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Chapter I. Of Moral Precepts

  §225. By the constitution of our human nature, we are necessarily led to assume and refer to a Supreme Rule of human action; and to conceive human actions, our own and those of other men, to be absolutely right, when they are conformable to this Rule. In order that such a Rule may have a definite form, in human Society, men must have Rights; and must also have their Obligations, corresponding, in each man, to the Rights of others. The real existence of Rights and Obligations is a condition requisite for the definite application of the Supreme Rule of Human Action: for, by the existence of Rights and Obligations, the objects of human desire and affection assume such a general and abstract form, that they may be made the subjects of Rules of Action. These points have been discussed and established in the First Book.
  The Rights and Obligations which really exist among men are regulated by Laws, or Customs equivalent to Laws. Some of the most important of such Laws have been stated in the Second Book. Laws regard external actions only. But external actions |157| are the result of internal actions, namely, of Will and Intention, of Mental Desires and of Affections. These internal actions are essential parts of external actions, considered as human actions; or rather, these internal actions, Desire, Affection, Intention, Will, are the only really human part of actions.
  External actions, as the motions in our own limbs, and the motions and changes thereby produced in material things, and in the state of other persons, are not our actions, except so far as they are the consequences of our intention and will. When we have willed, what follows is a consequence of Laws of Nature, extraneous to us; and derives its character of right or wrong, so far as we are concerned in it, from the Will, and that which preceded the Will. Thus, if I fire off a pistol and kill a man, his pain and death, the grief of his friends, the loss to his family and his country, all follow as the consequence of the act of Will by which I pull the trigger. They are all morally included in that act of the Will. All those consequences are produced by the working of the Springs of Action within me. They may all be prevented by the operation of other Faculties, withholding me from this act of Will. Hence the Will, the Springs of Action which impel it, and the Faculties which control and direct it, must be the main subjects of our consideration, in treating of actions as right and wrong.
  Will, Intention, Desire, Affection, are governed, not merely by external objects and by transient impulses, but by Habits and Dispositions, which give a permanent character to the operation of the Springs of Action and of the controlling Faculties.

  §226. The Reason is the Faculty by which we conceive General Rules, and Special Cases as conformable to General Rules (§14). It is therefore the Faculty by which we conceive Actions as right or wrong. The Moral Sentiments, Approval of what is right, Condemnation of what is wrong, are powerful |158| Springs of action (§82), and thus impel us to carry into effect the judgments formed by the Reason. When we intentionally conform to the Supreme Rule, we speak of our actions as rightly directed by our Reason.
  Actions to which we are rightly directed by our Reason are Duties. The Habits and Dispositions by which we perform our Duties are Virtues. Morality is the Doctrine of Duties and Virtues.

  §227. The internal actions, Desire, Affection, Intention, Will, point to external Acts; they have external acts for their Objects, and derive their character and significance, as right or wrong, from the external Acts to which they thus point. Thus the Desire of Having leads to Acts of appropriation, and derives its character, as right or wrong, from the Acts of appropriation to which it points. Hence, if this, or any other internal Act, point to external Acts of which the character, as right or wrong, is already determined in the preceding Book; these internal Acts have their characters as right or wrong determined. If the Desire of Having point to the Act of Stealing, which Act is wrong; the Desire itself is wrong. For, as we have already said, it is the internal Springs of Action from which the Act derives its character of wrong. If it be wrong, it is so because the Desire and Intention which produce it are wrong.
  The character of actions considered with reference to the internal Springs of Action from which they proceed, is their Moral character.
  The Moral character of actions is governed by their jural character. To steal is jurally wrong; it is contrary to universal natural Law. Hence the Volition which aims at theft is morally wrong. The Intention which points to theft is also morally wrong. The Desire of that which belongs to another is morally wrong. These internal acts are wrong, even if the external act do not take place. It is wrong to |158| put my hand in a man’s pocket in order to pick it, even if I find nothing there. It is wrong to intend to do so, even if I am prevented making the attempt by the presence of a looker-on. It is wrong to desire another man’s money, even if I do not proceed to take it.

  §228. As there are Laws, which express Rules of external action, there are also Moral Precepts, which express Rules of internal action; that is, of Will and Intention, of the Desires and Affections. Thus the Law is, Do not steal; the Moral Precept is, Do not covet or desire what is another’s.
  Such Moral Precepts express our Duties. They may be put in various forms. Thus the Precept, Do not covet, may be expressed by saying, It is wrong to covet; We ought not to covet; We must not covet; We should not covet; We are not to covet; It is our Duty not to covet; We are morally bound not to covet; We must not be guilty of covetousness.

  §229. As the Laws which describe our principal Obligations have reference respectively to the principal Desires and Affections of our nature, the Moral Precepts which respect those Desires will correspond to each of our principal Obligations. Hence we shall have Precepts of Duty corresponding to each of the Classes of Rights, of which we have spoken in the last Book.
  Thus there are Rights of the Person, and a corresponding Class of Obligations. We are bound by Law to abstain from inflicting any personal harm on any one through anger, malice, or negligence. We are therefore bound morally to abstain from the affections which aim at any such harm, and the habits of mind which lead to it. It is our Duty to avoid Anger, Malice, and the Carelessness which may lead to another’s hurt. The Moral Precepts are; Be not angry with any man: Bear no Malice: Neglect no one’s safety.
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  There are the Rights of Property, and a corresponding Class of Obligations. We are bound by Law not to meddle with the Property of another; not to take or appropriate what is not our own. We are morally bound to abstain from the Intentions and Desires which point to such appropriation. It is our Duty to avoid the Wish to possess what is another’s. The Moral Precept is, Do not covet.
  There is a Class of Obligations which regards Contracts and Promises. We are bound by Law to perform our Contracts; not to break our Engagements. We are morally bound not to wish to break our Engagements. And as the moral obligation is not confined by mere legal limits, we are morally bound to perform our engagements, whether or not they are legally valid as Contracts. It is our Duty to perform our Promises: not to deceive or mislead any man by our words. The Moral Precepts are, Do not break your word; Do not deceive.
  There is a Class of Obligations which regards the Marriage Union. We are bound by Law not to meddle with the person, or seduce the conjugal affection, of her who belongs to another. There is a Class of Duties which regard the Desires and Affections on which this Union is founded. We are morally bound not to allow these Desires and Affections to point to unlawful objects. The Moral Precept is, Do not lust after her.
  There is a Class of Obligations which regard the Governors and the Government of the State to which we belong. We are jurally bound to obey the Governors, and to conform our actions to the Law. We are morally bound to conform our Desires and Intentions to the Law. It is our Duty to submit to positive Laws, as the realization and definition of the Supreme Law, The Moral Precepts are, Do not desire what the Law forbids. Do not desire to violate general Laws.

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  The Moral Precepts just stated: Be not angry: Bear no malice: Do not covet: Do not lie: Do not deceive: Do not lust: Do not desire to break Law: are to be applied to the whole train of our affections, desires, thoughts, and purposes, and to the whole course of actions, internal and external, which make up our lives. By their application to the various circumstances of human character and condition, the Classes of Duties, thus pointed out, are further particularized and defined.

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Chapter II. On the Idea of Moral Goodness

  §230. These Moral Precepts, as now stated, are negative. They prohibit certain kinds of internal actions. They point out certain Conceptions which we are to avoid: Anger, Malice, Covetousness, Lying, Deceit, Lust, Lawbreaking. These are internal acts from which we are morally bound to abstain. These are points from which the Forces of morality tend.
  But negative Precepts and repulsive Forces cannot suffice to express the character of Morality. The Supreme Law of Human Action must be positive. It must command as well as prohibit. It must direct us what to tend to, as well as from. It must not merely repress and control the Affections, Desires, and Intentions; it must direct them to their proper objects, and enjoin steadiness and energy in them, thus directed. The Supreme Law of our Actions must be a Law for all the Powers of Action. It must include the whole of our nature. Its rule for Affection and Desire must be, not that they shall be extinguished, but that they shall be right Affection and right |162| Desire. And the Reason, which has for its office the formation of Conceptions to which the Mental Affections and Desires tend, must form Conceptions to which the right Affections and right Desires may tend.

  §231. The Conceptions to which Morality directs our Desires and Affections, may be collected, in a general way, from what has been said of the Conceptions from which the impulses of Morality urge us. As Morality calls us from Anger, Malice, Covetousness, Lying, Deceit, Lust, Lawbreaking; she impels us to an opposite set of qualities:—Mildness, Kindness, Liberality, Fairness, Truthfulness, Humanity, Temperance, Chastity, Obedience. These Conceptions must enter into the Idea of the End of Human Action. These must be included in the Supreme Law of Human Action. These points indicate the place to which the lines of Duty all tend. The Supreme Law of Human Action must be found in the point to which all such lines converge. It may be conceived as the Ideal Center of such special moral tendencies as we have spoken of; and thus, as the Idea of Morality.

  §232. We may proceed somewhat further in the determination of this Ideal Center, or Idea of Morality. The Supreme Law of Human Action must be a Law which belongs to man as man; a thing in which all men sympathize, and which binds together man and man by the tie of their common humanity (§69). It excludes all that operates merely to separate men; for example, all Desires that tend to a center in each individual, without any regard to the common sympathy of mankind; and especially, all Affections which operate directly to introduce discord and conflict; as we have seen, accordingly, that it excludes Malice and Anger, and directs us to Mildness and Kindness. The absence of all the affections which tend to separate men, and the aggregate of the Affections which unite them, may be expressed by the |163| term Benevolence, understood in its largest and fullest sense, as including all the ties of Love which bind men together. We feel and conceive the affection of Love, at first, as binding together the members of the same Family, or of the same Community: but man is capable of extending his Love to all mankind; in proportion as there is unfolded, in his mind, the conception of the community of their nature and his own;—of their common affections, reason, and moral sentiments in which all mankind participate. With the development of this conception, he is led to a love of man as man, and a desire of the good of all men;—an affection in which all mankind are ready to sympathize, and which binds together man as man. This Affection, then, of Love to man as man, is a part of the Supreme Law of Human Action: and the Idea of a complete and universal Benevolence is a point in the direction of the Ideal Center, or a part of the Idea of Morality of which we have spoken.
  Again; in the Supreme Law of Human Action we must exclude, as we have said, all Desires that merely tend to their center in the individual, without regard to the common sympathy of mankind. The Desire of Property is, in its original form, of this kind. Each man desires Property for himself alone. But the nature of Morality, as we have seen, points out Liberality and Fairness as the proper guides of action, in opposition to Selfish Covetousness. Liberality partakes of Benevolence; but Fairness may be conceived as the Desire that each person should have his own. And this Desire may be conceived in its most complete and comprehensive form as Justice: and the Idea of Justice, thus fully understood, is part of that Ideal Center or Idea of Morality above mentioned.
  Again; among the necessary conditions of a Rule of human action, is the existence of a Common Understanding among men, such that they can depend upon |164| each other’s actions. Lying and Deceit tend to separate and disunite men; and to make all actions implying mutual dependence, that is, all social action and social life, impossible. Such acts are accordingly excluded by the Supreme Rule, and Truthfulness and Honesty are pointed out as proper guides of Moral Action. These qualities, conceived in their most complete form, as extending from the Acts to the Words, and from the Words to the Intentions, may be termed Integrity, as implying an entire consistence of external and internal acts; or may be termed Truth, as implying an agreement of the verbal expression with the thought: and the Idea of Truth, in this full and comprehensive sense, is a part of the Central Idea, or Idea of Morality.
  Again: the bodily Appetites and Desires, still more than the mental ones, tend to their center in the individual, and thus operate to disunite and oppose men. The Affections make the bodily Desires, in some measure, operate towards the union and sympathy of men; but still more towards their conflict and disunion, except so far as both Desires and Affections are governed by Obligations. The Supreme Rule requires that they should be so governed as not even to tend to violate Obligations;—that they should be conformed to Precepts of Duty; and therefore, that they should be controlled and directed by the Moral Sentiments and the Reason. The Control of the Appetites by the Moral Sentiments and the Reason is recommended to us by Morality, under the Conceptions of Temperance and Chastity. In our moral view of the Springs of Action, we conceive the Appetites and Desires as elements which ought to be thus controlled. Appetite and Desire are the Lower Parts; Moral Sentiments and Reason are the Higher Parts, of our Nature: and the Precepts which recommend to us Temperance and Chastity may be expressed in a general form by saying, that the Higher Part of our |165| Nature ought to control and govern the Lower. We may express this Control and Government in the most general and comprehensive way, by the term Purity; and the Idea of Purity, thus completely and comprehensively understood, is a part of the Ideal Center, or Idea of Morality.
  Again; the Supreme Law of Human Action, in order to operate effectively upon men’s minds, must be distinctly and definitely conceived, at least in some of its parts and applications. But all distinct and definite conceptions of Laws of Human Action must involve a reference to the relations which positive Laws establish. Hence Moral Rules, in order to be distinct and definite, must depend upon Laws; and must suppose Laws to be fixed and permanent. It is our Duty to promote, by our acts, this fixity and permanence: and the Duty, of course, extends to our internal actions, to Will, Intention, Desire and Affection, as well as to external act. We must conform our Dispositions to the Laws; obey the Laws cordially, or administer them carefully, according to the position we may happen to hold in the community. This disposition may be denoted by the term Order, understood in a large and comprehensive sense. But further: not only positive human Laws, but subordinate moral Rules, are necessary conditions of morality. We cannot conform our actions, intentions, desires, to the Supreme Rule, without having in our thoughts subordinate Rules, which are partial expressions of the Supreme Rule; and to such subordinate Rules, it is our Duty to conform our Intentions and Desires. The disposition to do this may also be included in the term Order, taken in its largest sense. We thus denote, by this term, a disposition to conform, both to positive human Laws as the necessary conditions of this, and to special Moral Rules, as the expression of the Supreme Rule. And the Idea of Order in this |166| comprehensive sense is part of the Central Idea of Morality.

  §233. Thus we have five Ideas, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, which may be considered as the elements of the Central Idea of Morality, or as the Cardinal Points of the Supreme Rule of Human Action.
  We are not to conceive these Ideas as distinct and separable, but rather as connected and combined in a fundamental and intimate manner. Thus, we have already mentioned moral qualities which partake of more than one, as Liberality partakes of Benevolence and Justice: Honesty, of Justice and Truth. And all these dispositions, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, may be conceived to be included in a Love of Goodness. The Disposition enjoined by the Supreme Law of Human Action is the Love of Moral Good as Good, and the desire to advance towards it as the ultimate and only real object of action. To this object, all special affections, all external objects, and the desires of such objects, all intercourse of men, all institutions of society, are considered as subordinate and instrumental. And thus, this Love of Good includes, excites, nourishes, and directs to their proper ends, those more special Affections and Dispositions of which we have spoken.
  In order to describe the character and conduct conformable to the Supreme Rule, we may speak of it as the character and conduct of a good man. That is right which a good man would do. Those are right affections which a good man would feel.

  §234.Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, have been considered as Dispositions in man. But these Dispositions may be conceived as Desires or Affections, tending to certain abstract mental Objects or Ideas. Thus, Benevolence is a Desire or Affection which has for its Object the Good of all Mankind, This object may be expressed by the |167| term Humanity. Humanity, which is thus the ideal object of Benevolence, is also a term used to describe the disposition itself, as it exists in man, who is the subject of this affection. We have thus an objective and a subjective Humanity. In like manner, Justice is a Desire which has for its Object the Rule, To each his own. This Rule is itself described as Justice, (“I ask for Justice.”); and thus we have subjective Justice, the Disposition, and objective Justice, the Rule. In like manner. Truth, the Disposition as it exists in man, its Subject, assumes and tends to an Objective Truth, the agreement between the reality of things and our expressed conceptions of them. Purity, the Disposition, has for its Object an Ideal Purity, free from all blemish and taint of mere desire. Willing conformity to Law, which is subjective Order, has, for its Object, Law itself, which may be described as Objective Order. Thus, some of the most common and familiar abstract terms. Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, are used to describe both subjectively, the Disposition, and objectively, the Idea to which it tends.

  §235. There are, however, other terms by which the two significations of each of these words is separately expressed. Thus, as we have seen, subjective Humanity is Benevolence; objective Humanity is the Good of all Mankind, the Welfare of Man, and the like. Perhaps one of the most usual modes of describing the object of Benevolence, in its largest sense, is to say, that it is the increase of Human Happiness. Justice is used with equal familiarity for Subjective Justice, the Disposition, and Objective Justice, the Rule. Subjective Truth is called Truthfulness, Veracity; and under certain conditions, Faithfulness, Fidelity. Special portions of objective Truth are Truths: and are also termed Verities. Purity in its subjective sense may be distinguished, as Purity of Heart, from Purity used objectively, as |168| when we speak of the Love of Purity. Subjective Order is Orderliness, Obedience, or, as we have said, willing Conformity to Law: Objective Order is Law, Rule, which includes Special Laws and Rules, as Truth includes special Verities.

  §236. These five terms, in their Subjective Sense, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, are Dispositions conformable to the Supreme Law of Human Action: they are therefore Virtues (§226). And inasmuch as they are the leading points to which we have been led, by our analysis of human springs of action, and human obligations, we may term them Cardinal Virtues; although they are different from the list of Cardinal Virtues as usually given, Temperance, Fortitude, Justice, and Wisdom. This latter list is too unphilosophical a division to be employed with any advantage in Morality. But the Virtues which have names in common language, are all conceived as Virtues, in consequence of partaking of one or more of our five Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order; and we may arrange the Virtues in general according to their affinity with these five.
  The five Cardinal Virtues may be variously combined with the Springs of Human Action; but yet each of these Virtues has its more peculiar sphere of operation in our nature. Benevolence is mainly concerned in guiding and governing the Affections; Justice, in controlling and correcting our Mental Desires; Truth, in directing the Mutual Understanding of men; Purity, in regulating the Bodily Desires. Order engages the Reason in the consideration of Rules and Laws, by which Virtue and its opposite are defined.

  §237. The opposite of Virtue, or the want of it, is Vice: and the language of all nations supplies us with a long list of Virtues, arising from the combination of the Cardinal Virtues with the various springs and conditions of human action, and of the antagonist Vices. These names of Virtues and Vices are Abstract Terms, and have Adjectives connected with them, by which the varieties of human character and disposition are familiarly designated. The limits of |169| Virtue and Vice, however, are far from being manifest and obvious. It is often very difficult to say where Virtue ends, and where Vice begins. To define such limits, when it is possible, must be our business, when we come to treat of Questions of Duty. But it is necessary for us to employ the names of Virtues and Vices in a general and usual sense, before we thus attempt to define their limits. The names of Virtues and Vices are the Vocabulary of Morality; and of this Vocabulary, we shall give a brief account; arranging the Terms, as we have said, according to their affinity with the Five Cardinal Virtues.

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Chapter III. Virtues and Vices

1. Virtues of the Affections

  §238. Benevolence is the Virtue of the Affection of Love. This Affection is variously modified, according to the persons to whom it is directed, and the accompanying circumstances. Thus there is Conjugal Love, the Love of Husband and Wife; Parental (Paternal and Maternal) Love; Filial Love; Fraternal Love, and other kinds of Family Affection; Friendship, the Love by which Friends are especially drawn to each other; our Love of our Fellow-Citizens; of our Fellow-Countrymen; finally, the Love which we bear to the whole Human Race and to every member of it. All these Kinds of Love are Springs of Action, and Sources of Emotion, which it is the business of Morality, not to resist and destroy, but to govern and |170| direct. When these natural Affections are directed to their proper objects, and regulated by Reason, they are virtuous Affections. Those in whom they are wanting are blamed as without natural affection. They are all included in the general term, Benevolent Affections. They are spoken of figuratively as the Heart. A man’s heart is hard, or cold, when these affections are feeble and dull in him; he is warmhearted, when they are strong; and openhearted, when they are readily bestowed on those around him.

  §239. Benevolent Affections are called kindly affections, for they knit us to our Kind, the Human Race. Hence kind, the adjective, describes the disposition of a person full of such affections. A man is estranged from his friends, when those affections cease; he is unkind, when the opposite prevail; he is unsocial, when he shuns the occasions of kindly intercourse with companions.
  When a benevolent affection turns our attention upon its object in a tranquil manner, it is Regard. Love is the affection in a more marked form. It is Tenderness when it implies a sensitive and vigilant solicitude for the good of its object; Fondness when it absorbs the thought, so that Reason is disregarded. When this is the case, the affection is no longer a Virtue: still less is it so, when Love becomes doting, overweening, passionate.
  Love towards a person, growing out of good received from him, is Gratitude. A grateful person expresses his emotions in Words, which are Thanks; but he is also desirous of doing Acts of gratitude; of returning Good for Good. Gratitude is a natural and virtuous Affection; but the Acts which it prompts must be limited by Rules of Duty. A man who does what is wrong in return for benefits received, makes his Benefactor the director of his actions, instead of directing them himself, as Morality requires. Hence he is said to sell himself; and to be venal.

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  §240. The manifestations of the benevolent affections, in their influence upon the habitual external Behaviour, have various names. Such affections, regarding a particular person, and not necessarily leading to action, are Good-will. When they produce a current of cheerful thoughts, they are Good-humour. When benevolent feelings lead a man to comply readily with the wishes of others, or to seek to give them pleasure, we have Good-nature. When this Disposition is shown on the part of a superior, we term him gracious and benign. When a person’s Good-nature makes it easy to address him, he is affable. If, in his behaviour, he avoid all that may give offense to others, he is courteous. This Disposition is conceived to have generated in the inhabitants of cities. Habits of behaviour which are termed Urbanity and Civility. The opposite of these is Rudeness.

  §241. Good-humour may often be disturbed by the Provocations which offenses and outrages occasion; but there are virtuous Dispositions which support our benevolence under such provocations. Such dispositions are Gentleness, Mildness, Meekness. Under the influence of these, we repress or avoid the resentment and anger, which offenses against us, and insults offered to us, tend to produce; we preserve benevolence, tranquillity, and good-humour in our minds; and manifest such a disposition in our behaviour. With these dispositions, if men act wrongly or foolishly, we are tolerant and indulgent; if they offend us, we pardon and forgive them. We are ready to do this; we are placable. To be intolerant, unforgiving, implacable, is a vicious Disposition.

  §242. The Benevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object. We naturally share in the emotions which we witness in man: we have a Fellow-feeling, a Sympathy with them. When this Disposition leads us to feel pain at the sight of pain, it is Compassion; we commiserate |172| the object. This feeling, being strongly confirmed by Piety, came to be called Pity. Such a Disposition, as it prompts us to abstain from adding to the pain felt, is Mercy, or Clemency; as it prompts us to remove the pain or want which we see, it is Charity. But this word has also a wider sense, in which it describes Benevolence, as it makes us abstain from judging unfavourably of other men. All these are virtuous Affections, and lead to the performance of Duties of Benevolence.

  §243. Admiration can hardly be called a benevolent affection towards its object; for we admire what does not draw our Love; as when we admire a great geometer. But if we admire a man as a good man, we also love him (§91). Esteem is the benevolent affection which we entertain towards that of which we approve. Persons whom we esteem, but to whom we are not drawn by love, we respect. When, with such a Disposition, we look at them as our Superiors, we reverence them; in a higher degree, this Affection is Veneration; when combined with Fear, it is Awe. Reverence assumes, in its object, Authority and Power, combined with Justice and Goodness.

  §244. The irascible Affections are, for the most part, opposed to the virtue of Benevolence; and therefore are to be repressed and controlled. Yet these Affections also have their moral office, and give rise to Virtues. They act as a Defense against harm and wrong; and hence, in their various modifications, they may be termed Defensive Affections. As opposed to harm, inflicted or threatened, they are Resentment; as directed against wrong, they are Indignation (§56). And these Emotions may be blameless or praiseworthy; as when we feel natural and proper Resentment, or just Indignation. Such Sentiments are an important and necessary part of Virtue; not of Benevolence, strictly speaking, but of Justice. Without Indignation against cruelty, fraud, falsehood, |173| foulness, disorder, the Virtues have not their full force in the mind.
  But Anger, in order to be virtuous, must be directed solely against moral Wrong. Malevolent Affections directed towards Persons are Vices; Antipathy, Dislike, Aversion to any person, independently of his bad character and conduct, are vicious. It is vicious to be displeased, irritated, incensed, exasperated at any person, merely because his actions interfere with our pleasures and desires. The proneness to such Anger is Irascibility. Still more vicious are our Emotions, when they swell into Rage and Fury, or settle into Malice and Hatred. The term Rancour denotes a fixed Hate, which, by its inward working, has, as it were, diseased the Soul in which it exists. Spite implies a vigilant desire to depress and mortify its object. All these malevolent Feelings are vicious.

  §245. Moderate Anger, arising from pain inflicted on us is Offense; which term is also used for the offensive Act. A person commits an offense, or offends, in the latter sense; and takes offense, or is offended, in the former. If the Act be one which violently transgress common rules, it is an Outrage. Anger at pain received, impelling a man to inflict pain in return, is Revenge. This term also implies the object or aim of the feeling, as well as the feeling itself. A man is stimulated by Revenge, and seeks his Revenge. The same may be said of the word Vengeance, another form of the word, but of the same origin. The man who admits into his heart this Affection, and retains it, is revengeful, vengeful, vindictive.

  §246. The Malevolent Feelings, as manifested in the external behaviour, have various names. As they affect our disposition to a person, without necessarily leading to action, they are Ill-will. When they disturb the usual current of cheerful thoughts, they are Ill-humour. When malevolent feelings lead |174| us to speak or act with a view of giving pain to others, they are Ill-nature. When they make us rejoice in another person’s pain, they are Malignity. If the pleasure, which a malignant man takes in another man’s pain, be uncheckt [sic] by compassion, when the pain is evident, he is cruel; and as such a disposition shows a deficiency in the common feelings which bind men together, he is inhuman. If this character be strongly marked, the man is savage; he approaches to the character and temper of wild beasts; he is brutal.
  The Malevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object of them, as compared with our own circumstances. Malevolent Pain at the Good which happens to another, and at our own Want of this Good, is Envy.

