Laws, Books VII.–XII.

By Plato of Athens

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Laws Book VII.

[or On Legislation, political]

Characters: An Athenian Stranger, Clinias of Crete, Megillus of Lacedaemon

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[788a]

Athenian: Now that our children, of both sexes, are born, our proper course will be to deal in the next place with their nurture and education. This is a subject which it is wholly impossible to pass over; but obviously it can be treated more suitably by way of precept and exhortation than by legislation. For in the private life of the family many trivial things are apt to be done which escape general notice, — things which are the result of individual feelings of pain, pleasure, or desire, [788b] and which contravene the instructions of the lawgiver; and these will produce in the citizens a multiplicity of contradictory tendencies. This is bad for a State. For while, on the one hand, it is improper and undignified to impose penalties on these practices by law, because of their triviality and the frequency of their occurrence, on the other hand, it detracts from the authority of the law which stands written when men grow used to breaking the law in trivial matters repeatedly. [788c] Hence, while it is impossible to pass over these practices in silence, it is difficult to legislate concerning them. The practices I refer to I will try to |5| make clear by bringing some specimens, as it were, to the light; for at present my words rather resemble a ‘dark speech.’

Clinias: That is quite true.

Athenian: When we said 1 that right nurture must be manifestly capable of making both bodies and souls in all respects as beautiful and good as possible, we spoke, I presume, truly?

Clinias: Certainly we did. [788d]

Athenian: And I suppose that (to take the simplest point) the most beautiful bodies must grow up from earliest infancy as straight as possible.

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: Well then, do we not observe that in every living creature the first shoot makes by far the largest and longest growth; so that many people stoutly maintain that in point of height men grow more in the first five years of life than in the next twenty?

Clinias: That is true.

Athenian: But we know, don’t we, that when growth occurs rapidly, [789a] without plenty of suitable exercise, it produces in the body countless evils?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: And when bodies receive most food, then they require most exercise?

Clinias: What is that, Stranger? Are we to prescribe most exercise for newborn babes and tiny infants?

Athenian: Nay, even earlier than that, — we shall prescribe it for those nourished inside the bodies of their mothers.

Clinias: What do you mean, my dear sir? Is it unborn babes you are talking of? |7| [789b]

Athenian: It is. Still it is by no means surprising that you know nothing of this prenatal gymnastic; but, strange though it is, I should like to explain it to you.

Clinias: By all means do so.

Athenian: In our country it is easier to understand a practice of this kind, because there are people there who carry their sports to excess. At Athens we find not only boys but sometimes old men rearing birds and training such creatures to fight one another. [789c] But they are far from thinking that the training they give them by exciting their pugnacity provides sufficient exercise; in addition to this, each man takes up his bird and keeps it tucked away in his fist, if it is small, or under his arm, if it is large, and in this way they walk many a long mile in order to improve the condition, not of their own bodies, but of these creatures. Thus clearly do they show to any observant person that all bodies benefit, as by a tonic, when they are moved by any kind of shaking or motion, [789d] whether they are moved by their own action — as in a swing or in a rowing-boat — or are carried along on horseback or by any other rapidly moving bodies; and that this is the reason why bodies can deal successfully with their supplies of meat and drink and provide us with health and beauty, and strength as well. This being the state of the case, what does it behove us to do in the future? Shall we risk ridicule, [789e] and lay down a law that the pregnant woman shall walk, and that the child, while still soft, shall be moulded like wax, and be kept in swaddling clothes till it is two years |9| old? And shall we also compel the nurses by legal penalties to keep carrying the children somehow, either to the fields or to the temples or to their relatives, all the time until they are able to stand upright; and after that, still to persevere in carrying them until they are three years old, as a precaution against the danger of distorting their legs by over-pressure while they are still young? And that the nurses shall be [790a] as strong as possible? And shall we impose a written penalty for every failure to carry out these injunctions? Such a course is quite out of the question; for it would lead to a super-abundance of that consequence which we mentioned a moment ago.

Clinias: What was that?

Athenian: The consequence of our incurring ridicule in abundance, in addition to meeting with a blank refusal to obey on the part of the nurses, with their womanish and servile minds.

Clinias: What reason, then, had we for saying that these rules ought to be stated?

Athenian: The reason was this: the minds of the masters and of the freemen [790b] in the States may perhaps listen, and so come to the right conclusion that, unless private affairs in a State are rightly managed, it is vain to suppose that any stable code of laws can exist for public affairs; and when he perceives this, the individual citizen may of himself adopt as laws the rules we have now stated, and, by so doing and thus ordering aright both his household and his State, may achieve happiness.

Clinias: Such a result seems quite probable.

Athenian: Consequently we must not desist from this kind of legislation until we have described in detail |11| the treatment suited for the souls [790c] of young children in the same manner as we commenced our advice regarding their bodies.

Clinias: You are quite right.

Athenian: Let us take this, then, as a fundamental assumption in both cases, — that for both body and soul of the very young a process of nursing and moving, that is as continuous as possible both by day and by night, is in all cases salutary, and especially in the case of the youngest: it is like having them always rocked — [790d] if that were possible — on the sea. As it is, with new-born infants one should reproduce this condition as nearly as possible. Further evidence of this may be seen in the fact that this course is adopted and its usefulness recognized both by those who nurse small children and by those who administer remedies in cases of Corybantism. 2 Thus when mothers have children suffering from sleeplessness, and want to lull them to rest, the treatment they apply is to give them, not quiet, but motion, for they rock them constantly in their arms; and instead of silence, [790e] they use a kind of crooning noise; and thus they literally cast a spell upon the children (like the victims of Bacchic frenzy) by employing the combined movements of dance and song as a remedy.

Clinias: And what, Stranger, are we to suppose is the main cause of this?

Athenian: It is easy enough to see.

Clinias: How so?

Athenian: Both these affections are forms of fright; |13| and frights are due to a poor condition of soul. So whenever one applies an external shaking [791a] to affections of this kind, the external motion thus applied overpowers the internal motion of fear and frenzy, and by thus overpowering it, it brings about a manifest calm in the soul and a cessation of the grievous palpitation of the heart which had existed in each case. Thus it produces very satisfactory results. The children it puts to sleep; the Bacchants, who are awake, it brings into a sound state of mind instead of a frenzied condition, by means of dancing and playing, with the help of whatsoever gods [791b] they chance to be worshipping with sacrifice. This is — to put it shortly — quite a plausible account of the matter.

Clinias: Most plausible.

Athenian: Seeing, then, that these causes produce the effects described, in the case of the people mentioned one should observe this point, — that every soul that is subjected to fright from youth will be specially liable to become timid: and this, as all would aver, is not to practise courage, but cowardice.

Clinias: Of course it is. [791c]

Athenian: The opposite course, of practising courage from youth up, consists, we shall say, in the conquering of the frights and fears that assail us.

Clinias: That is true.

Athenian: Let us say, then, that this factor — namely, the exercise of quite young children by the various motions — contributes greatly towards developing one part of the soul’s virtue.

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Moreover, cheerfulness of soul and its opposite will constitute no small part of stout-heartedness and faintheartedness. |15|

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: What way can we find, then, for implanting at once in the new-born child whichever of these qualities we desire? We must endeavour to indicate how and to what extent we have them at our command.

Clinias: By all means.

Athenian: The doctrine held amongst us, I may explain, is this, — that whereas luxurious living renders the disposition of the young morose and irascible and too easily moved by trifles, its opposite (which is uttermost and cruel enslavement) makes them lowly and mean-spirited and misanthropic, and thus unfit to associate with others. [791e]

Clinias: In what way, then, should the State at large rear up infants that are still incapable of understanding speech or receiving other kinds of education?

Athenian: In this way: it is usual for every creature that is born — and the human child as much as any — to utter at once a loud outcry; and, what is more, the child is the most liable of them all to be afflicted with tears as well as outcries.

Clinias: Quite true.

Athenian: When nurses are trying to discover what a baby wants, they judge by these very same signs in offering it things. [792a] If it remains silent when the thing is offered, they conclude that it is the right thing, but the wrong thing if it weeps and cries out. Thus infants indicate what they like by means of weepings and outcries— truly no happy signals! — and this period of infancy lasts not less than three years, which is no small fraction of one’s time to spend ill or well.

Clinias: You are right. |17|

Athenian: When a man is peevish and not cheerful at all, do you not regard him [792b] as a doleful person and more full, as a rule, of complaints than a good man ought to be?

Clinias: I certainly regard him as such.

Athenian: Well then, suppose one should try to secure by every available means that our nursling should experience the least possible amount of grief or fear or pain of any kind, may we not believe that by this means the soul of the nursling would be rendered more bright and cheerful?

Clinias: Plainly it would, Stranger; and most of all if one should provide him [792c] with many pleasures.

Athenian: There, my good sir, I must part company with Clinias. For in our eyes such a proceeding is the worst possible form of corruption, for it occurs in every instance at the very beginning of the child’s nurture. 3 But let us consider whether I am right.

Clinias: Explain your view.

Athenian: I believe that the issue before us is one of extreme importance. You also, Megillus, consider the matter, I pray, and lend us the aid of your judgment. What I maintain is this: that the right life ought neither to pursue pleasures nor to shun pains entirely; [792d] but it ought to embrace that middle state of cheerfulness (as I termed it a moment ago), which — as we all rightly suppose, on the strength of an inspired utterance — is the very condition of God himself. And I maintain that whosoever of us would be godlike must pursue this state of soul, neither becoming himself prone at all to pleasures, even as he will not be devoid of pain, not allowing |19| any other person — old or young, man or woman — to be in this condition and least of all, [792e] so far as possible, the new-born babe. For because of the force of habit, it is in infancy that the whole character is most effectually determined. 4 I should assert further — were it not that it would be taken as a jest — that women with child, above all others, should be cared for during their years of pregnancy, lest any of them should indulge in repeated and intense pleasures or pains, instead of cultivating, during the whole of that period, a cheerful, bright and calm demeanour.

Clinias: There is no need for you. Stranger, to ask Megillus [793a] which of us two has made the truer statement. For I myself grant you that all men ought to shun the life of unmixed pain and pleasure, and follow always a middle path. So all is well both with your statement and with my reply.

Athenian: You are perfectly right, Clinias. So then let the three of us together consider this next point.

Clinias: What is that?

Athenian: That all the regulations which we are now expounding are what are commonly termed ‘unwritten laws.’ And these as a whole are just the same as [793b] what men call ‘ancestral customs.’ Moreover, the view which was recently 5 impressed upon us, that one should neither speak of these as ‘laws’ nor yet leave them without mention, was a right view. For it is these that act as bonds in every constitution, forming a link between all its laws (both those already enacted in writing and those still to be |21| enacted), exactly like ancestral customs of great antiquity, which, if well established and practised, serve to wrap up securely the laws already written, whereas if they perversely [793c] go aside from the right way, like builders’ props that collapse under the middle of a house, they bring everything else tumbling down along with them, one thing buried under another, first the props themselves and then the fair superstructure, once the ancient supports have fallen down. Bearing this in mind, Clinias, we must clamp together this State of yours, which is a new one, by every possible means, omitting nothing great or small [793d] in the way of laws, customs and institutions; for it is by all such means that a State is clamped together, and neither kind of law is permanent without the other. Consequently, we need not be surprised if the influx of a number of apparently trivial customs or usages should make our laws rather long.

Clinias: What you say is quite true, and we will bear it in mind.

Athenian: If one could carry out these regulations methodically, and not merely apply them casually, [793e] in the case of girls and boys up to the age of three, they would conduce greatly to the benefit of our infant nurslings. To form the character of the child over three and up to six years old there will be need of games: by then punishment must be used to prevent their getting pampered. — not, however, punishment of a degrading kind, but just as we said before, 6 in the case of slaves, that one should avoid enraging the persons punished by using degrading punishments, or pampering them by leaving them unpunished, [794a] so in the case of the free-born the |23| same rule holds good. Children of this age have games which come by natural instinct; and they generally invent them of themselves whenever they meet together. As soon as they have reached the age of three, all the children from three to six must meet together at the village temples, those belonging to each village assembling at the same place. Moreover, the nurses of these children must watch over their behaviour, whether it be orderly or disorderly; and over the nurses themselves and the whole band of children [794b] one of the twelve women already elected must be appointed annually to take charge of each band, the appointment resting with the Law-wardens. These women shall be elected by the women who have charge of the supervision of marriage, 7 one out of each tribe and all of a like age. The woman thus appointed shall pay an official visit to the temple every day, and she shall employ a State servant and deal summarily with male or female slaves and strangers; [794c] but in the case of citizens, if the person protests against the punishment, she shall bring him for trial before the city-stewards; but if no protest is made, she shall inflict summary justice equally on citizens. After the age of six, each sex shall be kept separate, boys spending their time with boys, and likewise girls with girls; and when it is necessary for them to begin lessons, the boys must go to teachers of riding, archery, javelin-throwing and slinging, and the girls also, if they agree to it, must share in the lessons, [794d] and especially such as relate to the use of arms. For, as regards the view now prevalent regarding these matters, it is based on almost universal ignorance. |25|

Clinias: What view?

Athenian: The view that, in the case of hands, right and left are by nature different in respect of their utility for special acts; but, as a matter of fact, in the case of the feet and the lower limbs there is plainly no difference in working capacity; [794e] and it is due to the folly of nurses and mothers that we have all become limping, so to say, in our hands. For in natural ability the two limbs are almost equally balanced; but we ourselves by habitually using them in a wrong way have made them different. In actions of trifling importance this does not matter — as for example, whether a man uses the left hand for the fiddle and the right hand for the bow, and things of that sort; but to follow these precedents and to use the hands in this way on other occasions, when there is no necessity, is very like foolishness. [795a] This is shown by the Scythian custom not only of using the left hand to draw the bow and the right to fit the arrow to it, but also of using both hands alike for both actions. And there are countless other instances of a similar kind, in connexion with driving horses and other occupations, which teach us that those who treat the left hand as weaker than the right are confuted by nature. But this, as we have said, matters little in the case of fiddle-bows of horn [795b] and similar implements; but when it is a case of using iron instruments of war — bows, darts and the like — it matters a great deal, and most of all when weapon is to be used against weapon at close quarters. There is a vast difference here between the taught and the untaught, the trained and the untrained warrior. For just as the athlete who is thoroughly |27| practised in the pancratium or in boxing or wrestling is capable of fighting on his left side, and does not move that side as if it were numb [795c] or lame, whenever he is compelled to bring it into action through his opponent shifting to the other side, — in precisely the same way, I take it, in regard to the use of weapons of war and everything else, it ought to be considered the correct thing that the man who possesses two sets of limbs, fit both for offensive and defensive action, should, so far as possible, suffer neither of these to go unpractised or untaught. Indeed, if a man were gifted by nature with the frame of a Geryon or a Briareus, with his hundred hands he ought to be able to throw a hundred darts. So all these matters must be the care of [795d] the male and female officers, the women overseeing the games and the feeding of the children, and the men their lessons, to the intent that all the boys and girls may be sound of hand and foot, and may in no wise, if possible, get their natures warped by their habits.

The lessons may, for practical convenience, be divided under two heads — the gymnastical, which concern the body, and the musical, which aim at goodness of soul. Of gymnastic there are two kinds, dancing [795e] and wrestling. Of dancing there is one branch in which the style of the Muse is imitated, preserving both freedom and nobility, and another which aims at physical soundness, agility and beauty by securing for the various parts and members of the body the proper degree of flexibility and extension and bestowing also the rhythmical motion which belongs to each, and which accompanies [796a] the whole of dancing and is diffused throughout it completely. As to the |29| devices introduced by Antaeus or Cercyon 8 in the art of wrestling for the sake of empty glory, or in boxing by Epeius or Amycus, since they are useless in the business of war, they merit no eulogy. But the exercises of stand-up wrestling, with the twisting free of neck, hands and sides, when practised with ardour and with a firm and graceful pose, and directed towards strength and health, — these must not be omitted, since they are useful for all purposes; but we must charge both the pupils and their teachers — [796b] when we reach this point in our legislation — that the latter should impart these lessons gently, and the former receive them gratefully. Nor should we omit such mimic dances as are fitting for use by our choirs, — for instance, the sword-dance of the Curetes 9 here in Crete, and that of the Dioscori 10 in Lacedaemon; and at Athens, too, our Virgin-Lady 11 gladdened by the pastime of the dance deemed it not seemly to sport with empty hands, [796c] but rather to tread the measure vested in full panoply. These examples it would well become the boys and girls to copy, and so cultivate the favour of the goddess, alike for service in war and for use at festivals. It shall be the rule for the children, from the age of six until they reach military age, whenever they approach any god and form processions, to be always equipped with arms and horses, and with dance and march, now quick, now slow, to make their supplications to the gods |31| and the children of gods. [796d] Contests, too, and preliminary trials must be carried out with a view to the objects stated, if at all; for these objects are useful both in peace and war, alike for the State and for private families; but all other kinds of work and play and bodily exercise are not worthy of a gentleman. And now, O Megillus and Clinias, I have pretty fully described that gymnastic training which — as I said 12 early in our discourse — requires description: here it is in its full completeness. So if you know of a better gymnastic than this, [796e] disclose it.

Clinias: It is no easy thing. Stranger, to reject your account of gymnastic training and competition, and produce a better one.

Athenian: The subject which comes next to this, and deals with the gifts of Apollo and the Muses, is one which we previously 13 thought we had done with, and that the only subject left was gymnastic; but I plainly see now, not only what still remains to be said to everybody, but also that it ought to come first. Let us, then, state these points in order.

Clinias: By all means let us do so. [797a]

Athenian: Give ear to me now, albeit ye have already done so in the past. None the less, one must take great heed, now as before, both in the telling and in the hearing of a thing that is supremely strange and novel. To make the statement that I am going to make is an alarming task; yet I will summon up my courage, and not shrink from it.

Clinias: What is the statement you refer to, Stranger?

Athenian: I assert that there exists in every State |33| a complete ignorance about children’s games — how that they are of decisive importance for legislation, as determining whether the laws enacted are to be permanent or not. [797b] For when the programme of games is prescribed and secures that the same children always play the same games and delight in the same toys in the same way and under the same conditions, it allows the real and serious laws also to remain undisturbed; but when these games vary and suffer innovations, amongst other constant alterations the children are always shifting their fancy from one game to another, so that neither in respect of their own bodily gestures nor in respect of their equipment have they any fixed and acknowledged standard of propriety and impropriety; but the man they hold in special honour is he who is always innovating or introducing some novel device [797c] in the matter of form or colour or something of the sort; whereas it would be perfectly true to say that a State can have no worse pest than a man of that description, since he privily alters the characters of the young, and causes them to contemn what is old and esteem what is new. And I repeat again that there is no greater mischief a State can suffer than such a dictum and doctrine: just listen while I tell you how great an evil it is. [797d]

Clinias: Do you mean the way people rail at antiquity in States?

Athenian: Precisely.

Clinias: That is a theme on which you will find us no grudging listeners, but the most sympathetic possible.

Athenian: I should certainly expect it to be so.

Clinias: Only say on. |35|

Athenian: Come now, let us listen to one another and address one another on this subject with greater care than ever. Nothing, as we shall find, is more perilous than change in respect of everything, save only what is bad, — in respect of seasons, winds, bodily diet, mental disposition, everything in short with the solitary exception, as I said just now, of the bad. [797e] Accordingly, if one considers the human body, and sees how it grows used to all kinds of meats and drinks and exercises, even though at first upset by them, and how presently out of these very materials it grows flesh that is akin to them, and acquiring thus a familiar acquaintance with, [798a] and fondness for, all this diet, lives a most healthy and pleasant life; and further, should a man be forced again to change back to one of the highly-reputed diets, how he is upset and ill at first, and recovers with difficulty as he gets used again to the food, — it is precisely the same, we must suppose, with the intellects of men and the nature of their souls. For if there exist laws under which men have been reared up and which (by the blessing of Heaven) have remained unaltered [798b] for many centuries, so that there exists no recollection or report of their ever having been different from what they now are, — then the whole soul is forbidden by reverence and fear to alter any of the things established of old. By hook or by crook, then, the lawgiver must devise a means whereby this shall be true of his State. Now here is where I discover the means desired: — Alterations in children’s games are regarded by all lawgivers (as we said above 14) as being mere matters |37| of play, and not as the causes of serious mischief; [798c] hence, instead of forbidding them, they give in to them and adopt them. They fail to reflect that those children who innovate in their games grow up into men different from their fathers; and being thus different themselves, they seek a different mode of life, and having sought this, they come to desire other institutions and laws; and none of them dreads the consequent approach of that result which we described just now as the greatest of all banes [798d] to a State. The evil wrought by changes in outward forms would be of less importance; but frequent changes in matters involving moral approval and disapproval are, as I maintain, of extreme importance, and require the utmost caution.

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: Well, then, do we still put our trust in those former statements of ours, 15 in which we said that matters of rhythm and music generally are imitations of the manners of good [798e] or bad men? Or how do we stand?

Clinias: Our view at least remains unaltered.

Athenian: We assert, then, that every means must be employed, not only to prevent our children from desiring to copy different models in dancing or singing, but also to prevent anyone from tempting them by the inducement of pleasures of all sorts.

Clinias:- Quite right. [799a]

Athenian: To attain this end, can any one of us suggest a better device than that of the Egyptians? 16 |39|

Clinias: What device is that?

Athenian: The device of consecrating all dancing and all music. First, they should ordain the sacred feasts, by drawing up an annual list of what feasts are to be held, and on what dates, and in honour of what special gods and children of gods and daemons; and they should ordain next what hymn is to be sung at each of the religious sacrifices, and with what dances [799b] each such sacrifice is to be graced; these ordinances should be first made by certain persons, and then the whole body of citizens, after making a public sacrifice to the Fates and all the other deities, should consecrate with a libation these ordinances — dedicating each of the hymns to their respective gods and divinities. And if any man proposes other hymns or dances besides these for any god, the priests and priestesses will be acting in accordance with both religion and law when, with the help of the Law-wardens, they expel him from the feast; and if the man resists expulsion, he shall be liable, so long as he lives, to be prosecuted for impiety by anyone who chooses.

Clinias: That is right. [799c]

Athenian: Since we find ourselves now dealing with this theme, let us behave as befits ourselves. 17

Clinias: In what respect?

Athenian: Every young man — not to speak of old men — on hearing or seeing anything unusual and strange, is likely to avoid jumping to a hasty and impulsive solution of his doubts about it, and to stand still; just as a man who has come to a crossroads and is not quite sure of his way, if he be travelling alone, will question himself, or if travelling with others, [799d] will question them too about |41| the matter in doubt, and refuse to proceed until he has made sure by investigation of the direction of his path. We must now do likewise. In our discourse about laws, the point which has now occurred to us being strange, we are bound to investigate it closely; and in a matter so weighty we, at our age, must not lightly assume or assert that we can make any reliable statement about it on the spur of the moment.

Clinias: That is very true. [799e]

Athenian: We shall, therefore, devote some time to this subject, and only when we have investigated it thoroughly shall we regard our conclusions as certain. But lest we be uselessly hindered from completing the ordinance which accompanies the laws with which we are now concerned, let us proceed to their conclusion. For very probably (if Heaven so will) this exposition, when completely brought to its conclusion, may also clear up the problem now before us.

Clinias: Well said, Stranger: let us do just as you say.

Athenian: Let the strange fact be granted, we say, that our hymns are now made into "nomes" (laws), 18 just as the men of old, it would seem, gave this name to harp-tunes, — [800a] so that they, too, perhaps, would not wholly disagree with our present suggestion, but one of them may have divined it vaguely, as in a dream by night or a waking vision: anyhow, let this be the decree on the matter: — In violation of public tunes and sacred songs and the whole choristry of the young, just as in violation |43| of any other ‘nome’ (law), no person shall utter a note or move a limb in the dance. He that obeys shall be free of all penalty; but he that disobeys shall (as we said just now) be punished by the Law-wardens, the priestesses and the priests. [800b] Shall we now lay down these enactments in our statement?

Clinias: Yes, lay them down.

Athenian: How shall we enact these rules by law in such a way as to escape ridicule? Let us consider yet another point concerning them. The safest plan is to begin by framing in our discourse some typical cases, 19 so to call them; one such case I may describe in this way. Suppose that, when a sacrifice is being performed and the offerings duly burned, some private worshipper — a son or a brother — when standing beside the altar [800c] and the offering, should blaspheme most blasphemously, would not his voice bring upon his father and the rest of the family a feeling of despair and evil forebodings?

Clinias: It would.

Athenian: Well, in our part of the world this is what happens, one may almost say, in nearly every one of the States. Whenever a magistrate holds a public sacrifice, the next thing is for a crowd of choirs — not merely one — to advance and take their stand, not at a distance from the altars, [800d] but often quite close to them; and then they let out a flood of blasphemy over the sacred offerings, racking the souls of their audience with words, rhythms and tunes most dolorous, and the man that succeeds at once in drawing most tears from the sacrificing city carries |45| off the palm of victory. Mast we not reject 20 such a custom as this? For if it is ever really necessary that the citizens should listen to such doleful strains, it would be more fitting that the choirs that attend should be hired from abroad, and that not on holy days but only on fast-days — [800e] just as a corpse is escorted with Carian music by hired mourners. Such music would also form the fitting accompaniment for hymns of this kind; and the garb befitting these funeral hymns would not be any crowns nor gilded ornaments, but just the opposite, — for I want to get done with this subject as soon as I can. Only I would have us ask ourselves again 21 this single question, — are we satisfied to lay this down as our first typical rule for hymns?

Clinias: What rule?

Athenian: That of auspicious speech; and must we have a kind of hymn that is [801a] altogether in all respects auspicious? Or shall I ordain that it shall be so, without further questioning?

Clinias: By all means ordain it so; for that is a law carried by a unanimous vote.

Athenian: What then, next to auspicious speech, should be the second law of music? Is it not that prayers should be made on each occasion to those gods to whom offering is made?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: The third law, I suppose, will be this, — that the poets, knowing that prayers are requests addressed to gods, must take the utmost care lest |47| unwittingly [801b] they request a bad thing as though it were a good thing; for if such a prayer were made, it would prove, I fancy, a ludicrous blunder.

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: Did not our argument convince us, a little while ago, 22 that no Plutus either in gold or in silver should dwell enshrined within the State?

Clinias: It did.

Athenian: What then shall we say that this statement serves to illustrate? Is it not this, — that the tribe of poets is not wholly capable of discerning [801c] very well what is good and what not? For surely when a poet, suffering from this error, composes prayers either in speech or in song, he will be making our citizens contradict ourselves in their prayers for things of the greatest moment; yet this, as we have said, 23 is an error than which few are greater. So shall we also lay down this as one of our laws and typical cases regarding music?

Clinias: What law? Explain it to us more clearly.

Athenian: The law that the poet shall compose nothing which goes beyond the limits of what the State holds to be legal and right, fair and good; nor shall he show [801d] his compositions to any private person until they have first been shown to the judges appointed to deal with these matters, and to the Law-wardens, and have been approved by them. And in fact we have judges appointed in those whom we selected to be the legislators of music and in the supervisor of education. Well then, I repeat my question. — is this to be laid down as our third law, typical case, and example? What think you? |49|

Clinias: Be it laid down by all means.

Athenian: Next to these, it will be most proper to sing hymns and praise to the gods, coupled with prayers; and after the gods will come prayers combined with praise to daemons and heroes, as is befitting to each.

Clinias: To be sure. [801e]

Athenian: This done, we may proceed at once without scruple to formulate this law: — all citizens who have attained the goal of life and have wrought with body or soul noble works and toilsome, and have been obedient to the laws, shall be regarded as fitting objects for praise.

Clinias: Certainly. [802a]

Athenian: But truly it is not safe to honour with hymns and praises those still living, before they have traversed the whole of life and reached a noble end. All such honours shall be equally shared by women as well as men who have been conspicuous for their excellence. As to the songs and the dances, this is the fashion in which they should be arranged. Among the compositions of the ancients there exist many fine old pieces of music, and likewise dances, from which we may select without scruple for the constitution we are founding such as are fitting and proper. [802b] To examine these and make the selection, we shall choose out men not under fifty years of age; and whichever of the ancient songs are approved we shall adopt, but whichever fail to reach our standard, or are altogether unsuitable, we shall either reject entirely or revise and remodel. For this purpose we shall call in the advice of poets and musicians, |51| and make use of their poetical ability, without, however, trusting to their tastes or their wishes, [802c] except in rare instances; and by thus expounding the intentions of the lawgiver, we shall organise to his satisfaction dancing, singing, and the whole of choristry. In truth, every unregulated musical pursuit becomes, when brought under regulation, a thousand times better, even when no honeyed strains are served up: all alike provide pleasure. 24 For if a man has been reared from childhood up to the age of steadiness and sense in the use of music that is sober and regulated, then he detests the opposite kind whenever he hears it, and [802d] calls it ‘vulgar’; whereas if he has been reared in the common honeyed kind of music, he declares the opposite of this to be cold and unpleasing. Hence, as we said just now, in respect of the pleasure or displeasure they cause neither kind excels the other; where the superiority lies is in the fact that the one kind always makes those who are reared in it better, the other worse.

Clinias: Finely spoken!

Athenian: Further, it will be right for the lawgiver to set apart suitable songs for males and females by making a rough division of them; and he must necessarily adapt them to harmonies and rhythms, [802e] for it would be a horrible thing for discord to exist between theme and tune, metre and rhythm, as a result of providing the songs with unsuitable accompaniments. So the lawgiver must of necessity ordain at least the outline of these. And while it is necessary for him to assign both words and music for both |53| types of song as defined by the natural difference of the two sexes, he must also clearly declare wherein the feminine type consists. Now we may affirm that what is noble and of a manly tendency is masculine, while that which inclines rather to decorum and sedateness is to be regarded rather as feminine both in law and in discourse. [803a] Such then is our regulation of the matter. We have next to discuss the question of the teaching and imparting of these subjects — how, by whom, and when each of them should be practised. Just as a shipwright at the commencement of his building outlines the shape of his vessel by laying down her keel, so I appear to myself to be doing just the same — trying to frame, that is, the shapes of lives according to the modes of their souls, and thus literally [803b] laying down their keels, by rightly considering by what means and by what modes of living we shall best navigate our barque of life through this voyage of existence. And notwithstanding that human affairs are unworthy of earnest effort, necessity counsels us to be in earnest; and that is our misfortune. Yet, since we are where we are, it is no doubt becoming that we should show this earnestness in a suitable direction. But no doubt [803c] I may be faced — and rightly faced — with the question, ‘What do I mean by this?’

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: What I assert is this, — that a man ought to be in serious earnest about serious things, and not about trifles; and that the object really worthy of all serious and blessed effort is God, while man is contrived, as we said above, 25 to be a plaything of God, and the best part of him is really just that; and |55| thus I say that every man and woman ought to pass through life in accordance with this character, playing at the noblest of pastimes, being otherwise minded than they now are. [803d]

Clinias: How so?

Athenian: Now they imagine that serious work should be done for the sake of play; for they think that it is for the sake of peace that the serious work of war needs to be well conducted. But as a matter of fact we, it would seem, do not find in war, either as existing or likely to exist, either real play or education worthy of the name, which is what we assert to be in our eyes the most serious thing. It is the life of peace that everyone should live as much and as well as he can. What then is the right way? We should live out our lives playing [803e] at certain pastimes — sacrificing, singing and dancing — so as to be able to win Heaven’s favour and to repel our foes and vanquish them in fight. By means of what kinds of song and dance both these aims may be effected, — this has been, in part, stated in outline, and the paths of procedure have been marked out, in the belief that the poet is right when he says 26 — [804a]

‘Telemachus; thine own wit will in part
Instruct thee, and the rest will Heaven supply;
For to the will of Heaven thou owest birth
And all thy nurture, I would fain believe.’

It behoves our nurslings also to be of this same mind, and to believe that what we have said is sufficient, and that the heavenly powers will suggest to them all |57| else that concerns sacrifice and the dance, — [804b] in honour of what gods and at what seasons respectively they are to play and win their favour, and thus mould their lives according to the shape of their nature, inasmuch as they are puppets 27 for the most part, yet share occasionally in truth.

Clinias: You have a very mean opinion, Stranger, of the human race.

Athenian: Marvel not, Megillus, but forgive me. For when I spoke thus, I had my mind set on God, and was feeling the emotion to which I gave utterance. Let us grant, however, if you wish, [804c] that the human race is not a mean thing, but worthy of serious attention.

To pursue our subject, — we have described 28 buildings for public gymnasia as well as schools in three divisions within the city, and also in three divisions round about the city training-grounds and race-courses for horses, arranged for archery and other long-distance shooting, and for the teaching and practising of the youth: if, however, our previous description of these was inadequate, let them now be described and legally regulated. In all these establishments there should reside teachers [804d] attracted by pay from abroad for each several subject, to instruct the pupils in all matters relating to war and to music; and no father shall either send his son as a pupil or keep him away from the training-school at his own sweet will, but every ‘man jack’ of them all (as the saying goes) must, so far as possible, be compelled to be educated, inasmuch as they are children of the State even more than children of their parents. For females, too, my law will lay down the same regulations as for men, and training of an identical kind. [804e] I will unhesitatingly affirm that |59| neither riding nor gymnastics, which are proper for men, are improper for women. I believe the old tales I have heard, and I know now of my own observation, that there are practically countless myriads of women called Sauromatides, in the district of Pontus, upon whom equally with men is imposed the duty of handling bows and other weapons, [805a] as well as horses, and who practise it equally. In addition to this I allege the following argument. Since this state of things can exist, I affirm that the practice which at present prevails in our districts is a most irrational one — namely, that men and women should not all follow the same pursuits with one accord and with all their might. For thus from the same taxation and trouble there arises and exists half a State only instead of a whole one, in nearly every instance; yet surely this would be a surprising blunder [805b] for a lawgiver to commit.

Clinias: So it would seem; yet truly a vast number of the things now mentioned, Stranger, are in conflict with our ordinary polities.

Athenian: Well, but I said 29 that we should allow the argument to run its full course, and when this is done we should adopt the conclusion we approve.

Clinias: In this you spoke most reasonably; and you have made me now chide myself for what I said. So say on now what [805c] seems good to you.

Athenian: What seems good to me, Clinias, as I said before, 30 is this, — that if the possibility of such a state of things taking place had not been sufficiently proved by facts, then it might have been possible to gainsay our statement; but as it is, the man who |61| rejects our law must try some other method, nor shall we be hereby precluded from asserting in our doctrine that the female sex [805d] must share with the male, to the greatest extent possible, both in education and in all else. For in truth we ought to conceive of the matter in this light. Suppose that women do not share with men in the whole of their mode of life, must they not have a different system of their own?

Clinias: They must.

Athenian: Then which of the systems now in vogue shall we prescribe in preference to that fellowship which we are now imposing upon them? Shall it be that of the Thracians, and many other tribes, [805e] who employ their women in tilling the ground and minding oxen and sheep and toiling just like slaves? Or that which obtains with us and all the people of our district? The way women are treated with us at present is this — we huddle all our goods together, as the saying goes, within four walls, and then hand over the dispensing of them to the women, together with the control of the shuttles and all kinds of wool-work. Or again, shall we prescribe for them, Megillus, that midway system, the Laconian? [806a] Must the girls share in gymnastics and music, and the women abstain from wool-work, but weave themselves instead a life that is not trivial at all nor useless, but arduous, advancing as it were halfway in the path of domestic tendance and management and child-nurture, but taking no share in military service; so that, even if it should chance to be necessary for them to fight in defence of their city and their children, they will be unable to handle |63| with skill either a bow [806b] (like the Amazons) or any other missile, nor could they take spear and shield, after the fashion of the Goddess, 31 so as to be able nobly to resist the wasting of their native land, and to strike terror — if nothing more — into the enemy at the sight of them marshalled in battle-array? If they lived in this manner, they certainly would not dare to adopt the fashion of the Sauromatides, whose women would seem like men beside them. So in regard to this matter, let who will commend your Laconian lawgivers: [806c] as to my view, it must stand as it is. The lawgiver ought to be whole-hearted, not half-hearted, — letting the female sex indulge in luxury and expense and disorderly ways of life, 32 while supervising the male sex; for thus he is actually bequeathing to the State the half only, instead of the whole, of a life of complete prosperity.

Megillus: What are we to do, Clinias? Shall we allow the Stranger to run down our Sparta in this fashion? [806d]

Clinias: Yes: now that we have granted him free speech we must let him be, until we have discussed the laws fully.

Megillus: You are right.

Athenian: May I, then, endeavour without more delay to proceed with my exposition?

Clinias: By all means.

Athenian: What manner of life would men live, supposing that they possessed a moderate supply of all the necessaries, and that they had entrusted all the crafts to other hands, [806e] and that their farms were hired out to slaves, and yielded them produce |65| enough for their modest needs? Let us further suppose that they had public mess-rooms — separate rooms for men, and others close by for their households, including the girls and their mothers — and that each of these rooms was in charge of a master or mistress, to dismiss the company and to watch over their behaviour daily; and, at the close of the meal, that the master and all the company poured a libation [807a] in honour of those gods to whom that night and day were dedicated, and so finally retired home. Supposing them to be thus organised, is there no necessary work, of a really appropriate kind, left for them, but must every one of them continue fattening himself like a beast? 33 That, we assert, is neither right nor good; nor is it possible for one who lives thus to miss his due reward; and the due reward of an idle beast, fattened in sloth, is, as a rule, [807b] to fall a prey to another beast — one of those which are worn to skin and bone through toil hardily endured. Now it is probable that if we look to find this state of leisure fully realised exactly as described, we shall be disappointed, so long as women and children and houses remain private, and all these things are established as the private property of individuals; but if the second-best State, 34 as now described, [807c] could exist, we might be well content with it. And, we assert, there does remain for men living this life a task that is by no means small or trivial, but rather one that a just law imposes upon them as the weightiest task of all. For as compared with the life that aims at a Pythian or |67| Olympian victory and is wholly lacking in leisure for other tasks, that life we speak of — which most truly deserves the name of ‘life’ — is doubly (nay, far more than doubly) lacking in leisure, seeing that it is occupied with the care [807d] of bodily and spiritual excellence in general. For there ought to be no other secondary task to hinder the work of supplying the body with its proper exercise and nourishment, or the soul with learning and moral training: nay, every night and day is not sufficient for the man who is occupied therein to win from them their fruit in full and ample measure.

So this being nature’s law, a programme must be framed for all the freeborn men, prescribing how they shall pass their time continuously, [807e] from dawn to dawn and sunrise on each successive day. It would be undignified for a lawgiver to mention a host of petty matters connected with the domestic arrangements — such as, in particular, the rules about that wakefulness at night which is proper for men who propose to guard a whole State adequately and continuously. That any citizen, indeed, should spend the whole of any night in sleep, instead of setting an example to his household by being himself [808a] always the first to awaken and rise — such a practice must be counted by all a shameful one, unworthy of a free man, whether it be called a custom or a law. Moreover, that the mistress of a house should be awakened by maids, instead of being herself the first to wake up all the others — this is a shameful practice; and that it is so all the servants must declare to one another — bondman and bondmaid and boy, yea, even (were it possible) every stone in the house. And, when awake by night, they must certainly transact a large |69| share of business, [808b] both political and economical, the magistrates in the city, and the masters and mistresses in their own houses. For much sleep is not naturally suitable either to our bodies or souls, nor yet to employment on any such matters. For when asleep no man is worth anything, any more than if he were dead: on the contrary, every one of us who cares most greatly for life and thought keeps awake as long as possible, only reserving so much time for sleep as his health requires — [808c] and that is but little, once the habit is well formed. And rulers that are watchful by night in cities are a terror to evil-doers, be they citizens or enemies, but objects of respect and admiration to the just and temperate; and they confer benefit alike on themselves and on the whole State.

The night, if spent in this way, will — in addition to all the other benefits described — lend greater fortitude to the souls of all who reside in these States. With the return of daylight the children should go to their teachers; [808d] for just as no sheep or other witless creature ought to exist without a herdsman, so children cannot live without a tutor, nor slaves without a master. And, of all wild creatures, the child is the most intractable; for in so far as it, above all others, possesses a fount of reason that is as yet uncurbed, it is a treacherous, sly and most insolent creature. Wherefore the child must be strapped up, as it were, [808e] with many bridles — first, when he leaves the care of nurse and mother, with tutors, to guide his childish ignorance, and after that with teachers of all sorts of subjects and lessons, treating him as becomes a freeborn child. |71| On the other hand, he must be treated as a slave; 35 and any free man that meets him shall punish both the child himself and his tutor or teacher, if any of them does wrong. And if anyone thus meets them and fails to punish them duly, he shall, in the first place, be liable to the deepest degradation; and the Law-warden who is chosen as [809a] president over the children shall keep his eye on the man who has met with the wrong-doings mentioned and has failed either to inflict the needed punishment at all, or else to inflict it rightly. Moreover, this Law-warden shall exercise special supervision, with a keen eye, over the rearing of the children, to keep their growing natures in the straight way, by turning them always towards goodness, as the laws direct.

But how is the law itself to give an adequate education to this Law-warden of ours? For, up to the present, the law has not as yet made any clear or [809b] adequate statement: it has mentioned some things, but omitted others. But in dealing with this warden it must omit nothing, but fully expound every ordinance that he may be both expositor and nurturer to the rest. Matters of choristry of tunes and dancing, and what types are to be selected, remodelled, and consecrated — all this has already been dealt with; 36 but with regard to the kind of literature that is written but without metre we have never put the question — O excellent supervisor of children, of what sort ought this prose to be, and in what fashion are your charges to deal with it? [809c] You know from our discourse 37 what are the military exercises they ought to learn and to practise, but the matters that |73| have not as yet, my friend, been fully declared to you by the lawgiver are these — first, literature, next, lyre-playing; also arithmetic, of which I said that there ought to be as much as everyone needs to learn for purposes of war, house-management and civic administration; together with what it is useful for these same purposes to learn about the courses of the heavenly bodies — stars and sun and moon — in so far as every State [809d] is obliged to take them into account. What I allude to is this — the arranging of days into monthly periods, and of months into a year, in each instance, so that the seasons, with their respective sacrifices and feasts, may each be assigned its due position by being held as nature dictates, and that thus they may create fresh liveliness and alertness in the State, and may pay their due honours to the gods, and may render the citizens more intelligent about these matters. These points, my friend, have not all as yet been explained to you sufficiently by the lawgiver. [809e] Now attend carefully to what is next to be said. In the first place, you are, as we said, insufficiently instructed as yet concerning letters. The point we complain of is this — that the law has not yet told you clearly whether the man who is to be a good citizen must pursue this study with precision, or neglect it altogether; and so likewise with regard to the lyre. That he must not neglect them we now affirm. For the study of letters, about three years is a reasonable period for a child of ten years old; [810a] and for lyre-playing, he should begin at thirteen and continue at it for three years. And whether he likes or dislikes the study, neither the child nor his father shall be permitted either to cut short or to prolong the years |75| of study contrary to the law; and anyone who disobeys shall be disqualified for the school honours which we shall mention presently. 38 And, during these periods, what are the subjects which the children must learn and the teachers teach — this you yourself must learn first. [810b] They must work at letters sufficiently to be able to read and write. But superior speed or beauty of handwriting need not be required in the case of those whose progress within the appointed period is too slow. With regard to lessons in reading, there are written compositions not set to music, whether in metre or without rhythmical divisions — compositions merely uttered in prose, void of rhythm and harmony; [810c] and some of the many composers of this sort have bequeathed to us writings of a dangerous character. How will you deal with these, O my most excellent Law-wardens? Or what method of dealing with them will the law-giver rightly ordain? He will be vastly perplexed, I verily believe.

Clinias: What does this mean, Stranger? Evidently you are addressing yourself, and are really perplexed.

Athenian: You are right in your supposition, Clinias. As you are my partners in this investigation of laws, I am bound to explain to you both what seems easy and what hard. [810d]

Clinias: Well, what is it about them that you are now alluding to, and what has come over you?

Athenian: I will tell you: it is no easy matter to gainsay tens of thousands of tongues.

Clinias: Come now, — do you believe that the points |77| in which our previous conclusions about laws contradicted ordinary opinion were few and trifling?

Athenian: Your observation is most just. I take it that you are bidding me, now that the path which is abhorrent to many is attractive to others possibly not less numerous [810e] (or if less numerous, certainly not less competent), — you are, I say, bidding me adventure myself with the latter company and proceed boldly along the path of legislation marked out in our present discourse, without flinching.

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Then I will not flinch. I verily affirm that we have composers of verses innumerable — hexameters, trimeters, and every metre you could mention, — some of whom aim at the serious, others at the comic; on whose writings, as we are told by our tens of thousands of people, we ought to rear and soak the young, if we are to give them a correct education, making them, by means of recitations, lengthy listeners [811a] and large learners, who learn off whole poets by heart. Others there are who compile select summaries of all the poets, and piece together whole passages, telling us that a boy must commit these to memory and learn them off if we are to have him turn out good and wise as a result of a wide and varied range of instruction. 39 Would you have me now state frankly to these poets what is wrong about their declarations and what right?

