Ἅιδης: as if he would say that Ἅιδης, far from being the abode of death and nothingness, is the region of true existence alone. That he did connect the words is clear from 80d, 81c, in spite of Cratylus 404b.
Phaedo, Part 27.
—“But we call things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we not?”
—“Yes, we do.”
—“Then what do we say about the soul? Can it be seen or not?”
—“It cannot be seen.”
—“Then it is invisible?”
—“Yes.”
—“Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body is,
—“Necessarily, Sokrates.”
—“Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?”
—“Certainly.”
—“But when the soul
—“Sokrates,” said he, “what you say is perfectly right and true.”
—“And now again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which class do you think
—“I think, Sokrates,” said he, “that anyone, even the dullest, would agree, after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always the same than that which is not.”
—“And the body?”
—“Is more like the other.”
Φαιδων, Part 27.
—οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν,
—πάνυ γε.
—
—παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ
—πᾶς ἄν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου,
—τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα;
—τῷ ἑτέρῳ.
1 πάλαι ἐλέγομεν: 65b following.
2 τότε μὲν ἕλκεται: ‘then she is dragged by the body among things that are never constant, and she herself loses her way and is filled with confusion and dizziness, like one that is drunk; for of such nature are the things that she grasps.’ τοιούτων = πλανωμένων etc., cf. 58d. Plato means that when the soul makes her investigations by the aid of the body, she necessarily is concerned with sensible phenomena; and since these have nothing stable or sure in them, there is a like want of stability and certainty in her perceptions.
3 καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου: ‘she has rest from her wandering, and in dwelling with them is ever constant, since the things that she grasps are constant.’ So in Republic 500c it is said of philosophers, εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ᾽ ἀδικούμενα ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. For πλάνου compare Parmenides 135e οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν.
4 τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα: ‘this condition of hers is called wisdom.’ Olympiodoros is much exercised as to how φρόνησις can be a πάθημα, how an activity of the soul can be denoted by a passive term. But Aristotle, for whom cognition was emphatically an ενέργεια {energy}, says, De Anima III iv 429a 13, εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. I think however that πάθημα here means nothing more than condition: compare Republic 511d, where the term παθήματα is applied to the four mental states corresponding to the four segments of the line.
5 ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου: ‘from this way of approaching the question.’ μεθόδος is frequently used by Plato for ‘scientific method,’ especially dialectic: cf. Republic 510b, Politicus 286d.
6 ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ: Prof. Geddes explains ‘both in the general and in the particular’; which I think is a needless refinement. It is only a strong expression for ‘altogether’ and is not uncommon: see Republic 469c, 527c (with the article), Laws 779b, Cratylus 434a. In Laws 734e we have the reverse order τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ, and in 944c we find ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν in precisely the same sense. In Lysis 215c is the remarkable phrase ἆρά γε ὅλῳ τινὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα; {Can it be, indeed, that we are deceived in the whole matter?}
Phaedo, Part 28.
—“Consider, then, the matter in another way. When the soul
—“Yes, I think so.”
—“Which, then, does the soul resemble?”
—“Clearly, Sokrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal.”
—“Then see, Kebes, if this is not the conclusion from all that we have said,
—“No, we cannot.”
Φαιδων, Part 28.
—ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε
—ἔμοιγε.
—ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικεν;
—δῆλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ.
—σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων
—οὐκ ἔχομεν.
1 ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε: After showing that the soul resembles the ideas (1) in her invisibility (2) in her affinity to the changeless, we now come to the last piece of evidence: that she is mistress over the body and uses it as a slave. Cf. Timaeus 34c γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου ξυνεστήσατο {God constructed Soul to be older than Body and prior in birth and excellence, since she was to be the mistress and ruler and it the ruled}.
2 θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ: Below, 80b, we have the contrast θείῳ—ἀνθρωπίνῳ: but the antithesis θεῖον—θνητὸν occurs Timaeus 69c and d.
3 ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχήν: I have adopted this reading notwithstanding that there is much stronger ms. authority for ψυχή which Schanz Z. and St. retain, ψυχὴ can only be construed by supplying ξυμβαίνει again, which is intolerably harsh. Such instances as Philebus 55a πολλή τις ἀλογία ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι are nothing to the point: such a construction is common enough, but here we have τάδε as the subject of ξυμβαίνει.
4 ἀνοήτῳ: i.e. ‘not the object of intelligence’: a sense which, I believe, ἀνοήτος bears nowhere else; it is however placed beyond doubt by νοήτῳ in the opposite catalogue, by which Olympiodoros absurdly understands ‘intelligent.’ Another rare usage is that of ἀπίθανος in Parmenides 133c, = ‘incredulous.’ Considering the exact correspondence of every word in one list with the antithetical word in the other, Hermann ought not to have wished that the mss. gave αἰσθητῷ.
Phaedo, Part 29.
—“Well then, since this is the case, is it not natural for the body to meet with speedy dissolution and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or nearly so?”
—
—“Observe,” he went on, “that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition, does not undergo these processes at once, but remains for a considerable time, and even for a very long time, if death takes place when the body is in good condition, and at a favorable time of the year. For when the body is shrunk and embalmed, as is done in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incalculable time. And even if the body decay,
—“Yes.”
—“But the soul, the invisible, which departs into another place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, to the realm of the god of the other world in truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go,—is this soul, which has such qualities and such a nature, straightway scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say?
—“By all means.”
—“Then if it is in such a condition, it goes away into that which is like itself, into the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, and when it arrives there it is happy, freed from error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills, and as the initiated say, lives in truth through all after time with the gods. Is this our belief, Kebes, or not?”
Φαιδων, Part 29.
—Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἆρ᾽ οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου;
—
—ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον,
—ναί.
—ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀιδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀιδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς,
—
—παντάπασί γε.
—οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀιδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων
1 ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου: Here is a distinct confession that the foregoing is only an approximate demonstration: we have made out a case of probability, and that is all.
2 ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον: ‘situate in the region of the visible.’
3 καὶ διαπίπτειν: Z. and St. add καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι at which is found in the citations of Stobaeus and Eusebius, but not in the best mss. Hermann justly says ‘imperite ab anima ad corpus translata esse apparet’ {the soul’s governance seems to have transferred to the body}.
4 ἐὰν μέν τις: It seems to me that needless difficulty has been raised over this sentence, χαριέντως ἔχων simply means ‘having his body in a good state,’ and to this τοιαύτῃ refers. If the body were in a healthy condition at death and at a healthy age, it would hold out longer, says Plato, against decomposition. Mr. Cope, I think, is quite correct in translating: ‘if a man die with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous period of his life, a very considerable time indeed.’ The following sentence συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον is bracketed by Schanz after Ast. I see no sufficient reason for doing so; the γὰρ is certainly not very obvious, but may be explained thus, ‘(nor is this the strongest case,) for if a body is embalmed, it remains nearly whole for an incredible time.’ Hirschig brackets ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες: very superfluously. Plato says (1) the body of a healthy man who dies in the prime of life lasts a good while, (2) an Egyptian mummy lasts an indefinite time, (3) even without this some parts of the human frame are almost indestructible.
5 καὶ ἂν σαπῇ: i.e. τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα.
6 εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς: To Hades rightly named, the abode of the unseen. Cf. Gorgias 493b.
7 καὶ συνηθροισμένη: Schanz brackets these words, but they are in the best mss., and I see nothing against them. He omits αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν, which words have much slighter ms. support. I have thought it sufficient to bracket them.
8 ῥᾳδίως: savours of the margin, and I have followed Schanz and Hirschig in bracketing it.
9 ἀγρίων ἐρώτων: Cf. Republic 572b δεινόν τι καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστι {there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable, a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires}.
10 διάγουσῃ: I have ventured to follow Heindorf and Hirschig in reading thus. The mss. all have διάγουσα, which most editors retain, but which I cannot believe that Plato wrote. It is idle to quote Thucydides vii 42 §2: for in the first place it is rash to argue that a construction found in Thucydides is therefore possible in Plato; secondly, it is not a parallel case. When Thucydides says Συρακοσίοις κατάπληξις ἐγένετο {Syracusans were in consternation}, and after a subordinate clause resumes with ὁρῶντες, the shock is not very great; but that after the regular datives εὐδαίμονι, ἀπηλλαγμένῃ Plato should end with this ungrammatical διάγουσα is quite a different thing. More to the purpose is Prof. Geddes’ citation of Phaedrus 241d, where however Schanz reads λέγονθ΄ for λέγων. Not one of the constructions given in Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 271 following, at all justifies this, which is not an anacoluthon but a solecism. It has been suggested to connect διάγουσα with ἀπέρχεται, but I think this is hardly possible.
Phaedo, Part 30.
—“Assuredly,” said Kebes.
—“But, I think,
—“By no means,” said he.
—“But it will be interpenetrated, I suppose, with the corporeal which intercourse and communion with the body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its constant companion and the object of its care?”
—“Certainly.”
—“And, my friend, we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and heavy and earthly and visible. And such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world, and so,
—“That is likely, Sokrates.”
—“It is likely, Kebes. And it is likely that those are not the souls of the good, but those of the base, which are compelled to flit about such places as a punishment for their former evil mode of life. And they flit about
Φαιδων, Part 30.
—οὕτω νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
—
—οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.
—ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην
—πάνυ γε.
—ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν: ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται
—εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης: καὶ οὔ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς
1 οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο: Cf. Theaetetus 155e οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, and Sophist 246a.
2 διειλημμένην: ‘interpenetrated.’ The notion of this word is the mixture of two substances so that the particles of one are held apart by those of the other. The soul’s substance is as it were adulterated by a material alloy. Z. and St. omit καὶ, which is however in the best mss.
3 ξύμφυτον: ‘ingrained.’ The soul’s perpetual communion with the body has so inseparably blended the material and the spiritual that they become virtually one nature; hence even when separated from the body she is not yet freed from matter.
4 βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται: Cf. Phaedrus 248c.
5 περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη: This is an interesting illustration of the manner in which Plato will take some popular belief, as he often takes some popular expression, and fill it with a deeper meaning of his own. In Laws 865d we find another current opinion about ghosts, here however without any special Platonic turn: that if one man killed another the spirit of the slain wandered about his accustomed haunts, terrifying and tormenting the homicide so long as he remained there.
6 τροφῆς: ‘mode of life.’ ἕως ἂν ‘until by craving after that bodily nature which is their companion they are again confined in a body.’ The presence of this material alloy is sufficient to inspire the soul with bodily desires but cannot afford means to gratify them: so that the longing grows more and more intense until the soul is once more confined in her earthy prison.
Phaedo, Part 31.
—“What natures do you mean, Sokrates?”
—“I mean, for example, that those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them, are likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort.
—“Certainly that is very likely.”
—“And those who have chosen injustice and tyranny and robbery pass into the bodies of wolves and hawks and kites. Where else can we imagine that they go?”
—“Beyond a doubt,” said Kebes, “they pass into such creatures.”
—“Then,” said he, “it is clear where all the others go, each in accordance with its own habits?”
—“Yes,” said Kebes, “of course.”
—“Then,” said he, the happiest of those, and those who go to the best place, are those who have practiced,
—“How are these happiest?”
—“Don’t you see? Is it not likely that they pass again into some such social and gentle species as that of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the human race again, and that worthy men spring from them?”
—“Yes.”
—With this chapter should be compared the remarkable passage Timaeus 91d following. The other principal statements of Plato on metempsychosis are in Timaeus 41e-42d, Republic 618a-620c, Phaedrus 249b. Wyttenbach has a long and learned note on the subject, dealing chiefly with neoplatonist views. {Unfortunately Wyttenbach’s translation is unavilable to us.}
Φαιδων, Part 31.
—ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.
—τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
—οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διηυλαβημένους
—τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη: ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν 2 τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι;
—ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.
—οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ᾗ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας
—δῆλον δή, ἔφη: πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
—οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν
—πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι;
—τί; ὅτι τούτους
—εἰκός.
1 μὴ διευλαβημένους: ‘who have not taken heed to their ways.’
2 φαμεν: So Schanz with the best mss., joining ἂν with ἰέναι. Z. and St. φαῖμεν.
3 κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας: ‘according to the peculiar affinities of their pursuits.’ Cf. Timaeus 42c κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου γενέσεως {quote in context: he shall be changed every time, according to the nature of his wickedness, into some bestial form after the similitude of his own nature; nor in his changings shall he cease from woes until he yields himself to the revolution of the Same and Similar that is within him, and dominating by force of reason that burdensome mass}.
4 δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν: As to this popular and social virtue see on 69b and Appendix I. In Republic 619c-d we find that this class of people are in great danger of making a bad choice at the αἵρεσις βίῳν {life’s purpose} One who chose a tyrant’s life was τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἁλισκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους {he had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence, participating in virtue by habit and not by philosophy; and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffering}.
5 τί; ὅτι τούτους: So Schanz: B has ὅτι ού. St. and Z. give ὅτι τούτους.
6 εἰς τοιοῦτον: ‘to another social and gentle race like themselves.’ In Timaeus 91d-e we have another class of harmless but unphilosophic men with a different destination: tτὸ δὲ τῶν ὀρνέων φῦλον μετερρυθμίζετο, ἀντὶ τριχῶν πτερὰ φύον, ἐκ τῶν ἀκάκων ἀνδρῶν, κούφων δέ, καὶ μετεωρολογικῶν μέν, ἡγουμένων δὲ δι’ ὄψεως τὰς περὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις βεβαιοτάτας εἶναι δι’ εὐήθειαν. Who these are we learn in Republic 529a-530c: viz. astronomers who fancy that observation of the heavenly bodies is in itself important, apart from its bearing on philosophy.
7 ἄνδρας μετρίους: ‘worthy citizens’; men who practise δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ {municipal and political virtue} and discharge their social and domestic duties creditably. They belong to a decidedly higher grade than the character described in Republic 554.
Phaedo, Part 32.
—“And no one who has not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to enter into the communion of the gods,
—“No, that would not be seemly for them, Sokrates,” said Kebes.
—“Most assuredly not,”
Φαιδων, Part 32.
—εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος
—οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης.
—
1 εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος: ‘but to the company of the gods none may approach who has not sought wisdom and departed in perfect purity; none but the lover of learning.’ The words ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ are appended as though μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι had not preceded: they are certainly pleonastic, but perfectly natural and intelligible. I see no cause to insert ἄλλῳ, far less to adopt such a violent transposition as Wyttenbach suggests. Φιλομαθὴς and φιλόσοφος are frequently identified by Plato, especially in the passage quoted by Heindorf, Republic 376b τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν {the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same}. St. gives ἄλλῳ ἤ.
2
σώμά τι πλάττοντες: Literally ‘moulding a body,’ i.e. spending all their care on tending the body. Cf. Timaeus 88c τόν τε αὖ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνταποδοτέον κινήσεις {he who is diligent in molding his body must, in turn, provide his soul with motion}. Also Republic 377d καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν {shape the children’s souls by these stories rather than their bodies by their hands}. The usage of the word in the present context easily arises from that in the two passages quoted, where it signifies the development of the body by nourishment and training and in each case is opposed to the culture of the soul. The reading of BCD is σώμάτι, whence Fischer suggested σώμά τι, which with the Zurich editors I have adopted: the τι seems to add a touch of contempt. E has σώμάτα, retained by Stallbaum. Ast’s σώμάτι πράττοντες, ‘working for the body,’ is a very strange expression, by no means justified by the use of πράσσειν {practice} in Thucydides. Schanz adopts Heindorf’s bold alteration λατρεύοντες {worshipers} which I cannot approve; far less Madvig’s coinage πελατεύοντες {customers}.
Phaedo, Part 33.
—“How do they do this, Sokrates?”
—“I will tell you,” he replied. “The lovers of knowledge,” said he, “perceive that when philosophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely
—“What is this evil, Sokrates?” said Kebes.
—“The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not. These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?”
—
—“And when this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body?”
—“How so?”
—“Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it,
—“What you say, Sokrates, is very true,” said Kebes.
Φαιδων, Part 33.
—πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;
—ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη. γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς
—
—
—
—τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
—ὅτι ψυχὴ
—πάνυ γε.
—
—πῶς δή;
—ὅτι ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ
—ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες.
1 διὰ εἱργμοῦ: ‘through the bars of her prison.’ She can indeed see τὰ ὄντα, but only in the material symbols by which alone they reveal themselves to the senses.
2 κυλινδουμένην: ‘wallowing in utter ignorance.’ Stallbaum compares Politicus 309a, Theaetetus 172c.
3 ὅτι δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν: I take the literal translation of this sentence to be as follows: ‘that it (the prison) exists by means of lust; just the way in which the captive is most apt to aid and abet his own incarceration’; in other words, the prison is the dungeon of lust, wherein the prisoners are accomplices in their own imprisonment: ὡς I understand as a simple relative, ‘in which way.’ The phrase δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν is understood by Stallbaum as a periphrasis for ἐπιθυμεῖ, by Heindorf for ἐπιθυμεῖται. The former makes the clause ὡς ἂν μάλιστα express the object of the ἐπιθυμία which comes to this: the prison (i.e. the body) desires to find out how the soul may most aid her own imprisonment. But this is downright nonsense. Heindorf rightly interprets the ὡς ἂν μάλιστα clause, except that he makes ὡς = ὤστε. But δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν = ἐπιθυμεῖται is surely very questionable; moreover it is not the body but bodily pleasures which the embodied soul desires. The interpretation I have suggested precisely agrees with 83d: the prison of lust is just that very one of which the soul shuts the doors upon herself: for each act of indulgence is the shooting of a fresh bolt. The translator in the Engelmann series alone takes the same view: ‘weil er auf der Sinnenlust beruht, auf welche Weise der Gefangene selbst hauptsachlich Heifer seiner Gefangenschaft sein muss.’
4 τοῦ δεδέσθαι: So all the mss. Schanz and Z. after Heindorf’s conjecture read τοῦ. But since συλλαμβάνειν continually takes a dative there is no reason why the verbal συλλήπτωρ should not be followed by the same case: the alteration seems gratuitous.
5 οὕτω goes with ἔχουσαν.
6 δι᾽ ἄλλων: i.e. τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων. ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο, ‘varying with varying conditions.’
7 λογιζομένη: The soul reflects that vehement passions of pleasure, pain, fear, or desire so absorb the attention that nothing seems so real as the object inspiring them. Therefore if she is strongly excited by bodily affections of this kind she will be forced to think nothing so real as these material things: so that instead of seeking truth in the changeless verities of the intelligible she will look for it in the ever-changing flux of phenomena.
8 ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ: Z. and St. add ἢ λυπηθῇ, but these words are not in bcd, and the other mss. are not agreed as to their position.
9 οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον: ‘not on the scale that one might suppose.’ For τοσοῦτον virtually = ‘so little,’ compare Republic 608b μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ. Schanz, against the mss., writes ὑπ΄αὐτῶν: but ἀπὸ may equally well be said; ‘arising from them.’
10 οἷον ἢ νοσήσας: the considerations on which the δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ {civic virtue} is based.
11 ὅτι ψυχὴ: ‘that the soul of every man in the act of feeling some vehement pleasure or pain is at the same time constrained to believe that whatsoever most strongly excites such feelings, this is most vivid and true; whereas it is not so.’
12 τὰ ὁρατά: Heindorf supplied τὰ, which is missing in the mss.
13 ταῦτα ἀληθῆ: So Schanz for ταῦτα: rightly, I think.
14 ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος: ‘like it in her ways and nurture.’
Phaedo, Part 34.
—“This, Kebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; not the world’s reason.
—“Certainly not.”
—“No, for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy should set it free, and that then when set free it should give itself again into bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil, like Penelope unweaving the web she wove. No, his soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, must follow reason and abide always in it, beholding that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food;
Φαιδων, Part 34.
—τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασιν:
—
—οὐ γάρ: ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω
—
1 οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασιν: ‘not for the reasons which the many assign for being so.’ Schanz brackets φασιν, and Heindorf proposes φαίνονται, both, as I think, needlessly. Stallbaum rightly supplies κόσμιοί εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι.
2 οὐ γάρ: ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω: This punctuation is clearly right here as in Phaedrus 276d. οὐ γάρ: ἀλλὰ gives just the wrong sense.
3 λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης: ‘and while philosophy is loosing her to give herself up to pleasures and pains that they may bind her fast.’ The appended infinitive ἐγκαταδεῖν is a very common idiom, and why Madvig should wish to expunge παραδιδόναι I cannot see. Schanz however brackets it.
4 μεταχειριζομένης: This is doubtless the right reading, although the mss. are stronger in favour of μεταχειριζομένης: the genitive is however, as Prof. Geddes says, easily accounted for by the proximity of Πηνελόπης. The soul works at a kind of Penelope’s web, only in the opposite way. Penelope, to preserve her virtue, undid at night the work she wove by day; the soul weaves again the web of lusts which philosophy has been unravelling to set her free. Prof. Geddes would govern Πηνελόπης by ἐναντίως: but I believe Plato never uses the genitive with this adverb; for in 112e, to which Prof. Geddes refers, τούτου is governed by καταντικρὺ. St. has μεταχειριζομένης.
5 τούτων: Sc. ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπῶν.
6 ἐν τούτῳ See on 59a.
7 ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τρεφομένη: Compare Phaedrus 248b-c οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεχ᾽ ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὗ ἐστιν, ἥ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἥ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. The souls which cannot reach the plain of truth τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται. Compare the still more striking metaphor in Timaeus 90a-b ἐκεῖθεν γάρ, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφυ, τὸ θεῖον τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ῥίζαν ἡμῶν ἀνακρεμαννὺν ὀρθοῖ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα.
8 τοιοῦτον: Sc. ἀληθὲς καὶ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον.
9 οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ: For this unusual phrase compare Republic 465b, Apology 28b, Gorgias 520d, Epistle vii 345e. Also Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 650 οὐχὶ δέος μή σε φιλήσῃ.
10 ταῦτα γ᾽ ἐπιτηδεύσασα: mss. ταῦτα δ᾽. Many editors, beginning with Forster, have regarded these words as a gloss upon ἐκ τοιαύτης τροφῆς, and Schanz brackets them. This view may be right; but I think there is hardly sufficient evidence for bracketing. If the words are genuine, δὲ needs correction. Wyttenbach has ταῦτα τ᾽.
—At first sight the concluding words of the chapter seem to imply that a soul that is pure is less likely to perish than the impure. But since this is not the case, we must understand Plato to mean that the pure soul alone is exempt from fear. The impure soul, having cast in her lot with the body, and having no conception of existence apart from it, may well suppose that corporeal life is a condition of her being: but the pure soul, who has lived apart from the body so far as she may and feels her own independent power, has no misgivings lest the company of her slave be necessary to her existence: the body may dread dissolution, but she is secure.
Phaedo, Part 35.
—When Sokrates had said this there was silence
—And Simmias said: “Sokrates, I will tell you the truth. For some time each of us has been in doubt and has been egging the other on and urging him to ask a question, because we wish to hear your answer, but hesitate to trouble you, for fear that it may be disagreeable to you in your present misfortune.”
—And when he heard is, he laughed gently and said: “Ah,
—“Good,” said Simmias.
Φαιδων, Part 35.
—
—καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη: καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τἀληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀηδὲς ᾖ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν.
—καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἠρέμα καί φησιν: Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία: ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι
—ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται
—καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας: καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ
1 πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ: ‘was absorbed in the foregoing discourse.’
2 βέλτιον ἂν λεχθῆναι: The insertion of ἂν, which could easily drop out after βέλτιον, seems to me necessary. Prof. Geddes observes that verbs of thinking often take a bare infinitive, to express duty. This is true: but φαίνεται is not a verb of thinking.
3 διάκειμαι: Heindorf takes this for a subjunctive, and Hirschig reads διάκέωμαι: but, even if διάκειμαι could be a subjunctive, that mood would be positively wrong here. Sokrates says ‘you are afraid (not lest I should be, but) lest I am more peevish than heretofore.’ Contrast this with the words of Simmias, μή σοι ἀηδὲς ᾖ, where the subjunctive has its proper reference to the future.
4 καὶ μάλιστα: Schanz reads κάλλιστα after Blomfield’s conjecture. I have reverted to the reading of the mss.
5 τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα: ‘so far as this is concerned.’
6 ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων: Cobet proposes ἕως ἂν οἱ ἕνδεκα ἐῶσιν. I do not conceive that any person who has ears to hear will prefer Cobet’s sentence to Plato’s: nor, apart from this, would one willingly sacrifice the grave courtesy of Sokrates’ language. I regret that Schanz determines to bracket the clause; still omission is preferable to mutilation. Prof. Geddes justly says ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα is to be regarded as one expression, and compares 69e τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς. The common reading is ἕως ἂν οἱ, but ἂν οἱ are wanting in the best mss.
7 καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι: Hirschig wrongly brackets μὴ. The words παντὶ...προαφίστασθαι are all qualified by μὴ οὐχὶ; or as Heindorf puts it, we may regard καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι as equivalent to μὴ προαφισταμένους. We have here a very strong case of μὴ οὐ after a word which only implies negation: cf. Symposium 210b πολλὴ ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ ἕν τε καὶ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι.
8 ἢ μαθεῖν: i.e. either to learn from another or to discover by our own researches: cf. 99 c. Hesiod says, Works and Days 291, οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ φρασσάμενος, τά κ᾽ ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ᾖσιν ἀμείνω: ἐσθλὸς δ᾽ αὖ κἀκεῖνος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται {Between us and Goodness the gods have placed the sweat of our brows: long and steep is the path that leads to her, and it is rough at the first; but when a man has reached the top, then is she easy to reach, though before that she was hard.}.
9 λόγου θείουv: ‘a divine doctrine’; such as the Orphic traditions. The Pythagorean Simmias, whose mystical tendencies are well contrasted with the clear and acute intellect of Kebes, naturally gives a θεῖος λόγος {godly word} the preference over dialectical demonstration. Cf. 107a. Olympiodoros explains it, αὐτοπτικὸς νοῦς ὁ θεῷ τῷ ὄντι συνών. But the other interpretation is more natural and more dramatically appropriate. The mss. have ἢ λόγου, Schanz brackets ἢ: I have followed Heindorf in omitting it. That ἢ is ever explanatory I do not believe: it certainly is not so in the passages cited by Prof. Geddes. Plato would have used καί. St. retains ἢ.
Phaedo, Part 36.
—
—“In this,” said he, “that one might use the same argument about harmony and a lyre with its strings. Once might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful and
—As I have pointed out in the introduction, the refutation of this theory does not constitute an argument for immortality. To refute a doctrine which would be fatal to immortality is not the same as to prove immortality. Plato justly considered that a view so widely entertained and so hostile to his own, must be disposed of; but its overthrow leaves the argument precisely where it was at 81a.
Φαιδων, Part 36.
—
—ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾗ δὴ (ᾗ δή: So Forster for ἤδη.) καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ
—
1 τις διισχυρίζοιτο: The apodosis never comes. Prof. Geddes finds it in ὅρα οὖν, 86d. This is not strictly accurate; for the subject of διισχυρίζοιτο is supposed to maintain that the harmony survives the lyre, while the subject of ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ maintains that the soul is the first to perish. In fact the protasis ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ is substituted for the original protasis.