  §247. Contempt can hardly be called a malevolent feeling; for we may despise persons without hating them. Contempt consists rather in an estimate of a man as below a certain Standard of Character, to which our Esteem is given. We despise a man for Cowardice, because we admire Courage. The verb despise (despicio, to look down upon,) shows that such a view is implied. The word Scorn implies a condemnation of this kind, so strong that it approaches to Indignation. The expression of contempt, in a marked manner, is an Insult. If the discrepance of the contemplated character with the assumed standard be extravagant, so as to excite a sudden and poignant feeling of Incongruity, our Contempt expresses itself in Laughter. The character is regarded as ridiculous.

  §248. There are various modifications of character and conduct which arise frpm the greater or less Energy of the affections, and appear as Virtues or as Vices. The feelings of Love of Right, and Anger at Wrong, in a permanent and energetic form, are virtuous Zeal. Courage, the habit of mind which rejects Fear, is allied to this virtue; as is Fortitude, the |175| habit of not yielding to Pain. From such dispositions of mind, arise Energy and Activity in action; which are important virtues when the action is virtuous.

  §249. Though Hope and Fear are not Affections, they operate in increasing or diminishing our energy and activity, as the Affections do. The Disposition in which the emotion of Hope predominates is also termed Hope, or Hopefulness. Joy and Joyfulness describe rather Delight produced by some special event, than any permanent Disposition; but Cheerfulness, like Hopefulness, is rather an habitual Disposition; and when governed by Rules of Duty, is an auxiliary Virtue. A tranquil yet cheerful flow of the spirits keeps the thoughts and feelings in a condition suitable to virtuous action. The want of activity and energy is Sluggishness, Sloth, Idleness, Laziness, Indolence; which are habits alien to virtue, and connected with the Vice of Apathy, the absence of lively affections and desires. As the influence of Fear predominates, the character becomes timid, and tends to Cowardice, the opposite of Courage. Such habits are at variance with the Rules of Duty; for these Rules often direct us in a course which leads through Danger, either to the Person or Fortune of the Actor, or to the Good-will which others feel for him. In order that a man may act rightly, he must act freely, independently. Men wanting in Independence of Character, and seeking the favour of others, without regard to moral Rules, are slavish, servile, obsequious, cringing, fawning; they are Flatterers and Sycophants. Such dispositions make men abject and base. The want of cheerfulness and hopefulness is Despondency, Dejection, Sullenness, Melancholy, Gloom; which are habits of mind adverse to active virtue. The theological moralists have made Acedia (ακηδία), Apathy with regard to Good, one of their seven deadly sins.

  §250. We have placed here the Virtues and Vices which are connected with Energy or Zeal, because |176| these qualities depend very much upon the strength of the Affections. They depend also, however, upon the Habits of Mind by which the intention is directed. The energetic man decides soon and conclusively what course to take. This is Decision. Energy also manifests itself in Fixity of Purpose. When the purpose is once formed, the energetic man’s course is determined; his doubts are resolved; and he goes on in spite of difficulty and danger. This is Determination, Resolution. A man who adheres to his purpose, in spite of strong motives to draw him away, is firm; but if the motives which he resists are reasonable, he is obstinate. Firmness implies a good cause; Obstinacy a bad one. Energy and Zeal may also become extreme, so as to trespass upon Benevolence. In this case they are Overzeal, Vehemence, Harshness, Impatience.
  Zeal, operating through the Reason, is Earnestness, which leads to Seriousness. With this quality. Cheerfulness is not inconsistent, but Levity is. Care sometimes implies only so much attention as Earnestness requires; at other times, it implies more than is consistent with Cheerfulness. It is right to take Care, but it is not necessary to be full of Care. It is wrong to be careless, reckless. A disposition to attend to Trifles only is Frivolity.

  §251. Connected with the pleasures of Cheerfulness, there are pleasures which show themselves externally in good-humoured Laughter; as the pleasures of Jesting and the like. These arise from intellectual acts, and may be spoken of hereafter; but we may here remark, that under the influence of Levity, they lead to mere Merriment, Buffoonery, Folly.

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2. Virtues of the Mental Desires

  §252. Property is the Conception about which the Cardinal virtue of Justice is especially concerned; and hence the dispositions and habits of mind which regard Property, have Justice for their leading virtue. Yet Wealth, and Property of all kinds, may be used as a means of Benevolence; and from this use, arise Virtues; as Charity, already mentioned, Liberality (a willingness to give), and the like. Wealth may be desired as a means either to such ends, or to different ones. Hence the Disposition which aims at acquisition, may be virtuous or vicious, according to the ulterior object. A man may desire Wealth as a means of Luxury and Sensuality; and in such a case, the Desire of Wealth is opposed to Temperance, rather than to Justice.
  The Desire of the means of Subsistence is an universal and necessary Desire. A Wish for a Competence,—for so much property as may free a man from solicitude respecting common needs and common enjoyments,—is not opposed either to Justice or to Temperance. The prospect of Poverty and Penury; the pressure of Privation and Want; the sense of Dependence upon others;—greatly tend to disturb the influence of virtue in the mind. The Fear of these evils is not a vice. Also wealth may be desired as a means of benevolent action, or of right action, in many other ways. A person’s power of doing good, of many kinds, depends much upon the Station and Influence which wealth bestows.

  §253. But though wealth may be desired for ends which make the Desire virtuous; the progress of men’s habits is such that, when sought at first as a means, it is afterwards desired as an end. The Desire to acquire money is then unlimited; and is Covetousness, Avarice. The man’s greediness in |178| desiring, is Cupidity: his eagerness in taking, is Rapacity. He scrapes and hoards. He spares carefully and spends unwillingly: he is parsimonious, niggardly, penurious. His solicitude and privations make him miserable. He is a Miser.
  On the other hand, such habits of care, with regard to sparing and spending, as may tend to avoid Poverty and Privation, are reckoned as Virtues; such virtues are Economy, Frugality. By these, a man thrives or grows in his possessions: he is thrifty. A person who is destitute of these qualities is an Unthrift. A willingness to give is Liberality, Generosity, Bountifulness; which are reckoned Virtues. But this disposition may be excessive: the man is then lavish, extravagant.

  §254. Property conveys Power to the Possessor: but there are also many other Sources of Power. Whoever aims at a larger share of Power than his neighbours possess, is, so far, regardless of Justice. The Desire of Power is Ambition. But the Desire of Power for good ends, and the Desire of the Power which moral excellence gives, may be termed laudable Ambition.
  The Disposition which represses our own desires, whether of money, power, victory, or any other object; and contemplates the desires and claims of other persons with equal favour; is Fairness. This is a kind of personal application of Justice, to questions between ourselves and others. Impartiality is more commonly used for the Fairness which decides justly between two other persons.

3. Virtues Connected with Truth

  §255. We have mentioned (§235) some of the names of the Virtues connected with Truth; as Truthfulness, Veracity. These express a conformity of our |179| words to the reality. The conformity of our actions to our Engagements, whether express or implied, is Fidelity, Good Faith. Thus a subject is faithful to the engagement which binds him to the Sovereign of the State. If, in such a case, Love is added to Fidelity, it becomes Loyalty.
  A man who says what he knows to be untrue, is a Liar. He is guilty of Falsehood. A man who says what he thinks, is sincere. Such a man shows himself what he is. A man who conceals some important part of his feelings or thoughts dissembles. When he assumes the appearance of virtues which he really does not possess, he is a Hypocrite. By such means men impose upon others, and deceive them. |154|
  Lies and Deceit are often used as means of Fraud; which is an offense against Property, and therefore contrary to Justice as well as Truth. A person who defrauds, circumvents, cheats any one, must be destitute both of Justice and of Truth. Property and Language may both be considered as Universal Contracts, to which the whole human race are parties; Fraud by means of Falsehood violates both these Contracts.
  A man free from all fraudulent dispositions is honest; he is a man of Probity. He is not drawn aside, by the desire of gain, to act obliquely, tortuously, in a crooked manner. He is straightforward, and upright. His intentions, words, and actions, form a whole in which there is no inconsistent part. This is Integrity. A deceitful man may have two purposes; one, apparent, simulated, declared; the other secretly held, but dissembled, till it can be acted on. To have two purposes in this way is Duplicity. The truthful person, on the contrary, has Simplicity for a part of his character: he has Singleness of Purpose, Singleness of heart. He is frank and open, showing himself as he really is.

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4. Virtues Relating to the Bodily Desires

  §256. The gratification of the Appetites or Bodily Desires, to a certain extent, and under certain conditions, is requisite for the continuance of the individual and of the Species, and therefore is not vicious. These Desires being mere attributes of the Body, cannot have, of themselves, a moral character. They are to be controlled by moral Rules, and made subservient to moral Affections, and thus, are the materials of Virtues. The Habits of thus controlling the bodily Desires, are the Virtues of Temperance and Chastity. The Demeanour produced by a chaste mind, especially in women, is Modesty.
  By the establishment of Family and Social Relations, the gratification of the bodily wants is connected with the impulses of Affection and the Love of Society. The shelter of the common family roof, and the social meal, as well as the marriage-bed, are the objects of far other feelings than mere bodily desires. The Appetites are thus made subservient to the Affections. They are absorbed by the Affections, and are thus purified. All gratifications of the Appetites, sought as gratifications merely, are impure and vicious. Among such vices is the Love of the Pleasures of the Table. When the Desire of Food is gratified to excess, there is Gluttony, Gulosity. When there is an excessive solicitude about the gratification of the Taste, the man is an Epicure. The Love of Drink involves, not only a bodily Appetite, but a complacency in the mental condition to which certain liquors lead; namely, the condition of Intoxication or Ebriety; a condition in which the Reason loses the power of directing our actions. The Vice of falling into such a condition is Intemperance, Drunkenness.
  The other leading bodily Desire, when not morally |181| controlled, is Lust. The control of this within moral limits, is Continence. The vicious indulgence is Lewdness, Lechery. Persons whose guiding springs of action are these bodily desires, are sensual, carnal. A chaste and modest person does not allow his eyes or his imagination to dwell on things which may excite Lust. Such images are obscene, indecent. To suggest such images in speech is Obscenity. All such filthy conversation pollutes the mind. A man who makes pleasure the object of his actions is a Voluptuary. Such men generally cast off moral restraint, and are hence dissolute, profligate. A woman who thinks lightly of chastity is a Wanton.
  When the arts of life are employed to gratify artificial wants and desires, those who give their attention and solicitude to obtain such gratifications are luxurious. Luxury is often employed to describe the aggregate of such gratifications; but the Solicitude employed on the means of gratification, rather than any special Class of such means, appears to be essential to our conception of Luxury. Things which are Luxuries in one stage of society, become universal Wants, and consequently Necessaries, in another stage. Linen garments, glass windows, tea, were Luxuries a few centuries ago in this country. They are now Necessaries of life.

5. Intellectual Virtues

  §257. The Disposition by which we accept Law and Rule as the necessary guides of human action, is that which we have termed Order. This Virtue is also, as we have said (§235), termed Orderliness, Obedience, and the like. But it is a Virtue to govern carefully, as well as to obey cordially, according to the position we hold in the community.
  A virtuous governor must be guided by Justice; but Justice itself must be defined by specific Rules. |182| Laws and Rules must be apprehended by the Intellect, and must be expressed in terms of general conceptions constructed by the Reason. Hence, the Virtues connected with Order especially include operations of the Intellect, and may be termed Intellectual Virtues.

  §258. The abstract Conceptions of the objects of our mental Desires, as Property, Power, Society, require operations of the Reason for their formation. By the further operation of the like Faculties, we form still more abstract and general conceptions of objects of action, as Good, Well-being, Happiness, Expediency, Interest, and the like. Rules of Action, dependent upon such Conceptions, may be conceived and expressed. Various moralists have stated various Rules, thus expressed. Different individuals govern their conduct by one or other of such Rules, more or less clearly apprehended. One man looks to Interest as liis object, another to Happiness, another to Wellbeing, another to the Happiness of Mankind, and so on.
  One or other of such objects being assumed as the end of human action, Prudence is the Intellectual Virtue by which we select the right means to this end. A man is prudent, who acts so as to promote his own Interest, if his Interest be assumed to be the proper Object of action: but if we conceive Happiness to be a higher object than Interest, he is prudent, if he disregard mere Interest, and attend only to his Happiness. Prudence supposes the value of the end to be assumed, and refers only to the adaptation of the means. It is the selection of right means for given ends.

  §259. In the notion of Wisdom, we include, not only, as in Prudence, a right selection of means for an assumed end, but also a right selection of the end. However prudent a man may be in seeking his Interest, he is not wise, if, in doing this, he neglect a truer end |183| of human action. Wisdom is the habit by which we select right means for right ends. We approve and admire Prudence relatively to its end: we approve and admire Wisdom absolutely. We commend the prudent man, as taking the best course for his purpose; but we do not necessarily agree with him in his estimate of his object. We venerate the wise man, as one knowing, better than we do, the true object of action, as well as the means of approaching it. Wisdom is a Cardinal Virtue, like Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity; and with reference to the first, as well as the other four, human Dispositions are good, as they partake of the Cardinal Virtue. Wisdom is the complete Idea of Intellectual Excellence; as Benevolence, Justice, Truth, and Purity, are of Moral Excellence.

  §260. Prudence is, etymologically speaking, the same word as Providence, that is Foresight. But we do not call a man prudent, except he not only see the bearing of actions on a distant end, but act upon his foresight. A man who gambles, with a clear foresight that gambling will ruin him, is not prudent. Prudence is a Virtue, not of the Speculative Reason, which contemplates Conceptions, but of the Practical Reason, which guides our Actions.
  The guidance of our Actions by Reason, requires us to attend both to the present and to probable future circumstances; it requires Attention, and Forethought, or Forecast. It requires, too, the employment of Thought upon the Circumstances of the case. A virtuous man must be thoughtful, considerate. The want of thoughtfulness is a part of that Levity which we have already noticed as involving a Vice of the Affections.
  In order to act prudently, we must not only have Prudent thought, but have it at the right time for action; this is Presence of Mind. Cunning is a lower kind of Prudence, that seeks its ends by means, of |184| which the end is not intended to be seen by others, when they are used.
  By our Intellectual Faculties we are able to apprehend and know Truth, that is, Objective Truth (§234); and especially, Truths which bear upon our actions, and which must be taken into account in framing Rules of Action. Truth is the proper object of Reason; that is, of the universal Reason of mankind: and the Supreme Rule of human action which belongs to mankind, in virtue of their universal Faculties, must depend upon the Truths which Reason makes known to us. The Love of Knowledge impels men to aim at the Knowledge of such Truths: and the Love of Truth, which thus contributes to a Knowledge of the Supreme Law, is a Virtue.
  The progress which each man makes in the Knowledge of Truth, depends in a great measure upon himself; upon his Observation; his Diligence, Attention, Patience, in seeking the Truth. His progress depends also upon external circumstances; upon the Intellectual and Moral Development of the Society in which he lives; and upon his own Education, in the largest sense of the term. But there are also differences of the Mental Faculties, between one person and another. One man excels another in Acuteness and Clearness of the mind, when employed in observation or in reasoning; one man has a quicker or a more tenacious Memory than another. There are various degrees of Sagacity; various kinds of Imagination. Some men have Genius. These Faculties are not properly termed Virtues, but Gifts, Endowments, Ability. They may be used as means to right ends, and hence they are termed Talents; by a metaphor taken from the Parable in the New Testament, which teaches us that a man is blameable, when he does not use the means of right action assigned to him.

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6. Reflex Virtues and Vices

  §261. We may place, among the Intellectual Virtues and Vices, those which depend upon our apprehension of other men’s sentiments concerning us. For such Virtues and Vices imply reflex thought. We have already enumerated (§57) among the springs of human action, the Reflex Sentiments, in which we form a conception of other men’s sentiments, by the image of our own; and of ourselves, as the object of those sentiments. Such are the Desire of Esteem, the Desire of Admiration, the Love of Fame, and the like.
  There is a difference to be made between the Desire of Esteem and the Desire of Admiration. Esteem is given to what is deemed right and good. Admiration and Applause are often bestowed upon qualities which have no moral character; as strength, skill, beauty, wit, and the like. The want of such qualities is a ground, among many men, of Contempt; and if the deficiency appear suddenly and glaringly, of Ridicule. Ridicule implies that the object which excites it is so palpably below the standard which we apply to it, that the comparison is extravagant and absurd. The Desire of Admiration produces a Fear and Dread of this Contempt and Ridicule. But the Desire of being admired, for other than moral excellences, has in it nothing of Virtue. He who desires the Esteem of others, desires them to regard him as good; and will, for the most part, be disposed to sympathize with them in their admiration for what is good. The Desire of Esteem therefore is easily consistent with Virtue.
  The Desire of Admiration produces a ready belief that we are admired, and a Joy and Elation of Mind accompanying such belief. This Disposition is Vanity. One who is treated with marks of general esteem |186| among men, is brought to Honour. One who is pointed at as an object of general disesteem, is brought to Disgrace; and, if he feel the Disgrace, is put to Shame. But Honour and Shame likewise indicate, subjectively, the Sensibility of the man to those indications of general Esteem and Disesteem. We speak also of False Honour, and False Shame; meaning Dispositions to be influenced by Applause on the one side, and Blame or Ridicule on the other, even when they are not rightly bestowed. True Honour is a Regard for what is right and good, considered especially as the object of sympathy and esteem among men. A man of Honour, an honourable man, has an especial abhorrence of the Vices of Fraud and Falsehood. The Desire of Admiration in another form is the Love of Glory. In Civil Society are established marks of Public Honour, as Rank, Titles, Decorations, and the like. Dispositions, for the most part, allied to Vanity, fasten upon these objects; and thus we have the Love of Rank, or the like. But such marks of honour are often accompanied with Political Power; as when, in England, a man is made a Peer. In this case, the Desire of Rank may be Ambition, rather than Vanity.

  §262. When I have formed a conception of myself, I am led to regard myself as the object of my own moral sentiments. If I approve my own character, I feel Self-esteem. If I am the object of my own Admiration, without requiring the sympathy of others, this feeling is Pride; a Vice which estranges me from other men. The Satisfaction which is felt in my own Admiration, is Self-complacency; a feeling which blinds men to their true character.
  I ought to render my Character such as to deserve esteem, and therefore, such as to deserve ray own esteem, if I contemplate my own character. If I do this, I may reject wrong acts and emotions, as unsuited to the character which I thus ascribe to myself. The |187| Disposition to do this, appears to be what is meant by a Proper Pride: but this way of regarding one’s own character appears to involve a share of Self-complacency. Men reckon among virtues, the Magnanimity which disregards small dangers and small injuries or offenses. The opposite term, Pusillanimity, denotes cowardice; a quick sensibility to offenses is Captiousness.
  Pride is, in its tendency, at variance with the Benevolent Virtues, Meekness, Heverence, Courtesy. But the virtue which is especially opposed to Pride, is Humility. He who is humble in his estimate of himself, is also modest in comparing himself with others; but, as we have said (§256), Female Modesty has a more especial meaning. When Pride is manifested so as to imply Contempt of others, it is Haughtiness, Disdain; if Unkindness be added, it is Insolence. The insolent man is overbearing, domineering, arrogant. Self-esteem, so far as it regards the Operation of the Intellect, is Self-opinion. When this excludes all mistrust of one’s self, it is Self-sufficiency: and, as taking much for granted, it is Presumption. When Pride fastens upon special points, it is Conceit.

  §263. The Habits of mind by which we resist the impulses of desire and affection, so as to conform to rules of virtue or prudence, are Self-control, Self-command, Self-watchfulness; Self-mistrust; when the desires which we control are so lively that we cannot suppress them, though we resist them, it is Self-denial. When we seek our own gratification, in disregard of more virtuous objects, it is Self-seeking. When we let our Will take its course, in spite of manifest warnings of prudence, it is Self-will.
  The Habit of making ourselves the principal object of our attention and solicitude, is the Vice of Selfshness. A man is selfish, if the Desires which tend to himself (the Desires of the Body, the Desire of Property, and the like), rather than the Affections, are his leading |188| Springs of Action. These may be termed Selfish Desires. The term implies an Excess in the attention which we give to ourselves, a Defect in that which we give to others; and is always used in an unfavourable sense. Hence the term is not applied to the predominance of those Desires which do not interfere with the claims of others. We call a man selfish, in whom the Love of Money or of Bodily Ease prevails, because such Dispositions make him disregard the claims of others; but we do not call a man selfish, in whom the Love of Knowledge or of Society is strong; for my pursuit of knowledge takes nothing from other persons; and my love of society implies an acknowledgment of some kind of merit or value in other men. Pride and Vanity are selfish dispositions; for the proud man is too much occupied with his own admiration of himself, and the vain man with admiration of himself proceeding from other men, to regard, with due attention, the claims of his neighbours.
  The Selfish Man thinks only of himself: hence he has no Consideration for others: no due care for their feelings, condition, and claims. This Virtue is required in all; there is a higher degree of it, Unselfishness; the disposition of a person who pays no regard to his own gratification when that of another person comes in competition with it. A still higher degree of such virtue is Self-devotion; the virtue of him who willingly incurs pain, danger, or death, to procure benefits for another.

  §264. There are some dispositions regarded as Virtues, which are conceived to go beyond the standard of common characters. Such virtues are called noble; and when elevated still higher in our thoughts, they are heroic or heroical. Heroism generally implies great Fortitude or Courage, combined with Self-devotion. History is full of heroic acts; as that of Regulus, who refused to counsel his countrymen to peace, and returned to Carthage to die in tortures; |189| that of Virginius, who stabbed his daughter to preserve her from dishonour; that of the elder Brutus, who, as judge, condemned his own sons to death; that of Lucilius, who saved the younger Brutus by oifering himself to the pursuers as Brutus; that of Socrates, who preferred to receive death in obedience to the Laws of his country, though escape was offered him by his friends. The acts of Martyrs, who died for the Truth, when they might have saved their lives by denying it, are heroical.

  §265. The Moral Vocabulary of which we have taken a survey, the Collection of Terms describing Virtues and Vices, is used to express the judgments of mankind in general, respecting the Dispositions and Characters of men. The approval or disapproval implied in each Term is, for the most part, so well understood, that the mere use of the term pronounces a moral sentence on the subject to which it is applied. And the moral judgment of mankind, thus expressed in a recognized form, is very efficacious in forming the moral sentiments of each person; and hence, in modifying the characters and affections of men. The Vocabulary of Virtues and Vices is a constant moral Lesson; perpetually operating to bring each man’s moral sentiments into agreement with the general judgment of men. Every man is taught, by the use of moral language, to admire Gratitude and Filial Love, to condemn Revenge and Cruelty; and the like.
  For the most part, this Lesson agrees with the Lesson of true Morality, and points rightly to the Supreme Law of Human Action. This may be readily understood. For the Supreme Law of Human Action must be a Law in which all men, as men, sympathize (§98). Hence the common moral judgment, of which we have been speaking, which is expressed and communicated by the moral language commonly in use among men, will, in general at |190| least, conform to the Supreme Law. What are universally held as Virtues, must be dispositions in conformity with this Law. What are universally reckoned Vices, must be wrong.
  And a man, in so far as he is taught and formed by the general judgment of men, thus conveyed in the language of the Morality universally recognized, will be rightly taught. A man whose character contains what all men reckon Virtues, and is free from what are universally reckoned Vices, will be a good man. His affections and desires being thus regulated, he will tend to the possession of the Operative Moral Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; which we have stated as the Elements of the Supreme Law.

  §266. To the doctrine, that the common judgment of mankind respecting Virtues and Vices agrees, generally, with true Morality; it may be objected, that there are dispositions which we reckon vicious; and which yet, in many ages and countries, have been esteemed laudable, as Revenge. To this we reply, that men do not conceive themselves pronouncing the moral judgment of mankind when, under the influence of strong emotion, they speak of the satisfaction arising from Revenge, or appeal to the sympathy of other men alike moved. No Moralist, speaking calmly, and in the Name of Mankind, would say that boundless Revenge is good and virtuous. So far as he could praise or defend the Disposition, it would be by identifying it with the Punishment of Wrong, that is, with Justice. Men speak of Revenge as “a kind of wild Justice”; and approve it only so far as it partakes of the nature of Justice. And in like manner, all other dispositions are reckoned Virtues, even in the common judgment of mankind, only so far as they agree with, and partake of, the Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order.

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Chapter IV. Moral Principles

  §267. It is the business of our Reason to frame Rules of moral action, which are more or less partial expressions of the Supreme Rule (§231, 257). When we have an assemblage of such Rules expressed in words, they may be variously connected, by means of the Conceptions which they involve; and Rules may be deduced, one from another, by reasoning; some being of a more general, and others of a more special nature. But such connexion and such reasoning must rest ultimately upon certain fundamental general Rules, which we may term Principles; just as in Geometry the reasoning rests ultimately upon the Axioms and Definitions. In order, therefore, that we may be able to express Moral Rules in words, we must state certain Moral Principles as the foundation of such Rules.
  Then Moral Principles, being the expression of the Supreme Rule of Human Action, must coincide in their effect with the Ideas of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order; which, as we have seen (§230), are the Elements, or Cardinal Points, of the Supreme Rule. In order to lay down such Principles as we speak of, we have to express those Cardinal Ideas.

  §268. The term Principles is variously used. Springs of Action, as Affections, Desires, Dispositions, are often termed Principles of Action; especially when they operate in a steady and consistent manner. We put such steady Principles in opposition to transient and casual Feelings, which may be inconsistent with themselves. Our Feelings may prompt us to be kind to one person, and harsh to another; but Benevolence, operating as a Principle, would make us kind |192| to all. We have hitherto avoided speaking of “Principles of Action”; and have called the Affections and Desires Springs of Action (§24). Custom allows us to term Benevolence, and the other Cardinal Virtues, Moral Principles, when they operate in any man steadily and consistently, even though they be not expressed in words. But we must distinguish the term Principles, used in this sense, from the fundamental Rules, the basis of other Rules, which we have also more especially called Moral Principles. We may call the former Operative Principles, the latter, Express Principles. The former are Principles of Action, the latter are Principles of Reason.
  In order that a man’s Character should conform to the Supreme Rule, it is requisite that Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, should be in him Operative Principles. In order that he should express his Rules of Action so that they may be contemplated by the Reason, and communicated from one person to another, it is requisite that he should arrive at Express Principles.