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: What single statement can I make about all these people [811b] that will be adequate? This, |79| perhaps, — in which everyone will agree with me, — that every poet has uttered much that is well, and much also that is ill; and this being so, I affirm that a wide range of learning involves danger to children.

Clinias: What advice then would you give the Law-warden?

Athenian: About what?

Clinias: About the pattern by which he should be guided in respect of the particular subjects which he permits or forbids all the children to learn. [811c] Tell us, and without scruple.

Athenian: My good Clinias, I have had, it would seem, a stroke of luck.

Clinias: How so?

Athenian: In the fact that I am not wholly at a loss for a pattern. For in looking back now at the discussions which we have been pursuing from dawn up to this present hour — and that, as I fancy, not without some guidance from Heaven — it appeared to me that they were framed exactly like a poem. And it was not surprising, perhaps, [811d] that there came over me a feeling of intense delight when I gazed thus on our discourses all marshalled, as it were, in close array; for of all the many discourses which I have listened to or learnt about, whether in poems or in a loose flood of speech like ours, they struck me as being not only the most adequate, but also the most suitable for the ears of the young. Nowhere, I think, could I find a better pattern than this to put before the Law-warden who is educator, that he may charge the teachers to teach the children these discourses of ours, and such as resemble [811e] and accord with these; and if it should be that in his search he should light on poems of |81| composers, or prose-writings, or merely verbal and unwritten discourses, akin to these of ours, he must in no wise let them go, but get them written down. In the first place, he must compel the teachers themselves to learn these discourses, and to praise them, and if any of the teachers fail to approve of them, he must not employ them as colleagues; only those who agree with his praise of the discourses should he employ, and entrust to them the teaching and training of the youth. [812a] Here and herewith let me end my homily concerning writing-masters and writings.

Clinias: Judged by our original intention. Stranger, I certainly do not think that we have diverged from the line of argument we intended; but about the matter as a whole it is hard, no doubt, to be sure whether or not we are right.

Athenian: That, Clinias, (as we have often said) will probably become clearer of itself, 40 when we arrive at the end of our whole exposition concerning laws. [812b]

Clinias: Very true.

Athenian: After the writing-master, must we not address the lyre-master next?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: When assigning to the lyre-masters their proper duties in regard to the teaching and general training in these subjects, we must, as I think, bear in mind our previous declarations. 41

Clinias: Declarations about what?

Athenian: We said, I fancy, that the sixty-year-old singers of hymns to Dionysus ought to be exceptionally keen of perception [812c] regarding rhythms and harmonic compositions, in order that when dealing |83| with musical representations of a good kind or a bad, by which the soul is emotionally affected, they may be able to pick out the reproductions of the good kind and of the bad, and having rejected the latter, may produce the other in public, and charm the souls of the children by singing them, and so challenge them all to accompany them in acquiring virtue by means of these representations.

Clinias: Very true. [812d]

Athenian: So, to attain this object, both the lyre-master and his pupil must use the notes of the lyre, because of the distinctness of its strings, assigning to the notes of the song notes in tune with them; 42 but as to divergence of sound and variety in the notes of the harp, when the strings sound one tune and the composer of the melody another, or when there results a combination of low and high notes, of slow and quick time, of sharp and grave, [812e] and all sorts of rhythmical variations are adapted to the notes of the lyre, — no such complications should be employed in dealing with pupils who have to absorb quickly, within three years, the useful elements of music. For the jarring of opposites with one another impedes easy learning; and the young should above all things learn easily, since the necessary lessons imposed upon them are neither few nor small, — which lessons our discourse will indicate in time as it proceeds. So let our educator regulate these matters in the manner stated. As regards the |85| character of the actual tunes and words which the choir-masters ought to teach, [813a] all this we have already 43 explained at length. We stated that in each case they should be adapted to a suitable festival and dedicated, and thus prove a benefit to the States, by furnishing them with felicitous enjoyment.

Clinias: This, too, you have explained truly.

Athenian: Yes, most truly. These matters also let the man who is appointed our Director of Music take over and supervise, with the help of kindly fortune; and let us supplement our former statements concerning dancing and bodily gymnastics in general. [813b] Just as, in the case of music, we have supplied the regulations about tuition that were missing, so also let us now do in the case of gymnastics. Shall we not say that both girls and boys must learn both dancing and gymnastics?

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: Then for their practices it would be most proper that boys should have dancing-masters, and girls mistresses.

Clinias: I grant it.

Athenian: Let us once more summon the man who will have most of these duties to perform, [813c] the Director of the Children, — who, in supervising both music and gymnastic, will have but little time to spare.

Clinias: How will he be able, at his age, to supervise so many affairs?

Athenian: Quite easily. For the law has granted him, and will continue to grant him, such men or women as he wishes to take to assist him in this task of supervision: he will know himself the right persons |87| to choose, and he will be anxious [813d] to make no blunder in these matters, recognizing the greatness of his office and wisely holding it in high respect, and holding also the rational conviction that, when the young have been, and are being, well brought up, all goes ‘swimmingly,’ but otherwise — the consequences are such as it is wrong to speak of, nor will we mention them, in dealing with a new State, out of consideration for the over-superstitious. 44 Concerning these matters also, which relate to dancing and gymnastic movements, we have already spoken at length. 45 We are establishing gymnasia and all physical exercises connected with military training, — the use of the bow and all kinds of missiles, light skirmishing and heavy-armed fighting of every description, [813e] tactical evolutions, company-marching, camp-formations, and all the details of cavalry training. In all these subjects there should be public instructors, paid by the State; and their pupils should be not only the boys and men in the State, but also the girls and women who understand all these matters — being practised in all military drill and fighting while still girls and, when grown to womanhood, taking part in evolutions and rank-forming and the piling [814a] and shouldering of arms, — and that, if for no other reason, at least for this reason, that, if ever the guards of the children and of the rest of the city should be obliged to leave the city and march out in full force, these women should be able at least to take their place; while if, on the other hand — and this is quite a possible contingency — an invading army of foreigners, fierce and strong, |89| should force a battle round the city itself, [814b] then it would be a sore disgrace to the State if its women were so ill brought up as not even to be willing to do as do the mother-birds, which fight the strongest beasts in defence of their broods, but, instead of facing all risks, even death itself, to run straight to the temples and crowd all the shrines and holy places, and drown mankind in the disgrace of being the most craven of living creatures.

Clinias: By Heaven, Stranger, if ever this took place in a city, it would be a most unseemly thing, [814c] apart from the mischief of it.

Athenian: Shall we, then, lay down this law, — that up to the point stated women must not neglect military training, but all citizens, men and women alike, must pay attention to it?

Clinias: I, for one, agree.

Athenian: As regards wrestling, some points have been explained; 46 but we have not explained what is, in my opinion, the most important point, nor is it easy to express it in words without the help of a practical illustration. [814d] This point, then, we shall decide about 47 when word accompanied by deed can clearly demonstrate this fact, among the others mentioned,— that wrestling of this kind is of all motions by far the most nearly allied to military fighting; and also that it is not the latter that should be learned for the sake of the former, but, on the contrary, it is the former that should be practised for the sake of the latter. 48

Clinias: There, at any rate, you are right.

Athenian: For the present let this suffice as an |91| account of the functions of the wrestling-school. Motion [814e] of the whole body, other than wrestling, has for its main division what may be rightly termed dancing; 49 and we ought to consider it as consisting of two kinds, — the one representing the solemn movement of beautiful bodies, the other the ignoble movement of ugly bodies; and of these again there are two subdivisions. Of the noble kind there is, on the one hand, the motion of fighting, and that of fair bodies and brave souls engaged in violent effort; and, on the other hand, there is the motion of a temperate soul living in a state of prosperity and moderate pleasures; and this latter kind of dancing one will call, in accordance with its nature, ‘pacific.’ The warlike division, [815a] being distinct from the pacific, one may rightly term ‘pyrrhiche’; 50 it represents modes of eluding all kinds of blows and shots by swervings and duckings and side-leaps upward or crouching; and also the opposite kinds of motion, which lead to active postures of offence, when it strives to represent the movements involved in shooting with bows or darts, and blows of every description. In all these cases the action and the tension of the sinews are correct when there is a representation of fair bodies and souls [815b] in which most of the limbs of the body are extended straight: this kind of representation is right, but the opposite kind we pronounce to be wrong. In pacific dancing, the point we must consider in every case is whether the performer in his dances keeps |93| always rightly, or improperly, to the noble kind of dancing, in the way that befits law-abiding men.

So, in the first place, we must draw a line between questionable dancing and dancing that is above question. [815c] All the dancing that is of a Bacchic kind and cultivated by those who indulge in drunken imitations of Pans, Sileni and Satyrs (as they call them), when performing certain rites of expiation and initiation, — all this class of dancing cannot easily be defined either as pacific or as warlike, or as of any one distinct kind. The most correct way of defining it seems to me to be this — [815d] to separate it off both from pacific and from warlike dancing, and to pronounce that this kind of dancing is unfitted for our citizens: and having thus disposed of it and dismissed it, we will now return to the warlike and pacific kinds which do beyond question belong to us.

That of the unwarlike Muse, in which men pay honour to the gods and the children of the gods by dances, will consist, broadly speaking, of all dancing performed under a sense of prosperity: of this we may make two subdivisions — [815e] the one being of a more joyful description, and proper to men who have escaped out of toils and perils into a state of bliss, — and the other connected rather with the preservation and increase of pre-existent blessings, and exhibiting, accordingly, joyousness of a less ardent kind. Under these conditions every man moves his body more violently when his joys are greater, less violently when they are smaller; also, he moves it less violently when he is more |95| sedate and better trained in courage, [816a] but when he is cowardly and untrained in temperance, he indulges in greater and more violent changes of motion; and in general, no one who is using his voice, whether in song or in speech, is able to keep his body wholly at rest. Hence, when the representation of things spoken by means of gestures arose, it produced the whole art of dancing. In all these instances, one man of us moves in tune with his theme, another out of tune. [816b] Many of the names bestowed in ancient times are deserving of notice and of praise for their excellence and descriptiveness: one such is the name given to the dances of men who are in a prosperous state and indulge in pleasures of a moderate kind: how true and how musical was the name so rationally bestowed on those dances by the man (whoever he was) who first called them all ‘Emnieleiai,’ 51 and established two species of fair dances — the warlike, termed ‘pyrrhiche,’ and the pacific, [816c] termed ‘emmeleia’ — bestowing on each its appropriate and harmonious name. These dances the lawgiver should describe in outline, and the Law-warden should search them out and, having investigated them, he should combine the dancing with the rest of the music, and assign what is proper of it to each of the sacrificial feasts, distributing it over all the feasts; and when he has thus consecrated all these things in due order, he should thenceforth make no change in all that appertains to either dancing or singing, but this [816d] one and the same city and body of citizens should continue in one and the same way, enjoying the same pleasures and living alike in all ways possible, and so pass their lives happily and well. |97|

What concerns the actions of fair and noble souls in the matter of that kind of choristry which we have approved as right has now been fully discussed. The actions of ugly bodies and ugly ideas and of the men engaged in ludicrous comic-actings in regard to both speech and dance, and the representations given by all these comedians — all this subject we must necessarily consider and estimate. For it is impossible to learn the serious without the comic, [816e] or any one of a pair of contraries without the other, if one is to be a wise man: but to put both into practice is equally impossible, if one is to share in even a small measure of virtue; in fact, it is precisely for this reason that one should learn them, — in order to avoid ever doing or saying anything ludicrous, through ignorance, when one ought not; we will impose such mimicry on slaves and foreign hirelings, and no serious attention shall ever be paid to it, nor shall any free man or free woman be seen learning it, and there must always be some novel feature in their mimic shows. 52 Let such, then, be the regulations for all those laughable amusements which we all call ‘comedy,’ [817a] as laid down both by law and by argument. Now as to what are called our ‘serious’ poets, the tragedians, — suppose that some of them were to approach us and put some such question as this, — ‘O Strangers, are we, or are we not, to pay visits to your city and country, and traffic in poetry? Or what have you decided to do about this?’ What would be the right answer to make to these |99| inspired persons regarding the matter? In my judgment, this should be the answer, 53 — ‘Most excellent of Strangers, [817b] we ourselves, to the best of our ability, are the authors of a tragedy at once superlatively fair and good; at least, all our polity is framed as a representation of the fairest and best life, which is in reality, as we assert, the truest tragedy. Thus we are composers of the same things as yourselves, rivals of yours as artists and actors of the fairest drama, which, as our hope is, true law, and it alone, is by nature competent to complete. [817c] Do not imagine, then, that we will ever thus lightly allow you to set up your stage beside us in the market-place, and give permission to those imported actors of yours, with their dulcet tones and their voices louder than ours, to harangue women and children and the whole populace, and to say not the same things as we say about the same institutions, but, on the contrary, things that are, for the most part, just the opposite. In truth, both we ourselves and the whole State [817d] would be absolutely mad, were it to allow you to do as I have said, before the magistrates had decided whether or not your compositions are deserving of utterance and suited for publication. So now, ye children and offspring of Muses mild, do ye first display your chants side by side with ours before the rulers; and if your utterances seem to be the same as ours or better, then we will grant you a chorus, 54 but if not, my friends, we can never do so.’ [817e] Let such, then, be the customs ordained to go with the laws regarding all choristry and the learning |101 thereof — keeping distinct those for slaves and those for masters, — if you agree.

Clinias: Of course we now agree to it.

Athenian: There still remain, for the freeborn, three branches of learning: of these the first is reckoning and arithmetic; the second is the art of measuring length and surface and solid; the third deals with the course of the stars, and how they naturally travel in relation to one another. [818a] All these sciences should not be studied with minute accuracy by the majority of pupils, but only by a select few — and who these are we shall say when we have come near the end, — since that will be the proper place: 55 but for the bulk of the pupils, while it would be shameful for most of them not to understand all those parts of them that are most truly termed ‘necessary,’ yet it is not easy nor even at all possible for every student to go into them minutely. The necessary part of them it is impossible to reject, and probably this is what was in the mind [818b] of the original author of the proverb, 56 ‘Not even God will ever be seen fighting against Necessity,’ — meaning by this, I suppose, all kinds of necessity that are divine, since in relation to human necessities (to which most people apply the saying when they quote it) it is of all sayings far and away the most fatuous.

Clinias: What necessities then. Stranger, belong to these sciences, that are not of this sort, but divine?

Athenian: Those, as I believe, which must be practised and [818c] learned by every god, daemon, and hero, if he is to be competent seriously to supervise mankind:|103| a man certainly would be far from becoming godlike if he were incapable of learning the nature of one and of two, and of even and odd numbers in general, and if he knew nothing at all about counting, and could not count even day and night as distinct objects, and if he were ignorant of the circuit of the sun and moon and all the other stars. [818d] To suppose, then, that all these studies 57 are not ‘necessary’ for a man who means to understand almost any single one of the fairest sciences, is a most foolish supposition. The first thing we must grasp correctly is this — which of these branches of study must be learnt, and how many, and at what periods, and which of them in conjunction with which, and which by themselves apart from all others, and the method of combining them; this done, and with these studies as introductory, we may proceed to the learning of the rest. For such is the natural [818e] order of procedure as determined by Necessity, against whom, as we declare, no god fights now, nor ever will fight.

Clinias: Yes, Stranger, this account of yours does seem to be in accord with nature, and true.

Athenian: That is indeed the truth of the matter, Clinias; but to give legal enactment to this programme of ours is difficult. We will, if you agree, enact this more precisely on a later occasion.

Clinias: You appear to us, Stranger, to be scared by the neglect of such studies which is the habit in our countries; but you are wrong to be scared. Do not be deterred on that account, but try to proceed with your statement. [819a]

Athenian: I am indeed scared about the habit you mention, but I am still more alarmed about the |105| people who take up these very sciences for study, and do so badly. 58 Complete and absolute ignorance of them is never alarming, nor is it a very great evil; much more mischievous is a wide variety of knowledge and learning combined with bad training.

Clinias: That is true.

Athenian: One ought to declare, then, that the free- born children should learn as much of these subjects as the innumerable crowd of children in Egypt 59 learn along with their letters. [819b] First, as regards counting, lessons have been invented for the merest infants to learn, by way of play and fun, — modes of dividing up apples and chaplets, so that the same totals are adjusted to larger and smaller groups, and modes of sorting out boxers and wrestlers, in byes and pairs, taking them alternately or consecutively, in their natural order. Moreover, by way of play, the teachers mix together bowls made of gold, bronze, [819c] silver and the like, and others distribute them, as I said, by groups of a single kind, adapting the rules of elementary arithmetic to play; and thus they are of service to the pupils for their future tasks of drilling, leading and marching armies, or of household management, and they render them both more helpful in every way to themselves and more alert. [819d] The next step of the teachers is to clear away, by lessons in weights and measures, a certain kind of ignorance, both absurd and disgraceful, |107| which is naturally inherent in all men touching lines, surfaces and solids.

Clinias: What ignorance do you mean, and of what kind is it?

Athenian: My dear Clinias, when I was told quite lately of our condition in regard to this matter, I was utterly astounded myself: it seemed to me to be the condition of guzzling swine rather than of human beings, and I was ashamed, not only of myself, but of all the Greek world. 60 [819e]

Clinias: Why? Tell us what you mean, Stranger.

Athenian: I am doing so. But I can explain it better by putting a question. Answer me briefly: you know what a line is?

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: And surface?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: And do you know that these are two things, and that the third thing, next to these, is the solid?

Clinias: I do.

Athenian: Do you not, then, believe that all these are commensurable one with another?

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: And you believe, I suppose, that line is really commensurable with line, surface with surface, [820a] and solid with solid?

Clinias: Absolutely.

Athenian: But supposing that some of them are neither absolutely nor moderately commensurable, some being commensurable and some not, whereas you regard them all as commensurable, — what do you think of your mental state with respect to them?

Clinias: Evidently it is a sorry state. |109|

Athenian: Again, as regards the relation of line and surface to solid, or of surface and line to each other — do not all we Greeks imagine that these are somehow commensurable with one another? [820b]

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: But if they cannot be thus measured by any way or means, while, as I said, all we Greeks imagine that they can, are we not right in being ashamed for them all, and saying to them, ‘O most noble Greeks, this is one of those ’necessary’ things which we said 61 it is disgraceful not to know, although there is nothing very grand in knowing such things.’

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: In addition to these there are other matters, closely related to them, [820c] in which we find many errors arising that are nearly akin to the errors mentioned.

Clinias: What are they?

Athenian: Problems concerning the essential nature of the commensurable and the incommensurable. For students who are not to be absolutely worthless it is necessary to examine these and to distinguish the two kinds, and, by proposing such problems one to another, to compete in a game that is worthy of them, — for this is a much more refined pastime than draughts for old men. [820d]

Clinias: No doubt. And, after all, draughts and these studies do not seem to lie so very far apart.

Athenian: I assert, then, Clinias, that these subjects must be learnt by the young; for they are, in truth, neither harmful nor hard, and when learnt by way of play they will do no damage at all to our State, but will do it good. Should anyone disagree, however, we must listen to him. |111|

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: Well then, if this is clearly the case, obviously we shall adopt these subjects; but if it seems clearly to be otherwise, we shall rule them out. [820e]

Clinias: Yes, obviously.

Athenian: Shall we not, then, lay these down as necessary subjects of instruction, so that there may be no gap in our code of laws? Yet we ought to lay them down provisionally — like pledges capable of redemption — apart from the rest of our constitution, in case they fail to satisfy either us who enact them or you for whom they are enacted.

Clinias: Yes, that is the right way to lay them down.

Athenian: Consider next whether or not we approve of the children learning astronomy.

Clinias: Just tell us your opinion.

Athenian: About this there is a very strange fact — indeed, quite intolerable. [821a]

Clinias: What is that?

Athenian: We commonly assert that men ought not to enquire concerning the greatest god and about the universe, nor busy themselves in searching out their causes, since it is actually impious to do so; whereas the right course, in all probability, is exactly the opposite.

Clinias: Explain yourself.

Athenian: My statement sounds paradoxical, and it might be thought to be unbecoming in an old man; but the fact is that, when a man believes that a science is fair and true and beneficial to the State and altogether well-pleasing to God, [821b] he cannot possibly refrain any longer from declaring it. 62 |113|

Clinias: That is reasonable; but what science of this kind shall we find on the subject of stars?

Athenian: At present, my good sirs, nearly all we Greeks say what is false about those mighty deities, the Sun and Moon.

Clinias: What is the falsehood?

Athenian: We assert that they, and some other stars along with them, never travel along the same path; and we call them ‘planets.’ 63 [821c]

Clinias: Yes, by Zeus, Stranger, that is true; for I, during my life, have often noticed how Phosphorus and Hesperus and other stars never travel on the same course, but ‘wander’ all ways; but as to the Sun and Moon, we all know that they are constantly doing this.

Athenian: It is precisely for this reason, Megillus and Clinias, that I now assert that our citizens and our children ought to learn so much concerning all these facts about the gods of Heaven [821d] as to enable them not to blaspheme about them, but always to speak piously both at sacrifices and when they pray reverently at prayers.

Clinias: You are right, provided that, in the first place, it is possible to learn the subject you mention; and provided also that learning will make us correct any mistakes we may be making about them now, — then I, too, agree that a subject of such importance should be learned. This being so, do you make every effort to expound the matter, and we will endeavour to follow you and learn. [821e]

Athenian: Well, the matter I speak of is not an easy |115| one to learn; nor yet is it altogether difficult and demanding very prolonged study. In proof of this — although I was told of it neither in the days of my youth nor long ago, I may be able to explain it to you in a comparatively short time. Whereas, if it had been a difficult subject, I should never have been able to explain it to you at all — I at my age to you at yours.

Clinias: Very true. But what is this science which you describe as marvellous and fitting for the young to learn, and which we are ignorant about? [822a] Do try to tell us thus much, at least, about it, with all possible clearness.

Athenian: I must try. The opinion, my friends, that the Sun and Moon and the rest of the stars ‘wander’ is not correct; the truth is precisely the opposite: each of them always travels in a circle one and the same path, — not many paths, although it appears to move along many paths; and the quickest of the stars is wrongly opined to be the slowest, and vice versa. 64 [822b] If these are the real facts and we imagine otherwise, — well, suppose we held a similar notion about horses racing at Olympia, or about long-distance runners, and proclaimed the quickest to be slowest and the slowest quickest, and sang chants lauding the loser as the winner, why, then, the laudations we bestowed on the runners would be neither right nor acceptable, though they were but mortal men. But in the present case, when we commit the same error [822c] about gods, do we not think that what would have been ludicrous and wrong there and then is, here and now and in dealing with this subject, by no means ludicrous and assuredly |117| not pleasing to the gods, when concerning gods we repeat a tale that is false?

Clinias: Very true, if the facts are as you say.

Athenian: Then, if we demonstrate that they really are so, shall all these subjects be learnt up to the point mentioned, and, failing that demonstration, be left alone? Is that to be our agreement? [822d]

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: We. may now say that our regulations concerning subjects of education have been completed. The subject of hunting, and similar pursuits, must now be dealt with in a similar manner. The duty laid upon the lawgiver probably goes further than the bare task of enacting laws: in addition to laws, there is something else which falls naturally between advice and law — [822e] a thing which has often cropped up in the course of our discussion, 65 as, for example, in connexion with the nurture of young children: such matters, we say, should not be left unregulated, but it would be most foolish to regard those regulations as enacted laws. When, then, the laws and the whole constitution have been thus written down, our praise of the citizen who is pre-eminent for virtue will not be complete when we say that the virtuous man is he who is the best servant of the laws and the most obedient; a more complete statement will be this, — that the virtuous man is he who passes through life consistently obeying the written rules of the lawgiver, as given in his legislation, approbation and disapprobation. 66 [823a] This statement is the |117| most correct way of praising the citizen; and in this way, moreover, the lawgiver must not only write down the laws, but in addition to the laws, and combined with them, he must write down his decisions as to what things are good and what bad; and the perfect citizen must abide by these decisions no less than by the rules enforced by legal penalties.

The subject now before us we may adduce as a witness [823b] to show more clearly what we mean. Hunting is a large and complex matter, all of which is now generally embraced under this single name. Of the hunting of water-animals there are many varieties, and many of the hunting of fowls; and very many varieties also of hunts of land-animals — not of beasts only, but also, mark you, of men, both in war and often, too, in friendship, a kind of hunt that is partly approved and partly disapproved; 67 and then there are robberies and hunts carried on by pirates and by bands. [823c] When the lawgiver is making laws about hunting, he is necessarily bound to make this point clear, and to lay down minatory directions by imposing regulations and penalties for all these kinds. What then ought to be done about these matters? The lawgiver, for his part, will be right in praising or blaming hunting with an eye to the toils and pursuits of the young; and the young man will be right in listening and obeying, and in allowing neither pleasure nor toil to hinder him, and in holding in greater respect the orders that are |121| sanctioned by praise, [823d] and carrying them out, rather than those which are enacted by law under threat of penalties.

After these prefatory observations there will follow adequate praise and blame of hunting — praise of the kind which renders the souls of the young better, and blame of the kind which does the opposite. Our next step will be to address the young people with prayer — ‘O friends, would that you might never be seized with any desire or craving for hunting by sea, or for angling, [823e] or for ever pursuing water-animals with creels that do your lazy hunting for you, whether you sleep or wake. And may no longing for man-hunting by sea and piracy overtake you, and render you cruel and lawless hunters; and may the thought of committing robbery in country or city not so much as cross your minds. Neither may there seize upon any of the young the crafty craving for snaring birds — [824a] no very gentlemanly pursuit! Thus there is left for our athletes only the hunting and capture of land-animals. Of this branch of hunting, the kind called night-stalking, which is the job of lazy men who sleep in turn, is one that deserves no praise; nor does that kind deserve praise in which there are intervals of rest from toil, when men master the wild force of beasts by nets and traps instead of doing so by the victorious might of a toil-loving soul. Accordingly, the only kind left for all, and the best kind, is the hunting of quadrupeds with horses and dogs and the hunter’s own limbs, when men hunt in person, and subdue all the creatures by means of their own running, striking and shooting — all the men, that is to say, who cultivate the courage that is divine.’ |123| Concerning the whole of this subject, the exposition we have now given will serve as the praise and blame; and the law will run thus, — ‘None shall hinder these truly sacred hunters from hunting wheresoever and howsoever they wish; but the night-trapper who trusts to nets and snares no one shall ever allow to hunt anywhere. The fowler no man shall hinder on fallow land or mountain; but he that finds him on tilled fields or on sacred glebes shall drive him off. The fisherman shall be allowed to hunt in all waters except havens and sacred rivers and pools and lakes, but only on condition that he makes no use of muddying juices.’ 68 So now, at last, we may say that all our laws about education are complete.

Clinias: You may rightly say so.

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Laws Book VIII.

[828a]

Athenian: Our next task is, with the help of the Delphic oracles, to arrange and ordain by law the festivals, prescribing what sacrifices, and to what deities, it will be good and right for the State to offer: the times and the number of them, however, it is, no doubt, our own business to ordain by ourselves.

Clinias: Very likely, as regards the number of them.

Athenian: Then let us first state the number. There shall be [828b] not less than 365 feasts, so that some one official may always be doing sacrifice to some god or daemon on behalf of the State, the people, and their property. 69 The interpreters, the priests, the priestesses and the prophets shall assemble, and, in company with the Law-wardens, they shall ordain what the lawgiver is obliged to omit: moreover, these same persons shall determine wherein such omissions consist. For the law will state that there are twelve feasts to the twelve gods who give their names to the several tribes: [828c] to each of these they shall perform monthly sacrifices and assign choirs and musical contests, and also gymnastic contests, as is suitable both to the gods themselves and to the several seasons of the year; and they shall ordain also women’s festivals, prescribing how many of these shall be for women only, and how many open also to men. Further, they must determine, in conformity with the law, the rites proper to the nether gods, |127| and how many of the celestial gods should be invoked, and what of the rites connected with them should not be mingled but kept apart, and put them in the twelfth month, [828d] which is sacred to Pluto; and this god should not be disliked by men who are warriors, but honoured as one who is always most good to the human race; for, as I would assert in all seriousness, union is in no way better for soul and body than dissolution. Moreover, if they are to arrange these matters adequately, these persons must believe that no other State exists which can compare with ours in respect of the degree in which it possesses leisure and control over the necessities of life; 70 and believe also that it, [829a] like an individual, ought to lead a good life. But for a good and blessed life, the first requisite is neither to do wrong oneself nor to suffer wrong from others. Of these, the former is not very hard, but it is very hard to secure immunity from suffering wrong; 71 indeed, it is impossible toga in this perfectly, except by becoming perfectly good. So likewise a State may obtain a life of peace if it becomes good, but if bad, a life of war both abroad and at home. This being so, all men must train for war [829b] not in war-time, but while they are living in peace. 72 Therefore, a judicious State must carry out a march, every month, for not less than one whole day, or more (according as the rulers decree), 73 paying no heed to cold weather or hot: all shall join in it — men, women and children — whenever the rulers decide to march them out |129| en masse, and at other times they shall go in sections. Along with sacrifices, they must continually devise noble games, to serve [829c] as festival-contests, modelled as closely as possible on those of war. At each of these they must distribute prizes and awards of merit, and compose for one another speeches of praise and blame, according to the character each one exhibits not only in the contests, but in his life generally, magnifying him who is accounted most good and blaming him who is not. Such speeches not everyone shall compose; for, first, no one who is under fifty years old shall compose one, and further, no one shall do so who, though he may be fully proficient in poetry and music, has not as yet performed any noble [829d] or notable deed. But, even though they be not musical, those poems shall be sung which are composed by men 74 who are personally good and honoured in the State as performers of noble deeds. The adjudication of these shall lie with the Educator and the rest of the Law-wardens, who shall grant them the sole privilege of free speech in song; whereas to the others no permission shall be given; nor yet shall anyone venture to sing an unauthorised song — [829e] not even should it be sweeter than the hymns of Orpheus or of Thamyras, — but only such sacred poems as have won the judges’ approval and have been presented to the gods, or those by good men which have been adjudged to have duly distributed praise or blame.

In regard both to military operations and to freedom of poetic speech I state that the same rules shall apply equally to both men and women. The lawgiver ought to commune with himself and |131| reason thus — ‘Come now, what men am I to rear up, [830a] when I have made ready the whole State? Are they not to be competitors in the greatest of contests, wherein their antagonists will be numberless?’ ‘Most certainly,’ one would rightly reply. What then? Suppose we had been rearing boxers or pancratiasts or competitors in any similar branch of athletics, should we have gone straight into the contest without previously engaging in daily combat with someone? If we were boxers, for a great many days before the contest we should have been learning how to fight, [830b] and working hard, practising in mimicry all those methods we meant to employ on the day we should be fighting for victory, and imitating the real thing as nearly as possible: thus, we should don padded gloves instead of proper ring-gloves, so as to get the best possible practice in giving blows and dodging them; and if we chanced to be very short of training-mates, do you suppose that we should be deterred by fear of the laughter of fools from hanging up a lifeless dummy and practising on it? Indeed, if ever we were in a desert, and without either live or lifeless [830c] training-mates, would we not have recourse to shadow-fighting of the most literal kind, against ourselves? Or what else should one call the practice of pugilistic posturing?

Clinias: There is no other name for it, Stranger, than the one you have just given to it.

Athenian: What then? Is the fighting force of our State to venture to come forward every time to fight for their lives, their children, their goods, and for the whole State, after a less thorough preparation than the competitors we have been describing? [830d] And so is their lawgiver, through fear lest these training-bouts |133| may appear ridiculous to some, to refrain from laying down laws whereby he will ordain field-operations, of which the minor kind, without heavy arms, will take place daily, if possible, — and to this end both the choristry and all the gymnastic shall be directed, — while the others, as a major kind of gymnastics in full armour, he shall order to be held at least once a month? [830e] In this latter kind they will engage in contests with one another throughout the whole country, contending in the capturing of forts and in ambuscades and in all forms of mimic warfare; in fact, they shall do literal fighting with balls 75 and darts as nearly real as possible, — though the points of the darts shall be made less dangerous, — in order that their games of combat may not be devoid of some element of alarm, but may provide terrors and indicate to some extent who is stout-hearted [831a] and who not: to the former the lawgiver shall duly assign honours, to the latter degradation, that thus he may prepare the whole State to be serviceable throughout life in the real contest. Moreover, if a man gets killed in these sham fights, inasmuch as the murder is involuntary, he shall pronounce the slayer to be pure of hands, when he has been legally purified; for he will reflect that, when a few men die, others equally good will grow up in their place, whereas, once fear is, so to speak, dead, he will be unable to find a test to distinguish, in all such cases, the good from the bad, — [831b] and that is a far greater evil than the other for a State.

Clinias: We, at least. Stranger, would certainly agree that every State should both ordain and practise these things.

Athenian: Are we all aware of the reason why such |135| choristry and such contests do not at present exist anywhere in the States, except to a very small extent? Shall we say that this is due to the ignorance of the populace and of those who legislate for them?

Clinias: Possibly.

Athenian: Not so, by any means, my ingenious Clinias! What we ought to say [831c] is that there are two causes, and both most weighty ones.

Clinias: What are they?

Athenian: The first springs from a lust for wealth which allows a man no leisure time for attention to anything else save his own private property; and when the soul of every citizen hangs upon this, it is incapable of attending to matters other than daily gain. Whatsoever science or pursuit leads to this, every man individually is most ready to learn and to practise; but all else he laughs to scorn. [831d] This we must assert to be one particular cause why a State is unwilling to be in earnest about this, or any other, fine and noble pursuit; and why, on the other hand, every individual, because of his greed for silver and gold, is willing to toil at every art and device, noble or ignoble, if he is likely to get rich by it, — willing, too, to perform actions both holy and unholy — nay, utterly shameful — without a scruple, [831e] provided only that he is able to sate himself to repletion, like a beast, with all manner of foods and drinks and wenchings.

Clinias: True.

Athenian: Then let this which I describe be laid down as one cause which hinders the States from adequately practising either military operations or any other |137| noble pursuits and which turns men who are of a quiet nature 76 into traders, ship-owners, and servants, while of the bold it makes pirates, burglars, temple-robbers, fighters [832a] and despots, — and that though, in some cases, they are not ill-natured, but merely ill-fortuned.

Clinias: How so?

Athenian: Well, how could I describe otherwise than as utterly unfortunate men who are compelled to go through life with hunger 77 always in their own souls?

Clinias: This, then, is one cause: what is the second cause you speak of, Stranger?

Athenian: You are right in reminding me.

Clinias: One cause, as you assert, is this lifelong insatiable pursuit, which wholly engrosses each man, and hinders each and all from rightly practising military operations. [832b] Be it so: now tell us the second cause.

Athenian: Do you think that I am delaying to do so because I am at a loss?

Clinias: No; but we think that, owing to a sort of hatred against the character you describe, you are castigating it more severely than is required by the argument now on hand.

Athenian: Your rebuke is just. Strangers; you want, it seems, to hear what comes next.

Clinias: Only say on.

Athenian: There lies a cause, as I affirm, in those non-polities which I have often mentioned 78 in our previous discourse, — namely, democracy, [832c] oligarchy, and tyranny. For none of these is a polity, but the |139| truest name for them all would be ‘faction-State’; for none of them is a form of voluntary rule over willing subjects, but a voluntary rule over unwilling subjects accompanied always by some kind of force; and the ruler, through fear of the subject, will never voluntarily allow him to become noble or wealthy or strong or brave or in any way warlike. These, then, are the two main causes of nearly everything, and certainly of the conditions we described. [832d] The polity, however, for which we are now legislating has escaped both these causes; for not only does it enjoy a great amount of leisure, 79 but the citizens also are free from one another’s domination, and as a consequence of these laws of ours they will be the least likely of men to be money-lovers. Hence it is both natural and logical that of all existing polities this type alone should welcome the system above described, which combines military schooling with sport, when we have rightly completed that description.

Clinias: Very good.

Athenian: The next step, then, is to remind ourselves, [832e] with regard to all gymnastic contests, that all such as afford training for war should be instituted, and should have prizes assigned to them, but all that do not do so must be set aside. What these contests consist in, it will be well to have described and ordained at the beginning. First, then, should we not ordain contests in running and speed in general?

Clinias: We should.

Athenian: Most important of all things for war is, no doubt, general activity of the body of hands as well as feet — activity of foot for flight and pursuit, [833a] and of |141| hand for the stand-up fighting at close quarters which calls for sturdiness and strength.

Clinias: No doubt.

Athenian: Yet, surely, neither of these is of the greatest service when it lacks weapons.

Clinias: Certainly not.

Athenian: So at our contests the herald (as is now the practice) shall summon first the short-distance runner: he shall enter fully armed; and for an unarmed competitor we shall offer no prize. First, then, there shall enter the man who, with his arms, is to run the furlong, — second, the runner of the quarter-mile, — [833b] third, the half-miler, — fourth, the runner of the three-quarters, — and fifth, that runner whom we shall despatch first, fully armed, to run a distance of four miles to a temple of Ares and back; he shall be in heavier armour, and be called a hoplite, and he shall run over a smooth course, while his antagonist 80 shall be dressed in the full equipment of an archer, and shall run a course of twelve miles over hills and varied country to a temple of Apollo and Artemis. And having thus set up the contests, we shall await the return of these runners, and to the winner of each race we shall award the prize.

Clinias: Very right.

Athenian: Let us plan these contests in three divisions — one for children, one for youths, and one for men. We shall ordain that the course for the youths’ races shall be two-thirds of the full course, and that for children one-half, when they compete either as archers or as hoplites. In the case of females, we shall |143| ordain races of a furlong, a quarter-mile, a half-mile, and a three-quarters [833c] for girls under the age of puberty, who shall be stripped, and shall race on the course itself; and girls over thirteen shall continue to take part until married, 81 up to the age of twenty at most, or at least eighteen; but these, when they come forward and compete in these races, must be clad in decent apparel.

Let such, then, be the rules concerning races for men and women. As to trials of strength, instead of wrestling and the other ‘strong-man’ events now in vogue, we shall ordain fencing in armour, [833e] both in solo-contests and in team-competitions of anything from two to ten a side. As regards the hits which a winner is to make or avoid, and how many points he must score, — just as now in the case of wrestling, those who deal with this art have fixed by law the points of good wrestling and bad, so likewise we must summon the experts in fencing under arms, and bid them help us to draw up laws by which to decide the proper winner in such fights, [834a] what he must do and what he must avoid, — and similarly the rules for determining the loser. For females also, up to the age of marriage, the same laws shall be laid down. And in the place of the pancratium we must establish a general tourney for peltasts, who shall compete with bows, targes, javelins, and stones flung either by hand or by sling: and for these, too, we shall prescribe laws for assigning the rewards and prizes to the man who best conforms to the rules governing such contests. After these, the next thing to ordain [834b] will be |145| horse-racing. Here, in a country like Crete, there is not much need of horses — not in great numbers, — so that inevitably less attention is paid either to the rearing or the racing of horses. As to chariots, we have no one who keeps them, nor is anyone here likely to cherish any great ambition respecting them, so that to establish contests for them would run counter to native custom, and would not only seem, but be, a foolish act. If, however, we establish prizes for races of riding-horses — [834c] both for young colts, and for three-year-olds, and for those of full age — we shall be adapting the sport of horse-racing to the character of the country. Of these horsemen there shall be established by law a competitive contest, and the phylarchs and hipparchs shall act as public judges both of all the races and of the armed competitors. For unarmed competitors we should be wrong in establishing prizes, either here or in the gymnastic sports. [834d] And for a Cretan there is credit in being a mounted archer or javelin-man, so we shall have contests and matches of a sportive kind between these also. As to women, — it is not worth while to make compulsory laws and rules about their taking part in such sports; but if, as a result of earlier training which has grown into a habit, their nature allows, and docs not forbid, girls or maidens to take part, let them do so without blame.

So now at length we have reached the end both of competition and instruction in gymnastic, so far as concerns our education [834e] by means of contests and of daily teaching. Most of our account of music has likewise been completed; the regulations about |147| rhapsodes, however, and their retinue, and the choral contests which must accompany festivals are matters to be arranged after the gods and demigods have had their months, days and years assigned to them; then it will be seen whether they should be biennial fixtures or quadrennial, [835a] or what mode and manner of arranging them the gods may suggest. Then also, one expects, the musical contests will be held in sections, as arranged by the Masters of the Games and the Educator of the youth and the Law-wardens, meeting for this special purpose and acting in person as legislators to determine what persons, and when and with whom, are to frame the contests for all the choruses and choristry. Of what character each of these ought to be in respect of words, songs and tunes, blended with rhythm and dance, [835b] has frequently been stated 82 by the original law-giver; the secondary lawgivers should follow him in their enactments, and they should arrange the contests at convenient times to suit the several sacrifices, and thus appoint festivals for the State to observe.

Now as to these and the like matters, it is by no means hard to perceive how they should be given legal regulation, nor indeed would a shifting of their positions cause much [835c]gain or loss to the State. But the things which do make no small difference, and of which it is hard to persuade men — these form a task especially for God (were it possible that orders should come from him): as it is, they are likely to require a bold man who, valuing candour above all else, will declare what he deems best for city and citizens, and in the midst of corrupted souls will enjoin what is fitting and |149| in keeping with all the constitution, and gainsay the mightiest lusts, acting alone by himself with no man to help him save, as his solitary leader, Reason. [835d]

Clinias: What is it we are reasoning about now, Stranger? For we are still in the dark.

Athenian: Naturally: but I will try to explain myself more clearly. When in my discourse I came to the subject of education, 83 I saw young men and maidens consorting with one another affectionately; and, naturally, a feeling of alarm came upon me, as I asked myself how one is to manage a State like this in which young men and maidens are well-nourished but exempt from those severe and menial labours which are the surest means of quenching wantonness, [835e] and where the chief occupation of everyone all through life consists in sacrifices, feasts and dances. In a State such as this, how will the young abstain from those desires which frequently plunge many into ruin, — all those desires from which reason, in its endeavour to be law, 84 enjoins abstinence? That the laws previously ordained serve to repress the majority of desires is not surprising; [836a] thus, for example, the proscription of excessive wealth is of no small benefit for promoting temperance, and the whole of our education-system contains laws useful for the same purpose; in addition to this, there is the watchful eye of the magistrates, trained to fix its gaze always on this point and to keep constant watch on the young people. These means, then, are sufficient (so far as any human means suffice) to deal with the other desires. But when we come to the amorous passions of children of both sexes and of men for women and |151| women for men, — [836b] passions which have been the cause of countless woes both to individuals and to whole States, — how is one to guard against these, or what remedy can one apply so as to find a way of escape in all such cases from a danger such as this? It is extremely difficult, Clinias. For whereas, in regard to other matters not a few, Crete generally and Lacedaemon furnish us (and rightly) with no little assistance in the framing of laws which differ from those in common use, — in regard to the passions of sex (for we are alone by ourselves) [836c] they contradict us absolutely. If we were to follow in nature’s steps and enact that law which held good before the days of Laius, 85 declaring that it is right to refrain from indulging in the same kind of intercourse with men and boys 86 as with women, and adducing as evidence thereof the nature of wild beasts, and pointing out how male does not touch male for this purpose, since it is unnatural, — in all this we would probably be using an argument neither convincing nor in any way consonant with your States. Moreover, that object which, as we affirm, the lawgiver ought always to have in view [836d] does not agree with these practices. For the enquiry we always make is this — which of the proposed laws tends toward virtue and which not. Come then, suppose we grant that this practice is now legalised, and that it is noble and in no way ignoble, how far would it promote virtue? Will it engender in the soul of him who is seduced a courageous character, or in the soul of the seducer the quality of temperance? Nobody would ever believe this; on the contrary, as all men |153| will blame the cowardice [836e] of the man who always yields to pleasures and is never able to hold out against them, will they not likewise reproach that man who plays the woman’s part with the resemblance he bears to his model? Is there any man, then, who will ordain by law a practice like that? Not one, I should say, if he has a notion of what true law is. What then do we declare to be the truth about this matter? It is necessary to discern the real nature of friendship [837a] and desire and love (so-called), if we are to determine them rightly; for what causes the utmost confusion and obscurity is the fact that this single term embraces these two things, and also a third kind compounded of them both.

Clinias: How so?

Athenian: Friendship is the name we give to the affection of like for like, in point of goodness, and of equal for equal; and also to that of the needy for the rich, which is of the opposite kind; and when either of these feelings is intense we call it ‘love.’ [837b]

Clinias: True.