2 διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν: is bracketed by Hirschig, whom Schanz follows: again I see no reason.
3 ὑπολαμβάνομεν: The use of the first person by Simmias would seem to imply that this doctrine was Pythagorean. But there is little or no evidence to that effect, and it is irreconcilable with the Pythagorean dogma of transmigration. Aristotle De Anima 1 iv 407b 27 mentions the theory as πιθανὴ πολλοῖς, but without assigning it to any particular school of thinker. Macrobius ascribes it to Pythagoras and Philolaos; but the testimony of so late a writer is worthless. Prof. Geddes remarks that it seems more Eleatic than Pythagorean: and there certainly is some resemblance between this ἀρμονία and the conception of ψυχὴ as a κρῇμα attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius ix 29. The view of Parmenides is expounded by Theophrastos De Sensu §§ 3, 4: it is however merely a theory of perception. The opinion that soul is a harmony was certainly held by Aristoxenos the musician, as we learn from Cicero Tusc. 1 10: and Lucretius in controverting the theory (in 94 following) evidently had him chiefly in his mind; cf. in 131 redde harmoniai Nomen ad organicos alto delatum Heliconi. But Aristoxenos was a pupil of Aristotle not a Pythagorean. On the whole then it seems probable that Simmias is not speaking as a Pythagorean, but making himself the exponent of a widely received opinion. Kebes, who is equally a Pythagorean, professes his disbelief in the doctrine, 87a: but on the other hand it is a favourite theory with Echekrates, 88d.
4 κρᾶσιν: ‘a temperament.’ Compare the lines of Parmenides quoted by Theophrastos l.l. (Karsten 145 following) {Greek not includeds}. That is to say, the character of the perception is dominated by the preponderating elements of the percipient. As Theophrastos remarks, Parmenides does not distinguish between φρονεῖν and αἰσθάνεσθαι.
The word ἁρμονία is generally used to denote a succession of musical tones, not their simultaneous accord, for which συμφωνία is the ordinary term. The former meaning is however here clearly unsuitable; and in fact ἁρμονία is a general term expressing the relation between musical sounds, in itself signifying neither succession nor accord. That ἁρμονία includes συμφωνία is proved by Republic 617b: the eight sirens standing on the whorl of the spindle sing each a single tone: ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν ξυμφωνεῖν.
5 μετρίως κραθῇ: Cf. Diogenes Laertius ix 29 ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν. {The generation of man proceeds from earth, and the soul is formed by a union of all the foregoing, so blended that no one element predominates.}
6 παραμένειν: ‘remain with us.’ Cf. 62e. The word occurs again and again in this sense; yet Hirschig must needs alter it to ἐπιμένειν {to remain}.
Phaedo, Part 37.
—Then Sokrates, looking keenly at us, as he often used to do, smiled and said: “Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point. However, I think
—“Well, I will tell you,” said Kebes. “The argument seems to me to be just where it was, and to be still open to the objection I made before.
—“But I do not think he is right, Simmias, and I ask you especially to notice what I say. Anyone can understand that a man who says this is talking nonsense. For the weaver in question wove and wore out many such cloaks and
Φαιδων, Part 37.
—διαβλέψας
—λέγω δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
—ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι
—τὸ δ᾽
—ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὔπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν ὡς
1 διαβλέψας: ‘with a piercing glance.’ This rare word well describes the penetrating gaze of Sokrates’ prominent eyes (Theaetetus 143e) from under the gathered eyebrows: much the same is expressed by ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας in 117b. The preposition seems to have the same force as in one usage of διαβαίνω—i.e. with eyelids far apart: cf. Aristotle De Insomniis 462a 13 ‘with eyes wide open.’ Compare Xenophon Symposium V v 5, where Sokrates says οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ἤδη οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καλλίονες ἂν τῶν σῶν εἴησαν. πῶς δή; ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ᾽ εὐθὺ μόνον ὁρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιοι εἶναι. {“My eyes are finer ones than yours…because, while yours see only straight ahead, mine, by bulging out as they do, see also to the sides.”}
2 ἁπτομένῳ: ‘he is one, it seems, who takes the question in hand after a thorough-going fashion.’ I think this rendering is more agreeable to Plato’s use of the phrase ἄπτεσθαι λόγου than that of Mr. Cope and Prof. Geddes, who take it to mean ‘attack.’ Cf. Euthydemus 283a, Republic 538c, Phaedrus 279a.
3 προσᾴδειν = speak to the purpose. This use seems to be directly derived from that in Laws 670b γελοῖος γὰρ ὅ γε πολὺς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γιγνώσκειν τό τε εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὔρυθμον καὶ μή, ὅσοι προσᾴδειν αὐτῶν καὶ βαίνειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ γεγόνασι διηναγκασμένοι. {It is absurd of the general crowd to imagine that they can fully understand what is harmonious and rhythmical, or the reverse, when they have been drilled to sing to the flute or step in time.}
4 τὸ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον: In order to retain the words ἀπιστίαν παρέχει, some editors have altered τὸ into ὅ. I have judged it better to follow Hermann and Schanz in bracketing them as a gloss. This abbreviated form of ταράττειν is more than once used to express a misgiving as to the validity of an argument: cf. Theaetetus 187c, Parmenides 130d.
5 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: i.e. just where it was at the end of the discussion of anamnesis. Kebes is perfectly right: the reasoning contained in chapters 25-29 at best affords a mere presumption in favour of immortality: see note on 78c.
6 ἐπαχθές: ‘arrogant.’
7 οὐ ξυγχωρῶ: Again we may observe the superior acuteness of Kebes. The objection of Simmias is ingenious and plausible, but somewhat flimsy: it crumbles away at the first touch of the elenchus: moreover its refutation adds nothing to the argument. That of Kebes goes straight to the root of the matter, and obliges Sokrates to put forth his whole argumentative strength; while its disproof constitutes the crowning argument of the dialogue.
δοκεῖ γάρ: ‘for I think soul is far superior in all these respects.’
8 ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι: ‘for I think your argument is exactly parallel to the assertion one might make about a weaver who died at an advanced age.’ Heindorf would insert εἰ, but this is not necessary.
9 ἔστι που σῶς: I adopt without hesitation Forster’s admirable emendation, which by a very slight change materially improves the sense, ἴσως seems to me quite inappropriate, notwithstanding Heindorf’s defence of it and its retention by Z. and St.
10 αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος: The weaver is chosen as the closest parallel to the soul, who is perpetually renewing the body that is her vesture.
11 ἀπιστοίη: mss. ἀπιστῶν which cannot stand, since the question would be pointless in the mouth of an opponent. The ἂν which belongs to λέγοι also does duty for παρέχοιτο, ἀνερωτῷη, and οἴοιτο {which lasts longer, a man or a cloak that is in use and wear,…a man lasts much longer, he would think it had been proved beyond a doubt that the man was safe, because that which was less lasting had not perished.}.
12 τὸ δὲ: ‘but in fact this is not the case. 7 Cf. Theaetetus 157b, Sophist 244a, Laws 642a.
13 πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν: i.e. within the limits of a single human life. Kebes puts his case in two forms: the superior durability of the soul is consistent with the supposition (1) that during the ordinary span of human life she wears out many bodies, perpetually restoring them as they suffer waste; (2) that after separation from one body she may survive and enter into another and another. Yet in the first case she may become extinct on separating from the body; in the second she may after several incarnations be worn out by her labours and at some one separation perish utterly. Therefore we cannot argue that because the soul outlasts the body she is necessarily immortal.
14 εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι: Compare Timaeus 43a τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον {souls, then, being thus bound within a mighty river neither mastered it nor were mastered, but with violence they rolled along and were rolled along themselves}.
15 ἐπιδεικνύοι: Prof. Geddes is not, I think, right in referring this optative to indirect speech, though Soph. Phil. 617 would justify it (not the other passage he cites). As Stallbaum points out av is easily carried on from above, ἀναγκαῖον μεντἂν.
16 ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν: Schanz adopts ἔσται from Hirschig, for which I see no sufficient reason, since ἔστιν is general. Note that Kebes treats the whole of chapters 25-29 as intended to supplement anamnesis by showing the after-existence of the soul: he recurs to the objection he made at 77c, against which Sokrates appeals to antapodosis but nevertheless proceeds to bring fresh evidence.
17 τῷ λέγοντι [ἢ]: Madvig proposed to strike out ἢ, and Schanz seems right in bracketing it. For (1) τῷ λέγοντι wants an object, (2) Kebes offers to grant not more than what Sokrates says, but more than he has himself just said. He will grant not only that the soul may have existed before birth and may wear out many bodies in this life before perishing, but also that she may survive the severance once or many times before she herself succumbs.
18 οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ: αὐτὸ, referring to ψυχὴν seems to be attracted into the gender of ἰσχυρὸν. Prof. Geddes compares 109a πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, sc. τὴν γῆν.
19 τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον: Since no one knows how often his soul has already been incarnate, he cannot tell whether or not she may survive the termination of his present life.
20 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει: ‘if the hypothesis I suggest be true.’ Few who have read through this forcibly stated argument will agree with Wagner that ‘it gives the reader the impression that Kebes is represented as an awkward speaker, because he is not a clear thinker.’
Phaedo, Part 38.
—Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards,
—Echecrates: “By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathize with you; for I myself after listening to you am inclined to ask myself:
—Phaedo: “Echecrates, I have often wondered at Sokrates, but never did I admire him more
—Echecrates: “How did he do it?”
—Phaedo: “I will tell you. I was sitting at his right hand on a low stool
—“I suppose so, Sokrates,” said I.
—“Not if you take my advice.”
—“What shall I do then?” I asked.
—“You will cut it off today, and I will cut mine, if our argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again.
—“But,” I replied, “they say that even Heracles is not a match for two.”
—“Well,” said he, “call me to help you, as your Iolaus, while there is still light.”
—“I call you to help, then,” said I, “not as Heracles calling Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling Heracles.”
—“That is all one,” said he.
—By interposing this interlude Plato desires to mark in the most emphatic manner that an acute crisis has arrived in the discussion. The whole position has to be reconsidered, and the argument, as Echekrates says, started again almost from the beginning. The exact situation of the argument at this point is dealt with in the Introduction §2, where I have tried to show as clearly as possible the relation between the earlier and the later part of the demonstration. A short dialogue between Phaedo and Echekrates is similarly introduced at 102a to mark the completion of an important step.
Φαιδων, Part 38.
—
—Ἐχεκράτης νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν
—Φαίδων: καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος.
—
—Ἐχεκράτης πῶς δή;
—Φαίδων: ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος
—οὔκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ.
—ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
—τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.
—
—ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς
—ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστιν.
—παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.
—οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη.
1 τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις: governed by ἀπιστίαν.
2 ἄπιστα ᾖ: Schanz, following Heindorf, reads εἴη against the mss. But the change of mood is nothing remarkable, as the instances cited by Stallbaum will show. The subjunctive represents a more vivid conception of the contingency: see Prof. Goodwin’s excellent article in the Journal of Philology, vol. viii p. 18. For εἶμεν BCD corruptly give ἦμεν.
3 ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα: ‘for how strongly persuasive was that theory which Sokrates maintained, and yet it has now fallen into discredit.’
4 ἀντιλαμβάνεται: ‘has a wonderfully firm grasp of me.’ It never seems to have occurred to Echekrates that his favourite theory was fatal to the soul’s immortality and to metempsychosis.
5 ἔνδηλός τι: Heindorf rightly says that τι belongs to ἀχθόμενος.
6 ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος: The subject is placed in the relative instead of the main clause.
7 ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο: as is shown by his admonition against ‘misology’ in the next chapter.
8 τὰς καλὰς κόμας: Z. and St. with some mss. have ὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας.
9 οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς: We find the legend in Euthydemus 297c. Herakles, while fighting the hydra, was assailed by a big crab, against which he called in the aid of Iolaos. Cf. Laws 919b. Presently Schanz after Cobet brackets τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.
10 ἀναβιώσασθαι: This transitive use of the word occurs again Crito 48c.
11 ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι: referring to the story told by Herodotus 1 82. The Argives, foiled in their attempt to recover Thyreai from the Spartans, vowed not to let their hair grow till they reconquered it. Prof. Geddes remarks that the Romans on the contrary showed grief by letting their hair grow long.
12 ἀναμαχόμενος: ‘renewing the battle.’
13 ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστιν: because at sunset he must drink the poison.
Phaedo, Part 39.
—“But first let us guard against a danger.”
—“Of what sort?” I asked.
—
—“Certainly,” said I.
—“Well,” he went on, “is it not disgraceful, and is it not plain that such a man undertakes to consort with men when he has no knowledge of human nature? For if he had knowledge when he dealt with them, he would think that the good
—“What do you mean?”
—“I mean just what I might say about the large and small. Do you think there is anything more unusual than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or other creature, or again, one that is very quick or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very black or white? Have you not noticed that the extremes in all these instances are rare and few, and the examples between the extremes are very many?”
—“To be sure,” said I.
—“And don’t you think,”
—“Very likely,” I replied.
—“Yes, very likely,” he said, “But it is not in that respect that arguments are like men; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity lies in this: when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false, whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again; then you know, those men especially who
—“Certainly,” I said, “that is very true.”
—“Then, Phaedo,” he said, “if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man,
—“Yes, by Zeus,” I said, “it would be sad.”
Φαιδων, Part 39.
—ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.
—τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
—
—πάνυ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
—οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, αἰσχρόν,
—πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ.
—ὥσπερ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων: οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐχὶ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων
—πάνυ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
—
—εἰκός γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
—εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν
—οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ
—νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.
1 ἢ λόγους μισήσας: ‘than by conceiving a hatred for arguments’; explanatory of τούτου.
2 οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο: ‘whom he would naturally think.’ ἂν of course belongs to ἡγήσαιτο.
3 ᾔσθησαι σύ τοῦτο: Z. has οὕτω τοῦτο. St. οὕτω πως τοῦτο.
4 αἰσχρόν: is bracketed by Schanz. ἄνευ τέχνης i.e. without a knowledge of mankind.
5 τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα: Although the order of the words inclines us to take σφόδρα with ὀλίγους, I think the sense requires that it should be joined with χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς. Heindorf would double σφόδρα; but it is not really wanted with ὀλίγους.
6 τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων: ‘the extremes in both directions.’ The ἐσχάτα are the two opposite qualities, ἄκρα the extremes of these. Thus if we conceive λευκὸν and μέλαν to be represented by a straight line, the central portion is occupied by shades of grey; the ἐσχάτα, or parts remote from the centre, by white and black; and the ἄκρα, or ends of the line, by the highest degree of each.
7 ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν: Sokrates has been led by the question of Phaedo into a digression upon the nature of the ἀτεχνία shown by misanthropes, which consists in their forgetting that extremes are seldom met with. But this does not constitute the analogy between μισανθρωπία {misanthropy = hatred of humanity} and μισολογία {misology = hatred of reasoning}. The real analogy is that when we have been several times disappointed in a λόγος we jump to the conclusion that all λόγοι are worthless, without stopping to consider whether the fault may not lie in our unscientific treatment.
8 ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ: The apodosis never comes: Plato finishes the sentence as if he had not written ᾗ, which Schanz, at Madvig’s suggestion, omits.
9 οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους: Plato may refer to the Ephesian school, οἱ ῥέοντες of the Theaetetus: perhaps also to sophists of the type of Dionysodoros and Euthydemos, such as he seems to have in view at 101e; and to the Cynics.
10 σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι: Cf. Sophist 251c ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναι. {I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.} Clearly a hit at Antisthenes.
11 ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται: Compare the invective of Theodoros against the Ephesians, Theaetetus 179b following. Besides these Herakleiteans (with whom Plato had really little or no quarrel, so far as regards the phenomenal world), the principal ἀντιλογικοὶ {antilogicians} were Antisthenes with his school, and some later Sophists, who had caught up the trick of the Sokratic method of question and answer and used it to force on the unwary the acceptance of the most preposterous paradoxes. Their habits are admirably described in the Euthydemus. These men, whose only object was to make a sensation, must be classed apart from disputants of the Cynic and Megarian schools, whose paradoxes rested upon logical and metaphysical errors which were genuine difficulties at the time; which in fact required all Plato’s genius to clear away.
Phaedo, Part 40.
—“First, then,” said he, “let us be on our guard against this,
Φαιδων, Part 40.
—πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ
—λογίζομαι γάρ,
—παρεσκευασμένος δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον: ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε,
1 οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι: The language suggests the Cynics; cf. Theaetetus 155e Εἰσὶν γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ’ εὖ ἄμουσοι; cf. Sophist 246d, and Aristotle Metaphysics H iii 1043b 24 οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι. Sophists of the eristic type are no doubt included.
2 εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον: ‘unless it were merely by the way.’ It is surprising that Prof. Geddes has adopted against all the mss. Hermann’s most infelicitous conjecture εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον. Had εἰ been found in the texts, one would have felt strongly inclined to alter it to εἴη.
3 λογίζομαι γάρ: ‘for I am reasoning, my dear companion—see how selfishly.’ All this is Sokratic εἰρωνεία {irony}: Sokrates and Plato were the last men to persuade themselves that a belief was true, because it was pleasant.
4 ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν: ‘I shall be less likely to annoy the company with lamentation.’ ἧττον of course qualifies all the words that follow: it will less be the case that I shall annoy them by lamenting. The passage would not have required a note but for the strange misconception of Wagner, who seems to think that μὴ is wanted before ὀδυρόμενος.
5 ἡ δὲ δὴ ἄγνοιά: Sokrates means that one way or another his doubts will be cleared away; he will not go on existing in doubt whether his existence will continue. For at death he will either find assurance of immortality or he will cease to be, and in neither case is he subject to ἄγνοιά {agnoia = ignorance}. ὀλίγον ὕστερον means shortly after the present moment, not after death. δὴ ἄγνοιά is Fischer’s suggestion for διάνοιά, which is the reading of the best mss.; the rest have ἄγνοιά.
6 σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους: Cf. Republic 595c ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ: and Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics I iv 1096a 16 ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
7 ὅπως μὴ: The editions generally have εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως: but the participle is absent in BCD and omitted by Schanz.
8 ἐμαυτόν: This reading has the best authority: Z. and St. give ἐαυτόν.
ὥσπερ μέλιττα: The commentators think this is borrowed from the line of Eupolis concerning Perikles, τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν τοῖςἀκροωμένοις. The expression seems likely to have been proverbial.
Phaedo, Part 41.
—“But we must get to work,” he said. “First refresh my memory, if I seem to have forgotten anything. Simmias, I think, has doubts and fears that the soul, though more divine and
—
—“Now,” said he, “do you reject all of our previous arguments, or only some of them?”
—“Only some of them,” they replied.
—“What you think,” he asked, “bout the argument in which we said that learning is recollection and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily have been somewhere
—“I,” said Kebes, “was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than any other argument.”
—“And I too,” said Simmias, “feel just as he does, and I should be much surprised if I should ever think differently on this point.”
—And Sokrates said: “You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body.
—“Certainly not, Sokrates.”
—“Then do you see,” said he, “that this is just what you say when you assert that the soul exists before it enters into the form and body of a man, and that it is composed of things that do not yet exist? For harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be. The lyre and the strings and the sounds
—“I cannot at all,” said Simmias.
—“And yet,” said Sokrates, “there ought to be harmony between it and the theory about harmony above all others.”
—“Yes, there ought,” said Simmias.
—“Well,” said he, “there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?”
—“The former, decidedly, Sokrates,” he replied. “For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely seemed probable
The first refutation is addressed to believers in anamnesis and pre-existence of the soul; it appeals therefore only to Platonists or Pythagoreans.
Φαιδων, Part 41.
—ἀλλ᾽ ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ
—
—πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ᾽ οὔ;
—τοὺς μέν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ᾽ οὔ.
—τί οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν
—καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι περί γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτέ τι δόξειεν.
—καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι,
—οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—αἰσθάνῃ οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει
—οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
—καὶ μήν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ συνῳδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας.
—πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
—οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ συνῳδός: ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα πότερον αἱρῇ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν;
—πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ
1 ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει: Cf. Timaeus 30c τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἴδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν. Also Republic 389b; Cratylus 394d.
2 πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις: We might take πολλὰ to refer to the exhaustion of many bodies during our human life, and πολλάκις to the repeated incarnations of the soul; the two cases put by Kebes. But the following words καὶ ᾖ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται seem to show that Sokrates had the first case only in view; and for the purposes of his possibly argument there is no difference between them. {See Telomere in the Glossary.}
3 ἄλλα δόξαι: So Stallbaum and Schanz; Z. has δόξάσαι with the mss.
4 ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει: ‘this is what your statement amounts to.’ Schmidt proposes οὐ ταῦτά, i.e. you make contradictory statements. This would do well enough, had it ms. authority; but the ms. reading is equally good sense. ταῦτά = πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι.
5 ὃ ἀπεικάζεις: ‘harmony is not what you represent it.’ i.e. it is not such a thing as soul. This is the reading of the best mss. and gives a simpler construction than the ordinary ᾧ.
6 οἱ φθόγγοι: i.e. the tones of the several strings before they are combined into harmony.
7 μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς: ‘through a certain analogy and plausibility.’ τοῖς πολλοῖς: Another indication that this was a widely spread popular opinion, not distinctively Pythagorean.
8 ἐρρήθη γάρ που: ‘for we said, I think, that the existence of our soul before she entered the body rested on the same assurance as that of the very substance that has the title of absolute essence.’ I have followed Schanz in adopting the emendation of Mudge, αὐτὴ for αὐτῆς. Retaining αὐτῆς we make Plato affirm that the pre-existence of the soul is assured inasmuch as her substance is absolute existence. But Plato never said anything of the sort: he merely said, as surely as the ideas exist, so surely did the soul, 76e. Heindorf in an acute note defends the vulgate, taking αὐτῆς as possessive; ‘as surely as absolute existence belongs to her,’ i.e. was cognised by her; referring to the words in 76e ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν. But (1) this interpretation supposes a very awkward ellipse of ἔστιν in a relative clause, (2) the sense of αὐτῆς is severely strained: could Plato say ‘absolute existence is hers,’ meaning ‘absolute existence is cognised by her’? (3) we have already seen reason to doubt the genuineness of the words in 76e. Hirschig also adopts αὐτὴ.
9 ἱκανῶς: ‘on adequate proof.’
Phaedo, Part 42.
—“Here is another way of looking at it, Simmias,” said he. “Do you think a harmony or any other composite thing can be in any other state
—“Certainly not.”
—“And it can neither do nor suffer anything other than they do or suffer?”
—He agreed.
—“Then a harmony cannot be expected to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to follow them.”
—He assented.
—“A harmony, then, is quite unable to move or make a sound or do anything else that is opposed to its component parts.”
—“Quite unable,” said he.
—“Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonized?”
—“I do not understand,” said Simmias.
—“Would it not,” said Sokrates, “be more completely a harmony
—“Certainly.”
—“Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?”
—“Not in the least,” said he.
—“Well now,” said he, “one soul is said to possess sense and 93cvirtue and to be good, and another to possess folly and wickedness and to be bad; and is this true?”
—
—“Now what will those who assume that the soul is a harmony say that these things—the virtue and the wickedness—in the soul are? Will they say that this is another kind of harmony and a discord, and that the soul, which is itself a harmony, has within it another harmony and that the other soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it?”
—“I cannot tell,” replied Simmias, “but evidently those who make that assumption would say some thing of that sort.”
—“But we agreed,” said Sokrates,
—“Certainly.”
—“And that which is no more or less a harmony, is no more or less harmonized. Is that so?”
—“Yes.”
—“But has that which is no more and no less harmonized any greater or any less amount of harmony, or an equal amount?” “An equal amount.”
—“Then a soul, since it is neither more nor less
—“That is so.”
—“And therefore can have no greater amount of discord or of harmony?”
—“No.”
—“And therefore again one soul can have no greater amount of wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue harmony?”
—“It cannot.”
—“Or rather, to speak exactly, Simmias,
—“Certainly not.”
—“Then the soul, being entirely soul, could have no part in wickedness.”
—“How could it, if what we have said is right?”
—“According to this argument, then, if all souls are by nature equally souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good.”
—“So it seems, Sokrates,” said he.
—
—“Not in the least,” he replied.
—“Well,” said Sokrates, “of all the parts that make up a man, do you think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise one?”
—“No, I do not.”
The second argument will reach those who accept neither anamnesis nor the ideal theory, but who do accept the view that virtue is a harmonious state of the soul. It is to be observed (1) that the premiss in 93a πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία κινηθῆναι ἂν ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἤ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὑτῆς μέρεσιν, of which a different use is made in the next chapter, here is simply brought in to show that the perfection of the harmony depends upon the tuning of the strings etc., and consequently that as these may be more or less in tune, the harmony admits corresponding degrees of completeness: (2) the argument might seem to be complete in 93b, where it is allowed that, while harmony admits degrees, soul does not. But we should regard all the earlier part of the chapter as collecting the materials for the refutation which proceeds consecutively from 93d: moreover Plato had to guard against the rejoinder that, although harmony, as such, admits of degrees, there may yet be particular kinds of harmony, whereof soul is one, which do not admit of degrees.
Φαιδων, Part 42.
—τί δέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῇδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ἄλλῃ
—οὐδαμῶς.
—οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ᾽ ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ; συνέφη.
—οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαί γε προσήκει ἁρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἕπεσθαι. συνεδόκει.
—πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία
—πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη.
—τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἑκάστη ἁρμονία ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῇ;
—οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη.
—ἢ οὐχί, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον,
—πάνυ γε.
—ἦ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας
—οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.
—φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός: λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν
—ἀληθῶς μέντοι.
—τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην
—οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν: δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος.
—
—πάνυ γε.
—τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον ἁρμονίαν οὖσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμόσθαι: ἔστιν οὕτως;
—ἔστιν.
—ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον ἡρμοσμένη ἔστιν ὅτι πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον;
—τὸ ἴσον.
—οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον ἄλλη
—τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι ἄν;
—οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
—τοῦτο δ᾽ αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἆρ᾽ ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη;
—οὐδὲν πλέον.
—
—οὐ μέντοι.
—οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχή, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας.
—πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων;
—ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῴων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν
—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—ἦ καὶ καλῶς
—οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.
1 ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία: ἐναντία is of course accusative plural. Plato means that the harmony is entirely the outcome of its constituents and is conditioned by them, having no independent existence: as you tighten the string the tone rises. On this ground it would be impossible for a soul to be in a harmonious state, i.e. virtue, independently of the physical conditions of which she herself is the result.