  §269. Express Moral Principles must, as we have already said, be the expression of those Ideas which are the elements of the Supreme Rule. We have already been led to attempt to obtain such expressions, in speaking of these Moral Ideas.
  We have seen (§231) that the Idea of Benevolence is, that of an Affection, which makes man, as man, an object of love to us. We may therefore state it as a Moral Principle, that Man is to he loved as Man. We may term this the Principle of Humanity.
  We have seen that the Idea of Justice is, that of a Desire that, of external things, each person should have his own, without any preference of ourselves to others, or of one person to another. We may state this also as a Moral Principle, that Each Man is to have his own; and this we may term the Principle of Justice.
  |193| We have seen that the Idea of Truth (as a Cardinal Virtue) is, the Idea of a Conformity to a Universal Understanding among men, which is involved in the use of language, and according to which Understanding, each may depend upon the representations of the others. Hence we may state it as a Moral Principle, that We must conform to the Universal Understanding among men which the use of Language implies: and this we may call the Principle of Truth.
  Again, we have seen that the Idea of Purity implies the contemplation of mere Appetite and Desire, as the Lower Parts of our nature, which are to be governed by, and made subservient to, the Moral Sentiments and Reason, the Higher Parts. We may state this as a moral Principle, that The Lower Parts of our Nature are to be governed by, and subservient to, the Higher. This is the Principle of Purity.
  Again, we have seen that the Idea of Order implies a conformity, both to positive Human Laws, as the necessary conditions of morality, and to special Moral Rules, as the expression of the Supreme Rule. We may therefore state it as a Moral Principle, that We must obey positive Laws as the necessary Conditions of Morality; and this is the Principle of Order. We need not state it as a Principle that we must obey subordinate Moral Rules: for the claims of such Rules may be established in virtue of the Primary Moral Principles which we are now stating.

  §270. These five Express Moral Principles may be further unfolded; and the Conceptions by which we designate them, Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, may be further defined hereafter. But we do not fully express the import of the Cardinal Virtues of Benevolence, Justice, and the like, without adding some further Principles to those which we have mentioned. Benevolence must be strong, as well as general: vivid in its degree, as well as universal in its application. And the same is true of the |194| other Affections rightly directed. As we have already said (§229), the Supreme Law must not only direct the Affections and Intentions to their proper objects, but require steadiness and energy in them thus directed. The recognition of this condition of the Supreme Rule is shown in the place which Zeal, Energy, Earnestness, hold among the Virtues (§250). In order to express this, we may therefore state, as a Moral Principle, that The Affections and Intentions must not only he rightly directed, but energetic; and this we may call the Principle of Earnestness.

  §271. Again, it is not enough for the character of virtue, that each person should confine his desires to those objects which Justice assigns to him. His desires are not virtuous, if they terminate in the objects themselves. The Supreme Law of Human Action requires us (§232) to consider Moral Good, as the object to which all other objects are subordinate, and from which they derive their only moral value. Morality cannot allow us to desire external things, as wealth, power, or honour, for their own sake, but only as means to moral ends. And we may state this as a Moral Principle, that Things are to be sought only as means to moral ends; and this we may term the Principle of Moral Purpose.

  §272. Spirit of Justice, etc. To the Express Principles which we have thus stated, correspond Operative Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose; which exist in each man’s character, in so far as the Express Principles above stated become his habitual guides and springs of action; in so far as these express the tendencies of his affections and purposes. In this sense, as Operative Principles, a man is also said to have a Spirit of Benevolence, of Justice, and the like.
  It may be proper hereafter to state other Moral Principles, in addition to these seven: but these seven will enable us to lay down many Rules of Duty, |195| which is the purpose for which we put them forwards. We must now speak of Duty; and in the first place, of the distinction between Duty and Virtue.

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Chapter V. Duties

  §273. We have already stated, that Virtue and Duty differ, as the Habit and the Act; as the internal Disposition, and the outward Manifestation. Acts do not prove the existence of the Dispositions to which they generally correspond. A man may frequently give relief to a person in distress, without being really compassionate; he may habitually perform what he has promised, without real integrity. Such is the case, for instance, when a man gives alms to avoid importunity; or pays his debts to escape disgrace. Acts do not even prove Habits; for an Act may be solitary; like that of her “Who paid a tradesman once to make him stare.”
  But notwithstanding this, Acts of Duty are both the most natural operation of virtuous Dispositions, and the most effectual mode of forming virtuous Habits. Hence, Acts of Duty are requisite, both as the manifestations of Virtue, and as the means of becoming virtuous. The Virtues belong to a deeper part of our nature than the Duties, being the sources out of which our acts of Duty spring. But Duties are more capable of definite description and determination than Virtue not exhibited in Act; and hence Duties are the more especial subject of the Moralist’s discussions. The Virtues are what we are; the Duties are what we do. It is more important what we are, |196| than what we do; but it is more easy to speak of what we do, than of what we are; and moreover, what we are, gives rise to what we do; and what we do, shows what we are.

  §274. Duties, in their general form, coincide with Virtues. Justice is a Virtue; Justice is also a Duty. But they are generally conceived with this difference; that Virtue is more of an unconscious Disposition; Duty implies more of Conscious Thought. Our Virtues exist and operate without our thinking about them; we perform an act of Duty, thinking that we ought to do it. To think an Act a Duty, is to think we ought to do it; it is to think it right; to think it conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Action.
  To think an act right, is to think that there is a Reason for it, by which it is shewn to be conformable to the Supreme Rule. Such Reasons are given, when we shew that Acts are conformable to the Moral Principles which have just been laid down (§269); for these Principles express parts of the Supreme Rule. Hence, Rules of Duty are to be established by a reference to those Principles, as their Reasons.

  §275. Virtue is a Habit of the Desires, Affections, and Will; Duty involves an operation of the Reason, by which the Desires, Affections, and Will, are directed and governed. By the frequent performance of such acts of direction and government, they become habitual, easy, familiar, and finally cease to be objects of consciousness; and thus Duty becomes Virtue.

  §276. We may make a further distinction between Duty and Virtue; indicating that we carry the notion of Virtue farther than that of Duty. We speak of Heroic Virtues, as we have seen (§264), but never of Heroic Duties. Heroic Virtues are Virtues beyond the range of Duty. Duty implies Rules of Duty, but Heroic Virtue soars above Rules.

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  §277. The act of conscious thought by which we recognize our Duties, turns our attention upon ourselves as the objects of the Moral Sentiments of Approbation and Condemnation (§262). The habit of regarding ourselves as worthy of Condemnation when we do wrong, and as consequently liable to Punishment, the consequence of deserved Condemnation, in a world in which the Supreme Law is really administered, is the Sense of Responsibility. This Habit of Thought is not explicitly recognized in our notion of Virtue, but it forms part of our conception of Duty; and is often termed the Sense of Duty.

  §278. A further feature in our Conception of Duty is, that it includes the notion of Actions determined by external Relations and Circumstances, as well as by internal Dispositions. Duties depend upon the social position of men, and other like conditions. There are Duties of Parents and Children, of Husbands and Wives, of Friends, of Neighbours, of Magistrates, of Members of various Bodies and Professions. Men’s Virtues manifest themselves in various Acts of Duty, according to these conditions. The descriptions of Duties must include a reference to those varieties of circumstance and condition. There belong to each man the Duties of his Station. Our Duties, so far as they regard our special Relations to particular persons, may be termed Relative Duties.

  §279. It has already been seen, that there are Obligations which depend upon these same conditions. Every man has his Obligations which belong to his Station. Duties extend beyond Obligations, and direct the Affections, Desires, and Intentions, as well as the Actions. Duties give a Moral Significance to Obligations. Thus I have Obligations as a Father, or as a Son. And these Obligations determine certain good offices which are to take place between the Father and the Son. But my Duties as a Father, or as a Son, must give a Moral Significance to these good |198| offices. They must make them the manifestation of an internal Spring of Action; that is, of an Affection which binds together Father and Son. Such a tie of Affection is the Moral Meaning of the Paternal and Filial Obligations; for such a tie of Affection will constantly give rise to mutual good offices. Again, I have Obligations as a Master or as a Servant; and these determine certain acts of service and of guidance; but my Duties as a Master or as a Servant suppose the relation of the two to be a bond of good-will, producing cordial and considerate service and guidance. Service and guidance, in order to be Duties, must proceed from internal affections, and must thus have a Moral Meaning.
  This Maxim, that there is a Moral Significance in our Social Relations, will often serve to point out our Duties. All acts relative to other men, in order to be moral, must proceed from an internal Spring of Affection; our Obligations, being what we ought to do, are also Duties. But in order that they may be Duties, there must exist an Affection which is the natural Source of such acts; and this Affection is itself a Duty.

  §280. The Affections from which Duties thus proceed, will be, for the most part, those Affections which naturally grow up in the bosoms of men, so far as they are influenced by the common moral judgments of mankind; they will be Virtuous Affections; the Affections which belong to a good man (§232, §265).
  Our Duties are determined by the General Notions of the Virtues on the one hand, and on the other, by the Social Relations, special Circumstances, Conditions, Rights and Obligations of men.
  So far as Duties depend on the Notions of the Virtues, they will admit of a Classification corresponding to that of the Virtues, already given. We shall have Duties of the Affections; Duties respecting Property and other Objects of Desire; Duties connected with |199| Truth; Duties connected with the Bodily Desires; Duties connected with Order, Each of these Classes contains Duties which may be distinguished according to the Social Relations with which they are concerned.

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Chapter VI. Duties of the Affections

  §281. The Supreme Law of Human Action adopts and authorizes the Benevolent Affections, as a part of human nature which binds men together, and depends upon their common humanity. This we have expressed, by laying down the Principle of Benevolence as one of our fundamental Moral Principles (§269). But further; the Supreme Law requires that the Affections thus authorized be vivid, strong, and permanent. This we have expressed, by stating the Principle of Earnestness as one of our fundamental Moral Principles (§270). Now the more general Benevolent Affections which bind men together cannot be vivid and strong, except the special Benevolent Affections, determined by family relations, and other external circumstances, be also vivid and strong. For the Affection of Universal Benevolence is only the expansion of the Love belonging to narrower circles of relation. The Affection of the most General Benevolence is expressed by saying that we love all men as our Brothers. The heart learns to love, by its contact with its nearest objects of love, and by the occasions arising out of its intercourse with neighbouring men. If it do not begin its lesson of Duty in that school, it will never be able to apply it in a more comprehensive sphere. The Natural Affections are the proper moral School of the Heart. |200| The lessons of the benevolent affections are further inculcated by the general moral judgment of mankind; for the universal voice of man commends Gratitude, Family Affection, Compassion, and the like, as Virtues. Hence a good man, in his progress towards the sympathy with man as man, which is implied in the Supreme Rule, will be led to possess the Affections thus universally regarded as Virtues (§265). Moreover, such Affections are requisite to give to the obligations of Family, and the like, their moral significance. They are therefore Duties (§279).
  Hence the special kinds of benevolent Affection, Gratitude, Compassion, Reverence for Superiors, Filial Affection, Parental Affection, Conjugal Affection, Fraternal Affection, are all Duties. They are Affections in which all men sympathize. They are Natural Affections. Those who have them not, are universally condemned as without natural affection. Such men have not found admission into the Moral School of the Heart. They have not made the first steps towards that Universal Benevolence, which is a Fundamental Moral Principle. Such men must be destitute of that warmth of right affections which the Principle of Earnestness requires. Such men cannot give to the Obligations of their Station that Moral significance which Morality requires.
  We will consider this further, with regard to the above kinds of Affection in particular.

  §282. To render advantage for advantage, is often a matter of mutual contract; to render good-will for good-will, is the Duty which gives a Moral Significance to the Obligations of such contracts (§279). Gratitude, that is, Good-will in return for benefits conferred with good-will, is a natural feeling, and is universally acknowledged as a Virtue (§280). He, therefore, who does not feel this, has made little advance in the natural progress of the benevolent affections; |201| he is little influenced by the sympathy of men in favour of Virtue. The ungrateful man disregards one of the most manifest lessons of morality; that in which the common understanding of mankind apprehends mutual good-will, as the proper signification of good offices, given and received. He violates this understanding; and is necessarily looked upon with repugnance and alarm, as one on whom the common ties of Humanity have no hold. He transgresses a Rule which all men can and must sympathize in approving; and which draws men together by the common recognition of the significance of external relations. Thus he is a violator of a Duty.
  Hence, Gratitude is a Duty of the Affections. A man who is devoid of gratitude cannot be a good man. And the Affection of gratitude, which is thus a Duty, will tend to express itself in acts. But no special acts are directed by this Rule of Duty. Gratitude is one Rule for the Affections, but the Rules of Action must be governed by the consideration of all the Rules of the Affections, and all the Moral Principles. The actions which gratitude prompts may be prohibited by other Rules of Duty, derived from the Principle of Benevolence in other bearings, or from the principles of Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, and their combinations.

  §283. Reverence is a Benevolent Affection, which assumes in its object Superiority of Condition to ourselves, combined with Justice and Goodness. Obedience to Law and Authority are Obligations; and these Obligations, like all others, have a Moral Significance (§279), when the Law is just and the Authority rightful. They require in the Inferior Party, a Spirit of Obedience (§272); an Obedience of the Heart. When the person, thus invested with Authority, is also invested with Goodness, the heart joins, and ought to join, with its Obedience, the Love which belongs to Virtue |202| (§91). And thus, this union of the Spirit of Obedience and Love, Reverence for Superiors, is a Duty.
  This Sentiment is fostered by a sympathy with the natural feelings, and with the common moral judgments of mankind, expressed by means of terms implying Virtue and Vice. That Reverence for Superiors is a natural feeling, we see in the willing submission with which, in all ages and countries. Superiors have been treated by their Inferiors; and in the cordial submission rendered to Laws. Man has, among his natural feelings, a Reverence for Something better, wiser, more stable, more permanent than himself. He readily believes in the existence of something of this nature; and has, in his mind, a ready Sentiment of deferential Regard for it. And this feeling is fostered by the general sympathy of men. The common moral judgment of mankind appears in the commendation bestowed upon such dispositions. Disloyalty to the Sovereign, Disobedience to Authority, Sedition, Treason, Rebellion, are, in themselves, looked upon with feelings of Dislike and Indignation. If a person does not participate in these feelings, he is not likely to possess Benevolent Affections at all. If he have no sympathy with these emotions, his Affections cannot be conformable to that Supreme Law, in which all men, as men, sympathize. If Goodness and Justice, joined with Superiority of condition, are not regarded by a man with Reverence, he has not that feeling towards Goodness and Justice by which virtuous men are bound together. A participation in this feeling belongs to a good man. And this feeling is requisite to invest with a moral significance the obligation of Obedience to the governing authorities of the State. For such Obedience must be a Duty, as well as an Obligation, in order that it may have a moral character. But if Obedience be a Duty, Reverence, the Obedience of the heart, which is the internal spring of external obedience, must also |203| be a Duty. And this Reverence, being a part of the natural feelings of a good man, and a necessary condition of the Duties of Obedience, is itself a Duty.
  If it be said, that in the actual constitution of the world, it may happen that Superiority of social condition is not joined with goodness and justice, and that thus this affection has no proper place; we reply, that however this may be the case in particular instances, human government is requisite as a general condition of morality, and especially as a condition of justice and order. The Governors of Society are therefore, so far as this condition requires, the representatives of Justice and Order; and reverence to them, under this aspect, is still a general Duty. A Reverence for Superiors and Governors, as the representatives and cardinal points of justice and order, is requisite, to give a moral significance to the structure of human society. Reverence in inferiors, and Benevolence in superiors, are ties of affection which alone can bind together a community in which there are superiors and inferiors, so as to give them moral relations. And in every community, those who are, by its constitution and nature, the depositaries and sources of law and government, must be looked upon as superiors, and are, in that capacity, proper objects of reverence.

  §284. Filial Affection, the Affection of the Child towards the Parent, is a Duty of the Affections. The Supreme Law of our nature requires us to possess the Operative Principle of Benevolence; but it is unlikely that we shall possess this Principle, if we do not possess those benevolent affections which are the most natural and universal; which are commended to us and urged upon us by the sympathy and common judgment of mankind; and for which there are strong and manifest reasons. Filial Affection is |204| pressed upon us in all these ways. It is a natural and universal affection among men, failing to show itself only under very peculiar circumstances. It is everywhere regarded as a Virtue. A child wanting in love toward his parent, is looked upon with abhorrence, as an unnatural child. And this affection is supported by the strong and evident reasons, of its being agreeable to the Duties of Gratitude and Reverence. For, in the common course of events, children receive from their parents far more kindness, and far greater benefits, than from any other persons. And the sentiment of deferential regard and conscious dependence, which is natural to man; and for which he naturally assumes in his thoughts, as an object, a person wiser and better than himself; is, by the natural condition of man, directed, in the first place, towards the Parents. The child, who learns from them his lessons of what is good and wise; who sees and feels himself to be dependent upon them, and weak and ignorant in comparison of them; sees in them the necessary and proper objects of Reverence. This Sentiment gives a Moral Significance to the Family relation. Such an affection in the child towards the Parent, combined with Parental Affection on the other part, are ties of affection which must exist, in order that the Members of the Family may have moral relations to each other, such as correspond to the obligation of obedience in the child, and support and care in the parent (§279). If this Affection be not a Duty, there is no Duty on the part of the child; for Duty extends to the Springs of Action, and therefore to the Affections. Hence Filial Affection is a necessary portion of the Benevolent Affections which a good man must possess; and being conformable to the Duties of Gratitude and Reverence for Superiors, and essential to the existence of Filial Duty, it is itself a Duty.
  This Affection tends to govern the Actions. Under the influence of Filial Affection, Obedience to Parents tends to become an Obedience of Love. |205| Such an obedience is not merely a submission of our wishes and desires to those of others; but an identification of our wishes and desires with those of the persons whom we love and obey. We wish what they wish. Our intentions anticipate their commands. The pleasure of giving them pleasure, is a more powerful Spring of Action, than any pleasures obtained in opposition to their wishes.

  §285. The Duty of Parental Affection is shown on the like grounds. This Affection is a necessary portion of our benevolent affections. It is natural and universal; and commended by the common judgment of mankind, who loudly condemn an unnatural Parent. If a person do not feel an affection thus urged upon him, the Operative Principle of Benevolence must be entirely wanting in him, or greatly defective. Such an affection is requisite to give a moral significance to the Family relation. The Obligation of Support and Care on the part of the Parents, is necessary for the preservation and wellbeing of the Child. These good offices are generally secured by the impulse of a strong and almost universal affection, supported by the general sympathy of mankind. This Affection gives a moral significance to the Obligations of the parent; and constitutes a tie which is requisite, in order that the parent and child may have a moral relation to each other. If this Affection be not a Duty, there is no Duty on the part of the Parent; for Duty regards the Affections. Thus the Parental Affection is a part of the Benevolent Affections which a good man must necessarily possess; and inasmuch as it is the natural Security for the most essential Obligations of man, and requisite to the existence of Parental Duty, it is a Duty.

  §286. Conjugal Affection is, in a like manner, a Duty. This affection produces the marriage union, or grows out of it, where it is not repressed by |206| adverse feelings. It is supported by the sympathy and approbation of mankind; for all admire and praise a husband and wife, so far as they are bound together by a strong and steady mutual affection. It is this affection which alone gives moral significance to the legal union. Without the supposition of this tie of affection, there can be no moral relation between the two; no Duties, no Moral Claims; for duties and moral claims belong to the affections. Moreover, the married condition involves a Promise of such affection; and therefore the want of the affection, in that condition, implies a breach of promise, as well as a coldness of heart; and violates the Principle of Truth, as well as the Principle of Benevolence. Thus, the Conjugal Affection is a part of the benevolent affections which a married person must possess, in order to be good; and being required by the Principle of Truth, and essential to the existence of Conjugal Duty, it is itself a Duty.

  §287. Such an affection is natural; it readily grows up under the usual circumstances of Family intercourse. Not to have this affection, implies a want of that warmth and tenderness of heart, out of which Family Affections are unfolded by the conditions of the Family. If a man is wanting in this disposition, we conceive that his Benevolence, in its more comprehensive bearings, will be feeble and cold. If he do not love his brother, he is little likely to love a stranger. This affection gives a moral significance to the mutual good offices which a Family requires and gives rise to. These good offices between brethren cannot be Duties, except the affection which prompts them be a Duty. And thus Fraternal Affection is a part of the Benevolent Affections which a good man must possess; and being essential to the existence of Fraternal Duties, is itself a Duty.

  §288. The Love of our Fellow-citizens is a Duty. |207| This is a Fraternal Affection of a wider kind. A Community, a Tribe, a Nation, may be considered as a wider Family. The benevolent affections fasten themselves upon that part of mankind with whom we principally converse, and with whom we share many common influences. A common descent, a common history, a common language, common manners, common laws, draw fellow-citizens together, as, in a narrower way, the habits and common conditions of a family draw together the members of the family. And the mutual services and knowledge of each other, thus produced, tend to generate a mutual affection. This Affection gives a moral significance to all mutual Services; for the mutual Services of Fellow-citizens cannot be Duties, except their mutual Good-will be a Duty. And thus a Love towards his Fellow-citizens is part of the Benevolent Affections which a good man will necessarily possess; and being necessary to the existence of social and civil Duties, it is itself a Duty.

  §289. In the same manner, it is seen that we have Duties of Benevolent Affection towards all persons who are connected with us by any less comprehensive social relations; as to our Servants, our Masters, our Dependents, our Employers, and the like.

  §290. A Duty of the same kind exists towards the whole human race. There is a Duty of Universal Benevolence which we ought to bear to men as men. We have already (§231) stated, that in considering the conditions of the Supreme Law of Human Action, we are led to the Idea of absolute and Universal Benevolence, as a part of that which the Law must include. And we have stated the express Principle which represents this Idea (§269), that we must love man as man. This Principle now comes before us as an expression of a Duty. In taking this view of it, we imply that the Principle is requisite to give a moral significance to our social relations; for this has been noted as a character of Duties (§279). |208| This character will now be seen to belong to the Affection of Universal Benevolence towards man as man. We have Duties to all men: Duties of Justice and Truth are to be performed towards all men. But these Duties cannot be performed as Duties, except they proceed from an internal Spring of Action. They must be the results of Affection. And thus an Affection towards all men, being essential to the existence of all other duties towards them, is itself a Duty.

  §291. As our love of the members of the same family, or of the same community, is unfolded by our being led to see and feel what their nature has in common with ours; so our love of mankind in general is unfolded, by our being led to see and feel that they have a human nature, which is identical with our own. We are by degrees led to look upon them as Members of the same Race; as Children, along with ourselves, of the great human Family. And thus, we love them with an extension of the love which we bestow upon our brothers. We look upon all Mankind as our Brothers.

  §292. But this Duty of the Love of Mankind goes further. We come to feel a love for all mankind, of which we have spoken, by having brought before our thoughts, the common human nature which they share with us. But there is a kind of love which we far more readily feel for those who offer themselves to our notice, as under the infliction of pain or grief. There is (§242) a natural impulse of Compassion, which draws, to such persons, our benevolent regard; and which prompts us to do them good offices by which their distress may be relieved. This Compassion for the Afflicted, merely as afflicted, is a feeling which the whole human race sympathize in, and which is by all commended and loved. It thus naturally exists, among the benevolent affections, which are unfolded in a man’s bosom, as he becomes more |209| and more fully possessed of those Operative Moral Principles which belong to the Supreme Rule of Human Action, and in which man, as man, universally sympathizes. And the Acts which proceed from this affection of Compassion, are part of that course of action, which the Supreme Rule, drawing together all men, in virtue of that which belongs to all, directs and enjoins. Hence, Acts of Compassion are what men ought to do. They are Duties. But these acts cannot be Duties, except the Affection from which they proceed is a Duty. And thus Compassion, which, as we have seen, is a part of the benevolent affections possessed by a good man, being essential to the Duties of Charity, is itself a Duty.
  And thus, we have established as Duties, the Affections of Gratitude, Reverence for Superiors, Filial, Parental, Conjugal, and Fraternal Affection, the Love of our Fellow-citizens, and the Love of Man as Man, and Compassion.

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Chapter VII. Of the Moral Culture of the Affections as a Duty

  §293. It has been shown that Gratitude to Benefactors, Reverence to Superiors, Compassion to the Afflicted, are Duties; as also are Filial, Parental, Conjugal, and Fraternal Affection, the Love of our Fellow-citizens, and the Universal Benevolence which embraces all men as men. These Affections we ought to possess. Such Affections therefore we ought to acquire. We ought to foster, cherish, cultivate them. We ought to establish these Affections in our Minds; to direct our Affections by these Forms |210| of Duty. We ought to form our character in such a way that these Benevolent Affections shall belong to it.
  To this doctrine, it may be objected, that we have not the power of doing what we are thus enjoined to do. It may be said, that we have not the power of generating or directing our Affections, and of forming our own character. It may be urged, that we cannot love a particular person, or love under particular circumstances, and with a particular kind of love, merely because we will to do so. Love, it may be said, cannot be thus compelled by command. Character cannot be thus formed by Rule.
  But we reply, that the objection, thus stated, involves much too large an assertion. It is very far from being true, that we have no power over our own affections or our own character. The universal voice of mankind recognizes the existence of such a power, by the condemnation which it awards to the want of the affections above mentioned. If a child do not love his parent, a father or a mother their child, a brother his brother; all men join in condemning the person thus destitute of natural affection. He offends against the common nature of man. And in like manner, all men look with repugnance and disapprobation upon the ungrateful or pitiless man. All men blame him who is irreverent towards a just and good Master. These, and the like moral judgments of mankind, imply that a man’s affections are, in some way, his own act. The affections are thus declared to be part of that internal action for which he is responsible. He is a proper subject of praise or blame for what he feels; and so far, his feeling is his doing.