Athenian: The friendship which occurs between opposites is terrible and fierce and seldom reciprocal amongst men, while that based on similarity is gentle and reciprocal throughout life. The kind which arises from a blend of these presents difficulties, — first, to discover what the man affected by this third kind of love really desires to obtain, and, in the next place, because the man himself is at a loss, being dragged in opposite directions by the two tendencies, — of which the one bids him to enjoy the bloom of his beloved, while the other forbids him. For he that is in love with the body |155| [837c] and hungering after its bloom, 87 as it were that of a ripening peach, urges himself on to take his fill of it, paying no respect to the disposition of the beloved; whereas he that counts bodily desire as but secondary, and puts longing looks in place of love, 88 with soul lusting really for soul, regards the bodily satisfaction of the body as an outrage, and, reverently worshipping temperance, courage, nobility and wisdom, will desire to live always chastely in company with [837d] thethe chaste object of his love. But the love which is blended of these two kinds is that which we have described just now as third. Since, then, love has so many varieties, ought the law to prohibit them all and prevent them from existing in our midst, or shall we not plainly wish that the kind of love which belongs to virtue and desires the young to be as good as possible should exist within our State, while we shall prohibit, if possible, the other two kinds? Or what is our view, my dear Megillus?

Clinias: Your description of the subject, [837e] Stranger, is perfectly correct.

Athenian: It seems that, as I expected, I have gained your assent; so there is no need for me to investigate your law, and its attitude towards such matters, but simply to accept your agreement to my statement. Later on I will try to charm Clinias also into agreeing with me on this subject. So let your joint admission stand at that, and let us by all means proceed with our laws.

Clinias: Quite right. |157|

Athenian: I know of a device at present for enacting this law, [838a] which is in one way easy, but in another quite the hardest possible.

Clinias: Explain your meaning.

Athenian: Even at present, as we are aware, most men, however lawless they are, are effectively and strictly precluded from sexual commerce with beautiful persons, — and that not against their will, but with their own most willing consent.

Clinias: On what occasions do you mean?

Athenian: Whenever any man has a brother or sister who is beautiful. So too in the case of a son or daughter, the same unwritten law [838b] is most effective in guarding men from sleeping with them, either openly or secretly, or wishing to have any connexion with them, — nay, most men never so much as feel any desire for such connexion.

Clinias: That is true.

Athenian: Is it not, then, by a brief sentence that all such pleasures are quenched?

Clinias: What sentence do you mean?

Athenian: The sentence that these acts are by no means holy, [838c] but hated of God and most shamefully shameful. And does not the reason lie in this, that nobody speaks of them otherwise, but every one of us, from the day of his birth, hears this opinion expressed always and everywhere, not only in comic speech, but often also in serious tragedy — as when there is brought on to the stage a Thyestes or an Oedipus, or a Macareus having secret intercourse with a sister, and all these are seen inflicting death upon themselves willingly as a punishment for their sins? |159|

Clinias: Thus much at least you are quite right in saying — that public opinion [838d] has a surprising influence, when there is no attempt by anybody ever to breathe a word that contradicts the law.

Athenian: Then is it not true, as I said just now, that when a lawgiver wishes to subdue one of those lusts which especially subdue men, it is easy for him at least to learn the method of mastering them, — that it is by consecrating this public opinion in the eyes of all alike — bond and free, women and children, and the whole State — that he will effect the firmest security [838e] for this law.

Clinias: Certainly; but how it will ever be possible for him to bring it about that all are willing to say such a thing —

Athenian: A very proper observation. That was precisely the reason why I stated that in reference to this law I know of a device for making a natural use of reproductive intercourse, — on the one hand, by abstaining from the male and not slaying of set purpose the human stock, [839a] nor sowing seed on rocks and stones where it can never take root and have fruitful increase: and, on the other hand, by abstaining from every female field in which you would not desire the seed to spring up. This law, when it has become permanent and prevails — if it has rightly become dominant in other cases, just as it prevails now regarding intercourse with parents, — is the cause of countless blessings. For, in the first place, it follows the dictates of nature, and it serves to keep men from sexual rage and frenzy and all kinds of fornication, and from all excess in meats |161| and drinks, [839b] and it ensures in husbands fondness for their own wives: other blessings also would ensue, in infinite number, if one could make sure of this law. Possibly, however, some young bystander, rash and of superabundant virility, on hearing of the passing of this law, would denounce us for making foolish and impossible rules, and fill all the place with his outcries; and it was in view of this that I made the statement 89 [839c] that I knew of a device to secure the permanence of this law when passed which is at once the easiest of all devices and the hardest. For while it is very easy to perceive that this is possible, and how it is possible — since we affirm that this rule, when duly consecrated, will dominate all souls, and cause them to dread the laws enacted and yield them entire obedience, — yet it has now come to this, that men think that, even so, it is unlikely to come about, — just in the same way as, in the case of the institution of public meals, people refuse to believe that it is possible [839d] for the whole State to be able to continue this practice constantly; and that, too, in spite of the evidence of facts and the existence of the practice in your countries; and even there, as applied to women, the practice is regarded as non-natural. Thus it was that, because of the strength of this unbelief, I said that it is most difficult to get both these, matters permanently legalised.

Clinias: And you were right in that.

Athenian: Still, to show that it is not beyond the power of man, but possible, would you like me to try to state an argument which is not without some plausibility?

Clinias: Certainly. |163| [839e]

Athenian: Would a man be more ready to abstain from sex-indulgence, and to consent to carry out the law on this matter soberly, if he had his body not ill-trained, but in good condition, than if he had it in bad condition?

Clinias: He would be much more ready if it were not ill-trained.

Athenian: Do we not know by report about Iccus 90 of Tarentum, because of his contests at Olympia and elsewhere, — [840a] how, spurred on by ambition and skill, and possessing courage combined with temperance in his soul, during all the period of his training (as the story goes) he never touched a woman, nor yet a boy? And the same story is told about Crison and Astylus and Diopompus and very many others. And yet, Clinias, these men were not only much worse educated in soul than your citizens and mine, [840b] but they also possessed much more sexual vigour of body.

Clinias: That this really happened in the case of these athletes is indeed, as you say, confidently affirmed by the ancients.

Athenian: Well then, if those men had the fortitude to abstain from that which most men count bliss for the sake of victory in wrestling, running, and the like, shall our boys be unable to hold out in order to win a much nobler victory — that which is the noblest of all victories, as we shall tell them from their childhood’s days, charming them into belief, we hope, by tales [840c] and sentences and songs.

Clinias: What victory?

Athenian: Victory over pleasures, — which if they win, |165| they will live a life of bliss, but if they lose, the very opposite. Furthermore, will not the dread that this is a thing utterly unholy give them power to master those impulses which men inferior to themselves have mastered?

Clinias: It is certainly reasonable to suppose so.

Athenian: Now that we have reached this point in regard to our regulation, [840d] but have fallen into a strait because of the cowardice of the many, I maintain that our regulation on this head must go forward and proclaim that our citizens must not be worse than fowls and many other animals which are produced in large broods, and which live chaste and celibate lives without sexual intercourse until they arrive at the age for breeding; and when they reach this age they pair off, as instinct moves them, male with female and female with male; and thereafter [840e] they live in a way that is holy and just, remaining constant to their first contracts of love: surely our citizens should at least be better than these animals. If, however, they become corrupted by most of the other Hellenes or barbarians, through seeing and hearing that among them the ‘lawless Love’ (as it is called) is of very great power, and thus become unable to overcome it, then the Law-wardens, acting as lawgivers, must devise for them a second law. [841a]

Clinias: What law do you recommend them to make if that which is now proposed slips out of their grasp?

Athenian: Evidently that law which comes next to it as second.

Clinias: What is that?

Athenian: One ought to put the force of pleasures as |167| far as possible out of gear, by diverting its increase and nutriment to another part of the body by means of exercise. This would come about if indulgence in sexual intercourse were devoid of shamelessness; for if, owing to shame, people indulged in it but seldom, [841b] in consequence of this rare indulgence they would find it a less tyrannical mistress. Let them, therefore, regard privacy in such actions as honourable — sanctioned both by custom and by unwritten law; and want of privacy — yet not the entire avoidance of such actions — as dishonourable. Thus we shall have a second standard of what is honourable and shameful established by law and possessing a second degree of rectitude; and those people of depraved character, whom we describe as ‘self-inferior,’ 91 and who form a single kind, shall be hemmed in [841c] by three kinds of force and compelled to refrain from law-breaking.

Clinias: What kinds?

Athenian: That of godly fear, and that of love of honour, and that which is desirous of fair forms of soul; not fair bodies. The things I now mention are, perhaps, like the visionary ideals in a story; yet in very truth, if only they were realized, they would prove a great blessing in every State. Possibly, should God so grant, [841d] we might forcibly effect one of two things in this matter of sex-relations, — either that no one should venture to touch any of the noble and freeborn save his own wedded wife, nor sow any unholy and bastard seed in fornication, nor any unnatural and barren seed in sodomy, — or else we should entirely abolish love for males, and in regard to that for women, if we enact a law that any man who has intercourse with any women save those who have been brought to his house [841e] under the sanction |169| of Heaven and holy marriage, whether purchased or otherwise acquired, if detected in such intercourse by any man or woman, shall be disqualified from any civic commendation, as being really an alien, — probably such a law would be approved as right. So let this law — whether we ought to call it one law or two — be laid down concerning sexual commerce and love affairs in general, as regards right and wrong conduct [842a] in our mutual intercourse due to these desires.

Clinias: For my own part, Stranger, I should warmly welcome this law; but Clinias must tell us himself what his view is on the matter.

Clinias: I shall do so, Megillus, when I deem the occasion suitable; but for the present let us allow the Stranger to proceed still further with his laws.

Clinias: You are right. [842b]

Athenian: Well, now we have arrived at this point in our progress, that common meals have been established — a thing which elsewhere, as we say, would be difficult, but in Crete no one would question its correctness. As concerns the manner of them, — whether we should adopt the Cretan fashion, or the Lacedaemonian, or whether we can find a third fashion that is better than either, — this does not seem to me a difficult problem to decide, nor indeed would its decision prove of much benefit, since these meals are now [842c] actually established in a satisfactory way.

Next to this comes the question of organising the food-supply, and how to make this fit in with the meals. In other States this supply would include all kinds of food and come from many sources, certainly from twice as many sources as it will in |171| our State; for most of the Greeks arrange for their food to be derived from both land and sea, but our people will derive it only from the land. This makes the lawgiver’s task easier; [842d] for in this case half the number of laws, or less, will suffice, and the laws, too, will be better fitted for free men. For the lawgiver of our State is rid, for the most part, of shipping and merchandise and peddling and inn-keeping and customs and mines and loans and usury, and countless matters of a like kind; he can say goodbye to all such, and legislate for farmers and shepherds and bee-keepers, and concerning the preservation and supervision of the instruments employed in these occupations. This he will do, now that he has already enacted the most important laws, [842e] which deal with marriage, and with the birth and nurture and education of the children, and with the appointment of magistrates in the State. For the present he must turn, in his legislating, to the subject of food and of those whose labours contribute to its supply.

First, then, let there be a code of laws termed ‘agricultural.’ The first law — that of Zeus the Boundary-god — shall be stated thus: No man shall move boundary-marks of land, whether they be those of a neighbour who is a native citizen or those of a foreigner [843a] (in case he holds adjoining land on a frontier), realising that to do this is truly to be guilty of ‘moving the sacrosanct’: 92 sooner let a man try to move the largest rock which is not a boundary-mark than a small stone which forms a boundary, sanctioned by Heaven, between friendly |173| and hostile ground. For of the one kind Zeus the Clansmen’s god is witness, of the other Zeus the Strangers’ god; which gods, when aroused, bring wars most deadly. He that obeys the law shall not suffer the evils which it inflicts: but whoso despises it shall be liable to a double penalty, the first from the hand of Heaven, the second from the law. No one shall [843b] voluntarily move the boundary-marks of the land of neighbours: if any man shall move them, whosoever wishes shall report him to the land-holders, and they shall bring him to the law court. And if a man be convicted, — since by such an act the convicted man is secretly and violently merging lands in one, — the court shall estimate what the loser must suffer or pay.

Further, many small wrongs are done against neighbours which, owing to their frequent repetition, engender an immense amount of enmity, and make of neighbourhood a grievous and bitter thing. [843c] Wherefore every neighbour must guard most carefully against doing any unfriendly act to his neighbour, and must above all things take special care always not to encroach in the least degree on his land; for whereas it is an easy thing and open to anyone to do an injury, to do a benefit is by no means open to everyone. Whosoever encroaches on his neighbour’s ground, overstepping the boundaries, shall pay for the damage; and by way of cure for his shamelessness [843d] and incivility, he shall also pay out to the injured party twice the cost of the damage. In all such matters the land-stewards shall act as inspectors, judges and valuers, — the whole staff of the district, as we have said above, 93 in respect of the more important cases, and, in respect of the |175| less important, those of them who are ‘phrourarchs.’ If anyone encroaches on pasture-land, these officials shall inspect the damage, and decide and assess it. And if any, yielding to his taste for bees, [843e] secures for himself another man’s swarm by attracting them with the rattling of pans, he shall pay for the damage. And if a man, in burning his own stuff, fails to have a care for that of his neighbour, he shall be fined in a fine fixed by the officials. So too if a man, when planting trees, fail to leave the due space between them and his neighbour’s plot: this has been adequately stated by many lawgivers, whose laws we should make use of, instead of requiring the Chief Organiser of the State to legislate about all the numerous small details which are within the competence of any chance lawgiver. [844a] Thus, regarding water-supplies also, there are excellent old laws laid down for farmers, which we, in our exposition, need not draw upon. Let this suffice: — he that desires to bring water to his own land may do so, commencing at the public cisterns, but he must not undercut the exposed wells of any private person: he may lead it by whatever way he wishes, except through a house, temple or tomb, and he must do no damage beyond the actual work of channelling. If, in any spot, the rain-water filters through owing to the natural dryness of the soil, [844b] and there is a scarcity of necessary moisture, then the owner shall dig in his own ground down to the chalk subsoil, and if he fails to find water at this depth, he shall procure from his neighbours just so much as he requires for drinking purposes for all his household; and if his neighbours also are stinted in their supplies, he shall apply for a ration of water |177| from the land-stewards, and fetch it day by day, and so share the water with his neighbours. [844c] And if, when rain comes, any dweller on lower ground damages the farmer above him, or the adjoining dweller, by preventing its outflow, — or if, conversely, the man on higher ground damages the man below by letting out the floods carelessly, — and if, in consequence, they refuse to accommodate one another in this matter, any person who wishes shall call in a city-steward, if it is in the city, or a land-steward, if in the country, and get an order as to what each party is to do; and the man who does not abide by the order shall be liable to be charged with envy and frowardness, [844d] and if convicted he shall pay to the injured party double the damage, for refusing to obey the magistrates.

As concerns the fruit-harvest, the rule of sharing for all shall be this: — this goddess has bestowed on us two gifts, one the plaything of Dionysus which goes unstored, the other produced by nature for putting in store. 94 So let this law be enacted concerning the fruit-harvest: — whosoever shall taste of the coarse crop of grapes or figs before the season of vintage, [844e] which coincides with the rising of Arcturus, whether it be on his own land or on that of others, shall owe fifty sacred drachmae to Dionysus if he has cut them from his own trees, if from his neighbour’s trees, a mina, and if from others, two-thirds of a mina. And if any man wishes to harvest ‘choice’ grapes or ‘choice’ figs (as they are now called), he shall gather them how and when he will if they are from |179| his own trees, but if they are from another man’s, and without his consent, he shall be fined every time, in pursuance of the law, 95 ‘thou shalt not shift what thou hast not set.’ [845a] And if a slave, without the consent of the master of the plots, touches any of such fruit, he shall be beaten with stripes as many as the grapes in the bunch or the figs on the fig-tree. If a resident alien buys a choice crop, he shall harvest it if he wishes. If a foreigner sojourning in the country desires to eat of the crop as he passes along the road, he, with one attendant, [845b] shall, if he wishes, take some of the choice fruit without price, as a gift of hospitality; but the law shall forbid our foreigners to share in the so-called ‘coarse’ fruit, and the like; and should either a master or a slave touch these, in ignorance, the slave shall be punished with stripes, and the free man shall be sent off with a reproof and be instructed to touch only the other crop, which is unfitted for storing to make raisins for wine or dried figs. As to pears, apples, pomegranates, and all such fruits, [845c] it shall be no disgrace to take them privily; but the man that is caught at it, if he be under thirty years of age, shall be beaten and driven off without wounds; and for such blows a free man shall have no right to sue. A foreigner shall be allowed to share in these fruits in the same way as in the grape crop; and if a man above thirty touch them, eating on the spot and not taking any away, he shall, have a share in all such fruits, like the foreigner; but if he disobeys the law, he shall be liable to be disqualified [845d] in seeking honours, in case anyone brings these facts to the notice of the judges at the time. |181| Water above all else in a garden is nourishing; but it is easy to spoil. For while soil and sun and wind, which jointly with water nourish growing plants, are not easy to spoil by means of sorcery or diverting or theft, all these things may happen to water; hence it requires the assistance of law. [845e] Let this, then, be the law concerning it: — if anyone wantonly spoil another man’s water, whether in spring or in pond, by means of sorcery, digging, or theft, the injured party shall sue him before the city-stewards, recording the amount of the damage sustained; and whosoever is convicted of damaging by poisons shall, in addition to the fine, clean out the springs or the basin of the water, in whatever way the laws of the interpreters declare it right for the purification to be made on each occasion and for each plaintiff.

Touching the bringing home of all crops, [846a] whoso wills shall be permitted to fetch his own stuff through any place, provided that either he does no damage or else gains himself three times as much profit as the damage he costs his neighbour; the authority in this matter shall rest with the magistrates, as in all other cases where a man willingly injures an unwilling party either by force or secretly — whether it be the party himself he injures or some of his chattels, by means of his own chattels; in all such cases the plaintiff must report to the magistrates to get redress, where the damage is under three minas; but if a man makes a larger claim than this [846b] against another, he shall bring a suit before the public courts and punish the injurer. If any of the magistrates be thought to have given an unjust verdict in deciding the penalties, he shall |183| be liable to pay to the injured party double the amount; and whoso wishes shall bring up the wrong-doings of the magistrates before the public courts in the case of each complaint. And since there are countless petty cases for which penalties must be laid down, concerning written complaints [846c] and citations and evidence of citation, — whether the citation requires two or more witnesses, — and all matters of the like kind, — these cases cannot be left without legal regulation, but at the same time they do not deserve the attention of an aged law-giver; so the young lawgivers shall make laws for these cases, modelling their small rules on the great ones of our earlier enactments, and learning by experience how far they are necessary in practice, until it be decided that they are all adequately laid down; and then, having permanently fixed them, they shall live in the practice of them, now that they are set out in due form.

[846d] Moreover, for craftsmen we ought to make regulations in this wise. First, no resident citizen shall be numbered among those who engage in technical crafts, nor any servant of a resident. For a citizen possesses a sufficient craft, and one that needs long practice and many studies, in the keeping and conserving of the public system of the State, a task which demands his full attention: and there hardly exists a human being with sufficient capacity [846e] to carry on two pursuits or two crafts thoroughly, nor yet to practise one himself and supervise another in practising a second. So we must first of all lay down this as a fundamental rule in the State: no man who is a smith shall act as a joiner, nor shall |185| a joiner supervise others at smith-work, instead of his own craft, under the pretext that, in thus supervising many servants working for him, he naturally supervises them more carefully because he gains more profit [847a] from that source than from his own craft; but each several craftsman in the State shall have one single craft, 96 and gain from it his living. This law the city-stewards shall labour to guard, and they shall punish the resident citizen, if he turn aside to any craft rather than to the pursuit of virtue, with reproofs and degradation, until they restore him to his own proper course; and if a foreigner pursue two crafts, they shall punish him by imprisonment, money-fines, [847b] and expulsion from the State, and so compel him to act as one man and not many. And as regards wages due to craftsmen, and the cancellings of work ordered, and any injustices done to them by another, or to another by them, the city-stewards shall act as arbitrators up to a value of fifty drachmae, and in respect of larger sums the public courts shall adjudicate as the law directs. No toll shall be paid in the State by anyone either on exported goods or on imports. Frankincense and all such foreign spices for use in religious rites, [847c] and purple and all dyes not produced in the country, and all pertaining to any other craft requiring foreign imported materials for a use that is not necessary, no one shall import; nor, on the other hand, shall he export any of the stuff which should of necessity remain in the country: and of all such matters the inspectors and supervisors shall consist of those twelve Law-wardens who remain next in order when five of the oldest are left out. |187| In regard to arms and all instruments of war, [847d] if there is need to import any craft or plant or metal or rope or animal for military purposes, the hipparchs and generals shall have control of both imports and exports, when the State both gives and takes, and the Law-wardens shall enact suitable and adequate laws therefor; but no trading for the sake of gain, either in this matter or in any other, shall be carried on anywhere within the boundaries of our [847e] State and country.

Touching food-supply and the distribution of agricultural produce, a system approaching that legalised in Crete would probably prove satisfactory. The whole produce of the soil must be divided by all into twelve parts, according to the method of its consumption. And each twelfth part — of wheat and barley, for instance (and all the rest of the crops must be distributed in the same way as these, as well as all marketable animals [848a] in each district) — must be divided proportionately into three shares, of which the first shall be for the freeborn citizens, and the second for their servants; the third share shall be for craftsmen and foreigners generally, including any resident aliens who may be dwelling together and in need of necessary sustenance, and all who have come into the country at any time to transact either public or private business; and this third share of all the necessaries shall be the only one liable to compulsory sale, 97 it being forbidden to sell any portion of the other two shares compulsorily. What, then, will be the best way of making these |189| divisions? [848b] It is plain, to begin with, that our division is in one way equal, in another, unequal.

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: Of each of these products of the soil, necessarily some parts are worse and some better.

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: In respect of this, no one of the three shares shall have an undue advantage, — neither that given to the masters, nor that of the slaves, nor that of the foreigners, — but the distribution shall assign to all the same equality of similarity. [848c] Each citizen shall take two shares and have control of the distribution of them to slaves and free men respectively, in the quantity and of the quality he desires to distribute. The surplus over and above this must be distributed by weight and number as follows, — the owner must take the number of all the animals that have to be fed on the produce of the soil, and make his distribution accordingly.

In the next place, there must be dwellings for the citizens separately arranged. A suitable arrangement for them will be this. There should be twelve villages, one in the middle [848d] of each of the twelve districts; and in each village we shall first select temples and a market-place for the gods and demi-gods; and if there exist any local deities of the Magnetes 98 or any shrines of other ancient gods whose memory is still preserved, we shall pay to them the same worship as did the men of old; and everywhere we shall erect temples to Hestia and Zeus and Athena, and whatever other deity is the patron of |191| the district concerned. First, buildings shall be erected round about these temples, and wherever the ground is highest, [848e] to form a stronghold, as well fenced as possible, for the garrison; and all the rest of the land we shall provide for by dividing the craftsmen into thirteen sections, of which one shall settle in the city (and this section shall be sub-divided again into twelve parts, like the whole city itself, and distributed round about it in the suburbs); and in each village we shall settle the classes of craftsmen that are serviceable to farmers. Of all these the chiefs of the land-stewards shall be the supervisors, determining how many and what craftsmen each place requires, and where they shall dwell so as to be of least trouble and greatest use [849a] to the farmers. And in like manner the board of city-stewards shall diligently supervise the craftsmen in the city. All matters concerning the markets must be managed by the market-stewards. In addition to supervising the temples adjoining the market, to prevent any damage being done to them, they shall, secondly, supervise personal conduct, keeping an eye on temperate and outrageous behaviour, so as to punish him who needs punishment. They shall watch over commodities put up for sale, to see that the sales which citizens [849b] are directed to make to foreigners are always legally conducted. There shall be this one law — that on the first day of the month the portion of the goods which is to be sold to foreigners shall he brought out by the managers — that is, the foreigners or slaves who act as managers for the citizens: and the first commodity shall be the twelfth share of corn, and the foreigner shall |193| buy corn, and all that goes with it, at this first market. On the tenth day of the month, fluids sufficient to last through the month shall be sold by the one party and bought by the other. Thirdly, on the twentieth day, there shall be a sale of livestock, as much as each party [849c] can buy or sell to suit their requirements, and also of all utensils or goods which the farmers have for sale, such as skins or any kind of clothing or woven stuff or felt or any such material; and these the foreigners must obtain from others by purchase. But neither these goods, nor barley or wheat ground into flour, nor any other kind of foodstuff whatsoever, may be sold by way of retail trade to the citizens or their slaves, [849d] or bought from any such retailer (but to the craftsmen and their slaves in the foreigners’ market a foreigner may sell and traffic in wine and corn by way of what is generally termed ‘retail trade’): and the butchers shall cut up the animals and distribute the meat to the foreigners and craftsmen and their servants. Any foreigner who wishes shall buy any kind of fuel in bulk, on any day, from the managers in the districts; and he shall sell it to the foreigners in what quantity [849e] and at what time he pleases. As to all other goods and utensils that each party requires, they shall be brought for sale to the public market, each kind to its appointed place, wherever the Law-wardens and market-stewards, with the help of the city-stewards, have marked out suitable sites and set up the stalls for market-stuff: there they shall exchange coins for goods and goods for coins, and no man shall give up his share to the other without receiving its equivalent; and if any does thus give |195| it up, as it were on credit, he shall make the best of his bargain, 99 whether or not he recovers what is due to him, since in such transactions he can no longer sue. [850a] And if the purchase or sale is greater or more costly than is allowed by the law stating the limits of increase or decrease of property beyond which both of these transactions are forbidden, the amount of difference must at once (in the case of excess) be registered with the Law-wardens, and (in the case of deficiency) be cancelled. The same rule shall hold good regarding the registration of property in the case of resident aliens. Whosoever wishes shall enter on residence as an alien on fixed terms, since residence is permitted to a foreigner who is willing and able to reside, [850b] provided that he has a craft and remains in the country not more than twenty years from the date of his registration, without the payment of even a small aliens’ tax, except virtuous conduct, or indeed any other tax for any buying or selling; and when his time has expired, he shall depart, taking with him his own property. And if within the period of twenty years it should happen that he has proved his merit by doing some signal service to the State, and if he believes that he can persuade the Council and Assembly to grant his request and authorize a [850c] postponement of his departure, or even an extension of his residence for life, whatever request he thus succeeds in persuading the State to grant to him shall be carried out for him in full. For the children of resident aliens, who are craftsmen and over fifteen years of age, the period of residence shall commence from the fifteenth year, and such an one, after remaining for twenty years from that date, shall depart whither |197| he pleases, or if he desires to remain, he shall gain permission in like manner, and so remain: and he that departs [850d] shall go after first cancelling the entries which were previously made by him in the register at the magistrates’ office.

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Laws Book IX.

[853a]

Athenian: The method of our legislation requires that we should deal next with the judicial proceedings connected with all the transactions hitherto described. The matters which involve such proceedings have been stated 100 in part (those, namely, which concern farming and all industries dependent thereon), but we have not stated as yet the most important of such matters; so our next step must be to state them in full, enumerating in detail what penalty must attach to each offence, [853b] and before what court it must be tried.

Clinias: True.

Athenian: It is, in a sense, a shameful thing to make all those laws that we are proposing to make in a State like ours, which is, as we say, to be well managed and furnished with all that is right for the practice of virtue. In such a State, the mere supposition that any citizen will grow up to share in the worst forms of depravity practised in other States, so that one must forestall and denounce by law the appearance of any such character, [853c] and, in order to warn them off or punish them, enact laws against them, as though they were certain to appear, — this, as I have said, is in a sense shameful. But we are not now legislating, like the ancient lawgivers, for heroes and sons of gods, 101 — when, as the story goes, both the lawgivers themselves and their subjects were men of divine descent: we, on the contrary, |201| are but mortal men legislating for the seed of men and therefore it is permitted to us to dread lest any of our citizens should prove horny-hearted [853d] and attain to such hardness of temper as to be beyond melting; and just as those ‘horn-struck’ 102 beans cannot be softened by boiling on the fire, so these men should be uninfluenced by laws, however powerful. So, for the sake of these gentlemen, no very gentle law shall be stated first concerning temple-robbery, in case anyone dares to commit this crime. That a rightly nurtured citizen should be infected with this disease is a thing that we should neither desire nor expect; but such attempts might often be made by their servants, and by foreigners or foreigners’ slaves. Chiefly, then, on their account, and also as a precaution against [854a] the general infirmity of human nature, I will state the law about temple-robbing, and all other crimes of a like kind which are hard, if not impossible, to cure. And, in accordance with our rule as already approved, 103 we must prefix to all such laws preludes as brief as possible. By way of argument and admonition one might address in the following terms the man whom an evil desire urges by day and wakes up at night, driving him to rob some sacred object — [854b] ‘My good man, the evil force that now moves you and prompts you to go temple-robbing is neither of human origin nor of divine, but it is some impulse bred of old in men from ancient wrongs unexpiated, which courses round wreaking ruin; and it you must guard against with all your strength. How you must thus guard, now learn. |203| When there comes upon you any such intention, betake yourself to the rites of guilt-averting, betake yourself as suppliant to the shrines of the curse-lifting deities, betake yourself to the company of the men who are reputed virtuous; and thus learn, partly from others, [854c] partly by self-instruction, that every man is bound to honour what is noble and just; but the company of evil men shun wholly, and turn not back. And if it be so that by thus acting your disease grows less, well; but if not, then deem death the more noble way, and quit yourself of life.’

As we chant this prelude to those who purpose all these unholy deeds, destructive of civic life, the law itself we must leave unvoiced 104 for him who obeys; but for him who disobeys we must suffer the law, following on the prelude, to utter aloud this chant: [854d] ‘Whosoever is caught robbing a temple, if he be a foreigner or a slave, his curse shall be branded on his forehead and on his hands, and he shall be scourged with so many stripes as the judges decree, and he shall be cast out naked beyond the borders of the country: for, after paying this penalty, he might perchance be disciplined into a better life. For no penalty that is legally imposed aims at evil, but it effects, as a rule, one or other of two results, — [854e] it makes the person who suffers it either better or less bad. 105 But if any citizen is ever convicted of such an act, — that is, of committing some great and infamous wrong against gods, parents, or State — the judge shall regard him as already incurable, reckoning that, in spite of all the training and nurture he has had from infancy, he has not refrained from the worst iniquity. For him |205| the penalty is deaths the least of evils; and moreover, [855a] by serving as an example, he will benefit others, when himself disgraced and removed from sight beyond the borders of the country; but his children and family, if they shun their father’s ways, shall be honoured, and honourable mention shall be made of them, seeing that they have done well and bravely in leaving the ways of vice for those of virtue. That the goods of any such criminal should be confiscated would not be fitting in a State in which the allotments must remain always identical and equal in number. Whosoever is held to have done a wrong which deserves a money-fine must pay the fine exacted when the fine comes within the limits of the surplus he has over when his allotment has been equipped, [855b] but not what exceeds this: the precise facts in such cases the Law-wardens must find out from the registers, 106 and they must inform the judges of the true state of each case, in order to prevent any allotment falling out of cultivation through lack of money. And if any man is held to deserve a larger fine, in case none of his friends are willing to go bail or, by clubbing together, to pay the sum and set him free, then we must punish him by long imprisonment, of a public kind, [855c] and by measures of degradation; but no one shall be absolutely outlawed for any single crime, even though he be banished from the country. 107 The punishments to be inflicted shall be death, or imprisonment, or stripes, or seats or stations or exposures of a degrading kind at temples or at outermost boundaries, or money-fines of the kind we have stated, — where such punishments are required. In cases where the penalty is death, the judges shall be the Law-wardens together with |207| the court of last year’s magistrates selected by merit. 108 In respect of these cases [855d] the younger lawgivers must attend to the indictments and summonses and all such matters, and the procedure involved, while it is our task to regulate by law the method of voting. The votes shall be cast openly, and, before this takes place, our judges shall be seated, facing the plaintiff and defendant, in a closely-packed row in order of seniority, and all the citizens who have leisure to do so shall attend and listen attentively to the trials. [855e] One speech shall be made by the plaintiff first, and secondly one by the defendant; and after these speeches the oldest judge shall lead off with his survey of the case, in which he shall review in detail the statements made; and after the oldest, each of the other judges in turn must discuss every point which he has noticed in which either of the litigants has been guilty of making any kind of omission or blunder in his statement: and he that has no such criticism to make shall pass on the task of reviewing to his neighbour: and when such of the statements as the judges have pronounced relevant have been confirmed by affixing to the documents the signatures [856a] of all the judges, they shall lay them up at the altar of Hestia. On the morrow again they shall assemble at the same place and discuss the case, and they shall make their pronouncements in the same manner, and shall again sign the statements. And after doing this thrice, — during which proceedings they shall pay full attention to evidence and witnesses. — each of the judges shall cast a sacred vote, promising by Hestia to give just and true judgment to the best of his power; and thus they shall bring to its end this form of trial. |209| [856b]

Next to cases which concern religion come those which concern the dissolution of the polity. Whosoever enslaves the laws by making them subject to men, and makes the State subject to a faction, and acts illegally in doing all this by violence and in stirring up civil strife, — such a man must be deemed the worst of all enemies to the whole State. And the man who, though he takes part in none of these doings, yet fails to observe them, while he has a share in the chief offices of State, or else, though he observes them, fails to defend his country [856c] and punish them, owing to his cowardice, — a citizen of such a kind must be counted second in order of badness. Every man who is of the least worth shall inform the magistrates by prosecuting the plotter on a charge of violent and illegal revolution: they shall have the same judges as the temple-robbers had, and the whole trial shall be conducted just as it was in their case, and the death penalty shall be imposed by a majority of votes. As a summary rule, the disgrace or punishment inflicted on a father shall not descend upon his children, [856d] except in a case where not only the father, but his father and grandfather before him, have all been condemned on a capital charge: in such a case, the children, while retaining their own property, excepting only the allotment with its full equipment, shall be deported by the State to their original country and State. And from the sons of citizens who happen to have more than one son over ten years old, ten shall be chosen by lot — after application made by the father or by the paternal or maternal grandfather, — [856e] and the names thus chosen shall be sent to Delphi; and that man whom the oracle names shall be established as the allotment-holder in the house of those departed, — be it with happier fortune! |211|

Clinias: Very good.

Athenian: Moreover, a third general law shall be laid down, dealing with the judges to be employed and the manner of the trials, in cases where one man prosecutes another on a charge of treason; and concerning the offspring, likewise, whether they are to remain in their country or be expelled, this one law [857a] shall apply to the three cases of the traitor, the temple-robber, and the man who wrecks the State laws by violence. For the thief also, whether he steals a great thing or a small, one law and one legal penalty shall be enacted for all alike: 109 first, he must pay twice the value of the stolen article, if he loses his case and possesses enough property over and above his allotment wherewith to pay; but if not, he must be put in prison until either he has paid the sum or has been let off by the prosecutor. And if a man be cast in a suit for theft from the State, [857b] on obtaining pardon from the State, or after payment of double the sum stolen, he shall be let out of prison.

Clinias: How comes it, Stranger, that we are ruling that it makes no difference to the thief whether the thing he steals be great or small, and whether the place it is stolen from be holy or unhallowed, or whatever other differences may exist in the manner of a theft; whereas the lawgiver ought to suit the punishment to the crime by inflicting dissimilar penalties in these varying cases?

Athenian: Well said, Clinias! You have collided with me [857c] when I was going, as it were, full steam ahead, and so have woken me up. You have reminded me of a previous reflection of mine, how that none of the attempts hitherto made at legislation have ever |213| been carried out rightly — as in fact we may infer from the instance before us. What do I mean to imply by this remark? It was no bad comparison we made 110 when we compared all existing legislation to the doctoring of slaves by slaves. For one should carefully notice this, that if any of the doctors who practise medicine by purely empirical methods, [857d] devoid of theory, were to come upon a free-born doctor conversing with a free-born patient, and using arguments, much as a philosopher would, dealing with the course of the ailment from its origin and surveying the natural constitution of the human body, — he would at once break out into a roar of laughter, and the language he would use would be none other than that which always comes ready to the tongue of most so-called ‘doctors’: ‘You fool,’ he would say, ‘you are not doctoring your patient, but schooling him, so to say, as though what he wanted was to be made, not a sound man, [857e] but a doctor.’

Clinias: And in saying so, would he not be right?

Athenian: Possibly, provided that he should also take the view that the man who treats of laws in the way that we are now doing is schooling the citizens rather than legislating. Would he not seem to be right in saying that, too?

Clinias: Probably.

Athenian: How fortunate we are in the conclusion we have now come to!

Clinias: What conclusion?

Athenian: This, — that there is no need to legislate, [858a] but only to become students ourselves, and endeavour to discern in regard to every polity how the best |215| form might come about, and how that which is the least elaborate possible. Moreover, we are now allowed, as it seems, to study, if we choose, the best form of legislation, or, if we choose, the least elaborate. So let us make our choice between these two.

Clinias: The choice we propose, Stranger, is an absurd one: we should be acting like legislators [858b] who were driven by some overpowering necessity to pass laws on the spot, because it is impossible for them to do so on the morrow. But for us (if Heaven will) it is quite possible to do as bricklayers do, or men starting on any other kind of construction, — that is, to collect material piecemeal, from which we may select what is suitable for the edifice we intend to build, and, what is more, select it at our leisure. Let us assume, then, that we are not now building under compulsion, but that we are still at leisure, and engaged partly in collecting material and partly in putting it together; so that we may rightly say that our laws are being in part [858c] already erected and in part collected.

Athenian: In this way, Clinias, our survey of laws will at any rate follow nature’s course more closely. Now let us consider, I adjure you, the following point about legislators.

Clinias: What point?

Athenian: We have in our States not only the writings and written speeches of many other people, but also the writings and speeches of the lawgiver.

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Are we, then, to pay attention to the compositions of the others — [858d] poets, and all who, either with or without metre, have composed and |217| put on record their counsels concerning life, — but to pay no attention to those of the lawgivers? Or should we not attend to them above all others?

Clinias: Yes, far above all.

Athenian: But we surely do not mean that the law-giver alone of all the writers is not to give counsel about what is noble, good and just, teaching what these are, and how those who intend to be happy must practise them.

Clinias: Of course he must do so. [858e]

Athenian: Well then, is it more disgraceful on the part of Homer and Tyrtaeus and the rest of the poets to lay down in their writings bad rules about life and its pursuits, and less disgraceful on the part of Lycurgus and Solon and all the legislators who have written? Or rather, is it not right that, of all the writings which exist in States, those which concern laws should be seen, when unrolled, to be by far the fairest and best, and all other writings to be either modelled on them or, [859a] if disagreeing with them, contemptible? Are we to conceive that the written laws in our States should resemble persons moved by love and wisdom, such as a father or a mother, or that they should order and threaten, like some tyrant and despot, who writes his decree on the wall, and there is an end of it? So let us now consider whether we are going to try to discuss laws [859b] with this intention — showing zeal, at any rate, whether or not we may prove successful; and if, in proceeding on this course, we must meet with mishap, so be it. Yet we pray that it may be well with us, and if God wills, it shall be well. |219|

Clinias: You are right: let us do as you say.

Athenian: First of all, since we have started on it, we must examine closely the law about temple-robbers and all forms of thieving and wrong-doing; nor should we be vexed by the fact that, although we enacted some points while legislating, [859c] there are some points still under consideration: for we are in process of becoming lawgivers, and may perhaps become so, but we are not lawgivers as yet. So if we agree to consider the matters I have mentioned in the way I have mentioned, let us so consider them.

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: In respect of goodness and justice as a whole, let us try to discern this, — how far we now agree with ourselves, and how far we differ (for we should certainly say that we desire, if nothing else, [859d] to differ at least from the majority of men), and how far also the majority agree or differ among themselves.

Clinias: What differences of ours have you in mind?

Athenian: I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and men, things, or actions that are just, we all agree that these are all beautiful, so that no one would be regarded as saying what was wrong even if he should maintain that just men, however ugly in body, [859e] are quite beautiful in respect of their very just character.

Clinias: Would not that be right?

Athenian: Perhaps; but let us observe this, — that if all things which belong to justice are beautiful, that ‘all’ includes for us passions 111 nearly as much as actions. |221|

Clinias: Well, what then?

Athenian: Every just action, in so far as it shares in justice, practically in the same degree partakes of beauty.

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: It is agreed also — if our argument is to be consistent — [860a] that a passion which shares in justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.

Clinias: True.

Athenian: But if we agree that a passion though just is unseemly, then justice and beauty will be at discord, when just things are called most unseemly.

Clinias: What do you mean by that?

Athenian: It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to enjoin what is absolutely contrary to our present statements.

Clinias: What statements? [860b]

Athenian: We laid it down 112 that it is just to put to death the temple-robber and the enemy of the rightly-enacted laws; and then, when we were minded to enact a host of similar rules, we held our hand, since we perceived that such rules involve passions infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are eminently just, they are also eminently unseemly. Thus the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical, at another, utterly opposed, will they not?

Clinias: I am afraid so. [860c]

Athenian: Thus it is that by the multitude the beautiful and the just are flung apart, and inconsistent language is used about them.

Clinias: It certainly seems so, Stranger. |223|

Athenian: Then let us look again at our own view, and see how far it is consistent in this respect.

Clinias: What kind of consistency, and in respect of what, do you mean?

Athenian: I believe that I expressly stated 113 in our previous discourse, — or, if I did not do it before, please assume that I now assert —

Clinias: What? [860d]

Athenian: That all bad men are in all respects unwillingly bad; and, this being so, our next statement must agree therewith.

Clinias: What statement do you mean?

Athenian: This, — that the unjust man is, indeed, bad, but the bad man is unwillingly bad. 114 But it is illogical to suppose that a willing deed is done unwillingly; therefore he that commits an unjust act does so unwillingly in the opinion of him who assumes that injustice is involuntary — a conclusion which I also must now allow; for I agree that all men do unjust acts unwillingly; so, since I hold this new — and do not share the opinion of those who, [860e] through contentiousness or arrogance, assert that, while there are some who are unjust against their will, yet there are also many who are unjust willingly, — how am I to prove consistent with my own statements? Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias. put this question to me — ‘If this is the state of the case, Stranger, what counsel do you give us in regard to legislating for |225| the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or shall we not?’ ‘Legislate by all means,’ I shall reply. ‘Will you make a distinction, then, between voluntary and involuntary wrong-doings, and are we to enact heavier penalties for the crimes and wrong-doings that are voluntary, [861a] and lighter penalties for the others? Or shall we enact equal penalties for all; on the view that there is no such thing as a voluntary act of injustice?’

Clinias: What you say. Stranger, is quite right: so what use are we to make of our present arguments?

Athenian: A very proper question! The use we shall make of them, to begin with, is this —

Clinias: What?

Athenian: Let us recall how, a moment ago, we rightly stated that in regard to justice we are suffering from the greatest confusion and inconsistency. Grasping this fact, [861b] let us again question ourselves, — ‘As to our perplexity about these matters, since we have neither got it clear nor defined the point of difference between those two kinds of wrong-doing, voluntary and involuntary, which are treated as legally distinct in every State by every legislator who has ever yet appeared, — as to this, is the statement we recently made to stand, like a divine oracle, as a mere ex cathedra statement, unsupported by any proof, and to serve as a kind of master-enactment?’ 115 [861c] That is impossible; and before we legislate we are bound first to make it clear somehow that these wrong-doings are twofold, and wherein their difference consists, in order that when we impose the penalty on either kind, everyone may follow our rules, and be able to |227| form some judgment regarding the suitability or otherwise of our enactments.

Clinias: What you say, Stranger, appears to us to be excellent: we ought to do one of two things, — either not assert that all unjust acts are involuntary, or else make our distinctions first, [861d] then prove the correctness of that assertion.

Athenian: Of these alternatives the first is to me quite intolerable — namely, not to assert what I hold to be the truth, — for that would be neither a lawful thing to do nor a pious. But as to the question how such acts are twofold, — if the difference does not lie in that between the voluntary and the involuntary, then we must try to explain it by means of some other distinction. 116

Clinias: Well, certainly, Stranger, about this matter there is no other plan we can possibly adopt. [861e]

Athenian: It shall be done. Come now, in dealings and intercourse between citizens, injuries committed by one against another are of frequent occurrence, and they involve plenty of the voluntary as well as of the involuntary.

Clinias: To be sure!

Athenian: Let no one put down all injuries as acts of injustice and then regard the unjust acts involved as twofold in the way described, namely, that they are partly voluntary and partly involuntary (for, of the total, the involuntary injuries are not less than the voluntary either in number or in magnitude); [862a] but |229| consider whether in saying what I am now going to say I am speaking sense or absolute nonsense. For what I assert, Megillus and Clinias, is not that, if one man harms another involuntarily and without wishing it, he acts unjustly though involuntarily, nor shall I legislate in this way. pronouncing this to be an involuntary act of injustice, but I will pronounce that such an injury is not an injustice at all, whether it be a greater injury or a less. And, if my view prevails, we shall often say that the author of a benefit wrongly done commits an injustice; [862b] for as a rule, my friends, neither when a man gives some material object to another, nor when he takes it away, ought one to term such an act absolutely just or unjust, but only when a man of just character and disposition does any benefit or injury to another, — that is what the lawgiver must look at; he must consider these two things, injustice and injury, and the injury inflicted he must make good so far as possible by legal means; he must conserve what is lost, restore what has been broken down, make whole [862c] what is wounded or dead: and when the several injuries have been atoned for by compensation, he must endeavour always by means of the laws to convert the parties who have inflicted them and those who have suffered them from a state of discord to a state of amity.