2 μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον: There must be some distinction between μᾶλλον and ἐπὶ πλέον. I think μᾶλλον may apply to the degree of completeness in which the σύνθεσις is accomplished, and ἐπὶ πλέον to the character of the σύνθεσις itself. To take an illustration from music (1) the two notes forming an octave may be more or less in tune; (2) the octave and the fifth are more perfect concords than the fourth and third. This view, I find, is in a manner supported by Olympiodoros: ὑποτίθεται μὴ εἷναι ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας πλείω μηδὲ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧττον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον περὶ τὴν ποσότητα τῶν διαστημάτων καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο οὔτε ἐν πλείοσιν οὔτε ἐν ἐλάττοσιν· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον περὶ τὴν ἄνεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπίτασιν. κα’ αὐτο γὰρ τὸ εἶδος οὐδεμία ἁρμονία οὔτε ἀνίεται οὔτε ἐπιτείνεται. That is, a particular harmony, e.g. the fourth, cannot be harmonised ἐπὶ πλέον or μᾶλλον: since (1) it cannot comprehend more than a fixed number of tones, (2) it cannot (if it is to be a true fourth) admit any tampering with the pitch, κατὰ τὸν ἁρμονικὸν λόγον. The Pythagoreans, he says, συλλαβὰν μὲν καλοῦστιτὴν διὰ τεσσάρων ἁρμονίαν ὡς ἥκιστα ἁρνονίαν κατακορεστάτην δὲ τὴν διὰ πασῶν ὡς μάλιστα. As to the μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον he remarks ἔχει γὰρ ἑκάστη ἁρνονία πλάτος τικατὰτὴναἴσθησιν οὐ μὴν κατὰ τὸν ἁρμονικὸν λόγον: that is to say, although one precise ratio alone constitutes a true octave, there is a certain margin of variation within which the ear will accept the interval as an octave.
3 μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας: I have retained μᾶλλον with all the mss. It is bracketed by Schanz and expunged by the Zurich editors. μᾶλλον however is not seldom used by Plato to strengthen another comparative: cf. Timaeus 87c δικαιότερον γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κακῶν ἴσχειν λόγον. Politicus 259c-d Τῆς δὴ γνωστικῆς μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς χειροτεχνικῆς καὶ ὅλως πρακτικῆς βούλει τὸν βασιλέα φῶμεν οἰκειότερον εἶναι; Gorgias 487b αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. The present case is, it is true, a stronger one, since the word μᾶλλον is actually repeated; but this is softened by the interposition of ἐπὶ πλέον, and the pleonasm seems to me not unnatural. Some editors would insert ψυχήν before ψυχῆς: but, as Schmidt observes, this is superfluous on account of the preceding words ἦ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν.
4 ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην: The conception of virtue as a harmonious condition of the soul is peculiarly Platonic. Compare the description of δικαιοσύνη {justice, righteousness} in Republic 443d μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης. And in Sophist 228b we hear that vice is a στάσις {dissension; frozen} of the soul.
Plato’s contention is this. If soul is a harmony of the body, soul is the result of a combination of certain elements arranged in a certain way and in certain ratios. And if virtue is a harmonious state of the soul, the difference between a virtuous and a non-virtuous soul must consist in some variation of the component elements, either in the number or in the disposition or in the ratios. Virtue then is due either to the addition of some element which is wanting in the non-virtuous soul, or to some better proportion or arrangement of the same elements. Whichever alternative we adopt, the result, is that the virtuous soul is a more complete harmony than the non-virtuous; thus contravening our statement that one soul cannot be more soul, i.e. more harmony, than another.
5 τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα: ‘the admission amounts to this, that (in saying one soul is not more soul than another) you affirm that one harmony is not more a harmony than another.’ Schanz, following Madvig and Schmidt, brackets ἁρμονίας, so that we must understand ψυχὴν ψυχῆς in agreement with ἑτέραν ἑτέρας. But this prematurely anticipates the conclusion in 93e οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον ἄλλη |93ε| ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχή, ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἥρμοσται. The train of reasoning is thus. We agree that one soul is as much soul as any other. Assuming soul to be a harmony, this amounts to saying that all these harmonies, which we call souls, are equally harmonies. Now equal harmonies are equally harmonised and have an equal portion of harmony. Therefore souls, being harmonies, are equally harmonised. In other words, if souls are harmonies, they are equal harmonies; but equal harmonies cannot be more or less harmonised one than another; neither therefore can souls. There is no difficulty about ἁρμονίας, if we understand ‘that particular harmony which is soul.’
6 παντελῶς: {παντελῶς = absolute, complete, entire} Soul is complete and perfect soul, as such; therefore complete and perfect harmony: no discord then, and consequently no vice, can exist in her.
7 ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν: Schanz brackets ψυχαὶ, following Heindorf. But the clause is of general application: ‘seeing that it is the nature of souls to be this precise thing, namely souls, in the same degree.’
8 ἦ καὶ καλῶς: ‘do you think this is a worthy conclusion? or that our theory would have been in such a predicament, had our premiss been correct, that soul is a harmony?’
9 πάσχειν ἂν: The mss. omit ἂν, which however occurs in the citation of Stobaeus. It is certainly necessary, since εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν = ‘if our premiss had been correct’: which it is not.
Phaedo, Part 43.
—“Does it yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them? I mean, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul oppose it and draw it away from drinking, and from eating when it is hungry, and do we not see the soul opposing the body
—“Certainly.”
—“Did we not agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead them?”
—“Yes,” he replied, “we did, of course.”
—“Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the opposite way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and opposing them
~Homer, Odyssey 20.17-18.
—
—“By Zeus, Sokrates, the latter, I think.”
—“Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems,
—“That is true,” said he.
The last argument rests neither upon the ideal theory nor upon the doctrine that virtue is harmony: it is simply an appeal to common sense. Aristotle’s views on the subject will be found in De Anima 1 iv §§ 2-9. In the lost dialogue Eudemos he argued against harmony, (1) that harmony has an opposite, viz. ἀναρμοστία, but soul has no opposite—an obvious petitio principii; (2) that the opposite of ἀρμονία σώματος is ἀναρμοστία σώματος: the ἀναρμοστία is disease, weakness, and deformity, therefore the ἀρμονία is health, strength, and beauty; none of which is soul. See Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles p. 26.
Φαιδων, Part 43.
—τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς: τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ᾽ ὅτι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον;
—οὐκ ἔγωγε.
—πότερον συγχωροῦσαν
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
—οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν
—ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
—τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν
—ἆρ᾽ οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν;
—νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
—οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν
—ἔχει οὕτως, ἔφη.
1 πότερον συγχωροῦσαν: The mss. are in confusion here. Schanz gives πότερον [συγχωροῦσαν] τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην [παθὴμασι]; which, omitting the brackets, is the reading of BCD. Schanz considers that the confusion arose because the copyist was puzzled by the use of πότερον with a single interrogative. The sentence, as he reads it, seems to me however somewhat bare; and I have reverted to the text of Z. and St. In the next sentence ὡς εἰ is found in B, ὡσεἰ in CD. οἷον is in Stobaeus and many inferior mss. ὡς is in the margin of B, and was approved by Schanz N. C. p. 150, though he now prints [ὡσεἰ]. St. and Z. give οἷον.
2 ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἕλκειν: Cf. Republic 439b following.
3 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν: 93a. St. and Z. give ἔμπρόσθεν.
4 οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο: i.e. ἐκείνοις ἅ, cognate accusative, ‘it can never give a sound contrary to the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and all the other conditions of the materials from which it arises.’
5 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις: The construction is usually regarded as following ἀπειλοῦσα rather than νουθετοῦσα. Heindorf compares Isokrates Areopagitikos 149c (§ 48) and Lysias against Andokides § 33. But it is surely evident that ἐπιθυμίαις κ.τ.λ. depends on διαλεγομένη, as Schleiermacher takes it.
6 στῆθος δὲ πλήξας: Odyssey xx 17. The passage is quoted also in Republic 390d, 441b.
7 Ὁμήρῳ: In the same half-serious manner Plato professes to trace the doctrine πάντα ῥεῖ {Heraclitus, “everything flows”} back to Homer: Theaetetus 152e εἰπών γὰρ Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύνη, πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. Cf. 153c.
Phaedo, Part 44.
—“Very well,” said Sokrates, “Harmonia, the Theban goddess, has, it seems, been moderately gracious to us; but how, Kebes, and by what argument can we find grace in the sight of Cadmus?”
—“I think,” said Kebes, “you will find a way. At any rate, you conducted this argument against harmony wonderfully and better than I expected. For when Simmias was telling of his difficulty, I wondered if anyone could make head against
—“My friend,” said Sokrates, “do not be boastful, lest some evil eye put to rout the argument that is to come. That, however, is in the hands of God. Let us, in Homeric fashion, charge the foe and test the worth of what you say. Now the sum total of what you seek is this: You demand a proof that our soul is indestructible
—And Kebes said, “I do not at present wish to take anything away or to add anything. You have expressed my meaning.”
Φαιδων, Part 44.
—εἶεν δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας
—σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν: τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅ τε ἠπόρει,
ὠγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία
—τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν
—καὶ ὁ Κέβης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι: ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λέγω.
1 τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας: Sokrates playfully personifies the theory of his Theban friend as Harmonia the Theban heroine. She had threatened the argument with destruction, but the persuasive tongue of Sokrates has propitiated her. Harmonia naturally suggests Kadmos, who is made to personify the objection of Kebes. Many and marvellous are the interpretations which various commentators have forced upon this simple piece of pleasantry, which ill deserves such treatment. But even the laboured absurdity of Olympiodoros compares favourably with such trifling as Stallbaum’s ‘Simmiae ratio facilior, Cebetis difficilior ad refellendum fuit. quamobrem facile ilia uxori haec marito tribuitur.’ Supposing the ‘ratio’ of Simmias had been ten times more difficult than that of Kebes, to whom but Harmonia could it have been assigned? Heindorf sensibly says ‘hinc ad alteram illam Cebetis itidem Thebani transituro sponte se Cadmi offerebat mentio.’ Richard Shilleto (as I am informed by Dr. Jackson) held that ἵλεα conveys the notion of ‘bidding farewell.’ ἵλαθι having the same sense addressed to a deity as χαῖρε addressed to a mortal: this view he supports by Cicero De Natura Deorum I § 124 deinde si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam ‘propitius sit‘? This seems to me very probable: ἵλαθι certainly is a form of farewell in Theokritus xv 143, where the lady ends her song with ἵλαθι νῶν φίλ Ἄδωνι καὶ ἐς νέωτ’ εὐθυμήσαις. Compare Apollonius Rhodius IV 1773 ἵλατ ἀριστήων μακάρων γένος: the poet is taking leave of his heroes. I am indebted to Dr. Jackson for some further illustrations from the Anthology: the point is well brought out in xii 140.
2 ὅ τι ἠπόρει: So Schanz after Forster. I have adopted ὅ τι mainly because λέγοντος seems to want an object. If ὅτε be retained we must translate: ‘while Simmias was speaking, at the time he was stating his difficulty.’ Kebes did not agree with the theory of Simmias, but apparently did not see his way to refute it.
3 βασκανία: ‘lest some malign influence should put to confusion our discourse that is to come.’ βασκανία expresses the prevalent superstition that over-confidence on the part of man drew down on him the resentment of superhuman powers. Cf. Vergilius Eclogue vii 27 aut, si ultra placitum laudarit, bacchare frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro. The ‘mala lingua’ of Codrus vents its malice, not in abuse, but in extravagant praise exciting supernal wrath. This feeling has found its most perfect expression in Caliban upon Setebos, e.g. ‘Meanwhile the best way to escape His ire Is, not to seem too happy. ‘Sees, himself, Yonder two flies, with purple films and pink, Bask on the pompion-bell above: kills both.’ Plato, however, when speaking seriously, is careful to repudiate the popular notion of θεῶν φθόνος: cf. Timaeus 29e ἀγαθὸς ἦν [sc. ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ξυνιστάς], ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος. See too Phaedrus 247a φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται. Aristotle also denies it, Metaphysics I ii 983 a 2. ἡμῖν is Heindorf’s correction for ἡμῶν, which seems too far removed from τὸν λόγον.
4 ἔσεσθαι: seems suspicious, and is bracketed by Schanz. As it has strong ms. support, however, I have retained it. λέγεσθαι has hardly any authority.
5 Ὁμηρικῶς: Prof. Geddes rightly translates, ‘as Homer’s heroes do‘: not, as Wagner, ‘in Homeric phrase.’
6 εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ: Note that Plato once more carefully marks the proof of immortality as merely subordinate to this main thesis.
7 εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ: i.e. ἐν βίῳ μὴ φιλοσόφῳ.
8 τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν: ‘but as for proving that the soul is a strong and godlike thing, and that she existed even before we were born as men—there is nothing, you say, to prevent all this from showing, not indeed her immortality, but that she is long-lived, etc.’ That is to say, Kebes does not object to the reasoning of Sokrates, so far as it merely shows that the soul is very durable; but it is none the nearer to showing that she is immortal.
9 ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου: Kebes did not put it quite in this way; Sokrates amplifies his expression in 88a πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι.
10 ζῴη: The change of mood is readily understood if we transfer the words from reported to direct speech. The two imperfects would naturally be used by Kebes in making his statement: ‘for all your reasoning, she was none the more immortal’ (ἦν = ἦν ἄρα); ‘the incarnation was the beginning of her dissolution’: while the two optatives would in his mouth be present indicative; ζῇ and ἀπόλλυται. As Ast says, the construction follows ὅτι: cf. 96b, where ὅτι is never actually expressed.
12 πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω: This extreme care in preparing the indictment serves to remind us of the vital importance of the coming struggle. All that precedes has been, so to speak, mere skirmishing: from this point the main battle begins; the whole strength of the ideal theory must be put forth to secure the victory.
Phaedo, Part 45.
—Sokrates paused for some time and was absorbed in thought. Then he said: “It is no small thing that you seek; for the cause of generation and decay must be completely investigated.
—“Certainly,” said Kebes, “I wish to hear your experiences.”
—“Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Kebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists;
—“Yes,” said Kebes.
—“Now listen to this, too. I thought I was sure enough, when I saw a tall man standing by a short one, that he was, say, taller by a head than the other,
—“And now,” said Kebes, “what do you think about them?”
—“By Zeus,” said he, “I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has become two, or the one which was added, or the one which was added and
Φαιδων, Part 45.
—ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος, οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς: ὅλως γὰρ
—
—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε.
—ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν: ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι. καὶ πολλάκις
—καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά
—
—ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
—σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ᾤμην γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων
—νῦν δὲ δή, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;
—πόρρω που, ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τις προσθῇ ἕν, ἢ τὸ ἓν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν
1 ὅλως γὰρ: The ἀπορία {aporia = perplexity} of Kebes necessarily raises the question propounded in Timaeus 27d τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; The immortality of the soul can only be proved by means of the theory of ideas; and in order that we may fully understand the bearing of that theory, it is put in sharp contrast with the αἰτίαι {reason, cause} of previous philosophies.
2 τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη: It has been maintained that we have here a piece of actual history; that the mental development of the real Sokrates is here described. This is, however, highly improbable. We know from Xenophon (Memorabilia I i 11-15) that Sokrates had the utmost distaste for physical speculation; nor does Xenophon say one word which leads us to suppose this was the result of fruitless study. Such inquiries must have been always alien to the strongly practical genius of Sokrates. Plato may be merely describing in its supposed effect on an individual mind the development of philosophy to the theory of ideas; but it is not impossible that he is recounting his own experience. Nothing can be more probable than that a mind so insatiably thirsting for knowledge should have already sought it from every existing source, and that when he met Sokrates his disappointment in all should fast be leading him to philosophic scepticism. But in the lack of direct evidence it would be rash to speak positively.
3 ὧν ἂν λέγῃς: i.e. whatever you may have to say after hearing my reply. ὧν λέγεις would refer to the statement already made by Kebes; but this has less ms. authority.
4 τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν: This was held by several philosophers, first perhaps by Anaximandros, of whose ἄπειρον {apeiron = the infinite, unlimited}, according to Plutarch and Stobaeus, the first determinations were these. Simplicius assigns to him other ἐναντιότητες {inceptions} among the first determinations, such as ξηρὸν {dry} and ὑγρόν {wet}. To Anaxagoras this classification is attributed by Theophrastos De Sensu 59; and to Archelaos by Diogenes Laertius ii 16. Compare Aristotle De Generatione et Corruptione II ii 329 b 24 Θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν τὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητικὰ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ παθητικὰ λέγεται. Schanz gives τὸ θερμὸν [καὶ ψυχρόν] {the hot [and cold]}.
5 σηπεδόνα: ‘fermentation.’ The σηπεδὼν would take place by the action of θερμὸν {heat}, cf. Aristotle De Generatione Animalium v iv 784b 6 γίνεται δὲ σῆψις διὰ θερμότητος μὲν πᾶσα, οὐ τῆς συμφύτου δέ. {‘All decay is caused by heat, not the innate heat but external heat.’} Also Meteorologica IV i 379 a 16 σῆψις δ’ ἐττὶ φθορὰ τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὑγρῷ οἰκείας καὶ κατὰ φύσιν θερμότητος· αἵτη δ’ ἔστιν ἡ τοῦπεριέχοντος. {‘the strictest general opposite of true becoming is putrefaction.’} Decomposition of matter in one form must precede its recomposition in another.
6 τὸ αἷμά: See Empedokles 315 (Karsten).
αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἀμφιθροῶντος,
τῇ τε νόημα μάλιστα κυκλίσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν·
αἷμα γὰρἀνθρώποις περιάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.
Compare too the Hippokratean treatise περὶ νούσων book 1 (Kuhn vol. I p. 209) τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος συνέσιος· ἔνιοι δὲ λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν. The same view is mentioned by Lucretius in 43, without being assigned to any particular authority: ‘et se scire animae naturam sanguinis esse.’ Aristotle De Anima I ii 405b 5 gives Kritias as the upholder of this theory: ἕτεροι δ’ αἷμα, καθάπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς οἰκειότατον ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δ’ ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύσιν.
7 ὁ ἀὴρ: This too was the view of more than one philosopher. Air was the ἀρχὴ {arche = first principle} of Anaximenes. Diogenes of Apollonia said the soul was dry hot air; as in a passage quoted by Simplicius, καὶ πάντων τῶν ζῴων δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀὴρ θερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω, ἐν ᾧ εἰμέν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τοῦ ἠελίου πολλὸν χυχρότερος: and again ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναπνέοντα ζώει τῷ ἀέρι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖσι καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶνόησις. Cf. Theophrastos De Sensu 39-45. τὸ πῦρ: This was held by Herakleitos, who considered the soul as a ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις {dry fumes}. Cf. Aristotle De Anima I ii.
8 ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκέφαλός: It is very doubtful to whom this doctrine must be assigned. Possibly it was merely a popular opinion, as Wyttenbach thinks. It has been ascribed to the Pythagoreans; but this rests only on a statement of Diogenes Laertius (viii 30), which has a suspiciously post-platonic appearance. E. Hirzel (Hermes, vol. xi p. 240) endeavours to trace it to Alkmaion of Krotona; but his evidence hardly amounts to proof. Theophrastos De Sensu 26 does indeed say of him that he affirmed ἁπάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις συνηρτῆσθαί πως πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, but this is not very definite. It may be observed that the brain is not ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, but ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων: and the view of Hippokrates is not far off this. In a passage quoted by Heindorf, De Morbo Sacro 17, he says of the brain, It is the brain which is the messenger to the understanding. For when the man draws the breath (pneuma) into himself, it passes first to the brain, and thus the air is distributed to the rest of the body, leaving in the brain its acme, and whatever has sense and understanding. For if it passed first to the body and last to the brain, then having left in the flesh and veins the judgment, when it reached the brain it would be hot, and not at all pure, but mixed with the humidity from flesh and blood, so as to be no longer pure. Wherefore, I say, that it is the brain which interprets the understanding.
Thus Hippokrates may be said to have held that air is ᾧ φρονοῦμεν and the brain is ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων. Still as the brain is introduced as an alternative to air, not as supplementary, probably no special reference to Hippokrates is intended. Plato’s own view is that the brain and spinal marrow form the medium through which the soul acts on the body: Timaeus 73c-d. For the process of growth see Timaeus 80d following.
9 λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν: Cf. Meno [97e] καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντ᾽ [98a] ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. Also Aristotle Analytics Posterior 11 xix 100 a 3 Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ’ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης. See also Metaphysics I i 980 b 28. To Plato the difference between δόξα {good opinion} and ἐπιστήμη {science, knowedge} was fundamental, the one dealing with γιγνόνενα {becoming, coming into being}, the other with ὄντα {being}.
10 ἀφυὴς εἶναι: ‘nothing in the world could be more stupid in such studies than myself.’ Cope.
11 ἃ καὶ πρότερον: There are three stages to be discriminated in the πάθη of Sokrates: (1) the period when he was content with the ordinary beliefs of the unreflecting many concerning γένεσις καὶ φθορά {coming into being and passing away}: (2) when he sought some more scientific theory in the speculations of the physicists: (3) when, disappointed in this and failing in his search for the ultimate αἰτία itself, he fell back upon his system of λόγοι.
12 ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες: This is commonly understood as alluding to the theory of Anaxagoras. But I cannot imagine that any such reference is meant. Sokrates says that his physical studies not only brought him no fresh knowledge but made him sceptical of that which he fancied he already possessed. This belief therefore is one that he held, not only before he made acquaintance with the works of Anaxagoras, but before he entered upon any physical speculations whatsoever. It is probably the view of popular common sense, that the human frame is composed of the food consumed, without any reference to the ὁμοιομερῆ.
13 μεῖζον εἶναι αὐτοῦ: The mss. have αὐτῇ. I have accepted Wyttenbach’s correction (1) because the following words, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου, seem to require that the object of comparison should be expressed here also, (2) because αὐτῇ seems superfluous with τῇ κεφαλῇ. If we retain αὐτῇ, we must translate ‘just by the head.’ Cf. 101a.
14 ἢ τὸ προστεθέν: Wyttenbach writes these words twice over, arguing that the question should be put thus: if B be added to A, has A become two, or B, or are A + B two because of their juxtaposition? Schanz follows him. I cannot see that Plato is bound to express this in full, and therefore I have reverted to the ms. reading.
15 ἡ ξύνοδος: ‘the juxtaposition caused by their approximation.’ τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι is explanatory genitive after ξύνοδος: compare Timaeus 58b ἡ δὴ τῆς πιλήσεως ξύνοδος. The right explanation, according to Plato, is not juxtaposition but participation in the idea of duality: it is irrational to speak as if the mere approximation of two objects one to the other had anything to do with the question.
16 ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται: The fact that two opposite processes produce the same result shows that neither of them can really be the explanation of the result; they are συναίτια, not αἰτία.
17 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον i.e. the method of physical speculation.
18 αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω: ‘I mix up everything at random according to another method of my own.’ Such is the literal translation of this difficult phrase, but the meaning is not so easily fixed. Wyttenbach, saying that the ideal theory cannot possibly be meant, takes φύρω as virtually a past tense, and explains ‘alium modum ex male intellecto Anaxagora susceptum commentus sum.’ Prof. Geddes translates ‘it so chances that I form to myself another method.’ He says φύρω is ‘I work up,’ like dough, and quotes Aristophanes Birds 482 προπεφύραται λόγος εἷς μοι {I have already mixed the dough of my address and nothing prevents me from kneading it}: and so Heindorf takes it. But φύρω is not the same as φυράω: Plato always uses the former word in the sense of ‘confusing,’ see below 101d, Gorgias 465d, etc. For ‘kneading’ he uses the proper word φυράω, cf. Timaeus 73e, Theaetetus 147c. The exact phrase occurs in Aeschylus Prometheus 450 ἔφυρον εἰκῇ πάντα. Wyttenbach’s explanation will not do; we have the present tense running through the whole passage. Nor does Sokrates represent his view as arising from that of Anaxagoras. I believe Sokrates is speaking half ironically, half in earnest. We must remember that the Platonic Sokrates took refuge, not in the theory of ideas, which he failed to reach, but in the method of λόγοι, cf. 99 e. This method is then what he means by τιν᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον. In 101c he advises Kebes to leave divisions and additions and such subtleties to those who are cleverer than he. There the irony is obvious; and here with the same irony he says that being unable to follow any of the infallible methods of the physicists he was forced to blunder on after a fashion of his own. And although he does not seriously mean to disparage his own method in comparison with theirs, perhaps he does hint some dissatisfaction that he is still unable to work on the more perfect principle.
Phaedo, Part 46.
—“Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras,
Φαιδων, Part 46.
—ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούσας
—
—
—
—
1 ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούσας: ‘but once when I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras.’
2 τρόπον τινὰ: ‘in a certain way,’ but not, as we presently see, in the way of Anaxagoras.
3 πάντα κοσμεῖν: Hermann is probably right in bracketing κοσμεῖν. Translate: ‘if mind orders all things, it places each thing severally as is best,’ i.e. we must not, as Anaxagoras did, assign ἀέρες and αἰθέρες as causes of various phenomena, if we assign νοῦς as the cause of the whole.
4 περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου: So the best mss. Schanz brackets αὐτοῦ, Z. and St. give αὐτοῦ, omitting ἐκείνου. I think the ms. reading will stand: it refers to the ἑκάστου above; ‘he will seek this cause both for the particular object of his inquiry and for everything else.’
5 κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ: As Wyttenbach points out, there is a play on νοῦν: ‘κατὰ νοῦν, secundum mentem, Anaxagorae placitum significat, et vulgo usurpatur, gratum, ex animi nostri sententia.’
6 πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη: For various views on this subject see Aristotle De Caelo II xiii 294a 29. Thales thought the earth floated like a piece of wood; Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokritos said it was flat. The Pythagoreans held that it was a sphere.
7 εἰ ἐν μέσῳ: Aristotle De Caelo 293a 15. This view was almost universal: the Pythagoreans seem to have been the only exception. They believed the earth to revolve round the central fire.
8 πῇ ποτε ταῦτ᾽ ἄμεινόν: The final cause of the movements of the heavenly bodies is declared in the Timaeus, see especially 39b following.
9 φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ: If an intelligent cause ordered the universe, it is inconceivable that it should not design the best in all things: and this is our proper object of investigation, not the mere physical agencies which immediately produce the phenomena. Plato’s own system is perfectly consistent with this principle: by making the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν {personal good} the ultimate cause he keeps his ontology strictly teleological; and again his teleology is strictly ontological. The cause of each thing is its indwelling idea; this idea is a form of the ἀγαθόν, therefore the ἀγαθόν {the good} is the cause why each thing is as it is. The βέλτιστον {the best, superlative of agathon} is not merely the design of a creative intelligence; it is the very idea which is symbolised in the particular. In the Timaeus Plato teaches that the entire universe is the self-evolution of absolute intelligence, which is the same as absolute good. This is differentiated into finite intelligences, subject, through their limitation, to the conditions of space and time. Sensible perceptions are the finite intellect’s apprehension, within these conditions, of the idea as existing in absolute intelligence. Thus the perception is the idea, as existing under the form of space. Therefore the idea, which is a form of the good, is the cause of the perception’s existence: that is, as was said above, the ἀγαθόν {the Good} is the ultimate αἰτία {cause} of each thing. But only the first-beginnings of this theory are to be found in the Phaedo.
Phaedo, Part 47.
—“My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence,
—“I wish it with all my heart,” he replied.
Φαιδων, Part 47.
—ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος,
—
—ἀλλ᾽ αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα
—τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι
—
—ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν γενοίμην: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην
—ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.