  §294. And we can perceive that we have, in various ways, power over our feelings. Even immediately, by the power which we possess of directing our train of thoughts, we can foster or repress an affection. |211| We can call before our minds, and dwell upon, those features of character and situation, which tend to impress on our minds one Sentiment or another. We can, for instance, think on all that our parents have done and suffered for us, and can thus move our hearts to a love of them. And above all, the recollection that affections are natural and right, will fix and promote them. We shall constantly approximate to those benevolent affections, which we constantly regard as recommended by the universal sympathy of mankind, and as conformable to the supreme law of our being. While, on the other hand, coldness and hardness of heart,—still more, malevolence or perversely directed affection,—perpetually dwelt upon in our thoughts, as feelings which estrange us from our kind, make us a natural object of their abhorrence, and violate the very essence of our nature,—will be, by this means, repressed and extinguished.

  §295. The course of thought by which the virtuous affections are promoted, may sometimes be traced, in the progress of special Conceptions, and in the significance of the terms by which they are denoted. Thus the clear apprehension of a common internal nature in all men, which suggests the use of the term Humanity to designate this common nature, leads, further, to the benevolent affection towards man as man; which affection is also termed Humanity. Thus, the apprehension of objective Humanity tends to promote subjective Humanity (§235). We shall hereafter consider the progress by which some Conceptions of this kind have arrived at clearness and comprehensiveness of signification. We shall thus be led to see some of the steps by which the affections are cultivated.

  §296. Moreover, the Benevolent Affections impel us to endeavour to do good to the objects of them. We wish to promote the wellbeing of those whom we love. This their wellbeing, thus becomes the object |212| of our desires and intentions. But the conception of the Wellbeing of other persons, which we thus place before us as our object, may be variously modified and transformed by the operations of our thoughts. We may conceive it as merely their Pleasure, or as their Interest, or as their Happiness. And as some of these are truer and more moral views of Wellbeing than others; we may, by the exercise of our Faculties, advance from those which are false and wrong, to those which are true and right. This possession of true conceptions of the ends to which our benevolent affections must direct us, is a part of our character: and this, depending upon our own course of thought, is in a great measure in our own power.

  §297. And besides this direct operation of thought upon the affections, there are many circumstances and conditions which have an influence in the formation of our character; and which, being in our power, put the formation of our character also in our power. As we have already said, Acts of Duty generate Virtues: and our acts depend upon our will. We can, by directing our Acts, form our Habits; and Habits of external action extend their influence to the internal feelings. Each link of this chain may be in some degree loose; and yet the whole will exert a constant pressure upon the character, drawing it towards the line of Duty. The Acts of Duty may be imperfectly done; the good Habits may be imperfectly formed; the internal Feelings may imperfectly correspond to the Habits; but yet, by the steady performance of Acts of Duty, the cultivation of a virtuous character is perpetually promoted.

  §298. It may be objected, that when we have done all that is possible in the formation of our character, still there will remain in it much of good and evil, the result of our original native qualities which we cannot alter, and of external circumstances over which we have no control; and thus, that our character |213| and disposition is not in our own power. To this we reply, that, as we have before said, our character and disposition is in our own power, so far as to be a subject of praise or blame. For if praise and blame are not applied to character and disposition, to what can they be applied? We are endeavouring to define those dispositions which are the proper objects of approbation. An opponent, whose objections imply that nothing is a proper object of approbation or disapprobation, has no common ground with us; and with him, therefore, it is useless to reason. But further; when it is said that there will remain in our character much that is good and evil, the result of its native elements, even when we have done all that is possible to repress the evil, and promote the good; we reply, that we never can be said to have done all that is possible, in the improvement of our character. So long as life continues, thoughts of Duty, and acts of Duty, by which our internal being may be improved, are possible: and so long, therefore, we are responsible for not labouring to remove the evil which remains, and to forward the good.

  §299. We thus see, that as there are certain Affections which are Duties, so is it in our power to foster and cherish those affections; to form and improve our character, so that those dispositions shall make a part of it; and to continue this course of self-improvement to the end of our lives. This course may be termed our Self-cultivation, or Moral Culture; and the effect which it produces upon our character is our Moral Progress. This Progress is carried on, as we have seen, by giving earnestness and vividness to our Moral Affections, generality and clearness to the conceptions by which such affections are regulated, steadiness to our habits of Moral Action. It also requires us to give consistency to our Rules of Duty; and generally, to give consistency, comprehensiveness, |214| and completeness, to the whole of our intellectual and moral being.

  §300. Our Moral Culture and Moral Progress can never be terminated in our lifetime: for we can never reach a condition in which there is no possibility of giving more earnestness and vividness to our moral affections, more generality and clearness to our conceptions of moral objects, more steadiness to our moral habits. The formation of a human character is never ended. There will always be some part of it which does not fully conform to Virtue. It will always be possible to go further in these respects. The Supreme Law of our Being, by which we are directed to Duty and Virtue, is not satisfied, except the whole of our Being conform to it. Hence this Law demands a perpetual Moral Progress; and such a perpetual Moral Progress is necessary, in consequence of other changes also. New persons, new objects, are constantly presented to us: new thoughts, new views of ends and means, constantly arise in the mind. And as these arise, the feelings which they occasion, ought constantly to be conformed to the Supreme Law. The Affections must constantly expand and modify themselves, according to these developments of the mind, so as to remain in harmony with the Moral Ideas. The current of thought is constantly flowing, and constantly receiving accessions from fresh rills, put in motion by the course of the outer world. It thus becomes constantly wider and deeper through life, except when it is narrowed and constrained by external obstacles. The whole of this current of thought must be tinged by the virtuous affections; and there must, therefore, be a constantly flowing source of moral goodness to preserve the moral colour of the stream. As there is, in the head, a fountain of perpetual internal change; there must be, in the heart, a fountain which shall give to every change a character of good.

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  §301. Thus there is a Duty of Moral Self-culture, which can never be interrupted nor terminated. With reference to that part of Morality of which we are now speaking, this is the Duty of the Culture of the Affections. It is our duty constantly to cultivate the Affections which have been described as Duties; Gratitude; Compassion; Reverence; Family Love; the Love of our Fellow-countrymen; the Love of our Fellow-men. This Culture of the benevolent affections is a Duty which never stops nor ends.

  §302. Further; the Duty of thus cultivating these Affections includes the Duty of possessing such affections; and may often, in our consideration, take the place of the Duties which we have mentioned. The Duty of cultivating Gratitude and Compassion includes the Duty of feeling Gratitude and Compassion. That we are to cultivate such Affections, is a reason for feeling them, which is added to the other reasons, but which includes them all. We are to feel Gratitude and Compassion, because it is right: we are to cultivate them, because it is right to feel them; but we cultivate them by feeling them. The Duty of Self-culture enjoins upon us the same feelings which the Duty of Gratitude and the Duty of Compassion enjoined before.

  §303. The constant and interminable moral culture of the affections which is thus a Duty, and includes the other Duties of the Affections, may suffer interruption and reverse. The progress at which such culture aims, is thwarted by every act which is morally wrong. The moral progress of our affections is interrupted by every malicious act, by every feeling of malice, by the want of love on occasions when the circumstances and relations of our position call for it. Our moral progress is reversed when such malice, or such coldness of heart, becomes habitual. The transgression of moral precepts, whether they regard external acts, or internal springs of action, is a |216| suspension, and may be a termination, of our moral progress. And this effect of transgression, as being a contradiction of our moral culture, adds greatly to the importance of its moral aspect.

  §304. We may further add, that in this aspect of transgressions of Duty, that they interrupt or undo our moral progress, we have the aspect of them which most determines their moral weight; so that those transgressions are considered most grave, which most interrupt our moral progress. As the interruption or inversion of this progress becomes more decided, the transgression becomes more grievous. This subject will be pursued afterwards.
  We may likewise remark, as a point which will be hereafter pursued, that Moral Progress, the Supreme Law of our nature, must necessarily be the way to Happiness, the Supreme Object of our nature.

  §305. The Duty of Moral Culture adds to other Duties. It may perhaps appear to some that there is nothing gained in Morality by the view just presented; since the Duty of Moral Culture is identical with other Duties already spoken of. But this is not so. By presenting to our minds the Conception of Moral Culture, our Duties often assume a different aspect from that which they have when considered separately; and we are able to establish Rules of Action, of a wider and completer kind than those to which the contemplation of more partial Duties would lead. For instance, the Duty of Compassion assumes a new and larger aspect, when we consider every compassionate act and compassionate feeling to be not only a relative Duty towards the distressed object, but a means of softening and improving our own heart: and this aspect of the Duty may be a better guide for our actions and feelings than any narrower view would be. And thus our Duties, when regarded as parts of our Moral Progress, may be looked upon as higher objects of moral desire, and higher aims, than more special objects and more partial aims could be.

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  §306. Although Moral Culture can never reach its termination, it may be conceived as a Progress towards an Ideal Object by which its tendency is marked. Our Moral Progress may be conceived as a constant tendency towards an Ideal Point of complete Moral Perfection;—the same Ideal Center of Morality of which we have already spoken (§231). The Elements of this ideal Moral Perfection are, as we have already said, the Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. To these we are constantly to tend. We are to establish them in our minds as Principles: that is (§268) as Operative Principles—the Operative Principles of our Being. To do this, we may look upon as the Highest Object of our actions; as the Greatest Good of which our moral nature is capable.
  For the present, we are considering only the Moral Culture of the Affections; which requires us to make Benevolence an Operative Principle of our Being, so that it may manifest itself in all its modifications, according to our condition and relations to other men. But what has been said of the Duty of Moral Culture, and of its bearing upon more Special Duties, and upon violations of Duty, applies equally to the other classes of Duties, as well as to those of the Affections. We now proceed to those other classes.

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Chapter VIII. Duties Respecting Property and Other Objects of Desires

  §307. The Rules of Duty with regard to external things, as objects of possession, are consequences of the Principle of Justice, that Each man is to have |218| his own; and of the Principle of Moral Ends, that Things are to be sought only as means to moral ends.
  The Rule that each man is to have his own, is a Rule which regulates all external acts relative to Property. It thus prescribes external Duties. But these external Duties imply also an internal Duty, directing the Desires and Affections. We must desire that each man should have his own, and must desire things for ourselves, only so far as they are assigned to us by this rule. And this Duty enjoins a perfect Fairness and Evenness in our views of external possession; an Equality in our estimate of our own claims with those of other persons; and an absence of any vehemence of Desire which might disturb this equality. The Duty of a Spirit of Justice excludes all Cupidity or eagerness in our desires of wealth; all Covetousness, or wish to possess what is another’s; all Partiality, or disposition to deviate from equal Rule in judging between ourselves and others. The Rule of action is. Let each man have his own; but the Rule of desire is. Let no man seek his own, except so far as the former Rule directs him to do so. Justice gives to each man his own: but each ought to cling to his own, not from the love of riches, but from the love of Justice. It is the love of equal and steady laws, not of possessions, which makes a good man appropriate what is his. This rule does not require us to abstain from the usual transactions respecting property:—buying and selling, getting and spending; for it is by being employed in such transactions, that property is an instrument of human action,—the means by which the characters and dispositions of men manifest themselves. A rich man may employ many men in his service by means of his wealth; nor does morality forbid this; but then, they must be employed for moral purposes.

  §308. Justice, as we have said, directs us to |219| desire external things only in so far as an equal and steady Rule assigns them to us as our own. But further: even when they are our own, our desires must not turn to external things, as ultimate and independent objects. We must not seek them for their own sake, but as Means to moral Ends. We must not desire gold and lands, as things in themselves desirable; but as things which will enable us to do good. We are not forbidden by morality to use our possessions in upholding and carrying on the usual relations of society; as those of Employer and Workman, Master and Servant; for the duties of men suppose the existence and fixity of these relations; but we must consider these relations, also, as means of our duty; and must maintain and direct them, only in such a manner as that they are such means of duty. We must in all things regulate our desire of wealth and its results by the Spirit of Moral Purpose.
  Thus we are directed by Morality to regard Property only as a mean of doing good. In the eyes of the Moralist no possessions are absolute and unconditional property; the possessor holds them only in trust for moral and benevolent purposes. He is a Trustee (§152) for the general benefit of mankind; and the Condition of the Trust is, not merely that he shall give something, in cases where benevolence directs; but that he should employ the whole so as to promote moral ends. Not only in giving, but in buying goods, paying wages, saving or spending, he is bound to act morally. When the proprietor asks. Have I not a Right to do what I will with my own? the Moralist replies, No; you have not a moral Right to do what is wrong with your own.
  The same may be said of the other Desires. A good man may seek Rank, or eminent station in the state, and may desire the Power which Rank and Station give. But then, he will seek these his |220| Objects only in entire fairness of act and spirit; and he will desire them only as means of doing good.

  §309. Thus, the Duties of the Desires are determined by the Principle of Justice, and the Principle of Moral Purpose. But these Principles, in order to have their proper place in the character, must become complete Operative Principles. The Spirit of Justice, and the Spirit of Moral Purpose must pervade the whole of the good man’s being, must regulate all his thoughts and wishes. This is a condition of ideal moral perfection, towards which we may tend, but to which we can never fully attain. Yet, that we have it in our power to make some advance in this direction, is plain. We have it in our power to become in some degree just and morally minded; for if this were not so, we should deserve no condemnation for being unjust and sordid minded. Since, then, we can make progress towards the possession of these Principles of Justice and Moral Purpose, in which a large portion of our Duty is contained, our Duty requires us to make such Progress. There is, in these respects, as in the case of the Affections,a Duty of Moral Progress and of Moral Culture.

  §310. The conception of our Moral Culture being placed before us, as an object of our desires and endeavours, our Duties with regard to Wealth, and other external things, assume a new aspect, by which light may often be thrown upon the course of our Duty. We are to use Wealth only as a means of our Moral Culture and Moral Progress. Hence, though, as we have said, if we are rich, we may use Wealth in most of its ordinary applications, as in maintaining many servants, or in employing many workmen; we must take care that there is not, in our affections to such dependents, or in the occupation thus given to our thoughts, or in the results which we intend or expect, anything which prevents our moral progress. And since benevolence to our |221| dependents is a part of moral excellence, we must give to our relation to them such a character as promotes their welfare.

  §311. As the rich man is bound in Duty to seek and to use wealth for moral ends only, and to make it a means of his moral culture; so the poor man, who has to labour in order to provide himself with the necessaries and comforts of life, is also bound to abstain from all labours that are immoral; and to combine, with a care for his bodily wants, a care also for his moral progress. A man may not, because he is poor, engage himself in the service of vice; or sell, for his own gain, what is committed to him as a trust. And however large a portion of his time and thought, a man’s necessary labours may demand; he must always recollect that he has a mind, which is to be instructed and morally cultivated, as well as a body to be supported. The poorest, as well as the richest man, is a moral agent; and does not conform to the law of his being, except he make all other ends subservient to moral ends. He who seeks a mere livelihood, must still seek to make acting rightly, and doing good, the ends of his living. He who has the largest superfluity cannot live for a higher purpose, and may not live for a lower.

  §312. The power which wealth bestows upon its possessor, and any other power or influence over his fellow-man, which any one may possess, must be used for their welfare, in obedience to the Principle of Benevolence, as we have already said. The welfare of men may be contemplated under various aspects; as Interest, Happiness, and the like. But our contemplation of the good of other men cannot be complete, except we include in it that which we consider as the highest good for ourselves; namely, Moral Progress. Our Benevolence, therefore, will not be consistent with our moral views, except we seek to |222| promote the Moral Culture of those over whom our power extends.
  The Moral Culture and progress of Man, considered as an object which we may endeavour to promote, includes many comprehensive and complex conceptions; the Liberty, the Education, the Civilization of Man, may all be considered as elements of their moral culture, which we may make our objects in our efforts for their welfare; and above all, Religion may be looked upon as including the most important part of such culture. In order to follow, into further detail, the Duty of the Moral Culture of men, we must unfold into particulars and consequences these Conceptions of Liberty, Education, Civilization, Religion. This it will hereafter be our business, in some measure, to do. In the mean time, we proceed to another class of Duties.

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Chapter IX. Duties Connected with Truth

  §313. The Duties connected with Truth, are those which result from the Principle of Truth already stated (§269); that we must conform to the universal understanding among men which the use of language implies. This Principle is expressed more briefly by saying, that we must not Lie; for a Lie is a violation of the universal understanding of which we speak. This Rule of Duty is in agreement with the universal moral sympathy of mankind, which condemns the Liar as hateful and despicable. That a Lie is a violation of the general understanding of mankind, is the reason why the Rule, Lie not, is universally accepted by mankind as an absolute Rule, even when a |223| Lie infringes no positive Rights. The other absolute Rules, Kill not. Steal not, and the like, are requisite for the establishment of Rights of the Person, of Property, and so on. A Lie violates no Right, except the Right of knowing the truth; which is not a jural Right, though it may be a moral claim. But the Rule is acknowledged by men as absolute; because a Contract to speak the Truth is implied in the use of Language; and a Right to know the Truth is conveyed, by every speaker, to the person to whom he addresses his assertions.
  Accordingly, when the common understanding among men is not violated, a declaration is not a lie, although in the common meaning of the term it would be false; as when a man says at the end of a letter, “I am your obedient Servant,” though the letter itself may contain a refusal to obey or to serve the correspondent.

  §314. Not only Lying, but every mode of conveying a false belief, is prohibited by the Principle of Truth. This especially applies when we convey a belief of our own intention in a matter affecting him whom we address; that is, when we make a Promise. We are bound by the Duty of Truth to promise only what we intend to perform. All Deceit, Fraud, Duplicity, Imposition is excluded by the Duty of Truth.
  But if I have promised what I intended to perform, and afterwards change my intention, does it cease to be my Duty to perform my Promise? It is plain that it does not. To break my Promise is to break the understanding between the Promisee and me. The understanding established between us was, not a doubtful understanding; namely, that, if I did not change my mind, I would do thus and thus; but an absolute one, that I would do thus. If a Promise were capable of arbitrary revocation by the Promiser, it would establish no common understanding, and could be of no use in enabling the Promisee to regulate his |224| actions. At the time I make the Promise, I have the power of determining my future actions, by retaining my present intention. The engagement I make is, that I will retain it; and this the Promisee must be able to reckon upon, in order that the Promise may mean anything. It is therefore a universal Duty to perform Promises.

  §315. The Duty of performing Promises is an extension of the Obligation of performing Contracts. A Contract is a Promise, sanctioned by the formalities which the law prescribes, as necessary to make it valid. It is a Duty to perform Contracts, as well as a legal Obligation; but the Duty is not limited by the formalities which limit the legal Obligation. The legal Obligation depends upon the external form, as well as the intention; but the Duty depends upon the intention and mutual understanding alone; and therefore the Duty of performing Promises must exist, wherever the mutual understanding of the Promiser and Promisee existed.
  It follows from this, also, that Promises are to be performed in the Sense in which they were made and received, by the mutual understanding of the two parties, at the time.

  §316. It is a Duty to avoid all Falsehood, Deceit, Fraud, Duplicity, Imposition. Hence it is a Duty to have the internal spring of action which impels us to avoid such acts. It is a Duty to hate Lying, Deceit, Fraud, Duplicity: to have no wish to deceive or impose upon any one: to profess and assume no intentions different from those which we really entertain. Singleness of Heart, Simplicity of Character, Openness, Frankness, are the virtues which ought to give rise to our words and actions. We ought to have in us the Operative Principle, or Spirit, of Truth.

  §317. And as in the case of the other Principles, because we ought to have this Principle in operation within us, we ought to cultivate and encourage it in |225| our hearts. Our Moral Culture in this respect also is a Duty.
  The Spirit of Truth is to be cultivated by Acts of Truthfulness. That we have it in our power to be truthful, is evident. The difficulty and need of exertion, indeed, are on the other side. To say that which we know not to be true; to assume the appearance of that which we are not; requires effort, invention, and contrivance. Truth is the first thing that comes to our lips; and we must do some violence to ourselves, to substitute anything else for it. In this respect, then, in order to cultivate a Spirit of Truth in ourselves, we have only to obey our natural impulses, and to say what we think and feel. But yet there are many desires, purposes, and motives, which are constantly impelling men to falsehood and deceit. Men use language as a means to ends;—not always, nor principally, as the simple declaration of what they think and feel; but with a view to the effect which it will produce upon the person addressed. And as a falsification or distortion of the real state of the case, often seems likely to answer their purpose, better than a true representation, the natural impulses of Truth are checked and overpowered by other Springs of Action. Now the Moral Culture of the Principle of Truth in us, requires that all such working of our desires should be suppressed. To lie, to deceive, for any purpose whatever, is utterly inconsistent with any care for our moral progress.
  It is impossible that the Operative Principle of Truth should acquire that place in our character which morality requires, if we allow it to be thrust aside by the desire of pleasure, or gain, or power, or the like. The only way in which we can advance towards the moral standard, at which it is our Duty constantly to aim, is by a steady and solemn determination, under no circumstances, to be guilty of falsehood. A man earnestly aiming at his own moral |226| progress, will be true in his assertion, true to his promises, true to his implied engagements, true in what he says, true in what he does. No prospect of any object of desire, or of any advantage, can sway him to any deceit or fraud; for objects of desire have no necessary tendency to further his purpose; whereas deceit and fraud are in direct contradiction to it.

  §318. We have spoken of a steady and solemn determination not to be guilty of falsehood, as means of moral culture. This expression supposes, that which our consciousness as moral beings assures us of, that we have the power of making such determinations of our future course of action. We can determine and resolve upon a future act or course of actions. We must do this, in order that we may promise, and fulfil our promise. But we may combine a greater than ordinary degree of earnestness and self-watchfulness with this determination; a more than ordinary degree of distinctness and gravity with the promise, or declaration in which we express the determination. We may solemnly resolve, and solemnly promise. If we do this, we connect the fulfilment of our resolution and promise more thoroughly with the progress of our moral culture. We entwine the two, so that the one cannot be broken, without great damage to the other. We embark a larger portion than usual of the moral treasure of our lives in one bottom, and risk a more ruinous wreck. If we break a solemn resolution, a solemn promise, what hope can we have of any steadiness or vigour in our future moral course? How can we retain the moral hopes and aspirations which are to carry us forwards? The growth of the Principle of Truth is arrested; the Principle itself seems to be eradicated. The interruption and reverse in our moral progress is marked and glaring, and hence (§304) the offense is grievous. The violation of a solemn promise is a moral offense of the highest kind.
  There may be some cases in which there may be |227| at first a doubt what course this Rule of the Duty of Truth directs us to take; but these cases we shall consider, when we have taken a view of the remaining Classes of Duties.

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Chapter X. Duties Connected with Purity

  §319. The Duties connected with Purity, are those which result from the Principle of Purity; that the Lower Parts of our Nature are to be governed by and subservient to the Higher Parts. Thus the Appetites and Desires, which find their gratification in meat and drink, with the accompaniments of a decent table, are to be indulged as subservient to the support of life, strength, and cheerfulness, and the cultivation of the social affections; the indulgence is to be limited by these purposes, and these purposes by moral rules. In like manner, other desires, mingled of bodily and mental elements, are to be indulged only in subservience to the affections and hopes which belong to them; and the affections and hopes are to be regulated by conditions which morality and law prescribe. In the gradation of the parts of human nature, we place bodily appetite, and all merely selfish desires, below affection; but mere blind affection we place below the moral affection which approves of goodness. The affections of the heart in some measure refine the desires of the body; but the affections of the heart may be greatly impure, if they are not regulated by the law of the heart, which morality teaches. Affection alone does not make actions moral, or remove that stain of impurity which they derive from bodily appetite. The nature of man is purified, by having a |228| moral character given to it. This moral character purifies the affections; and the affections, thus purified, communicate their purity to the desires which are subservient to them. And thus. Morality does not require us to extinguish the desires, or to reject the pleasures arising from their gratification. Still, she directs us not to dwell on this gratification in our thoughts, as an object; but to accept from it that influence, which it can exercise in giving energy to our affections, without being itself a direct object of contemplation. The bodily desires are made the instruments and evidences of the affections; and are thus absorbed into the affections, and made conformable to the Principle of Purity.

  §320. The distinction of the Lower and Higher Parts of our Nature, by means of which we express the Principle of Purity, has been rejected by some moralists, and has been termed Declamation. Such moralists contend that pleasure is universally and necessarily the object of human action; and that human pleasures do not differ in kind, but only in intensity and duration: so that, according to these teachers, there is no difference of superior and inferior, between the pleasures of appetite, the pleasures of affection, and the pleasure of doing good. Hence, say they, the only difference in the character of actions, is their being better or worse means of obtaining pleasure. But the universal reason of man assents to the opposite doctrine, delivered by Butler: who maintains that our principles of action do not differ in degree merely, but in kind also; some being, by the constitution of human nature, superior to others, and their natural governors. Thus, as he teaches, the Rule of our nature is, that Prudence shall control Appetite, and that the Moral Sentiments shall control the Affections. If we take the opposite view, we obliterate the difference between man and brute beasts. We make no distinction between the blame which we |229| bestow upon Error, and upon Crime; for on this supposition, Crime is only miscalculation; and merely means an erroneous way of seeking pleasure. If we follow this view, we make a bad heart the same thing as a bad head. According to this doctrine, we can have no Supreme Rule of Action; for if pleasure be the highest object of action, it is also the lowest. With such opinions, we deprive the words right and wrong of their common meaning; for to men in general, they do not mean right and wrong roads to enjoyment, which this view makes them mean.

  §321. The Duties of Purity are those which follow from such an operation of the Principle. They prohibit indulgence in the pleasures of the Table for the sake of bodily gratification alone; though they allow our meals to be so conducted, that they may not only satisfy the bodily wants of nature, but also minister to the cheerful and social flow of spirits and thought, which is a condition favourable to moral action. They prohibit, in like manner, the gratification of other bodily appetites when sought for their own sake; though they allow such gratification under the sanction of the conjugal tie, and with the hope of that extension of family affections, and family duties, which the birth of children brings.