Clinias: He will be right in doing that.

Athenian: As regards unjust injuries and gains, in case one man causes another to gain by acting unjustly towards him, all such cases as are curable we must cure, regarding them as diseases of the soul. And we should affirm that our cure for injustice lies in this direction — |231|

Clinias: What direction? [862d]

Athenian: In this, — that whenever any man commits any unjust act, great or small, the law shall instruct him and absolutely compel him for the future either never willingly to dare to do such a deed, or else to do it ever so much less often, in addition to paving for the injury. To effect this, whether by action or speech, by means of pleasures and pains, honours and dishonours, money-fines and money-gifts, and in general by whatsoever means one can employ to make men hate injustice and love (or at any rate not hate) justice, — this is precisely the task of laws most noble. [862e] But for all those whom he perceives to be incurable in respect of these matters, what penalty shall the lawgiver enact, and what law? The lawgiver will realise that in all such cases not only is it better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but also that they will prove of a double benefit to others by quitting life — since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly, and also rid [863a] the State of wicked men, 117 — and thus he will of necessity inflict death as the chastisement for their sins, in cases of this kind, and of this kind only.

Clinias: What you have said seems very reasonable; but we should be glad to hear a still clearer statement respecting the difference between injury and injustice, and how the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary applies in these cases.

Athenian: I must endeavour to do as you bid me, and explain the matter. [863b] No doubt in conversing with one another you say and hear said at least thus much about the soul, that one element in its nature (be it affection or part) is ‘passion,’ which is an inbred |233| quality of a contentious and pugnacious kind, and one that overturns many things by its irrational force.

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: Moreover, we distinguish ‘pleasure’ from passion, and we assert that its mastering power is of an opposite kind, since it effects all that its intention desires by a mixture of persuasion and deceit.

Clinias: Exactly. [863c]

Athenian: Nor would it be untrue to say that the third cause of sins is ignorance. 118 This cause, however, the lawgiver would do well to subdivide into two, counting ignorance in its simple form to be the cause of minor sins, and in its double form — where the folly is due to the man being gripped not by ignorance only, but also by a conceit of wisdom,

119^ as though he had full knowledge of things he knows nothing at all about, — counting this to be the cause of great and brutal sins when it is joined with strength and might, [863d] but the cause of childish and senile sins when it is joined with weakness; and these last he will count as sins and he will ordain laws, as for sinners, but laws that will be, above all others, of the most mild and merciful kind.

Clinias: That is reasonable.

Athenian: And pretty well everyone speaks of one man being ‘superior,’ another ‘inferior,’ to pleasure or to passion; and they are so.

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: But we have never heard it said that one man is ‘superior,’ another ‘inferior,’ to ignorance. 120 |235| [863e]

Clinias: Quite true.

Athenian: And we assert that all these things urge each man often to go counter to the actual bent of his own inclination.

Clinias: Very frequently.

Athenian: Now I will define for you, clearly and without complication, my notion of justice and injustice. The domination of passion and fear and pleasure and pain and envies and desires in the soul, whether they do any injury or not, I term generally ‘injustice’; but the belief in the highest good — [864a] in whatsoever way either States or individuals think they can attain to it, — if this prevails in their souls and regulates every man, even if some damage be done, we must assert that everything thus done is just, and that in each man the part subject to this governance is also just, and best for the whole life of mankind, although most men suppose that such damage is an involuntary injustice. But we are not now [864b] concerned with a verbal dispute. Since, however, it has been shown that there are three kinds of sinning, we must first of all recall these still more clearly to mind. Of these, one kind, as we know, is painful; and that we term passion and fear. 121

Clinias: Quite so.

Athenian: The second kind consists of pleasure and desires; the third, which is a distinct kind, consists of hopes and untrue belief regarding the attainment of the highest good. And when this last kind is subdivided into three,122 five classes are made, as we |237| now assert; and for these five classes [864c] we must enact distinct laws, of two main types.

Clinias: What are they?

Athenian: The one concerns acts done on each occasion by violent and open means, the other acts done privily under cover of darkness and deceit, or sometimes acts done in both these ways, — and for acts of this last kind the laws will be most severe, if they are to prove adequate.

Clinias: Naturally.

Athenian: Let us revert next to that point from which we digressed, 123 and proceed with our enactment of the laws. [864d] We had, I believe, laid down the laws dealing with those who plunder the gods and with traitors, and also with those who wreck the laws with intent to overthrow the existing constitution. An act of this kind a man might commit when mad, or when suffering from some disease or from excessive senility, or in a state of childishness, whereby he is no better than a madman. If any case of this kind is ever brought to the notice of the selected judges, either on the information of the doer of the act or on that of him who is pleading for the doer, and if it be judged that he was in this state of madness when he broke the law, [864e] then he shall certainly pay for the damage he has done, but only the exact sum, and he shall be acquitted of the other charges, unless it be that he has killed a man and has not purged his hands from blood: in this case he shall depart into another country and place, and dwell there as an exile for a year; and should he return within the time fixed by the law or set foot at all within his own country, he shall be put in the public gaol by |239| the Law-wardens for the space of two years, [865a] and not let out of gaol until after that time.

We need not hesitate to enact laws about every class of murder on similar lines, now that we have made a beginning. First we shall deal with the cases that are violent and involuntary. If a man has killed a friend in a contest or in public games — whether his death has been immediate or as the after-effect of wounds, — or similarly if he has killed him in war or in some action of training for war, either when practising [865b] javelin-work without armour or when engaged in some warlike manoeuvre in heavy armour, — then, when he has been purified as the Delphic rule on this matter directs, he shall be accounted pure. So too with respect to all doctors, if the patient dies against the will of his doctor, the doctor shall be accounted legally pure. And if one man kills another of his own act, but involuntarily, — whether it be with his own unarmed body, or by a tool or a weapon, or by a dose of drink or of solid food, or by application of fire or of cold, or by deprivation of air, and whether he does it himself with his own body or by means of other bodies, — [865c] in all cases it shall be accounted to be his own personal act, and he shall pay the following penalties. If he kill a slave, he shall secure the master against damage and loss, reckoning as if it were a slave of his own that had been destroyed, or else he shall be liable to a penalty of double the value of the dead man, — and the judges shall make an assessment of his value, — and he must also employ means of purification greater and more numerous than those |241| employed by persons [865d] who kill a man at games, and those interpreters 124 whom the oracle names shall be in charge of these rites; but if it be a slave of his own that he has killed, he shall be set free after the legal purification. And if anyone kill a free man involuntarily, he shall undergo the same purifications as the man that has killed a slave; and there is an ancient tale, told of old, to which he must not fail to pay regard. The tale is this, — that the man slain by violence, who has lived in a free and proud spirit, is wroth with his slayer when newly slain, [865e] and being filled also with dread and horror on account of his own violent end, when he sees his murderer going about in the very haunts which he himself had frequented, he is horror-stricken; and being disquieted himself, he takes conscience as his ally, and with all his might disquiets his slayer — both the man himself and his doings. Wherefore it is right for the slayer to retire before his victim for a full year, in all its seasons, and to vacate all the spots he owned in all parts of his native land; and if the dead man be a Stranger, he shall be barred also from the Stranger’s country [866a] for the same period. If a man willingly obeys this law, he that is nearest of kin to the dead man, having the supervision of the performance of all these rules, shall pardon him and live at peace with him, and in doing so he will be acting with perfect propriety; but if a man disobeys, and dares, in the first place, to approach the altars and to do sacrifice while still unpurified, and if he refuses, further, [866b] to fulfill the times appointed in exile, then the next of kin to the dead man shall |243| prosecute the slayer for murder, and in case of conviction all the penalties shall be doubled. And should the nearest relative fail to prosecute for the crime, it shall be as though the pollution had passed on to him, through the victim claiming atonement for his fate; and whoso pleases shall bring a charge against him, and compel him by law to quit his country for five years.

And if a Stranger involuntarily kills a Stranger who is resident in the State, whoso pleases shall prosecute him under the same laws; [866c] and if he be a resident alien, he shall be exiled for a year, while if he be altogether a Stranger — whether the man slain be a Stranger or resident alien or citizen — in addition to the purifications imposed, he shall be barred for all his life from the country which ordains these laws; and if he transgresses the law, and comes back to it, the Law-wardens shall punish him with death; and if he has any property, they shall hand it over [866d] to the next of kin of the victim. And should he come back unwillingly, in case he be shipwrecked off the coast of the country, he shall camp with his feet in the sea, and watch for a ship to take him off; or in case he be brought in by people forcibly by land, the first magistrate of the State that meets with him shall loose him, and send him out over the border unharmed.

If a person with his own hand kills a free man, and the deed be done in passion, in a case of this kind we must begin by making a distinction between two varieties of the crime. For murder is committed in passion by those who, on a sudden and without intent to kill, [866e] destroy a man by blows or some such means in an immediate attack, when the |245| deed is at once followed by repentance; and it is also a case of murder done in passion whenever men who are insulted by shameful words or actions seek for vengeance, and end by killing a man with deliberate intent to kill, and feel no repentance for the deed. We must lay it down, as it seems, that these murders are of two kinds, [867a] both as a rule done in passion, and most properly described as lying midway between the voluntary and the involuntary. None the less, each of these kinds tends to resemble one or other of these contraries; fur the man who retains his passion and takes vengeance, not suddenly on the spur of the moment, but after lapse of time, and with deliberate intent, resembles the voluntary murderer; whereas the man who does not nurse his rage, but gives way to it at once on the spur of the moment and without deliberate intent, has a likeness to the involuntary murderer; yet neither is he wholly involuntary, but bears a resemblance thereto. [867b] Thus murders done in passion are difficult to define, — whether one should treat them in law as voluntary or involuntary. The best and truest way is to class them both as resemblances, and to distinguish them by the mark of deliberate intent or lack of intent, and to impose more severe penalties on those who slay with intent and in anger, and milder penalties on those who do so without intent and on a sudden. For that which resembles a greater evil must be more heavily punished, that which resembles a lesser evil [867c] more lightly. So our laws also must do likewise.

Clinias: They must, most certainly.

Athenian: Returning, then, to our task, let us make this pronouncement: — If a man with his own hand |247| slay a free man, and the deed be done in rage without deliberate intent, he shall suffer such other penalties as it is proper for the man to suffer who has slain without passion, and he shall be compelled to go into exile for two years, thereby chastising his own passion. [867d] And he that slays in passion and with deliberate intent shall be treated in other respects like the former, but shall be exiled for three years — instead of two, like the other, — receiving a longer period of punishment because of the greatness of his passion. As regards the return home, in such cases it shall be on this wise. (It is a difficult matter to legislate for with exactness; for sometimes the more dangerous of the two murderers in the eye of the law might prove the more gentle and the gentler the more dangerous, and the latter might have committed the murder more savagely, the former more gently; though as a rule matters turn out in the way we have stated: [867e] so, regarding all these regulations the Law-wardens must act as supervisors). When the period of exile in each case has elapsed, they must send twelve of their number to the borders of the country to act as judges — they having made during the interval a still closer investigation into the actions of the exiles; and these men shall serve also as judges in regard to the matter of giving them pardon and admitting them back; and the exiles must abide by the verdicts of these magistrates. [868a] And if either of them, after his return, again yields to rage and commits the same act, he shall be exiled, and never again return; and if he returns, he shall suffer the same fate as the returned Stranger. 125 He that slays a slave of his own shall purify himself: and if he kill another man’s slave in rage, he shall |249| pay to the owner twice the damage. And if anyone of all these types of slayers disobeys the law and, being unpurified, denies the market and the games and other sacred assemblies, whoso pleases shall prosecute [868b] both that member of the dead man’s kindred who permits this and the slayer himself, and shall compel the one of them to exact, and the other to pay, double the amount of the money-fines and of the other exactions; 126 and the sum so paid he shall keep for himself as the law directs. If a slave kills his own master in rage, the kindred of the dead man shall treat the slayer how they please, — save that they must not [868c] in any wise let him live, — and shall be held guiltless. And if a slave kill a free man (other than his master) in rage, his masters shall hand over the slave to the kindred of the dead man, and they shall be compelled to put the criminal to death, doing so in whatever manner they choose.

If in a fit of rage a father or mother slays a son or daughter by means of blows or some kind of violence, — an occurrence which, though rare, does sometimes happen, — the slayer must make the same purifications as the other slayers, and be exiled for three years; [868d] and when the slayers have returned, the wife must be separated from the husband and the husband from the wife, and they must never again have a child, nor shall they ever share a home with those whom the slayer has robbed of child or brother, nor shall they take part in their worship; he that is disobedient and impious concerning this matter shall be liable to an action for impiety at the hands of whoso pleases. And if a husband in a fit of rage kills his wedded wife, or if a wife in like manner |251| kills her husband, they must undergo [868e] the same purifications, and remain exiled for three years. And when one who has committed such a crime returns, he shall never take part in worship with his children, nor sit at table with them; and if either the parent or the child disobeys, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of whoso pleases. And if in rage a brother kill a brother or a sister, or a sister kill a brother or a sister, it shall be declared that they must undergo the same purifications and banishment as have been ordained for parents and children, — namely, that the homicide shall never share in the house or in the worship of those brothers or parents whom he has robbed of brothers or of children; [869a] and if anyone disobeys, he will rightly and justly be liable to the law laid down concerning such cases of impiety.

If any man gets into such an uncontrollable rage with his parents as actually to dare to kill a parent in the madness of his rage, then, in case the dead person before dying voluntarily acquits the culprit of murder, he shall be held pure, after he has purified himself in the same maimer as those who have committed an involuntary murder, and done as they [869b] in all other respects; but in case the dead person does not so acquit him, then he that has done such a deed is liable to a number of laws: for outrage he will be liable to most heavy penalties, and likewise for impiety and temple-robbing, since he has robbed his parent of life; so that if ‘to die a hundred deaths’ were possible for any one man, that a parricide or a matricide, who did the deed in rage, should undergo a hundred deaths would be a fate most just. Since every law will forbid |253| the man to kill [869c] father or mother, the very authors of his existence, even for the sake of saving his own life, and will ordain that he must suffer and endure everything rather than commit such an act, — in what other way than this can such a man be fittingly dealt with by law, and receive his due reward? Be it enacted, therefore, that for the man who in rage slays father or mother the penalty is death.

If a brother kill a brother in fight during a civil war, or in any such way, acting in self-defence [869d] against the other, who first started the brawl, he shall be counted as one who has slain an enemy, and be held guiltless; so too, when a citizen has killed a citizen in like manner, or a Stranger a Stranger. And if a citizen kill a Stranger in self-defence, or a Stranger a citizen, he shall be accounted pure in the same way. So likewise, if a slave kill a slave; but if a slave kill a free man in self-defence, he shall be liable to the same laws as he that kills a father. And what has been said about remission of the charge in the case of the murder of a father shall hold equally good [869e] in all such cases — if any man voluntarily acquit any culprit of this charge, the purifications for the culprit shall be made as though the murder were involuntary, and one year of exile shall be imposed by law.

Let us take this as an adequate statement respecting murder-cases that involve violence, and are involuntary and done in passion. Next to these we must state the regulations regarding such acts when voluntary and involving iniquity of all kinds and premeditated, — acts caused by yielding to pleasure or lust or envy. |255|

Clinias: You are right.

Athenian: First, let us once more state, as best we can, [870a] how many these causes are likely to be. The greatest is lust, which masters a soul that is made savage by desires; and it occurs especially in connexion with that object for which the most frequent and intense craving afflicts the bulk of men, — the power which wealth possesses over them, owing to the badness of their nature and lack of culture, to breed in them countless lustings after its insatiable and endless acquisition. And of this lack of culture the cause is to be found in the ill-praising of wealth in the common talk of both Greeks and barbarians; for by exalting it as the first of ‘goods,’ 127 [870b] when it should come but third, they ruin both posterity and themselves. The noblest and best course of all in all States is that the truth should be stated about wealth, — namely, that it exists for the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul; so that, while the objects for which it really exists are ‘goods,’ yet wealth itself will come third, after goodness of body and of soul. So this law will serve as an instructor, to teach that the man who intends to be happy must seek not to be wealthy, but to be justly and temperately wealthy; [870c] and if this were so, no murders that needed purging by murders would occur in States. But, as things now stand, this love of riches is — as we said 128 when we began this subject — one cause, and a very great cause, which produces the most serious of trials for willful murder. A second cause is the temper of the ambitious soul, which breeds envies that are |257| dangerous associates for the man that feels the envy, in the first place, and dangerous also for the best citizens in the State. Thirdly, fears bred of cowardice and iniquity [870d] have wrought many murders, — in cases where men do or have done things concerning which they desire that no one should share their secret; consequently, if there are any who might expose their secret, they remove them by death, whenever they can do so by no other means.

Concerning all these matters, the preludes mentioned shall be pronounced, and, in addition to them, that story which is believed by many when they hear it from the lips of those who seriously relate such things at their mystic rites, — that vengeance for such acts is exacted in Hades, 129 and that those who return again to this earth 130 are bound to pay [870e] the natural penalty, — each culprit the same, that is, which he inflicted on his victim, — and that their life on earth must end in their meeting a like fate at the hands of another. To him who obeys, and fully dreads such a penalty, there is no need to add to the prelude by reciting the law on the subject; [871a] but to the disobedient this is the law which shall be stated in the written code: — Whosoever of deliberate intent and unjustly slays with his own hand any of the tribesmen shall, in the first place, be debarred from the lawful assemblies, and shall not defile either temples or market or harbours or any other place of meeting, whether or not any person warns off the doer of such deeds — for he is warned off by the law, which is, and always will continue, warning him thus publicly, on behalf of the whole State; and the |259| man who fails to prosecute him when he ought, [871b] or fails to warn him of the fact that he is thus debarred, if he be of kin to the dead man on either the male or female side, and not further removed than a cousin, 131 shall, first, receive upon himself the defilement and the wrath of the gods, since the curse of the law brings also upon him that of the divine voice, and, secondly, he shall be liable to the action of whosoever pleases to punish him on behalf of the dead man. And he that wishes to punish him shall duly perform all that concerns the observance of the purifications proper therefor, and whatsoever else the god prescribes as lawful in these cases, [871c] and he shall recite the pronouncement of warning; and thus he shall go and compel the culprit to submit to the execution of the penalty according to law. That it is necessary that these proceedings should be accompanied by certain invocations and sacrifices to those gods whose concern it is that murders should not occur in States, it is easy for the lawgiver to demonstrate: who these gods are, and what method for bringing such prosecutions would be the most correct in point of ritual, — this the Law-wardens, in conjunction with the interpreters and seers and with the god, shall ordain; [871d] and so they shall bring these prosecutions. And the judges in these cases shall be the same persons who form — as we described 132 — the final court of trial for robbers of temples. He that is convicted shall be punished by death, and he shall not be buried in the land of the victim, because of the shamelessness as well as impiety of his act. If the culprit flees and refuses to come up for judgment, he shall be exiled with an unending exile; and if any such |261| person sets foot in the country of the murdered man, he of the dead man’s relatives or of the citizens that first meets with him [871e] shall slay him with impunity, or else bind him and hand him over to those magistrates who have judged the case, to be slain. The prosecutor, in a murder-charge, must at once demand bail from the defendant; and the latter shall provide three substantial securities — as approved by the court of the judges in such cases, — who guarantee to produce him at the trial; and if a man be unwilling or unable to provide these sureties, the court must take, bind and keep him, and produce him at the trial of the case. [872a] If a man does not slay another with his own hand, but plots death for him, and after killing him by design and plotting resides in the State, being responsible for the murder and not innocent or pure of heart in respect of it, — in his case the prosecutions on this charge shall proceed in the same way, except in the matter of bail. And the person convicted shall be allowed to have burial at home; but all else shall be carried out in his case in the same way as in the case last described. And these same regulations shall govern all cases where Strangers are at law with Strangers, or citizens and Strangers at law with each other, [872b] or slaves with slaves, in respect both of actual murder and of plotting to murder, except as regards bail; and as to this, just as it has been said that the actual murderers must be secured by guarantors, so these persons too must provide security to the person who proclaims the murder. If a slave willfully slay a free man, either by his own hand or by plotting, and be convicted at the trial, the public executioner |263| of the State shall drag him in the direction of the tomb of the dead man to a spot from which he can see the tomb, and there scourge him with as many stripes [872c] as the prosecutor shall prescribe; and if the murderer be still alive after the beating, he shall put him to death. And if a man kill a slave when he is doing no wrongs actuated by fear lest the slave should expose his own foul and evil deeds, or for any other such reason, just as he would have been liable to a charge of murder for slaving a citizen, so likewise he shall be liable in the same way for the death of such a slave.

Should cases occur of a kind for which it is a formidable and most unwelcome task to legislate, and yet impossible not to legislate, — such as murders of kinsfolk, either by a man’s own hand [872d] or by plotting, which are wholly willful and wicked, — crimes that occur for the most part in States with bad organisation and nurture, but may occur at times even in a country where one would not expect them, — we must again recite the story we uttered 133 a moment ago, if haply anyone, on hearing us, may become more strongly disposed in consequence voluntarily to abstain from murders of the most impious kind. The myth or story (or whatever [872e] one should call it) has been clearly stated, as derived from ancient priests, to the effect that Justice, the avenger of kindred blood, acting as overseer, employs the law just mentioned, and has ordained that the doer of such a deed must of necessity suffer the same as he has done: if ever a man has slain his father, he must endure to suffer the same violent fate at his own children’s hands in days to come; or if he |265| has slain his mother, he must of necessity come to birth sharing in the female nature, and when thus born be removed from life by the hands of his offspring in afterdays; for of the pollution of common blood there is no other purification, nor does the stain of pollution admit of being washed off [873a] before the soul which committed the act pays back murder for murder, like for like, and thus by propitiation lays to rest the wrath of all the kindred. Wherefore, in dread of such vengeances from Heaven a man should refrain himself; if, however, any should be overtaken by a disaster so lamentable that they have the audacity deliberately and of free will to reave soul from body for father, mother, brethren or children, in such cases the ordinance of the law of the mortal lawgiver stands thus: — [873b] The warnings of exclusion from customary places, and the sureties, are the same as those prescribed for former cases; and if any man be convicted of such a murder, and of having slain any of the persons named, the officers of the judges and magistrates shall kill him and cast him out naked at an appointed cross-roads outside the city; and all the magistrates, acting on behalf of the whole State, shall take each a stone and cast it on the head of the corpse, and thus make atonement for the whole State; and after this they shall carry the corpse to the borders of the land and cast it out [873c] unburied, according to law.

Now he that slays the person who is, as men say, nearest and dearest of all, — what penalty should he suffer? I mean the man that slays himself, — violently robbing himself of his Fate-given share of life, when this is not legally ordered by the State, and when he is not compelled to it by the occurrence of some intolerable |267| and inevitable misfortune, nor by falling into some disgrace that is beyond remedy or endurance, — but merely inflicting upon himself this iniquitous penalty owing to sloth and unmanly cowardice. In this case, the rest of the matters — concerning the rules [873d] about rites of purification and of burial — come within the cognizance of the god, and regarding these the next of kin must seek information from the interpreters and the laws dealing with these matters, and act in accordance with their instructions: but for those thus destroyed the tombs shall be, first, in an isolated position with not even one adjacent, and, secondly, they shall be buried in those borders of the twelve districts which are barren and nameless, without note, and with neither headstone nor name to indicate the tombs.

If a mule or any other animal murder anyone, — [873e] except when they do it when taking part in a public competition, — the relatives shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and so many of the land-stewards as are appointed by the relatives shall decide the case, and the convicted beast they shall kill and cast out beyond the borders of the country. If a lifeless thing rob a man of life — except it be lightning or some bolt from heaven, — if it be anything else than these which kills someone, either through his falling against it or its falling upon him, then the relative shall set the nearest neighbour [874a] to pass judgment on it, thus making atonement on behalf of himself and all his kindred, and the thing convicted they shall cast beyond the borders, as was stated in respect of animals.

If anyone be found evidently dead, and if his slayer be unknown and undiscoverable after |269| careful search, then the warnings shall be the same as in the other cases, including the warning of death [874b] to the doer of the deed, and the prosecutor, when he has proved his claim, shall give public warning in the market-place to the slayer of So-and-so, convicted of murder, not to set foot in holy places nor anywhere in the country of the victim, since, if he appears and is known, he shall be put to death and be cast out from the country of the victim without burial. So let this stand as one section of our code of law dealing with murder.

Thus far we have dealt with crimes of the kind described; in what follows we shall describe the cases and the circumstances under which the slayer will rightly be pronounced guiltless. If a man catch and slay a thief who is entering his house by night to steal goods, he shall be guiltless; [874c] and if a man in self-defence slay a footpad, he shall be guiltless. The man who forcibly violates a free woman or boy shall be slain with impunity by the person thus violently outraged, or by his father or brother or sons. And should a man discover his wedded wife being violated, if he kills the violator he shall be guiltless before the law. And if a man slay anyone when warding off death from his father (when he is doing no wrong), or from his mother or children or brethren, or from the mother of his own children, [874d] he shall be wholly guiltless. Thus let it be laid down by law respecting the nurture and training of living souls, — which when gained make life livable, but when missed, unlivable, — and respecting the punishments which ought to be imposed in cases of violent death. The regulations regarding the nurture and training of the body |271| have been stated: 134 but what comes next, namely, violent actions, both voluntary and involuntary, done by one against another, — these we must define as clearly as we can, stating their character and number [874e] and what punishment each duly deserves: such enactments, as it seems, will rightly follow on the foregoing.

Next in order after cases of death even the least competent of those who essay legislation would place cases of wounds and maiming. Wounds, just like murders, must be classed under several heads, — the involuntary, those done in passion, those done in fear, and all those that are voluntary and deliberate. Concerning all such cases we must make a prefatory pronouncement to this effect: — It is really necessary for men to make themselves laws and to live according to laws, or else to differ not at all from [875a] the most savage of beasts. The reason thereof is this, — that no man’s nature is naturally able both to perceive what is of benefit to the civic life of men and, perceiving it, to be alike able and willing to practise what is best. For, in the first place, it is difficult to perceive that a true civic art necessarily cares for the public, not the private, interest, — for the public interest bind States together, whereas the private interest rends them asunder, — and to perceive also that it benefits both public and private interests alike when the public interest, rather than the private, is well enacted. [875b] And, secondly, even if a man fully grasps the truth of this as a principle of art, should he afterwards get control of the State and become an irresponsible autocrat, he would never prove able to abide by this view and to continue always fostering |273| the public interest in the State as the object of first importance, to which the private interest is but secondary; rather, his mortal nature will always urge him on to grasping and self-interested action, irrationally avoiding pain [875c] and pursuing pleasure; both these objects it will prefer above justice and goodness, and by causing darkness within itself it will fill to the uttermost both itself and the whole State with all manner of evils. Yet if ever there should arise a man competent by nature and by a birthright of divine grace to assume such an office, he would have no need of rulers over him; for no law or ordinance is mightier than Knowledge, 135 nor is it right for Reason to be subject or in thrall to anything, but to be lord of all things, [875d] if it is really true to its name and free in its inner nature. But at present such a nature exists nowhere at all, except in small degree; wherefore we must choose what is second best, namely, ordinance and law, which see and discern the general principle, but are unable to see every instance in detail.

This declaration has been made for the sake of what follows: now we shall ordain what the man who has wounded, or in some way injured, another must suffer or pay. And here, of course, it is open to anyone, in regard to any case, to interrupt us, and quite properly, with the question — ‘What wounds has the man you speak of inflicted, [875e] and on whom, and how and when? For cases of wounding are countless in their variety, and they differ vastly from one another.’ So it is impossible for us either to commit all these eases to the law courts for trial, or to commit none of them. Yet in regard to them all there is one point that we must of necessity commit for decision, — the question of |275| fact; whether or not each of the alleged acts took place; [876a] and it is practically impossible for the lawgiver to refuse in all cases to commit to the courts the question regarding the proper penalty or fine to be inflicted on the culprit, and himself to pass laws respecting all such cases, great and small.

Clinias: What, then, is to be our next statement?

Athenian: This, — that some matters are to be committed to the courts, while others are not to be so committed, but enacted by the lawgiver.

Clinias: What are the matters to be enacted, and what are to be handed over to the law courts for decision?

Athenian: It will be best to make the following statement next, — [876b] that in a State where the courts are poor and dumb and decide their cases privily, secreting their own opinions, or (and this is a still more dangerous practice) when they make their decisions not silently but filled with tumult, like theatres, roaring out praise or blame of each speaker in turn, — then the whole State, as a rule, is faced with a difficult situation. To be compelled by some necessity to legislate for law courts of this kind is no happy task; but when one is so compelled, one must commit to them the right of fixing penalties [876c] only in a very few cases, dealing oneself with most cases by express legislation — if indeed one ever legislates at all for a State of that description. On the other hand, in a State where the courts have the best possible constitution, and the prospective judges are well-trained and tested most strictly, there it is right, and most fitting and proper, that we should commit to such judges for decision most of the questions regarding what penalties convicted criminals should |277| suffer or pay. On the present occasion we may well be pardoned [876d] if we refrain from ordaining for them by law the points that are most important and most numerous, which even ill-educated judges could discern, and could assign to each offence the penalty merited by the wrong as suffered and committed; and seeing that the people for whom we are legislating are themselves likely, as we suppose, to become not the least capable of judges of such matters, we must commit most of them to them. None the less, that course which we frequently adopted 136 when laying down our former laws, both by word and action — [876e] when we stated an outline and typical cases of punishments, and gave the judges examples, so as to prevent their ever overstepping the bounds of justice, — that course was a perfectly right one then, and now also we ought to adopt it, when we return again at last to the task of legislation.

So let our written law concerning wounding run thus: — If any man purposing of intent to kill a friendly person — save such as the law sends him against, — wounds him, but is unable to kill him, he that has thus purposed [877a] and dealt the wound does not deserve to be pitied; rather he is to be regarded exactly as a slayer, and must be compelled to submit to trial for murder; yet out of respect for his escape from sheer ill-fortune and for his Genius 137 — who in pity alike for him and for the wounded man saved the wound of the one from proving fatal and the fortune and crime of the other from proving accursed, — in gratitude to this Genius, and in compliance therewith, the wounder shall be relieved of the death-penalty, but |279| shall be deported for life [877b] to a neighbouring State, enjoying the fruits of all his own possessions. If he has done damage to the wounded man, he shall pay for it in full to him that is damaged; and the damage shall be assessed by the court which decides the case, which court shall consist of those who would have tried the culprit for murder if the man had died of the wound he received.

If in like manner, deliberately, a son wound his parents or a slave his master, death shall be the penalty; and if a brother wound in like manner a brother or sister, or a sister wound a brother or sister, [877c] and be convicted of wounding deliberately, death shall be the penalty. A wife that has wounded her husband, or a husband his wife, with intent to kill, shall be exiled for life: if they have sons or daughters who are still children, the guardians shall administer their property, and shall take charge of the children as orphans; but if they be already grown men, the offspring shall be compelled to support their exiled parent, and they shall possess his property. If any person overtaken by such a disaster be childless, the kinsfolk [877d] on both sides, both male and female, as far as cousins’ children, shall meet together and appoint an heir for the house in question — the 5040th in the State. — taking counsel with the Law-wardens and priests; and they shall bear in mind this principle, that no house of the 5040 belongs as much, either by private or public right, to the occupier or to the whole of his kindred as it belongs to the State; [877e] and the State must needs keep its own houses as holy and happy as possible. Therefore, whenever any house is at once |281| unhappy and unholy, in that the owner thereof leaves no children, hut — being either unmarried or, though married, childless — dies, after having been convicted of willful murder or of some other offence against gods or citizens for which death is the penalty expressly laid down in the law; or else if any man who is without male issue be exiled for life; — then they shall be in duty bound, in the first place, to make purifications and expiations for this house, and, in the next place, the relatives, [878a] as we said just now, must meet together and in consultation with the Law-wardens consider what family there is in the State which is pre-eminent for goodness, and prosperous withal, and containing several children. Then from the family selected they shall adopt one child on behalf of the dead man’s father and ancestors to be a son of theirs, and they shall name him after one of them, for the sake of the omen — with a prayer that in this wise he may prove to them a begetter of offspring, a hearth-master and a minister in holy and sacred things, and be blest with happier fortune than his (official) father; [878b] him they shall thus establish legally as lot-holder, and the offender they shall suffer to lie nameless and childless and portionless, whenever such calamities overtake him.

It is not the fact, as it would seem, that in the case of all objects boundary is contiguous with boundary; but where there is a neutral strip, which lies between the two boundaries, impinging on each, it will be midway between both. And that is precisely the description we gave 138 of the passionate action as one which lies midway between involuntary |283| and voluntary actions. So let the law stand thus respecting woundings committed in anger: — If a person be convicted, in the first place he shall pay [878c] double the damage, in case the wound prove to be curable, but four times the damage in case of incurable wounds. And if the wound be curable, but cause great shame and disgrace to the wounded party, the culprit shall pay three times the damage. And if ever a person, in wounding anyone, do damage to the State as well as to the victim, by rendering him incapable of helping his country against its enemies, such a person, in addition to the rest of the damages, shall pay also for the damage done to the State: in addition to his own military service, he shall do service also as a substitute for the incapacitated man, [878d] and carry out his military duties in his place, or, if he fails to do so, he shall by law be liable to prosecution for shirking military service, at the hands of anyone who pleases. The due proportion of the damage payable — whether two, three, or four times the actual amount — shall be fixed by the judges who have voted on the case. If a kinsman wound a kinsman in the same way as the person just mentioned, the members of his tribe and kin, both males and females, as far as cousins’ children on both the male and female side, [878e] shall meet together and, after coming to a decision, shall hand over the case to the natural parents for assessment of the damage; and if the assessment be disputed, the kindred on the male side shall be authorized to make a binding assessment; and if they prove unable to do so, they shall refer the matter finally to the Law-wardens. When woundings of this kind are inflicted by children on parents, the judges shall be, of necessity, men |285| over sixty years of age who have genuine, and not merely adopted, children of their own; and if a person be convicted, they shall assess the penalty — whether such a person ought to be put to deaths or ought to suffer some other punishment still more severe, or possibly a little less severe: but none of the relatives of the culprit shall act as a judge, [879a] not even if he be of the full age stated in the law. If a slave wound a free man in rage, his owner shall hand over the slave to the wounded man to be dealt with just as he pleases; and if he do not hand over the slave, he shall himself make good the damage to the full. And if any man alleges that the deed was a trick concocted by the slave in collusion with the wounded party, he shall dispute the case: if he fail to win it, he shall pay three times the damage, but if he win, he shall hold liable for kidnapping the man who contrived the trick in collusion with the slave. [879b] Whoever wounds another involuntarily shall pay a single equivalent for the damage (since no law-giver is able to control fortune), and the judges shall be those designated to act in cases of the wounding of parents by children; and they shall assess the due proportion of damage payable.

All the cases we have now dealt with are of suffering due to violence, and the whole class of cases of ‘outrage’ involve violence. Regarding such cases, the view that should be held by everyone, — man, woman and child, — is this, that the older is greatly more revered than the younger, both among the gods and among those men who propose to keep safe and happy. [879c] An outrage perpetrated by a younger against an older person is a shameful thing to see happening in a State, and a thing hateful to God: |287| when a young man is beaten by an old man, it is meet that, in every ease, he should quietly endure his anger, and thus store up honour for the time of his own old age. Therefore let the law stand thus: — Everyone shall reverence his elder both by deed and word; whosoever, man or woman, exceeds himself in age by twenty years he shall regard as a father or a mother, and he shall keep his hands off that person, and he shall ever refrain himself, for the sake of the gods of birth, from all the generation [879d] of those who are potentially his own bearers and begetters. So likewise he shall keep his hands off a Stranger, be he long resident or newly arrived; neither as aggressor nor in self-defence shall he venture at all to chastise such an one with blows. If he deems that a Stranger has shown outrageous audacity in beating him and needs correction, he shall seize the man and take him before the bench of the city-stewards (but refrain from beating him), so that he may flee the thought of [879e] ever daring to strike a native. And the city-stewards shall take over the Stranger and examine him — with due respect for the God of Strangers; 139 and if he really appears to have beaten the native unjustly, they shall give the Stranger as many strokes of the scourge as he himself inflicted, and make him cease from his foreign frowardness; but if he has not acted unjustly, they shall threaten and reprove the man who arrested him, and dismiss them both. If a man of a certain age beat a man of his own age, or one above his own age who is childless, — [880a] whether it be a case of an old man beating an old man, or of a young man beating a young man, — the man attacked shall defend himself with bare hands, as nature dictates, and without a weapon. |289| But if a man over forty ventures to fight, whether as aggressor or in self-defence, he shall be called a knave and a boor, and if he finds himself incurring a degrading sentence, he will be getting his deserts. Any man who lends a ready ear to such exhortations will prove easy to manage; but he that is intractable and pays no regard to the prelude will hearken readily [880b] to a law to this effect: — If anyone beats a person who is twenty or more years older than himself, in the first place, whoever comes upon them, if he be neither of equal age nor younger, shall try to separate them, or else be held to be a coward in the eyes of the law; and if he be of a like age with the man assaulted or still younger, he shall defend him who is wronged as he would a brother or a father or a still older progenitor. Further, he that dares to strike the older man in the way described shall be liable also to an action for outrage, and if he be convicted, [880c] he shall be imprisoned for not less than a year; and if the judges assess the penalty at a longer period, the period so assessed shall be binding on him. And if a Stranger or a resident alien beat a man older than himself by twenty or more years, the same law regarding help from bystanders shall be equally binding; and he that is cast in a suit of this kind, if he be a non-resident Stranger, shall be imprisoned for two years and fulfil this sentence; and he that is a resident alien and disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court assess his penalty at a longer period. [880d] And the man who is a bystander in any of these cases of assault, and who fails to give help as the law prescribes, shall be penalised — by a fine of a mina, if he be a man of the highest property-class; of fifty drachmae, if he be of the second class; of thirty |291| drachmae, if of the third; and of twenty drachmae, if of the fourth class. And the court for such cases shall consist of the generals, taxiarchs, phylarchs, and hipparchs.

Laws, it would seem, are made partly [880e] for the sake of good men, to afford them instruction as to what manner of intercourse will best secure for them friendly association one with another, and partly also for the sake of those who have shunned education, and who, being of a stubborn nature, have had no softening treatment 140 to prevent their taking to all manner of wickedness. It is because of these men that the laws which follow have to be stated, — laws which the lawgiver must enact of necessity, on their account, although wishing that the need for them may never arise. Whosoever shall dare to lay hands on father or mother, or their progenitors, and to use outrageous violence, fearing neither the wrath of the gods above nor that of the Avengers (as they are called) of the underworld, but scorning the ancient and world-wide traditions [881a] (thinking he knows what he knows not at all), and shall thus transgress the law, — for such a man there is needed some most severe deterrent. Death is not a most severe penalty; and the punishments we are told of in Hades for such offences, although more severe than death and described most truly, yet fail to prove any deterrent to souls such as these, — else we should never find cases of matricide and of impiously audacious assaults [881b] upon other progenitors. Consequently, the punishments inflicted upon these men here in their lifetime |293| for crimes of this kind must, so far as possible, fall in no way short of the punishments in Hades. So the next pronouncement shall run thus: — Whosoever shall dare to beat his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, if he be not afflicted with madness,— in the first place, the bystander shall give help, as in the former cases, and the resident Stranger who helps shall be invited to a first-row seat at the public games, but he who fails to help shall be banished from the country for life; [881c] and the non-resident Stranger shall receive praise if he helps, and blame if he does not help; and the slave who helps shall be made free, but if he fails to help he shall be beaten with 100 stripes of a scourge by the market-stewards, if the assault occur in the market, and if it occur in the city, but outside the market-place, the punishment shall be inflicted by the city-steward in residence, and if it occur in any country district, by the officers of the country-stewards. And the bystander who is a native — whether man, woman, or boy — shall in every case drive off the attacker, crying out against his impiety; [881d] and he that fails to drive him off shall be liable by law to the curse of Zeus, guardian-god of kinship and parentage. And if a man be convicted on a charge of outrageous assault upon parents, in the first place he shall be banished for life from the city to other parts of the country, and he shall keep away from all sacred places; and if he fails to keep away, the country-stewards shall punish him with stripes, and in any other way they choose, and if he returns again he shall be punished with death. And if any free man voluntarily eat or drink or hold any similar intercourse with such an one, [881e] or even give him merely a greeting |295| when he meets him, he shall not enter any holy-place or the market or any part of the city until he be purified, but he shall regard himself as having incurred a share of contagious guilt; and should he disobey the law and illegally defile sacred things and the State, any magistrate who notices his case and fails to bring him up for trial shall have to face this omission as one of the heaviest charges against him at his audit. [882a] If it be a slave that strikes the free man — stranger or citizen — the bystander shall help, failing which he shall pay the penalty as fixed according to his assessment; 141 and the bystanders together with the person assaulted [882b] shall bind the slave, and hand him over to the injured person, and he shall take charge of him and bind him in fetters, and give him as many stripes with the scourge as he pleases, provided that he does not spoil his value to the damage of his master, to whose ownership he shall hand him over according to law. The law shall stand thus: — Whosoever, being a slave, beats a free man without order of the magistrates, — him his owner shall take over in bonds from the person assaulted, and he shall not loose him until the slave have convinced the person assaulted that he deserves to live [882c] loosed from bonds. The same laws shall hold good for all such cases when both parties are women, or when the plaintiff is a woman and the defendant a man, or the plaintiff a man and the defendant a woman.

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Laws Book X.

[884a]

Athenian: Next after cases of outrage we shall state for cases of violence one universally inclusive principle of law, to this effect: — No one shall carry or drive off anything which belongs to others, nor shall he use any of his neighbour’s goods unless he has gained the consent of the owner; for from such action proceed all the evils above mentioned — past, present and to come. Of the rest, the most grave are the licentious and outrageous acts of the young; and outrages offend most gravely when they are directed against sacred things, and they are especially grave when they are directed against objects which are public as well as holy, or partially public, as being shared in by the members of a tribe or other similar community. Second, and second in point of gravity, come offences against sacred objects and tombs that are private; [885a] and third, offences against parents, when a person commits the outrage otherwise than in the cases already described. 142 A fourth 143 kind of outrage is when a man, in defiance of the magistrates, drives or carries off or uses any of their things without their own consent; and a fifth kind will be an outrage against the civic right of an individual private citizen which calls for judicial vindication. To all these severally one all-embracing law must be assigned. As to temple-robbing, whether done by open violence or secretly, [885b] it has been already stated summarily what the punishment should be; and in respect of all the outrages, whether |299| of word or deed, which a man commits, either by tongue or hand, against the gods, we must state the punishment he should suffer, after we have first delivered the admonition. It shall be as follows: — No one who believes, as the laws prescribe, in the existence of the gods has ever yet done an impious deed voluntarily, or uttered a lawless word: he that acts so is in one or other of these three conditions of mind — either he does not believe in what I have said; or, secondly, he believes that the gods exist, but have no care for men; or, thirdly, he believes that they are easy to win over when bribed by offerings and prayers. 144 [885c]

Clinias: What, then, shall we do or say to such people?

Athenian: Let us listen first, my good sir, to what they, as I imagine, say mockingly, in their contempt for us.

Clinias: What is it?

Athenian: In derision they would probably say this: ‘O Strangers of Athens, Lacedaemon and Crete, what you say is true. Some of us do not believe in gods at all; others of us believe in gods of the kinds you mention. So we claim now, as you claimed in the matter of laws, [885d] that before threatening us harshly, you should first try to convince and teach us. by producing adequate proofs, that gods exist, and that they are too good to be wheedled by gifts and turned aside from justice. For as it is, this and such as this is the account of them we hear from those who are reputed the best of poets, orators, seers, priests, and thousands upon thousands of others; and consequently most of us, instead of seeking to avoid wrong-doing, do the |301| wrong and then try to make it good. [885e] Now from law-givers like you, who assert that you are gentle rather than severe, we claim that you should deal with us first by way of persuasion; and if what you say about the existence of the gods is superior to the arguments of others in point of truth, even though it be but little superior in eloquence, then probably you would succeed in convincing us. Try then, if you think this reasonable, to meet our challenge.’

Clinias: Surely it seems easy, Stranger, to assert with truth [886a] that gods exist?

Athenian: How so?

Clinias: First, there is the evidence of the earth, the sun, the stars, and all the universe, and the beautiful ordering of the seasons, marked out by years and months; and then there is the further fact that all Greeks and barbarians believe in the existence of gods.

Athenian: My dear sir, these bad men cause me alarm — for I will never call it ‘awe’ — lest haply they scoff at us. For the cause of the corruption in their case is one you are not aware of; since you imagine that it is solely by their incontinence in regard to pleasures and desires [886b] that their souls are impelled to that impious life of theirs.

Clinias: What other cause can there be, Stranger, besides this?

Athenian: One which you, who live elsewhere, could hardly have any knowledge of or notice at all.

Clinias: What is this cause you are now speaking of?