1 ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος: ‘from what a height of hope was I hurled down, when I went on with my reading and saw a man that made no use of mind.’ Heindorf takes ἄνδρα = τὸν ἄνδρα: but the above rendering seems preferable. The metaphor in ᾠχόμην φερόμενος is surely falling from a height; not, as Wagner has it, ’starting from great hope, I was sailing along’: a most feeble saying. The same charge is brought against Anaxagoras by Aristotle, Metaphysics I iv 985a 18. Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν: compare Laws 967 b, c. Schanz brackets καὶ before ἀναγιγνώσκων, but this causes a harsh collision between the two participles.
2 οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον: I concur with Mr. Jackson in regarding these words as an unmeaning interpolation. The sole complaint Plato has against Anaxagoras is that he made no use of νοῦς: what then are these αἰτίαι that he ought to have introduced? We cannot understand it as explanatory of τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον, ‘making no use of mind, that is alleging no real (primary) causes,’ (1) because the distinction between primary and secondary causes has not yet been made, so that a reference to it would be unintelligible, (2) the plural is fatal to such a rendering; there is but one real cause, that is νοῦς. Dr. Jackson now proposes to bracket also the words εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα. which are twice omitted by Proklos in citing this passage—in Timaeum 1c, and in Parmenidem p. 481 Stallbaum.
3 διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων: ‘joints to separate them one from another,’ and so render the limbs flexible. διαφυὴ and ἄρθρον regard the joints from opposite points of view; the former as breaking the continuity of the bones, the latter as knitting the frame together.
4 νεῦρα: here, as always in Plato, mean sinews or muscles, not nerves. Of the nerves he had no knowledge. Cf. Timaeus 74d.
5 ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν:: Hirschig most unnecessarily brackets these words. It is true there is now no doubt what the sentence is; but Sokrates expresses in general terms that he deems it best to submit to whatever may be the judgment of the Athenians: compare ἥντιν᾽ ἂν τάττῃ below.
6 πάλαι ἂν |99α| ταῦτα: The bones and muscles cannot be the cause; for they would have acted in a precisely opposite way had a different δόξα τοῦ βελτίστου prompted them.
7 ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα Prof. Geddes justly remarks that it is δόξα not ἐπιστήμη τοῦ βελτίστου that could urge Sokrates to escape.
8 ἀλλ᾽ αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα: Cf. Timaeus 46c-d ταῦτ’ οὖν πάντα ἔστιν τῶν συναιτίων οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσιν χρῆται τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἰδέαν ἀποτελῶν: δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ συναίτια ἀλλὰ αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων, ψύχοντα καὶ θερμαίνοντα πηγνύντα τε καὶ διαχέοντα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζόμενα. λόγον δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ νοῦν εἰς οὐδὲν δυνατὰ ἔχειν ἐστί. Presently he distinguishes these two classes as πρώται and δευτέραι αἰτίαι. In 46e-47a he says τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὀμμάτων συμμεταίτια πρὸς τὸ σχεῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἣν νῦν εἴληχεν εἰρήσθω: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον αὐτῶν εἰς ὠφελίαν ἔργον, δι’ ὃ θεὸς αὔθ’ ἡμῖν δεδώρηται, μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον.
9 καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων: So Schanz after Heindorf. The mss. have πράττω, which may be thus rendered: ‘to say that it is because of these that I do what I do, and at the same time that I do it by intelligence, is an extremely slovenly mode of speaking’: i.e. to assert simultaneously that Sokrates acts thus because of these subsidiary causes and also through intelligence, is a very confused statement. But though the ms. reading can be defended, I think it probable that Heindorf’s neat and simple emendation restores what Plato wrote. Z. and St. have ταῦτῃ νῷ πράττω.
10 τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι: The construction is either an anacoluthon or an indignant aposiopesis. Cf. Symposium 177c τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, Ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι εἰς ταυτηνὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνῆσαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἠμέληται τοσοῦτος θεός; Similarly Xenophon Memorabilia I iv 12, iv iii 5. Wyttenbach suggests τὸ δ’ ἄῤ ἧν μὴ διελέσθαι, which is neat: but no change is needed.
11 ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται: ‘this is what they seem to me to be handling blindly, as if in the dark.’ ὃ = τὸ ξυναίτιον. ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι, they call it by a name which does not belong to it, i.e. αἴτιον. The reading ὄμματι is quite out of place.
12 ὁ μέν τις δίνην: Empedokles conceived the earth to be kept in its place by the rapid rotation of the universe, as, when a cup of water is whirled swiftly round, the water is retained in the cup; so Aristotle explains, De Caelo II xiii 295 a 16, οἱ δ’ ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιθέουσαν καὶ θᾶττον φερομένην ἢ τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κωλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυάθοις ὕδωρ· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κύκλῳ τοῦ κυάθου φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον ὅμως οὐ φέρεται κάτω, πεφυκὸς φέρεσθαι, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. Anaxagoras too supposed a περιχώρησις, in order to effect the separation of the ὁμοιομερῆ; but he did not utilise it to steady the earth.
13 ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ: should be connected with μένειν.
14 ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ: ‘another sets the air as a basis of support beneath the earth, which is like a flat kneading-trough.’ This view is attributed by Aristotle to Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokritos; cf. De Caelo 11 xiii 294b 13. Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλάτος αἴτιον εἶναί φασι τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν. Οὐ γὰρ τέμνειν ἀλλ’ ἐπιπωμάζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν, ὅπερ φαίνεται τὰ πλάτος ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων ποιεῖν. That is to say, the earth does not sink in the ocean of air, but rests upon the surface like a lid.
15 τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα: As Heindorf says, the words must be construed τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τοῦ οὕτως νῦν αὐτὰ κεῖσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα τεθῆναι. The distinction between τεθῆναι and νῦν κεῖσθαι should be noticed: ‘as it was best for them to be placed by mind, so they are now situate.’
16 τούτου: i.e. τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα κεῖσθαι. They think that in their purely physical theories they can find an Atlas, i.e. a system to explain the universe, more potent than the final cause which Sokrates postulates.
17 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον: ‘the good and the binding.’ There is a play on the double sense of δέον: cf. Cratylus 418e ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἰδέα οὖσα τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἶναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς. All this critique of Anaxagoras is a propaedeutic to the ideal theory. The main fault of Anaxagoras is that ‘the good’ is not the ultimate cause in his system. Plato supplies his defects (in the Republic first and still more in the later dialogues) (1) by making τὸ ἀγαθὸν the principle of all existence, so that each thing really exists in proportion as it is perfect; (2) in that νοῦς, instead of being a merely external motive power, is actually the universe: causation is ultimately identity.
18 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην: Sokrates here expressly confesses that he has not succeeded in tracing the genesis of the universe to the idea of the good: and it is most important to bear in mind that what follows is only a description of the δεύτερος πλοῦς. In the Republic Plato is bolder and sets forth under a similitude the relation between the ἀγαθὸν and the ideal and material worlds; but not until the Philebus and especially his crowning achievement, the Timaeus, does he attempt fully to expound the supremacy of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν {personal good}.
19 τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν: i.e. the next best course. The origin of this proverb is shown by a passage of Menander which Wagner quotes: ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δήπου λεγόμενος ἂν ἀποτύχῃ τις πρῶτον έν κώπαισι πλεῖν. Heindorf quotes Eustathius: δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται, ὅτε ἀποτυχών τις οὐρίου κώπαις πλέῃ κατὰ Παυσανίαν. Plato uses it again, Politicus 300c, Philebus 19c. Compare Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics II ix 4 ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν. Also Politics III viii 6 (Susemihl) 1284b 19.
Phaedo, Part 48.
—“After this, then,” said he, “since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its image in water
—“Not very well, certainly,” said Kebes.
—From the foregoing analysis it will be seen that the interpretation here given of this extremely difficult passage differs widely from that of other editors. A full discussion of the problems presented in this chapter would occupy too much space for a note: they are accordingly dealt with in Appendix II.
Φαιδων, Part 48.
—ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα
—ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους
—οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.
1 τὰ ὄντα: ‘realities’; i.e. from Plato’s point of view the true causes, τἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον.
2 τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ: Cf. Republic 516a.
3 τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην: Compare the metaphor in Republic 527d-e τὸ δ᾽ ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον ὂν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων: μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται.
4 πρὸς τὰ πράγματα: I formerly understood this to mean the ideas themselves. Cf. Phaedo 66d αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα. But I am now convinced that it is possible to make πράγματα signify particulars, and thus to avoid the harshness of taking ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων as a metaphorical expression for ‘all the powers of the soul’: see the discussion of this clause in Appendix II.
5 εἰς τοὺς λόγους: The meaning of this can be fully understood only after a very careful study of Republic 506–518. Briefly, however, it is this. The Sokratic method of definition was, by comparison of a number of particulars which we designate by the same name, to ascertain what attributes were merely accidental in various particulars, and what were essential to the class: thus in defining a horse we must distinguish between those qualities which some horses possess and others do not, and those without which the animal would not be a horse. The definition thus formed is the λόγος, the concept or general notion. Now in the earlier stage of the ideal theory, wherever there is such a λόγος, there is also an idea, corresponding to every group of particulars called by the same name (Republic 596a). The principal difference between the λόγος and the ἰδέα is (1) the λόγος is a mental concept, having no existence but in our thought; the ἰδέα is a self-existing essence, independent of our thought: (2) the λόγος includes all that we can discover about the class by observation; the Idea includes all that there is to be known about it. Therefore from the Platonic point of view the λόγος is our conception of the ἰδέα, the reflection of it in our mind; which reflection only imperfectly represents it, inasmuch as it is derived from an imperfect apprehension of particulars, which themselves are only imperfect likenesses of the idea. In this sense it is that Plato regards the λόγος as εἰκὼν τοῦ ὄντος. This matter has been admirably cleared up by Dr. Jackson, Journal of Philology vol. x p. 132 following. See Introduction § 5. There is an interesting use of λόγος in Laws 895d, where the Athenian says ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν;…ἓν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἓν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἓν δὲ ὄνομα. The approximation of οὐσία to the Aristotelian sense is also notable.
6 ἴσως μὲν οὖν: Sokrates stops to guard himself against conceding too much. The λόγοι are indeed only εἰκόνες, but so also are the sensible particulars; and the latter are the less trustworthy. He then who seeks truth ἐν τοῖς λόγοις is does not deal with images any more than the physicist who investigates natural phenomena. For ᾧ BCDE give ὡς, which perhaps should be retained.
7 τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις: ἔργα here = the particulars. The word is used because of the familiar antithesis with λόγοις: not, I think, with a view of denoting the particulars as works or products of the ideas whence they derive their existence.
8 ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δὴ: ‘however that may be.’ Sokrates does not propose here to debate the issue raised in the preceding sentence. ὑποθέμενος: The method is more fully explained in the next chapter. For example, Sokrates by examining a number of instances of δίκαιον forms his ὑπόθεσις as to the nature of δικαιοσύνην. This ὑπόθεσις is his conception of the αὐτὸ δίκαιον. Then he compares with this ὑπόθεσις particular δίκαιον, or whatever professes to be such, and admits or rejects each in so far as it agrees or disagrees with the ὑπόθεσις.
Phaedo, Part 49.
—
—“You may assume,” said Kebes, “that I grant it, and go on.”
—“Then,” said he, “see if you agree with me in the next step. I think that if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to everything. Do you assent to this view of cause?”
—“I do,” said he.
—“Now I do not yet, understand,” he went on, “nor can I perceive those other ingenious causes. If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely color,
—“I do.”
—“And great things are great and greater things greater by greatness, and smaller things smaller by smallness?”
—“Yes.”
—“And you would not accept the statement, if you were told that one man was greater or smaller than another by a head,
—And Kebes laughed and said, “Yes, I should.”
—“Then,” he continued, “you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two and that this is the reason it is more. You would say it is more by number and by reason of number; and a two cubit measure is greater than a one-cubit measure not by half but by magnitude, would you not? For you would have the same fear.”
—“Certainly,” said he.
—“Well, then, if one is added to one
—“That is true,” said Simmias and Kebes together.
—Echecrates: By Zeus, Phaedo, they were right. It seems to me that he made those matters astonishingly clear, to anyone with even a little sense.
—Phaedo: Certainly, Echecrates, and all who were there thought so, too.
—Echecrates: And so do we who were not there, and are hearing about it now. But what was said after that?
The upshot of this chapter is that universals alone can be known. For the present, however, these universals are in the form of λόγοι or ὑπόθεσις which are not objects of νοῦς proper. When dialectic is made perfect λόγοι will be exchanged for ἰδέαι, ὑπόθεσις for ἀρχαί.
Φαιδων, Part 49.
—
—
—σκόπει δή, ἔφη, τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις ἐάν σοι συνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ: καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς;
—συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.
—οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας
—δοκεῖ.
—καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα
—ναί.
—οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ᾽ ἂν ἀποδέχοιο εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ
1 ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν As Heindorf observes ἐπιχειρῶν ἐπιδείξασθαι has virtually a future force, whence it takes the place of ἐπιδείξόμενος, which would be the ordinary construction. Cf. Theaetetus 180c ὅπερ ᾖα ἐρῶν: a phrase which occurs in Republic 449a, 562c.
2 οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις: ‘you cannot be too quick in proceeding to the end.’ This is not an uncommon formula. Cf. Symposium 185e, Euripides Iphigenia in Tauris 245, Xenophon Memorabilia II iii 11.
3 τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας: i.e. the causes of the physicists.
4 ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ: This is the passage referred to by Aristotle De Generatione et Corruptione II ix 335b 9 ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἱκανὴν ᾠήθησαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἴδη τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, γίνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάληψιν καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολήν, ὥστ’ εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, τὰ εἴδη οἴεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἴτια εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Another reference is in Metaphysics I ix 991b 3.
5 εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη: The ms. reading προσγενομένη has given much trouble to the editors. Wyttenbach proposes προσαγορενομένη which, though accepted by the Zurich editors, is hardly satisfactory. Schanz and other recent editors bracket εἴτε, which is precisely the word I should most wish to keep. For surely Plato is suggesting some alternative to παρουσία and κοινωνία, not merely some mode of their existence: moreover προσγενομένη is not properly applied to those two nouns. On the whole Ueberweg’s προσγενομένου seems the best remedy; though I formerly adopted Dr. Jackson’s suggestion to omit the participle altogether. He remarks that προσγίγεσθαι is a familiar word as applied to the connexion of ideas and phenomena; cf. Hippias maior 289d, 292d, Parmenides 153e, and is especially common in later writers; it might therefore be supposed to be a marginal note upon ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως. Certainly, had Plato written προσγενομένου, here seems no obvious reason for its corruption into -η. A very similar use of ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως is found in Laws 899b θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῷα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσιν πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως. I should add that Olympiodoros in quoting this passage omits προσγενομένη.
6 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο: ‘for I do not proceed to insist upon that point.’ i.e. all he insists upon is that the idea is the cause; he does not specify the mode of its operation. This phrase is an indication that Plato at this period did not entertain a view of the relation between ideas and particulars definitely distinct from that expounded in his later writings; but that he had not as yet applied himself to working out the question. In the later dialogues he does not so much alter his view as define it; the definition, however, necessarily leads to important modifications in the theory of ideas, and to the decisive rejection of the doctrine of παρουσία {advent, the coming to be}, towards which he had hitherto chiefly inclined: see on 73e: compare Parmenides 133d τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται.
7 μεγέθει ἄρα: The words μέγεθος and σμικρότης are synonymous with μεῖζον and ἔλαττον in 75c.
8 τῇ κεφαλῇ: Plato here clears up a logical confusion. The fact that the dative is used to express both cause and manner gives the ἀντιλογικὸς his opportunity. If A is said to be taller by a head than B, he insists upon understanding ‘by the head’ as denoting the cause, just as in the phrase ‘Sokrates acts by intelligence,’ νῷ πράττει.
9 ἐναντίος λόγος: Inasmuch as (1), if A is taller by a head than B, B is shorter than A by the same head, namely A’s; which is therefore the cause of both tallness and shortness; (2) the head is small compared with the rest of the body, therefore it is absurd to say A is large through a small part of himself.
—
—καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, ἔγωγε, ἔφη.
—οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος.
—πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη.
—τί δέ; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι
—
—ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.
—Ἐχεκράτης νὴ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε: θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.
—Φαίδων: πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.
—Ἐχεκράτης καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;
10 10τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως: ‘clinging to the safeguard of your hypothesis.’ The ὑποθεσις is is the notion or definition, λόγος, under which the object to be explained falls. If we are asked, why is a rose beautiful? we shall not attribute its beauty to the colour, shape, disposition of the petals, and such κομψεῖαι, for all these are merely ξυναίτια: we shall say it is because the rose partakes of the beautiful. Now it is of course the idea which is the cause of the rose’s beauty; the λόγος is not the cause, but it is the conception of the cause which, for fault of direct apprehension of the idea, we have formed by generalisation from particulars. Only when we know the ideas shall we have a true insight into causation; until then λόγοι are the best substitute. The term ὑποθεσις {hypothesis}, as well as the method, may be traced to Sokrates: cf. Xenophon Memorabilia IV vi 13 εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περί του ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ὃν αὐτὸς λέγοι ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδέ πως {Whenever anyone argued with him on any point without being able to make himself clear, asserting but not proving, that so and so was wiser or an abler politician or braver or what not, he would lead the whole discussion back to the definition required, much in this way}. In illustration we have an inquiry, what is the ἀγαθὸς πολίτης. It is used in a similar sense in Gorgias 454c ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς {that you may complete your own statement in your own way, as the premises may allow.}.
11 11εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο: The difficulty of retaining ἔχοιτο in the sense of ‘attack’ has been perceived by most editors, and Madvig proposes to read ἔφοιτο, which Schanz adopts. But the objections to the passage are by no means thus exhausted. A discussion of them will be found in the article of Mr. Jackson’s before mentioned, Journal of Philology vol. x p. 148. I shall state them as follows: (1) ἔχοιτο in a sense entirely unparalleled following immediately upon the ordinary use. Wagner indeed finds ‘a certain acumen’ in this; but wherein it consists he fails to inform us. (2) If we acquiesce in ἔχοιτο or accept ἔφοιτο, the words εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο are a clumsy and tautological anticipation of ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον. Ast, seeing this, most ingeniously suggests εἰ δέ τις ἄλλης ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο. But, as Dr. Jackson observes, there is grave difficulty in applying the term ὑποθεσις {hypothesis}, which is throughout reserved for the Sokratic method, to the principle of an opponent, who would doubtless term it αἰτία. Moreover the introduction of a rival method is here irrelevant. Finally Ast’s emendation does not meet the most serious objection of all, which is (3) that the words ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ are inconsistent with the method indicated in ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, κ.τ.λ. and are in themselves sheer nonsense. The comparison of particulars between themselves is made before the formation of the ὑποθεσις. But when the ὑποθεσις is established by means of this comparison, we proceed to observe, not whether the particulars are consistent with one another, but whether they are consistent with the hypothesis; and this is precisely what Sokrates professes to do in 100a ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, where he is supposing the truth of his hypothesis established. And presently we see that the validity of a doubtful hypothesis is tested, not by examination of particulars, but by the ascent to a more general hypothesis. The word ὁρμηθέντα too strikes me as betraying a writer who had no sense of the difference between aorist and perfect participles: below we have ὡρμημένων. On these grounds I fully agree with Dr. Jackson in regarding the passage ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ as an interpolation; probably, as he suggests, by the same hand that inserted ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον in 72d.
A very full and instructive discussion of the whole subject of the present chapter, and the relation of the δεύτερος πλοῦς to the dialectical method, will be found in the aforesaid article of Dr. Jackson’s in Journal of Philology vol. x; to which my notes on this part of the dialogue are largely indebted.
12 ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης: i.e. as when we are asked to explain a group of particulars we form by generalisation a concept or definition, ὑποθεσις {hypothesis}, which includes them all, so if we have to explain our ὑποθεσις we form a wider generalisation which includes that and other ὑποθεσις corresponding to other groups of particulars. We proceed from particulars to species, from species to genus, from genus to a more comprehensive genus, and so ascend step by step until we arrive at one that will satisfy our needs.
13 ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν: ‘whichever of the higher generalisations seems most adequate.’ τῶν ἄνωθεν means the more comprehensive ὑποθεσις {hypothesis}, farther removed from the particulars. So Aristotle Analytics Posterior I xx 82a 23; λέγω δ’ ἄνω μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον, κάτω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος. Cf. Metaphysics B iii 998b 17 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἀρχαί, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἀνωτάτω τῶν γενῶν: ταῦτα γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ πάντων.
14 ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις: I agree with Prof. Geddes, though for very different reasons, in holding that ἱκανὸν does not mean the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. In this passage Sokrates is avowedly setting forth his δεύτερος πλοῦς: he has declared his inability (99d) to attain to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. Now if ἱκανὸν means the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, we have here described no δεύτερος πλοῦς, but the perfect dialectic of which Sokrates at present despairs; and we ought to exchange the term ὑποθεσις {hypothesis} for ἀρχή. By the superior method we use our ὑποθεσις merely as steps to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν: having reached this we are enabled to descend step by step, verifying every one of the ὑποθεσις by which, we ascended: so that the knowledge of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν is essential to the real knowledge of all our generalisations from the highest to the lowest. But since the inferior method only is attempted here, ἱκανὸν must merely mean a ὑποθεσις comprehensive enough to satisfy the antagonist or our own doubts. Olympiodoros, though his phraseology is sadly confused, means rightly when he says ἄμεινον δέ, τὸ ἀεὶ ὁμολογούμενον φάναι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοπίστους ὑποθεσις τε καὶ ἀρχάς.
15 ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις: i.e. you would not make a confusion between arguments intended to prove your ὑποθεσις {hypothesis} and arguments applicable to deductions therefrom: e.g. in the case that follows, you would not confuse a demonstration of the ideal theory with a demonstration of the immortality of the soul, which is a corollary from the former. In other words the processes which are not to be confounded are (1) the establishment of the ὑποθεσις, (2) the comparison of the ὡρμημένα with the ὑποθεσις, cf. 100a. As Grote says, ‘during this debate [on the ὡρμημένα] Plato would require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis provisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must open a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that the discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis shall be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the hypothesis itself.’ In the sarcastic remarks that follow Plato indicates the difference between the aim of the φιλόσοφοι and that of the ἀντιλογικοί: the former seek τῶν ὄντων τι εὑρεῖν the latter αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν. This spirit of self-satisfaction is exorcised by dialectic; cf. Theaetetus 177b. (φύροις is Madvig’s correction for φύροιο, which is retained by Z. and St. οὐκ ἂν φύροιο means ‘you would not get muddled.’ but the active gives a preciser sense.
16 |102 a| Plato brings in this brief interlude with his usual skill. The emphatic approval expressed by Echekrates of the principles just laid down serves to impress on us that by them we must stand or fall. We have staked all upon this last effort; we have chosen our own battle-ground, on which alone we can hope for victory. Nothing could better mark the gravity of the crisis than this momentary pause in the narrative.
Phaedo, Part 50.
—Phaedo: As I remember it, after all this had been admitted, and they had agreed that
—“Yes.”
—“But,” said Sokrates, “you agree that the statement that Simmias is greater than Sokrates is not true as stated in those words. For Simmias is not greater than Sokrates
—“True.”
—“And again, he is not smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias’s smallness.”
—“That is true.”
—“Then Simmias is called small and great, when he is between the two,
—Simmias agreed.
—“I am speaking so because I want you to agree with me. I think it is evident not only that greatness itself will never be great and also small, but that the greatness in us will never admit the small or allow itself to be exceeded. One of two things must take place: either it flees or withdraws when
—“That,” said Kebes, “seems to me quite evident.”
Setting aside the metaphysical objections to the doctrine of ideas of relation, which we have here in its most pronounced form, it conveniently serves Plato’s purpose to show that in particulars contradictory ideas may coexist. In 103d we pass on to the next stage. We are here dealing with the participation by particulars in ideas which are not essential to their nature. Greatness and smallness are not essential to a man as heat is essential to fire and cold to snow. With this chapter it is well to contrast Parmenides 150a folllowing.
Φαιδων, Part 50.
—Φαίδων: ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη,
—ἔγωγε.
—ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν
—ἀληθῆ.
—οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα;
—ἔστι ταῦτα.
—οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει
—συνέφη.
—λέγω δὴ τοῦδ᾽ ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος
—ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι:
—παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεταί μοι.
1 ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη: Sokrates now assumes the existence of the ideas, though at present he is unable to attain cognition of them: that is, he assumes that his ὑποθεσις {hypothesis} more or less faithfully represent the substantial realities. Taking then the ideas as the true αἰτίαι περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, it remains to examine whether the immortality of the soul is a legitimate deduction from this theory.
2 τἆλλα: i.e. concrete existence. τἆλλα is constantly used thus in the Parmenides.
3 λέγεις τότ᾽ εἶναι: The ideas are the cause of comparison, as of everything else. It is through partaking of the ideas of great and small that Simmias is comparable in point of size with other men.
4 τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν: ‘as to Simmias being bigger than Sokrates, you admit the truth is not as expressed in the words.’ Strictly speaking Simmias is not bigger than Sokrates, for the personality of two men cannot be compared in respect of size. The only things that can be so compared are great and small: therefore it is the greatness in Simmias which we compare with the smallness that is in Sokrates. But to say that Simmias qua Simmias is greater or less than Sokrates qua Sokrates would be nonsense.
5 ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει: because he participates in the two opposite ideas. This predication of opposite attributes exhibits particulars in sharp contrast to the ideas, of which no such contrary predication is, to the Sokrates of the Phaedo, possible: cf. Parmenides 129b εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν οἶμαι ἦν: εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι. The whole passage 129a–130a should be compared, where Sokrates is stating the earlier Platonic doctrine, which in the latter part of the dialogue Plato criticises with a view to its modification.
6 τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων: This reading is due to Madvig, who thus renders the sentence: ‘alterius magnitudini exiguitatem suam superandam subministrans, alteri magnitudinem exiguitatem superantem praebens’; i.e. Simmias submits his smallness to be exceeded by the greatness of Phaedo and presents his greatness to exceed the smallness of Sokrates. On the whole this seems the best attempt to disentangle this troublesome sentence that has yet been made. The ordinary reading is ὑπερέχων, which is thus translated by Mr. Cope: ‘exceeding the shortness of the one by excess of height, and lending to the other by comparison a size exceeding his own shortness.’ The grave objection to this reading and interpretation is that in the first clause ὑπερέχων is followed by the accusative, in the second ὑπερέχον by the genitive. The verb may, it is true, take either case; but surely Plato would not use both constructions in the same breath. Wyttenbach, Heindorf, and Ast reconstruct the passage each in his own way: Madvig’s remedy is, however, the simplest.
7 ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν: ‘it seems I am going to talk in the style of an indenture.’ ξυγγραφὴ is the regular term for a legal document, especially a bond or covenant. Sokrates makes fun of the clumsy sentence he has just uttered, which he compares to the cumbrous pedantry of legal phraseology.
8 οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος: According to the earlier Platonism, the idea exists (1) absolutely apart from the sensible world, χωριστή, (2) inherent in phenomena, to which it imparts their attributes. Not only are opposite ideas incapable of communion, as existing apart by themselves, but also as informing particulars. The importance of this point becomes manifest when the argument is applied to ψυχή {soul}.