  §322. As it is our Duty to regulate our actions by these Rules it is our Duty also to acquire and possess an inward Principle, from which such a course of action will spring. It is our Duty to acquire and possess within us an Operative Principle, or Spirit, of Purity, which may of itself, and without the recollection of express Rules, direct us from all that is impure. A good man has dispositions, and habits of mind, which not only restrain him from acts of intemperance and unchastity, but repress and banish intemperate and unchaste desires and wishes.
  And though it may sometimes be difficult for a man to arrive at this state of Purity of Heart and Mind; it |230| is always the Duty of every man to aim at it. A moral Self-culture in such Purity, is a constant and universal Duty, of which the obligation can never relax nor terminate. A Moral Progress in this, as in other respects, must be the constant aim of a good man.

  §323. Offenses, against the Duties of which we are now speaking, more distinctly than in other Classes of Duties, produce their effect, of impeding our Moral Progress, and turning our course backwards. The intemperate and unchaste person becomes, by every vicious act and every vicious purpose, plainly more and more prone to Vice. These Vices affect his habits of mind in a very direct manner. The Glutton and the Epicure, eager and curious respecting the pleasures of the palate, can hardly give due weight in their thoughts to higher objects; and they often stimulate and overtask the bodily functions, till the mind is oppressed, impeded, or arrested in its intellectual and moral operations. In the man who indulges a love of intoxicating liquors, this takes place more evidently and more rapidly. He speedily reduces himself to a condition in which neither reason nor moral restraint has its due power. The indulgence of other sensual appetites stimulates the bodily desires and inflames the imagination. Lust, obeyed as mere Lust, tends to fill the mind with obscene thoughts, and to make the intellect and the fancy mere ministers of Appetite. By such courses, the heart and affections are corrupted: the imagination is polluted: the character is depraved. Any steps in such a course are the opposite of a moral progress: they are steps in a course of moral degradation, of which the end is utter depravity, filthiness, and profligacy; in short, moral ruin. Transgressions of the Rules of Duty, of the kind now referred to, especially produce their effect, as steps of a course. The act of transgression leaves a more distinct trace in the habits, than in the case of mere mental desires. The |231| appetites become more powerful by being gratified. Their craving becomes, by indulgence, more and more importunate and irresistible. The body will not let the mind turn away from the accustomed path of sensuality. Sensual acts leave a stain of material filth upon the mind; of which it takes long and earnest efforts to remove the trace, so that it shall not afterwards give a sensual tendency to the Will. And thus, every sensual act contributes to the moral degradation of which we have spoken; and is grossly at variance with the Duty of our own Moral Culture.

  §324. It is very important to dwell upon this Duty of Moral Self-culture, in reference to offenses of Impurity; for these offenses are not mere extensions of the notion of jural wrongs, as some moral offenses are. Jurally speaking, each person may be said to have a Right over his own body, provided ho injure no other person; and two persons may appear to have a Right to agree to unite in acts of sensuality, when no Right of a husband or a father is violated. Accordingly, Fornication, and Concubinage, have not been generally prohibited by the Laws of Ancient and Modern Countries. But yet such practices have almost always been condemned as impure and degraded. And the consideration of the Duty of Moral Self-culture, which we have insisted on, shows the propriety of this condemnation. No person can use his body for purposes of mere Lust, without utterly abandoning all aim at his Moral Progress, and all hope of it. He who thus gives himself up to the government of the Lower parts of his nature, neglects and despises the Higher. So far as he does this, he renounces his moral nature, reduces himself to the level of brute beasts, and goes on resolutely and recklessly to moral ruin. It is true, that men may continue to perform some Duties, and to aim at some Virtues, while they still do not refrain from the Vice of Impurity. But it is plain, that a man’s desire of |232| Moral Progress must be so feeble and inconsistent as not to deserve the name, if he contentedly and intentionally pursues a course which manifestly leads to the pollution and degradation of one main element of a moral character.

  §325. The different constitution of the heart and mind in the two sexes, as well as the difference in corporeal conditions, lead to some special considerations respecting their Duties. The Desires and Affections of both sexes lead to the Conjugal Union: but according to the natural feelings of most persons, and the practice of most communities, the man proposes and urges the union, before it takes place; the woman yields and consents. The man is impelled by a love which he proclaims to the object of it; and he asks for a return in which he has the character of a conqueror. The woman is led to consent, not only by affection, but by the hope of a life filled with those family affections, and family enjoyments, for which, as her heart whispers to her, she was made. When these natural propensities operate under due moral restraint, they lead to the marriage union. But moral restraints may be disregarded in some cases; and in other cases may be so feeble, that the solicitation on one side overcomes the resistance on the other; and the woman is seduced to a bodily union without marriage. This is an act of sensuality; and thus, as we have already said, an offense against morality. And in consequence of the character and conditions of the two sexes, of which we have just spoken, after such an act, the woman continues to yield, but the man is no longer ready to bind himself to her by the marriage tie. She is betrayed, as well as seduced. In so far as the Seducer breaks the engagements which he has expressly or implicitly made, he violates the Duty of Good Faith, as well as the Duty of Chastity. But what we have here to observe is, that by the act of unchastity, he |233| not only renounces the Duty of Moral Culture, so far as he himself is concerned; but that he is a Violator of the Duty of Benevolence, as the author of her moral degradation; perhaps of her utter moral ruin. For, as we have already said, the Vice of Sensuality, once admitted, has an especial, and almost irresistible tendency, to extend itself over the whole character. The woman who has yielded to blind affection, afterwards, when her affections are chilled, and her character hardened, by the disappointment and treachery she has experienced, and retaining the trace of sensual desire which unchastity produces, may, as we know she often does, become a Wanton; may give herself up to lasciviousness; may sink from one degree of impurity to another, till she end in a state of utter moral ruin. There are said to be men who intentionally, and without remorse, practise the Seduction of women. It cannot but seem very strange, to a person of the ordinary kind of affections, that a human being should employ his skill and exertions in urging a woman, whom he pretends to love and admire, down this moral descent. Such conduct appears to involve a want of common humanity; for the moral degradation of the woman deprives her of almost all that is admirable and estimable, even in the eyes of her seducer himself; and would be mourned by him as the bitterest evil, and resented as the most grievous wrong, if it were inflicted upon any one for whom he has a family affection. To say nothing of the duty of purity, a man who is not restrained by his Humanity from such a course of action, must look upon the moral destruction of women with the kind of indifference with which the sportsman looks upon the death and wounds of beasts and birds which he pursues. It is difficult to conceive a more monstrous degree of inhumanity than is implied in such a view of human beings. The cruelty is greater than if the pursuer were, in willful levity, to inflict bodily |234| pain and wounds: for this moral damage is, and is commonly held to be, a greater calamity than any bodily suffering. The moral ruin of a woman makes her an object of abhorrence to those who are bound to her by ties of family love; and produces in her and in them extreme bitterness of heart, and a gloom approaching to the blackness of despair.

  §326. The tendency of sensual indulgence to inflame the desires, defile the imagination, and corrupt the heart, makes the Duty of Purity especially important in the season of youth. Habits of indulgence, begun in that season, can hardly fail to give their impress to the character, throughout life. The common belief that this is so, appears in the contempt and condemnation which the loss of virginity in unmarried women, has in all ages and countries incurred. In its effects upon the moral culture of the character, unchastity is as destructive in men as in women. No young man who has any regard for his moral progress, will make his body the instrument of lust. And as connected with the government of his bodily desires, both in the way of cause and of consequence, he will guard the purity of his mind. He will avoid admitting into his own thoughts, or suggesting to others, lascivious images. He will avoid placing himself in circumstances of temptation or opportunity. He will watch the affections which may arise in his heart towards particular persons, in order to suppress them; well aware how vehement may become the combined urgency of unlawful affection, and sensual desire; and in what a career of vice they plunge those whom they overmaster.

  §327. The prospect of Marriage a preservative. The direction of the Affections and Desires, here referred to, towards their proper object. Marriage, is the best mode of avoiding the degradation of character which is produced by their improper operation. Virtuous love, as it has often been said, is the best preservative against impure acts and |235| thoughts. The Love which looks forwards to the conjugal union, includes a reverence for the conjugal condition, and all its circumstances. Such a love produces in the mind a kind of moral illumination, which shows the lover how foul a thing mere lust is; and makes him see, as a self-evident truth, that affection is requisite to purify desire, and virtue necessary to purify affection.
  Other Duties arising out of the conjugal union depend upon the Principle of Order, and must be considered in reference to that Principle.

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Chapter XI. Duties of Order

  §328. The Principle of Order is, that we must obey positive Laws as the necessary conditions of morality (§269). This Principle leads to various Duties of Obedience towards persons connected with us by various social relations; for these social relations are established and recognized by Laws; or by Customs equivalent to Laws; and are the points on which our Obligations, and therefore our relative Duties, depend: and many of these relations give one person an authority over another. Thus, by the laws and customs of nations, parents have a large amount of authority over their children. In most places, the husband has by law and usage some authority over the wife; the master over the servant; and everywhere, there are magistrates and governors, in whom are vested authority over the members of the community in general. There is, for all, an Obligation to submit to this Authority; and, in order that such acts of Submission may be moral, there must be corresponding Duties of Obedience. There must |236| therefore be Duties of Obedience of Children to Parents, of Wives to Husbands, of Servants to Masters, of Private Persons to Magistrates; and these, we term Duties of Order, or more specially, Duties of Obedience.
  These Duties of Obedience, in order to be moral, must arise from a corresponding internal Disposition; from a Spirit of Obedience. It is therefore our Duty to possess such a Spirit of Obedience, and a corresponding Affection towards our Superiors. We have already spoken of certain Affections,—Reverence towards our Superiors, Love of Parents, Conjugal Love, and the like,—as Duties. We have there also remarked, that these Duties involve the Principle of Order, as well as the Principle of Benevolence; and that the Affections, thus enjoined, show themselves in acts of willing Obedience.

  §329. The Rules of the Duty of Obedience, belonging to each of the Relations of Society, that of the Child, that of the Wife, that of the Servant, and the like, must depend, in part, upon the Rules which Law and Custom have established in each community. For our Duties are such as give moral significance to our legal Obligations (§279); and the Obligations of the various Members of the Family to each other, must depend upon the idea of the structure of the Family, entertained in each community. The limits of Filial Obedience are very different, in the customs of different countries; and these customs must have their weight in defining the Limits of Duty. In all states of Society, in the early stages of life, the Parent is the natural guide and governor of the child; and it is the Duty of the child to obey such government and guidance. But we cannot pretend to say, generally, how far or how long this Duty extends. For instance, we cannot lay down any universal Rule to determine whether the Parent may prevent the son from selecting a wife, or the daughter a husband, by |237| their own choice; and whether, in such a case, it is the child’s Duty to obey: or whether, supposing that obedience to a prohibition in such a case be a Duty, it be a Duty also to take the husband or the wife whom the Parent selects. In some countries, the marriage of the child is a matter usually managed altogether by the parents. In such cases, it is the child’s duty to bring the affections, as far as possible, into harmony with the custom. But those communities and those parents appear to provide better for that special personal affection which the completeness of the marriage union requires, who allow to young men and young women freedom of choice in marriage. Where this is the case, it is the Duty of the man to select a partner to whom his heart tells him he is likely to bear a true conjugal affection; and of the woman, also, to give her hand only when she can give her heart. But even in such cases, filial duty requires, if not absolute obedience, great reverence and deference to the wishes of parents; especially while the children are young; and while, consequently, the habit of submitting to the parent’s guidance must be still in force, in a family directed by Rules of Duty. In the same manner, the kind of authority which the husband, by law and custom, has over the wife, is different in different communities. In all countries, the man is the head and representative of the family, and is the person to whom political offices are assigned. But to what extent the husband, and to what extent the wife, shall rule in domestic concerns, will be regulated by local usage, or by special understanding of the parties. And in every case, the Duties of the husband and of the wife are those which give a moral significance to the Rules which usage and mutual understanding establish. While established. Duty requires the married pair to conform to the Rules; but Duty requires, too, that this should be done in a spirit of Affection and Confidence; the acts |238| thus performed expressing the common will of the two. And in the same way, the Obligations of obedience in Servants are variously determined by law, use, or agreement; and their Duties will vary with their Obligations: but in all cases, there are Duties corresponding to their Obligations; their offices must be performed faithfully and heartily, not with a grudging and merely formal service. And with respect to political relations, a willing obedience to the laws, an affection for his country, a love of its institutions and of its constitution, a loyalty to its sovereign, are proper feelings of a good man, in a rightly constituted state; and are Duties, except where, by some special historical facts, objects, on which such feelings can be employed, are wanting.

  §330. A willing obedience to the Laws of the Land is, as we have said, a Duty; for the Laws define those social relations which determine the course of our Duties; the Laws establish those Obligations of which our Duties are the expansion, and to which our Duties give a moral signification. But Laws themselves aim at a moral signification; they seek to be just and equitable Laws. We shall hereafter consider the moral character of Laws; but we may here remark, that so far as they have an obvious moral signification, it is our duty to accept and obey them according to this signification. In cases where the Law is equitable, it is our Duty to conform to the Spirit as well as to the Letter of the Law.

  §331. There are, however, many cases in which the Law is arbitrary, and rests upon the Authority of the State alone; or in some other way, is devoid of any obvious moral signification. There are many forms, details, and magnitudes regulated by Law, merely because they must be fixed by some Rule, and Law is the proper Rule. In such cases we have no Duty, but to conform to the letter of the Law. And accordingly, the Law itself so directs us; and |239| the Courts of Justice pronounce their decisions, according to the Letter of the Law. In such indifferent matters, we are not to seek for a Spirit beyond the Letter. The State itself, to which our Duties refer, gives us to understand that we are to guide ourselves by the Letter. Nor, in such cases, is the Intention of the Legislator the measure of our Duty. It is not with any particular Legislator or Body of Legislators that we have to do. The State enjoins the Law; and we accept the Law as the State understands it. The State must be supposed to have accepted the Law, and to understand it, according to the meaning of the words; for the State has accepted and adopted the expressed words, not the unexpressed meaning of any man or set of men. If any set of Legislators failed in expressing what they meant, the State cannot be bound by their incapacity. And thus, in indifferent matters, the Letter of the Law, and not some supposed Spirit besides the Letter, is the proper guide of our obedience. The business of Legislation is to prevent our Duties depending upon anything so vague and obscure, as the Spirit of a Law not expressed in the Letter.

  §332. We have spoken hitherto of Duties of Obedience; but the Duties of Order include also the Duties which exist on the other side; the Duties of Command. As it is a Duty to give a cordial obedience to just authority, with a regard to the purposes for which the authority subsists; so is it a Duty to exercise Authority for its proper purposes, and in a spirit of benevolence towards those who are its subjects. As it is the Child’s Duty to submit to the guidance and government of the Parent, it is the Parent’s Duty to guide the Child aright, and to govern it by Rules which the good of the child itself justifies. As far as it is the Wife’s Duty to obey the commands of her husband, it is the Husband’s Duty to command nothing harshly, capriciously, or unreasonably; but |240| such acts only as may fall in with an affectionate and confiding conduct of their united course of life. As it is the Servant’s Duty to do his work willingly, and bear to his employer such respect as suits their relative condition; it is the Employer’s Duty, in directing those who labour in his service, to consider their powers and their comfort. It is his Duty, also, not to make the relation of employer and servant a source of estrangement between the two classes, by a hard and repulsive demeanour; for this cannot be the true moral aspect of the relation between men, since they are bound together by the Duty of mutual Benevolence. As to their place in the social scale of a particular community, men may be called Superiors and Inferiors; but no class of men are superior or inferior to others, in their moral claim to kindness in our intention, and gentleness in our manner. So far as the relations of society receive their true moral significance, they bind together all the members of the society by a tie of benevolence; which has, for its natural results, ready and willing good offices of all to all; frank, affable, and courteous intercourse of all with all. If this feeling of benevolence had its due effect, the repulsive forces which social distinctions bring into play—the pride of rank and station, the capricious exclusions of fashion, the supreme regard of each class to its own comfort, the excessive jealousy of interference, the impatience of intrusion—would disappear before it; and, so far as the influence of such a feeling operates upon the members of a community, those repulsive elements will diminish and melt away.

  §333. The Duties of Order, so far as regards the State, like other Duties, include the Duty of giving a moral significance to the social and civil relations with which they deal. Every man who has any power, or any function in the State assigned him, must exercise it in such a manner as to give a moral |241| meaning to his office. He must act, on the part of the State, as a public representative of its moral character. If he be a Judge, he must administer the Laws impartially, and so as to make them instruments of justice. If he be an administrative officer, he must carry into effect the intentions of the Community; giving to it, as far as the Rules of his office admit, the character of a moral agent acting rightly. If he have assigned to him a vote by which he shares in the election of a legislator or a governor, the vote is a Trust for public purposes (§152); and it is grossly immoral to convert such a Trust to purposes of private gain. All such Duties are Public Duties; and Public, no less than Private Duties, require us to use all our external means and powers for the furtherance of Morality.

  §334. The Laws and Customs which determine how far each person shall have a share in the government of the State, define the Political Rights and Obligations of men; and the general scheme of Government, thus constituted, is the Constitution of the Country. In every country, the Political Rights and Obligations of men ought to be in a great measure fixed; for otherwise the Laws could not remain fixed, and could afford no fixed points to serve as the basis of Duty. It is therefore the Duty of a citizen to use his Political Rights, so as to give to the Laws the fixity which the purposes of Morality require. This is the Political Duty of Conservation. On the other hand, the Political Rights and Obligations of the citizens of a State may change from time to time; for by course of time and circumstance, it often becomes possible to alter the Laws in general, and Political Laws in particular, so as better to further the purposes of Morality. It is the Duty of a citizen to use his Political Rights in promoting changes of this description. This is the Political Duty of Progress.

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|242|
Chapter XII. Intellectual Duties

  §335. Besides the Duties of Kindness, which the Duties of Command include, there are other Duties of Command, which require our attention. He who has authority, must issue Commands, not only kind, but also prudent, and wise. He has faculties by which he is enabled to judge of such characters in Rules of Action: and he is bound to employ these faculties, as well as his Affections, in the performance of his Duty. Thus, there are Duties which belong to these faculties. We may term them generally, Duties of the Intellectual Faculties; but we may conveniently distinguish among them, the Duty of Prudence, and the Duty of Wisdom.
  We have already said, that we conceive Prudence as the Virtue by which we select right means for given ends; while Wisdom implies the selection of right ends, as well as of right means. Those who have authority over others, have to lay down Laws for their conduct; and these Laws may be considered as means, to ends which the Lawgiver contemplates. There are certain objects, which those who possess authority by their social position, may be assumed as having constantly and necessarily in their desires: thus, a head of a family desires sustenance for his family, tranquillity among the members of it, freedom from debts contracted by them; as an employer, he desires to have his work well and carefully done; and the like: and he manifests his Prudence by the Laws, which he lays down, or the Rules on which he acts, with reference to these objects. But perhaps a father makes it his main object that his sons and his daughters should rise to riches and |243| rank: and then, though he may be prudent in the means he takes for such ends, we may doubt whether he is wise in selecting these as his highest ends.

  §336. But we have to select the ends of action, and the means to them, for ourselves, as well as for others; and Prudence and Wisdom are concerned in this selection, in the former, as in the latter case. We may therefore consider the Duty of Prudence, and the Duty of Wisdom, without any special reference to the offices of command over others, which men may have to execute.
  The Duty of Prudence, like other Duties, implies that man has a power over the faculties, which such a Duty requires him to employ. That man has some power over his own thoughts, is evident. He can retain an object of thought in his mind: contemplate it in various aspects and bearings; scrutinize it; deliberate upon it. This is Inquiry and Consideration; and by this proceeding, he can often discover means to an end, and consequences of an act, which escape his notice, in a more rapid and slight mode of regarding the subject. Now the means to an end have their moral character affected by the end. The consequences of an act contribute to the moral character of the act. The points which Consideration and Inquiry brings into view, may determine whether the act be good or bad. And since we must employ all our Faculties and Powers in order to conform our actions to the Supreme Law, we must exercise this power of Consideration; and thus every man, as a moral agent, is bound by a Duty of Consideration, including a Duty of Inquiry.

  §337. The Intention is directed by the various Springs of Action, including the Moral Sentiments and the Reason. Morality requires that Intention be directed rightly: that is, towards the Ideas contained in the Supreme Law; Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. There is a Duty of right |244| Intention, which is included in all other Duties. Now we have here to remark, that this Duty of Right Intention does not replace or supersede the Duty of Consideration. We must consider the means, as they are in themselves, as well as in subservience to the end at which our intention points. We must consider the consequences which will follow upon our act, as well as the act which we directly intend. For a good end does not justify the means which we employ, if a due consideration would shew us that the means are wrongly selected: and that an act is in itself moral, does not justify it, if by a due consideration we might see that it would lead to evil consequences. I may have a wish to improve the character of my child: I may hastily punish him, with such an intention. But the intention does not justify the haste. If a little thought and care, bestowed upon the subject, would have shown me that these courses would make him worse, and not better, I am to blame. I have violated the Duty of Consideration. And in like manner, the Duty of Consideration is transgressed by any want of a Regard to Consequences. I may heedlessly indulge the desires of a child, or give what a man asks of me. But if the consequences of doing this be mischief to the child or to the man, and mischief which a little thought would have shown to be probable, or certain, I am culpable. Here, also, I have violated the Duty of Consideration. Haste and Heedlessness are grave offenses, in cases which concern the welfare of others. We have already seen that the Law treats such offenses as violations of our Obligations (§114): and our Duties, in this, as in other cases, are extensions of our Obligations. If Law require in us a care and consideration for the wellbeing of our fellow-men, Morality must require such care and consideration still more; and must require more care and more consideration than the Law can enforce. Benevolence aims at the good of |245| those among whom we are placed: but she must take to her aid the best exertions of the Intellect, in order to determine by what means such good is to be brought about; and what will be the consequences of any acts which such a purpose may suggest to us.

  §338. It is in our power to deliberate; but even after deliberation, we may be mistaken. It may be asked, if we are responsible for such a mistake. Is it a violation of any Duty to select wrong means to good ends, or to err in foreseeing the consequences of actions meant for good? If we here also follow the analogy of the Law, we shall be led to conclude that, in some cases at least, such an error is blameable. A physician who administers medicaments grossly pernicious, is condemned by the Law for his error, however right may have been his intentions, and with however much thought he may have gone to his error And the common judgment of mankind throws a like blame upon similar err ours. Men are indignant against folly and ignorance, when they affect important acts; as well as against evil intention. Men feel, and express, a strong moral indignation against a father, who ruins the character of his child by bad teaching, though he may have employed much pains upon its education: against a pilot who wrecks his ship by bad steering, though he may have steered his best: against a legislator who makes bad laws, though he thought them good. And if we look into the ground of this indignation, and of the moral condemnation which it involves, we shall see that the persons, in these cases, are judged to be to blame, because they deviated from the guidance of that Reason which is the common light of all mankind. They had a Faculty which points out the difference between what is good and what is bad, in such cases; between right means and wrong means, to the acknowledged ends. They cannot have duly employed this Faculty, or they would not have gone wrong. |246| They acted irrationally, and in so doing, they violated a Duty; and thus we are led to recognize the Duty of acting rationally. It is our Duty, not only to be careful and considerate in our choice of means to ends, but also to choose rationally. We do not say that it is our Duty to choose rightly, for there may be inevitable err ours.: but at least, we must use our Reason in choosing, and avoid such err ours. as her light manifests to us.
  We do not say that it is easy to determine what err ours. can, and what cannot be avoided: what selection of means for an acknowledged end is rational, and what is irrational. So far as such a distinction can be drawn, it will be our business hereafter to examine it. But the difficulty of doing this, does not prevent our recognizing, in general, the Duty of acting rationally, as one of our intellectual Duties.

  §339. The Reason directs our course in various ways: among others, by accepting Rules of action, and directing the conduct in conformity to them. Such Rules have it for their office to control and regulate the variable and discordant action of men’s Affections and Desires: to render permanent and consistent the guidance, which Reason, operating without Rules, exercises, in each person, doubtfully and interruptedly. Rules are the primary expressions of Duties. The Rules, Do not kill, Do not steal. Do not lie, and the like, are the basis of moral action. The formation, the establishment, the acceptance of such Rules, is the mode in which man becomes a moral agent. But besides such Rules, others, of a less absolute and general kind, are among the most suitable and efficacious means of controlling the conduct in a rational and moral manner. Such are those we have just mentioned: Children, obey your parents: Masters, treat your servants with kindness. Such Rules, accepted as right, and retained in the recollection as the constant guides of our conduct, extend the sway of |247| Reason to times when, without them, we might be led wrong by passion or desire. They sustain us against the pressure of special seasons of temptation; and extend, to the worse periods of our rational and moral life, the influence of the better periods. To act by such Rules, is the very meaning of acting according to Duty. Further; not only are such Moral Rules means by which our Reason guides us, but other Rules also, not directly moral, but of a prudential character only, are among the proper means of directing our conduct rationally. Thus, we may avoid intemperance, by conforming to Rules which shall moderate our eating and drinking; we may escape debt and poverty, by conforming to Rules limiting our habitual expenses; we may suppress our tendencies to harsh and rude behaviour, by conforming ourselves to Rules of courtesy. Rules of this kind, more or less distinctly expressed in words, are the proper guides of man, as a rational being. They are the modes in which the general convictions of the Reason are brought into contact with particular cases of action. It is our Duty thus to regulate our conduct; and thus we have a Duty of acting according to Rule.

  §340. Moral Rules, in so far as they are moral, are absolute, being expressions of the Supreme Rule of human action, which nothing can overmaster or supersede. Prudential Rules, having for their object subordinate ends, may be set aside in particular cases, as these objects themselves may. They must give way, for instance, whenever they interfere with Moral Rules. Moral Rules only, are, in the highest sense, the proper guides of human life.
  Hence, it is our Duty to accept or to frame Moral Rules, as the means of our guidance. This is a Duty, which has not, like the Duties of which we have been speaking, reference to any subordinate end, but to the highest; it is the Duty of Wisdom, not a Duty of Providence.
  |248| The Duty of Wisdom is the Duty of framing or adopting such Rules of action as are consistent with the Supreme Rule of Human Action. It is the Duty of having Rules of Duty: for, as we have seen, the Rules of Duty are determined, on the one hand, by those Moral Ideas which serve to express the Supreme Rule; while, on the other hand, they are determined by the various social relations and conditions of man’s life.