Athenian: A very grievous unwisdom which is reputed to be the height of wisdom. |303|

Clinias: What do you mean?

Athenian: We at Athens have accounts 145 preserved in writing (though, I am told, such do not exist in your country, owing to the excellence of your polity), [886c] some of them being in a kind of metre, others without metre, telling about the gods: the oldest of these accounts relate how the first substance of Heaven and all else came into being, and shortly after the beginning they go on to give a detailed theogony, and to tell how, after they were born, the gods associated with one another. These accounts, whether good or bad for the hearers in other respects, it is hard for us to censure because of their antiquity; but as regards the tendance and respect due to parents, I certainly would never praise them or say that they are either helpful or wholly true accounts. [886d] Such ancient accounts, however, we may pass over and dismiss: let them be told in the way best pleasing to the gods. It is rather the novel views of our modern scientists 146 that we must hold responsible as the cause of mischief. For the result of the arguments of such people is this, — that when you and I try to prove the existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects — sun, moon, stars, and earth — as instances of deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will assert that these things are simply earth and stone, [886e] incapable of paying any heed to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are speciously tricked out with arguments to make them plausible.

Clinias: The assertion you mention, Stranger, is indeed a dangerous one, even if it stood alone; but now that such assertions are legion, the danger is still greater. |305|

Athenian: What then? What shall we say? What must we do? Are we to make our defence as it were before a court of impious men, where someone had accused us [887a] of doing something dreadful by assuming in our legislation the existence of gods? Or shall we rather dismiss the whole subject and revert again to our laws, lest our prelude prove actually more lengthy than the laws? For indeed our discourse would be extended in no small degree if we were to furnish those men who desire to be impious with an adequate demonstration by means of argument concerning those subjects which ought, as they claimed, to be discussed, and so to convert them to fear of the gods, and then finally, when we had caused them to shrink from irreligion, to proceed to enact the appropriate laws. [887b]

Clinias: Still, Stranger, we have frequently (considering the shortness of the time) made 147 this very statement, — that we have no need on the present occasion to prefer brevity of speech to lengthiness (for, as the saying goes, ‘no one is chasing on our heels’); and to show ourselves choosing the briefest in preference to the best would be mean and ridiculous. And it is of the highest importance that our arguments, showing that the gods exist and that they are good and honour justice more than do men, should by all means possess some degree of persuasiveness; [887c] for such a prelude is the best we could have in defence, as one may say, of all our laws. So without any repugnance or undue haste, and with all the capacity we have for endowing such arguments with |307| persuasiveness, let us expound them as fully as we can, and without any reservation.

Athenian: This speech of yours seems to me to call for a prefatory prayer, seeing that you are so eager and ready; nor is it possible any longer to defer our statement. Come, then; how is one to argue on behalf of the existence of the gods without passion? For we needs must be vexed and indignant with the men who have been, and now are, [887d] responsible for laying on us this burden of argument, through their disbelief in those stories which they used to hear, while infants and sucklings, from the lips of their nurses and mothers — stories chanted to them, as it were, in lullabies, whether in jest or in earnest; and the same stories they heard repeated also in prayers at sacrifices, and they saw spectacles which illustrated them, of the kind which the young delight to see and hear when performed at sacrifices; and their own parents they saw showing the utmost zeal on behalf of themselves and their children in addressing the gods in prayers and supplications, as though they most certainly existed; and at the rising and setting of the sun and moon [887e] they heard and saw the prostrations and devotions of all the Greeks and barbarians, under all conditions of adversity and prosperity, directed to these luminaries, not as though they were not gods, but as though they most certainly were gods beyond the shadow of a doubt — all this evidence is contemned by these people, and that for no sufficient reason, as everyone endowed with a grain of sense would affirm; and so they are now forcing us to enter on our present argument. [888a] How, I ask, can one possibly use mild terms in admonishing such men, and at the same |309| time teach them, to begin with, that the gods do exist? Yet one must bravely attempt the task; for it would never do for both parties to be enraged at once, — the one owing to greed for pleasure, the other with indignation at men like them.

So let our prefatory address to the men thus corrupted in mind be dispassionate in tone, and, quenching our passion, let us speak mildly, as though we were conversing with one particular person of the kind described, in the following terms: ‘My child, you are still young, and time as it advances [888b] will cause you to reverse many of the opinions you now hold: so wait till then before pronouncing judgment on matters of most grave importance; and of these the gravest of all — though at present you regard it as naught — is the question of holding a right view about the gods and so living well, or the opposite. Now in the first place, I should be saying what is irrefutably true if I pointed out to you this signal fact, that neither you by yourself nor yet your friends are the first and foremost to adopt this opinion about the gods; rather is it true that people who suffer from this disease are always springing up, in greater or less numbers. But I, who have met with many of these people, would declare this to you, that not a single man [888c] who from his youth has adopted this opinion, that the gods have no existence, has ever yet continued till old age constant in the same view; but the other two false notions about the gods do remain — not, indeed, with many, but still with some, — the notion, namely, that the gods exist, but pay no heed to human affairs, and the other notion that they do pay heed, but are easily won over by prayers and offerings. For a doctrine about them |311| that is to prove the truest you can possibly form you will, if you take my advice, wait, considering the while whether the truth stands thus or otherwise, [888d] and making enquiries not only from all other men, but especially from the lawgiver; and in the meantime do not dare to be guilty of any impiety in respect of the gods. For it must be the endeavour of him who is legislating for you both now and hereafter to instruct you in the truth of these matters.’

Clinias: Our statement thus far, Stranger, is most excellent.

Athenian: Very true, O Megillus and Clinias; but we have plunged unawares into a wondrous argument.

Clinias: What is it you mean? [888e]

Athenian: That which most people account to be the most scientific of all arguments.

Clinias: Explain more clearly.

Athenian: It is stated by some that all things which are coming into existence, or have or will come into existence, do so partly by nature, partly by art, and partly owing to chance.

Clinias: Is it not a right statement?

Athenian: It is likely, to be sure, that what men of science say is true. Anyhow, let us follow them up, and consider [889a] what it is that the people in their camp really intend.

Clinias: By all means let us do so.

Athenian: It is evident, they assert, that the greatest and most beautiful things are the work of nature and of chance, and the lesser things that of art, — for art receives from nature the great and primary products as existing, and itself moulds and shapes all the smaller ones, which we commonly call ‘artificial.’ |313|

Clinias: How do you mean? [889b]

Athenian: I will explain it more clearly. Fire and water and earth and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art; and by means of these, which are wholly inanimate, the bodies which come next — those, namely, of the earth, sun, moon and stars — have been brought into existence. It is by chance all these elements move, by the interplay of their respective forces, and according as they meet together and combine fittingly, — hot with cold, dry with moist, [889c] soft with hard, and all such necessary mixtures as result from the chance combination of these opposites, — in this way and by these means they have brought into being the whole Heaven and all that is in the Heaven, and all animals, too, and plants — after that all the seasons had arisen from these elements; and all this, as they assert, not owing to reason, nor to any god or art, but owing, as we have said, to nature and chance. 148 As a later product of these, art comes later; and it, being mortal itself and of mortal birth, begets later playthings [889d] which share but little in truth, being images of a sort akin to the arts themselves — images such as painting begets, and music, and the arts which accompany these. Those arts which really produce something serious are such as share their effect with nature, — like medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic. Politics too, as they say, shares to a small extent in nature, but mostly in art; and in like manner all legislation which is [889e] based on untrue assumptions is due, not to nature, but to art. |315|

Clinias: What do you mean?

Athenian: The first statement, my dear sir, which these people make about the gods is that they exist by art and not by nature, — by certain legal conventions 149 which differ from place to place, according as each tribe agreed when forming their laws. They assert, moreover, that there is one class of things beautiful by nature, and another class beautiful by convention; 150 while as to things just, they do not exist at all by nature, but men are constantly in dispute about them and continually altering them, and whatever alteration they make at any time [890a] is at that time authoritative, though it owes its existence to art and the laws, and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views which young people imbibe from men of science, both prose-writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force; whence it comes that the young people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also arise, when these teachers attract them towards the life that is right ‘according to nature,’ which consists in being master over the rest in reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention. 151 [890b]

Clinias: What a horrible statement you have described, Stranger! And what widespread corruption of the young in private families as well as publicly in the States!

Athenian: That is indeed true, Clinias. What, then, |317| do you think the lawgiver ought to do, seeing that these people have been armed in this way for a long time past? Should he merely stand up in the city and threaten all the people that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive them in their minds to be such as the law maintains; 152 and so likewise with regard to the beautiful and the just and all the greatest things, [890c] as many as relate to virtue and vice, that they must regard and perform these in the way prescribed by the lawgiver in his writings; and that whosoever fails to show himself obedient to the laws must either be put to death or else be punished, in one case by stripes and imprisonment, in another by degradation, in others by poverty and exile? But as to persuasion, should the lawgiver, while enacting the people’s laws, refuse to blend any persuasion with his statements, and thus tame them so far as possible? [890d]

Clinias: Certainly not, Stranger; on the contrary, if persuasion can be applied in such matters in even the smallest degree, no lawgiver who is of the slightest account must ever grow weary, but must (as they say) ‘leave no stone unturned’ 153 to reinforce the ancient saying that gods exist, and all else that you recounted just now; and law itself he must also defend and art, as things which exist by nature or by a cause not inferior to nature, since according to right reason they are the offspring of mind, even as you are now, as I think, asserting; and I agree with you.

Athenian: What now, my most ardent Clinias? Are |319| not statements thus made to the masses [890e] difficult for us to keep up with in argument, and do they not also involve us in arguments portentously long?

Clinias: Well now, Stranger, if we had patience with ourselves when we discoursed at such length on the subjects of drinking and music, 154 shall we not exercise patience in dealing with the gods and similar subjects? Moreover, such a discourse is of the greatest help for intelligent legislation, [891a] since legal ordinances when put in writing remain wholly unchanged, as though ready to submit to examination for all time, so that one need have no fear even if they are hard to listen to at first, seeing that even the veriest dullard can come back frequently to examine them, nor yet if they are length), provided that they are beneficial. Consequently, in my opinion, it could not possibly be either reasonable or pious for any man to refrain from lending his aid to such arguments to the best of his power. 155

Megillus: What Clinias says, Stranger, is, I think, most excellent. [891b]

Athenian: Most certainly it is, Megillus; and we must do as he says. For if the assertions mentioned had not been sown broadcast well-nigh over the whole world of men, there would have been no need of counter-arguments to defend the existence of the god’s; but as it is, they are necessary. For when the greatest laws are being destroyed by wicked men, who is more bound to come to their rescue than the lawgiver?

Megillus: No one.

Athenian: Come now, Clinias, do you also answer me again, [891c] for you too must take a hand in the argument): it appears that the person who makes |321| these statements holds fire, water, earth and air to be the first of all things, and that it is precisely to these things that he gives the name of ‘nature,’ while soul he asserts to be a later product therefrom. Probably, indeed, he does not merely ‘appear’ to do this, but actually makes it clear to us in his account.

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Can it be then, in Heaven’s name, that now we have discovered, as it were, a very fountain-head of irrational opinion in all the men who have ever yet handled physical investigations? Consider, and examine each statement. For it is a matter [891d] of no small importance if it can be shown that those who handle impious arguments, and lead others after them, employ their arguments not only ill, but erroneously. And this seems to me to be the state of affairs.

Clinias: Well said; but try to explain wherein the error lies.

Athenian: We shall probably have to handle rather an unusual argument.

Clinias: We must not shrink, Stranger. You think, I perceive, that we shall be traversing alien ground, outside legislation, if we handle such arguments. But if there is no other way in which it is possible for us to speak in concert with the truth, as now legally declared, [891e] except this way, then in this way, my good sir, we must speak.

Athenian: It appears, then, that I may at once proceed with an argument that is somewhat unusual; it is this. That which is the first cause of becoming and perishing in all things, this is declared by the arguments which have produced the soul of the impious |323| to be not first, but generated later, and that which is the later to be the earlier; and because of this they have fallen into error regarding the real nature of divine existence. [892a]

Clinias: I do not yet understand.

Athenian: As regards the soul, my comrade, nearly all men appear to be ignorant of its real nature and its potency, and ignorant not only of other facts about it, but of its origin especially, — how that it is one of the first existences, and prior to all bodies, and that it more than anything else is what governs all the changes and modifications of bodies. And if this is really the state of the case, must not things which are akin to soul be necessarily prior in origin to things which belong to body, seeing that soul [892b] is older than body? 156

Clinias: Necessarily.

Athenian: Then opinion and reflection and thought and art and law will be prior to things hard and soft and heavy and light; and further, the works and actions that are great and primary will be those of art, while those that are natural, and nature itself, — which they wrongly call by this name — will be secondary, and will derive their origin from art and reason. [892c]

Clinias: How are they wrong?

Athenian: By ‘nature’ they intend to indicate production of things primary; but if soul shall be shown to have been produced first (not fire or air), but soul first and foremost, — it would most truly be described as a superlatively ‘natural’ existence. Such is the state of the case, provided that one can prove that soul is older than body, but not otherwise. |325|

Clinias: Most true.

Athenian: Shall we then, in the next place, address ourselves to the task of proving this? [892d]

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Let us guard against a wholly deceitful argument, lest haply it seduce us who are old with its specious youthfulness, and then elude us and make us a laughing-stock, and so we get the reputation of missing even little things while aiming at big things. Consider then. Suppose that we three had to cross a river that was in violent flood, and that I, being the youngest of the party and having often had experience of currents, were to suggest that the proper course [892e] is for me to make an attempt first by myself — leaving you two in safety — to see whether it is possible for you older men also to cross, or how the matter stands, and then, if the river proved to be clearly fordable, I were to call you, and, by my experience, help you across, while if it proved impassable for such as you, in that case the risk should be wholly mine, — such a suggestion on my part would have sounded reasonable. So too in the present instance; the argument now in front of us is too violent, and probably impassable, for such strength as you possess; so, lest it make you faint and dizzy as it rushes past and poses you with questions [893a] you are unused to answering, 157 and thus causes an unpleasing lack of shapeliness and seemliness, I think that I ought now to act in the way described — question myself first, while you remain listening in safety, and then return answer to my- self, and in this way proceed through the whole argument until it has discussed in full the subject of soul, and demonstrated that soul is prior to body. 158 |327|

Clinias: Your suggestion, Stranger, we think excellent; so do as you suggest. [893b]

Athenian: Come then, — if ever we ought to invoke God’s aid, now is the time it ought to be done. Let the gods be invoked with all zeal to aid in the demonstration of their own existence. And let us hold fast, so to speak, to a safe cable as we embark on the present discussion. And it is safest, as it seems to me, to adopt the following method of reply when questions such as this are put on these subjects; for instance, when a man asks me — ‘Do all things stand still, Stranger, and nothing move? Or is the exact opposite the truth? Or do some things move [893c] and some remain at rest?’ My answer will be, ‘Some things move, others remain at rest.’ 159 ‘Then do not the standing things stand, and the moving things move, in a certain place?’ ‘Of course.’ ‘And some will do this in one location, and others in several.’ ‘You mean,’ we will say, ‘that those which have the quality of being at rest at the centre move in one location, as when the circumference of circles that are said to stand still revolves?’ ‘Yes. And we perceive that motion of this kind, which simultaneously turns in this revolution both the largest circle and the smallest, distributes itself [893d] to small and great proportionally, altering in proportion its own quantity; whereby it functions as the source of all such marvels as result from its supplying great and small circles simultaneously with harmonizing rates of slow and fast speeds — a condition of things that one might suppose to be impossible.’ ‘Quite true.’ ‘And by things moving in several places you seem to me to mean all things that move by locomotion, continually |329| passing from one spot to another, and sometimes resting [893e] on one axis 160 and sometimes, by revolving, on several axes. And whenever one such object meets another, if the other is at rest, the moving object is split up; but if they collide with others moving to meet them from an opposite direction, they form a combination which is midway between the two.’ ‘Yes, I affirm that these things are so, just as you describe.’ ‘Further, things increase when combined and decrease when separated in all cases where the regular constitution 161 of each persists; but if this does not remain, then both these conditions cause them to perish. And what is the condition which must occur [894a] in everything to bring about generation? Obviously whenever a starting-principle receiving increase comes to the second change, and from this to the next, and on coming to the third admits of perception by percipients. 162 Everything comes into being by this process of change and alteration: and a thing is really existent whenever it remains fixed, but when it changes into another constitution it is utterly destroyed.’ Have we now, my friends, mentioned all the forms of motion, capable of numerical classification, 163 [894b] save only two?

Clinias: What two?

Athenian: Those, my good sir, for the sake of which, one may say, the whole of our present enquiry was undertaken. |331|

Clinias: Explain more clearly.

Athenian: It was undertaken, was it not, for the sake of soul?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: As one of the two let us count that motion which is always able to move other things, but unable to move itself; and that motion which always is able to move both itself and other things, — by way of combination and separation, of increase and decrease, of generation and corruption, — let us count as another separate unit [894c] in the total number of motions.

Clinias: Be it so.

Athenian: Thus we shall reckon as ninth on the list that motion which always moves another object and is moved by another; while that motion which moves both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all forms of action and passion, and is termed the real change and motion of all that really exists, — it, I presume, we shall call the tenth. [894d]

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: Of our total of ten motions, which shall we most correctly adjudge to be the most powerful of all and excelling in effectiveness?

Clinias: We are bound to affirm that the motion which is able to move itself excels infinitely, and that all the rest come after it.

Athenian: Well said. Must we. then, alter one or two of the wrong statements we have now made?

Clinias: Which do you mean?

Athenian: Our statement about the tenth seems wrong.

Clinias: How?

Athenian: Logically it is first in point of origin and |333| power; and the next one is second to it, [894e] although we absurdly called it ninth a moment ago.

Clinias: What do you mean?

Athenian: This: when we find one thing changing another, and this in turn another, and so on, — of these things shall we ever find one that is the prime cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands upon thousands of things, [895a] will the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself?

Clinias: Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.

Athenian: Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus: — Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and stand still, — as most of these thinkers 164 venture to maintain, — which of the motions mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course, which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted beforehand by another thing, [895b] since no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the self-moving motion is the starting-point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and potent change of all, while the motion which is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second. |335|

Clinias: Most true.

Athenian: Now that we have come to this point in our discourse, [895c] here is a question we may answer.

Clinias: What is it?

Athenian: If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in combination, what condition should we say exists in such a thing?

Clinias: What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a thing as ‘alive’ when it moves itself?

Athenian: Yes.

Clinias: It is alive, to be sure.

Athenian: Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive?

Clinias: We must. [895d]

Athenian: Now stop a moment, in Heaven’s name! Would you not desire to observe three points about every object?

Clinias: What do you mean?

Athenian: One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name; 165 and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked.

Clinias: How two?

Athenian: At one time each of us, propounding the name by itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding the definition by itself, he demands the name.

Clinias: Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?

Athenian: Of what kind? |337| [895e]

Clinias: We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is ‘the even,’ and the definition is ‘a number divisible into two equal parts.’

Athenian: Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition, — describing one and the same object by the name ‘even,’ and by the definition ‘a number divisible into two halves’?

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: What is the definition of that object which has for its name ‘soul’? [896a] Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now — ‘the motion able to move itself’?

Clinias: Do you assert that ‘self-movement’ is the definition of that very same substance which has ‘soul’ as the name we universally apply to it?

Athenian: That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, Has been, and shall be, [896b] and of all that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

Clinias: We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.

Athenian: Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in |339| order — or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it, — it being the change of a really soulless body?

Clinias: True.

Athenian: Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement [896c] to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.

Clinias: Yes, most veracious.

Athenian: We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed 166 that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things of soul also will be older than those of body.

Clinias: Certainly we do. [896d]

Athenian: Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and strength, if soul is prior to body.

Clinias: Necessarily.

Athenian: Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?

Clinias: Of course we must.

Athenian: And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things [896e] everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you — ‘several.’ Anyhow, let us assume not |341| less than two — the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind

Clinias: You are perfectly right.

Athenian: Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, [897a] of which the names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are prime-working motions; these, when they take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease and separation and combination, 167 and, supervening on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, [897b] hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all respects the opposite. Shall we postulate that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?

Clinias: By no means.

Athenian: Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is wise and full of goodness, or that which [897c] has neither quality? To this shall we make reply as follows?

Clinias: How?

Athenian: If, my good sir, we are to assert that the |343| whole course and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a motion like to the motion and revolution and reckonings of reason, 168 and proceed in a kindred manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course, which is of the kind described.

Clinias: You are right. [897d]

Athenian: But the bad soul, if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way.

Clinias: That also is right.

Athenian: Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer wisely; consequently, it is fitting that you should now call me in to assist you with the answer.

Clinias: Very good.

Athenian: In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the sun, 169 as though with mortal eyes we could ever behold reason and know it fully; [897e] the safer way to behold the object with which our question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions which reason resembles; reminding ourselves of which 170 I, along with you, will make answer.

Clinias: You will probably speak admirably.

Athenian: Do we still recollect thus much about the things then described, that we assumed that, of the total, some were in motion, others at rest? |345|

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: And further, that, of those in motion, some move in one place, [898a] others move in several places?

Clinias: That is so.

Athenian: And that, of these two motions, the motion which moves in one place must necessarily move always round some centre, being a copy of the turned wheels; and that this has the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason? 171

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: If we described them both as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system — reason, namely, and the motion that spins in one place [898b] (likened to the spinning of a turned globe), — we should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful in the construction of fair images by speech.

Clinias: Most true.

Athenian: On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order [898c] or system or rule — will not this motion be akin to absolute unreason?

Clinias: It will, in very truth.

Athenian: So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find driving everything round, we must affirm that this circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite. |347|

Clinias: But, Stranger, judging by what has now been said, it is actually impious to make any other assertion than that these things are driven round by one or more souls endowed with all goodness.

Athenian: You have attended to our argument admirably, Clinias. [898d] Now attend to this further point.

Clinias: What is that?

Athenian: If soul drives round the sum total of sun, moon and all other stars, does it not also drive each single one of them?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Then let us construct an argument about one of these stars which will evidently apply equally to them all.

Clinias: About which one?

Athenian: The sun’s body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense, [898e] has grown round all the senses of the body, 172 and is an object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it —

Clinias: What fact?

Athenian: If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.

Clinias: What things?

Athenian: That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or |349| air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside; [899a] or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body.

Clinias: Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in one of these ways when it propels all things.

Athenian: Here, I pray you, pause. This soul, — whether it is by riding in the car of the sun, 173 or from outside, or otherwise, that it brings light to us all — every man is bound to regard as a god. Is not that so? [899b]

Clinias: Yes; everyone at least who has not reached the uttermost verge of folly.

Athenian: Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same, — namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied that ‘all things are full of gods’? 174 [899c] >

Clinias: There is not a man, Stranger, so wrong-headed as that.

Athenian: Let us, then, lay down limiting conditions for the man who up till now disbelieves in gods, O Megillus and Clinias, and so be quit of him. |351|

Clinias: What conditions?

Athenian: That either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is of all things the first production, together with all the consequential statements we made, — or, if he is unable to improve on our account, he must believe us, and for the rest of his life live in veneration of the gods. [899d] Let us, then, consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods addressed to those who disbelieve in them has been stated adequately or defectively.

Clinias: Anything rather than defectively, Stranger.

Athenian: Then let our argument have an end, in so far as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist, but pay no regard to human affairs, — him we must admonish. ‘My good sir,’ let us say, ‘the fact that you believe in gods is due probably to a divine kinship drawing you to what is of like nature, to honour it and recognise its existence; but the fortunes of evil and [899e] unjust men, both private and public, — which, though not really happy, are excessively and improperly lauded as happy by public opinion, — drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry, but in tales of every kind. Or again, when you see men attaining the goal of old age, and leaving behind them children’s children in the highest offices, [900a] very likely you are disturbed, when amongst the number of these you discover — whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation — some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, just because of these, have risen from a small position to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence of all this |353| clearly is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship to them, and since on the other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability [900b] to repudiate the gods, you have come to your present morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order, therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply we are able) by argument, let us endeavour to attach our next argument to that which we set forth in full to him who utterly disbelieves in gods, and thereby to employ the latter as well.’ [900c] And do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, as you did before; and should anything untoward occur in the course of the argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just now. and convey you across the stream. 175

Clinias: A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.

Athenian: Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course, [900d] he was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.

Clinias: Most certainly he heard that.

Athenian: Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that |355| they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?

Clinias: We do say so.

Athenian: And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?

Clinias: Certainly. [900e]

Athenian: And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?

Clinias: Necessarily.

Athenian: And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?

Clinias: To this, too, everyone would assent.

Athenian: Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?

Clinias: How could we?

Athenian: As the opposite, then?

Clinias: Yes. [901a]

Athenian: And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?

Clinias: Of the opposite quality.

Athenian: What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described 176 — ‘a man most like to stingless drones’?

Clinias: A most true description.

Athenian: That God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.

Clinias: We could not possibly allow that.

Athenian: When a person whose duty it is especially |357| to act and care for [901b] some object has a mind that cares for great things, but neglects small things, on what principle could we praise such a person without the utmost impropriety? Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two forms, does it not?

Clinias: What forms?

Athenian: Either because he thinks that neglect of the small things makes no difference to the whole, [901c] or else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person — be he god or common man — fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for.

Clinias: Of course not.

Athenian: Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small. [901d] First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things, 177 and that nothing of all that is apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?

Clinias: That is what we assert. 178

Athenian: And further, that they can do all that can be done by mortal or immortal?

Clinias: They will, of course, admit that this also is the case. |359| [901e]

Athenian: And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, yea, exceeding good.

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: Being, then, such as we agree, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly amongst us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness of idleness and indolence.

Clinias: Very true.

Athenian: None, then, of the gods is neglectful owing to idleness and laziness, seeing that none has any part in cowardice.

Clinias: You are very right. [902a]

Athenian: Further, if they do neglect the small and scant things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things or — well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing?

Clinias: There is none.

Athenian: Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir, that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care, — or that they know indeed what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to do, who, though they know that other things are better to do than what they are doing, yet do them not, [902b] owing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures or pains?

Clinias: Impossible.

Athenian: Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself, too, the most god-fearing of all living creatures?

Clinias: That is certainly probable. |361|

Athenian: We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom belongs also the whole heaven.

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: That being so, it matters not whether a man says that these things are small or great [902c] in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it behove those who are our owners to be neglectful, seeing that they are most careful and most good. For let us notice this further fact —

Clinias: What is it?

Athenian: In regard to perception and power, — are not these two naturally opposed in respect of ease and difficulty?

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: It is more difficult to see and hear small things than great; but everyone finds it more easy to move, control and care for things small and few than their opposites. [902d]

Clinias: Much more.

Athenian: When a physician is charged with the curing of a whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for the large parts, he neglects the small parts and members, will he ever find the whole in good condition?

Clinias: Certainly not.

Athenian: No more will pilots or generals or house-managers, nor yet statesmen or any other such persons, find that the many and great thrive apart from the few [902e] and small; for even masons say that big stones are not well laid without little stones.

Clinias: They cannot be.

Athenian: Let us never suppose that God is inferior to mortal craftsmen who, the better they are, the more |363| accurately and perfectly do they execute their proper tasks, small and great, by one single art, — or that God, who is most wise, and both willing and able to care, [903a] cares not at all for the small things which are the easier to care for — like one who shirks the labour because he is idle and cowardly, — but only for the great.

Clinias: By no means let us accept such an opinion of the gods, Stranger: that would be to adopt a view that is neither pious nor true at all.

Athenian: And now, as I think, we have argued quite sufficiently with him who loves to censure the gods for neglect.

Clinias: Yes.

Athenian: And it was by forcing him by our arguments to acknowledge [903b] that what he says is wrong. But still he needs also, as it seems to me, some words of counsel to act as a charm upon him.

Clinias: What kind of words, my good sir?

Athenian: Let us persuade the young man by our discourse that all things are ordered systematically by Him who cares for the World — all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, whereof also each part, so far as it can, does and suffers what is proper to it. To each of these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of their action and passion are appointed to bring about fulfillment even to the uttermost [903c] fraction; whereof thy portion also, O perverse man, is one, and tends therefore always in its striving towards the All, tiny though it be. But thou failest to perceive that all partial generation is for the sake of the Whole, in order that for the life of the World — all blissful existence may be secured, — |365| it not being generated for thy sake, but thou for its sake. For every physician and every trained craftsman works always for the sake of a Whole, and strives after what is best in general, and he produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part; [903d] but thou art vexed, because thou knowest not how what is best in thy case for the All turns out best for thyself also, in accordance with the power of your common origin. And inasmuch as soul, being conjoined now with one body, now with another, is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to another soul, there is left for the draughts-player no further task, — save only to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that to each may be allotted its appropriate destiny. [903e]

Clinias: In what way do you mean?

Athenian: The way I am describing is, I believe, that in which supervision of all things is most easy for the gods. For if one were to shape all things, without a constant view to the Whole, by transforming them (as, for instance, fire into water), instead of merely converting one into many or many into one, [904a] then when things had shared in a first, or second, or even third generation, 179 they would be countless in number in such a system of transformations; but as things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is wondrous easy.

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: Thus: — Since our King saw that all actions involve soul, and contain much good and much evil, |367| and that body and soul are, when generated, indestructible but not eternal, 180 as are the gods ordained by law (for if either soul or body had been destroyed, [904b] there would never have been generation of living creatures), and since He perceived that all soul that is good naturally tends always to benefit, but the bad to injure, — observing all this, He designed a location for each of the parts, wherein it might secure the victory of goodness in the Whole and the defeat of evil most completely, easily, and well. For this purpose He has designed the rule which prescribes what kind of character should be set to dwell in what kind of position and in what regions: 181 but the causes of the generation of any special kind he left to the wills [904c] of each one of us men. 182 For according to the trend of our desires and the nature of our souls, each one of us generally becomes of a corresponding character.

Clinias: That is certainly probable.

Athenian: All things that share in soul change, since they possess within themselves the cause of change, and in changing they move according to the law and order of destiny; the smaller the change of character, the less is the movement over surface in space, but when the change is great and towards great iniquity, [904d] then they move towards the deep and the so-called lower regions, regarding which — under the names of Hades and the like — men are haunted by most fearful imaginings, both when alive and when disparted from their bodies. And whenever the soul gets a |369| specially large share of either virtue or vice, owing to the force of its own will and the influence of its intercourse growing strong, then, if it is in union with divine virtue, it becomes thereby eminently virtuous, and moves to an eminent region, being transported by a holy road to another and a better region; [904e] whereas, if the opposite is the ease, it changes to the opposite the location of its life’s abode. ‘This is the just decree of the gods who inhabit Olympus,’ 183 O thou child and stripling who thinkest thou art neglected by the gods, — the decree that as thou becomest worse, thou goest to the company of the worse souls, and as thou becomest better, to the better souls; and that, alike in life and in every shape of death, thou both doest and sufferest what it is befitting that like should do towards like. 184 [905a] From this decree of Heaven neither wilt thou nor any other luckless wight ever boast that he has escaped; for this decree is one which the gods who have enjoined it have enjoined above all others, and meet it is that it should be most strictly observed. For by it thou wilt not ever be neglected, neither if thou shouldest dive, in thy very littleness, into the depths of the earth below, nor if thou shouldest soar up to the height of Heaven above; but thou shalt pay to the gods thy due penalty, whether thou remainest here on earth, or hast passed away to Hades, [905b] or art transported to a region yet more fearsome. And the same rule, let me tell thee, will apply also to those whom thou sawest growing to great estate from small after doing acts of impiety or other such evil, — concerning whom thou didst deem that they had risen from misery to happiness, and |371| didst imagine, therefore, that in their actions, as in mirrors, thou didst behold the entire neglect of the gods, not knowing of their joint contribution and [905c] how it contributes to the All. And surely, O most courageous of men, thou canst not but suppose that this is a thing thou must needs learn. For if a man learns not this, he can never see even an outline of the truth, nor will he be able to contribute an account of life as regards its happiness or its unhappy fortune. If Clinias here and all our gathering of elders succeed in convincing thee of this fact, that thou knowest not what thou sayest about the gods, then God Himself of His grace will aid thee: but shouldest thou still be in need of further argument, give ear to us while we argue with the third unbeliever, [905d] if thou hast sense at all. For we have proved, as I would maintain, by fairly sufficient argument that the gods exist and care for men; the next contention, that the gods can be won over by wrongdoers, 185 on the receipt of bribes, is one that no one should admit, and we must try to refute it by every means in our power.

Clinias: Admirably spoken: let us do as you say.

Athenian: Come now, in the name of these gods themselves I ask — in what way would they come to be seduced by us, if seduced they were? [905e] Being what in their essence and character? Necessarily they must be rulers, if they are to be in continual control of the whole heaven.

Clinias: True.

Athenian: But to which kind of rulers are they like? Or which are like to them, of those rulers whom we can fairly compare with them, as small with great? |373| Would drivers of rival teams resemble them, or pilots of ships? Or perhaps they might be likened to rulers of armies; or possibly they might be compared to physicians watching over a war against bodily disease, [906a] or to farmers fearfully awaiting seasons of wonted difficulty for the generation of plants, or else to masters of flocks. For seeing that we have agreed 186 among ourselves that the heaven is full of many things that are good, and of the opposite kind also, and that those not good are the more numerous, such a battle, we affirm, is undying, and needs a wondrous watchfulness, — the gods and daemons being our allies, and we the possession 187 of the gods and daemons: and what destroys us is iniquity and insolence combined with folly, [906b] what saves us. justice and temperance combined with wisdom, which dwell in the animate powers of the gods, and of which some small trace may be clearly seen here also residing in us. But there are certain souls that dwell on earth and have acquired unjust gain which, being plainly bestial, beseech the souls of the guardians — whether they be watch-dogs or herdsmen or the most exalted of masters — trying to convince them by fawning words [906c] and prayerful incantations that (as the tales of evil men relate) they can profiteer among men on earth without any severe penalty: but we assert that the sin now mentioned, of profiteering or ‘over-gaining,’ is what is called in the case of fleshly bodies ‘disease,’ 188 in |375| that of seasons and years ‘pestilence,’ and in that of States and polities, by a verbal change, this same sin is called ‘injustice.’

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Such must necessarily be the account of the matter given by the man who says that the gods are always merciful to unjust men [906d] and those who act unjustly, provided that one gives them a share of one’s unjust gains; it is just as if wolves were to give small bits of their prey to watch-dogs, and they being mollified by the gifts were to allow them to go ravening among the flocks. Is not this the account given by the man who asserts that the gods are open to bribes?

Clinias: It is.

Athenian: To which of the guardians aforementioned might a man liken the gods without incurring ridicule? Is it to pilots, [906e] who, when warped themselves by wine’s ‘flow and flavour,’ 189 overturn both ships and sailors?

Clinias: By no means.

Athenian: And surely not to drivers ranged up for a race and seduced by a gift to lose it in favour of other teams?

Clinias: If that was the account you gave of them, it would indeed be a horrible comparison.

Athenian: Nor, surely, to generals or physicians or farmers or herdsmen; nor yet to dogs charmed by wolves?

Clinias: Hush! That is quite impossible. [907a]

Athenian: Are not all gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest things? |377|

Clinias: Yes, by far.

Athenian: Shall we say that those who watch over the fairest things, and who are themselves eminently good at keeping watch, are inferior to dogs and ordinary men, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts impiously offered by unjust men? [907b]

Clinias: By no means; it is an intolerable thing to say, and whoever embraces such an opinion would most justly be adjudged the worst and most impious of all the impious men who practise impiety in all its forms.

Athenian: May we now say that we have fully proved our three propositions, — namely, that the gods exist, and that they are careful, and that they are wholly incapable of being seduced to transgress justice?

Clinias: Certainly we may; and in these statements you have our support.

Athenian: And truly they have been made in somewhat vehement terms, in our desire for victory [907c] over those wicked men; and our desire for victory was due to our fear lest haply, if they gained the mastery in argument, they should suppose they had gained the right to act as they chose — those men who wickedly hold all those false notions about the gods. On this account we have been zealous to speak with special vigour; and if we have produced any good effect, however small, in the way of persuading the men to hate themselves and to feel some love for an opposite kind of character, then our prelude to the laws respecting impiety [907d] will not have been spoken amiss.

Clinias: Well, there is hope; and if not, at any rate no fault will be found with the lawgiver in respect of the nature of the argument |379|

Athenian: After the prelude it will be proper for us to have a statement of a kind suitable to serve as the laws’ interpreter, forewarning all the impious to quit their ways for those of piety. For those who disobey, this shall be the law concerning impiety: — If anyone commits impiety either by word or deed, he that meets with him [907e] shall defend the law by informing the magistrates, and the first magistrates who hear of it shall bring the man up before the court 190 appointed to decide such cases as the laws direct; and if any magistrate on hearing of the matter fail to do this, he himself shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of him who wishes to punish him on behalf of the laws. And if a man be convicted, the court shall assess one penalty [908a] for each separate act of impiety. Imprisonment shall be imposed in every case; and since there are three prisons in the State (namely, one public prison near the market for most cases, to secure the persons of the average criminals: a second, situated near the assembly-room of the officials who hold nightly assemblies, 191 and named the ‘reformatory’; and a third, situated in the middle of the country, in the wildest and loneliest spot possible, and named after ‘retribution’ 192, and since men are involved in impiety [908b] from the three causes which we have described, and from each such cause two forms of impiety result — consequently those who sin in respect of religion fall into six classes which require to be distinguished, as needing penalties that are neither equal nor similar. For while those who, though they utterly disbelieve in the existence of the gods, possess by nature a just character, both hate the evil and, because of their |381| dislike of injustice, are incapable of being induced to commit unjust actions, and flee from unjust men [908c] and love the just, on the other hand, those who, besides holding that the world is empty of gods, are afflicted by incontinence in respect of pleasures and pains, and possess also powerful memories and sharp wits — though both these classes share alike in the disease of atheism, yet in respect of the amount of ruin they bring on other people, the latter class would work more and the former less of evil. For whereas the one class will be quite frank in its language about the gods and about sacrifices and oaths, [908d] and by ridiculing other people will probably convert others to its views, unless it meets with punishment, the other class, while holding the same opinions as the former, yet being specially ‘gifted by nature’ and being full of craft and guile, is the class out of which are manufactured many diviners and experts in all manner of jugglery; and from it, too, there spring sometimes tyrants and demagogues and generals, and those who plot by means of peculiar mystic rites of their own, and the devices of those who are called ‘sophists.’ Of these there may be many kinds; [908e] but those which call for legislation are two, of which the ‘ironic’ 193 kind commits sins that deserve not one death only or two, while the other kind requires both admonition and imprisonment. Likewise also the belief that the gods are neglectful breeds two other kinds of impiety; and the belief in their being open to bribes, other two. These kinds being thus distinguished, those criminals who suffer from folly, 194 being devoid of evil disposition and character, shall be placed by the judge according to |383| law in the reformatory for a period of not less than five years, during which time no other of the citizens [909a] shall hold intercourse with them, save only those who take part in the nocturnal assembly, 195 and they shall company with them to minister to their souls’ salvation by admonition; and when the period of their incarceration has expired, if any of them seems to be reformed, he shall dwell with those who are reformed, but if not, and if he be convicted again on a like charge, he shall be punished by death. But as to all those who have become like ravening beasts, and who, besides holding that the gods are [909b] negligent or open to bribes, despise men, charming the souls of many of the living, and claiming that they charm the souls of the dead, and promising to persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers and incantations, 196 and who try thus to wreck utterly not only individuals, but whole families and States for the sake of money, — if any of these men be pronounced guilty, the court shall order him to be imprisoned according to law in the mid-country gaol, [909c] and shall order that no free man shall approach such criminals at any time, and that they shall receive from the servants a ration of food as fixed by the Law-wardens. And he that dies shall be cast outside the borders without burial; and if any free man assist in burying him, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who chooses to prosecute. And if the dead man leaves children fit for citizenship, the guardians of orphans shall take them also [909d] under their charge from the day of their father’s conviction, just as much as any other orphans. |385|

For all these offenders one general law must be laid down, such as will cause the majority of them not only to offend less against the gods by word and deed, but also to become less foolish, through being forbidden to trade in religion illegally. To deal comprehensively with all such cases the following law shall be enacted: — No one shall possess a shrine in his own house: when anyone is moved in spirit to do sacrifice, [909e] he shall go to the public places to sacrifice, and he shall hand over his oblations to the priests and priestesses to whom belongs the consecration thereof; and he himself, together with any associates he may choose, shall join in the prayers. This procedure shall be observed for the following reasons: — It is no easy task to found temples and gods, and to do this rightly needs much deliberation; yet it is customary for all women especially, and for sick folk everywhere, and those in peril or in distress (whatever the nature of the distress), and conversely for those who have had a slice of good fortune, to dedicate whatever happens to be at hand at the moment, and to vow sacrifices [910a] and promise the founding of shrines to gods and demi-gods and children of gods; and through terrors caused by waking visions or by dreams, and in like manner as they recall many visions and try to provide remedies for each of them, they are wont to found altars and shrines, and to fill with them every house and every village, and open places too. and every spot which was the scene of such experiences. For all these reasons their action should be governed by the law now stated; and a further reason is this — to prevent impious men [910b] from acting fraudulently in regard to these matters also, by setting up shrines and |387| altars in private houses, thinking to propitiate the gods privily by sacrifices and vows, and thus increasing infinitely their own iniquity, whereby they make both themselves and those better men who allow them guilty in the eyes of the gods, so that the whole State reaps the consequences of their impiety in some degree — and deserves to reap them. The lawgiver himself, however, will not be blamed by the god; for this shall be the law laid down: — Shrines of the gods no one must possess [910c] in a private house; and if anyone is proved to possess and worship at any shrine other than the public shrines — be the possessor man or woman, — and if he is guilty of no serious act of impiety, he that notices the fact shall inform the Law-wardens, and they shall give orders for the private shrines to be removed to the public temples, and if the owner disobeys the order, they shall punish him until he removes them. [910d] And if anyone be proved to have committed an impious act, such as is not the venial offence of children, but the serious irreligion of grown men, whether by setting up a shrine on private ground, or on public ground, by doing sacrifice to any gods whatsoever, for sacrificing in a state of impurity he shall be punished with death. And the Law-wardens shall judge what is a childish or venial offence and what not, and then shall bring the offenders before the court, and shall impose upon them the due penalty for their impiety.

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Laws Book XI.

[913a]

Athenian: In the next place our business transactions one with another will require proper regulation. The following will serve for a comprehensive rule: — So far as possible, no one shall touch my goods nor move them in the slightest degree, if he has in no Arise at all got my consent; and I must act in like manner regarding the goods of all other men, keeping a prudent mind. As the first of such things let us mention treasure: that which a man has laid by in store for himself and his family (he not being one of my parents), I must never pray to the gods to find, [913b] nor, if I do find it, may I move it, nor may I ever tell of it to the soothsayers (so-called), who are certain to counsel me to take up what is laid down in the ground. For never should I gain so much pecuniary profit by its removal, as I should win increase in virtue of soul and in justice by not removing it; and by preferring to gain justice in my soul rather than money in my purse, I should be winning a greater in place of a lesser gain, and that too in a better part of me. The rule, 197 ‘Thou shalt not move the immovable,’ is rightly applicable to many cases; and the case before us is one of them. [913c] And men ought also to believe the stories told about these matters, — how that such conduct is injurious to the getting of children. But if any man proves to be both regardless of children and neglectful of |391| the legislator, and, without the consent of the depositor, takes up a treasure which neither he himself nor any of his forefathers has deposited, and thus breaks a law most fair, and that most comprehensive ordinance of the noble man 198 who said, [913d] ‘Take not up what you laid not down,’ — the man who despises these two lawgivers and takes up what he has not laid down himself, it being no small thing but sometimes a vast quantity of treasure, — what penalty should such a man suffer? God knows what, at the hands of gods; but the man that first notices an act of this kind shall report it, if it occur in the city, to the city-stewards, or if in a public market, [914a] to the market-stewards; and if it occur in the country outside, he shall declare it to the rural stewards and their officers. And when such declarations are made, the State shall send to Delphi; 199 and whatever the god pronounces concerning the goods and him that moved them, that the State shall execute, acting as agent on behalf of the oracles of the god. And if the informer be a free man, he shall win a reputation for virtue, but for vice if he fail to inform; and if he be a slave, as a reward for informing it will be right that he should be set free, by the State offering his price to his master, whereas he shall be punished by death if he fail to give information.