9 ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν: If any object that was great becomes small, the idea of greatness either withdraws from it and goes elsewhere or is extinguished; and the idea of smallness takes its place. But under no circumstances can the idea of greatness remain in the object and accept the attribute of smallness, thus contradicting its own nature.
10 ὑπομένον: Schanz has adopted Hirschig’s ὑπομεῖναν, against all authority. The change of tense is however perfectly proper. Awaiting the approach of the other idea is a prolonged process, accepting it is an act performed once for all. In the next sentence ὑπομείνας denotes the actual completion of the process in a specified instance.
11 οὐκ ἐθέλειν: ‘it will not consent to abide and accept smallness and thus become different from what it was, in the way that I accept and abide smallness and still remaining the man I am, without losing my identity am small; whereas it has never submitted, while remaining great, to be small.’ That is to say, if Sokrates δέχεται σμικρότητα, we have a small Sokrates, which involves no incongruity nor loss of identity; but if greatness δέχεται σμικρότητα, we have small greatness, which is incongruous and impossible. Schmidt (Krit. Comm. II p. 41) discusses this passage at great length: he would read οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτι ὅπερ ἦν, comparing 103e δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. There is much to be said for this; but I think the vulgate may be defended, as indicating that in the one case a change of identity is involved but not in the other: the incongruity in fact lies in the supposed retention of its identity by the idea under circumstances which render its retention impossible. σμικρὸν μέγεθος would remain μέγεθος but yet be ἕτερον. Moreover Schmidt’s reading anticipates the point made in μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι. On the whole, therefore, it is better to make no change.
12 οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι: ‘I, this same Sokrates, am small.’
13 τετόλμηκε: as in 103d τολμήσειν. The perfect expresses the fixed constitution of the idea: it has been ordained by nature not to endure smallness.
14 ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι: i.e. ἐν τῷ προσιέναι αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον.
Phaedo, Part 51.
—Then one of those present—I don’t just remember who it was—said: “In Heaven’s name, is not this present doctrine the exact opposite of what was fitted in our earlier discussion, that the greater is generated from the less and the less from the greater and that opposites are always generated from their opposites? But now it seems to me we are saying, this can never happen.”
—Sokrates cocked his head on one side and listened.
—At the same time he looked at Kebes and said: “And you—are you troubled by any of our friends’ objections?”
—“No,” said Kebes, “not this time; though I confess that objections often do trouble me.”
—“Well, we are quite agreed,” said Sokrates, “upon this, that an opposite can never be its own opposite.”
—“Entirely agreed,” said Kebes.
Φαιδων, Part 51.
—καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις δ᾽ ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο.
—καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν
—
—οὐδ᾽ αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω: καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει.
—συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἁπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι.
—παντάπασιν, ἔφη.
1 παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν: ‘bending his head to listen.’ As Heindorf suggests, the objector probably spoke in a low voice through diffidence.
2 ἀνδρικῶς: Sokrates is never without a word of praise for any mark of interest or intelligence in his listeners. Plato is fond of the word ἀνδρικῶς and its cognates to express staunchness in argument: cf. Theaetetus 204e, Phaedrus 265a, Republic 454b, Laws 752b: in the last two instances ironically.
3 οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον: The distinction is clear enough. The concrete particular is not in itself opposed to either of the opposites, therefore it can admit either of such opposites without contradicting itself; but the opposites themselves are so mutually exclusive that neither can admit the other without self-contradiction. Hot water can become cold, because water is not itself opposite to hot or cold, nor is any attribute essential to it which is opposed to either. But hot cannot become cold without manifest contradiction of its own nature. Similarly, when we generated ζῶν from τεθνηκός, we did not mean that death became life, but simply that things that live have passed over from a state of death into a state of life. In the next chapter, however, we shall see that a further refinement must be made.
4 οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν: Simmias can be small and great by participation in the ideas of small and great; but the idea of greatness in him can never have the quality of smallness, so that Simmias should be small by virtue of its immanence. For ἐν τῇ φύσει compare Parmenides 132d τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει.
5 τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ: Here Plato propounds a theory of predication. When we say that Sokrates is small, we do not mean that Sokrates and small are the same thing, but we call Sokrates after the name of the idea whose attribute he possesses. To mark this point was necessary because of the confusion into which Antisthenes and others had fallen in the matter of predication. The difference between Plato’s treatment of the subject in the Phaedo and in the Sophist has been dealt with in the Introduction § 5.
6 οὐκ ἄν: ‘no, not this time.’ The mss. are corrupt here: I have adopted the text of Schanz, except that he brackets ὁ Κέβης. Z. and St. have οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
Phaedo, Part 52.
—“Now,” said he, “see if you agree with me in what follows: Is there something that you call heat and something you call cold?”
—“Yes.”
—“Are they the same as snow and fire?”
—
—“But heat is a different thing from fire and cold differs from snow?”
—“Yes.”
—“Yet I fancy you believe that snow, if (to employ the form of phrase we used before) it admits heat, will no longer be what it was, namely snow, and also warm, but will either withdraw when heat approaches it or will cease to exist.”
—“Certainly.”
—“And similarly fire, when cold approaches it, will either withdraw or perish. It will never succeed in admitting cold and being still fire,
—“That is true,” said he.
—“The fact is,” said he, “in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea. But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples. In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?”
—“Certainly.”
—“But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not
—“Of course,” he replied.
—“Now see what I want to make plain. This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites; these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them,
—“Certainly,” said Kebes.
—“But the number two is not the opposite of the number three.”
—“No.”
—“Then not only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites.”
—“Very true,” he said.
—After establishing in the fiftieth chapter that opposite ideas cannot enter into communion, Plato’s next task is to show that this incommunicability extends to other ideas, which, though not themselves opposite to anything, are inseparably combined with one of such opposites and therefore necessarily exclude the other.
Φαιδων, Part 52.
—ἔτι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;
—ἔγωγε.
—ἆρ᾽ ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ;
—
—ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν;
—ναί.
—ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽ οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα οὖσαν
—πάνυ γε.
—καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξιέναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν.
—
—ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς,
—πάνυ γε.
—ἆρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ
—πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη.
—ὃ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
—οὐδὲ μήν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι.
—οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
—οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα.
—ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.
1 ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ: Plato at first speaks of hot, cold, fire, snow, without distinctly specifying whether he means ideas or particulars: presently, however, he gives a precise statement: we have in 104a (1) περιττόν, the idea of odd, (2) τρίας, the idea of three, (3) τρία, the three particulars informed by the τρίας.
2 χιόνα οὖσαν: Schanz writes χιόνα twice, which is far from euphonious and surely unnecessary, the subject being readily supplied from the preceding sentence.
3 ἐν τοῖς ἔμπρόσθεν Phaedo 102e.
4 χιόνα καὶ θερμόν: ‘at once snow and hot.’ The sense is perfectly right, and I cannot understand why Schanz should bracket καὶ θερμόν, as he does καὶ ψυχρόν in d. For the phrase χιόνα καὶ θερμόν is explanatory of the whole clause δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, the result of which process would be precisely what Plato says, hot snow. Schanz seems to refer it to the ὅπερ ἦν alone. Hirschig goes so far as to bracket all three words; also πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν below. I cannot see that the shadow of suspicion attaches to them.
5 ἀπολεῖσθαι: That which ἀπολεῖσθαι is of course not the idea, which is as imperishable existing ἐν τῇ χιόνι as existing ἐν τῇ φύσει: what perishes is the quality of snow which the particular possesses by the immanence of the idea of snow—the sensible form of snow, such as those described in Timaeus 50c as ἐσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα: this, however, is to explain Plato’s words by means of an analysis which he had not yet made. For αὐτῷ the mss. have αὐτό.
6 ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς: ‘it is the case then with some ideas of this kind that not only do we recognise the right of this idea itself to the same name in perpetuity, but also that of some other idea, not being identical with it, which, whenever it exists, always possesses the form of the other.’ For the construction ἔστιν ὥστε cf. 93b.
7 τοῦ αὑτοῦ ὀνόματος: So Schanz: rightly, it would seem; cf. below, τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεί που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν. In support of ἑαυτοῦ Prof. Geddes refers to 104a μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος. But there, as well as in τῷ τε αὑτῆς ὀνόματι below, a comparison is involved which is absent here. Z. and St. give ἑαυτοῦ.
8 τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν: On this Wyttenbach observes ‘notatur alius verborum usus: quo εἶδος ut universalis habetur, μορφὴ minus universale et quasi communio τοῦ εἴσους: veluti numerus impar εἶδος dicitur, tria autem illius μορφὴν habere.’ But this distinction cannot be maintained; for, as Wyttenbach himself points out, in 104d Plato says ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ ἣ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, where μορφῇ = τῷ περιττῷ. In fact μορφή, εἶδος, and ἰδέα are in the present passage interchangeable words. ‘The species has the μορφὴ of the genus present, with whatever else that μορφὴ may be combined,’ says Prof. Geddes, rightly.
9 ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῖσδε: No fresh point is introduced here: Plato is merely illustrating his proposition more fully. From his second example he again draws the inference stated in 103e, which he gives in a more complete form in 104b.
10 τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ: ‘for this is the point of my question.’ These words direct the attention of the hearer to the proposition on which most stress is laid: viz. that there are ideas which are not logically opposite to anything, but which nevertheless contain the principle of some opposite and therefore refuse to combine with the rival opposite. The vital importance of this we shall presently see.
11 καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν: sc. περιττὸν.
12 ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας: ‘the entire half of the set of numbers,’ Cope. For the construction cf. Thucydides viii 8 τὰς ἡμισείας τῶν νεῶν {only half the ships}. πολὺς is similarly used, Thucydides i 5 τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου {unwalled and straggling towns}: and other like idioms are given in Wagner’s note.
13 οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία: ‘not only those original opposites refuse to admit each other, but also those which, though not opposite one to another, always contain the opposites, seem no more likely to admit the idea which is opposite to the idea they contain, but on its approach they either perish or withdraw.’ That is to say τριὰς is not opposite to δυάς, but it contains an opposite, περιττόν, to the idea, ἄρτιον, contained in δυάς. Therefore τριὰς equally with περιττόν excludes ἄρτιον, and δυάς excludes περιττόν.
14
—(14ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα: As Ast says, the construction is as though φαινεται had been written instead of ἔοικε.
Phaedo, Part 53.
—“Shall we then,” said Sokrates, “determine if we can, what these are?”
—“Certainly.”
—
—“What do you mean?”
—“Such things as we were speaking of just now. You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd.”
—“Certainly.”
—“Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result.”
—“No, it cannot.”
—“But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?”
—“Yes.”
—“And the opposite of this is the idea
—“Yes.”
—“Then the idea of the even will never be admitted by the number three.”
—“No.”
—“Then three has no part in the even.”
—“No, it has none.”
—“Then the number three is uneven.”
—“Yes.”
—“Now I propose to determine what things, without being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and
—“Yes, I agree entirely,” he said, “and am with you.”
It might be thought that in the last chapter we had already a sufficient account of these ideas. But in the present chapter one important addition is made. Now we not only say of the ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα, that they ἔχει τὰ ἐναντία, but also that they ἐπιφέρει τὰ ἐναντία εἰς ὄ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ. This is a necessary corollary to the foregoing; but Plato desires to bring it out as prominently as possible, because this is the point at which the whole argument is aimed. Thus the gist of this chapter lies in its application of the principle to concretes.
Φαιδων, Part 53.
—βούλει οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐὰν οἷοί τ᾽ ὦμεν, ὁρισώμεθα ὁποῖα ταῦτά ἐστιν;
—πάνυ γε.
—
—πῶς λέγεις;
—ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι ἃ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχῃ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.
—πάνυ γε.
—ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ
—οὐ γάρ.
—εἰργάζετο δέ γε ἡ περιττής;
—ναί.
—ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου;
—ναί.
—
—οὐ δῆτα.
—ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.
—ἄμοιρα.
—ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς.
—ναί.
—ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι,
—τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον,
—πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἕπομαι.
1 ἃ ὅτι ἂν κατάσχῃ: ‘which, whatever they occupy, compel that to have not only its own idea, but always that of some opposite as well.’ The word κατάσχῃ marks the fresh point: what the idea occupies or informs can be nothing else but particulars.
2 τὴν αὑτοῦ ἰδέαν: i.e. ἐκείνου ὅ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ’ Wohlrab strangely remarks ‘αὐτοῦ bezüglich auf den Plural ἃ’. To say nothing of the grammar, this makes sheer nonsense, representing the idea as the idea of itself. Plato’s meaning is plain enough. The ideal triad, for instance, occupying the concrete three, forces the latter to receive not only the special idea, τριάς, but also the idea of a certain opposite, περιττόν.
3 ἐναντίου ἀεί τινος: There is so much confusion in the mss. that it would be rash to assert confidently what is the true reading. This however gives precisely the sense required and differs from the best mss. only in the omission of αὐτῷ. Notwithstanding that αὐτῷ has overwhelming ms. authority I cannot believe it genuine. The only plan for making sense of it is to read δεῖ with Schmidt for ἀεί. But the phraseology ‘but it also has need of some opposite’ is so glaringly inappropriate that it is incredible that Plato wrote it. I have therefore with the Zurich editors ejected αὐτῷ, which Schanz retains within brackets. Ast’s ἀεί δή τινος is not bad, possibly accounting for the corruption δῆνος.
4 ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ: see on 103e.
5 εἰργάζετο δέ γε ἡ περιττής: The ms. reading ἡ περιττὴ is surely indefensible. Plato never uses such a phrase as ἡ περιττὴ ἰδέα, which would indeed be something very like nonsense. Probably he wrote either ἡ τοῦ περιττοῦ or ἡ περιττότης: the latter, which was suggested to me by Dr. Jackson, I have ventured to adopt, as the mildest remedy I can find for an evident corruption. Compare 105c οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης.
6 ἐπὶ τὰ τρία: i.e. three particulars.
7 ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς: The word ἀνάρτιος is used instead of περιττὴ to denote the opposition to ἄρτιον involved in the number three: the full significance of this mode of expression will be clear when we come to take the case of ψυχή.
8 ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι: Heindorf says ‘ἔλεγον in his, ut saepe, idem fere est quod ἐκέλευον.’ Cf. Aeschylus Agamemnon 955 λέγω κατ’ ἄνδρα, μὴ θεον, σέβειν ἐμέ.
9 οὐ δέχεται αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον: There seems no reason for omitting τὸ ἐναντίον. ‘The opposite itself’ is distinguished from the idea which is not, but implies, an opposite: and this is all that is meant by the word αὐτό. Cf. 103b. This seems to be the view of H. Schmidt (Krit Comm. II p. 58), who understands αὐτό ‘nicht in dem streng philosophischen Sinne an sich.’ Stallbaum’s plan of taking to τὸ ἐναντίον in apposition to αὐτό is clumsy.
10 ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὁρίζῃ: resumes the sentence begun at ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι, the construction of which is left imperfect.
11 μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον: ‘that not only does the opposite refuse to admit its opposite, but whatever imports an opposite into that to which itself comes—that very importing idea can never admit the opposite of that which is imported.’ Sokrates here speaks highly ξυγγραφικῶς. Not only will odd refuse to admit even, but the triad, which imports the idea of odd (ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον) into whatsoever it enters, will itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον) never admit even, the opposite of oddness which is imported by it (τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα). ἐκείνῳ is to be joined with ἐπιφέρῃ. The present definition differs from that in 104b in the introduction of the word ἐπιφέρειν, which denotes that the principle is now being applied to concretes which are informed by the ideas.
12 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ [οὐκ] ἐναντίον: The insertion of οὐκ is absolutely necessary: there is no sense in which the number ten can be said to be contrary to anything else. Cf. 104b ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τἀναντία: and 104e. Stalibaum’s defence of the vulgate apparently fails to satisfy even himself.
13 οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον: ‘nor will 3/2 and the rest of the fractions whose denominator is 2 accept the idea of whole; nor yet will 1/3 and the fractions whose denominator is 3.’ These last examples do not seem very felicitous, since we have no such definite contrast of opposites as in the case of odd and even. We must however take it thus: 3/2 and 1/3 are not opposites to anything; they contain however the idea of fractionally, which is opposite to that of integrity, therefore they will never admit the latter.
14 τὸ ἥμισυ: Schanz brackets this as a gloss.
Phaedo, Part 54.
—“Then,” said Sokrates, “please begin again at the beginning. And do not answer my questions in their own words, but do as I do. I give an answer beyond that safe answer which I spoke of at first, now that I see another safe reply deduced from what has just been said. If you ask me what causes anything in which it is to be hot, I will not give
—“Quite sufficiently,” he replied.
—“Now answer,” said he. “What causes the body in which it is to be alive?”
—“The soul,” he replied.
—
—“Yes” said he, “of course.”
—“Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?”
—“Certainly,” he said.
—“Is there anything that is the opposite of life?”
—“Yes,” said he.
—“What”
—“Death.”
—“Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will never admit the opposite of that which it brings with it.”
—“Decidedly not,” said Kebes.
We now see the significance of Plato’s insistence on his point that some ideas which are not opposites yet refuse to combine with certain opposites. Soul is not opposite to anything: but she stands in the same relation to the idea of life as fire does to that of heat and the triad to that of oddness.
It is to be noted that a fourth term is added in this chapter. Hitherto we have had three, e.g. περιττόης, τριάς, τριά: the general idea, the special idea, and the particular informed by the latter: now in addition to these three we have σῶμα in which the particular resides; the fever that seizes on us is not the idea of fever, but a particular fever, which corresponds to τριά, while the idea of fever corresponds to τριάς. Similarly the soul that quickens a particular body corresponds to τριά. Now since this fourth term is itself in no wise material to the argument,—it matters nothing to the immortality of soul whether or not she resides in a body—I conceive the point of it is to emphasise the fact that these particulars too, πυρετὸς and ψυχή with them the ideas of νόσος and ζωή, and consequently refuse to admit their opposites. Hitherto it has only been the special idea which ἐπιφέρει the general idea.
Φαιδων, Part 54.
—πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ
—ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.
—ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν ἔσται;
—ὧι ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη.
—
—πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
—ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ,
—ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη.
—πότερον δ᾽ ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν;
—ἔστιν, ἔφη.
—τί;
—θάνατος.
—οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται;
—καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
1 καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ: ‘and do not answer in the terms of the questions I put, but following the examples I shall give you’ i.e. to the question, what makes a thing θερμόν? the answer must be, not θερμότης, but πῶρ. The reading in the text has the best ms. authority and gives the best sense.
2 τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην: Cf. 100e ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. For the use of ἀσφαλὲς cf. Timaeus 50b μακρῷ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀσφαλέστατον εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρυσός.
3 εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με: ‘were you to ask me what must be inherent in a body to make it hot.’ Stallbaum seems right in bracketing ἐν τῷ: we thus have the same phrase three times over, with a slight variation in the order of the words. Schanz and others include σώματι in the bracket; but it seems quite as much in place here as in the two passages below.
4 ᾧ ἂν πυρετός: i.e. he will specify the particular kind of sickness instead of using the general term: as Prof. Geddes puts it, the species is substituted for the genus.
5 ᾧ ἂν μονάς: Similarly, instead of assigning περιττότης as the cause of oddness in a number, he will assign the idea of that particular odd number, whatever it may be: μονάς, like πυρετός, is merely given as an example.
6 ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ: It is to be noted that the usage of κατάσχῃ here is different from that in 104d. The soul does not occupy the body in the sense in which τριὰς occupies τρία: the triad is the cause why the three are three, the soul is not the cause why body is body, but the cause why it is alive. The difference lies in this: the triad is the idea of three; the soul which quickens the body is not the idea of soul, but a particular soul, just as the fever is a particular fever. Thus we have the following terms, (1) the idea of life, (2) the idea of soul, which carries the idea of life to particular souls, (3) the particular soul, which vivifies the body, (4) the body in which is displayed this vivifying power. It is true that an idea of soul is a metaphysical monstrosity; but we cannot escape it here, first because otherwise Plato’s elaborate parallel breaks down, secondly because in the earlier Platonism an idea of soul is inevitable. Wherever there is a group of particulars called by the same name, we are told in the Republic, there is an idea corresponding: therefore since there are particular ψυχαί there must be αὐτὸ ὃ ἓστι ψυχαί. This is one of the errors which Plato rectifies in his later dialogues; for the present we must bear with it. The whole point of this sentence is that not only the idea of soul but also a particular soul ἐπιφέρει ζωήν, and accordingly to τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται.
Phaedo, Part 55.
—“Then what do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?”
—“Uneven,” said he.
—“And those which do not admit justice and music?”
—
—“Well then what do we call that which does not admit death?”
—“Deathless or immortal,” he said.
—“And the soul does not admit death?”
—“No.”
—“Then the soul is immortal.”
—“Yes.”
—“Very well,” said he. “Shall we say then that this is proved?”
—“Yes, and very satisfactorily, Sokrates.”
—“Well then, Kebes,” said he, “if the odd were necessarily imperishable,
—“Of course.”
—“And if that which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow? For it could not have been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat.”
—“That is very true,” he replied.
—“In the same way, I think, if that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away unharmed.”
—“Necessarily,” he said.
—
—“Certainly.”
—“And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal,
—“But,” he said, “it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable.”
We have seen that πῦρ and τρία, on the approach of cold or evenness, had two alternatives open to them, either ὑπεκχωρεῖν or ἀπόλλυσθαι: what is not open to them is δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον. Therefore if in any case ἀπόλλυσθαι were identified with δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον, it would necessarily be precluded. In the foregoing instances this is not so: ἀπόλλυσθαι is not identical with δέχεσθαι ψυχρὸν nor with δέχεσθαι ἄρτιον. Consequently both alternatives are open to πῦρ and τρία. But in the case of ψυχὴ this identification actually occurs: δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον is for the principle of life δέχεσθαι θάνατον: ἀπόλλυσθαι is the same as δέχεσθαι θάνατον: therefore, since δέχεσθαι θάνατον is precluded, so also is ἀπόλλυσθαι; else we should find soul doing what we have agreed is impossible, viz. admitting the opposite idea to the idea contained in it.
Φαιδων, Part 55.
—τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νυν δὴ ταῦτα
—ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.
—τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται;
—
—εἶεν: ὃ δ᾽ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν;
—ἀθάνατον, ἔφη.
—οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;
—οὔ.
—ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.
—ἀθάνατον.
—εἶεν, ἔφη: τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν;
—καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—τί οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν
—πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
—οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον
—ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
—ὣς δ᾽ αὔτως οἶμαι κἂν εἰ τὸ [ἄψυκτον] ἄψυχρον
—ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
—
—πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
—οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος
—ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἕνεκα: σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν
1 τί νυν δὴ ταῦτα: ταῦτα is in BCD, omitted by Z. and St. Schanz cites Alcibiades I 109c πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσῃ.
2 ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχή: It is necessary to distinguish very carefully the meaning of ἀθάνατον. All it denotes here is ὃ δ᾽ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται: it is that which contains the opposite idea to θάνατος, as ἀνάρτιον contains the opposite idea to ἄρτιον. It signifies in fact not what soul is but what she is not; and for the present we must dissociate the word from the positive notion of imperishability. We are now merely expressing the particular ἐναντίον which soul will not admit; that the exclusion of this ἐναντίον involves indestructibility is an inference we do not reach until we declare that ἀθάνατον = ἀνώλεθρον. Wyttenbach accurately says ‘ἀθάνατον hic dicitur ὃ δ᾽ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται: ἀνόλεθρον, quod superveniente contrario οὐκ ἀπώλλυται.’ For a somewhat similar subtlety compare Aristotle Topica VI vi 145b 21 following, where ἀθάνατον is regarded as logically distinguishable, though not actually separable, from ἄφθάνατον.
3 τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν: What has been demonstrated is, not the eternal existence of soul, which is a subsequent inference, but that soul contains the opposite idea to death. Dead soul would be analogous to cold fire or even three. It must be borne in mind that ψυχὴ means the principle of life: a dead vital principle is a contradiction in terms. That this is only a preliminary step to the final induction is marked by the τοῦτο μὲν.
4 εἰ τὸ ἄθερμον: If τὸ ἄθερμον were necessarily indestructible—that is, if ὄλεθρος were the opposite idea to ἄθερμον, then snow, as containing ἄθερμον, would not have the alternative of perishing on the approach of its opposite; it must withdraw whole and unmelted. Χιὼν ἀπολομένη would then be as impossible as χιὼν θερμὴ is now.
5 εἰ τὸ ἄψυχρον: The correction ἄψυχρον, suggested by Wyttenbach, seems to me certain. In order to formulate his antitheses with the utmost precision, Plato has coined the words ἀνάρτιον and ἄθερμον, to express the direct opposites of ἄρτιον and θερμόν: it seems hardly doubtful that he also coined the word ἄψυχρον to express the direct opposite of ψυχρόν. ἄψυκτον, as Wyttenbach says, is the counterpart of ἀθέρμαντον, not of ἄθερμον: and in a passage where Plato is choosing his terms with such extreme nicety the slightest failure in fitness is not to be tolerated. It is surprising that Wyttenbach’s admirable correction has been so completely ignored by subsequent editors. Dr. Jackson, independently of Wyttenbach, made the same emendation. ἄψυχρον is confirmed by the corrupt reading ψυχρόν in Stobaeus Ecl. I 814.
6 εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον: The inference that soul is immortal is not yet definitely drawn, but is based upon the two statements made in this sentence, (1) soul is ἀθάνατον, i.e. she cannot combine with death and so become dead soul; (2) therefore if ἀθάνατον involves ἀνώλεθρον, soul is ἀνώλεθρον, i.e. she cannot perish. When these two propositions are put side by side, it becomes obvious that the refusal of the soul to admit death implies her indestructibility, since we know that ἀθάνατον does involve ἀνώλεθρον.
7 οὐδ᾽ ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα: It is noteworthy that τεθνηκυῖα has a different sense here from that of τεθνηκὸς in the discussion at 71c: there it implied merely the state of separation of soul and body, but here denotes the actual destruction of the soul.
8 εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο: sc. τὸ ἀνάρτιον ἀνώλεθρόν εἷναι: that in the case of ἀνάρτιον, ἀπόλλυσθαι is equivalent to δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον, sc. ἄρτιον.
9 πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος: At last we have the inference definitely stated. Since soul will not admit the opposite of its immanent idea, and since that opposite is death, soul, being deathless, must be imperishable.
10 σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν: Here we have the fundamental postulate on which the whole argument rests: viz. that energy cannot be annihilated. All other things, being but forms of energy, may make way for their opposites, since their conversion into the opposite state involves not destruction but simply modification of energy. But vital principle is energy itself, therefore its conversion into the opposite state would mean conversion into non-energy, i.e. annihilation of energy. Plato is simply applying to spirit the principle which the older physicists laid down for matter, and which Persius formulates in the words ‘ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.’ Similarly we have in 72d εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνῄσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Compare Phaedrus 245d-e τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ᾽ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γῆν εἰς ἓν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται.