  §341. By what means can we obtain Rules of Duty which are truly moral, truly consistent with the Supreme Rule? We have already been employed in laying down such Rules; and we have seen, in some measure, by what process they may be arrived at. We find that there are external conditions necessary to the existence of man as a moral being; that there are certain Rights and Obligations, according to which, as external Facts, man’s Duties are regulated. There are, also, certain Ideas of Virtues, namely. Benevolence, Justice, and the like, according to which, as internal Ideas, the conceptions of Duty are regulated. By the combination of these two elements, we have endeavoured to define, in some measure, the scheme of Duties which belong to man. But we have, in several instances, been led to see that some further steps are requisite, before we can describe our Duties in a complete manner; and before we can produce Rules which shall admit of definite application, in the cases which commonly offer themselves to our notice. Among the steps which are thus pointed out to us, as required for the formation of more definite Rules of Duty, are Determinations and Definitions, more exact than we have yet obtained, of some of the Conceptions, in terms of which our Rules must necessarily be expressed; such conceptions, for instance, as Justice, Humanity, Happiness, and the like. The next step which we shall take, in the establishment of Moral Rules, will be to attempt to analyze and define, more |249| precisely than we have yet done, several such Conceptions as these, and to apply, in particular cases, the Conceptions thus defined. We may, in this way, best hope to obtain, both Moral Truths of a general kind, and the determination of the questions which belong to special cases.

  §342. The precision of our Conceptions, which may thus aid us in arriving at Moral Truths, is a proper object for us to aim at, as a mode of promoting our Moral Culture. It is our Duty to aim at such an intellectual progress, as a means to our moral progress. And not only may this particular kind of improvement of the intellect, be an aid in our moral culture; but the improvement of the intellect in general, in its conceptions and operations, is fitted to have this effect. And it is therefore our Duty to aim at such improvement. Corresponding to the Duty of Moral Culture of ourselves, there is a Duty of intellectual Culture. To cultivate our Intellect, is, in itself, a source of gratification. The love of knowledge which we have spoken of, as one of the desires of man, impels him constantly to make his knowledge more and more extensive, more and more precise, more and more connected; and an advance of this kind is indeed a Culture of the Intellect. But besides all other Truth, to which the love of knowledge leads, and where man seeks for the satisfaction of knowing, this desire leads to Moral Truth, which is the proper guide of man’s life; and which, therefore, he is impelled to seek, not only by pleasure, but by Duty.

  §343. Moral Truth is, as we have said, the proper guide of human life; and hence, those who have to guide others, are under a more peculiar necessity of knowing Moral Truth, and of possessing precise and consistent moral conceptions. Those especially need such Truth, such Precision, and such Consistency, whose office it is to make Rules for others, or to |250| teach them the Rules which they are to follow;—those, that is, who have to legislate for mankind, or to educate them. The Duty of Wisdom is especially incumbent on Legislators and on Educators.
  Since the offices of Legislation and of Education especially require the possession of Moral Truth, we shall defer the consideration of those offices in detail, till we have, under our notice, those further elements of Moral Truth, which we still have to consider.
  We will only observe, before we quit this part of the subject, that Legislation implies, not merely combinations of Conceptions, and mental results of Ideas, but also the external Facts, by which Law is realized. Laws are Moral Rules, clothed in an actual historical Form. The Legislator must also be a Governor; or at least his ideas must be adopted and enforced by the Governor, in order to make them be Laws.

  §344. In like manner, Education, so far as it teaches Rules of action, implies external facts, which give reality to the Precepts inculcated. The Educator teaches the learner the Laws of the Land, for instance, in order that he may guide himself by them; but in order that his teaching may have its effect, he must be able to speak of these Laws, as actually existing Laws; not as merely possible conceivable Rules. And when the Educator has to teach, not merely human Laws, but moral Rules, he must still be able to present these moral Rules, not merely as imaginable, but as possessing a real Authority. Moral Rules derive their substance from the Supreme Rule of Human Action, of which they are partial expressions. Hence, this Supreme Rule must have a real authority, and an actual force. The Educator teaches his pupil to do what is absolutely right; and because it is right: but this teaching supposes that its being right includes a sufficient reason for doing it; estimating reasons according to the real condition and destination of man.

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Chapter XIII. Of Transgression

  §345. In our survey of the several classes of Duties (§281-§344) we have seen that, beside the direct Duties of action, and of affection towards others, there are reflex Duties which regard ourselves: the Duties, namely, of unfolding within us, or establishing in our minds the Operative Moral Principles from which external Duties must proceed; the Duty of aiming at our own Moral Progress. The Duty of cultivating in our own minds the principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. We have it for our business and proper aim, to make our Lives a Moral Progress, in which these Principles constantly become more and more identified with our habits of action, thought, and feeling. We have to form our character, so that these principles are its predominant features. We have to seek not only to do, but to be; not only to perform acts of Duty, but to become virtuous (§299, etc.).
  |252| Further: there is an Intellectual, as well as a moral progress, at which we must aim; an Intellectual Progress, which is a means to a Moral Progress. We are to endeavour constantly to improve our powers of apprehending Truth, in order that we may be able the more readily and firmly to lay hold on that Moral Truth, which is the proper guide of our Lives (§342).

  §346. We have to aim at this moral and intellectual progress as the Greatest Good whch we can desire for ourselves (§306). But further, the complete Benevolence which is part of the character at which we thus aim, and which seeks the good of others, must seek for them that good which for ourselves we esteem the greatest. Our benevolence, therefore, will seek the moral progress of others as well as our own; and intellectual progress for them, no less than for ourselves, as a means of moral progress. And thus, the complex Object, at which we shall constantly have to aim, is, the Moral and Intellectual Progress of Ourselves and of the rest of Mankind.
  We may consider this as the highest object of action and thought which we can propose to ourselves; and in proportion as we make this our object, and direct our thoughts and purposes to it, we elevate our minds.

  §347. We have already seen (§293, etc.) that we have the power, in some measure at least, of carrying on this moral and intellectual progress within ourselves. That this progress must be altogether incomplete and imperfect without the aid of Religion, we shall hereafter see; but it is at least so far possible for men to promote or neglect their own moral progress, that one man shall differ very much from another in the advance he has thus made. Two men may be, at least by comparison, one virtuous and another vicious; and by a like difference, they may be at very different stages of their moral progress; if, indeed, we may not say of some, that the course of their lives |253| is a constant moral degradation rather than a progress.

  §348. This moral progress, as we have said (§300), can never terminate while we remain on earth. So long as we live, we shall have room to make ourselves better and wiser: to increase the warmth of our benevolence, to purify our hearts, to elevate our thoughts, to make ourselves more and more virtuous. To do this, is a moral growth and nurture; a moral life, which can never end, while our natural life goes on. Or if the moral progress end, the moral life is turned to moral disorder. In the moral faculties, if there be not a healthy growth, there must be a morbid decay and foul disease.

  §349. The Moral life is nourished by the perpetual aliment of moral actions, moral habits, moral thoughts, moral affections. All acts of Duty, and all affections which lead to acts of Duty, tend to promote our Moral Culture. On the other hand, all Transgressions of Duty interrupt our Moral Culture, arrest our Moral Progress, and are steps in a retrograde moral course. Unkind affections, unlawful desires, fraudulent intentions, impure imaginations, are inconsistent with our moral advancement, while they occupy us; and are proofs that we have much still to do, in giving a moral character to our being. If these things form frequent and common parts of our lives, they are proofs that we have made little moral progress; or rather, that we have made none, and are making none. If these things are acquiesced in by us, and allowed to grow into habits, we are not going forwards, but backwards, in moral character. So far as this is our case, we tend to become more and more degraded, depraved, vicious (§303).

  §350. Thus, if wrong affections, desires, intentions, and imaginations, occur in our lives at all, they are interruptions of our moral progress; and evidences that, in our moral culture, we have still much to |254| do. Yet such things may occur, so long as our moral culture is incomplete; and since, during our lives, it ever must be incomplete, they may occur so long as life remains. The Springs of Action, not fully converted into Moral Principles, may, under special circumstances, tend to deviate from the Law of Duty. Desires may be inflamed. Affections perverted. Reason misled. Consideration omitted. Rules neglected, lower aims put in the place of the highest; and man may fall below the line which morality draws. The circumstances which tend to produce such an effect are Temptations. By the impulses of the Springs of Action, not fully controlled by Rules of Duty, man is tempted to transgress such Rules.

  §351. It is the moral business of man to resist Temptation. The powers by which we guide ourselves, the Reason, and the Moral Sentiments, must be employed in controlling the Desires and Affections which impel us in an immoral direction. All the results of our Moral Culture must be called to our aid for this purpose. The Express Moral Principles which we have learnt; the Operative Moral Principles which we have acquired; Consideration, Rational Action, and Rules of Duty, we must call into operation, that they may overcome the immoral impulses by which we are urged. This we must do as moral agents; although to these resources. Religion alone can give their full force.
  If a man does not effectually resist Temptation; if he is overcome and yields, he transgresses the Rules of Duty; he offends against Morality; he commits a vicious act. The contemplation of man under this aspect, as liable to Transgressions and Offenses, introduces us to very important and serious views of his condition and destination.

  §352. Transgressions or Offenses are described by various terms, implying various degrees of condemnation. As defects from the standard of Morality |255| they are Faults; and when we would ascribe them to weakness of Will, rather than to wrong intention, they are called Failings. As transgression becomes graver, more grievous, we have no term which directly expresses an enormous violation of morality (as do the latin scelus, flagitium, facinus). Vice implies the disposition to transgress; Guilt and Crime properly express the violation of human laws; and Sin, an offense against God. But Guilt and Crime are terms also used of the violation of moral laws; and all Transgressions are Sins. Those who commit Sins are wicked, which is said to have meant, originally, under the influence of evil spirits. Sins are described, according to their character, as acts of cruelty, of injustice, of falsehood, of uncleanness, and the like. As they excite our moral abhorrence, they are termed hateful, heinous, atrocious, shocking, abominable, detestable, execrable. Crimes are said, figuratively, in proportion as they are greater, to be higher, deeper, heavier, darker. As their criminal nature is more manifest, they are flagrant.

  §353. It may be asked, according to what Measure and Standard do moral transgressions become greater and graver. Is there a definite gradation from slight Failings to atrocious Crimes; and if so, what circumstances fix the place of each Ofifense in this Scale? To this we reply, that the universal voice of mankind declares some offenses to be greater, some to be less; some heavier, some lighter. But yet, since the moral transgression consists in the perversion of internal affections, desires, and will; and since this internal condition cannot be fully known and compared in any two cases, at least in any two classes of cases; it must be almost impossible to declare one class of transgressions to be better or worse than another. This at least we may say; that to pronounce one kind of offenses better and slighter than another, would tend to convey a false opinion |256| respecting the offenses thus in some degree preferred and palliated. For no transgression can be said to be so much better than another, as not to be utterly bad. No offense can rightly be deemed slight, since the slightest utterly interrupts our moral progress.

  §354. But in this aspect of offenses, that they interrupt or undo our moral progress, we have a kind of Measure, of their magnitude. Those offenses are most grievous, which are most pernicious in their effect upon our moral culture. Some may interrupt our moral culture for a time, and it may nevertheless be resumed. Others may show that moral culture has no place in our thoughts; that we have no wish to be better than we are. Other transgressions may imply a recklessness or despair of moral progress; a state of mind which points to moral ruin as its natural sequel. The gravity of the offense will therefore be increased by all circumstances which indicate it to be the result of an habitually immoral state of the Affections and Desires, of settled and deliberate purpose, of a want or a rejection of moral aims. The hope that an offense may be only a transient interruption of the offender’s moral progress, is favoured by its being the result of great and sudden Temptation, plainly at variance with the habitual course of the affections and will. Such circumstances, therefore, tend to make an offense less grave and mischievous to the offender.

  §355. I have already pointed out, of what nature the mischief is, which offenses do to the offender. So long as there is a suspension of the authority of Duty, there is a suspension of the proper moral functions of man. So long as immoral thought, purpose, and affection prevail, the moral progress, which is the proper course of man’s life; is arrested or inverted. Acts of Wickedness are steps towards moral ruin. Or, to resume a figure which we have already employed; the moral life is nourished by the perpetual |257| aliment of moral purposes, desires and affections. By an immoral act, poison is taken into the human being, which tends to enfeeble, distemper, and destroy the moral life.
  We are now led to ask, whether there is any remedy for this mischief. When transgression has been committed, how is rectitude to be restored? When the moral progress has been interrupted and turned back, how is the regress to be checked, the lost ground to be recovered, the progress to be resumed? When poison has been taken into our moral being, how is it to be ejected, and the powers of life restored to their healthful action?
  The mode in which the poison of immoral purposes, desires, and affections, was taken into our being was, by their being our purposes, our desires, our affections. In order to expel their effect, they must be rejected as our purposes, our desires, our affections. They must be repudiated, so that they shall no longer belong to us. They must be changed into their reverse; desire, into aversion; love, into hate; the purpose to do, into the purpose to undo; joy in what was done, to sorrow that it was done. This change must be carried, by an effort of thought, into the past. We must recall in our memory the past act of transgression, contradicting, as we do so, the motives by which we were misled, and condemning the purpose which we formed. This change, this sorrow, this renunciation and condemnation of our past act, is Repentance. The transgressor must repent. We do not say that this suffices to remedy the evil. It does not do so. But there can be no remedy of the evil without this. This, at least, he must do. He must make the effort of Repentance, in order to cast out of his being the poison of immoral act or purpose. He, for this purpose, must see his moral regression as what it is, a dire mischief, which, if not remedied, tends to immeasurable evil.

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§356. But the regression must not only be lamented, it must also be repaired. We must not only reject the past offense by repentance, but we must seek to resume the course which morality points out. We must endeavour to restore our moral progress; to regain the ground which we have lost; to avoid all repetition of the errours and offenses which we have committed. We must direct our Moral Culture to our recovery and renovation. We must amend ourselves. We must reform our lives. Amendment and Reformation, as well as Repentance, are the necessary sequel of transgression, in virtue of that Duty of Moral Culture and Moral Progress which is constantly incumbent upon all men.

  §357. The Moralist is thus led to teach, that after Transgression, Repentance and Amendment are necessary steps in our Moral Culture. But the Moralist cannot pronounce how far these steps can avail as a remedy for the evil; how far they can repair the broken completeness of man’s moral course; how far they can restore the health of man’s moral life; how far they can finally, and upon the whole, avert the consequences of sin from man’s condition and destination. These are points on which the Moralist necessarily looks to Religion for her teaching. These questions regard the effects of Sin upon the Soul, and the concerns of the Soul belong to Religion. They regard the provision made by God for saving man from the effects of Sin, and this is also a matter belonging to Religion.

  §358. There is, however, one consequence of what has been said, which we may notice. We have said, that when a man has deviated from the course of Duty, he cannot resume his moral progress without Repentance and Amendment. We may remark further, that the Amendment is required by Morality to be immediate. If a man repents in the middle of an immoral act, he will not go on with the act. As soon |259| as the authority of Morality is acknowledged, the moral course of action must begin; and not at some later period, when pending acts have been completed. Duty is the perpetual rightful Governor of every man; and the man who merely promises to obey this Governor at some future time, is really disobedient. The man who completes an immoral act, knowing it to be immoral, commits a new offense. He yielded to temptation, in the first part of the act; he sins against conviction, in the second.
  This remark may be of use when we come to consider some cases of Duty. For instance, if I have made an immoral promise, and see my fault, it is my Duty not to complete the act by performing the promise.

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Chapter XIV. Of Conscience

  §359. The Desires and Affections receive their Culture by being converted into, or comprehended in, the Operative Moral Principles. The Faculties which control and direct the Desires and Affections, namely, the Reason and the Moral Sentiments, must also receive their Culture, in order that the being of man may tend to its proper completeness. The Culture of these Faculties implies the formation or adoption, in our minds, of Rules of Duty, and the application of such Rules to our own actions, with the accompanying Sentiment of Approval or Disapproval of ourselves.
  Thus, by the culture of these controlling and directing Faculties, we form habits, according to which we turn our attention upon ourselves, and approve or disapprove what we there discern. These Faculties, |260| thus cultured, are the Conscience of each man. The word conscious implies a reflex attention of the mind to its own condition or operation; a contemplation of what we ourselves feel and do. We feel pain, but we are conscious of impatience. We start unconsciously at a surprise, but in danger we are conscious of fear. Our consciousness reveals to us not only our most secret acts, but our desires, affections, and intentions. These are the especial subjects of morality, and we cannot think of them, without considering them as right or wrong. We approve, or disapprove, of what we have done, or tried to do. We consider our acts, external and internal, with reference to a moral standard of right and wrong. We recognize them as virtuous or vicious. The Faculty or Habit of doing this is Conscience.

  §360. As Science means Knowledge, Conscience etymologically means Self-knowledge; and such is the meaning of the word in Latin and French, and of the corresponding word in Greek; (conscientia, conscience, συνέιδησις). But the English word implies a Moral Standard of action in the mind, as well as a Consciousness of our own actions. It may be convenient to us to mark this distinction of an internal Moral Standard, as one part of Conscience; and Self-knowledge, or Consciousness, as another part. The one is the Internal Law; the other, the Internal Accuser, Witness, and Judge.
  This distinction was noted by early Christian Moralists. They termed the former part of Conscience, Synteresis, the internal Repository: the latter, Syneidesis, the internal Knowledge. We may term the former. Conscience as Law; the latter, Conscience as Witness.

  §361. We have already (§341) spoken of the steps by which we establish in our minds that internal Law which we call Conscience. It is established by such a Culture of our Reason as enables us to |261| frame or to accept Rules which are in agreement with the Supreme Law; and by the agreement of our Moral Sentiments with such Rules. Conscience as Law, is the expression of the condition at which we have aimed, in our advance towards a knowledge of the Supreme Law. It is a Stage in our moral and intellectual Progress.

  §362. The Offices of Conscience as Witness, Accuser, and Judge, cannot easily be separated; for to be conscious of having done an act, to question its character, and to know that it is wrong, are steps which usually follow close upon each other. Yet these steps may often be distinct. It may require some consideration, and some careful exercise of the intellect, to discern the important features of an act, and to apply to it the appropriate Rules of Duty. The moralists who distinguish the Synteresis from the Syneidesis, represent the acts of Conscience as expressed by the three members of a Syllogism; of which the first contains the Law, the Second, the Witness, the Third, the Judgment. As an example, we may take this Syllogism:
  He who dissembles, transgresses the Duty of Truth;
  I have dissembled;
  Therefore I have transgressed the Duty of Truth.

  §363. We may also note a further office which is ascribed to Conscience. She inflicts Punishment for the offenses thus condemned. For the Self-accusation and Self-condemnation, of which we have spoken, bring with them their especial pains. Repentance is sorrow; Remorse is a pang, a torment. Transgression lies like a weight on the Conscience, and makes it feel burdened and oppressed. Again, the Conscience is spoken of as the Record of offenses committed; and as stained, polluted, blackened, by our transgressions.

  §364. To act against Conscience is wrong. Conscience, the Judge, must pronounce its |262| decision according to Conscience, the Law. If we have not transgressed the Law of Conscience, Conscience acquits us. If we have violated the Law of Conscience, Conscience condemns us.
  He who is condemned by his own Conscience, is guilty. He has really done wrong. He has really offended against the Supreme Rule. His actions are inconsistent with the Stage at which he has arrived, in his moral progress. They are therefore inconsistent with Morality. He who acts against his Conscience is always wrong.

  §365. The question naturally occurs, whether, on the other hand, he who acts according to his conscience is always right: whether he who is acquitted by his conscience is free from blame. Is it enough for the demands of morality, if each person compares his actions to the Standard of right and wrong which he has in his mind? Is this a complete justification?
  It is evident, that to answer these questions in the affirmative, would lead to great inconsistencies in our Morality. For, under the influence of Education, Laws, Prejudices, and Passions, the Standard of right and wrong, which exists in men’s minds for the time, is often very different from that which the Moralist can assent to. Men have often committed thefts, frauds, impositions, homicides, thinking their actions right; though they were such as all Moralists would condemn as wrong. Such men acted according to their Consciences. Were they thereby justified?

  §366. What has already been said, may suggest a Reply to such questions. It is the Duty of man constantly to prosecute his moral and intellectual Culture (§345). This requires, not only that we should conform our actions to the Standard which we have in our minds for the time; but that, also, we are to make this Standard truly moral. Whatever subordinate Law we have in our minds, is to be looked upon only as a step to the Supreme Law;—the Law of |263| complete Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. Conscience, the Law, must be constantly directed with the purpose of making it conform to this Supreme Law. We must seek for such light, such knowledge, as may enable us constantly to promote this conformity. We must labour to enlighten and instruct our Conscience. This task can never be ended. So long as life and powers of thought remain to us, we may always be able to acquire a still clearer and higher view than we yet possess, of the Supreme Law of our Being. We never can have done all that is in our power, in this respect. It never can be consistent with our Duty, to despair of enlightening and instructing our Conscience, beyond what we have yet done. Our standard of virtue is not high enough, if we think it need be made no higher. Virtue has never so completely taken possession of man’s being, but that she may possess it still more completely; and therefore, any conception of Virtue, which we look upon as perfect, must, on that very account, be imperfect. Conscience is never fully formed, but always in the course of formation.

  §367. We may add, that in attempting to enlighten and instruct our Conscience, and to carry on our moral progress, we are led to feel the want of some light and some power in addition to the light of mere reason, and the ordinary powers which we possess over our own minds; and that Religion offers to us the hope of such a power, which will, if duly sought, be exercised upon us.

  §368. It appears from what has just been said, that we cannot properly refer to our Conscience as an Ultimate and Supreme Authority. It has only a subordinate and intermediate Authority; standing between the Supreme Law, to which it is bound to conform, and our own Actions, which must conform to it, in order to be moral. Conscience is not a Standard, personal to each man; as each man has his standard |264| of bodily appetite. Each man’s Standard of morals, is a standard of Morals, only because it is supposed to represent the Supreme Standard, which is expressed by the Moral Ideas, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Wisdom. As each man has his Reason, in virtue of his participation in the Common Reason of mankind, so each man has his Conscience, in virtue of his participation in the Common Conscience of mankind, by which Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Wisdom, are recognized as the Supreme Law of Man’s Being. As the object of Reason is to determine what is true, so the object of Conscience is to determine what is right. As each man’s Reason may err, and thus lead him to false opinion, so each man’s Conscience may err, and lead him to a false moral standard. As false opinion does not disprove the reality of Truth, so the false moral standards of men do not disprove the reality of a Supreme Rule of Human Action.

  §369. Since Conscience is thus a subordinate and fallible Rule, it appears, that for a man to act according to his conscience, is not necessarily to act rightly. His conscience may be erroneous. It may be culpably in error; for he may not have taken due pains to enlighten and instruct it. If the conscience be in error, it must be so, for this reason, that the man’s moral and intellectual progress is still incomplete; and this incompleteness is no justification of what is done under its influence. A conformity to an Erroneous Conscience is no more blameless, than an act of imperfect Benevolence, or imperfect Justice.

  §370. Moreover, since Conscience has only this subordinate and derivative authority, it cannot be right for a man to refer to his own Conscience, as a supreme and ultimate ground of action. The making our Conscience a ground of action, to this extent, is in itself wrong; since it is abandoning that Duty of further enlightening and instructing our Conscience, |265| which can never cease to be a Duty. That a man acts according to his Conscience, is not a reason for his actions, which can supersede the necessity of assigning other Reasons. If an action be according to his Conscience, it must be so because it is conformable to his Conceptions of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Wisdom; and his reason for the action is more properly rendered by showing that the act does conform to these Moral Ideas, than by saying that it is according to his Conscience. To allege that an act is according to ray Conscience; meaning thereby, that I act according to a Rule which is already fixed and settled in my mind, so that I will no longer examine whether the Rule be right; is to reject the real signification of moral Rules. It is the conduct of a person who pursues a wrong road to the place he aims at; and refuses to have it proved that the road is wrong.
  Indeed, the very use of the term Conscience, in rendering moral reasons for actions, may tend to mislead us, by presenting conscience to our minds as an authoritative and supreme guide. To dwell too much upon this abstraction, which, as we have said, merely denotes a step in our progress towards the Supreme Rule, may obstruct and disturb our further progress. We may confuse our minds, by fixing our consciousness too much upon our Conscience;—by reflecting upon this reflex habit. It has been said, that if I talk of my Humility, I lose it; something of the same kind may be said of Conscience.

  §371. But though a virtuous man may abstain from speaking much of his Conscience, he will not reverence its guidance the less on that account; or rather, his silence, if he be silent, will be that of reverence. For nothing can be more worthy of reverence than Conscience. It is, as we have said, the expression of the Supreme Rule, so far as each man has been able to discern that Rule. |266| Conscience is to each man the representative of the Supreme Law, and is invested with the authority of the Supreme Law. It is the voice which pronounces for him the distinction of right and wrong, of moral good and evil; and when he has done all that he can to enlighten and instruct it, by the aid of Religion, as well as of Morality, it is for him the Voice of God.

  §372. To disobey the commands and prohibitions of Conscience, under any circumstances, is utterly immoral; it is the very essence of immorality. In order to be moral, a man must be thoroughly conscientious; he must be careful to satisfy himself what the decision of his Conscience is, and must be resolved to follow the course thus prescribed, at any risk, and at any sacrifice. Nothing can be right which he does not do with a clear conscience. Whatever danger or sorrow lies in that direction, whatever advantage and gratification of the desires and affections in the other, he must not shrink or waver. Whatever may be gained by acting against his conscience, the consistency and welfare of his whole moral being is lost. His moral progress is utterly arrested. He commits a grievous transgression; and, as we have already said, morality can assure him of no means by which the evil may be remedied, and the broken unity of his moral being restored. To be steadily, resolutely, and carefully conscientious, is a Rule which every one, who aims at his moral progress, must regard as paramount to all others.