[914b] Following on this there should come next a similar rule about matters great and small, to reinforce it. If a man, whether willingly or unwillingly, leaves any of his goods behind, he that happens on them shall let them lie. believing that the Goddess of the Wayside 200 guards them, as things dedicated to her divinity by the law. Should |393| anyone transgress this rule and disobediently take up such things and carry them home, he being a slave and the article of small value, then the man who meets with him, being over thirty years old, shall scourge him with many stripes; [914c] but if he be a free man, he shall not only be accounted illiberal and a rebel against the laws, but he shall in addition pay back ten times the value of the article moved to the man who left it behind. And if one man charges another with possessing any of his goods, be it great or small, and the man so charged allows that he has the article, but denies that it is the other man’s, — then, if the article in question has been registered 201 with the magistrates according to law, the plaintiff shall summon the man who possesses it before the magistrate, and he shall produce it in court. And the article being thus exhibited, if it be clearly recorded in the records to which of the disputants it belongs, [914d] he shall take it and depart; but should it belong to another third party, not then present, whichever of the two claimants produces a sufficient guarantor shall take it away on behalf of the absent party, in pursuance of his right of removal, to hand it over to him. But if the article in dispute be not registered with the magistrates, it shall be kept in charge of the three senior magistrates up to the time of the trial; and if the article in pledge be a beast, the man that loses the case concerning it shall pay the magistrates for its keep; and the magistrates shall decide the case within three days.

[914e] Any person — provided that he be in his senses — may lay hands, if he wishes, on his own slave, to employ him for any lawful purpose; and on behalf |395| of another man (one of his relatives or friends) he may lay hands on the runaway slave, to secure his safe keeping. And if a man tries to remove to freedom anyone who is being carried off as a slave, the man who is carrying him off shall let him go, and he that is removing him shall do so on the production of three substantial sureties, but not otherwise; and if anyone removes a slave contrary to these conditions, [915a] he shall be liable for assault, and if convicted he shall pay double his registered value to the man deprived. And a man may arrest also a freedman, if in any case he fails to attend, or to attend sufficiently, on those who have freed him; and such tendance shall consist in the coming of the freedman three times a month to the home of the man that freed him, and there undertaking to do those duties which are both just and feasible, and in regard to marriage also to act as may seem good also to his former master. The freedman shall not be permitted to be more wealthy than the man who freed him; [915b] and, if he is, the excess shall be made over to his master. He that is let go free shall not remain in the country more than twenty years, but shall depart, like all other foreigners, 202 taking with him all the property he owns, — unless he gains the consent of the magistrates and also of the man who freed him. And if a freedman, or any other foreigner, acquire property exceeding in amount the third valuation, 203 within thirty days from the day on which he acquires this excess he shall take his own property and depart, [915c] and he shall have no further right to request from the magistrates permission to remain; and if he disobeys these rules and is summoned before the court and convicted, he shall be punished |397| by death, and his goods shall be confiscated. Such cases shall be tried before the tribal courts, unless the parties first get a settlement of their charges against one another before neighbours or chosen jurors.

If anyone claims as his own the beast of any other man, or any other [915d] of his chattels, the man who holds it shall refer the matter to the person who, as being its substantial and lawful owner, sold it or gave it, or made it over to him in some other valid way; and this he shall do within thirty days, if the reference be made to a citizen or metic in the city, or, in the case of a foreign delivery, within five months, of which the middle month shall be that which includes the summer solstice. 204 And when one man makes an exchange with another by an act of buying or selling, the exchange shall be made by a transfer of the article in the place appointed therefor in the market, and nowhere else, and by payment of the price on the spot, and no purchase or sale shall be made [915e] on credit; 205 and if anyone makes an exchange with another otherwise or in other places, trusting the man with whom he is dealing, he shall do so on the understanding that there are no suits by law touching things not sold according to the rules now prescribed. 206 As regards club-collections, 207 whoso wishes may collect as a friend among friends; but if any dispute arises concerning the collection, they must act on the understanding that in regard to these matters no legal actions are possible. If any man receives for the sale of any article a price of not less than fifty drachmae, he shall be compelled |399| to remain in the city for ten days, and the seller’s residence shall be made known to the buyer, [916a] because of the charges which are commonly brought in connexion with such transactions, and because of the acts of restitution permitted by law. Such legal restitution, or non-restitution, shall be on this wise: — If a man sell a slave who is suffering from phthisis or stone or strangury or the ‘sacred disease’ 208 (as it is called), or from any other complaint, mental or physical, which most men would fail to notice, although it be prolonged and hard to cure, — in case the purchaser be a doctor or a trainer, it shall not be possible for him to gain restitution for such a case, nor yet if the seller warned the purchaser of the facts. [916b] But if any professional person sell any such slave to a lay person, the buyer shall claim restitution within six months, saving only in the case of epilepsy, for which disease he shall be permitted to claim within twelve months. The action shall be tried before a bench of doctors nominated and chosen by both the parties; and the party that loses his case shall pay double the selling price of the slave. [916c] If a lay person sells to a lay person, there shall be the same right of restitution and trial as in the cases just mentioned; but the losing party shall pay the selling price only. If a man wittingly sells a murderer, if the buyer is aware of the fact, he shall have no claim to restitution for the purchase of such an one; but if the buyer be ignorant, he shall have right of restitution as soon as the fact is perceived, and the trial shall take place before a court of the five youngest Law-wardens, and if it be decided that the seller acted wittingly, he shall purify the houses of the buyer as ordained by the |401| interpreters, 209 and he shall pay three times the selling price to the buyer.

[916d] He that exchanges for money either money or anything else, living or not living, shall give and receive every such article unadulterated, conforming to the law; and touching all knavery of this sort, as in the case of other laws, let us hearken to a prelude. Adulteration should be regarded by every man as coming under the same head as falsehood and fraud — a class of actions concerning which the mob are wont to say, wrongly, that any such action will generally be right if it be done opportunely: [916e] but the proper ‘opportunity,’ the when and the where, they leave unprescribed and undefined, so that by this saving they often bring loss both to themselves and to others. But it is not fitting for the lawgiver to leave this matter undefined; he must always declare clearly the limitations, great or small, and this shall now be done: — No man, calling the gods to witness, shall commit, either by word or deed, any falsehood, fraud or adulteration, if he does not mean to be most hateful to the gods; [917a] and such an one is he who without regard of the gods swears oaths falsely, and he also who lies in the presence of his superiors. Now the better are the superiors of the worse, and the older in general of the younger; wherefore also parents are superior to their offspring, men to women and children, rulers to ruled. 210 And it will be proper for all to revere all these classes of superiors, whether they be in other positions of authority or in offices of State above all; and to enforce this is just the |403| purpose of our present discourse. For everyone [917b] who adulterates any market commodity, lies and deceives and, calling Heaven to witness, takes an oath in front of the laws and cautions of the market-stewards, neither regarding men nor revering gods. Certainly it is a good practice to refrain from sullying lightly divine names, and to behave with such purity and holiness as most of us generally exhibit in matters of religion; if however this rule is disobeyed, the law runs thus: — He that sells any article in the market shall never name two prices for what he is selling; [917c] he shall name one price only, and if he fails to get this, he will be entitled to take the article away; but he shall not put any other price, greater or less, upon it on that day; and there shall be no puffing or taking of oaths about anything put up for sale. If any man disobeys these rules, any townsman who is present, not being under thirty years of age, shall punish with a beating the seller who swears, and he shall do so with impunity; but if he is disobedient and neglects to do so, he shall be liable to reprobation for betraying the laws. And if a man is selling an adulterated article, [917d] and is incapable of obeying our present rules, any person who is present and aware of the fact and able to expose him shall take for himself the adulterated article, if he expose him before a magistrate, he being himself a slave or a metic, — but if he be a citizen, he shall be declared to be wicked, as a robber of the gods, if he fail to expose the guilty man; while if he does expose him, he shall offer the article to the gods who preside over the market. He that is found out in selling any such article, in addition to being deprived of the adulterated article, shall be beaten in the market-place |407| with stripes — one stripe for every drachma in the price he asks for the article — [917e] after that the herald has first proclaimed the crimes for which the seller is to be beaten. Touching acts of fraud and wrongful acts done by sellers, the market-stewards and the Law-wardens, after making enquiry from experts in each trade, shall write out rules as to what the seller ought to do or avoid doing, and shall post them up on a pillar in front of the stewards’ office, to serve as written laws and clear instructors [918a] for those engaged in business in the market. The duties of the city-stewards have been fully stated already; 211 in case any addition seems to be required, they shall inform the Law-wardens, and write out what seems to be wanting; and they shall post up on the pillar at the city-stewards’ office both the primary and the secondary regulations pertaining to their office.

Following close upon practices of adulteration follow practices of retail trading; concerning which, as a whole, we shall first offer counsel and argument, [918b] and then impose on it a law. The natural purpose for which all retail trading comes into existence in a State is not loss, but precisely the opposite: for how can any man be anything but a benefactor if he renders even and symmetrical the distribution of any kind of goods which before was unsymmetrical and uneven? And this is, we must say, the effect produced by the power of money, and we must declare that the merchant is ordained for this purpose. And the hireling and the innkeeper and the rest — some more and some [918c] less respectable trades, — all have this function, namely, to provide all men with full satisfaction of their needs and with evenness |407| in their properties. 212 Let us see then wherein trade is reputed to be a thing not noble nor even respectable, and what has caused it to be disparaged, in order that we may remedy by law parts of it at least if not the whole. This is an undertaking, it would seem, of no slight importance, and one that calls for no little virtue.

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: My dear Clinias, small is the class of men — rare by nature and trained, too, with a superlative training — who, when they fall into divers needs and lusts, [918d] are able to stand out firmly for moderation, and who, when they have the power of taking much wealth, are sober, and choose what is of due measure rather than what is large. The disposition of the mass of mankind is exactly the opposite of this; when they desire, they desire without limit, and when they can make moderate gains, they prefer to gain insatiably; and it is because of this that all the classes concerned with retail trade, commerce, and inn-keeping are disparaged and subjected to violent abuse. Now if anyone were to do what never will be done (Heaven forbid!) — but I shall make the supposition, ridiculous though it is — [918e] namely, compel the best men everywhere for a certain period to keep inns or to peddle or to carry on any such trade, — or even to compel women by some necessity of fate to take part in such a mode of life, — then we should learn how that each of these callings is friendly and desirable; and if all these callings were carried on according to a rule free from corruption, they would be honoured [919a] with the honour which one pays to a mother or a nurse. But as things are now, whenever a man has planted his house, with a view to |409| retail trade, in a desert place and with all the roads from it lengthy, if in this welcome lodging he receives travellers in distress, providing tranquillity and calm to those buffeted by fierce storms or restful coolness after torrid heat, — the next thing is that, instead of treating them as comrades and providing friendly gifts as well as entertainment, he holds them to ransom, as if they were captive foemen in his hands, demanding very high sums of unjust and unclean ransom-money; [919b] it is criminal practices such as this, in the case of all these trades, that afford grounds of complaint against this way of succouring distress. For these evils, then, the lawgiver must in each case provide a medicine. It is an old and true saying that it is hard to fight against the attack of two foes 213 from opposite quarters, as in the case of diseases and many other things; and indeed our present fight in this matter is against two foes, poverty and plenty, 214 of which the one corrupts the soul of men with luxury, [919c] while the other by means of pain plunges it into shamelessness. What remedy, then, is to be found for this disease in a State gifted with understanding? The first is to employ the trading class as little as possible; the second, to assign to that class those men whose corruption would prove no great loss to the State; the third, to find a means whereby the dispositions of those engaged in these callings may not quite so easily become infected [919d] by shamelessness and meanness of soul. After the declarations now made, let our law on these matters |411| (Heaven prosper it!) run in this wise: — Amongst the Magnesians, 215 whom the god is restoring and founding afresh, none of all the landholders who belong to the 5040 houses shall, either willingly or unwillingly, become a retail trader or a merchant, or engage in any menial service for private persons who do not make an equal return to himself, save only for his father and mother [919e] and those of a still earlier generation, and all that are elder than himself, they being gentlemen 216 and his a gentleman’s service. What is becoming, what unbecoming a gentleman it is not easy to fix by law; it shall, however, be decided by those persons who have achieved public distinction 217 for their aversion to the one and their devotion to the other. If any citizen in any craft engages in ungentlemanly peddling, whoso will shall indict him for shaming his family before a bench of those adjudged to be the first in virtue, and if it be held that he is sullying his paternal hearth by an unworthy calling, he shall be imprisoned for a year and so restrained therefrom; [920a] if he repeats the offence, he shall get two years’ imprisonment, and for each subsequent conviction the period of imprisonment shall go on being doubled. Now comes a second law: — Whosoever intends to engage in retail trade must he a resident alien or a foreigner. And thirdly, this third law: — In order that such an one may be as good as possible, or as little as possible bad, he being a resident in our State, the Law-wardens must bear in mind that they are guardians not only of those who, being well-trained both by birth and nurture, are easy to guard from lawless and evil ways, but also of those who are |413| otherwise, [920b] and who follow pursuits which greatly tend to urge them on the road to vice; and these they must guard the more. Accordingly, with respect to retail trading, which is a multifarious occupation, embracing many callings of a similar nature, — with respect (I mean) to so many branches of it as are allowed to exist, as being deemed absolutely necessary to the State, — concerning these the procedure shall be the same as that previously prescribed [920c] in the case of the kindred matter of adulteration: 218 the Law-wardens must meet in consultation with experts in every branch of retail trade, and at their meetings they must consider what standard of profits and expenses produces a moderate gain for the trader, and the standard of profits and expenses thus arrived at they must prescribe in writing; and this they must insist on — the market-stewards, the city-stewards, and the rural stewards, each in their own sphere. So possibly, by this means, retail trade would be of benefit to all classes, and would do but little damage to those in the States who practise it.

[920d] Touching agreements, whenever a man undertakes and fails to fulfill his agreement — unless it be such as is forbidden by the laws or by a decree, or one made under forcible and unjust compulsion, or when the man is involuntarily prevented from fulfilling it owing to some unforeseen accident, — in all other cases of unfulfilled agreements, actions may be brought before the tribal courts, if the parties are unable to come to a previous settlement before arbitrators or neighbours. Sacred to Hephaestus and Athena is the class of craftsmen who have furnished our life with the arts, [920e] and to Ares and |415| Athena belong those who safeguard the products of these craftsmen by other defensive arts; rightly is this class also sacred to these deities. These all continually serve both the country and the people: the one class are leaders in the contests of war, the others produce for pay instruments and works; and it would be unseemly for these men to lie concerning their crafts, because of their reverence for their divine ancestors. [921a] If any craftsman fail to execute his work within the time named, owing to baseness — he not revering the god who gives him his livelihood, but deeming him (in his blindness of mind) to be merciful because of his kinship, — he shall, in the first place, pay a penalty to the god, and, secondly, there shall be a law enacted to suit his ease: — He shall owe the price of the works regarding which he has bed to the person who gave him the order, and within the stated time he shall execute them all over again gratis. And as it counselled the seller, [921b] so the law counsels the contractor who undertakes a work not to give in too high an estimate for it, but to estimate it simply at its real worth; this same charge the law gives, I say, to the contractor, for he as a craftsman certainly knows what its worth is. In States composed of gentlemen it is wrong for a craftsman to try by his art (which is essentially truthful and sincere) to impose artfully upon lay persons: and in such cases the wronged shall be entitled to prosecute the wrong-doer. If, on the other hand, a man who has given an order to a craftsman [921c] fails to pay him his wage duly according to the legal agreement, and sets at naught Zeus, the Patron of the State, and Athena, who are partners in the constitution, — thereby dissolving |417| great partnerships through love of a little gain, — then, with the help of the gods, this law shall lend aid to the bonds that unite the State: — Whosoever has previously received the work ordered and fails to pay the price within the period agreed shall be bound to pay double the price; and if a year have elapsed, although all other [921d] monies on loan are barren, 219 this man shall pay as interest one obol on each drachma for every month 220 of arrears; and actions for these cases shall take place before the tribal courts. And now that we have made mention of craftsmen in general, it is right to allude in passing to those whose craft is military security, — that is to say, military commanders and all experts in such matters. As to the former craftsmen, so to these men, as craftsmen of another sort, — whenever any of them, either voluntarily or under orders, [921e] undertakes any public work and executes it well, — whosoever shall duly pay to these men those honours which are the soldier’s wages, him the law will never weary of lauding; but if he has previously received some noble work of a military kind and fails to pay for it, the law will blame him. So, touching this matter, let there be laid down this law, coupled with laudation. — a law which counsels rather than compels [922a] the mass of citizens to honour as second in merit those brave men who, either by bold deeds or by military devices, are protectors of the State; for first in merit come those on whom the greatest reward must be bestowed — namely, those who have proved themselves able pre-eminently |419| to honour the written code of the good law-givers. 221

We have now made regulations for most of the more important business dealings between man and man, excepting those regarding orphans and the care of orphans by their guardians: so, after those now dealt with, these matters must necessarily receive some kind of regulation. [922b] All these have their starting-points either in the desire of those at the point of death to devise their property, or in the accidental cases of those who die without making a testament; and it was in view of the complex and difficult nature of these cases, Clinias, that I made use of the word ‘necessarily.’ And it is, indeed, impossible to leave them without regulation; for individuals might set down many wishes both at variance with one another and contrary to the laws as well as to the dispositions of the living, and also to their own former dispositions in the days before they proposed making a will, [922c] if any will that a man makes were to be granted absolute and unconditional validity, no matter what his state of mind at the end of his life. For most of us are more or less in a dull and enfeebled state of mind, when we imagine that we are nearly at the point of death.

Clinias: What do you mean by this, Stranger?

Athenian: A man at the point of death, Clinias, is a difficult subject, and overflowing with speech that is most alarming and vexatious to a lawgiver.

Clinias: How so?

Athenian: Since he claims to be lord of all he has, he is wont [922d] to speak angrily.

Clinias: What will he say?

Athenian: ‘Good heavens!’ he cries, ‘what a monstrous |421| shame it is, if I am not to be allowed at all to give, or not give, my own things to whomsoever I will — and more to one, less to another, according as they have proved themselves good to me or bad, when fully tested in times of sickness, or else in old age and in other happenings of every kind.’

Clinias: And do yon not think. Stranger, that what they say is right? [922e]

Athenian: What I think. Clinias, is this — that the old lawgivers were cowardly, and gave laws with a short view and a slight consideration of human affairs.

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: It was through fear, my dear sir, of that angry speech that they made the law allowing a man unconditionally to dispose by will of his goods exactly how he pleases. [923a] But you and I will make a more suitable answer to those in your State who are at the point of death.

Clinias: In what way?

Athenian: O friends, we will say. for you, who are literally but creatures of a day, it is hard at present to know your own possessions and, as the Pythian oracle declares. 222 your own selves, to boot. So I, as lawgiver, make this ruling — that both you yourself and this your property are not your own, but belong to the whole of your race, both past and future, and that still more truly does all your race and its property belong to the State; [923b] and this being so. I will not willingly consent if anyone persuades you to make a will contrary to what is best, by fawning on you and helping you when afflicted by disease or age; rather will I legislate |423| with a general view to what is best for your whole race and State, justly accounting of minor importance the interest of the individual. May it be that you will feel kindly disposed and at peace with us as you journey towards that bourne whither, by the natural law of our human life, you now are travelling: the rest of your affairs [923c] shall be our care, and we will watch over them all, without exception, to the best of our power. This shall serve, Clinias, alike for consolation and for prelude for both the living and the dying, and the law shall run as follows: — Whosoever writes a will disposing of his property, if he be the father of children, he shall first write down the name of whichever of his sons he deems worthy to be his heir, and if he offers any one of his other children to another man to be adopted by him, this also he shall write down; and if he has any son besides that is not adopted for any lot, 223 [923d] of whom he has hopes that he will be sent out by law to a colony, to him the father shall be allowed to give so much of his other property as he wishes, saving only the ancestral lot and all the equipment of that lot; and if there be several more sons, the father shall divide among them the surplus, over and above the lot, in whatever way he chooses. And if a son already possesses a house, he shall not assign him goods, and so likewise in the case of a daughter, if she is betrothed to a husband, [923e] he shall not assign goods, but if not so betrothed, he shall assign. And if, after the will is made, it is discovered that one of the sons or daughters owns a lot in the district, then that person shall resign his legacy in favour of the heir of him that made the |425| will. If the testator leave no male children, but females, he shall bequeath to whichever daughter he chooses a husband, and to himself a son, and write him down as his heir; 224 and if a man has a son, whether his own or adopted, who dies in childhood before reaching man’s estate, in this case also, [924a] when making his will, he shall state in writing who is to be his son’s successor, and with happier luck. If any testator be wholly childless, he shall take out a tenth part of his surplus property and shall give it to any person, if he so chooses; but all the rest he shall hand over to his adopted heir, and him he shall make his son with mutual good-will and the blessing of the law.

When a man’s children need guardians, if he die after making a will and naming what persons and how many he desires to act as guardians to his children, [924b] and if they are willing and consent to act, then the choice of guardians in this document shall be final; but if a man dies either wholly intestate or having omitted from his will the choice of guardians, then the nearest of kin on both the father’s and the mother’s side, two from each side, together with one of the friends of the deceased, shall act as official guardians, and these the Law-wardens shall appoint in the case of each orphan that requires them. [924c] All that appertains to guardianship and the orphans shall be supervised by fifteen of the Law-wardens, who shall be the eldest of the whole body, and shall divide themselves into threes according to seniority, three acting one year and another three a second year, until five yearly periods |427| have passed in rotation; and this process shall go on, so far as possible, without a break.

[924d] And if any man die wholly intestate, leaving children that require guardianship, his unfriended children shall share in these same laws. [924d] And if a man meets with some unforeseen mischance and leaves daughters, he shall pardon the lawgiver if he regulates the betrothal of the daughters with an eve to two points out of three — namely, nearness of kinship and the security of the lot — and omits the third point, which a father would take into consideration, — namely, the selecting out of all the citizens of a person suited by character and conduct to be a son to himself and a spouse for his daughter, — if, I say, the lawgiver passes this over owing to the impossibility of taking it into consideration. [924e] Accordingly, the law that we shall enact, as the best in our power touching such matters, will be this: — If a man dies intestate and leaves daughters, that brother who is born of the same father or of the same mother and who is without a lot shall take the daughter 225 and the lot of the deceased; failing a brother, if there be a brother’s son, the procedure shall be the same, provided that the parties be of an age suited the one to the other; failing one of these, the same rule shall hold for a sister’s son; then, fourthly, for a father’s brother; and, fifthly, for his son; and, sixthly, for the son of a father’s sister. [925a] In like manner, if a man leaves female children, the right of kinship shall proceed always by degrees of consanguinity, going up through brothers and brother’s children, first the males, and secondly the females in one line.

The suitability or otherwise of the time of |429| marriage the judge shall decide by inspection, viewing the males naked and the females naked down to the navel. And if there be in the family a lack of kinsmen as far as brother’s grandchildren, and likewise as far as grandfather’s children, whomsoever of the other citizens the girl, aided by her guardians, shall choose, that man (if both he and the girl are willing) [925b] shall become the heir of the deceased and the spouse of his daughter. But obstacles often occur, and there might be times when there was an unusual dearth of such men in the city itself: so if any girl, being at a loss to find a spouse on the spot, sees one that has emigrated to a colony and desires that he should become heir to her father’s property, if so be that he is related, he shall proceed to the lot, according to the ordinance of the law; but if he be outside the kin, and there be no one of near kin in the State, [925c] then by the choice of the guardians and of the daughter of the deceased he shall be entitled to marry and to take the lot of the intestate man on his return home.

Whosoever dies intestate, being without any issue, male or female, in his case all other matters shall be governed by the previous law; and a man and woman from the family shall in each such instance go into the deserted house as joint assignees, and their claim to the lot shall be made valid; [925d] and the female claims to inheritance shall come in this order — first, a sister; second, a brother’s daughter; third, a sister’s daughter; fourth, a father’s sister; fifth, a father’s brother’s daughter; sixth, a father’s sister’s daughter; and these shall share the home with the male kinsmen according to the degree of relationship |431| and right, as we previously enacted. Now we must not fail to notice how burdensome such a law may prove, in that sometimes it harshly orders the next of kin to the deceased to marry his kinswoman, and that it appears to overlook the thousands of impediments which in human life [925e] prevent men from being willing to obey such orders and cause them to prefer any other alternative, however painful, in cases where either of the parties ordered to marry is suffering from diseases or defects of mind or body. Some might suppose that the lawgiver is paying no heed to these considerations, but they would be wrong. On behalf, therefore, of the lawgiver as well as of him to whom the law applies let a kind of general prelude be uttered, requesting those to whom the order is given to pardon the lawgiver because it is impossible for him, in his care for the public interests, to control also the private misfortunes which befall individuals, [926a] and requesting pardon also for the subjects of the law, inasmuch as they are naturally unable at times to carry out ordinances of the lawgiver laid down by him in ignorance.

Clinias: As regards this, Stranger, what would be the most rational course of action to adopt?

Athenian: It is necessary, Clinias, that for laws of this kind, and those whom they affect, arbitrators should be chosen.

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: It might happen that a nephew, who has a rich father, would be loth to take to wife his uncle’s daughter, [926b] giving himself airs and being minded to make a grander match. Or again, when what the lawgiver enjoins would be a fearful calamity, a man |433| might be compelled to disobey the law — for instance, when the law would force him to enter into an alliance with madness or some other dire affliction of body or soul, such as makes life intolerable for the person so allied. This statement of ours shall now be laid down as a law in the following terms: — If any man have a complaint against the ordained laws concerning testaments in respect of any detail, and especially [926c] of those relating to marriage; and if he affirms on oath that of a truth the lawgiver himself, were he alive and present, would never have compelled the parties to act as they are now being compelled to act in respect of marrying and giving in marriage; and if, on the other hand, some relative or guardian supports the compulsion of the law; what we declare is that the lawgiver has left us the fifteen Law-wardens to act for the orphans, male and female, as both arbitrators and parents, and to these [926d] all who dispute about any such matters shall go for judgment, and their verdict shall be carried out as final. If, however, anyone maintains that this is to confer too much power on the Law-wardens, he shall summon his opponents before the court of select judges 226 and secure a decision regarding the points in dispute. On him that is defeated there shall be imposed by the lawgiver censure and disgrace, — a penalty heavier than a large fine in the eyes of a man of right mind.

Accordingly, orphan children will undergo a kind of second birth. 227 How in each case they should be reared and trained [926e] after their first birth we have already described; 228 and now we must contrive some means whereby, after their |435| second birth in which they are destitute of parents, their orphan condition may be as free as possible from piteous misery for those who have become orphans. In the first place, to act in the room of their begetters, as parents of no inferior kind, we must legally appoint the Law-wardens; and we charge three of these, year by year, 229 to care for the orphans as their own, having already given both to these men and to the guardians a suitable prelude of directions concerning the nurture of orphans. Opportune, indeed, as I think, was the account we previously gave 230 [927a] of how the souls of the dead have a certain power of caring for human affairs after death. The tales which contain this doctrine are true, though long; and while it is right to believe the other traditions about such matters, which are so numerous and exceeding old, we must also believe those who lay it down by law that these are facts, unless it is plain that they are utter fools. So if this is really the state of the case, the guardians shall fear, first, the gods above who [927b] pay regard to the solitude of orphans; and, secondly, the souls of the dead, whose natural instinct it is to care especially for their own offspring, and to be kindly disposed to those who respect them and hostile to those who disrespect them; and, thirdly, they shall fear the souls of the living who are old and who are held in most high esteem; since where the State flourishes under good laws, their children’s children revere the aged with affection and live in happiness. These old people [927c] are keen of eye and keen of ear to mark such matters, and while they are gracious towards those who deal justly therein, they are very wroth |437| with those who despitefully entreat orphans and waifs, regarding these as a trust most solemn and sacred. To all these authorities the guardian and official — if he has a spark of sense — must pay attention; he must show as much care regarding the nurture and training of the orphans as if he were contributing to his own support and that of his own children, and he must do them good in every way to the utmost of his power. He, then, that obeys the tale prefixed to the law [927d] and in no wise misuses the orphan will have no direct experience of the anger of the lawgiver against such offences; but the disobedient and he that wrongs any who has lost father or mother shall in every case pay a penalty double of that due from the man who offends against a child with both parents living.

As regards further legal directions either to guardians concerning orphans or to magistrates concerning the supervision of the guardians, — if they did not already possess a pattern of the way to nurture free children in the way they themselves nurture their own children and supervise their household goods, [927e] and if they did not also possess laws regulating these same affairs in detail, then it would have been reasonable enough to lay down laws concerning guardianship, as a peculiar and distinct branch of law, marking out with special regulations of its own the life of the orphan as contrasted with the non-orphan; but, as the matter stands, the condition of orphanhood in all these respects does not differ greatly with us from the condition of parental control, although as a rule in respect of public estimation and of the care bestowed on the children they are on quite a different level. [928a] Consequently, |439| in its regulations concerning orphans the law has emphasized this very point both by admonition and by threat. A threat, moreover, of the following kind will be extremely opportune: — Whosoever is guardian of a male or female child, and whosoever of the Law-wardens is appointed supervisor of a guardian, shall show as much affection for the child whom Fate has made an orphan as for his own children, and he shall zealously care for the goods of his nursling as much as for his own goods — or rather, more.

[928b] Every guardian shall observe this one law in the discharge of his office; and if any act in such matters contrary to this law, the magistrate shall punish him if he be a guardian, and, if he be a magistrate, the guardian shall summon him before the court of the select judges, and fine him double the penalty adjudged by the court. And if a guardian be held by the child’s relatives, or by any other citizen, to be guilty of neglecting or maltreating his ward, they shall bring him before the same court, [928c] and he shall pay four times the damages assessed, and of this amount one half shall go to the child, the other half to the successful prosecutor. When an orphan has reached full age, if he thinks that he has been badly cared for, he shall be allowed to bring an action concerning the guardianship within a period of five years after the date of its expiration; and if the guardian lose his case, the court shall assess the amount of his penalty or fine; and if it be a magistrate that is held to have injured the orphan by neglect, the court shall assess [928d] what sum he shall pay to the child, but if the injury be due to unjust dealing, in addition to the fine he shall |441| be removed from his office of Law-warden, and the public authority of the State shall appoint another in his place to act as Law-warden for the country and the State.

Between fathers and their children, and children and their fathers, there arise differences greater than is right, in the course of which fathers, on the one hand, are liable to suppose that the law-giver should give them legal permission to proclaim publicly by herald, if they so wish, that their sons have legally [928e] ceased to be their sons; while the sons, on the other hand, claim permission to indict their fathers for insanity when they are in a shameful condition owing to illness or old age. These results are wont to occur among men who are wholly evil of character, since where only half of them are evil — the sou being evil and the father not, or vice versa — such enmity does not issue in calamitous consequences. Now, whereas under another polity a son when disinherited would not necessarily cease to be a citizen, it is necessary in our State (of which these are to be the laws) that the fatherless man should emigrate to another State, [929a] since it is impossible that a single household should be added to our 5040; consequently it is necessary that the person upon whom this punishment is to be inflicted legally should be disinherited, not by his father only, but by the whole family. Such cases should be dealt with according to a law such as this: — If any man is urged by a most unhappy impulse of anger to desire, rightly or wrongly, to expel from his own kindred one whom he has begotten and reared, he shall not be permitted [929b] to do this informally and immediately, but he shall, first of all, assemble his own kinsfolk |443| as far as cousins and likewise his son’s kinsfolk on the mother’s side, and in the presence of these he shall accuse his son, showing how he deserves at the hands of all to be expelled from the family, and he shall grant to the son an equal length of time for arguing that he does not deserve to suffer any such treatment; and if the father convinces them and gains the votes of more than half the family (votes being given by all the other adults of both sexes, [929c] save only the father, the mother, and the son who is defendant), in this way and on these conditions, but not otherwise, the father shall be permitted to disinherit his son. And as regards the man disinherited, if any citizen desires to adopt him as his son, no law shall prevent him from doing so, (for the characters of the young naturally undergo many changes during their life); but if within ten years no one offers to adopt the disinherited man, [929d] then the controllers of the surplus children designed for emigration shall take control of these persons also, in order that they may be duly included in the same scheme of emigration. And if a man becomes unusually demented owing to illness or old age or crabbedness, or a combination of these complaints, but his condition remains unnoticed by all except those who are living with him, and if he regards himself as master of his own property and wastes his goods, while his son feels at a loss and scruples to indict him for insanity, — in such a case a law shall be enacted [929e] on behalf of the son whereby he shall, in the first instance, go to the eldest of the Law-wardens and report to them his father’s condition, and they, after full enquiry, shall advise whether or not he ought to bring an indictment; and if they |445| advise him to bring an indictment, they shall act for him, when he brings it, both as witnesses and advocates; and the father that is convicted shall thenceforward have no power to administer even the smallest tittle of his property, and shall be counted as a child in the house for the rest of his life.

If a man and his wife, being of unhappy dispositions, in no wise agree together, it is right that they should be under the constant control of ten members of the Board of Law-wardens, of middle age, [930a] together with ten of the women in charge of marriage. 231 If these officials are able to bring about a reconciliation, this arrangement shall hold good; but if their passions rage too high for harmony, the officials shall, so far as possible, seek out other suitable unions for each of them. And since it is probable that such persons are not of a gentle disposition, they must endeavour to yoke with them dispositions that are more gentle and sedate. 232 If those who quarrel are childless, or have but few children, [930b] they must form unions with a view to children; but if they have children enough, then the object both of the separation and of the new union should be to obtain companionship and mutual assistance in old age. If a man’s wife dies, leaving both male and female children, there shall be a law, advisory rather than compulsory, directing the husband to rear the children without introducing a step-mother; but if there be no children, the widower must of necessity marry, until he has begotten children sufficient alike for his household and the State. [930c] And if the husband dies, leaving sufficient children, the mother of the children shall |447| remain there and rear them; but if it be deemed that she is unduly young to be able to live healthfully without a husband, the relatives shall report the case to the women in charge of marriage, and shall take such action as may seem good to them and to themselves; and if there be a lack of children, they shall also act with a view to the supply of children; [930d] and the number which constitutes a bare sufficiency of children shall be fixed by the law at one of each sex. Whenever, in spite of agreement as to who a child’s parents are, a decision is required as to which parent the child should follow, the rule is this: 233 in all cases where a slave-woman has been mated with a slave or with a free man or a freedman, the child shall belong to the slave-woman’s master; but if a free woman mates with a slave, the issue shall belong to the slave’s master; and if the child be a master’s by his own slave-woman, or a mistress’s by her own slave, and the facts of the case are quite clear, then the women officials shall send away the woman’s child, together with its father, [930e] to another country, and the Law-wardens shall send away the man’s child, together with its mother. Neglect of parents is a thing that no god nor any right-minded man would ever recommend to anyone; and one ought to recognize how fitly a prelude of the following kind, dealing with worship paid to the gods, would apply to the honours and dishonours paid to parents: — The ancient laws [931a] of all men concerning the gods are twofold: some of the gods whom we honour we see clearly, 234 but of others we set up statues as images, and we believe that when we worship these, lifeless |449| though they be, the living gods beyond feel great good-will towards us and gratitude. So if any man has a father or a mother, or one of their fathers or mothers, in his house laid up bed-ridden with age, let him never suppose that, while he has such a figure as this upon his hearth, any statue could be more potent, if so be that its owner tends it duly and rightly. [931b]

Clinias: And what do you say is the right way?

Athenian: I will tell you: for in truth, my friends, matters of this sort deserve a hearing.

Clinias: Say on.

Athenian: Oedipus, when he was dishonoured (so our story runs), invoked upon his children curses 235 which, as all men allege, were granted by Heaven and fulfilled; and we tell how Amyntor in his wrath cursed his son Phoenix, 236 and Theseus cursed Hippolytus, 237 and countless other parents cursed countless other sons, which curses of parents upon sons it is clearly proved that the gods grant; [931c] for a parent’s curse laid upon his children is more potent than any other man’s curse against any other, and most justly so. Let no man suppose, then, that when a father or a mother is dishonoured by the children, in that case it is natural for God to hearken especially to their prayers, whereas when the parent is honoured and is highly pleased and earnestly prays the gods, in consequence, to bless his children — are we not to suppose that they hearken equally to prayers of this kind, and grant them to us? For if not, they could never be just dispensers of blessings; and that, as we assert, would be [931d] most unbecoming in gods. |451|

Clinias: Most, indeed.

Athenian: Let us maintain, then, — as we said a moment ago — that in the eyes of the gods we can possess no image more worthy of honour than a father or forefather laid up with old age, or a mother in the same condition; whom when a man worships with gifts of honour, God is well pleased, for otherwise He would not grant their prayers. For the shrine which is an ancestor is marvellous in our eyes, [931e] far beyond that which is a lifeless thing: for while those which are alive pray for us when tended by us and pray against us when dishonoured, the lifeless images do neither; so that if a man rightly treats his father and forefather and all such ancestors, he will possess images potent above all others to win for him a heaven-blest lot. 238

Clinias: Most excellent!

Athenian: Every right-minded man fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing that many times and in many cases they have proved effective. And since this is the ordinance of nature, to good men aged forefathers are a heavenly treasure [932a] while they live, up to the very last hours of life, and when they depart they are sorely regretted; but to the bad they are truly fearsome. Therefore let every man, in obedience to these counsels, honour his own parents with all the due legal honours. If, however, ‘report convicts’ 239 any of deafness to such preludes, the following law will be enacted rightly to deal with them: — If any person in this State be unduly neglectful of his parents, 240 and fail to consider them |453| in all things more than [932b] his sons or any of his offspring, or even himself, and to fulfill their wishes, let the parent who suffers any such neglect report it, either in person or by a messenger, to the three eldest Law-wardens, and to three of the women in charge of marriage; and these shall take the matter in hand, and shall punish the wrongdoers with stripes and imprisonment if they are still young — up to the age of thirty [932c] if they are men, while if they are women they shall suffer similar punishment up to the age of forty. And if, when they have passed these limits of age, they do not desist from the same acts of neglect towards their parents, but in some cases maltreat them, they shall be summoned before a court of 101 citizens, who shall be the oldest citizens of all; and if a man be convicted, the court shall assess what his fine or punishment must be, regarding no penalty as excluded which man can suffer or pay. [932d] If any parent when maltreated is unable to report the fact, that free man who hears of it shall inform the magistrate, failing which he shall be esteemed base, and shall be liable to an action for damage at the hands of anyone who chooses. If a slave gives information he shall be set free: he shall be set free by the Board of Magistrates if he be a slave of either the injured party or the injurers; but if he belong to any other citizen, the State Treasury shall pay his owner a price for him; and the magistrates shall take care that no one does injury to such a man in revenge for his giving information.

[932e] We have already 241 dealt fully with cases where one man injures another by poisons so that death is the |455| result; but we have not as yet dealt fully with any of the minor cases in which willful and deliberate injury is caused by means of potions, foods, and unguents. A division in our treatment of poisoning cases is required by the fact that, following the nature of mankind, they are of two distinct types. The type [933a] that we have now expressly mentioned is that in which injury is done to bodies by bodies according to nature’s laws. Distinct from this is the type which, by means of sorceries and incantations and spells (as they are called), not only convinces those who attempt to cause injury that they really can do so, but convinces also their victims that they certainly are being injured by those who possess the power of bewitchment. In respect of all such matters it is neither easy to perceive what is the real truth, nor, if one does perceive it, is it easy to convince others. And it is futile to approach the souls of men [933b] who view one another with dark suspicion if they happen to see images of moulded wax at doorways, or at points where three ways meet, or it may be at the tomb of some ancestor, to bid them make light of all such portents, when we ourselves hold no clear opinion concerning them. Consequently, we shall divide the law about poisoning under two heads, according to the modes in which the attempt is made; 242 and, as a preliminary, we shall entreat, exhort, and advise that no one must attempt [933c] to commit such an act, or to frighten the mass of men, like children, with bogeys, and so compel the legislator and the judge to cure men of such fears, inasmuch as, first, the man who attempts |457| poisoning knows not what he is doing either in regard to bodies (unless he be a medical expert) or in respect of sorceries (unless he be a prophet or diviner). So this statement shall stand [933d] as the law about poisoning: — Whosoever shall poison any person so as to cause an injury not fatal either to the person himself or to his employees, or so as to cause an injury fatal or not fatal to his flocks or to his hives, — if the agent be a doctor, and if he be convicted of poisoning, he shall be punished by death; but if he be a lay person, the court shall assess in his case what he shall suffer or pay. And if it be held that a man is acting like an injurer by the use of spells, incantations, [933e] or any such mode of poisoning, if he be a prophet or diviner, he shall be put to death; but if he be ignorant of the prophetic art, he shall be dealt with in the same way as a layman convicted of poisoning, — that is to say, the court shall assess in his case also what shall seem to them right for him to suffer or pay.

In all cases where one man causes damage to another by acts of robbery 243 or violence, if the damage be great, he shall pay a large sum as compensation to the damaged party, and a small sum if the damage be small; and as a general rule, every man shall in every case pay a sum equal to the damage done, until the loss is made good; and, in addition to this, every man shall pay the penalty which is attached to his crime [934a] by way of corrective. The penalty shall be lighter in the case of one who [459| has done wrong owing to another’s folly — the wrongdoer being over-persuaded because of his youth or for some such reason; and it shall be heavier when the man has done wrong owing to his own folly, because of his incontinence in respect of pleasures and pains and the overpowering influence of craven fears or of incurable desires, envies and rages. And he shall pay the penalty, not because of the wrong-doing, — for what is done can never be undone, — but in order that for the future both he himself and those who behold his punishment may either utterly loathe his sin [934b] or at least renounce 244 to a great extent such lamentable conduct. For all these reasons and with a view to all these objects, the law, like a good archer, must aim in each case at the amount of the punishment, and above all at its fitting amount; and the judge must assist the lawgiver in carrying out this same task, whenever the law entrusts to him the assessment of what the defendant is to suffer or pay, [934c] while the lawgiver, like a draughtsman, must give a sketch in outline of cases which illustrate the rules of the written code. And that, O Megillus and Clinias, is the task which we must now execute as fairly and well as we can: we must state what penalties should be ordained for all cases of robbery and violence, in so far as the gods and sons of gods may suffer us to ordain them by law.

If any be a madman, he shall not appear openly in the city; the relatives of such persons shall keep them indoors, employing whatever means they know of, [934d] or else they shall pay a penalty; a person belonging to the highest property-class shall pay a hundred drachmae, whether the man he is neglecting be a free man or a slave, — one belonging to the second |461| class shall pay four-fifths of a mina — one of the third class, three-fifths, — and one of the fourth class, two-fifths. There are many and various forms of madness: in the cases now mentioned it is caused by disease, but cases also occur where it is due to the natural growth and fostering of an evil temper, by which men in the course of a trifling quarrel abuse one another slanderously with loud cries — [934e] a thing which is unseemly and totally out of place in a well-regulated State. Concerning abuse there shall be this one law to cover all cases: — No one shall abuse anyone. If one is disputing with another in argument, he shall either speak or listen, and he shall wholly refrain from abusing either the disputant or the bystanders. For from those light things, words, there spring in deed things most heavy to bear, even hatreds and feuds, [935a] when men begin by cursing one another and foully abusing one another in the manner of fish-wives; and the man who utters such words is gratifying a thing most ungracious and sating his passion with foul foods, and by thus brutalizing afresh that part of his soul which once was humanized by education, he makes a wild beast of himself through his rancorous life, and wins only gall for gratitude from his passion. In such disputes all men are commonly wont to proceed to indulge in ridicule [935b] of their opponent; but everyone who has ever yet indulged in this practice has either failed to achieve a virtuous disposition, or else has lost in great measure his former high-mindedness. No man, therefore, shall ever in any wise utter such words in any holy place or at any public sacrifice or public games, or in the market or the court or any public assembly; in every such |463| case the magistrate concerned shall punish the offender; or, if he fail to do so, he shall be disqualified for any public distinction [935c] because of his neglect of the laws and his failure to execute the injunctions of the lawgiver. And if in other places a man abstains not from such language — whether he be the aggressor or acting in self-defence — whosoever meets with him, if he be an older man, shall vindicate the law by driving off with stripes the men who pamper passion, that evil comrade; or, if he fail to do so, he shall be liable to the appointed penalty.

We are now asserting that a man who is gripped by the habit of abuse cannot avoid trying to indulge in ridicule; and this is a thing we abuse when it is uttered in passion. [935d] What then? Are we to countenance the readiness to ridicule people which is shown by comic writers, 245 provided that in their comedies they employ this sort of language about the citizens without any show of passion? Or shall we divide ridicule under the two heads of jest and earnest, and allow anyone to ridicule any other in jest and without passion, 246 [935e] but forbid anyone (as we have already said) to do so in real earnest and with passion? We must by no means go back on what we said; but we must determine by law who is to be granted this permission, and who refused. A composer of a comedy or of any iambic or lyric song shall be strictly forbidden to ridicule any of the citizens either by word or by mimicry, 247 whether with or without passion; and if anyone disobeys, the Presidents of the Games [936a] shall on the same day banish him wholly from the country, failing which |465| they shall be fined three minas, dedicated to the god whose festival is being held. Those to whom permission has been given, as we previously said, 248 to write songs about one another shall be allowed to ridicule others in jest and without passion; but they shall not be allowed to do so with passion and in earnest. The task of making this distinction shall be entrusted to the minister in charge of the general education of the young: whatever he shall approve, the composer shall be allowed to produce in public, but whatever he shall disapprove, the composer shall be forbidden either personally to exhibit to anyone or to be found teaching to any other person, free man or slave; [936b] and if he does so, he shall be held to be a base man and disobedient to the laws.