11 μὴ δέχοιτο: It is easier to feel the correctness of μὴ than to explain it grammatically. The meaning is ‘hardly could there be anything else incapable of admitting destruction, if the immortal, being eternal, will admit it.’ φμὴ δέχοιτο θορὰν is in fact equivalent to εἴη τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον φθοράν. Wohlrab compares Cratylus 429d Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὂν λέγοι; Add Gorgias 510d τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοίη. Also Thucydides vi 18 ὥστε τί ἂν λέγοντες εἰκὸς ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀποκνοῖμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους σκηπτόμενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν; {In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies for not helping them?}. For the form of the sentence Dr. Jackson compares Protagoras 330d-5 σχολῇ μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται.
12 εἰ τό γε ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται = εἰ ἐθέλει or μέλλει δέξεσθαι. The distinction between εἰ with future indicative and ἐὰν with subjunctive is apt to be overlooked. The former is constantly used as an equivalent to εἰ μέλλει, or even εἰ χρή with infinitive; and the substitution of ἐὰν would be, as here, impossible. It were easy to multiply instances, but one may suffice: Aristophanes Frogs 1460 εὕρισκε νὴ Δί᾽, εἴπερ ἀναδύσει πάλιν, ‘you must find something, if you mean to go on earth again.’ Cf. Timaeus 31a. This usage is recognised by Prof. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses §49, 1, note 3; he, however, regards a number of cases as falling into the class of ordinary future conditions equivalent to ἐὰν with subjunctive (§50). I cannot but think that such cases are very rare: nearly if not quite all of the instances he quotes might be taken the other way; especially Isokrates Archidamos §107, where εἰ δὲ φοβησόμεθα {‘if we are willing to die for our just rights’} is, I conceive, precisely parallel to ἢν ἐθέλωμεν ἀποθνῄσκειν: ‘if we mean to be cowards.’
Here it may be convenient to give concisely a synopsis of the reasoning in chapters l–lv. After agreeing that the truth of immortality will be best established if we can show that it is a legitimate deduction from the theory of ideas, we set forth thus: (1) particulars partake successively, or even simultaneously, of contrary ideas, but the idea itself can never admit its opposite, but at the approach thereof either withdraws or perishes; and this applies both to ideas as existing in nature and as immanent in particulars: (2) there is a second set of ideas, not being themselves opposites, but containing opposite ideas; no such idea can admit the opposite of the idea it contains, but either withdraws or perishes; e.g. the triad contains the idea of odd and cannot admit that of even: (3) particulars which one of this second class of ideas informs can never admit the opposite of the contained idea; e.g. three things can never be even: (4) if in any such instance refusal to admit the opposite necessarily involved indestructibility, we could predicate immortality of that which refused to admit it; e.g. if refusal to admit evenness involved indestructibility, three would be imperishable; but since this is not so, three may perish at the approach of evenness: (5) but in the case of soul refusal to admit the opposite of its contained idea does involve indestructibility, since the contained idea is life, whose opposite is death; and that which will not admit death is imperishable: soul therefore on the approach of death has not the option of perishing, but must adopt the other alternative, ὑπεκχωρεῖν {‘being gotten out of the way’}. Else, if the principle of life perished, nothing could be found to resist destruction.
Phaedo, Part 56.
—“All, I think,” said Sokrates, “would agree that God and the Principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish.”
—“All men would, certainly,” said he, “and still more, I fancy, the Gods.”
—“Since, then, the immortal
—“Necessarily.”
—“Then when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death.”
—“So it seems.”
—“Then, Kebes,” said he, “it is perfectly certain
—“I,” said Kebes, “have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions. But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters.”
—“But,” said Simmias, “I don’t see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great,
—“Not only that, Simmias,” said Sokrates, “but our first assumptions ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain. And if you analyze them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so. And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther.”
—“That is true,” he said.
Φαιδων, Part 56.
—ὁ δέ γε θεὸς
—παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, παρὰ θεῶν.
—
—πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.
—ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει,
—φαίνεται.
—παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ
—οὔκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πῃ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δή τι Σιμμίας ὅδε ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι: ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο
—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων: ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ
—οὐ μόνον γε,
—ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
1 ὁ δέ γε θεὸς: We must identify θεὸς with absolute universal mind, the νοῦς βασιλεὺς of the Philebus, the mythical δημιουργός {demiurgos = creator} of the Timaeus. Eternity cannot be ascribed either to the deities of popular worship or to those of Plato’s cosmology: see Timaeus 41b, creator: δι’ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ’ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων οἷς ὅτ’ ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε {ye also, seeing that ye were generated, are not wholly immortal or indissoluble, yet in no wise shall ye be dissolved nor incur the doom of death, seeing that in my will ye possess a bond greater and more sovereign than the bonds wherewith, at your birth, ye were bound together}. In the final development of Plato’s system we find that God, the idea of life, and universal soul are identical: ψυχὴ alone of all things is αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀθάνατον {self-moving and immortal}. This identification however is not to be found in the Phaedo: it belongs to the consummated idealism of the Philebus and Timaeus.
2 ἀποθνῄσκει: Here again the word denotes annihilation; not as in 71c.
3 ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον The distinction made in the last chapter between ἀθάνατον and ἀνώλεθρον {immortal and indestructible} must be carefully borne in mind.
4 εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο: It is needless, as I think, to insert ἄν: this use of the optative both in direct and indirect questions is established by a number of indubitable instances, and probably ought to be retained in some other cases where the editors introduce ἄν. It seems rash to assume in the face of much strong ms. evidence that the old use of the optative had entirely died out in Attic Greek. With the present example Wohlrab compares Euthydemus 296e οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοίην. A case in direct interrogation is Gorgias 492b τί [ἂν] τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη; In both these passages some would insert ἂν; but it is not so easy to dispose of cases like Aeschylus Choephoroe 172 {λέγοις ἄν: ὀρχεῖται δὲ καρδία φόβῳ = Speak—but my heart is dancing with fear} and several other passages in tragedy. In Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 170 {θύγατερ, ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθῃ;} the Laurentian has ποῖ τις φροντίδος ἔλθοι {We must conform us to the people’s will, yielding ere they compel}; The force is very much the same as that of the ‘deliberative’ subjunctive; but there is a distinction closely analogous to that drawn by Prof. Goodwin between ἐὰν γένηται and εἰ γένοιτο: the optative expresses a conception less vivid and more vague. The following words ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα are very needlessly bracketed by Hirschig.
5 τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων: ‘through distrust of human fallibility.’ Cf. 85d. The contrast between the clear-headed logician Kebes and the somewhat vague-minded Simmias is well brought out here. Kebes, sceptical as he is, has found an argument that in his judgment is free from flaw; he therefore freely accepts its consequences: Simmias still hesitates, not because he can find any defect in the reasoning, but rather because the ‘child in him’ cannot be soothed by reason. A good piece of dialectic does not come home to him as to his friend. Sokrates, it may be noticed, while commending his caution, points out what it ought to lead to: not to sighing over human weakness, but to a vigorous examination of the ὑποθέσεις {hypothesis}.
6 οὐ μόνον γε: ‘yes, Simmias, and not only so, but, besides what you have just so rightly suggested, you should also, however secure they may seem to you, nevertheless re-examine our first premisses.’—Cope. There seems no sufficient reason for ejecting ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις as Hirschig would do: nor can Ast’s ταῦτά γε εἰ λέγεις be commended.
7 ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον: I have followed Schanz in accepting this correction: the vulgate ἐπισκεπτέαι involves an anacoluthon so harsh as to amount to bad writing.
8 καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς: ‘and if you succeed in analysing them satisfactorily, you will follow up the reasoning, so far as it is possible for man to follow; and only when the result becomes perfectly plain will you cease to prosecute your search.’ κἂν τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, i.e. if the security of the hypothesis and the validity of the deductions from them become plain, then only you will be justified in relaxing your efforts.
Phaedo, Part 57.
—“But my friends,” he said, “we ought to bear in mind,
Φαιδων, Part 57.
—
—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα
—ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει: ἐκεῖνος
—ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι,
1 ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν: a short expression for ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν ὃ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν. The editors quote several similar phrases: Wyttenbach says he could fill a book with them.
2 εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει: ‘if we mean to neglect her.’
3 ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὑτῶν κακίας: A vicious soul would be well rid of her vice even at the cost of her existence. But in Laws 958a death is regarded as a remedy for those whom milder measures will not serve: οἷσιν δὲ ὄντως ἐπικεκλωσμέναι, [αἱ δόξαι] θάνατον ἴαμα ταῖς οὕτω διατεθείσαις ψυχαῖς διανέμοντες. And in 854c suicide is recommended to the incurable sinner as his only relief: καὶ ἐὰν μέν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφᾷ τι τὸ νόσημα: εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου. We may perhaps regard death as offering a chance of turning over a new leaf.
4 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα: Cf. Gorgias 523e καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. {Their judge also must be naked, dead, beholding with very soul the very soul of each immediately upon his death, bereft of all his kin and having left behind on earth all that fine array, to the end that the judgement may be just.}
5 ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων: Olympiodoros denies that each soul has a distinct δαίμων {daimon = spirit or guardian angel} for sundry reasons, one of which is ὄτι τοῦ βίου λυθέντος ἀργήσει ὁ λαχὼν ἐκείνης διοικεῖν τὸν βίον. But there can be no doubt that he is wrong: cf. Republic 620d-e ἐκείνην δ᾽ ἑκάστῳ ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα συμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων. We have a different sort of daemonic supervision in Politicus 274b τῆς τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νέμοντος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος ἀπερημωθέντες ἐπιμελείας. In Timaeus 90a, the rational part of the soul is said to be a man’s δαίμων. In Laws 730a we find a ξένιος ἑκάστων δαίμων {special guardian of him who is wronged}, who protects strangers.
6 ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει: In Republic 617e, on the other hand, we read οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε. {No divinity shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity.} But, as Olympiodoros explains, a δαίμων was assigned to the life chosen by the soul, so that either phrase might be used; though where Plato is so strongly insisting upon the perfect freedom of choice, he naturally selects δαίμονα αἱρεῖσθαι. No doubt the other was a popular phrase, cf. Theokritus iv 40 αἰαῖ τῶ σκληρῶ μάλα δαίμονος, ὅς με λελόγχει: and Plato there takes the opportunity of protesting against it.
7 μετὰ ἡγεμόνος: The two ἡγεμόνες are evidently distinct from the δαίμων {guardian spirit}, whose duties seem to cease when he has conveyed the soul to the place of judgment. In οἷ δεῖ above, the form of the adverb is determined by τοὺς ξυλλεγέντας, though in sense it belongs quite as much to διαδικασαμένους.
8 ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις: Plato does not here specify the number and length of these periods; but in Phaedrus 248e following, we learn that each soul must fulfill ten millennial periods, except that of the philosopher, who is let off with three. Cf. Pindar Olympians II 68 ὅσοι δ᾽ ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρὶς | ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν | ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν {those who have persevered three times, on either side, to keep their souls free from all wrongdoing}. In Republic 615a we have also a πορείαν χιλιέτη {thousand years}, and the reason for this number is assigned. Every man must be requited tenfold for his good and evil deeds; and calculating human life on the liberal estimate of 100 years, Plato devotes 1000 to his reward and punishment. The Egyptians made the period 3000 years (Herodotus 11 123); Empedokles goes as far as 30,000 ‘The divinities (daimones) who have received as lot a long life, Must wander thrice ten thousand seasons far from the blessed ones, Growing during this time in the different forms of mortal beings, Exchanging the painful paths of life.’
9 ἁπλῆν οἶμόν: This expression seems to have been proverbial. The verse of Aeschylus has not been preserved.
10 ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν τε καὶ νομίμω: ‘judging by the funeral offerings and ordinances on earth.’ ὅσια καὶ νόιμα are the offerings made in honour of the departed. As these were made on the shrines of Hekate at the τρίοδοι, Plato seems to infer by analogy that the road to Hades is also forked. Cf. Gorgias 524a οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ᾽ εἰς Τάρταρον. {These, when their life is ended, shall give judgement in the meadow at the dividing of the road, whence are the two ways leading, one to the Isles of the Blest, and the other to Tartarus.} The old reading θυσιῶν {sacrificial} is now universally discarded.
11 οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα: Wyttenbach well observes ‘agnoscit eam sibi iam antea meditatione mortis et philosophia cognitam.’
12 ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον: 81c-d ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη {such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world, and so it flits about the monuments and the tombs, where shadowy shapes of souls have been seen}. Plutarch De Genio Socratis §22 in a curious myth expands the notion of the present passage: his imagery is however chiefly borrowed from the Phaedrus.
13 ὅθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι so the mss. Schanz adopts Cobet’s οἶπερ.
14 αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται: ’she strays by herself.’
15 οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται: i.e. not so small as is supposed: cf. Phaedo 83b οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν {illness or loss of money}, and Sophist 217e.
16 ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι: Some think that Anaximandros is meant, because he first made a map of the world. But there is no evidence that his description of it had anything in common with Plato’s: and it seems very doubtful whether a reference to any definite person is intended. Plato is fond of giving an air of antiquity to his fables by referring them to some supposititious author: e.g. the Αἰγύπτιος λόγος in Phaedrus 274c, and the legendary war between Athens and Atlantis, Timaeus 24. Wagner strangely takes τινος to be neuter.
Phaedo, Part 58.
—
—“Well Simmias, I do not think I need the art of Glaucus to tell what it is. But to prove that it is true would, I think, be too hard for the art of Glaucus, and perhaps I should not be able to do it; besides, even if I had the skill, I think my life, Simmias, will end before the discussion could be finished. However, there is nothing to prevent my telling
—“Well,” said Simmias, “that will be enough.”
—“I am convinced, then,” said he, “that in the first place, if the earth is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither the air
—“And rightly,” said Simmias.
—“Secondly,” said he, “I believe that the earth is very large and that we who dwell between the pillars of Hercules
—“By all means, Sokrates,” said Simmias; “we should be glad to hear this story.”
Φαιδων, Part 58.
—
—ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη
—ἀλλ᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.
—πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε
—καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
—ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν
—ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἴεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἴοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὁρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ
—ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἅλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροί εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ,
—
—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.
1 οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη: The origin of this proverb is obscure. Wohlrab supposes that the sea-god Glaukos is meant, the patron of sailors. None of the ancient authorities however take this view, but oscillate between various artificers bearing this name; the most distinguished of whom seems to have been Glaukos of Chios, mentioned by Herodotus (l 25), who invented the art of soldering metal. The diverse theories will be found in Heindorf’s note.
2 μοι δοκεῖ: see on 77a.
3 τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ: Plato’s assumption is that the earth has no natural tendency to move in any one direction; and the substance of the universe, being homogeneous, offers it no inducement to move this way or that: were the surrounding mass of various density in different parts, the earth might move in the direction where the least resistance was offered; as it is, it remains poised in the centre of a uniform mass. It must be observed that Plato is putting this forward, not to show that the earth must necessarily abide in the centre, but that there is no reason why it should not. A similar theory is attributed to Anaximandros by Aristotle De Caelo II xiii 295b 11 ‘All who deny that the earth lies at the centre think that it revolves about the centre, and not the earth only but the counter-earth as well. Some of them even consider it possible that there are several bodies so moving, which are invisible to us owing to the interposition of the earth.’ Compare Timaeus 62e εἰ γάρ τι καὶ στερεὸν εἴη κατὰ μέσον τοῦ παντὸς ἰσοπαλές, εἰς οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐνεχθείη διὰ τὴν πάντῃ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν {suppose there were a solid body evenly-balanced at the center of the universe, it would never be carried away to the extremities because of their uniformity in all respects}: the theory of the Timaeus is however different.
4 ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ: We are conceived as inhabiting a depression or cavity scooped out of the earth’s surface, small and shallow when compared with the extent and mass of the earth, but still wide and deep enough to prevent us from ever scaling its sides. Many other such hollows exist on the earth, but we are of course cut off from all communication with their inhabitants, as well as with the dwellers on the true surface. Evidently Plato’s estimate of the earth’s dimensions was immense.
5 αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν: i.e. the real surface of the earth, as distinguished from the hollows.
6 οὗ δὴ ὑποστάθμην: i.e. our atmosphere is the sediment of aether, which, collects in the depressions on the earth’s surface, ταῦτα = ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα.
7 τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν: We are in the same plight as the supposed dwellers at the bottom of the sea, who, looking up through the water at the stars, would fancy that the sea above them was the heaven; so we, looking up through the air, fancy it is that wherein the stars move, and that the air is heaven.
8 τὸ δὲ [εἶναι ταὐτόν]: No satisfactory defence of the words εἶναι ταὐτόν has been made; nor is Heindorf’s τὸ δ’ εἶναι τοιοῦτον attractive. Hermann, after Baiter, reads τὸ δὲ δεινότατον: but there is no special aptness in this. Hirschig suggests ταἴτιον, but I think Schanz, following Rückert, is right in bracketing εἶναι ταὐτόν and retaining τὸ δὲ, which, is exactly the connecting link we want: ‘but the truth is that.’ τὸ δὲ occurs in this sense Theaetetus 157a, Sophist 244a, Laws 642a, 967a, Meno 97c, etc. εἶναι ταὐτόν might be the insertion of a copyist who did not understand the idiom.
9 εἴ τις αὐτοῦ: i.e. if we could either climb the sides of the hollow in which we dwell, or fly up through the air to its surface and peep up, as fishes do out of the sea.
10 κατιδεῖν ἀνακύψαντα: Most editors have ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, but ἂν is wanting in the mss. It could, it is true, easily have fallen out in that position; but since κατιδεῖν is presently repeated with ἂν, it seems to me hardly necessary to insert the particle here.
11 ὅπου ἂν καὶ γῆ ᾖ: Schanz retains ἡ γῆ with the best mss. But the meaning is, whenever any earth is present in the sea, the result is βόρβοροί.
12 εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν: After this some mss. and editions have the pointless addition καλόν: the word however is absent in the Bodleian and other mss. and is certainly to be omitted.
Phaedo, Part 59.
—“Well then, my friend,” said he, “to begin with, the earth when seen from above is said to look like those balls that are covered with twelve pieces of leather; it is divided into patches of various colors, of which the colors which we see here may be regarded as samples, such as painters use.
Φαιδων, Part 59.
—λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῷτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι,
—τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμῆσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ
—καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι,
1 ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι: The number twelve refers to the twelve signs of the zodiac, as is clear from Timaeus 55c ἔτι δὲ οὔσης συστάσεως μιᾶς πέμπτης, ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν: ‘and whereas there remained yet a fifth figure, God used it as a model for the universe in describing its signs.’ The τέμπτη ξύστασις was the dodecahedron: cf. Timaeus Locrus 98e τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἐστάσατο, ἔγγιστα σφαίας ἐόν. The last words, ἔγγιστα σφαίας ἐόν, are a foolish addition by the compiler of the Timaeus Locrus: for the dodecahedron has nothing to do with the shape of the universe, which is a perfect sphere modelled after the image of the αὐτὸ ζῷον: it merely affords the type for the duodenary division of the zodiac. In the present passage the δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖρα, a ball covered with patches of leather variously coloured, is used to represent not only the twelve signs, but also the variegated surface of the earth. A great store of erudition on the virtues of the number twelve is to be found in Wyttenbach’s note.
2 καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα: ‘even these very hollows, being full of water and of air, display a kind of colour that gleams amid the dazzling diversity of the rest; so that the earth’s form appears as one unbroken surface of varied hues.’ To an observer viewing the earth from above even such hollows as that wherein we dwell would appear as patches of colour, iridescent we may suppose; so that the many-coloured surface would not be marred by any blots of obscurity, συνεχὲς {continuously} is regarded by Heindorf and others as adverbial: perhaps, however, we might treat εἶδος συνεχὲς as practically one word, which is qualified by ποικίλον.
3 ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα: ‘the stones that here are so much prized.’ For this sense of ἀγαπαν compare Politicus 286d δεύτερον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρῶτον ὁ λόγος ἀγαπᾶν παραγγέλλει {reason counsels us to accept fitness for the easiest and quickest completion of the inquiry in which we are engaged}.
4 ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης: ‘not corroded and spoilt by the sediment that has gathered here, as the stones with us are by corruption and brine.’ For the punctuation and interpretation I am indebted to Dr. Verrall. In the ordinary texts there is no punctuation after διεφθαρμένοι and ἅλμης, and the second ὑπὸ is but an awkward repetition of the first. Schanz brackets ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης as a gloss upon ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυνερρυηκότων. Heindorf inserts τε after the second ὑπὸ, and Stallbaum substitutes ἀπὸ. I formerly followed the suggestion of Wyttenbach in bracketing the second ὑπὸ only.
5 ἐκφανῆ γὰρ: they are exposed to view on the surface, not, as with us, hidden in mines.
6 τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα: i.e. round the edges of the hollows, which are filled with air. Others again dwell on islands amid the aerial ocean, their bases plunged beneath the air but their surfaces encompassed with aether.
7 ἀήρ: The article is wanting in the mss. and supplied by Bekker. I have, on the suggestion of Schanz, written it as a crasis.
8 κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην: Compare the description of the climate of ancient Attica, Timaeus 24c, where Athene chooses the site of her city ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσοι {she established your State, choosing the spot wherein you were born since she perceived therein a climate duly blended}.
9 ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει: This reading has the all but unanimous support of the mss. Heindorf with one ms. reads ὀσφρήσει for φρονήσει, saying ‘ingenii praestantiam non sane tam obiter uno verbo memorasset Plato, nec post φρονήσεως mentionem addidisset haec καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις.’ These arguments do not seem very cogent; and it is hardly credible that Plato should have omitted to ascribe superior φρονήσις to his dwellers in aether. Schanz justly compares Republic 367c οἷον ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν {health too, and all other goods}. In fact ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ stand forαἰσθήσει. ‘In sight, hearing, and intelligence [i.e. both in bodily and mental power] they excel us in the same proportion as air excels water and aether air in purity.’ Z. adopts ὀσφρήσει.
10 ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι: i.e. in these temples is the very presence of the gods themselves; whereas we have but their statues. ‘And they had groves and temples of the gods, wherein the gods in very truth were dwellers, and voices and prophecies and visions of them, and of this kind was their communion with them, face to face.’ τοιαύτας = personal communion. αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς should be taken in the most emphatic sense, literally ‘the people themselves with the gods themselves.’
Phaedo, Part 60.
—“Such then is the nature of the earth as a whole, and of the things around it. But round about the whole earth, in the hollows of it, are many regions, some deeper and wider than that in which we live,
Far off, the lowest abyss beneath the earth
–Homer Iliad 8.14.
“and which elsewhere he and many other poets have called Tartarus. For all the rivers flow together into this chasm and flow out of it again, and they have each the nature of the earth through which they flow. And the reason why all the streams flow in and out here
Φαιδων, Part 60.
—καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν: τόπους δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὑτῶν τῆλε μάλ᾽, ᾗχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον
~Homer Iliad 8.14
ὃ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν: γίγνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι᾽ οἵας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ
—
—
1 τὸ χάσμα αὑτῶν: There a slight anacoluthon; the regular construction would be ἔχοντας. For αὑτῶν BDE give αὐτούς, which Wyttenbach illustrates by Xenophon Cyropaedia I iii 13 πειράσξμαι ἀγαθῶν ἱππέωνν κράτιστπς ὢν ἱππεὺς συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ. There is no lack of instances of a redundant pronoun, but the effect here is harsh. Schanz reads τὸ αὑτῶν χάσμα, Heindorf τὸ χάσμα αὑτῶν, which latter I have adopted, as being nearly identical with the reading of C, to τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν.
2 ὧν δὴ καὶ ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους: ‘wherewith each of the places is filled in turn as the stream in its course round chances each time to reach it.’—COPE. The stream, when replenished by the αἰώρα presently to be mentioned, makes a circuit of these hollows through the subterranean channels. ὡς ἂν is Stallbaum’s correction for ὧς ἂν, which Z. retains.
3 ὥσπερ αἰώραν: ‘all these are moved backwards and forwards by a kind of oscillation which exists in the earth.’ αἰώρα properly signifies a seesaw movement, like that of a pair of scales equally balanced. It is the name given to a kind of gymnastic machine like a swing. By the force of this αἰώρα the volume of air and fluid in Tartaros is perpetually swaying to and fro like a pendulum. When the mass which is ἄνω surges towards the centre, the mass that is κάτω is necessarily driven towards the extremity: then the latter in its turn recoils towards the centre and forces the former towards the opposite extremity.
4 διαμπερὲς τετρημένον: Tartaros differs from all the other ἔγκοιλα, not only in its far greater magnitude, but in being pierced right through the earth from end to end; whereas the rest are merely depressions more or less deep. The physical theory of the present passage is simple enough. Let us suppose for the sake of clearness that Tartaros is a chasm pierced from the north to the south pole; and let us concede so much to popular usage as to call one hemisphere, say the northern, ἄνω and the other κάτω. For each of these hemispheres the centre of the earth is the lowest point, towards which all things gravitate. Out of Tartaros ramify a number of channels in all directions through the earth, some reaching to the surface, some subterranean throughout their whole length. Now the αἰώρα pulsing up and down Tartaros carries with it all the fluid that is therein; and when it rushes northwards, it forces the liquid into the channels of the northern hemisphere; then returning southward it fills those in the southern. Thus the stream is violently impelled through the channel by the force of the αἰώρα: but when this force is spent, it obeys the law of gravitation and makes its way back to Tartaros at a lower level than that whence it started. It can however never pass beyond the centre, since that is the absolutely lowest point from whatever direction it is approached, and an ascent from it would be contrary to the force of gravitation.
5 ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει: The cause of the αἰώρα is that there is no bottom or foundation on which the liquid mass can rest. Were there a solid platform at the centre of the earth, the fluid on either side would settle there and remain stationary. Of this passage a doubtfully accurate statement and a certainly unfair criticism is made by Aristotle Meteorologica II ii 355b 32 following, cf. I 349b 28. Plato’s doctrine of gravitation, which is incomparably more scientific than anything to be found in Aristotle on that subject, is very clearly expounded in Timaeus 62c–63e.
6 ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε: Iliad viii 14: cf. viii 481.
7 ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ: Many editions, including Z. and St., have ὁρμῆσαν after οὖν: but since it is absent from the best mss. I have omitted it.
8 τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον: Plato considers the expression incorrect, as is indicated by δή. Cf. Timaeus 62c φύσει γὰρ δή τινας τόπους δύο εἶναι διειληφότας διχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους, τὸν μὲν κάτω, πρὸς ὃν φέρεται πάνθ᾽ ὅσα τινὰ ὄγκον σώματος ἔχει, τὸν δὲ ἄνω, πρὸς ὃν ἀκουσίως ἔρχεται πᾶν, οὐκ ὀρθὸν οὐδαμῇ νομίζειν {there really exist two distinct and totally opposite regions, each of which occupies one-half of the Universe—the one termed “below,” towards which move all things possessing any bodily mass, and the other “above,” towards which everything goes against its will}. For some very curious reasoning on the other side see Aristotle De Caelo II ii 284b 6 following.