  §373. Inasmuch as each man’s Conscience is the Supreme Law, so far as he has been able to discover that Law; and inasmuch as this discovery is a task to be performed only by a diligent and continued exercise of our faculties; there may be periods when each man is aware that the task has been imperfectly performed on special points, and may be uncertain what is right and what is wrong. In such cases, his Conscience is doubtful. The removal of |267| such doubts, is to be sought by the further use of the means by which the Conscience is enlightened and instructed. When the doubts turn rather upon special points than upon the general course of action, they are Scruples of Conscience.
  What a person can do without offending against his Conscience, when the question has been deliberately propounded and solved in his own mind, he does with a safe conscience, or with a good conscience.

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Chapter XV. Cases of Conscience Respecting Truth

  §374. It will appear from the preceding Chapter, that in all right action, the Conscience is employed, consciously or unconsciously. A man is bound in Conscience to do what he thinks right; but he is also bound to employ his faculties diligently, in ascertaining what is right. In cases in which he has not ascertained what is right, his Conscience is doubtful; and for the purposes of right action, it is requisite that these doubts be removed. Cases which are considered by Moralists with the view of doing this, are Cases of Conscience.
  We are not to suppose that any particular Class of questions in Morals are Cases of Conscience. Every case of Moral action is, for the person who acts, a Case of Conscience. But in the greater part of such cases, the Rule of Duty is so plain and obvious, that no doubt arises, as to the course of action; and thus, no internal inquiry brings the Conscience into notice. In cases in which there appear to be conflicting Duties, or reasons for opposite courses of action, we must endeavour to decide between them, |268| by enlightening and instructing the conscience; and these are especially termed Cases of Conscience.

  §375. Since, in Cases of conflicting Duties, whichever way we decide, one Duty is, or seems to be, evaded or violated, Cases of Conscience, as proposed by Moralists, have often the aspect of Questions as to when Duties may be evaded or violated. To discuss such questions, has been supposed, by the world in general, more likely to pervert than to improve men’s minds; and hence Casuistry, the part of Morality which is concerned with such discussions, has often been looked upon with dislike.

  §376. But the question, in every Case of Conscience, really is, not, How may Duty be evaded? but, What is Duty?—not, How may I avoid doing what I ought to do? but, What ought I to do? And this is a question which a virtuous man cannot help perpetually asking himself; and to which the answer may very often be far from obvious In such Cases, he will be glad to know to what decision the Moralist, treating such questions in a general form, and free from the influence of personal temptation, has been led. We shall here consider a few Questions of this kind.
  There occur Cases of Conscience respecting all Classes of Duties: but in many of these Classes, the decision of the question may require a more exact determination of the Conceptions involved in it; for instance, in questions concerning Duties of Justice, of Humanity, which Conceptions will be examined hereafter. But there are some Cases which we may consider by the aid of Rules and Maxims already laid down.
  Such are particularly the Cases which respect the Duties of Truth (Subjective Truth, Veracity). The Rules Lie not. Perform your Promise, are of universal validity; and the conceptions of Lie, and of Promise, are so simple and distinct, that, in general, the |269| Rules may be directly and easily applied. We shall consider first some such Questions relative to Promises.

  §377. In what sense are Promises to be interpreted? We have already said (§315), that the Mutual Understanding of the two parties, at the time of making the promise, is the sense in which it is the Promiser’s Duty to fullfil it. This is the right Interpretation of the promise, because the promise expressed and established this Mutual Understanding. If the Promisor, intending deceit to the Promisee, or to other persons, has used expressions, with a view to their being misunderstood, he has already violated the Duty of Truth. If he repent of this, his only way of resuming a moral condition is, to carry back the effect of his repentance to the time of making the promise, and to act as if he had intended what he was understood to intend.
  Since the Promiser may be the only speaker in the transaction, and the Promisee may imply his acceptance of the Promise, and the sense in which he understands it, only by his silence, or by words of assent; we may state, as the Rule in such cases, that the Promiser is bound in the sense in which he believes the Promisee to understand him. For this is the only Common Understanding between them.

  §378. It may be, that the Common Understanding of what the Promiser is to do for the Promisee, includes some suppositions which are afterwards discovered to be false: and it may be asked, if the Promise is still binding. This is the case of Erroneous Promises. And the answer to the question is, that the false supposition releases the Promiser, so far as it was included in the Common Understanding. Thus, a person solicits alms from you, telling you the tale of his distresses. Your purse being empty at the time, you promise to relieve him if he will call again. In the mean time, you discover that his story contained |270| falsehood. How far are you bound by your Promise? It is plain that if the Promise was understood by both of you to be unconditional, and the delay, to take place merely on account of the state of your purse, the Promise is binding. But if the Promise was understood to be conditional, on the truth of the tale; and if the falsehoods are material; the Promiser is released. Yet it must be very difficult for the Promiser to know how far his Promise is hypothetically understood. And therefore, to avoid the moral trouble which such doubts produce, it is wise in such cases to express the condition on which the Promise is given.

  §379. There is one circumstance respecting Promises which must be noticed. The Duty which they create, is not an absolute, but a Relative Duty. It is a Duty relative to the Promisee only. He is the only person affected by the non-performance of the Promise. He has a Moral Claim for this performance; but he may relinquish this Claim, as he may relinquish any Right or Possession. And when he has done this, the duty of performing the promise ceases. Hence it is laid down, as a Rule of Morality respecting Promises, that they are not binding when released by the Promisee.

  §380. The principal Class of Cases of Conscience respecting Promises is, that of what are called Unlawful Promises; that is, Promises to do an immoral act; for we are not now speaking of law, but of morality.
  When the immoral character of the act was known to the parties at the time, the Question of Immoral Promises is answered by recollecting what has been said (§358) respecting violations of Duty. The transgressor ought to repent and amend; and as a part of his amendment, he ought not to go on with an immoral act which is begun. To Promise, and to Perform, are parts of the same connected act. If the |271| Performance be immoral, the Promise was so. To promise, was a transgression of Duty begun; to perform, is to complete the transgression. It is my Duty to stop in the mid course of the act, as it was my Duty not to enter upon it at first. When the question of Duty is proposed, there can be no other answer.
  This applies at once to all promises to perform, or to participate in, any act of violence, injustice, fraud, or impurity. In all such cases, the Promisor, by his Promise, has rejected his moral nature; and can only resume it, by repudiating his own act. Even to do this, does not leave him blameless; for, as we have said, repentance does not obliterate past guilt; but this is necessary: this is the only way in which he can avoid the continuation and further degradation of his moral condition. He offended in the Promise; he offends again in the Performance. Whatever Temptation led him to sin, in the first part of the act; he sins against conviction, if he perform his promise, when the question has been brought before his conscience.

  §381. But in breaking my Promise, immoral though it be, I violate my Relative Duty to the Promisee; and the case may be one in which he denies, and even blamelessly denies, the immorality of the act promised. For instance, I have promised the less worthy Candidate for an office, that I will vote for him. I cannot expect to induce him to release me from my Promise, by representing to him his own unworthiness. Nevertheless, my relative Duty to him must give way to my absolute Duty of voting for the most worthy Candidate. But though I now do what I ought, I am not therefore blameless as to the past. The violation of a Relative Duty, is an offense against the Promisee. He has good reason to complain of me; and I have reason to feel repentance and shame, for having given him a claim upon me which I cannot |272| satisfy. This is the unhappy consequence of making an immoral Promise.
  In other cases, where the Promisee is aware that the act promised is immoral, he did wrong in accepting, as I in making, the promise. He ought to release me from the promise, not as an act of grace, but as an act of Duty. If he do not, my shame at not satisfying his claim upon me, is rightly lost in my shame at having given him such a claim.

  §382. When the Act promised was not immoral at the time of promising, but becomes so afterwards, it is not to be performed. For since we are asking what virtuous men would do, we are to suppose that they would not have made the promise, if they had known that performance would be immoral; and that they will release each other, now that it appears to be immoral. That the act should be lawful at the time of performance, was a part of the understanding which the promise conveyed. If a merchant promises his foreign correspondent to send him a ship-load of corn at a time appointed, and before the time arrive, the exportation of corn is forbidden by law; he is liberated from his engagement. Both parties must have understood that the promise was made, on the supposition that the act would be lawful; and that the engagement was annulled, when it became unlawful, and therefore immoral.

  §383. In the case where one party sees that the performance is immoral, and the other does not, the difficulty is greater; but the Rule by which we may direct ourselves is, that the promise must be understood as a promise made between virtuous men, and involving such a conditional engagement as may morally be made: and so understood, must be fulfilled.
  Thus, if I promise to vote for an unworthy candidate, the promise was immoral, and is not to be kept, as we have said. But if I promise to vote for a |273| candidate who, after my promise, becomes unworthy, not having been so before, am I bound? We say. No: for I promised on the supposition of his worthiness; and he, who ought to regard me as a moral man in making my promises, must have understood that this supposition was implied. But yet my refusal to fullfil my promise may give him ground to say, that it is not his worthiness, but my intentions, which have changed. And this must be a matter difficult of proof; at least to him; and therefore it will be difficult to show him that I have not violated my Relative Duty to him. The prospect of such difficulties, is a strong reason for not making promises respecting elections, in cases where the worthiness of the candidates, at the time of voting, ought alone to decide the election.

  §384. But there may be cases, in which an unconditional promise to vote for a candidate at an election may morally be given; and then it must be kept. There are cases in which the matter is left much to the discretion of the elector; and in such cases, though merit may determine his choice, he may fix his own time for making up his mind; and may promise when he has decided. Any candidate who offers himself after this, comes too late.

  §385. Or again, the Promise may imply an informal Contract; as when a person is elected to act on behalf of the Electors; or on the belief that he and they have a common purpose. This is the case, when the Representative of a body of men is to be elected. They look out for a person whose character fits him to act for them, and they promise to vote for him. He, on the other hand, by his conduct and his professions, pledges himself to follow a course of action which they approve. Promises thus made, are not immoral. Such a mutual understanding is requisite, between the Electors and their Representatives; and can only be established, by their promising him |274| their votes. The Electors are bound to elect the fittest person; but the Candidate with whom they have come to this understanding is thereby and thenceforth the fittest. The election is like the election of an Agent; and as we have said, is rather of the nature of a Contract, than of an election on the ground of merit only.
  But then, in order that this Contract may morally be made, it must be for moral purposes. Such would be an understanding between the Electors and the Candidate, that he, acting as their Representative, shall aim to preserve the Constitution, or to reform the Abuses, of the body into which he is elected. But if the understanding be, that he shall give them money in return for their votes, the Contract is an immoral one. The power of electing a Representative is in their hands for the sake of some public good; it is a violation of Duty, to turn such a power into a means of private gain (§311).

  §386. It is sometimes made a Question, Supposing such an informal Contract immorally made, whether, when the immoral end is answered, it is a Duty to perform the rest of the Contract; for instance, if a person were elected to an office of public trust on promise of sums of money to the electors, whether, after the election, it is his duty to pay these sums. We may remark, that the question, here, is not What he is to do as an innocent man; for by the supposition he is a guilty one; having been concerned in an immoral bargain. If the question be, What is he to do as a repentant man, convinced of his guilt, and wishing henceforth to do what is right, the answer is, that he must pay. There is no reason why he should add, to the violation of his absolute Duty, the violation of his Relative Duty to the Promisees. If, in his repentance, he wishes not to complete an immoral transaction, he is to recollect that the immoral transaction is completed by his election. If he wish to mark his |275| hatred of the offense, he may signify his meaning more clearly, by expressing his repentance, and paying the money, than by keeping it; which may be interpreted as adding avarice and falsehood to the violation of public Duties.

  §387. Promises are immoral, which contradict a former Promise, and therefore are not to be kept; but here, as in other cases, there is a violation of the Relative Duty to the promisee; and a ground for shame and repentance, so far as regards him. And here we have another warning, of the need of being cautious in making promises.

  §388. Promises which it is impossible to perform, are evidently not to be kept; but then, it can hardly be that such Promises can be made, without some want of due consideration and forethought on the Part of the Promisor, which gives the Promisee good ground for complaint. If the Promiser was aware of the impossibility at the time of making the promise, he is guilty of fraud; for by making the promise, he implied his belief of the possibility of performing it.
  When the Promiser himself occasions the impossibility, it is a breach of promise.

  §389. Are Promises extorted by Fear or Violence binding? This is a question which has been much debated among Moralists. We must apply to it the Rule which we have already laid down; that the Promise, if morally made, must be kept. If I ought not to keep the Promise, I ought not to have made it. The question, therefore, will be, whether I could morally make such a Promise. And it may be remarked, that if I could not morally make the Promise, I cannot morally derive advantage from any contract which was combined with the Promise; for to do this, is a part of the same Act, as to make the Contract. I cannot morally derive advantage from one part of the Contract, and refuse to perform another part. If I find the Contract to have been immoral, I |276| must undo, as far as I can, its effects; and go back, in my condition, to the state in which the Contract was made.

  §390. These Maxims may be applied to a case of this kind often discussed. A man falls into the power of a band of robbers, and, in fear of violence, promises them that if they will set him free, he will afterwards send them a certain sum of money. He is liberated on his promise: is he bound afterwards to send the money? According to the above considerations, if it was not immoral to make the Promise, it is a Duty to keep it. And this Rule is so obvious a one, and its application so direct, that we may wonder that any other should have been taken.
  The reasons given for doubt, or for the opposite decision, are various. Thus Cicero says, (1 Off. III. 29.) that with robbers, we have no tie of common faith or obligation. But we shall, of course, answer, that we keep our word, not as what is due to robbers, but as what is due to ourselves, and necessary to our character of truthful men: not as what is an act of obligation to them, but an act of reverence to truth. We may add, that we can hardly say that we have no ties of common obligation with them, when we have made them a promise, and have received life and liberty as a consideration for it. We make a Contract with them, though it may be an informal one. They fullfil their part of the Contract: if we do not fullfil ours, we shall take a very strange way of exemplifying our asserted moral superiority over them.
  It has also been alleged, as a reason why the Promise thus given should not be kept, that their confidence in Promises will thus greatly facilitate the perpetration of such robberies;—that in this way, such Contracts may be made the means of almost unlimited extortion. (2 Paley, B. iii. c. 5.) Upon this we may remark, that it is right to regard the probable consequences of our |277| actions; and we must agree, that it would be wrong to contribute to maintain a state of things in which lawless banditti levy ransoms upon peaceable citizens. But these considerations, if acted on, would prevent our making the Promise. And if, notwithstanding these considerations, we have made the promise, we must consider how far it is likely that to keep our word, rather than to break it, would make us the supporters of such a habit of extortion. Is it probable that the banditti will give up their practice, simply because their captives, liberated on such promises, do not perform them? Is it not likely that, their power remaining, such disappointments would induce them to seek some more effectual mode of extortion? Do we not, by making and adhering to such contracts, prevent their adding murder to robbery? And is not the most proper and hopeful course for suppressing such robbery, to call for, and, if required, to assist, the vigorous administration of the laws against robbers, which exist in every State. Till that can be done, may it not tend to preserve, from extreme cruelties, those who fall into the hands of the robbers, that they should have some confidence in the payment of the ransom agreed upon? Even on the balance of probable advantage, it would seem that such a promise is to be kept.
  But on our principles, we should not look to these results so much as to our own moral culture. By keeping this promise, we cherish and exemplify our regard for truth. What moral quality do we cultivate by breaking it? If it be replied, that we thus cultivate a regard for consequences; we reply, that consequences, when both their existence, and their moral character, are so doubtful, are not the main objects for our regard. The consequences which take the shape of strict veracity in ourselves, and the consequent confidence of others in us, are proper objects of moral action. The consequences which take the |278| shape of possible inconvenience produced to robbers by our own untruthfulness, are not proper objects for us to aim at.

  §391. It may be asked, whether, in order to avoid thus contributing to robbers, we ought to refuse to make the promise; and whether, thus, we ought to incur violence, or even death. This is included in the general question, what we ought to do in cases of extreme necessity, when the adherence to the usual Rules of Duty brings with it danger of life, limb, and the like terrible consequences. And to such questions perhaps no general answer can be given. They are commonly put in this form: Whether in such cases of necessity it be allowable to violate Duty: and in this form, something may be said respecting them hereafter.

  §392. If it be said, that the Law denies the validity of such engagements, by annulling Contracts made under duress; we reply, that even the Law requires that men should not allege light fears, as reasons for the nullity of a Contract. The Law makes Duress nothing less than the fear of loss of life or limb (§161); and thus shews that it expects that men will show some firmness, in refusing to be parties to illegal acts. It is true, that the Law would annul a Contract made under the circumstances which we have described. It would also punish the robbers, if they were brought under its administration. But then we must recollect that Duty does not necessarily confirm the advantages to which the administration of the Law would entitle us; while Duty does necessarily confirm our obligations, and extend them, so as to give them a moral meaning. Duty interprets informal obligations, so as to make them evidence of internal principles. Duty requires the performance of promises, so as to make them evidence of a Spirit of Truthfulness.

  §393. Lies stand nearly on the same footing as |279| promises; for a Lie is a violation of the general understanding among mankind, which the use of language implies, as we have already said (§313). And as has already been stated, that is a Lie which violates this mutual understanding, and nothing else. Hence the term Lie is not applicable, when no mutual understanding is violated. Such, is the case in Parables, Fables, Tales avowedly fictitious, or notoriously so, according to the literary habits of the time; as Novels, Dramas, Poems. A person, the most careful of his moral culture, may employ himself in such fictions. Yet there are provinces of literature in which the most rigorous attention to Truth is a Duty, as in History and Personal Narratives.

  §394. Falsehoods under Convention, There are various understood Conventions in society, according to which words, spoken or written under particular circumstances, have a meaning different from that which the general laws of language would give them. I have already noticed such phrases as, I am your obedient servant, at the foot of a letter; which, though not literally true, is not to be called a Lie. The Convention is here so established, that no one is for a moment misled by it. In the same way, if, when I wish not to be interrupted by visitors, I write upon my door, Not at home, and if there be a common understanding to that effect; this is no more a lie than if I were to write, Not to be seen.

  §395. But if I put the same words in the mouth of a Servant, and if the Convention be not regularly established in all classes of society, the Case is different. It is a violation of Duty in me to make the Servant tell a He: it is an offense against his moral culture (§312). He may understand the Convention to be so fully established in the class with which my intercourse lies, that the words, though not literally true, convey no false belief. In this case, he may use them, and I may direct him to use them, blamelessly. But it is my Duty to ascertain that he does |280| thus understand the words, as a conventional form; and in order to give them this character, he should not be allowed to deviate from the form, or to add any false circumstance; as, that his master has just gone out, or the like.

  §396. The view that we have taken, of the nature of a Lie, suggests an answer to some of the excuses sometimes offered for lies. For instance, some men tell lies in order to preserve a secret which they wish not to be known; and allege, in their justification, that the Questioner has no Right to know the truth. To such a plea we reply, that the Questioner has a right not to be told a lie, for all men have such a Right. By answering his question at all, I give him a Right to a true answer. If I take my stand on the ground that he has no Right to an answer, I must give him no answer. I may tell him that he has no Right to an answer.
  But it may be said, that to do this will in many cases be to disclose the secret which we wish to conceal. For instance, the author of an anonymous work, who wishes to remain unknown as the author, but is suspected, is asked whether he wrote the work. To refuse to reply, would be to acknowledge it. Such authors have held, that in such a case, they may deny the authorship. They urge, that the Questioner has no right to know: that the Author has a Right to remain concealed, and has no means of doing so but by such a denial. But this defense is wrong. The author has no moral Right to remain concealed at the expense of telling a Lie: that is, it is not right in him thus to protect himself. But on the other hand, he is not bound to answer. Nor need he directly refuse to do so. He may evade the question, or turn off the subject. There is nothing to prevent his saying, “How can you ask such a question?” or anything of the like kind, which may remove the expectation of an answer. If he cannot secure his object in this or |281| some similar way, it is to be recollected that he has drawn the inconvenience upon himself, by first writing an anonymous work, and then engaging in conversation on such terms, that he cannot escape answering questions about the authorship of the work. He has no Right, moral or other, to insist that these two employments may be pursued jointly without inconvenience. Familiar conversation is a play of reciprocal insight and reciprocal guidance of thought; and such weapons, a man may very rightly use, to guard his secret. But he may not assume that it must be guarded at any rate, by means right or wrong; by declarations true or false. On the other hand, lie may seek, as widely as he chooses, for some turn of conversation by which he may baffle curiosity, without violating truth. To discover such a turn, is a matter of skill, self-command, and invention. If he fail and be detected, he may receive some vexation or inconvenience; but if he succeed at the expense of truth, he receives a moral stain.

  §397. The like considerations apply in a case often discussed among moralists. A man is pursued by murderers who seek his life, and I conceal him. They ask me if I know where he is. Am I to say that I do not know? In this case, it is evident that I may blamelessly refuse to answer the question; but in this, as in the other case, not to answer, may be to speak plainly. I may also represent to the pursuers the wickedness of their purpose; I may call in the aid of the law. These latter courses are blameless.
  But suppose that these resources fail, that the pursuers turn their fury upon me, and that they threaten to kill me, except I disclose to them the hiding-place of their victim. We have here a new case; the prospect of my own death if I do not make myself accessary to a murder, for, to give up the man to his murderers, would be to be accessory to his death. This |282| is a Case of Necessity, and a Lie in such a Case is not to be judged of by common Rules.

  §398. Falsehoods told for the purpose of saving one’s life; or to avoid some other extreme peril, have found much sympathy among mankind. They are looked upon as at least excusable, and allowable. We must hereafter consider them among other Cases of Necessity. Lies of Necessity, told for the sake of saving a friend from some great misfortune, have met with a warmer admiration, in the cases in which they are narrated. Such for instance was the falsehood told by Grotius’s wife to save her husband. when she represented the box in which he was contained as a box of theological books.

  §399. But when such falsehoods which thus save a friend from ruin are accompanied with some great foreseen calamity to the teller, they excite a still higher admiration, and may be termed Heroic Lies: as when Lucilius offers himself to the soldiers of Octavius to be killed, declaring himself to be Brutus. So far as such acts come under the Moralist’s notice, they must be considered under a special head; for Heroic Virtue, as we have already said, is beyond the range of the Rules of Duty.

  §400. Though assertions, not literally true, may, by general Convention, cease to be Lies, we must be careful of trifling with the limits of such cases, and of too readily assuming, and acting upon, such Conventions. Carelessness in these matters, will diminish our habitual reverence for truth. Some Moralists have ranked with the cases in which Convention supersedes the general rule of truth, an Advocate asserting the justice, or his belief in the justice, of his Client’s cause. (1 Paley, B. iii. c. 15.) As a reason why he may do this, though he believe otherwise, it is said, that no promise to speak the truth was given, or supposed to be |283| given. But we reply by asking; If there is no mutual understanding that he shall speak truly, to what purpose does he speak, or to what purpose do the judges hear?
  By those who contend for such indulgence to Advocates, it is alleged, that the Profession of Advocate exists as an instrument for the administration of Justice in the Community; and that it is a necessary maxim of the Advocate’s Profession, that he is to do all that can be done for his Client. It is urged, that the application of Laws is a matter of great complexity and difficulty: that the right administration of them in doubtful cases, is best provided for, if the arguments on each side be urged with the utmost force, and if the Judge alone decide which side is in the right; that for this purpose, each Advocate must urge all the arguments he can devise; and must enforce them with all the skill he can command. It is added, to justify the Advocate, that being the Advocate, he is not the Judge;—that it is not his office to determine on which side Justice is; and that therefore his duty, in his office, is not affected by his belief on this subject.
  In reply to these considerations, the Moralist may grant that it is likely to answer the ends of Justice in a community, that there should exist a Profession of Advocates; ready to urge, with full force, the arguments on each side in doubtful cases. And if the Advocate, in his mode of pleading and exercising his profession, allows it to be understood that this is all that he undertakes to do, he does not transgress his Duties of Truth and Justice, even in pleading for a bad cause; since even for a bad cause, there may be arguments, and even good arguments. But if, in pleading, he assert his belief that his cause is just, when he believes it unjust, he offends against Truth; as any other man would do who, in like manner, made a like assertion. Nor is it conducive to the |284| ends of justice, that every man however palpably unjust his cause be, should have such support to it.
  To the argument, that the Advocate is not the Judge, and therefore, that he is not responsible for his judgment on the merits of the case; the Moralist will reply, that every man is, in an unofficial sense, by being a moral agent, a Judge of right and wrong, and an Advocate of what is right; and is, so far, bound to be just in his judgments, and sincere in his exhortations. This general character of a moral agent, he cannot put off, by putting on any professional character. Every man, when he advocates a case in which morality is concerned, has an influence upon his hearers, which arises from the belief that he shares the moral sentiments of all mankind. This influence of his supposed morality, is one of his possessions; which, like all his possessions, he is bound to use for moral ends. If he mix up his character as an Advocate, with his character as a Moral Agent, using his moral influence for the Advocate’s purpose, he acts immorally. He makes the Moral Rule subordinate to the Professional Rule. He sells to his Client, not only his skill and learning, but himself. He makes it the Supreme Object of his life to be, not a good man, but a successful Lawyer.
  If it be alleged, that by allowing the difference of his professional and unprofessional character to be seen in his pleading, the Advocate will lose his influence with his hearers; the Moralist will reply, that he ought not to have an influence which arises from a false representation of himself; and that if he employ the influence of his unprofessional character, he is bound, in the use of it, to unprofessional Rules of Duty.
  The Advocate must look upon his Profession, like every other endowment and possession, as an Instrument, which he must use for the purposes of Morality. To act rightly, is his proper object: to succeed |285| as an Advocate, is a proper object, only so far as it is consistent with the former. To cultivate his Moral being, is his highest end; to cultivate his Professional eminence, is a subordinate aim.

  §401. But further; not only is the Advocate to cultivate and practise his profession in subordination to moral ends, and to reject its Rules where they are inconsistent with this subordination; but moreover, there belong to him moral ends which regard his Profession; namely, to make it an Institution fitted to promote Morality. He must seek, so to shape its Rules, and so to alter them if need be, that they shall be subservient to the Rules of Duty. To raise and purify the character of the Advocate’s profession, so that it may answer the ends of justice, without requiring insincerity in the Advocate, is a proper aim for a good man who is a Lawyer;—a purpose on which he may well and worthily employ his efforts and his influence.