The man who suffers from hunger or the like is not the man who deserves pity, but he who, while possessing temperance or virtue of some sort, or a share thereof, gains in addition evil fortune; wherefore it would be a strange thing indeed if, in a polity and State that is even moderately well organised, a man of this kind (be he slave or free man) should be so entirely neglected as to come to utter beggary. Wherefore the lawgiver will be safe in enacting for such cases some such law as this: — [936c] There shall be no beggar in our State; and if anyone attempts to beg, and to collect a livelihood by ceaseless prayers, the market-stewards shall expel him from the market, and the Board of city-stewards from the city, and from any other district he shall be driven across the border by the country-stewards, to the end that the land may be wholly purged of such a creature. |467| If a slave, male or female, do any injury to another man’s goods, [936d] when the injured man himself has had no share in causing the injury through his own clumsy or careless handling, then the master of him that has done the injury shall fully make good the damage, or else shall hand over the person of the injurer: but if the master brings a charge affirming that the claim is made in order to rob him of his slave by a privy agreement between the injurer and the injured party, then he shall prosecute the man who claims that he has been injured on the charge of conspiracy; and if he wins his case, he shall receive double the price at which the court shall assess the slave, [936e] but if he loses he shall not only make good the damage, but he shall also hand over the slave. And if it be a mule or horse or dog or any other animal that causes damage to any property belonging to a neighbour, its master shall in like manner pay compensation. If anyone is unwilling to act as witness, the man who requires his evidence shall summon him, and the man so summoned shall attend the trial, and if he knows the facts and is willing to give evidence, he shall give it; but in case he denies knowledge, he shall take an oath by the three gods, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, that of a truth he has no knowledge, [937a] and this done, he shall be dismissed from the suit. And if a man summoned as witness does not attend with his summoner, he shall be legally liable to be sued for damages. And if one of the judges be summoned as a witness, he shall not vote at the trial after giving evidence. A free woman, if she be over forty years old, shall be allowed to give evidence and to support a plea, and if she have no husband, |469| she shall be allowed to bring an action; but if she have a husband alive, [937b] she shall only be allowed to give evidence. A male or female slave and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and support a plea in murder cases only, provided that they furnish a substantial security that, if their evidence be denounced as false, they will remain until the trial. Either of the opposing parties in a suit may denounce all or part of the evidence, provided that he claims that false witness has been given before the action is finally decided; and the magistrates shall keep the denunciations, when they have been sealed by both parties, and shall produce them at the trial for false witness. [937c] If any person be twice convicted of false witness, no law shall compel him any longer to bear witness, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness any longer; and if, after three convictions, a man dare to bear witness, whoso wishes shall report him to the magistrates, and they shall hand him over to the court, and if he be found guilty, he shall be punished with death. In the case of all those whose evidence is condemned at the trial, — they being adjudged to have given false witness and thus to have caused the victory of the winner, — if more than the half of their evidence be condemned, [937d] the action that was lost because of them shall be annulled, and there shall be a disputation and a trial as to whether the action was or was not decided on the evidence in question; and by the verdict then given, whichever way it goes, the result of the previous actions shall be finally determined.

Although there are many fair things in human life, yet to most of them there clings a kind of |471| canker which poisons and corrupts them. [937e] None would deny that justice between men is a fair thing, and that it has civilized all human affairs. And if justice be fair, how can we deny that pleading is also a fair thing? But these fair things are in disrepute owing to a kind of foul art, which, cloaking itself under a fair name, 249 claims, first, that there exists a device for dealing with lawsuits, and further, that it is the one which is able, by pleading and helping another to plead, to win the victory, whether the pleas concerned [938a] be just or unjust; and it also asserts that both this art itself and the arguments which proceed from it are a gift offered to any man who gives money in exchange. This art — whether it be really an art or merely an artless trick got by habit and practice 250 — must never, if possible, arise in our State; and when the lawgiver demands compliance and no contradiction of justice, or the removal of such artists to another country, — if they comply, the law for its part shall keep silence, but if they fail to comply, its pronouncement shall be this: — If anyone be held to be [938b] trying to reverse the force of just pleas in the minds of the judges, or to be multiplying suits unduly or aiding others to do so, whoso wishes shall indict him for perverse procedure or aiding in perverse procedure, and he shall be tried before the court of select judges; and if he be convicted, the court shall determine whether he seems to be acting from avarice or from ambition; and if from the latter, the court shall determine for how long a period such an one shall be precluded from bringing an action against anyone, or aiding anyone to do so; while if avarice be his motive, if he be an alien he |473| shall be sent out of the country [938c] and forbidden to return on pain of death, but if he be a citizen he shall be put to death because of his unscrupulous devotion to the pursuit of gain. And anyone who has twice been pronounced guilty of committing such an act from ambition shall be put to death.

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Laws Book XII.

[941a]

Athenian: If anyone, while acting as ambassador or herald, conveys false messages from his State to another State, or fails to deliver the actual message he was sent to deliver, or is proved to have brought back, as ambassador or herald, either from a friendly or hostile nation, their reply in a false form, — against all such there shall be laid an indictment for breaking the law by sinning against the sacred messages and injunctions of Hermes 251 and Zeus, and an assessment shall be made of the penalty they shall suffer or pay, [941b] if convicted.

Theft of property is uncivilized, open robbery is shameless: neither of these has any of the sons of Zeus practised, through delight in fraud or force. Let no man, therefore, be deluded concerning this or persuaded either by poets or by any perverse myth-mongers into the belief that, when he thieves or forcibly robs, he is doing nothing shameful, but just what the gods themselves do. 252 That is both unlikely and untrue; and whoever acts thus unlawfully is neither a god at all nor a child of gods; [941c] and this the lawgiver, as it behoves him, knows better than the whole tribe of poets. He, therefore, that hearkens to our speech is blessed, and deserves blessing for all time; but he that hearkens not shall, in the next place, be holden by this law: — If anyone |477| steals any piece of public property, he shall receive the same punishment, be it great or small. For he that steals a small thing steals with equal greed, though with less power, while he that takes a large thing which he has not deposited does wrong to the full; [941d] wherefore the law deems it right not to inflict a less penalty on the one offender than on the other on the ground that his theft is smaller, but rather because the one is possibly still curable, the other incurable. So if anyone convict in a court of law either a resident alien or a slave of stealing any piece of public property, in his case, since he is probably curable, the court shall decide what punishment he shall suffer [942a] or what fine he shall pay. But in the case of a citizen, who has been reared in the way he is to be reared, — if he be convicted of plundering or doing violence to his fatherland, whether he has been caught in the act or not, he shall be punished by death, 253 as being practically incurable.

Military organization is the subject of much consultation and of many appropriate laws. The main principle is this — that nobody, male or female, should ever be left without control, nor should anyone, whether at work or in play, grow habituated in mind to acting alone and on his own initiative, but he should live always, both in war and peace, with his eyes fixed constantly [942b] on his commander and following his lead; and he should be guided by him even in the smallest detail of his actions — for example, to stand at the word of command, and to march, and to exercise, to wash and eat, to wake up at night for sentry-duty and despatch-carrying, and in moments of danger to wait for the commander’s |479| signal before either pursuing or retreating before an enemy; and, in a word, [942c] he must instruct his soul by habituation to avoid all thought or idea of doing anything at all apart from the rest of his company, so that the life of all shall be lived en masse and in common; for there is not, nor ever will be, any rule superior to this or better and more effective in ensuring safety and victory in war. This task of ruling, and being ruled by, others must be practised in peace from earliest childhood; 254 but anarchy [942d] must be utterly removed from the lives of all mankind, and of the beasts also that are subject to man. Moreover, with a view to excellence in war, they shall dance all kinds of dances, 255 and with the same object they shall cultivate in general suppleness and dexterity, and endurance also in the matter of foods and drinks and cold and heat and hard beds: and, what is most important, they shall accustom themselves not to spoil the natural powers of head and feet by wrapping them in coverings of alien material, and thereby ruining the production and growth [942e] of their own natural hair and soles. For when these extremities are conserved, they keep at its highest the power of the whole body, but they effect the opposite when spoiled; and of these two extremities, the one is the chief minister of the whole body, and the other the chief master, inasmuch as, by the ordinance of nature, it contains all the leading senses of the body.

[943a] Such is the laudation of the military life to which, as we hold, the youth ought to hearken, and its laws are these: — He that is enrolled or put on some rota |481| must perform military service. If anyone, through cowardice, fail to present himself without leave from the commanders, he shall be indicted for desertion before the military officers when they return from camp, and each class of those who have served shall sit by themselves as judges — that is, hoplites, cavalry, and each of the other branches, — [943b] and they shall summon hoplites before the hoplites, cavalrymen before the cavalry, and all others in like manner before soldiers of their own class; and any man that is convicted shall be debarred from ever competing for any distinction and from ever prosecuting another for shirking service, or acting as accuser in connection with such charges; and, in addition to this, what he ought to suffer or pay shall be determined by the court. Next, when the suits for shirking service have been fully decided, the officers shall again hold a review of each class of soldiers, and he who wishes shall be tried before a court of his own colleagues on his claim for an award of merit; but any proof or verbal testimony which the claimant produces must have reference, [943c] not to any previous war, but solely to that campaign in which they have just been engaged. The prize for each class shall be a wreath of olive leaves; and this the recipient shall hang up, along with an inscription, in whatever temple of the war-gods he chooses, to serve throughout his life as a proof that he has won the first, [943d] second or third prize, as the case may be. If a man goes on military service, but returns home without leave from the officers, he shall be liable to be indicted for desertion before the same court which deals with cases of shirking service, and the same penalties which have been already prescribed shall |483| be imposed upon him, if he is convicted. Every man, when bringing an action against another, ought rightly to dread bringing upon him, whether intentionally or unintentionally, a wrongful punishment [943e] (for Justice is, and has been truly named, 256 the daughter of Reverence, and falsehood and wrong are naturally detested by Reverence and Justice); and he should beware also of trespassing against Justice in any matter, and especially in respect of loss of arms in battle, lest by mistakenly abusing such losses as shameful, when they are really unavoidable, he may bring undeserved charges against an undeserving man. It is by no means easy to draw distinctions between such cases; [944a] but none the less the law ought to try by some means to distinguish case from case. In illustration we may cite the story of Patroclus: 257 suppose that he had been brought to his tent without his arms and had recovered — as has happened in the case of thousands, — while the arms he had had (which, as the poet relates, had been given to Peleus by the gods, as a dowry with Thetis) were in the hands of Hector, — then all the base men of those days would have been free to abuse Menoetios’ son for loss of arms. Moreover, there are instances [944b] of men losing their arms through being flung down from cliffs, or on the sea, or in ravines, when overwhelmed by a sudden great rush of water, or from other mishaps, countless in number, which one could mention by way of consolation, and thereby justify an evil which lends itself to calumny. It is right, therefore, to separate, as best one can, |485| the greater and more serious evil from its opposite. As a rule, indeed, the employment of the names in question by way of abuse admits of a distinction; for the term ‘shield-flinger’ would not properly be applied in all cases, but rather the term ‘arms-dropper.’ [944c] For the man who by a fair amount of violence is stripped of his arms will not be as much of a ‘shield-flinger’ as the man who has voluntarily thrown them away — rather there is a vast difference between the two cases. So let the pronouncement of the law be this: — If a man is overtaken by his enemies and, having arms, instead of turning and defending himself, voluntarily drops his arms or flings them away, thereby gaining for himself a life that is shameful by speed of foot, rather than by bravery a noble and blessed death, — concerning the arms flung away in a loss of this sort a trial shall be held, but the judge shall pass over in his enquiry a case of the kind previously described. [944d] For the bad man one must always punish, in order to better him, but not the luckless man; for that profits not. What, then, would be a proper penalty for the man who has thrown away for naught such powerful weapons of defence? A god, it is said, once changed Kaineus the Thessalian 258 from woman’s shape to man’s; but it is beyond human power to do the opposite of this; otherwise, [944e] the converse transformation — changing him from a man into a woman — would be, perhaps, the most appropriate of all penalties for a ‘shield-flinger.’ As it is, to get the nearest possible approach to this, because of the man’s love of life at any price, and to secure that for the rest of his life he may run no risk, but may live saddled with this disgrace as long as possible, — the law dealing |487| with such cases shall be this: — If any man be convicted on a charge of shamefully throwing away his military weapons, no general or other military officer shall ever employ him as a soldier [945a] or post him to any rank; otherwise, the examiner shall fine the officer who posts the coward 1000 drachmae, if he be of the highest property-class, — if of the second class, five minas, — if of the third, three minas, — if of the fourth, one mina. And the soldier who is convicted of the charge, in addition to being debarred, as his own nature requires, from manly risks, shall also pay back his wage — 1000 drachmae, if he be of the highest class, — if of the second, five minas, — [945b] if of the third, three, — and if of the fourth, one mina, just as in the previous cases.

Respecting examiners, 259 what would be a proper statement for us to make, seeing that some of the magistrates are appointed by the hazard of the lot and for a year, while others are appointed for several years and chosen out of a number of selected persons? Of such, who will be a competent examiner, in the event of any one of them acting at all crookedly through being burdened by the weight of his office and his own inability to support it worthily? [945c] It is by no means easy to find an officer of officers, who surpasses them in excellence, but still one must try to find some examiners of a divine quality. In fact, the case stands thus: The dissolution of a polity, like that of a ship’s frame, depends upon many critical factors: these (in the case of a ship) though one in nature are separated into many parts, and we |489| call them by many names — such as stays, under-girders, bracing-ropes. For the preservation, or dissolution and disappearance, of a polity the office of examiner is such a critical factor, and that of the gravest kind. [945d] For if those who act as examiners of the magistrates are better men than they, and if they act blamelessly with blameless justice, then the whole of the State and country flourishes and is happy; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried out otherwise, then the bond of justice which binds all political elements into one is dissolved, and in consequence every office is torn apart from every other, and they no longer tend all to the same end; and thus out of one State they make many, 260 and by filling it with civil strife they speedily bring it to ruin. [945e] Wherefore it is most necessary that the examiners should be men of admirably complete virtue.

Let us contrive to bring them into being in some such way as this: — Every year, after the summer solstice, 261 the whole State must assemble at the common precincts of Helios and Apollo, there to present before the god the names of three out of their own number, — [946a] each citizen proposing that man, not less than fifty years old, whom (with the exception of himself) he regards as in all respects the best. Of those so nominated they shall choose out those who have gained most votes — half of the total number nominated, if that number be even, but if it be an odd number, they shall reject the one who has least votes and retain the even half, marking them off according to the number of the votes received; and if several have an equal number of votes, thus causing the upper half-section to be too large, they shall |491| remove the excess by rejecting those that are youngest; [946b] the rest being retained on the list, they shall vote again on these, and they shall continue the same process until three be left with an unequal number of votes. If, however, all of these, or two of them, have equal votes, they shall commit the matter to good luck and chance, and distinguish by lot between the first, the second, and the third, and crown them with olive-wreaths; and when they have thus awarded the distinctions, they shall make this public proclamation: — The State of the Magnetes, — which, by God’s grace, has again won salvation, — has presented to Helios the three best of its own men, and now it dedicates them, [946c] according to the ancient law, as a joint offering to Apollo and Helios of its choicest first fruits, for so long a time as they pursue their judicial task. Twelve such examiners shall be appointed in the first year, until each of them has come to the age of seventy-five; and thereafter three shall be added annually. And they, after dividing all the public offices into twelve sections, shall employ all tests, of a gentlemanly kind, in investigating them. So long as they are serving as examiners, they shall reside within the precincts of Apollo and Helios, [946d] where they were chosen. When they have judged — either each one singly or in consultation with one another — the State officials, they shall publish, by means of records placed in the market, a statement concerning what each official should suffer or pay according to the decision of the examiners. If any official claims that he has not been judged justly, he shall summon the examiners before the select judges; 262 and if he be acquitted in respect of the examiners’ charges, |493| he shall, if he wishes, [946e] prosecute the examiners themselves; but if he be convicted, in case the penalty imposed on him by the examiners be death, he shall simply be put to death (one death only being possible), but in the case of other penalties which admit of being doubled, he shall pay a double penalty.

As regards the examinations of these examiners themselves, it is right for us to hear what they are to be, and how they are to be conducted. During their lifetime these men, who have been deemed worthy of the highest distinction by the whole State, [947a] shall have the front seats at every festival; and from their number, too, shall be chosen the heads of every sacred mission sent out to take part in any public sacrifices, congresses or other such sacred assemblies of the Hellenes; and these alone of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel; and they all shall be priests of Apollo and Helios, and every year that one of them who has been adjudged first of those appointed in that year shall be the high-priest, and his name they shall inscribe at the head of the year, [947b] that it may serve as a measure of the date, so long as the State remains. When they die, their laying-out, funeral and interment shall be different from that of other citizens: nothing but white raiment shall be used at it, and there shall be no dirges or lamentations; a choir of girls and another of boys shall stand round the bier, and they shall chant alternately a laudation for the priests in the form of a hymn in verse, glorifying them with their hymnody all the day long; [947c] and at the next dawn the bier itself shall be borne to the tomb by a hundred of the young men who attend the gymnasia, |495| — they being selected by the relatives of the dead man, — and the procession shall be led by the men of war, all clad in their proper military garb, — cavalry with their horses, hoplites with their weapons, [947d] and the rest in like manner; and round about the bier the boys, being in front, shall sing their national anthem, and behind them the girls shall follow singing, and all the women who have passed the age of child-bearing; and next shall follow the priests and priestesses as to a tomb that is sanctified — yea, though they be debarred from approaching all other tombs, — if so be that the voice of the Pythian 263 approves that thus it shall be. Their tomb shall be constructed under ground, in the form of an oblong vault of spongy stone, as long-lasting as possible, and fitted with couches of stone [947e] set side by side; in this when they have laid him who is gone to his rest, they shall make a mound in a circle round it and plant thereon a grove of trees, save only at one extremity, so that at that point the tomb may for all time admit of enlargement, in case there be need of additional mounds for the buried. And every year contests of music, gymnastics and horse-racing shall be held in their honour.

These shall be the rewards for those who have passed the scrutiny of examiners. But if any of these examiners, relying on the fact of his election, shall give proof of human frailty by becoming evil after his election, the law shall enjoin on him who wishes to indict him, and the trial shall take place in the court after this manner: — [948a] The court shall be composed first of Law-wardens, next |497| of the living 264 members of the body of examiners themselves, and, in addition to these, of the Bench of select judges; 265 and he who indicts anyone shall state in his indictment that the person in question is unworthy of his distinctions and of his office; and if the defendant be convicted, he shall be deprived of his office and of his tomb, and of the other privileges granted to him; but if the prosecutor fails to gain one-fifth of the votes, he shall pay twelve minas if he be of the highest class, — [948b] if of the second, eight, — if of the third, six, — and if of the fourth, two minas. Rhadamanthys deserves admiration for the way in which, as we are told, he judged cases of law, in that he perceived that the men of his time had a clear belief in the existence of gods, — and naturally so, seeing that most men at that time were the offspring of gods, he himself among others, as the story declares. Probably he thought that he ought not to entrust lawsuits to any man, but only to gods, from whom he obtained verdicts that were both simple and speedy; for he administered an oath [948c] to the disputants regarding each matter in dispute, and thus secured a speedy and safe settlement. But nowadays, when, as we say, 266 a certain section of mankind totally disbelieve in gods, and others hold that they pay no regard to us men, while a third party, consisting of the most and worst of men, suppose that in return for small offerings and flatteries the gods lend them aid in committing large robberies, and often set them free from great penalties, — under such conditions, for men as they now are, the device of Rhadamanthys would no longer be appropriate in actions at law. [948d] Since, |499| therefore, the opinions of men about the gods have changed, so also must their laws change. In legal actions laws that are framed intelligently ought to debar both litigants from taking oaths; he that is bringing an action against anyone ought to write down his charges, but swear no oath, and the defendant in like manner ought to write down his denial and hand it to the magistrates without an oath. For truly it is a horrible thing to know full well that, inasmuch as lawsuits are frequent in a State, well-nigh half the citizens are perjurers, [948e] although they have no scruple in associating with one another at common meals and at other public and private gatherings. So it shall be laid down by law that a judge shall take an oath when he is about to give judgment, and likewise oaths shall be taken by him who is appointing public officials [949a] by voting under oath or by bringing his votes from a sacred spot, and by the judge of choirs or of any musical performance, and by the presidents and umpires of gymnastic and horse-racing contests, or of any matters which do not, in human opinion, bring gain to him who commits perjury. But in all cases where it obviously appears that a large gain will accrue to him who denies stoutly and swears ignorance, all the contending parties must be judged [949b] by trials without oaths. And in general, during a trial, the presidents of the court shall not permit a man to speak under oath for the sake of gaining credence, or to imprecate curses upon himself and his family, or to make use of unseemly supplications and womanish sobbings, but only and always to state and hear what is just in proper language; 267 otherwise, the magistrate shall check him for |501| digressing from the point, and shall call him back to deal with the matter in hand. In the case of resident aliens dealing with aliens, it shall be permitted them, as now, to give and receive oaths of a binding character one from another, if so they choose, — [949c] for these men will not grow old in the State 268 nor, as a rule, will they make their nest in it, and rear up others like themselves to become naturalised in the country; and in respect of the private actions they bring against one another, they shall all have the same privilege during the trial. In all cases where a free man disobeys the State, not by acts deserving of stripes, imprisonment or death, but in respect of matters such as attendance at festivals or processions or public ceremonies of a similar kind — [949d] matters involving either a sacrifice in peace or a contribution in time of war, — in all such cases the first necessity is to assess the penalty; in case of disobedience, those officers whom the State and the law appoint to exact the penalty shall take a pledge; and if any disregard the pledgings, the things pledged shall be sold, and the price shall go to the State; and if a greater penalty be required, the official proper in each case shall impose on the disobedient the suitable penalties [949e] and shall summon them before the court, until they consent to do what they are bidden. For a State which makes no money except from the produce of its soil, and which does not engage in commerce, it is necessary to determine what action it ought to take regarding the emigration of its citizens to outside countries and the admission of aliens from elsewhere. In giving counsel concerning |503| these matters the lawgiver must begin by using persuasion, so far as he can. The intermixture of States with States naturally results in a blending of characters of every kind, as strangers import among strangers novel customs: 269 [950a] and this result would cause immense damage to peoples who enjoy a good polity under right laws; but the majority of States are by no means well governed, so that to them it makes no difference if their population is mixed through the citizens admitting strangers and through their own members visiting other States whenever any one of them, young or old. at any time or place, desires to go abroad. Now for the citizens to refuse altogether either to admit others or to go abroad themselves is by no means a possible policy, [950b] and, moreover, it would appear to the rest of the world to be both churlish and cross-grained, since they would get the reputation of adopting harsh language, such as that of the so-called ‘Aliens Expulsion Acts,’ 270 and methods both tyrannical and severe; and reputation in the eyes of others, whether for goodness or the reverse, is a thing that should never be lightly esteemed. For the majority of men, even though they be far removed from real goodness themselves, are not equally lacking in the power of judging whether others are bad or good; and even in the wicked there resides a divine and correct intuition, 271 whereby a vast number even of the extremely wicked [950c] distinguish aright, in their speech and opinions, between the better men and the worse. Accordingly, for most States, the exhortation to value highly a good public reputation is a right exhortation. The most correct and most important rule is this, — that the man who pursues |505| after a good reputation should himself be truly good, and that he should never pursue it without goodness (if he is to be really a perfect man); and furthermore, as regards the State we are founding in Crete, it would well become it to gain for itself in the eyes of the rest of the world the best and noblest reputation possible for goodness; and if it develop according to plan, [950d] there is every hope that, as is natural, it (and but few others) will be numbered among the well-ordered States and countries upon which the Sun and all the other gods look down.

In regard, therefore, to the question of going abroad to other lands and places and of the admission of foreigners we must act as follows: — First, no man under forty years old shall be permitted to go abroad to any place whatsoever; next, no man shall be permitted to go abroad in a private capacity, but in a public capacity permission shall be granted to heralds, embassies, and certain commissions of inspection. [950e] Military expeditions in war it would be improper to reckon among official visits abroad. It is right that embassies should be sent to Apollo at Pytho and to Zeus at Olympia, and to Nemea and the Isthmus, to take part in the sacrifices and games in honour of these gods: and it is right also that the ambassadors thus sent should be, so far as is practicable, as numerous, noble and good as possible, — men who will gain for the State a high reputation in the sacred congresses of peace, and confer on it 951a] a glorious repute that will rival that of its warriors; and these men, when they return home, will teach the youth that the political institutions of other countries are inferior to their own. Also, they ought |507| to send out other inspecting commissioners (when they have obtained leave from the Law-wardens) of the following kind: — If any of the citizens desire to survey the doings of the outside world in a leisurely way, no law shall prevent them; [951b] for a State that is without experience of bad men and good would never be able (owing to its isolation) to become fully civilized and perfect, nor would it be able to safeguard its laws unless it grasped them, not by habit only, but also by conviction. 272 Amongst the mass of men there always exist — albeit in small numbers — men that are divinely inspired; inter- course with such men is of the greatest value, and they spring up in badly-governed States just as much as in those that are well governed. In search of these men it is always right for one who dwells in a well-ordered State to go forth on a voyage of enquiry by land and sea, [951c] if so be that he himself is incorruptible, so as to confirm thereby such of his native laws as are rightly enacted, and to amend any that are deficient. For without this inspection and enquiry a State will not permanently remain perfect, nor again if the inspection be badly conducted.

Clinias: How, then, might both these objects be secured?

Athenian: In this way. First, our overseas inspector shall be more than fifty years old: secondly, he shall have proved himself a man of high repute both in military and other affairs, if it is intended [951d] that he shall be despatched into other States with the approval of the Law-wardens; but when he has passed sixty years of age, he shall cease to act as inspector. When he has been inspecting for as |509| many years out of the ten as he wishes and has returned home, he shall go to the synod 273 of those who supervise the laws; and this synod shall be a mixed body of young men and old which is obliged to meet every day between dawn and sunrise; 274 it shall consist, first, of the priests who have gained the award of merit, 275 and secondly, [951e] of the ten senior Law-wardens; and it shall also include the President of Education who has been last appointed, and his predecessors in office as well. None of these members shall go alone, but each of them shall bring with him a companion — a young man, selected by himself, between thirty and forty years old. Their conference and discourse shall deal always with the subject of laws and [952a] of their own State, and with anything important they may have learnt elsewhere which bears on this subject, or any brandies of knowledge which are thought likely to assist in their enquiry, in that the learning of them helps towards a clearer view of legal matters, whereas ignorance of them conduces to a view that is dim and blurred. Whatsoever of these matters are approved by the elder members the younger shall learn with all diligence; and should any of the young men invited to attend be deemed unworthy, the person who has invited him [952b] shall be censured by the whole synod, but such of them as are held in good repute shall be watched over by the rest of the citizens, who shall regard and observe them with special care, honouring them when they do right, but dishonouring them more than other men if they turn out worse than most. To this synod he that has inspected the legal institutions |511| of other peoples shall repair immediately after his return home; and if he has discovered any persons able to declare any oracle regarding legislation or education or nurture, or if he has brought back any personal observations of his own, he shall communicate them to the whole synod; and if it appear [952c] that he has come back in no respect worse (nor yet any better) than when he went, still because of his extreme zeal he shall be commended; while if it appear that he has come back much better, he shall be much more highly commended during his life, and when dead, due honours shall be paid to him by the synod’s authority. But if, on the other hand, such an inspector appear to be corrupted on his return, in spite of his pretensions to wisdom, he shall be forbidden to associate with anyone, young or old; wherein if he obeys the magistrates, he shall live as a private person, but if not, he shall be put to death — if, that is to say, he be convicted in a court of law of being a meddler in respect of education and the laws. And if, when such an one deserves to be summoned before a court, [952d] none of the magistrates summons him, the magistrates shall be censured at the adjudication of awards of merit. Such, then, shall be the character and the procedure of him that travels abroad. Next to him we must deal in friendly wise with the visitor from abroad. There are four types of stranger which call for mention. The first and inevitable immigrant is the one who chooses summer, 276 as a rule, for his annual visits, in the fashion of migratory birds — [952e] and, like birds, the most of these cross the sea, just as if they had wings, for the sake of making gain by their trading, |513| and fly over to foreign cities during the summer season; this stranger must be received, when he comes to the city, at the markets, harbours, and public buildings outside the city, by the officials in charge thereof; and they shall have a care lest any such strangers [953a] introduce any innovation, and they shall duly dispense justice to them, and shall hold such intercourse as is necessary with them, but to the least extent possible. The second type of stranger is he who is an inspector, in the literal sense, with his eyes, and with his ears also of all that appertains to musical exhibitions: for all such there must be lodgings provided at the temples, to afford them friendly accommodation, and the priests and temple-keepers must show them care and attention, until they have sojourned for a reasonable length of time and have seen and heard all that they intended; [953b] after which, if no harm has been done or suffered by them, they shall be dismissed. And for these the priests shall act as judges, in case anyone injures one of them or one of them injures anyone else, if the claim does not exceed fifty drachmae; but if any greater claim is made, the trial for such strangers must take place before the market-stewards. The third type which requires a public reception is he who comes from another country on some public business: he must be received by none but the generals, hipparchs and taxiarchs, and the care of a stranger of this kind [953c] must be entirely in the hands of the official with whom he lodges, in conjunction with the prytaneis. The fourth type of stranger comes rarely, if ever: should there, however, come at any time from another country an inspector similar to those we send |515| abroad, he shall come on these conditions: — First, he shall be not less than fifty years old; and secondly, his purpose in coming must be to view some noble object which is superior in beauty to anything to be found in other States, or else to display to another State something of that description. Every visitor of this kind [953d] shall go as an unbidden guest to the doors of the rich and wise, he being both rich and wise himself; and he shall go also to the abode of the General Superintendent of Education, believing himself to be a proper guest for such a host, or to the house of one of those who have won a prize for virtue; and when he has communed with some of these, by the giving and receiving of information, he shall take his departure, with suitable gifts and distinctions bestowed on him as a friend by friends. Such are the laws in conformity with which they must receive all strangers, of either sex, from another country, [953e] and send out their own citizens; thus doing honour to Zeus, Patron of Strangers, instead of expelling strangers by means of meats and ceremonies 277 (as is now done by the nurslings of the Nile), or else by savage proclamations. 278 If anyone gives a security, he shall give it in express terms, setting forth the whole transaction in a written record: and this he shall do before not less than three witnesses, [954a] if the amount be under 1,000 drachmae, and before not less than five, if it be over 1,000. The broker in a sale shall act as security for the seller should the latter have no real right to the goods sold or be quite unable to guarantee their possession; and the broker shall be legally liable equally with the seller. |517|

If anyone wishes to make a search 279 on any man’s premises, he shall strip to his shirt and wear no girdle, and when he has first taken an oath by the appointed gods that of a truth he expects to find the object, he shall make his search; and the other man shall grant him the right to search his house, including things both sealed and unsealed. But if, when a man desires to search, the other party refuses leave, the man so prevented shall take legal proceedings, assessing the value of the object sought; [954b] and any man thus convicted shall pay as damages twice the value of the object assessed. And if the master of the house happens to be away from home, the occupants shall allow the claimant to search what is unsealed, and he that searches shall counter-seal what is sealed, and shall set any man he chooses to stand guard over it for five days; and if the master be absent longer, the claimant shall call in the city-stewards, and so make his search, in which he shall open also what is sealed, [954c] and he shall seal this up again in the same way in the presence of the household and of the city-stewards.

In cases of disputed claims there must be a limit of time, after which it shall be no longer possible to dispute the claim of the person in possession. In our State no dispute is possible in respect of lands or houses; but in respect of anything else which a man has acquired, if the possessor be seen to be using it in the city, market, and temple, and if no one lays claim to it, — then if some man asserts that he has been looking for it all this time, while it is plain that its possessor has made no concealment of it, and if this goes on for a year, the possessor still keeping the article [954d] and the other man still seeking, at the expiration |519| of the year no one shall be allowed to lay claim to its possession. And if a man uses an article openly in the country — although not in the city or market, — and if no claimant confronts him within five years, after the expiration of the five years no claim to such a possession shall be allowed. And if a man uses an article indoors in the city, the time-limit shall be three years; if he uses it in a concealed place in the country, [954e] it shall be ten years; while if it be in a foreign country, there shall be no limit of time set to making a claim, whenever it is found. If any man forcibly prevent any person from appearing at an action at law — whether it be the person himself or his witnesses, — in case that person be a slave of his own or of another man, the action shall be null and void; [955a] and in case the person so prevented be a free man, in addition to the annulment of the action, the offender shall be imprisoned for a year and shall be liable to a charge of kidnapping at the hands of anyone who chooses. And if anyone forcibly prevents a rival competitor at a gymnastic, musical or other contest from appearing, whoso wishes shall report the fact to the Presidents of the Games, and they shall allow him that wishes to contend to enter for the contest free; but should they prove unable, in case he who prevented the competitor wins, they shall give the prize to the man prevented and shall inscribe his name as victor [955b] in whatever temples he chooses, whereas the preventer shall be forbidden to put up any tablet or inscription regarding such a contest, and he shall be liable to pay damages, whether he be defeated at the contest or be victorious.

If anyone knowingly receive any stolen article, |521| he shall be liable to the same penalty as the thief; and for the crime of receiving an exile the penalty shall be death. Everyone shall regard the friend or enemy of the State as his own personal friend or enemy; and if anyone makes peace or war with any parties privately and without public consent, in his case also the penalty shall be death; [955c] and if any section of the State makes peace or war on its own account with any parties, the generals shall summon the authors of this action before the court, and the penalty for him who is convicted shall be death. Those who are performing any act of service to the State must do it without gifts; and it shall be no excuse nor laudable plea to argue that for good deeds a man ought to receive gifts, though not for bad: to decide wisely, and firmly to abide by one’s decision, is no easy thing, [955d] and the safest course is for a man to listen and obey the law, which says, ‘Perform no service for gifts.’ Whoso disobeys, if convicted by the court, shall be put to death once for all. Touching money-contributions to the public treasury, not only must the property of every man be valued, for many reasons, but the tribesmen also must furnish an annual record of the year’s produce to the land-wardens, so that the Treasury may adopt whichever it may prefer of the two existing methods of contribution, [955e] and may determine year by year whether it will require a proportion of the whole assessed value, or a proportion of the current yearly income, exclusive of the taxes paid for the common meals.

As regards votive offerings to the gods, it is proper for a reasonable man to present offerings of reasonable value. The soil and the hearth are in all cases sacred to all the gods; wherefore no one shall consecrate |523| afresh what is already sacred. Gold and silver, [956a] which in other States are used both privately and in temples, are objects liable to cause envy; and ivory, which comes from a body bereft of soul, is not a pure offering; 280 while iron and bronze are instruments of war; of wood forming a single piece a man may offer in the public temples whatsoever he wishes, and of stone likewise, and of woven stuff an amount not exceeding a month’s output by one woman. For woven stuff and other materials, white will be a colour befitting the gods; but dyes they must not employ, save only for military decorations. [956b] Birds and statues make most godlike gifts, and they should be no larger than what one sculptor can complete in a single day; and all other votive offerings shall be modelled on similar lines.

And now that we have stated in detail what and how many the divisions of the State as a whole must be, and have also stated to the best of our power the laws regarding all the most important business transactions, 281 it will be proper to deal next with judicial procedure. 282 Of law courts the first will be composed of selected judges, selected jointly [956c] by both plaintiff and defendant, and these will be called ‘arbitrators,’ as being a more suitable name than ‘judges.’ The second court shall be formed of the villagers and tribesmen (the tribes being divided into twelve parts); and if the cause be not decided in the first court, they shall come before these judges to fight a case involving a greater injury, and if at the second trial the defendant is defeated, he shall pay as an extra penalty the fifth part of the assessed amount of the penalty recorded; |525| and if, dissatisfied with his judges, he desires to fight his case before a court a third time, he shall bring it before the select judges, [956d] and if he be again worsted, he shall pay one and a half times the assessed amount. Again, if the plaintiff, when worsted in the first court, does not rest satisfied, but goes to the second court, in case he wins, he shall receive the fifth part, but in case he loses, he shall pay the same fraction of the penalty. And if, through dissatisfaction with the previous verdict, they proceed to the third court, the defendant (as we have said) shall pay, if worsted, one and a half times the penalty, and the prosecutor one-half of it. [956e] As regards the allotting of courts, the filling of vacancies, the appointing of Serjeants for the several boards of magistrates, the times prescribed for performing each of these duties, the recording of votes, adjournments, and all other necessary judicial arrangements, — such as the fixing by lot of the order of trials, rules about counter-pleadings and counter-attendances, and all matters cognate thereto, — all these we have dealt with previously, 283 [957a] but nevertheless it is a proper thing to reiterate twice, — yea, thrice, — the truth. 284 The old lawgiver, however, may pass over all such legal observances as are trivial and easy of discovery, and the young lawgiver shall fill up his omissions. In dealing with the private law courts this method would be reasonable, but in connection with the public courts of the State, and all those which the officials have to use in managing the affairs which belong to their several offices, there exist in many States quite a number of admirable ordinances of worthy men; 285 and from |527| these the Law-wardens must construct a code which is suitable to the polity we are now framing, [957b] partly by comparing and amending them, partly by submitting them to the test of experience, until each such ordinance be deemed satisfactory; and when they have been finally approved, and have been sealed as absolutely unchangeable, then the magistrates shall put them into practice all their life long. All rules regarding silence and discreet speech, and the opposite of these, on the part of the judges, and all else that differs from the rules which obtain in the other States concerning justice and goodness, — all these have been stated in part, 286 and in part they will be stated at the end. [957c] To all these matters he that purposes to be a righteous and just judge must attend, and that written exposition of them which he possesses he must learn. For of all studies, that of legal regulations, provided they be rightly framed, will prove the most efficacious in making the learner a better man; for were it not so, it would be in vain that our divine and admirable law bears a name akin to reason. 287 Moreover, of all other speeches — [957d] whether they be of personal praise or blame, composed in verse or prose, written down or uttered from day to day at some gathering by way of controversy or by way of consent (often of a very futile character), — of all such speeches the writings of the lawgiver 288 will serve as a test; and inasmuch as he possesses these within himself, as a talisman against other speeches, the good judge will guide both himself and the State aright; for the good he will secure both the permanence and [957e] the increase of |529| what is just, and for the bad a change as great as possible from their ignorance, intemperance and cowardice, and, in short, from their general iniquity, — that is to say, for all the bad whose opinions are curable; but for those whose opinions are really fixed by Fate, 289 — if they assigned death as a cure [958a] for souls in this condition (a statement that deserves to be often repeated), such judges and leaders of judges would merit praise from the whole State.

When all the lawsuits for the year have been finally adjudged, we must have laws for the execution of the verdicts to this effect: — First, the magistrate who is acting as judge shall assign to the victorious party all the goods of the party convicted, [958b] excepting such as the latter must necessarily retain in his possession; and this he shall do in each case immediately after the voting has taken place by means of a herald’s proclamation made in the hearing of the judges; and unless the loser settle with the victor to their mutual satisfaction by the end of the month next to those in which the courts are sitting, the magistrate who has tried the case shall, at the instance of the victor, hand over to him the goods of the loser. And if the means are not forthcoming, and there be a deficiency of not less than a drachma, the loser in question shall be precluded from suing anyone else until he has paid to the full his whole debt [958c] to the victor; but others may bring valid actions against him. If anyone, when condemned, obstructs the court which condemned him, the officials thus wrongfully obstructed shall summon him in before the court of the Law-wardens, and anyone who is cast in such an action, as being guilty of subverting the whole State and its laws, shall be punished by death. |531|

Next, when a man has been born and reared, and has himself begotten and reared up children, [958d] and has engaged reasonably in the transactions of business, giving or receiving (as the case may be) compensation for wrongs done, — when he has thus duly grown old in a law-abiding life, his end will come in the course of nature. Touching the dead, male or female, what the sacred rites are which require to be performed in respect of the gods of the underworld, or of this world, shall be declared by the Interpreters as the final authorities: no tombs, however, shall be put in places that are tilled, — whether the monument be small or great, — but they shall fill up those places where the soil is naturally fitted for this purpose only, — [958e] namely, to receive and hide the bodies of the dead with the least hurt to the living; but as regards all the places which of their own nature desire to produce food for mankind, of these no one, living or dead, shall deprive us who are alive. And they shall not pile up a mound to a height greater than can be made by five men in five days; nor shall they erect stone pillars of a size more than is required to hold, at the most, a eulogy of the dead man’s life consisting of not more than four heroic lines. [959a] And as to the laying-out of the corpse, first, it shall remain in the house only for such a time as is required to prove that the man is not merely in a faint, but really dead; and accordingly, in a normal case, the third will be the proper day for the carrying out to burial. As in other matters |533| it is right to trust the lawgiver, so too we must believe him when he asserts that the soul is wholly superior to the body, and that in actual life what makes each of us to be what he is [959b] is nothing else than the soul, while the body is a semblance which attends on each of us, it being well said that the bodily corpses are images of the dead, but that which is the real self of each of us, and which we term the immortal soul, departs to the presence of other gods, 290 there (as the ancestral law declares) to render its account, — a prospect to be faced with courage by the good, but with uttermost dread by the evil. But to him who is dead no great help can be given; it was when he was alive [959c] that all his relatives should have helped him, so that when living his life might have been as just and holy as possible, and when dead he might be free during the life which follows this life from the penalty for wickedness and sin. This being so, one ought never to spend extravagantly on the dead, through supposing that the carcase of flesh that is being buried is in the truest sense one’s own relative; but one ought rather to suppose that the real son or brother — or whoever else it may be that a man fancies himself to be mournfully burying — has departed in furtherance and fulfillment of his own destiny, and that it is our duty to make a wise use of what we have [959d] and to spend in moderation, 291 as it were on a soulless altar to the gods below: 292 and what constitutes moderation the lawgiver will most properly divine. Let this, then, be the law: — |535| An expenditure on the whole funeral not exceeding five minas for a man of the highest property-class, three minas for one of the second class, two for one of the third, and one mina for one of the fourth class, shall be held to be moderate amounts. The Law-wardens must of necessity perform many other duties and supervise many other matters, [959e] but by no means the least of their duties is to live keeping a constant watch over children and men and people of every age; and at the end of his life above all everyone must have some one Law-warden to take charge of him — that one who is called in as overseer by the relatives of the dead man; and it shall stand to his credit if the arrangements about the dead man are carried out in a proper and moderate way, but if improperly, to his discredit. The laying-out of the corpse and the other arrangements shall be carried out in accordance with the custom concerning such matters, but it is right that custom should give way to the following regulations of State law: — Either to ordain or to prohibit weeping for the dead [960a] is unseemly, but we shall forbid loud mourning and lamentation outside the house, and we shall prohibit the carrying out of the dead on to the open roads and making lamentation while he is borne through the streets, and the funeral party must be outside the city-bounds before daybreak. These shall be the legal regulations regarding such matters: he that obeys them shall be free from penalty, but he that disobeys a single one of the Law-wardens shall be penalized by them all [960b] with the penalty adjudged by all in common. All other interments of the dead, or disposal of |537| corpses without interment in the cases of parricides, temple-robbers, and all such criminals, — have been previously 293 dealt with and laid down by law, so that our task of legislation has nearly come to an end. But in every case, the full end does not consist in the doing, gaining or founding of an object; rather our view should be that it is only when we have discovered a means of salvation, endless and complete, for our creation, that we are at length justified in believing that we have done all that ought to be done: until then, we must believe, [960c] the whole of our creation is incomplete.

Clinias: You say well, Stranger; but explain to us yet more clearly the purport of your last observation.

Athenian: O Clinias, many of the sayings of old time have been nobly uttered, and of these not the least, I may say, are the titles given to the Fates.

Clinias: What titles, pray?

Athenian: That the first of them is Lachesis, the second Clotho, and Atropos the saviour-third 294 — she that bestows on the dooms ratified by Clotho the quality of irreversibility. [960d] She it is that must furnish also to the State and its citizens, not merely health and salvation for their bodies, but also right legality in their souls, or rather the salvation of the laws. And this, as it seems clear to me, is what our laws still lack — namely, a right mode of naturally implanting in them this irreversible quality. |539|

Clinias: The point you mention is a serious one, if it is really impossible to discover a means whereby everything may acquire some such quality. [960e]

Athenian: Nay, but it is possible, as I now perceive quite clearly.

Clinias: Then let us by no means desist until we have secured this very quality for the laws we have stated; for it would be ridiculous for us to have wasted all this labour on an object, and then not base it on any firm foundation.

Athenian: You are right in your exhortation, and you will find me as ready as yourself to proceed.