9 [τοῖς] κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα: If the text is sound we must translate ‘it (τὸ ὕδωρ) flows into the parts about those streams’; unless with Prof. Geddes we take τοῖς as an instrumental dative, which is hardly probable. But either way the phrase is a singularly awkward one and can scarcely, I think, have been written by Plato; though H. Schmidt defends it, translating ‘das zu jenen Strömen Gehörende.’ Madvig’s εἰσφρεῖ, which Schanz adopts, leaves the sentence as clumsy as before. Wyttenbach reads τότε for τοῖς, which may be right: Ast brackets τοῖς. Mr. Cope translates ‘it flows through the earth to the neighbourhood of those streams and fills them, as it were by a pump.’ But surely διὰ τῆς γῆς describes the progress of the water after it has entered the channels: it would be a strange expression to apply to its surging up and down Tartaros.
10 τὰ ἐνθάδε: i.e. the rivers in our hemisphere. We are regarded as living in the ‘upper’ hemisphere: and so said the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle De Caelo 285b 21. Aristotle himself said our hemisphere was the lower: to Plato of course the distinction is meaningless.
11 ἐπηντλεῖτο: i.e. were pumped into the channels: it is needless to read έξηντλεῖτο with Heindorf.
12 12καταντικρὺ ἢ ᾗ εἰσρεῖ: i.e. καταντικρὺ τῆς χώρας ᾗ εἰσρεῖ. This seems to mean that a stream which issued forth from Tartaros, say in an easterly direction, may, by a circuit of the earth, re-enter it on the western side. Aristotle’s version of this (Meteorologica 356 a 9) is τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρὺ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον εἰ ῥεῖν ἤρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἄνωθεν εἰσβάλλειν. This is usually regarded as a misstatement on Aristotle’s part: but H. Schmidt (Krit. Comm. II 107 following) ingeniously endeavours to reconcile it with Plato’s words. He lays stress on the fact that Aristotle says, not ἄνω and κάτω, but ἄνωθεν and κάτωθεν: and he explains it thus. A river may issue from Tartaros in the southern hemisphere, and in the course of its wanderings pass into the northern, finally discharging itself into the very centre of Tartaros. Thus after rising in the southern hemisphere (κάτωθεν) it enters Tartaros from the side of the northern (ἄνωθεν); but since it discharges itself at the centre, it has not violated the law μέχρι τοῦ μέσου τὴν κάθιέναι, πέρα δ’ οὔ. The weak point in the explanation seems to me this. When the stream has once reached the northern hemisphere, it is subject to precisely the same laws of gravitation as the rivers of that hemisphere; and there is no reason why it should be compelled to descend to the very centre any more than a stream which has risen in the northern hemisphere: yet, if it does not, it has passed beyond the centre, relatively to its source. Schmidt’s theory in fact breaks down, unless we can understand the words μέχρι τοῦ μέσου τὴν κάθιέναι, πέρα δ’ οὔ relatively to the direction of the stream after it has once begun its downward course, irrespective of its point of issue. Perhaps, however, Plato had not thought of the case of a river passing from one hemisphere to another while on the surface of the earth: or, as exact science is hardly to be expected in a myth, the rivers may be prohibited from crossing the plane which divides the two hemispheres. Aristotle’s paraphrase sounds like a reproduction of the Platonic passage based on an imperfect recollection of it. The notion, entertained by some, that καταντικρὺ ἧ εἰσρεῖ means that the stream on discharging itself crosses Tartaros and emerges on the opposite side is assuredly untenable. Schanz, against all mss., has έξέπεσεν εἰσρεῖ.)
καθέντα: This word comes to be practically intransitive similarly to ἐμβάλλει: the river is conceived as a power which pours down and discharges its waters. καθίημι is similarly used of a wind, as we see in Aristophanes Knights 430 ἔξειμι γάρ σοι λαμπρὸς ἤδη καὶ μέγας καθιείς {I will throw myself upon you like a terrible hurricane ravaging both land and sea at the will of its fury}.
13 ἄναντες γὰρ πρόσω: so Heindorf for πρός. Z. and St. omit πρόσω.
Phaedo, Part 61.
—“Now these streams are many and great and of all sorts, but among the many are four streams, the greatest and outermost of which is that called Oceanus, which flows round in a circle, and opposite this, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron, which flows through
Φαιδων, Part 61.
—τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματά ἐστι: τυγχάνει δ᾽ ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ᾽ ἄττα ῥεύματα,
—
1 τέτταρ᾽ ἄττα ῥεύματα:
Homer Odyssey x 511,
νῆα μὲν αὐτοῦ κέλσαι ἐπ᾽
Ὠκεανῷ βαθυδίνῃ,
αὐτὸς δ᾽ εἰς Ἀίδεω ἰέναι δόμον εὐρώεντα.
ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ῥέουσιν
Κώκυτός θ᾽, ὃς δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρώξ.
{there do thou beach thy ship by the deep eddying Oceanus,
but go thyself to the dank house of Hades.
There into Acheron flow Periphlegethon and Cocytus,
which is a branch of the water of the Styx}.
2 περὶ κύκλῳ: The only passage cited in defence of this phrase is Plutarch ἐρωτικὸς x 5, where Didot’s edition has περὶκύκλῳ. The latter is the reading of the best mss. here; but Heindorf justly denounces it as ‘monstri simile.’ Stallbaum’s reference to Laws 964e is totally irrelevant. Heindorf proposes πέριξ, Hermann has πέρι, adverbial: but it seems probable that the word has crept in from the margin.
3 αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων: Cf. 114a.
4 ἐκβάλλει,: ‘issues forth.’ In the passage of Aristotle already quoted ἐκβάλλειν, has the opposite sense, ‘discharges itself‘; it is in fact equivalent to ἐμβάλλει, in Plato’s account. Aristotle follows the ordinary usage, whereas Plato has formed his compounds to fit his present descriptions.
5 ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ: ’boiling with water and mud.’ The genitive is joined with the verb as describing the material: cf. Anthologia Planudeis iv 39 καὶ πεδία ζείοντα πολυσπερέων Άγαρηνῶν.
6 περιελιττόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῇ]: Of the three writers who quote this passage, Stobaeus, Theodoret, and Eusebius, τῇ γῇ is found in the first alone: the words are, however, in all the mss. The objection to them is that they seem to make Pyriphlegethon flow on the surface of the earth, which, Schmidt notwithstanding, cannot be allowed. Stallbaum retains τῇ γῇ, and explains that Pyriphlegethon encircles the earth beneath its surface. But this seems scarcely a natural interpretation; and I have thought it better to bracket the words, which the Zurich editors expunge.
7 κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου: ‘into a lower depth of Tartaros.’
8 ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς: ἣν is absent from most mss. but is rightly added from Theodoret and certain mss. by Heindorf, who compares Laws 683a. The construction is indeed familiar enough.
9 Στύγα: Plato’s conception of Styx as a lake differs from that of the older authorities: cf. Hesiod Theogonia 786 following, where Styx is a river, a branch (κέρας) of Okeanos; and Homer l.l. makes Kokytos a branch of Styx.
10 ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ: The convolutions of these four rivers are a little perplexing. They issue from Tartaros on four different sides: Okeanos emerges to the surface and encompasses the whole earth; of its return to Tartaros we are told nothing. Acheron, issuing from the opposite side, flows in the contrary direction, partly on the surface, partly beneath the earth; and before re-entering Tartaros forms the Acherusian lake, Pyriphlegethon, rising half-way between the two former, not far from its source forms the boiling lake, and after many windings skirts one end of the Acherusian lake before plunging into the profoundest deeps of Tartaros. Its course is entirely subterranean. Kokytos, flowing in the opposite direction, ascends to the surface, where it spreads into the Stygian lake; then diving into the earth, it reaches the Acherusian lake from the contrary side to Pyriphlegethon; and making another circuit enters Tartaros opposite to that river. Styx, it will be noticed, is on the earth’s surface, whereas the other two lakes are subterranean.
Phaedo, Part 62.
—
“But, Simmias, because of all these things which we have recounted we ought to do our best to acquire virtue and wisdom in life. For the prize is fair and the hope great.
Φαιδων, Part 62.
—
—οἳ δ᾽ ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα
—
1 ὁ δαίμων: Cf. 107d.
2 b>ἀναβάντες: ‘going on board vessels which, it is said (δή), are provided for them.’
3 ἀνιάτως ἔχειν: These incurables were cast into Tartaros, not in retribution for their crimes, but as warnings to others; since to Plato punishment is always either remedial or exemplary. So Gorgias 525c οἳ δ᾽ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. {in no other way can there be riddance of iniquity. But of those who have done extreme wrong and, as a result of such crimes, have become incurable, of those are the examples made; no longer are they profited at all themselves, since they are incurable, but others are profited who behold them undergoing for their transgressions the greatest, sharpest, and most fearful sufferings evermore, actually hung up as examples there in the infernal dungeon, a spectacle and a lesson to such wrongdoers} Cf. Republic 616a.
4 ἱεροσυλίας: This was a peculiarly heinous offence: cf. Laws 854a, where the law thus addresses the sacrilegious, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θεῖον κινεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν προτρέπον ἰέναι, οἶστρος δέ σέ τις ἐμφυόμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης. {the evil force that now moves you and prompts you to go temple-robbing is neither of human origin nor of divine, but it is some impulse bred of old in men from ancient wrongs unexpiated, which courses round wreaking ruin.}
5 ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν: In the νέκυιαι {rites by which ghosts were called up and questioned} of the Republic and Gorgias also incurable criminals are doomed to eternal punishment: and this is natural where Plato is weaving up popular tradition with his own phantasy. But in Timaeus 42c it is evident that the degenerate soul at any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation and final restoration to her original purity; nor is this possibility excluded in Phaedrus 248 following.
6 καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς: ‘and who have lived the rest of their days in a state of repentance.’ The participle μεταμέλον is used absolutely.
7 τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ: i.e. their offence is similar to that of the πατραλοῖαι in that it was committed in sudden passion and followed by repentance, and different from that of the φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι.
8 τὸ κῦμα: i.e. ἡ αἰώρα.
9 πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας: These terms apply not only to parricides and matricides, but to any one who strikes a father or mother.
10 κατὰ τὴν λίμνην: It will be remembered that both these rivers enter the Acherusian lake.
11 πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν: This was no doubt suggested by the Athenian law which enacted that a person guilty of involuntary homicide must appease the family of the deceased before he could return from exile: cf. Demosthenes Aristokr. p. 644. It would appear that the injured family could not insist upon more than a year’s exile, which was called ἀπενιαυτισμός. Plato adopts this period in Laws 869e ὡς ἀκουσίου γεγονότος τοῦ φόνου, οἵ τε καθαρμοὶ γιγνέσθωσαν τῷ δράσαντι καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς εἷς ἔστω τῆς ἐκδημίας ἐν νόμῳ. {the purifications for the culprit shall be made as though the murder were involuntary, and one year of exile shall be imposed by law}: cf. 865e. In Laws 872e we are told that in another life it shall be done to the willful homicide as he did to his victim: τοῦ γὰρ κοινοῦ μιανθέντος αἵματος οὐκ εἶναι κάθαρσιν ἄλλην, οὐδὲ ἔκπλυτον ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι τὸ μιανθὲν πρὶν φόνον φόνῳ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον ἡ δράσασα ψυχὴ τείσῃ καὶ πάσης τῆς συγγενείας τὸν θυμὸν ἀφιλασαμένη κοιμίσῃ. {for of the pollution of common blood there is no other purification, nor does the stain of pollution admit of being washed off before the soul which committed the act pays back murder for murder, like for like, and thus by propitiation lays to rest the wrath of all the kindred}.
12 δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι: The text is certainly corrupt. Stallbaum’s attempt to make βιῶναι do double duty isfutile, and his quotations are, transparently irrelevant. Schanz, following Heindorf, inserts from Theodoret προκεκρίσθαι after βιῶναι. This has some support from Clement of Alexandria, who reads προκεκρίσθαι; but it is not satisfactory. For while it is sense to say ‘who are deemed to have lived holily,’ it is not sense to say ‘who are deemed to have been judged to have lived holily.’ I suspect that Theodoret’s προκεκρίσθαι is merely a clumsy attempt to supply a deficiency which existed in his copy, and that Plato’s real word has been lost: possibly ἔχειν after διαφερόντως, unless we should read πρὸς τὸ ὁσίιον.
13 ἐπὶ γῆς: so all mss. Eusebius, Theodoret, and Stobaeus have ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς: but the article is not required. ‘Upon the earth’ means of course on the true surface, distinguished from the hollow wherein we dwell.
14 καθηράμενοι: a genuine reflexive middle: ‘who have purified themselves.’ ἄνευ τε σωμάτων: I conceive this to mean ‘without earthly bodies’: for the most exalted of finite spirits, even the gods, must have body of some sort; that is, they are subject to the conditions of space and time. Cf. Phaedrus 246c {the soul which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body, which seems to be self-moving, because of the power of the soul within it; and the whole, compounded of soul and body, is called a living being, and is further designated as mortal}. ἄνευ σωμάτων to Plato signifies freedom from bodily appetites.
Phaedo, Part 63.
—
Φαιδων, Part 63.
—
—ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ
1 τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι: Plato lays no stress upon the exact details of his description; indeed he is never at any pains to make his various accounts of ‘die letzten Dinge; precisely correspond: all he is really concerned about is that the virtuous soul is better off in the other world than the vicious.
2 ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ: cf. 77e ἀλλὰ χρή, ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε {“Ah, you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear.”}.
3 διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον: This phrase would seem to bear out the view of the myth given in the Introduction, p. 8.
4 πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι: ‘thinking that they do more harm than good:’ For this use of θάτερον cf. Euthydemus 297d. Also Pindar Pythia III 34 δαίμων δ᾽ ἕτερος {raging with irresistible force}.
5 ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ: ‘with freedom and truth.’ These terms practically correspond to φρόνησις {phronesis = understanding} or σοφία {sophia = wisdom}. Ἐλευθερίᾳ {elutheria = liberty} is that state of liberation from the body which enables the soul to grasp ἀληθείᾳ {alétheia = truth}.
6 ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε: so nearly all mss. Schanz writes ἕκαστος after Stallbaum.
7 φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός: ‘to speak like a hero of tragedy.’ The good taste of this parenthesis is admirable. ὅταν ἡ εἱμαρμένη καλεῖ is in perfect keeping with the eloquent passage which is its context; but in applying the phrase to himself Sokrates instinctively feels the risk that it may sound, high-flown. And so with these words he passes simply and naturally from his lofty flight of moralising to the homely, but eminently characteristic, ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν.
8 καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν: ‘and not to give the women the trouble of washing my corpse.’ This piece of thoughtfulness for others is admirable evidence of the perfect serenity with which Sokrates awaits his doom.
Phaedo, Part 64.
—When he had finished speaking, Crito said:
—“What I always say, Crito,” he replied, “nothing new. If you take care of yourselves you will serve me and mine and yourselves, whatever you do, even if you make no promises now; but if you neglect yourselves and are not willing to live following step by step, as it were, in the path marked out by our present and past discussions, you will accomplish nothing,
—“We will certainly try hard to do as you say,” he replied. “But how shall we bury you?”
—“However you please,” he replied, “if you can catch me and I do not get away from you.” And he laughed gently, and looking towards us, said: “I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that the Sokrates who is now conversing and arranging the details of his argument is really I; he thinks I am the one whom he will presently see as a corpse,
Φαιδων, Part 64.
—
—ἅπερ ἀεὶ λέγω,
—ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν: θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον;
—ὅπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν: οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι
1 ἐπιστέλλεις: ‘proprium de extrema morientium voluntate.’Heindorf. Cf. 116b ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο {gave them such directions as he wished}.
2 ἅπερ ἀεὶ λέγω: ‘what I am always saying; nothing fresh: that if you take good care of yourselves you will best please me and mine and yourselves also in whatever you do, even though you make no promise now; but if you are negligent of yourselves and will not guide your lives along the track of our present and our former discourse, though your promises be never so many and earnest at this moment, you will profit nothing.’ ἐπιμελούμενοι = taking heed to your ways, that you may live virtuously and rationally. Cobet would omit κατὰ before τὰ νῦν, but Schanz cites Euthyphro 2c ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὥσπερ πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν {he seems to me to be the only one of the public men who begins in the right way}.
3 ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι: ‘I cannot persuade Kriton, my friends, that the real “I” is that Sokrates who now converses with you and duly arranges every part of his discourse; he imagines I am that which he will presently see as a corpse; and he actually (δή) inquires how he is to bury me.’ The article is omitted before Σωκράτης in the best mss. and by some editors. In that case we should take Σωκράτης as in apposition to ovros. Wyttenbach appositely quotes Laws 959a-b τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἰνδαλλόμενον ἡμῶν ἑκάστοις ἕπεσθαι, καὶ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλῶς εἴδωλα εἶναι τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα, τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως, ἀθάνατον εἶναι ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι {what makes each of us to be what he is is nothing else than the soul, while the body is a semblance which attends on each of us, it being well said that the bodily corpses are images of the dead, but that which is the real self of each of us, and which we term the immortal soul, departs}.
4 ταῦτά μὴ [μοι] δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν: I have on the suggestion of Dr. Jackson substituted μὴ for the vulgate μοι, which Schanz, following Madvig, brackets.
5 οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυᾶτο: Kriton was bail for Sokrates in conjunction with Plato and Kritobulos and Apollodoros. Apology 38b.
6 εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι: ‘for you must know that incorrect speech is not only offensive on that score alone, but engenders mischief in our souls.’ An inaccurate mode of expression is apt to produce a loose and careless habit of thinking: Sokrates’ great object was to find out what things really are and call them by their right names, by obtaining a precise definition of each thing. That which we speak of as Sokrates is his soul, not his body; although, since the body is all we see, popular usage applies the name to the body even when the soul has quitted it. But, says Sokrates, not only is this in itself a slovenly mode of speech, but it may habituate us to thinking that the body is all that exists of a man.
7 θάπτειν οὕτως Most of the recent editors make θάπτειν depend upon φάναι. There seems to me no valid reason for doing so; and it makes better sense to take it with χρὴ.
Phaedo, Part 65.
—When he had said this, he got up and went into another room to bathe; Crito followed him, but he told us to wait. So we waited, talking over with each other and discussing the discourse we had heard, and then speaking of the great misfortune that had befallen us, for we felt that he was like a father to us and that when bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans. And when he had bathed
Φαιδων, Part 65.
—ταῦτ᾽ εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἵπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ᾽ ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ᾽ αὖ περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς διεξιόντες ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ
—σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πρᾳότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις,
—καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἀστεῖος,
—
—καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὓς σὺ λέγεις—οἴονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες—καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω:
1 δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ: cf. Apology 34d οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι καὶ ὑεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία {I have three sons, one nearly grown up, and two still children}. In Diogenes Laertius II 26 we are told that the name of the eldest was Lamprokles and those of the two younger Sophroniskos and Menexenos.
2 αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες: i.e. the women of his family. Probably his wife was not among them, else Plato would have mentioned her. Some suppose that this expression gave rise to the absurd fable that Sokrates had two wives living at the same time; of whom the second, Myrto, daughter or granddaughter of the famous Aristeides, was the mother of his two younger children: see Diogenes Laertius l.l.
3 [ἐκεῖναις] ἐναντίον: The mss. vary between ἐκεῖναις and ἐκεῖναι, and also in the position of the word, which in many follows ἐναντίον. Since ἐκεῖναι and the position after ἐναντίον are alike impossible, I read as above; bracketing, however ἐκεῖναις as highly suspicious.
4 ἔνδον: sc. ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι.
5 οὐ καταγνώσομαί ‘I shall not have the complaint to make of you that I make of others.’
6 οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις: Some read χαλεπανεῖς, but the present is found in the best mss. and gives the best sense. ‘I know it is not with me that you are angry, but with them; for you know who are to blame for it.’ There is a subtle dramatic propriety in these words which is one of the finer touches of this matchless narrative. This man must have had a large experience of criminals and been accustomed to look on the baser side of humanity. He could, however, appreciate the nobility of Sokrates, so far as it is directly brought before his eyes; but he never thought of Sokrates as bearing no ill-will even against those who were really the cause of his death: this is something outside his experience.
7 ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων: So the best mss. Schanz needlessly reads ἀγγέλλῶν: but ἀγγέλλων is equivalent to ἀγγέλλίαν φέρων which we have in Crito 43c.
8 ὡς ἀστεῖος: ‘how courteous the good fellow is; throughout all this time he used to come and talk to me now and then, and was the best of men: and now how honestly he mourns for me.’ ἀποδακρύει as below 117c ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν.
9 ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ: ‘for there is still time to spare.’
10 ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω: Hirschig condemns εἰκότως, for no reason that I can see, though Schanz brackets it.
11 οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν: The ms. authority is stronger for κερδαίνειν, but here I think Schanz is right in accepting the future. Prof. Geddes defends the present by a reference to Herodotus ix 106; but there Abicht reads ἐμμενέειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι: besides which the construction is different. Plato could very well say οὐδὲν οἶμαι κερδαίνειν ἀλλὰ ὀφλήσειν, but οὐδὲν ἀλλο κερδανεῖν ἢ ὀφλήσειν seems very doubtful Greek.
12 φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος: ‘being chary when the vessel is empty’; a proverbial expression which we find in Hesiod Works and Days 367 μεσσόθι φείδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ’ ἐνὶ πυθμένι φειδώ.
Phaedo, Part 66.
—And Crito said:
—
—And Sokrates said: “Crito, those whom you mention are right in doing as they do, for they think they gain by it; and I shall be right in not doing as they do;
—Thereupon Crito nodded to the boy who was standing near. The boy went out and stayed a long time, then came back with the man who was to administer the poison, which he brought with him in a cup ready for use. And when Sokrates saw him, he said: “Well, my good man, you know about these things; what must I do?” “Nothing,” he replied, “except drink the poison and walk about
—At the same time he held out the cup to Sokrates. He took it, and very gently, Echecrates, without trembling or changing color or expression, but looking up at the man with wide open eyes, as was his custom, said: “What do you say about pouring a libation to some deity from this cup? May I, or not?”
—“Sokrates,” said he, “we prepare only as much as we think is enough.”
—“I understand,” said Sokrates;
—With these words he raised the cup to his lips and very cheerfully and quietly drained it. Up to that time most of us had been able to restrain our tears fairly well, but when we watched him drinking and saw that he had drunk the poison, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself my tears rolled down in floods, so that I wrapped my face in my cloak and wept for myself; for it was not for him that I wept,
—“That,” said Crito, “shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say.” To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.
—Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.
Φαιδων, Part 66.
—καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἑστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἧκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν;
—οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιιέναι, ἕως ἄν σου βάρος
—καὶ ὃς λαβὼν
—τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν ὅσον οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν.
—
—ἐκεῖνος δέ, ‘οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ
—καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ᾐσχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθών, ἐπειδή οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίνη ὕπτιος—οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν
—ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος—ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ—εἶπεν—ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο—‘ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα:
—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων: ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.
—ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη
—ἥδε ἡ τελευτή,
1 αὐτὸ ποιήσει: ‘the poison will act of itself.’ ποιήσει is used in this technical sense by medical writers: Heindorf cites Dioscorides I 95 ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα ‘is efficacious against poison.’ The lexicons also give Strabo 234 λοῦτρα κάλλιστα ποιοῦντα πρὸς νόσους.
2 καὶ ὃς λαβὼν: ‘and he took it right cheerfully, Echekrates, without a shudder or any change of complexion or countenance; but looking on the man with bent brows, as his manner was, he asked, What say you of this potion as to pouring a libation to some deity? is it permitted or not?’ Notice the earnest emphasis thrown on the words μάλα ἵλεως by the following ὦ Ἐχέκρατες. διαφθείρας = changing for the worse, as Prof. Geddes says: the partitive genitives strengthen the force of the negation. ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας describes the fixed piercing gaze habitual to Sokrates, cf. 86d. For the use of πρὸς Stallbaum compares Symposium 174b, 176b. The man’s matter-of-fact reply and his conduct throughout serve to heighten the pathos: he does not mean to be unfeeling, but familiarity with such scenes has produced a certain professional indifference; he seems not to have been personally influenced by Sokrates like the servant of the eleven.
3 ἐπισχόμενος ‘putting it to his lips.’ The active ἐπισχεῖν is used of giving a draught to another.
4 κατέχειν: ‘we were able to refrain from tears.’ This usage of κατέχειν is rare: cf. Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus 781 κἀγὼ βαρυνθεὶς τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ἡμέραν μόλις κατέσχον. Below we have the common use, κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα.
5 ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ: ‘but in spite of myself my tears began to flow in torrents.’Cope.
6 ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ: ‘then above all bursting into loud sobs, by his weeping and lamenting he utterly broke down every one of the company, save Sokrates himself.’ Hirschig would omit κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν, Schanz brackets κλαίων καὶ but can anyone read the sentence without feeling that its rhythm is hopelessly ruined by either of these needless and mischievous omissions? With κατέκλασε Heindorf compares the Homeric κατεκλάσθη φιλον ἧτορ: and Stallbaum quotes two passages of Plutarch, Perikles 37, Demosthenes 22, where the word is used as here. The old editions had κατέλαυσε: Stephanus conjectured κατέκλασε, which was afterwards discovered in certain mss.
7 ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν: According to Olympiodoros it was a Pythagorean precept.
8 οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν: i.e. ὕπτιον κατακλιθῆναι.
9 οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον: Schanz brackets these words, but I think they are justly defended and retained by Heindorf.
10 πήγνυτο: contracted from πηγνύοιτο, cf. 77b.
11 καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο: Sokrates himself did the same as the man. This seems to be mentioned simply as evidence of his perfect calmness. Forster proposes αὖθις, supposing that the subject of ἥπτετο is ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, and Schanz reads αὖ, presumably on the same hypothesis. Neither alteration is to be commended.
12 τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα: It might have been supposed that the conception of life as a ‘fitful fever’ was familiar enough to spare us all the unprofitable ingenuity that has been expended on this passage. The last words of Sokrates are in perfect harmony with the whole tenor of his foregoing discourse. His soul is on the point of being liberated from the body and all its attendant infirmities and will presently be restored to her primal purity and health. Corporeal existence is in fact a morbid condition of the soul, for which death is the remedy; wherefore Sokrates vows to Asklepios the sacrifice customary on recovery from sickness. Prof. Geddes aptly quotes Timon of Athens v 1 ‘my long sickness of health and living now begins to mend.’ So Olympiodoros: ἵνα τὰ νενοσηκότα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει ταῦτα ἐξιάσηται: he speaks too of an oracle which declares τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναγομένας τὸν παιᾶνα ᾄδειν.
13 ἐκινήθη: ‘he stirred’: probably some slight spasm or shudder at the moment of dissolution. ἐκινήθη is far too mild a word to signify convulsions, as some would have it.