Clinias: Very good. Then what is it you say will prove a means of salvation to our polity and its laws, and how will it do so? [961a]

Athenian: Did we not say 295 that we must have in our State a synod of the following kind: — The ten senior members, at the moment, of the body of Law-wardens shall form the synod, in company with all who have won the award of merit; and, moreover, those inspectors who have gone abroad 296 to discover if they could hear of anything pertinent to the safe-keeping of laws, and who, in the belief that they have succeeded, have come safely home again, shall, after undergoing a searching test, be deemed worthy to take part in the synod? In addition to these, [961b] every member must bring with him one of the young men, not less than thirty years old, whom he has first selected as being both by nature and training a suitable person; after selecting him, he shall introduce him among the members, and if they also approve, he shall keep him as a colleague, but if they disapprove, the fact |541| of his original selection must be concealed from all the rest, and especially from the person thus rejected. The synod must meet at an early hour, when everyone has his time most free from other business, private or public. Was it not some such organisation as this that we described in [961c]our previous discourse?

Clinias: It was.

Athenian: Resuming, then, the subject of this synod, I will say this: — If one were to lay this down as an anchor for the whole State, possessing all the requisite conditions, — then, I affirm, it would secure the salvation of all that we desire.

Clinias: How so?

Athenian: Now will be the time for us to display no lack of zeal in declaring truly what follows.

Clinias: Excellently spoken! Proceed as you propose. [961d]

Athenian: One ought to observe, Clinias, in regard to every object, in each of its operations, what constitutes its appropriate saviour — as, for example, in an animal, the soul and the head are eminently such by nature.

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: Surely it is the goodness of those parts that provides salvation to every animal.

Clinias: How?

Athenian: By the existence of reason in the soul, in addition to all its other qualities, and by the existence of sight and hearing, in addition to all else, in the head; thus, to summarize the matter, it is the combination of reason with the finest senses, and their union in one, that would most justly be termed the salvation of each animal. |543| [961e]

Clinias: That is certainly probable.

Athenian: It is probable. But what kind of reason is it which, when combined with senses, will afford salvation to ships in stormy weather and calm? On shipboard is it not the pilot and the sailors who, by combining the senses with the pilot reason, secure salvation both for themselves and for all that belongs to the ship?

Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: There is no need of many examples to illustrate this. Consider, for instance, what would be the right mark for a general to set up to shoot at in the case of an army, or the medical profession in the case of a human body, if they were aiming [962a] at salvation. Would not the former make victory his mark, and mastery over the enemy, while that of the doctors and their assistants would be the providing of health to the body?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: But if a doctor were ignorant of that bodily condition which we have now called ‘health,’ or a general ignorant of victory, or any of the other matters we have mentioned, could he possibly be thought to possess reason about any of these things?

Clinias: How could he?

Athenian: What, now, shall we say about a State? If a man were to be plainly ignorant as regards the political mark to be aimed at, would he, first of all, deserve the title of magistrate, and, [962b] secondly, would he be able to secure the salvation of that object concerning the aim of which he knows nothing at all?

Clinias: How could he?

Athenian: So now, in our present case, if our settlement |545| of the country is to be finally completed, there must, it would seem, exist in it some element which knows, in the first place, what that political aim, of which we are speaking, really is, and, secondly, in what manner it may attain this aim, and which of the laws, in the first instance, and secondly of men, gives it good counsel or bad. But if any State is destitute of such an element, it will not be surprising [962c] if, being thus void of reason and void of sense, it acts at haphazard always in all its actions.

Clinias: Very true.

Athenian: In which, then, of the parts or institutions of our State have we now got anything so framed as to prove an adequate safeguard of this kind? Can we answer that question?

Clinias: No, Stranger; at least, not clearly. But if I must make a guess, it seems to me that this discourse of yours is leading up to that synod which has to meet at night, as you said just now. [962d]

Athenian: An excellent reply, Clinias! And, as our present discourse shows, this synod must possess every virtue; and the prime virtue is not to keep shifting its aim among a number of objects, 297 but to concentrate its gaze always on one particular mark, and at that one mark to shoot, as it were, all its arrows continually.

Clinias: Most certainly.

Athenian: So now we shall understand that it is by no means surprising if the legal customs in States keep shifting, seeing that different parts of the codes in each State look in different directions. And, in general, it is not surprising that, with some statesmen, [962e] the aim of justice is to enable a certain class of people to rule in the State (whether they be really |547| superior, or inferior), while with others the aim is how to acquire wealth (whether or not they be somebody’s slaves); and others again direct their efforts to winning a life of freedom. Still others make two objects at once the joint aim of their legislation, — namely, the gaining of freedom for themselves, and mastery over other States: while those who are the wisest of all, in their own conceit, aim not at one only, but at the sum total of these and the like objects, since they are unable to specify any one object of pre-eminent value towards which they would desire all else to be directed. [963a]

Clinias: Then, Stranger, was not the view we stated long ago the right one? We said 298 that all our laws must always aim at one single object, which, as we agreed, is quite rightly named ‘virtue.’

Athenian: Yes.

Clinias: And we stated that virtue consists of four things.

Athenian: Certainly.

Clinias: And that the chief of all the four is reason, 299 at which the other three, as well as everything else, should aim.

Athenian: You follow us admirably, Clinias; and now follow us in what conies next. In the case of the pilot, the doctor, and the general, reason is directed, [963b] as we said, towards the one object of aim which is proper in each case; and now we are at the point of examining reason in the case of a statesman, and. addressing it as a man, we shall question it thus: — ‘O admirable sir, what is your aim? Medical reason |549| is able to state clearly the one single object at which it aims; so will you be unable to state your one object — you who are superior, as perhaps you will say, to all the wise?’ Can you two, Megillus and Clinias, define that object on his behalf, and tell me what you say it is, [963c] just as I, on behalf of many others, defined their objects for you?

Clinias: We are totally unable to do so.

Athenian: Well then, can you declare that we need zeal in discerning both the object itself as a whole and the forms it assumes?

Clinias: Illustrate what you mean by ‘the forms’ you speak of.

Athenian: For example, when we said that there are four forms of virtue, obviously, since there are four, we must assert that each is a separate one.

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: And yet we call them all by one name: we assert that courage is virtue, and wisdom virtue, [963d] and the other two likewise, as though they were really not a plurality, but solely this one thing — virtue.

Clinias: Very true.

Athenian: Now it is not hard to explain wherein these two (and the rest) differ from one another, and how they have got two names; but to explain why we have given the one name ‘virtue’ to both of them (and to the rest) is no longer an easy matter.

Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: It is not hard to make clear my meaning. Let one of us adopt the role of questioner, the other of answerer. 300

Clinias: In what way? [963e]

Athenian: Do you ask me this question — why, when |551| calling both the two by the single name of ‘virtue,’ did we again speak of them as two — courage and wisdom? Then I shall tell you the reason, — which is, that the one of them has to do with fear, namely courage, 301 in which beasts also share, and the characters of very young children; for a courageous soul comes into existence naturally and without reasoning, but without reasoning there never yet came into existence, and there does not nor ever will exist, a soul that is wise and rational, it being a distinct kind.

Clinias: That is true. [964a]

Athenian: Wherein they differ and are two you have now learnt from my reply. So do you, in turn, inform me how it is that they are one and identical. Imagine you are also going to tell me how it is that, though four, they are yet one; and then, after you have shown me how they are one, do you again ask me how they are four. And after that, let us enquire regarding the person who has full knowledge of any objects which possess both a name and a definition, whether he ought to know the name only, and not know the definition, or whether it is not a shameful thing for a man worth anything to be ignorant of all these points in regard to matters of surpassing beauty [964b] and importance.

Clinias: It would certainly seem to be so.

Athenian: For the lawgiver and the Law-warden, and for him who thinks he surpasses all men in virtue and who has won prizes for just such qualities, is there anything more important than these very qualities with which we are now dealing — courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom?

Clinias: Impossible.

Athenian: In regard to these matters, is it not right |553| that the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, as the wardens of the rest, in dealing with him that requires knowledge and information, or with him that requires punishment and reproof for his sin, [964c] should excel all others in the art of instructing him in the quality of vice and virtue and exhibiting it fully? Or is some poet who comes into the State, or one who calls himself a trainer of youth, to be accounted evidently superior to him that has won prizes for all the virtues? In a State like that, where there are no wardens who are competent both in word and deed, and possessed of a competent knowledge of virtue, — is it surprising, I ask, if such a State, all unwarded as it is, suffers the same fate as do many of the [964d] States which exist today?

Clinias: Not at all, I should say.

Athenian: Well then, must we do what we now propose, or what? Must we contrive how our wardens shall have a more accurate grasp of virtue, both in word and deed, than the majority of men? For otherwise, how shall our State resemble a wise man’s head and senses, on the ground that it possesses within itself a similar kind of wardenship?

Clinias: What is this resemblance we speak of, and wherein does it consist? [964e]

Athenian: Evidently we are comparing the State itself to the skull; and, of the wardens, the younger ones, who are selected as the most intelligent and nimble in every part of their souls, are set, as it were, like State all round; and as they watch, they pass on their perceptions to the organs of memory, — that is, they report to the elder wardens all that goes on in the State, — [965a] while the old men, who are likened to |555| the reason because of their eminent wisdom in many matters of importance, act as counsellors, and make use of the young men as ministers and colleagues also in their counsels, so that both these classes by their cooperation really effect the salvation of the whole State. Is this the way, or ought we to contrive some other? Should the State, do you think, have all its members equal, instead of having some more highly trained and educated?

Clinias: Nay, my good sir, that were impossible.

Athenian: We must proceed, then, to expound a type of education that is higher than the one previously described. [965b]

Clinias: I suppose so.

Athenian: Will the type which we hinted at just now 302 prove to be that which we require?

Clinias: Certainly.

Athenian: Did we not say 303 that he who is a first-class craftsman or warden, in any department, must not only be able to pay regard to the many, but must be able also to press towards the One 304 so as to discern it and, on discerning it, to survey and organise all the rest with a single eye to it?

Clinias: Quite right. [965c]

Athenian: Can any man get an accurate vision and view of any object better than by being able to look from the many and dissimilar to the one unifying form?

Clinias: Probably not. |557|

Athenian: It is certain, my friend, rather than probable, that no man can possibly have a clearer method than this.

Clinias: I believe you, Stranger, and I assent; so let us employ this method in our subsequent discourse.

Athenian: Naturally we must compel the wardens also of our divine polity to observe accurately, in the first place, what that identical element is which pervades all the four virtues, [965d] and which, — since it exists as a unity in courage, temperance, justice and wisdom, — may justly be called, as we assert, by the single name of ‘virtue.’ This element, my friends, we must now (if we please) hold very tight, and not let go until we have adequately explained the essential nature of the object to be aimed at — whether, that is, it exists by nature as a unity, or as a whole, or as both, or in some other way. Else, if this eludes us, can we possibly suppose that we shall adequately grasp the nature of virtue, when we are unable to state whether it is many or four or one? [965e] Accordingly, if we follow our own counsel, we shall contrive somehow, by hook or by crook, that this knowledge shall exist in our State. Should we decide, however, to pass it over entirely — pass it over we must.

Clinias: Nay, Stranger, in the name of the Stranger’s God, we must by no means pass over a matter such as this, since what you say seems to us most true. But how is this to be contrived? [966a]

Athenian: It is too early to explain how we are to contrive it: let us first make sure that we agree among ourselves as to whether or not we ought to do so.

Clinias: Well, surely we ought, if we can. |559|

Athenian: Very well then; do we hold the same view about the fair and the good? Ought our wardens to know only that each of these is a plurality, or ought they also to know how and wherein they are each a unity?

Clinias: It is fairly obvious that they must necessarily also discern how these are a unity. [966b]

Athenian: Well then, ought they to discern it, but be unable to give a verbal demonstration of it?

Clinias: Impossible! The state of mind you describe is that of a slave.

Athenian: Well then, do we hold the same view about all forms of goodness, that those who are to be real wardens of the laws must really know the true nature of them, and be capable both of expounding it in word and conforming to it in deed, passing judgment on fair actions and foul according to their real character?

Clinias: Certainly. [966c]

Athenian: And is not one of the fairest things the doctrine about the gods, which we expounded earnestly, 305 — to know both that they exist, and what power they manifestly possess, so far as a man is capable of learning these matters; so that while one should pardon the mass of the citizens if they merely follow the letter of the law. one must exclude from office those who are eligible for wardenship, unless they labour to grasp all the proofs there are about the existence of gods? Such exclusion from office [966d] consists in refusing ever to choose as a Law-warden, or to number among those approved for excellence, a man who is not divine himself, nor has spent any labour over things divine. |561|

Clinias: It is certainly just, as you say, that the man who is idle or incapable in respect of this subject should be strictly debarred from the ranks of the noble.

Athenian: Are we assured, then, that there are two causes, amongst those we previously discussed, 306 which lead to faith in the gods?

Clinias: What two?

Athenian: One is our dogma about the soul, — that it is the most ancient [966e] and divine of all the things whose motion, when developed into ‘becoming,’ provides an ever-flowing fount of ‘being’; and the other is our dogma concerning the ordering of the motion of the stars 307 and all the other bodies under the control of reason, which has made a ‘cosmos’ of the All. For no man that views these objects in no careless or amateurish way has ever proved so godless as not to be affected by them in a way just the opposite of that which most people expect. [967a] For they imagine that those who study these objects in astronomy and the other necessary allied arts become atheists through observing, as they suppose, that all things come into being by necessary forces and not by the mental energy of the will aiming at the fulfillment of good.

Clinias: What in fact is the real state of the case?

Athenian: The position at present is, as I said, exactly the opposite of what it was when those who considered these objects considered them to be soulless. Yet even then they were objects of admiration, and the conviction [967b] which is now actually held was suspected by all who studied them accurately — namely, that if they were soulless, and consequently devoid of reason, they could never have employed with such |563| precision calculations so marvellous; and even in those days there were some who dared to hazard the statement 308 that reason is the orderer of all that is in the heavens. But the same thinkers, through mistaking the nature of the soul and conceiving her to be posterior, instead of prior, to body, [967c] upset again (so to say) the whole universe, and most of all themselves; for as regards the visible objects of sight, all that moves in the heavens appeared to them to be full of stones, earth and many other soulless bodies which dispense the causes of the whole, cosmos. These were the views which, at that time, caused these thinkers to incur many charges of atheism and much odium, and which also incited the poets to abuse them 309 by likening philosophers to ‘dogs howling at the moon,’ with other such senseless slanders. [967d] But today, as we have said, the position is quite the reverse.

Clinias: How so?

Athenian: It is impossible for any mortal man to become permanently god-fearing if he does not grasp the two truths now stated, — namely, how that the soul is oldest of all things that partake of generation, and is immortal, and rules over all bodies, — and in addition to this, he must also grasp that reason which, as we have often affirmed, controls what exists among the stars, together with the [967e] necessary preliminary sciences; 310 and he must observe |565| also the connection therewith of musical theory, and apply it harmoniously to the institutions and rules of ethics; 311 and he must be able to give a rational explanation of all that admits of rational explanation. [968a] He that is unable to master these sciences, in addition to the popular virtues, 312 will never make a competent magistrate of the whole State, but only a minister to other magistrates. And now, O Megillus and Clinias, it is time at last to consider whether, in addition to all the previous laws which we have stated, we shall add this also — that the nocturnal synod of magistrates shall be legally established, and shall participate in all the education we have described, to keep ward over the State, and to secure its salvation; [968b] or what are we to do?

Clinias: Of course we shall add this law, my excellent sir, if we can possibly do so, even to a small extent.

Athenian: Then, verily, let us all strive to do so. And herein you will find me a most willing helper, owing to my very long experience and study of this subject; and perhaps I shall discover other helpers also besides myself.

Clinias: Well, Stranger, we most certainly must proceed on that path along which God too, it would seem, is conducting us. But what is the right method for us to employ, — [968c] that is what we have now got to discover and state.

Athenian: It is not possible at this stage, Megillus and Clinias, to enact laws for such a body, before it has been duly framed; when it is, its members must themselves ordain what authority they should possess; but it is already plain that what is required |567| in order to form such a body, if it is to be rightly formed, is teaching by means of prolonged conferences.

Clinias: How so? What now are we to understand by this observation?

Athenian: Surely we must first draw up a list [968d] of all those who are fitted by age, intellectual capacity, and moral character and habit for the office of warden; but as regards the next point, the subjects they should learn, — these it is neither easy to discover for oneself 313 nor is it easy to find another who has made the discovery and learn from him. Moreover, with respect to the limits of time, when and for how long they ought to receive instruction in each subject, it were idle to lay down written regulations; 314 [968e] for even the learners themselves could not be sure that they were learning at the opportune time until each of them had acquired within his soul some knowledge of the subject in question. Accordingly, although it would be wrong to term all these matters ‘indescribable,’ they should be termed ‘imprescribable,’ seeing that the prescribing of them beforehand does nothing to elucidate the question under discussion.

Clinias: What then must we do, Stranger, under these circumstances? [969a]

Athenian: Apparently, my friends, we must ‘take our chance with the crowd’ (as the saying is), and if we are willing to put the whole polity to the hazard and throw (as men say) three sixes or three aces, so it must be done; and I will go shares with you in the hazard by declaring and explaining my views concerning education and nurture, the subject now started anew in our discourse; but |569| truly the hazard will be no small one, nor comparable to any others. And you, Clinias, I specially exhort to take good heed to this matter. For as concerns the State of the Magnesians — or whoever else, by the god’s direction, gives your State its name, 315 — if you frame it aright, you will achieve most high renown, or at any rate you will inevitably gain the reputation of being the boldest [969b] of all your successors. If so be that this divine synod actually comes into existence, my dear colleagues, we must hand over to it the State; and practically all our present lawgivers agree to this without dispute. Thus we shall have as an accomplished fact and waking reality that result which we treated but a short while ago in our discourse as a mere dream, when we constructed a kind of picture of the union of the reason and the head, 316 — if, that is to say, we have the members carefully selected [969c] and suitably trained, and after their training quartered in the acropolis of the country, and thus finally made into wardens, the like of whom we have never before seen in our lives for excellence in safeguarding.

Megillus: My dear Clinias, from all that has now been said it follows that either we must forgo the idea of settling the State, or else we must detain this Stranger here, and by prayers and every possible means secure his cooperation in the task of settling the State.

Clinias: That is most true, Megillus; I will do as you say, and do you yourself [969d] assist me.

Megillus: Assist you I will.

---

Endnotes

1^ Plato Laws 643d.

2^ ‘Corybantism’ is a technical term for a state of morbid mental excitement (cp. ‘tarantism’) derived from ‘Corybantes,’ the name given to the frenzied worshippers of Bacchus.

3^ Cp. Plato Republic 377b.

4^ Cp. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1103 a 17:ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ（ἀρετὴ）ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεγκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους（‘ethical virtue is the result of habit, and its name ’ethical’ is also derived from ’ethos’ (‘habit)’).

5^ Plato Laws 788b.

6^ Cp. Plato Laws 777a.

7^ Cp. Plato Laws 784a.

8^ Mythical giants and wrestlers, to whom were ascribed such devices as the use of the legs in wrestling. Epeius is mentioned as a boxer in Homer Iliad 23.668; and the mythical Amycus is said to have invented the use of ἱμάντες (boxing-gloves).

9^ Priests of the Idaean Zeus.

10^ Castor and Pollux.

11^ Athene.

12^ Plato Laws 672d, Plato Laws 673a ff.; cp. also Plato Laws 813d ff.

13^ Plato Laws 673b.

14^ Plato Laws 797b, Plato Laws 797c.

15^ Plato Laws 654e ff., Plato Laws 668a.

16^ Cp. Plato Laws 656d.

17^ i.e. with the caution proper to old men.

18^ A play on the double sense of νόμος, — ‘law’ and ‘chant’ or ‘tune’: cp. 700b, 722d, 734e.

19^ ἐκμαγεῖον（‘mold’ or ‘impression’) is here used, much like εἶδος, of a class or ‘type’ of cases needing legal regulation.

20^ Music should he used as an ennobling educational instrument, promoting self-control, not as a means of exciting vulgar sentiment and passion.

21^ Cp. Plato Laws 800b.

22^ Plato Laws 742d. Plutus is the god of wealth.

23^ Plato Laws 801b.

24^ i.e. a ‘regulated’ style of music pleases the educated just as much as the other sort pleases the uneducated. Cp. Plato Laws 658e.

25^ Plato Laws 644d.

26^ Homer Odyssey 3.26

27^ Cp. Plato Laws 644d-e.

28^ Plato Laws 764c, Plato Laws 779d.

29^ Cp. Plato Laws 746c, Plato Laws 799e.

30^ Plato Laws 805a.

31^ For Athene as a warrior, cp. Plato Laws 796b.

32^ Cp. Aristotle Politics 1269b 12 ff.

33^ Cp. Aristotle Politics 1334a.13 ff.

34^ i.e. the (Magnesian) State described in the Laws, in contrast to the Ideal (communistic) State of the Republic.

35^ The child is of two-fold nature, — semi-rational; as such he needs a double ‘bridle,’ that of instruction (proper to free men), and that of chastisement (proper to slaves).

36^ Plato Laws 799a ff., Plato Laws 802a.

37^ Cp. Plato Laws 796a.

38^ Cp. Plato Laws 832e.

39^ Cp. Heraclitus’s saying (Frag. 16): πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει; and the contempt shown for the versatile smatterer in Phaedrus 275 A (πολυήκοοι … δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶι).

40^ Cp. Plato Laws 799d.

41^ Plato Laws 664e., Plato Laws 679a.

42^ i.e. the notes of the instrument must be in accord with those of the singer’s voice. ‘The tune, as composed by the poet, is supposed to have comparatively few notes, to be in slowish time, and low down in the register; whereas the complicated variation, which he is condemning, has many notes, is in quick time, and high up in the register.’ (England.)

43^ Plato Laws 799a., Plato Laws 802a.

44^ i.e. they would regard the mere mention of possible evil (esp. in connection with anything new-born) as of ill-omen.

45^ Plato Laws 795d.

46^ Plato Laws 795d, Plato Laws 795e.

47^ Cp. Plato Laws 832e.

48^ Cp. Plato Laws 803d.

49^ Here a wide term, embracing all kinds of bodily gestures and posturing.

50^ The technical name for a ‘war-dance’ (‘polka’) in quick time (possibly connected by Plato with πῦρ, πυρετός）

51^ A decorous, stately dance (’minuet’).

52^ i.e. lest the public taste should be debased by the repeated exhibition of any one piece of vulgarity.

53^ Cp. Plato Republic 398a, Plato Republic 398b.

54^ i.e. grant you leave to ‘stage’ your play.

55^ Cp. Plato Laws 962c, Plato Laws 965a.

56^ Cp. Plato Laws 741a.

57^ i.e. arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy: some elementary (‘necessary’) knowledge of all three is indispensable for a through study of one branch of science.

58^ Cp. Plato Laws 886a.

59^ The Egyptian priests are said to have specially drilled their scholars in arithmetic and geometry — partly with a view to their use in land-mensuration.

60^ Cp. Plato Republic 528c.

61^ Plato Laws 818a: cp. Aristotle Politics 1338a.9 ff.

62^ Cp. Plato Laws 779b.

63^ i.e. ‘wanderers.’

64^ Cp. Plato Timaeus 39d ff.

65^ Plato Laws 788a ff., Plato Laws 793a ff.

66^ i.e. for perfect virtue there is required not only obedience to statute law, but also conformity with all the other rules of conduct laid down by the lawgiver in the less rigid form of advice (‘approbation’ and ‘disapprobation’).

67^ Cp. Plato Sophist 222d ff where ἡ τῶν ἐρώντων θήρα (‘the lovers’ chase‘) is mentioned as a sub-species of θηρευτική: and in Symposium 203d the God of Love is described as ‘a mighty hunter‘ (θηρευτὴς δεινός).

68^ i.e. vegetable juices which taint the water and paralyze the fish.

69^ Plato Laws 771d.

70^ Plato Laws 832c., Plato Laws 835d, Plato Laws 835e.

71^ Plato Laws 663a, Plato Laws 904e. ‘Perfect goodness’ helps to secure this ‘immunity’ because it includes the virtue of ‘courage’: people do not lightly provoke the brave warrior.

72^ Plato Laws 803d, Plato Laws 814d.

73^ Plato Laws 830d.

74^ Cp. Plato Laws 936a.

75^ ‘Sphaeromachia’ was a (hand) ball contest between opposing sides (something like our hockey or polo matches).

76^ Plato Laws 691b, Plat. Rep. 410c.

77^ i.e. for gold. Cp. Virgil’s ‘auri sacra fames.’

78^ Plato Laws 712c ff., Plato Laws 713e ff.

79^ Cp. Plato Laws 806d, Plato Laws 828d, Plato Laws 828e, etc.

80^ In this 5th race the hoplite, running the shorter course competes (on time) against the archer, running the longer course.

81^ Cp. Plato Laws 785b.

82^ In Books VI and VII.

83^ Plato Laws 771e.

84^ A play on νόμος=νοῦς; cp. Plato Laws 836e, Plato Laws 714a.

85^ King of Thebes, father of Oedipus.

86^ Cp. Plato Laws 636b., Plato Symposium 181-2.

87^ Cp. Plato Symposium 183d ff.

88^ A play on the assonance ὁρῶν=ἐρῶν.

89^ Plato Laws 838b.

90^ Cp. Plato Protagoras 316d ff.

91^ Cp. Plato Laws 626e.

92^ For the proverbial saying μὴ κινεῖν τἀκίνητα (like ‘Hands off!’ or ‘Let sleeping dogs lie"’), cp. Plato Laws 684e, Plato Laws 913b.

93^ Plato Laws 760a. The ‘phrourarchs’ were the (5) officers of the (60) country police.

94^ i.e. (1) choice (or ‘dessert’) fruit, for immediate use, and (2) coarse fruit, of poorer quality, for storing in bulk or making into wine.

95^ Cp. Plato Laws 913c, Plato Laws 913d.

96^ Cp. Plato Republic 369e ff., Plato Republic 434a.

97^ For sales to foreigners, see below Plato Laws 849a.: they had to buy their share of food-stuff, but the other two shares were not to be forced on to the market.

98^ The original inhabitants of the site of Clinias’s new colony (cp. Plato Laws 702b, Plato Laws 860e): they subsequently migrated to Magnesia in Asia Minor.

99^ Cp. Plato Laws 742c, Plato Laws 915e.

100^ Plato Laws 842e.

101^ Plato Laws 713b.

102^ i.e. ‘hard-shelled’; seeds struck by a beast’s horn were vulgarly supposed to become ‘horny’ and unfit for cooking.

103^ Plato Laws 718b.

104^ Plato Laws 871a.

105^ Plato Laws 862d., Plato Laws 934a.

106^ Plato Laws 745a; Plato Laws 745b.

107^ Plato Laws 865e ff., Plato Laws 877c ff.

108^ Plato Laws 767d.

109^ But cp. Plato Laws 859b ff., Plato Laws 933e ff.

110^ Plato Laws 720a.

111^ i.e. ‘sufferings.’

112^ Plato Laws 854b.

113^ Plato Laws 731c, Plato Laws 734b: cp. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1109b.30 ff.

114^ In what follows, the Athenian, adopting the Socratic dictum that "vice is involuntary" (cp. Plato Timaeus 86e ff.), applies it to the special vice of injustice; but here his view is found to conflict with the popular view which distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary acts of injustice, and assigns to them different legal penalties. If this popular distinction is wrong, the lawgiver must either (a) simply apply the Socratic rule, and enact that all unjust acts are involuntary and deserve therefore equal penalties, or (b) draw a new distinction, which Athenian proceeds to do in 861e ff. (see note ad loc.).

115^ Literally, ‘to legislate down’ (i.e. over-rule the popular objection to our Socratic view).

116^ The proper distinction to be drawn (as Athenian proceeds to argue) is not that between voluntary and involuntary acts of injustice (since there are no such voluntary acts), but that between ‘injuries’ (βλάβαι, ‘acts causing loss’) and ‘acts of injustice.’ Injustice is really a quality of the agent rather than of the act, and (like all vice) is a form of un-reason: as the slave of un-reason, the unjust man is never a free agent. Hence the task of the lawgiver is two fold, (1) to make good the ‘injuries,’ and (2) to cure the agent of his ‘injustice’ by restoring the power of reason (‘moral sense") in his soul.

117^ Cp. Plato Laws 957e, Plato Republic 410a.

118^ Cp. Plato Laws 864d, Plato Laws 908e; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1110b.18 ff.

119^ Cp. Plato Laws 732a, Plato Philebus 48e.

120^ i.e. ignorance is not regarded as an active force (like passion or pleasure) capable of opposing reason and tyrannizing over the soul.

121^ Cp. Plato Philebus 40d, Plato Philebus 40e.

122^ Cp. Plato Laws 863c, Plato Laws 863d.

123^ i.e. Plato Laws 857b.

124^ Cp. Plato Laws 759c.

125^ Cp. Plato Laws 855c.

126^ Such as the costs of the purification-rites.

127^ Cp. Plato Laws 697b, Plato Laws 831c; Aristotle Politics 1323a.25 ff; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1098 b 13 ff.

128^ Plato Laws 831c; cp. Aristotle Politics 1271a.17.

129^ Cp. Plato Laws 722d: whereas the law coerces, its ‘prelude’ seeks to persuade.

130^ This implies the (Pythagorean) doctrine of reincarnation: cp. Plato Laws 904c, Plato Republic 614e ff., Plato Timaeus 90e ff.

131^ Cp. Plato Laws 877c Plato Laws 877d.

132^ Plato Laws 855c.

133^ Plato Laws 870d, Plato Laws 870e.

134^ Plato Laws 813d.

135^ Cp. Plato Protagoras 352b ff.; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1145 b 24 ff.

136^ Cp. Plato Laws 770b, Plato Laws 846b, Plato Laws 846c.

137^ For ‘daemon’ in this sense of ‘tutelary Genius’ or ‘Guardian-angel,’ cp. Plato Laws 732c, Plato Republic 619d ff., Plato Republic 619e.

138^ Plat. Laws 867a.

139^ For the respect due to Strangers as a religious duty, cp. Plato Laws 729e.

140^ Cp. Plato Laws 853d.

141^ Cp. Plato Laws 880d.

142^ Plato Laws 868c ff., Plato Laws 877b ff., Plato Laws 930e ff.

143^ Plato Laws 941d, Plato Laws 941e.

144^ Plato Republic 364b ff.

145^ Hesiod, Pherecydes, etc.

146^ Materialists such as Democritus.

147^ Plato Laws 701c, Plato Laws 701d; Plato Laws 858a ff.: all this discussion is supposed to have taken place on one and the same day, — hence the reference to "shortness of time."

148^ This is a summary of the doctrines of the Atomists (Leucippus and Democritus) who denied the creative agency of Reason. Similar views were taught, later, by Epicurus and Lucretius.

149^ A view ascribed to Critias.

150^ Cp. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1094 b 14 ff.

151^ This antithesis between ‘Nature’ (φύσις) and ‘Convention’ (νόμος) was a familiar one in ethical and political discussion from the time of the Sophists. The supremacy of ‘Nature,’ as an ethical principle, was maintained (it is said) by Hippias and Prodicus; that of ‘Convention,’ by Protagoras and Gorgias: Plato goes behind both to the higher principle of Reason (νοῦς), cp. Introduction. p. xiv.

152^ Cp. Plato Laws 634d, Plato Laws 634e; Plato Laws 859b, al.

153^ Literally, ‘utter every voice’ (leave nothing unsaid).

154^ In Books I and II.

155^ Cp. Plato Laws 811d.

156^ Cp. Plato Timaeus 34d ff.

157^ Cp. Plato Laws 886b.

158^ Cp. Plato Laws 896b, Plato Laws 896c.

159^ Cp. Plato Sophist 255 ff.; Plato Timaeus 57 ff.

160^ i.e. with a forward gliding motion, as opposed to rolling forward (like a car wheel).

161^ i.e. as solid, liquid, or gaseous substance.

162^ This account of the derivation of the sense-world from the ‘starting-principle’ (ἀρχή) is obscure. It is generally interpreted as a ‘geometrical allegory,’ the stages of development being from point to line, from line to surface, from surface to solid, — this last only being perceptible by the senses (cp. Aristotle De Anima 404 b 18 ff.).

163^ The 8 kinds of motion here indicated are — (1) circular motion round a fixed center; (2) locomotion (gliding or rolling); (3) combination; (4) separation; (5) increase; (6) decrease; (7) becoming; (8) perishing. The remaining two kinds (as described below) are — (9) other-affecting motion (or secondary causation); and (10) self-and-other-affecting motion (or primary causation).

164^ E.g. Anaxagoras, who taught, originally, ‘all things were together (ὁμοῦ)’; and the Eleatic School (Parmenides, etc.) asserted that the Real World (τὸ ὄν) is One and motionless; cp. Plato Theaetetus 180e.

165^ Cp. Plato Epistles 7, 342a, b.

166^ Plato Laws 892a, Plato Laws 892b.

167^ Cp. Plato Laws 894b, Plato Laws 894c.

168^ i.e. the uniform revolution of a sphere in the same spot and on its own axis: cp. Plato Laws 898a; Plato Timaeus 34a ff, Plato Timaeus 34b ff.; Plato Timaeus 90c, d.

169^ Cp. Plato Republic 516a ff.

170^ Cp. Plato Laws 893b.; the motion to which reason is likened is the first of the ten.

171^ Cp. Plato Timaeus 33b ff, Plato Timaeus 34a ff; Plato Republic 436b ff.

172^ i.e. envelopes the body and its sense-organs (like circumambient air).

173^ Cp. Plato Timaeus 41d ff., Plato Timaeus 41e ff, where the Creator is said to apportion a soul to each star, in which it rides ‘as though in a chariot.’

174^ A dictum of Thales: Aristotle De Anima 411 a 7 ff.

175^ Cp. Plato Laws 892d, Plato Laws 892e.

176^ Hesiod Works and Days 303: τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς|ζώῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὁρμήν.

177^ Cp. Plato Laws 641e.

178^ Here, and in what follows, Clinias is answering on behalf of the two misbelievers.

179^ Homer Odyssey 19.43.

180^ This seems to refer to three stages of the soul’s incarnation; see p. 367, n. 2.

181^ Cp. Plato Timaeus 37c ff.

182^ Cp. Plato Timaeus 42b ff. where it is said that the soul of the good man returns at death to its native star, while that of the bad takes the form of a woman in its second, and that of a beast in its third incarnation.

183^ Cp. Plato Republic 617e.

184^ Cp. Plato Laws 728b., Plato Laws 837a.

185^ Cp. Homer Iliad 9.497 ff., τοὺς（θεοὺς）... λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ᾽ ἄνθρωποι κτλ.

186^ Cp. Plato Laws 904a ff., Plato Laws 896c ff., Plato Republic 379c.

187^ Cp. Plato Phaedo 62b.

188^ Cp. Plato Republic 609 ff., Plato Symposium 188a ff., where the theory is stated that health depends upon the ‘harmony,’ or equal balance, of the constituent elements of the body (‘heat’ and ‘cold,’ ‘moisture’ and ‘dryness,’); when any of these (opposite) elements is in excess (πλεονεκτεῖ), disease sets in. So, too, in the ‘body politic,’ the excess of due measure by any element, or member, is injustice.

189^ Homer Iliad 9.500 (quoted above, p. 371, n. 1).

190^ Cp. Plato Laws 767c, Plato Laws 767d, Plato Laws 855c.

191^ Cp. Plato Laws 909a, Plato Laws 961a.

192^ Cp. Plato Laws 704b.

193^ i.e. ‘hypocritical,’ hiding impiety under a cloak of religion.

194^ Cp. Plato Laws 863b, Plato Laws 863c.

195^ Cp. Plato Laws 908a.

196^ Cp. Plato Laws 933a, Plato Republic 364b ff.

197^ Plato Laws 684e, Plato Laws 843a.

198^ Solon.

199^ Plato Laws 759c, Plato Laws 772d.

200^ Hecate (= Artemis)

201^ Plato Laws 745a, b.

202^ Plato Laws 850b.

203^ Plato Laws 744c, Plato Laws 744e, Plato Laws 756d.

204^ Plato Laws 952e.

205^ Plato Laws 849e.

206^ Cp. Plato Republic 556b.

207^ i.e. of subscriptions due from members of a (dining) club, or of money raised as a loan to a member in time of need.

208^ i.e. epilepsy.

209^ The officials in charge of (Delphic) religious rites; cp. Plato Laws 759c, Plato Laws 828b.

210^ Cp. Plato Laws 690a ff.

211^ Cp. Plato Laws Cp. Plato Laws 759a, Plato Laws 849e, Plato Laws 881c.

212^ Cp. Plato Laws i.e. by equalizing the distribution of goods throughout the community. Cp. Aristotle Politics 1257a 14 ff.

213^ Cp. Plato Laws Cp. Plato Phaedo 89c ff: πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷός τε εἶναι.

214^ Cp. Plato Laws Cp. Plato Laws 679b, Plato Laws 705b.

215^ Cp. Plato Laws Cp. Plato Laws 702b ff., Plato Laws 848c ff.

216^ Cp. Plato Laws Literally ‘free men,’ — the Greek word connoting generosity, culture and dignity, like our ‘gentle.’

217^ Cp. Plato Laws Cp. Plato Laws 914a, Plato Laws 922a ff.

218^ Cp. Plato Laws Cp. Plato Laws 917e.

219^ Cp. Plato Laws i.e. bear no interest. Cp. Plato Laws 742c; Plato Republic 556a; Aristotle Politics 1258b 5 ff.

220^ As a drachma = 6 obols, the interest would amount to 200% per annum.

221^ Cp. Plato Laws 919d, e.

222^ Alluding to the dictum ‘Know thyself’; cp. Plato Protagoras 343b.

223^ i.e. one of the 5040 allotments, cp. Plato Laws 737c ff.

224^ i.e. he shall select a citizen to become his heir by marrying one of his daughters.

225^ i.e. in marriage: the ‘lot’ is to pass on always to the next of kin, cf. Plato Laws 925d, e.

226^ Cp. Plato Laws 775d ff., Plato Laws 855c.

227^ i.e. be ‘born again’ as children of the State, with the Law-wardens as their new official parents, as explained below.

228^ In Books II. and VII.

229^ Cp. Plato Laws 924c.

230^ Plato Laws 865e.

231^ Cp. Plato Laws 784a, Plato Laws 794b.

232^ Cp. Plato Laws 773c.

233^ The object of this rule dealing with irregular connections between free citizens and slaves is to prevent any of slave descent acquiring rights of property in the State.

234^ i.e. the stars; cp. Plato Laws 821b.

235^ Cp. Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes 709 ff.; Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 1432 ff.

236^ Cp. Homer Iliad ix. 446 ff.: Phoenix, to avenge his neglected mother, seduced his father’s mistress.

237^ Cp. Plato Laws 687e, Euripides Hippolytus 884 ff.: Hippolytus was falsely charged with dishonoring his step-mother, Phaedra.

238^ Cp. Plato Laws 931a.

239^ Alluding to Pindar’s phrase (Olympian 7. 18) ὁ δ᾽ ὄλβιος ὃν φᾶμαι κατέχοντ᾽ ἀγαθαί. Cp. Euripides Hippolytus 1466.

240^ Cp. Plato Laws 717d, Plato Laws 881d.

241^ Plato Laws 869e.

242^ i.e. attacking the mind or body.

243^ Cp. Plato Laws 857a.

244^ Cp. Plato Laws 862d ff.

245^ Cp. Plato Republic 394 ff., Plato Republic 606 ff.

246^ Cp. Plato Philebus 49e ff.

247^ Cp. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1128a 20 ff.; Aristotle Politics 1336b 2ff.

248^ Cp. Plato Laws 816e, Plato Laws 829c, d.

249^ i.e. Aristotle Rhetoric.

250^ Cp. Plato Gorgias 463b ff.

251^ Son, and herald, of Zeus, and a master of speech (and of lies).

252^ Plato Republic 378 ff., 388 ff. Hermes is specially in mind, as notorious for his thefts and frauds; cp. Homer Iliad 5. 390; 24. 395, etc.

253^ cp. Plato Laws 857a, b.

254^ Plato Laws 803c, d; Sophocles Antigone 668 ff.

255^ Plato Laws 795d ff., 829b, c.

256^ Hesiod Works and Days 192 ff., 254 ff., ἡ δὲ τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη … κυδρή τ᾽ αἰδοίη τε θεοῖς κτλ.

257^ Homer Iliad xvi., xvii. 125 ff., xviii. 84 ff. Patroclus (son of Menoetios) was wearing the arms of Achilles (son of Peleus) when slain by Hector.

258^ Ovid, Metamorphoses 8. 305 ff., 12. 189 ff. Plato Timaeus 90 E.

259^ i.e. persons appointed to audit the accounts and scrutinize the conduct of public officials at the expiry of their term of office. Note the play on the literal sense of εὐθυντής, ‘straightener’ (of ‘crooked’ actions).

260^ Cp. Plato Republic 422e.

261^ Cp. Plato Laws 767c, d.

262^ Cp. Plato Laws 855c, 926d.

263^ The priestess of Apollo at Delphi; cp. Plato Republic 461e.

264^ i.e. after superannuation.

265^ Cp. Plato Laws 855c.

266^ Cp. Plato Laws 886d ff., 891b ff.

267^ Cp. Plato Laws 934e.

268^ Cp. Plato Laws 850b ff.

269^ Cp. Plato Laws 704e.

270^ By a law of Lycurgus, strangers were forbidden to reside at Sparta; cp. Aristophanes Birds 1012 ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμον ξενηλατοῦνται.

271^ Cp. Plato Meno 99b, 99c.

272^ Cp. Plato Republic 619a.

273^ Cp. Plato Laws 908a, 909a.

274^ Cp. Plato Laws 807d ff.

275^ Cp. Plato Laws 946e.

276^ Cp. Plato Laws 915d.

277^ i.e. by forbidding their presence at ceremonial feasts; or, because (as Grote says) ‘the Egyptian habits as to eating and sacrifice were intolerably repulsive to a foreigner.’

278^ Cp. Plato Laws 950a, b.

279^ Cp. Aristophanes Clouds 500, 966.

280^ Cp. Leviticus 19:11: ‘He that toucheth the dead body of any man shall be unclean seven days.’

281^ Cp. Plato Laws 922a.

282^ Cp. Plato Laws 766d.

283^ Cp. Plato Laws 766d ff., 846b ff.

284^ Cp. Plato Laws 754c.

285^ Alluding, probably, to Athenian law in particular.

286^ Cp. Plato Laws 766d, 855d.

287^ νόμος = νοῦς; cp. Plato Laws 714a.

288^ Cp. Plato Laws 811d, 858c.

289^ i.e. men whose false beliefs are ineradicable, beyond hope of conversion.

290^ Cp. Plato Phaedo 63b.

291^ Cp. Plato Laws 717e, 719d.

292^ i.e. the corpse is like an altar which has no ‘real presence’ to sanctify it; hence it is less worthy of costly offerings.

293^ Cp. Plato Laws 854d, 873c ff.

294^ Cp. Plato Republic 620e. Atropos is called ‘the savior-third’ (cp. τὸ τρίτον τῷ Σωτῆρι) because she completes the work of the other Fates by making the thread of life (doom) spun by them irreversible. (ἄ-τροπος = ‘unturnable.’）

295^ Cp. Plato Laws 951d ff.

296^ Cp. Plato Laws 951a ff.

297^ Cp. Plato Laws 705e, 934b.

298^ Cp. Plato Laws 630e ff.

299^ Cp. Plato Laws 631c ff.: ‘reason’ (or ‘wisdom’) as the most ‘divine’ stands first, the others being temperance, justice and courage.

300^ Cp. Plato Laws 893a.

301^ Cp. Plato Laches 196d ff., Plato Protagoras 349b ff.

302^ Plato Laws 962e, 963b ff.

303^ Cp. Plato Laws 903c, d, 961e.

304^ ‘Cp. Plato Republic 537b ff., where the ‘dialectic’ method is described as a kind of induction (συναγωγή) whereby the mind ascends from ‘the many’ particulars to ‘the one’ universal concept or ‘idea’: a comprehensive view (σύνοψις) of the whole is what marks the dialectician (ὁ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός).

305^ In Book X.

306^ Cp. Plato Laws 893b.

307^ Cp. Plato Laws 898c ff.

308^ An allusion to the saying of Anaxagoras, ‘All things were together; then Reason (νοῦς) came and set them in order.’ But Anaxagoras ascribed to Reason only the initiation of a world-order; in all other respects his doctrine was materialistic, and he used purely physical causes and processes in explaining the world, regarding the stars as fiery masses of matter (‘full of earth, stones,’ etc.). Cp. Phaedo 91 B ff.

309^ Cp. Plato Republic 607b, c.

310^ Cp. Plato Laws 818a ff.

311^ Cp. Plato Republic 401d, 500d, 531 ff.

312^ Cp. Plato Laws 710a.

313^ Cp. Plato Republic 528b ff.

314^ Cp. Epp. 7. 341 C.

315^ i.e. if the god should direct the State to be named, not after the Magnetes, but after some other person or place: cp. Plato Laws 704a, 919d.

316^ Cp. Plato Laws 964d ff.

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