14 ἥδε ἡ τελευτή: The last three lines of the dialogue have been variously assailed by different critics on divers grounds. First Wyttenbach, offended by τότε proposes τῶν πώποτε. Heindorf would have πάντῶν, τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν. Schanz brackets ἄλλως. Hirschig is actually prepared to cancel all after ἐγένετο. I believe that every word stands exactly as Plato wrote it, and that not one could be altered or omitted without marring the sad music of this solemn close. Wyttenbach supports his τῶν πώποτε from Plutarch, but the Platonic passages he quotes have γενομένων, ἀφικομένων, etc., which makes all the difference. Moreover he introduces a tone of panegyric, which, though not perhaps exaggerated, is quite discordant with the subdued simplicity which is the chief charm of this wonderful scene, and with the studiously modest ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν: this has been remarked by Prof. Geddes. τῶν τότε, as Stallbaum says, ’solemnis est formula in eiusmodi praeconiis,’ meaning ‘of all his contemporaries‘; and for the reference of τότε to a recent period he cites Politicus 263e. But probably, as Grote suggests, Plato used the word rather from his own point of view at the time he wrote than from that of the supposed speaker. ἄλλως has reference not to τῶν τότε, as Heindorf thinks, but to ἀρίστου: ‘in other respects’ is practically equivalent to ‘moreover,’ or ‘besides’: it merely serves to mark the transition from the vaguer to the more definite expressions of praise. Preserving the sentence intact I should translate: ‘such was the end, Echekrates, of our companion—a man, as we should say, among all then living whom we knew the noblest, ay and the wisest and most just.’
Appendix I.
δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή. {civic and political virtue.}
To the student of Plato’s ethics it is obviously important to determine exactly what is to be understood by the popular, as contrasted with the philosophic, ἀρετή, and should there prove to be more than one variety of the former, to distinguish between them. With a view to this, I propose to examine briefly Plato’s principal statements on the subject. Besides the passages in the Phaedo, 68d following, and 82a, the following extracts seem to me to contain a complete exposition of Plato’s views.
i. Republic 554c. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τούτῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπιεικεῖ [554d] τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ᾽ ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων;
—καὶ πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη.
—καὶ νὴ Δία, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν ἐνευρήσεις, ὅταν δέῃ τἀλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος συγγενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας.
—καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, σφόδρα.
—οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἷς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ [554e] κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους χειρόνων.
—ἔστιν οὕτω.
—διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οἶμαι εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη: ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν.
{i. Republic 554c. And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better element in himself [554d] forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling within, not persuading them that it ‘is better not’ nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally.”
—“Quite so,” he said.
—“Yes, by God,” said I, “my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites.”
—”Most emphatically.”
—“Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension. He would not be really one, but in some sort a double man. Yet for the most part, [554e] his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse.”
—“It is so.”
—“And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony with itself would escape him and dwell afar.”}
ii. Republic 506a. οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα: μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.
{ii. Republic 506a. “I fancy, at any rate,” said I, “that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known, will not have secured a guardian of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this.”}
iii. Republic 500d. ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ φιλοσόφῳ] ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;
—ἥκιστά γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
—ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν δὴ αἴσθωνται οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ [500e] λέγομεν, χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι;
—οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐάνπερ αἴσθωνται. ἀλλὰ δὴ [501a] τίνα λέγεις τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς;
—λαβόντες, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον: ἀλλ᾽ οὖν οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθὺς τῶν ἄλλων διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἅψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι.
—καὶ ὀρθῶς γ᾽, ἔφη.
—οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἴει ὑπογράψασθαι ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας;
—τί μήν; [501b]
—ἔπειτα οἶμαι ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρως᾽ ἀποβλέποιεν, πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖν᾽ αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, συμμειγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.
{iii. Republic 500d. “If, then,” I said, “some compulsion is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there, and not merely to mould and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue?”
—“By no means,” he said.
—“But if the multitude become aware [500e] that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced by artists who used the heavenly model?”
—“They will not be harsh,” [501a] he said, “if they perceive that. But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?”
—“They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.”
—“And they would be right,” he said.
—“And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution?”
—“Surely.”
—“And then, [501b] I take it, in the course of the work they would glance frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things, and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.”}
iv. Laws 710a. Κλεινίας: σωφροσύνην μοι δοκεῖ φράζειν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, δεῖν εἶναι τὴν συνεπομένην ὁ ξένος. ἦ γάρ;
—Ἀθηναῖος: τὴν δημώδη γε, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ οὐχ ἥν τις σεμνύνων ἂν λέγοι, φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ εὐθὺς παισὶν καὶ θηρίοις, τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, σύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς: ὃ [710b] καὶ μονούμενον ἔφαμεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λόγου.
{iv. Laws 710a. Clinias: Temperance, as I think, Megillus, is what the Stranger indicates as the necessary accompaniment. Is it not?
—Athenian: Yes, Clinias; temperance, that is, of the ordinary kind not the kind men mean when they use academic language and identify temperance with wisdom, but that kind which by natural instinct springs up at birth in children and animals, so that some are not incontinent, others continent, in respect of pleasures; and of this we said [710b] that, when isolated from the numerous so-called “goods,” it was of no account.}
v. Meno 99e. εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν [100a] παραγίγνηται, εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ ἐνθάδε ὁ τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν.
v. Meno 99e. At the moment, if through all this discussion our queries and statements have been correct, virtue is found to be neither natural nor taught, but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation without understanding in those who receive it, [100a] unless there should be somebody among the statesmen capable of making a statesman of another. And if there should be any such, he might fairly be said to be among the living what Homer says Teiresias was among the dead—“He alone has comprehension; the rest are flitting shades.” In the same way he on earth, in respect of virtue, will be a real substance among shadows.
vi. Laws 642c. μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ [642d] ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔτι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί.
vi. Laws 642c. “‘Good Athenians are always incomparably good,’ for they alone are good [642d] not by outward compulsion but by inner disposition.”
vii. Republic 619c. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν [sc. τὸν τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἑλόμενον] τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει [619d] ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἁλισκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους.
vii. Republic 619c. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence, [619d] participating in virtue by habit and not by philosophy; and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffering.
viii. Republic 401e. τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ’ ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ’ ἂν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ [402a] γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ’ αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ’ ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ’ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι’ οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς.
viii. Republic 401e. “Because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good. [402a] The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason came the man thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity he would know her.”
Other passages might be quoted more or less bearing on the subject, e.g. Republic 409a, 430b, Phaedrus 256e, Protagoras 355c following, but none, so far as I am aware, which throw any additional light upon it.
In the extract first quoted we have, it is clear, precisely the same conception of the vulgar sort of virtue as in Phaedo 68d. Plato has been describing, in one of the most scathing passages he ever penned, the character of the ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀνήρ. Such a man sets lucre above all things; he scrapes and hoards and denies himself, subduing all other appetites beneath the master-passion of amassing wealth. And since such habits tend in the main to outward orderliness of conduct, he acquires the reputation of being a worthy respectable man. Yet he is filled with a swarm of ‘drone lusts,’ which are commonly held down by the strong-hand of avarice, but are suffered to riot unchecked, if this may be done at another’s expense. And all this happens because he has paid no heed to his education. Here we have a perfect picture of a man δἰ ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένος: in that he controls his sensual appetites he is so far σώφρων, but he controls them only because he is ἀκόλαστος in the indulgence of unbounded avarice. In ii again Plato insists upon the point which is so strongly emphasised in the Phaedo; that no real knowledge of things just and beautiful can exist which is not based on knowledge of the good. We see then in these passages that the δημοτικὴ ἀρετή is a morality formed by the mass of mankind for themselves on strictly utilitarian principles, by balancing pains and pleasures, and without knowledge of the good. We observe also that for this Plato has nothing but scorn and sarcasm: he would not indeed deny that a temperance which is the effect of intemperance is better than no temperance at all; but it is at best a base and sordid counterfeit of true virtue.
But in iii we have quite a different picture. Here we see the philosopher himself, as prophet and teacher, creating the δημοτικὴ ἀρετή in the souls of his fellow men, by moulding their characters after the image of that justice and beauty whereof he beholds the eternal ideas. As the painter’s glance passes to and fro between his model and his canvas, so is the gaze of the philosopher turned now to his ideal archetype, now to the human image of the divine that he is fashioning. Now it is evident that this virtue can no longer be a contemptible thing, since it is worth the philosopher’s while to pause in his study of the truth, that he may implant it in the hearts of men: it is indeed the highest that the great mass of mankind can hope to attain, who live and die in the darkness of the cave. Again this is no longer an ethical code which the multitude frame for themselves; it is one which the philosopher frames for them: nor does he construct it on any utilitarian basis, but out of his knowledge of ideal truth. Yet as held by them it is still utilitarian, for they accept it on utilitarian grounds: they receive it, not because they know why it is good, for they are without knowledge of the good, but because the philosopher convinces them that it is for their advantage to do so; that by submitting to its restrictions they avoid great evils. As they hold it, therefore, it is utilitarian; as he conceives it, not so: thus they are still, though in a far more refined sense, δἰ ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένος. Plato acknowledges that the morality of the multitude must be utilitarian, since none other is attainable save by the highly trained metaphysician. Therefore, however superior the morality of those who obey this code may be to that of the oligarchical man, it is sundered from that of the philosopher by a fathomless gulf—it is ἄνευ φρονήσεως.
In the next three quotations Plato is speaking of an innate virtue, not springing from reason or any system, but from natural instinct. The most interesting and important of these passages is that from the Meno, which with its context gives a pretty full statement of Plato’s view. This instinctive virtue is due to no effort of its possessor but to the dispensation of heaven; θείᾳ μοίρᾳ 1 παραγιγνομένη—a phrase which is explained in vi by αὐτπφυῶς. 1 22222 2 Some men are so happily endowed by divine favour that without consciously striving after virtue they lead virtuous lives; they do right without knowing the difference between right and wrong. Now this natural virtue seems at first sight difficult to classify along with either form of δημοτικὴ ἀρετή before described. But a closer examination will show that, however much more attractive it may be, it does not in principle differ from the first. For we observe (1) that the virtue which these θεῖοι {offspring of God} follow by the impulse of their own hearts is the ordinary utilitarian virtue, (2) they are just, temperate, etc., simply because these virtues are more natural and therefore more easy and pleasant to them than the opposite vices, not because they choose them as being better: their virtue, when analysed, is an amiable form of selfishness. Therefore they must, harsh as it seems, be classed with of οἱ δἰ ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένοι, and with the first variety, since their virtue is of themselves, not from the philosopher.
(1A careful investigation into the meaning of the phrase θείᾳ μοίρᾳ will be found in Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen II i p. 497 note (3rd ed.) See also Dr. Thompson’s note on Gorgias 506e {The virtue of each thing is a matter of regular and orderly arrangement…Hence it is a certain order proper to each existent thing that by its advent in each makes it good…So then a soul which has its own proper order is better than one which is unordered…further, one that has order is orderly.} οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῆ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται.)
(1 22222 2 This seems at first sight to conflict with the opposition of θείᾳ μοίρᾳ {divine providence} with φύσει {nature} in the Meno. But I think that while in the Laws Plato is contrasting the αὐτοφυὴς ἀρετὴ {self-grown virtue} with that which is the result of ἐπιστήμη {principled knowledge}, in the Meno he merely notes that ἀρετὴ {virtue} is no inbred attribute of human nature, but where it occurs without ἐπιστήμη {knowledge}, it is bestowed by special favour of the gods. Cf. 89b.)
The whole discussion in the Meno brings out two points very clearly: (1) the fundamental difference between popular and philosophic ἀρετή is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge; (2) true opinion, where it is present, leads in the same path as knowledge: the ἰδιώτης {idiot = unintelligent person} who has a true opinion about what is right will act in the same way as the φιλόσοφος who knows what is right. 1 Therefore the popular virtue in its highest conceivable form leads to the same conduct as the philosophic virtue. The difference is that we can trust the latter and not the former: we cannot ensure that a man will always have right opinions; they may at any moment slip away from him like the statues of Daidalos. But the knowledge of the philosopher can never fail him: thence it is that he must come forward as the instructor of mankind; they must not be left to their good instincts, which may betray them, or to their utilitarian codes, which must lower them: they must accept a morality founded on the philosopher’s sure and abiding knowledge of the good. 1 22222 2
(1 The ἰδιώτης and the φιλόσοφος are aiming at precisely the same thing, viz. the good: only the φιλόσοφος seeks it as it really is, the ἰδιώτης as it is adumbrated in his own mind: the demotic good is, as Plato says, the shadow of the philosophic.)
(2 Thus we see the Platonic origin of Aristotle’s conception of ἀρετή ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. Nicomachean Ethics II vi 15. Cf. Eudemian Ethics III v 1232a 36.)
In vii we have a slight distinction. Here is one who is virtuous by habit and convention. There is, however, no specific difference between him and the θεῖοι {offspring of God} of the Meno: his conduct is equally influenced by unreflecting impulse, and we must conceive him as naturally well disposed. Plato notes, however, that this unthinking obedience to custom and tradition may lead to the most disastrous consequences, when a man is placed in a situation where custom and tradition are of no avail. How little value Plato set on this conventional virtue may be gathered from Phaedo 82b, where those who have lived virtuously ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ {the social and civil virtues which are called moderation and justice} pass at death into the form of some social and peaceable animal, bee, wasp or ant, or at best live again as decent and orderly citizens.
In viii we have the description of a child who is receiving a true education. He is to be surrounded from infancy with an atmosphere of the purest morality, ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ [401δ] χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν {whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health, [401d] and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason}, till he insensibly glides into harmony with fair reason; music is to sink into his soul, filling it with a love of concord and order: and thus being habituated to all that is noble and beautiful, while still too young to understand the reason why it is so, when in maturer years he at last attains knowledge of the reason, he welcomes it with joy, because all his previous training has fitted him to receive it. Thus we see that the δημοτικὴ ἀρετή in its highest form serves as a propaedeutic for ἀρετή μετὰ φρονήσεως {virtue beyond understanding}. That is to the philosophic child but an early stage which to the unphilosophic many is their journey’s end; the highest level their maturity attains is for his youth a starting-point to the knowledge of the good.
The result then of our investigation is this. While all δημοτικὴ ἀρετή is radically distinguished from philosophical morality by the fact that it is ἄνευ φρονήσεως {without understanding}, we may I think discern two well-marked varieties of it, represented by extracts i and iii; regarding that of v, vi and vii as not specifically distinct from i. The first is an ethical code formed (1) by the multitude for themselves, (2) on utilitarian principles, (3) without knowledge of the good; the second is (1) formed by the philosopher for the multitude, (2) not on utilitarian principles, (3) with knowledge of the good, but (4) accepted by the multitude on utilitarian principles and without knowledge of the good. The first Plato regards with unmixed contempt; the second he recognises as the best which the great majority of mankind can attain, and by it he hopes to supersede the other: nay, so much importance does he attach to this, that his philosophers must take it in turns to desist from their own meditations and give their minds to instructing their fellow citizens. We must beware of regarding these two varieties as two successive conceptions by Plato of the δημοτικὴ ἀρετή: they are two distinct kinds, of which one is utterly condemned, the other positively enforced upon the masses.
Finally it may be noted that the perfection of philosophic virtue is only to be found in the perfect philosopher in whom all knowledge and wisdom are consummated, ὃς φιλοσοφίας ἐπ’ ἄκρον ἁπάσης ἐλήλυθε. Plato did not pretend that he or any one else had reached such knowledge; therefore he would admit that his moral code was necessarily incomplete and tentative. But this is only to say that no ethical system based on metaphysical research can be perfect until the object of that research has been fully attained; until, that is, absolute knowledge has been won. And though such knowledge may be unattainable, Plato has still consolation: if philosophy’s advance in cognition of the truth be endless, endless also must be her progress in virtue.
Appendix II.
The ordinary interpretation of chapter xlviii represents Sokrates, after failing to unravel the secrets of nature by the methods of the physicists, as betaking himself to the contemplation of nature through the medium of λόγοι. This view has been set forth with such clearness and precision by Principal Geddes that I cannot do better than give it in his words.
‘Having failed in his first voyage, under the guidance of the physicists, Sokrates says that he set out by himself on a second voyage of discovery in search of a solid basis of Being, not by gazing on the outward world of matter, but by meditating on the inner world of thought…Sokrates had stated that the study of the external world by the senses simply would not conduct to knowledge of causation, and that the effect of such study would be like looking at an eclipse of the sun with the naked eye; viz. dizziness under the dazzling maze of phenomena (cf. ἰλιγγιᾷ in 79c, ταράττομαι in 100d). Therefore, he goes on to say, as one uses a medium in looking at an eclipse, such as the reflection in water, or the like, so we must proceed regarding the external world, by studying phenomena through media or images, which images can be nothing else than of οἱ λόγοι, i.e. principles or reasons intellectually apprehended. This simile, however, has the disadvantage of representing the intellectual world as the shadow and not the reality; and therefore Sokrates at once anticipates and corrects a misimpression that might arise from the use of such a simile. Perhaps, however, the process I refer to (viz. to τὸ ἐν λόγοις σκοπεῖν) is in a certain respect not parallel with that to which I compare it For I do not at all admit that the man who looks at things in their principles sees things a whit more by images than one who looks at them in their external effects.1 “Although it is true,” says Sokrates, “that those who look at the sun’s reflection in water see a reflection and nothing more, I do not admit that those who study to obtain a knowledge of Being through the medium of the principles in the intellect (οἱ λόγοι) perceive mere reflections of things, and not realities. Therefore the simile I have used is simply an illustration indicating that transition in which I turned from the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists, to the less remote, but not less real, world of οἱ λόγοι, or the intellectual principles of things.” ’
(1The italics are Principal Geddes’s own.)
Now the first remark I have to offer upon the above exposition is that the representation of δεύτερος πλοῦς as a ’second voyage of discovery’ is not consistent with the perfectly correct explanation of that proverb given by Principal Geddes himself a little earlier; ‘it signifies a “second resource in default of a better,” and is applied, not to what is absolutely, but to what is relatively, best.’ Ast indeed denies this: but that such is the meaning is conclusively determined, not only by the origin of the proverb, but by its use in every one of the passages where it occurs. Sokrates means that having failed in the highest object of his endeavour he betakes himself to this method of λόγοι as the closest feasible approximation to it.
But what is this highest object, the πρῶτος πλοῦς? Certainly not the investigation of phenomena by means of physical science. On the study of phenomena Plato is perpetually heaping the most contumelious epithets, especially in the period to which the Phaedo belongs: even in the Timaeus, great part of which is occupied with physical speculations, the most Plato will say for such pursuits is that they are a sober and harmless recreation in the intervals of more serious studies (59c). Neither in matter nor in our opinions about it is there any certainty, stability, or truth: matter therefore cannot be meant when Sokrates says ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν. It is true that he guards himself by the provision οὐ γὰρ πάνυ ξυγχρῶ κ.τ.λ., but this very fact is inconsistent with the theory that phenomena are the ὄντα {ideas} which Sokrates failed to reach: the λόγοι must in some sense be εἰκόνες {icons} of something, else what is the point of the comparison? Apart from this, Sokrates has in the previous chapter given us two perfectly precise statements: (1) that he had actually tested and discredited the methods of the physicists, (2) that his hope was to discover τἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον {the good and necessary} as the ultimate αἰτία {cause}; in other words, to construct a teleological theory of the universe. This then is the ‘great and wondrous hope’ which the physicists could not gratify, and which he himself failed to fulfill; and this it is for which the method of λόγοι offers a substitute.
I conceive then that Principal Geddes has fallen into error as to the nature of the πρῶτος πλοῦς by failing to keep a firm hold upon the meaning of δεύτερος πλοῦς: for I cannot imagine he would maintain that Plato even for a moment could speak of the study of λόγοι as inferior to the study of phenomena. But I have another very grave objection to his interpretation. He speaks of the ‘dazzling maze of phenomena,’ ‘the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists‘; and in his exposition the sun symbolises material particulars. But where shall we find such language in Plato? If we turn to a part of the Republic with which our present passage is intimately connected, we shall see something very different. In 508c we read
ὀφθαλμοί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπῃ ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως;
—καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
—[508δ] ὅταν δέ γ᾽ οἶμαι ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται.
—τί μήν;
—οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει: ὅταν μὲν οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται: ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.
“You are aware,” I said, “that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them.”
—“Yes, indeed,” he said.
—“But when, I take it, [508d] they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes.”
—“Certainly.”
—“Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.”
Again if we turn to 516a we find the very same metaphor: the sun moon and stars represent the ideas, and their reflections in water represent these very λόγοι with which we are dealing in the present passage. It is to me absolutely incredible that Plato should have inverted his metaphor, should have reversed the relation of thought and matter. Thought is always to him the region of truth and light, matter of dimness and uncertainty: and that he should even for a moment represent thought as a medium to temper the blinding glare of material existence is in my judgment unnatural and inconsistent with the whole tenor of his language on this subject. Prof. Geddes appeals to the use of ἰλιγγιᾷ and ταράττομαι, but Plato tells us (Republic 518a) ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμμασιν, ἔκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς {there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light}. Moreover in the interpretation I am criticising λόγοι are used as helps to the contemplation of phenomena, whereas Plato always treats them as helps to the contemplation of the ideas.1
(1 Principal Geddes in his second edition says nothing in reply to my criticism, except that it ‘assumes that the mental history described belongs to Plato also.’ I am unable to see that I have anywhere assumed this; and although personally I believe that it does belong to Plato, I have carefully refrained from asserting this or basing any argument thereupon. All that I have ‘assumed’ is that the Platonic Sokrates, in describing his own method (as in this chapter he is doing), is as usual Plato’s mouthpiece. Principal Geddes gives no explanation of the inconsistency I have pointed out in his conception of the δεύτερος πλοῦς.)
In a former edition I interpreted the passage as follows. I attempted, says Sokrates, to discover τὸ ἀγαθὸν {the good} as the ultimate cause working in nature. But when, after long endeavour, I failed in the struggle, I began to fear that by fixing my gaze too intently on realities I might be blinded in soul, as men are bereft of their bodily vision by gazing on the sun. So I bethought me of framing in my own mind images or concepts of those realities which I desired to study, and in them safely to examine the nature of their types. But though I admit these concepts are but images of the realities, mind I don‘t allow that they are so in any greater degree than material phenomena: both in fact are images; but whereas phenomena are the images presented to us by our senses, concepts are the images deliberately formed by our understanding; concepts therefore are more real than phenomena in proportion as understanding is more sure than sense. Be that as it may, I did form these concepts and used them as a standard to estimate the truth or falsehood of particulars.
Sokrates in fact, since he despairs of actually grasping the eternal ideas, of which all natural phenomena are symbols, endeavours to form from those symbols mental concepts or universals, which shall represent the ideas to him: they are the ideas as reflected in his intelligence. The verity of these concepts cannot be thoroughly ascertained, as the Republic tells us, until the ideas have been actually apprehended and compared with them: meanwhile they afford the best working hypothesis that can be obtained. No prospect of this verification is held out in the Phaedo; in the Republic, however, Plato speaks more hopefully.
This interpretation, as it appeared to me, established the right relation between the δεύτερος πλοῦς and the πρῶτος πλοῦς, gave to Plato’s illustration its natural and customary significance, and brought the passage into complete harmony with the Republic. At the same time I could not but feel the difficulties which beset this explanation, owing to the sentence βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα κ.τ.λ. I was obliged to understand τὰ πράγματα as signifying the ideas, and all the terms denoting sensuous perceptions as metaphorically applying to the apprehension of the ideas by pure thought. This interpretation of πράγματα is to some extent countenanced by the use of αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα in 66e; and despite the refractoriness of the phrase ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσήων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσοαι αὐτῶν, I am still convinced that this view of the passage was far preferable to the chaotic confusion of thought and language which is involved by the generally received interpretation. None the less it would clearly be no small gain if we could find an explanation which, while avoiding this Charybdis, would enable us to understand these words in their natural sense.
An interpretation has recently been brought to my notice by Mr. C. E. Campbell of Trinity Hall, which I believe is successful in attaining this end. Mr. Campbell justly observes that the initial sentence μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν indicates that Sokrates is no longer describing the result he apprehends from seeking immediate intuition of the good, which he had already abandoned. He must refer to some mode of conducting the δεύτερος πλοῦς, and he is explaining why he deserted πράγματα for their (apparent) εἰκόνες in λόγοι. Again the words ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον [100α] τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις imply a previous antithesis between λόγοι and πράγματα. For if he were merely pointing out that while ἔργα and λόγοι are both εἰκόνες of ὄντα, ἔργα are the more remote, he had no occasion to apologise for incorrectness in the simile. What then is this antithesis? Mr. Campbell obtains the answer by making the eclipse a material part of the similitude. Thus we get the following parallel:—
(1) ἥλιος = τὰ ὄντα, i.e. ideas.
(2) ἥλιος ἐκλείπων = τὰ ὄντα eclipsed in the form of γιγνόμενα, or material nature.
(3) Image of ἥλιος ἐκλείπων in water = image of γιγνόμενα in λόγοι, i.e. Sokratic universals.
Thus γιγνόμενα are regarded as eclipsed ὄντα, the light of the latter everywhere struggling through the darkness of the former. The problem is to arrive at the one primal light by a study of its partial manifestations, which are best investigated by their reflection in λόγοι.
The statement of Sokrates then comes to this. “When I recognised that the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν was not directly cognisable, that like the sun in eclipse it was obscured by the darkness of γιγνόμενα, through which it nevertheless is flashing all the time, I perceived that complete knowledge of the ἀγαθὸν must be approached by a study of this broken radiance, and that soul-blindness would be most surely avoided by examining its gleams clearly reflected in mental concepts.”
The simile indeed, says Sokrates parenthetically, is not perfect: for since λόγοι have more immediate truth than ἔργα, the latter are more justly to be termed εἰκόνες, or images in contradistinction to realities.
This then was my δεύτερος πλοῦς. I could not see my way to a complete cognition of Being, so I betook myself to studying the reflections of Being as it flashes through Becoming.
By this ingenious explanation Mr. Campbell, as it seems to me, has avoided the difficulties incidental to my former interpretation, while preserving the object for which I was mainly contending. We have certainly to thank him for a valuable contribution towards elucidating this very difficult passage.
The views of other editors agree in the main with that of Principal Geddes, but show some minor points of difference. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, regards both λόγοι and ἔργα as εἰκόνες, and translates δεύτερος πλοῦς ‘ex effectis alicuius rei.’ Ast and H. Schmidt understanding ἔργοις of material objects, deny that λόγοι are εἰκόνες: and the former expressly, the latter by implication, denies that δεύτερος πλοῦς signifies an inferior method. I think the two latter are right about ἔργοις, but in respect of the λόγοι and the δεύτερος πλοῦς Fischer and Stallbaum are unquestionably nearer the truth. But all these views are in my judgment radically vitiated by failure to recognise that a theory of final causes is that which Sokrates had hitherto vainly attempted to reach by apprehension of the ultimate αἰτία {cause} itself, and to which he now hoped to make an approximation by the aid of his logical method.
The interpretation set forth above obviates the objections which I formerly felt to the sentence βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. {I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the truth of realities.} Although these words were by a certain amount of strain capable, as I thought, of reasonable explanation, yet for sundry reasons it seemed to me, as it had to Dr. Jackson, that they were probably due to an interpolator. But now there no longer seems any reason for rejecting them, nor for suspecting any part of the text throughout the chapter.
.
Plato of Athens
428 BC—348 BC
Premier Greek philosopher, the Father of Idealism in its many facets: philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, theology, psychology, mysticism, aesthetics, ethics, education, literature, and politics
Plato’s Phaedo was titled On the Soul, Character
in antiquity.
Works Cited
Plato. Phaedo, Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903.
Plato. The Phaedo of Plato, R. D. Archer-Hind, ed. London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 2nd edition, 1894.
Plato. Phaedo,
Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1, translated by Harold North Fowler; Introduction by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, 1966.