  §402. There are other Cases, in which the Duty of Truth may be violated by silence;—by that which we omit to say: as in selling defective wares, without notice of their faults; those faults being such as, by the universal understanding relative to such transactions, the Seller is bound to disclose. In these, as in the other cases, the Duty is, in a great measure, defined by the general understanding existing among Buyers and Sellers. In giving this Rule, we follow the guidance of the Law; which, in its decisions, recognizes such a general understanding with regard to sales. But here also Morality takes the Meaning, not the Letter of the Law, for her guide. We may apply this to a case stated by Cicero, and often since discussed by Moralists. We have already considered the case jurally (§172). In a time of great scarcity at Rhodes, a corn-merchant of Alexandria arrived there with a cargo of grain. The Merchant knew, what the Rhodians did not know, that a number of |286| other vessels laden with corn were on their way to Rhodes: was he bound in conscience to communicate this fact to the buyers?

  §403. The universal Rule, that we may not deceive men, must apply in this case. The Moralists cannot doubt that it would be wrong for the merchant to tell any falsehood, in order to raise the price of his wares. It would be plainly immoral for him to say, that he did not know that any other vessels were coming. But may he, the Seller, be silent, and allow the Buyers, ignorant of the truth which he knows, to raise the price by their mutual competition? This is a question belonging to trade in general; and must, as we have said, be answered according to the general understanding which we suppose to prevail among Buyers and Sellers. In common cases, both alike are supposed to have a regard to the prospect of an increased Supply, or an increased Scarcity. The Buyer does not depend upon the Seller, nor the Seller upon the Buyer, for this information. He who has, or thinks he has, superior information on this subject, takes advantage of it, and is understood to do so: and prices are settled by the general play of such opinions, proceeding from all sides. But if a Seller possess information which he is not understood to have, and takes advantage of it, he violates the general understanding, and thus, is guilty of deceit. If the merchant in question ask such an exorbitant price for his corn, as to imply that no further supply is probable, he falls under this blame. On the other hand, he is not bound to sell his corn today for the price to which it may fall tomorrow, when the other vessels arrive; for, as a trader, he may take advantage of the greater skill and foresight which has brought him first to the port. We cannot say that he is generally bound to reveal to the buyer any special circumstance which may affect the market-price; as for instance, the probable speedy arrival of other vessels: |287| for to make this a part of his duty, would be to lay down a Rule which would place skill and ignorance, diligence and indolence, on an equality; and would thus destroy the essence of trade. But if the Buyer asks questions on this subject, the Seller may not tell a lie. And if the Seller is silent as to this circumstance, he takes upon himself the responsibility, as a moral agent, of making an equitable estimate of the gain to which his unsuspected superiority of knowledge entitles him. If it be said, that it is very unlikely that a trader will be content with this, when he can get more; we shall of course reply, that the question is not what a trader is likely to do, but what a good man, (Vir bonus as Cicero puts the case), ought to do.

  §404. Promises of Marriage often give rise to doubt and fears; for the Promise implies much;—no less than affection and general community of interests during a whole life. A person may well hesitate before giving such a promise, and having given it, may fear whether he is not engaging for more than he can perform. But on the other hand, the Promise, sincerely given, leads to its own fulfilment; for affection grows, in virtue of the confidence which such an engagement establishes between the parties; the marriage union adds new ties to those which drew them together; and the progress of a well conducted married life makes conjugal affection continue as a habit.
  But the intention of fulfilling the engagement in this sense, and the belief of a power to do so, can alone render it right to make the Promise. A Promise of Marriage, though made, cannot morally be carried into effect, by him who does not intend thus to perform the engagement, or who despairs of doing so. If, before the Marriage takes place, he find the germ of conjugal affection wanting in his heart, the course of Duty is, to withdraw from entering upon the immoral condition of a mere external conjugal union. |288| But still, in doing this, he violates a most serious Relative Duty to the person thus deceived. She may have to accuse him of no less an injury, than the blighted hopes and ruined happiness of her whole life. To a man of any moral feeling, or even of any natural feeling, the remorse of having done such a wrong, by the promise of affection and livelong companionship, must be intense. And his shame also must be profound: for he may be supposed to have well examined his heart before he made the promise; and if his affections be so dark to himself, or so fickle, that in spite of his self-examination, he has remained so long in error, and has been led to such a false step at last; how can he hope ever to be justified in making a like engagement with another person? A life of remorse and shame would be the proper sequel to such a fault. The same remarks apply when the Promise is made on the other side.

  §405. We may notice here a Case of Conscience treated of by preceding Moralists (1 Paley, B. iii. c. 5. I state the case as Paley states it. Sanderson, from whom he professes to take it, states it differently.). A certain person in the lifetime of his wife had promised marriage to another woman if he should ever be free. The wife died, and the woman demanded performance of the promise. The man then alleged doubts whether the promise was binding, inasmuch as it was immorally given. The Question proposed has usually been, Whether the man is bound to marry the woman? But if we take the real Moral Question, Whether he ought to marry her? we must answer, that this does not depend on the Promise alone. If he wishes not to marry her, because he has ceased to bear her the affection which the conjugal union requires; according to what we have said, he ought not to marry her. If, on the other hand, he still wishes to marry her, there is nothing in the immoral condition of the |289| promise formerly given which need prevent it. That promise was an offense against Duty in itself, inasmuch as it implied a heart alienated from the former wife. But this does not necessarily vitiate all his succeeding dispositions to the woman to whom the promise was made. We may suppose the old promise annulled, and he may, after the first wife’s death, promise the same thing without blame, and perform his promise.

  §406. Without there being an absolute Promise of Marriage, there are often manifest suggestions of such a common purpose, between man and woman, which lead to difficulties of the same kind. In all countries, and especially in countries in which men and women are left free, in a great measure, to choose for themselves their partners in married life, marriage is the great event of life; it is the point to which the thoughts and imaginations, the hopes and designs of the young of both sexes, constantly tend. This is still more particularly the case with women; inasmuch as their social position depends mainly upon that of the husband. Hence the manner and behaviour of young men and young women, have a frequent reference, tacit or open, to the possibility of engagements of marriage among them. Conversation, of almost any kind, may disclose features of character and disposition, by which one heart may be drawn to another; and indications of such inclination may be given, in all degrees, from the slightest to the most marked. Among such a variety of elements, it may often be doubtful how far such marks of preference, on the one side and on the other, may be equivalent to an Offer of Marriage, or to an Engagement. Nor can any general Rule be laid down; for much must depend upon the conventions of society. But we may say, in general, that Morality requires of us a most serious and reverent estimate of the marriage state; and of the union of heart, and community of moral |290| purpose, by which the parties ought to be drawn together. Any behaviour, therefore, which, while it appears to tend to such a purpose, is really frivolous and unmeaning, or prompted only by vanity, or love of amusement, is at variance with Duty. Such behaviour is a very unfit portion of a life which has our Moral Culture for its constant purpose; and which looks upon the prospect of marriage, and the tone of intercourse with women, as means to this end.
  The above are given as Specimens only of Cases of Conscience respecting Truth; not as a complete Collection, or even as including all the more prominent classes of Cases. But the remarks made upon the above cases may serve to show the manner in which we are led, by the doctrines of Morality, to treat them; and the like Rules may be applied to other Cases.

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Chapter XVI. On Cases of Necessity

  §407. The discussion of Cases of Conscience, which we were pursuing in the last Chapter, led us, in several instances, to Cases of Necessity; and these, we stated that we must reserve for a separate consideration. Cases of Conscience are those in which conflicting Duties and conflicting Rules are weighed deliberately, the time and circumstances allowing of this. Cases of Necessity are those in which a man is impelled to violate Common Duties and Common Rules by the pressure of extreme danger or fear; as when a man kills another in defense of himself or his family; or when he steals, or tells a lie, to save his life.

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  §408. We shall first consider the Cases in which a man thus violates Common Rules under the pressure of danger to himself. The Law shows us that men judge such danger, when extreme, to justify the transgression of Common Rules. Thus, in the Laws of most countries, the Command, Thou shalt not kill, is suspended when I am attacked by a burglar or a robber; and the Command, Thou shalt not steal, is suspended when I am perishing with hunger. And the common moral judgment of mankind looks with indulgence upon the transgressions of ordinary Rules in such extraordinary circumstances. The Moralist must, in like manner, allow, that there are Cases of Necessity, in which the Common Rules of Duty may be transgressed. But these Cases of Necessity must be treated with great caution.

  §409. In the first place, the Necessity, which is the condition of these Cases, must be very rigorously understood. It must be some such extreme peril and terror of immediate death, or of some dreadful immediate evil, little short of death, as produces a pressure on the mind far beyond the usual course of human motives and passions. It is not every extraordinary emergency, when fear and other passions are excited somewhat beyond their usual bounds, that justifies acts which would otherwise be crimes. It is not a moderate danger, that justifies acts of violence and falsehood. The Law teaches us this, when it does not permit us to kill the diurnal housebreaker, or the flying robber; and when it requires, in order that a Contract, made under fear, shall be annulled, that the fear shall have been such as not a timid merely, but a firm man, might feel. To allow any looseness of signification in this condition of Cases of Necessity, would destroy all Morality. If not only the fear of death, but the fear of any great evil, would justify falsehood, there would be an end of the Duty of Truth. For any evil would appear great, when |292| it was impending over us; and the Duty, being confined in its influence to cases in which there were no fears of inconvenience to overcome, would have no office left. And the same might be said of the other Duties. If it be said that fear excuses the violation of Moral Rules, because it carries us out of ourselves; we reply, that so far as fear carries us out of ourselves, it makes us cease to be moral agents; and that if we allow any ordinary fears to do this, we abandon our moral character. To be thus carried out of ourselves, by fear and other passions such as commonly occur, is to be immoral and wicked. The precise office of Morality is, to condemn those who yield to such a necessity as this. We cannot make transgression blameless, merely by calling the Case a Case of Necessity.

  §410. In excuse of transgression of Moral Rules under Constraint, it has been said, that when man’s Liberty ceases, his moral agency ceases. But to make this maxim in every degree true, the notion of a Cessation of man’s liberty must be very rigorously understood. In truth, man’s Liberty, as a moral agent, never ceases, till he is moved as a piece of mere brute matter. Nothing but the man’s own volition can move his muscles. No force, which other men can exert, can compel him, by physical means, to utter a word, or sign his name. It is not merely being put in close prison, and scantily fed, that can deprive man of the liberty which moral agency supposes. His liberty is not a liberty that can act only when all external obstacles and influences are removed; for in fact, that can never be. Moral Liberty shows itself, not in acting without external influences, but in acting in spite of external influences. To resist fear and danger, and still to do what we will to do, is the manifestation of our liberty. If we plead the limitation of our liberty as a reason why we are not bound by Moral Rules, we cast off such Rules altogether; for our liberty |293| is always limited. It is not therefore by being deprived of Liberty merely, that we are placed in a Case of Necessity. Even when we are in prison, or otherwise under a constraint, we are bound by the ordinary Rules of Morality.

  §411. We have said, that the fear of immediate death constitutes a Case of Necessity. The fear of immediate death constitutes one of the most distinct and plain of such cases. The reason of fixing upon such a case, is that such a fear, in most persons, produces a paroxysm and agony of terror and trouble which subvert the usual balance of the mind, and the usual course of thought and action. What is done under such circumstances, may be considered as an exception to the common condition of the man’s being. It has not the same bearing upon the man’s moral culture as acts done in a more tranquil and deliberate manner. In cases where the condition is so extreme, we may allow a deviation from Moral Rules, without infringing their general authority. In addition to this reason for taking the fear of immediate death as a prominent example of a Case of Necessity, this condition makes the danger more inevitable. It may be supposed, in general, that if the threatened death be not immediate, other means of averting that result may be found by the person threatened, besides the violations of Moral Rules, which are the alternative. If, however, a death not immediate can be presented to the mind as an inevitable menace, it may perhaps constitute a Case of Necessity, on the grounds above stated.

  §412. But though the fear of immediate, or of certain, death, as the alternative, must be allowed to constitute a Case of Necessity, so far as such Cases are to be recognized; we are not therefore to conclude that such fear liberates us from all Duties, or justifies all Acts. We do not say, generally, that a man may, without blame, tell a Lie, or violate other Duties, in |294| order to save his life. If we were to decide thus, what would become of our moral approval of Martyrs, who incur death by their open assertion of the truth? and of our admiration of virtuous men in other cases, who perform acts of Duty, knowing that they lead to their death? Even in Cases of Necessity, the violation of Rule may not be without blame; but the blame may be mitigated, in consideration of the Necessity: or, reference being had to the circumstances of the case and of the person, the act may be even excusable and allowable.

  §413. We shall not attempt to define or enumerate Cases of Necessity. A consideration of the peculiar character of such cases will shew that the Moralist ought not to undertake such definition and enumeration. In the Act which is excused as a Case of Necessity, there must be a struggle and compunction in the mind of the agent respecting the Duty violated; although the extreme urgency of the motives which act in the opposite direction, may prevail. For we are supposing the agent to be a virtuous man; and are considering what such a one may do, in a Case of Necessity. And we cannot suppose that such a man can violate the broadest Rules of Morality, without pain and trouble of mind. If we suppose a good man to be led, under the terror of immediate death, not otherwise to be avoided, to tell a lie, or to stab the keeper of his prison; or a woman to give up her person to the lust of a man, we cannot suppose this to take place without great anguish and strong abhorrence of the acts thus committed. The intense vehemence with which man clings to life may over-master this abhorrence; and even the best estimate which the person, at the moment, can form of the course of Duty, may direct such acts. But a person would not be virtuous who could commit them without repugnance, or look upon them with complacency. Any acquiescence in the acts, except as great though inevitable evils; any |295| indifference with regard to the violation of the usual Rules of Morality; is at once immoral. When the act is over, there has been a dire and mortal struggle between Moral Rules and Self-preservation; and if we rejoice that we are preserved, we must still regret that, even for a moment, the general Rules of Duty were compelled to give way. We cannot look upon lying, or homicide, or being an instrument of lust, with approbation; even if, under the circumstances, we think that the acts have been, in this case, excusable. In such Cases of Necessity, we may excuse the act, but we cannot admire it. On the contrary, in such cases, our admiration is bestowed on the other side. We admire a man who suffers death, rather than tell a lie: we admire Socrates who would not escape from unjust legal bondage and death, even when he could do so without violence; we admire a woman who suffers death rather than submit to violation. It is plain that those who act thus, conform to the law of Duty: those who, in such cases of necessity, act otherwise, may do only what, in such cases, is excusable or allowable; but the Moralist must not let them suppose that they take the course which is alone right, or eminently commendable.

  §414. This being the case, we must necessarily abstain from laying down any definition of the limits of Cases of Necessity; and any Precepts for such cases. For if we were to define, beforehand, the conditions under which lying, or homicide, or submission to lust, is the proper course; those who accepted our Rules, would, when the occasion came, take that course without the reluctance and compunction, which are essential to make an act allowable in virtue of Necessity. If we were to trace a definite boundary, beyond which the Common Rules of Morality no longer hold good; men, in circumstances of temptation, would be looking out to see when they had passed this formal boundary, and were entitled to |296| use the license which such a position would give. They would be inquiring at what moment they were beyond the jurisdiction of ordinary Morality; in order that they might then disregard Moral Rules. Whereas this is not the disposition which the Moralist can approve or allow, even in Cases of Necessity. He requires, in order that he may give his approbation, or withhold his condemnation, a struggle in giving up what is commonly right; as well as a wish to do no more than is, in uncommon cases, allowable. He cannot wish to aid anyone in looking with composure upon the shock that his moral being must receive, by the emergencies of a Case of Necessity.

  §415. A further reason for not defining such cases, is this; that the application of such Rules requires a calmness and fairness which cannot be looked for in a case of necessity. By the supposition of a case of necessity, the man is so thrown off his balance, that he cannot conform to the Rules of Duty in their exact and primary form. If we state these Rules in a relaxed form, Cases of Necessity will occur, in which, from the like want of balance of mind, he will transgress even the enlarged Rule. The Moralist cannot deliver, as a Precept, Lie not except in great emergencies. If he were to say so, to a man, under the influence of passion, small emergencies would appear great; and thus such persons might learn to lie without compunction. The Moralist says. Lie not at all. If an extreme emergency occurs, he grants that there are Cases of Necessity in which transgressions of Moral Rules may be excusable; and if he have to pronounce a moral sentence on the case, he will take into account the circumstances of the case and of the person.

  §416. He will attend to the circumstances of the person, as well as of the case. For though the man who has to act in a Case of Necessity is not likely to look to the Moralist for Rules of Action; it is very |297| likely, or rather, inevitable, that his course of action will depend upon his own previous Moral Culture. A man who, like Socrates, has cherished in his mind, for many years, a reverence for the laws, will wait his death from their operation, rather than evade them. A man who has carried the love of truth, a woman who has carried the love of chastity, to a high point, will die, rather than incur the guilt they abhor. Other persons, not so far advanced in Moral Progress, will yield to the present fear, and seek the allowable course, which, in such Cases of Necessity, may exist. The conduct, in such cases, is governed, not by Rules, but by the Operative Moral Principles which have been taken into the character so as to be the Springs of Action.
  The conduct of a person in a Case of Necessity, as in any other case, must be considered with reference to his moral culture, in order that we may determine how far it is good or bad. Now in the case in which a person, whose moral culture has, up to that point been going on, violates the ordinary Rules of Duty in a Case of Necessity; his moral progress must, as we have said, receive a shock. There has been a mortal struggle between Moral Rules and Self-preservation; and Morality has been overcome. So far, the event is a suspension or reversal of moral culture, like any other transgression. But this has not taken place in the ordinary course of the man’s being: it has been at a moment of paroxysm and agony; when by the terror of immediate death, or dreadful evil, his mind was thrown off its usual balance. This event in his moral culture, is, therefore, not to be reckoned as if it had happened at any other time. Perhaps, the struggle and the defeat of Morality, was but for a moment; and implies no real permanent depravation of the character. Perhaps, the shock, though severe, was transient. Perhaps the moral derangement was a sharp and critical disorder, brought on by special |298| external circumstances; which, once past, does not affect the general moral health. In Cases of Necessity, when Rules have been violated, the Moralist may be willing to hope that such is the case; and in this hope, may abstain from condemning the actor, and may thus pronounce his act allowable. In delivering such a Sentence, the Moralist trusts that, as the Moral Culture has been interrupted by extraordinary circumstances, or turned into a strange channel; it will also afterwards be resumed with extraordinary zeal, and pursued with extraordinary advantage. The man who has had to take a merely allowable course, has great reason to examine his conscience and his heart, in order to see that they have received no stain or wrench; and to remove the defect, if they have. And if any more than native aid may be obtained in such a task, he has, more than others, reason to seek for it. If he do not need Repentance and Amendment after his act, at least he needs a renewed Recognition, in his heart, of the Moral Rule which he has violated.

  §417. We may remark, that we have spoken of cases in which the direct Rule of Duty leads to Death; as if Death were nothing more than one among many objects of human fear, although the greatest. Death is, however, also the end of our moral career, so far as this life is concerned. This consideration would not affect the merely Moral Question; which is a question concerning the Course that Duty and Virtue require, so long as life lasts. But Religion, which presents Death to us as, not merely the end of this life, but the beginning of another, gives a new aspect to all such questions. Still, in the eye of Religion, as in the eye of Morality, Death is only one of the events of man’s being; and every man’s conduct with regard to this as to the other events, must be governed by the Law of Duty.

  §418. It appears from what has been said, that |299| Cases of Necessity, in which the conflict is between Moral Rules and Self-preservation, are properly spoken of in the common maxim, which declares that Necessity has no Law; but the exception to Law amounts only to this; that transgression is allowable, provided the Necessity be extreme.

  §419. In the case in which Moral Rules are transgressed, not for the sake of our own preservation, but in order to preserve some other person from great impending evil; we may have a Case of Necessity, which is also a Conflict of Duties: for to preserve another person from great evil, is a part of the general Duty of Benevolence; and when the person is connected with us by special relations, to do this, is involved in the Duties of the Specific Affections. Thus, when the wife of Grotius saved him by a lie; when Lucilius saved Brutus by falsely personating him; when Virginius preserved his daughter from pollution by her murder; when a man, in rescuing a neighbour from death, kills the robber who assails him; we have two Duties, placed in opposition to each other; on one side, the Duty of rescuing, from a terrible and impending evil, a husband, a friend, a daughter, a neighbour; on the other hand, the Duty of not telling a falsehood, or committing homicide.

These Cases of Conflict of Duties differ from the Cases of Conscience formerly considered, in having, as one alternative, death, or some extreme evil, immediately impending over a person whom we love; and hence, they hardly admit of a deliberate previous decision what we ought to do; but rather lead to some paroxysmal act, of which we afterwards enquire whether it was allowable, as in other Cases of Necessity.

  §420. In these Cases, as in the other Cases of Necessity, the Moralist must abstain from laying down definite Rules of decision; and for the like reasons as before. To state General Rules for deciding |300| Conflicts between opposing Duties, would have an immoral tendency. For such a procedure would necessarily seem to make light of the Duties which were thus, in a general manner, postponed to other Duties; and would tend to remove the compunction, which any Moral Rule violated, ought to occasion to the Actor. We may see these defects, in the Rules which have been proposed for such purposes. For example, it has been said by some, that the wife of Grotius and the friend of Brutus were justified in what they did, because the Duty of Truth is only a Duty to one’s self; and Duties to a Husband or a Friend are of a higher order than Duties to one’s self. (1 Eschenmayer, Moralphilosophie. Stuttgart, 1813. §187. Nothlüge.) But the result of this Maxim would evidently be, that any Lie, however great, might be told to procure the smallest benefit to a Husband or Friend; which is a most immoral conclusion.

  §421. But though in such Cases of Conflict of Duties, no Moral Rules can be laid down, as of universal validity, the course taken by the Actor will depend, and ought to depend, upon his state of Moral Culture. And perhaps the best mode of deciding any particular case, is to consider how the two sides of the alternative would have affected the Moral Culture and Moral Progress of the person. Thus, in the case of Grotius’s wife, Conjugal Love was in Conflict with the Love of Truth. Both of these are Moral Principles, to be cultivated in our hearts, by their influence upon our actions. If the wife had neglected an opportunity which offered itself, of saving the husband from death, the shock to Conjugal Affection would have been intense; and the irremediable evil, when it had fallen upon her, must have brought with it a self-accusation and despair, against which the recollection of scrupulous veracity could hardly have supported her. If, on the contrary, in such extreme |301| necessity she uttered a falsehood; even if it had been to friends, it might have remained in her mind as an exception, without weakening the habitual reverence for Truth: but the deceit being, in fact, used towards enemies, with whom the same common understanding does not obtain, which subsists among friends, it would naturally still less be felt to be an act in which the Duty of Truth was lightly dealt with; so that there were reasons to hope, that if any wound were inflicted on the Love of Truth by the act, it might heal readily and completely. And for the like reasons, in extreme cases, the duties of the affections may be generally preferred to the duties of truth and justice. But then this must be understood only of Cases of Necessity, that is, of death or other peril of the highest kind, incumbent upon the object of affection: for otherwise, such a Rule would destroy the duties of truth and justice altogether.

  §422. As we have said, in such Cases of Necessity, men will hardly, in general, look to the Rules of Moralists for the direction of their conduct. But though they may not do this, they will be determined, in their conduct on such emergencies, by their previous moral culture and moral progress. A man who, acting under a momentary sense of duty, kills his daughter to preserve her purity, must have cultivated to a high degree his love of purity; and has probably not cultivated, in the same degree, his horror of homicide. Yet we can hardly blame him, in the same way as we should do, if immoral springs of action had over-mastered a moral Principle; for both those Principles are to be cherished in the Moral Culture of Man. If, in Cases of Necessity, the conflict of opposing Duties be decided by the energetic action of a Principle, which, though disproportioned to other Principles, is still moral, we may pronounce the act excusable; without pretending to decide that some other course might not have been selected, by a character |302| of more even and comprehensive Moral Culture. The predominant Principle in each character, will show itself, not only by prevailing in the struggle, when the conflict is begun; but also by stimulating the invention, and suggesting a course of conduct, which, to a more indifferent mind, would not have occurred. It was the strength of conjugal affection, which suggested to Grotius’s wife the device to save her husband; it was the strength of friendship, which suggested to Lucilius the thought of presenting himself as Brutus; it was the horror of shame and slavery, which inspired in the mind of Virginius, the thought of killing his daughter. A strong Moral Principle, like any other Spring of Action, shows its strength by the activity, vigour, and inventiveness which it calls out in the mind.

  §423. In such cases as have been described, when the course chosen implies self-devotion, or the sacrifice of strong special affections, along with great courage or fortitude, the act becomes an Heroic Act. As Heroic Acts, accordingly, we have already mentioned the acts of Lucilius, and of Virginius; also (§264) of the elder Brutus, Regulus, Socrates. Thus, Heroic Acts approach very near to those Cases of Necessity which involve Conflicting Duties. And they will be judged by the Moralist, in nearly the same manner as such Cases. Heroic Acts arise from the energetic predominance of some Operative Principle, which, overpowering selfish desires and affections, doubt and fear, stimulates the mind to some act out of the common course of human action. If the Principle which thus manifests itself, be a Moral Principle, although disproportioned to other Moral Principles in the character; the Moralist may, not only pronounce the acts excusable, but may even admire them, as Heroic Acts; that is, as Acts out of the reach of Rule. But at the same time, it must be recollected, that the Origin of Heroic Acts, in general, is a |303| disproportion in the Moral Character. To aim at Heroic Virtues only, would be an extremely bad culture of ourselves. It would lead to an entire rejection of Duties; for as we have said (§276), we speak of Heroic Virtues, but not of Heroic Duties.

  §424. Among the Cases of Necessity, there is one Class which may be specially noticed; namely, those in which, under the pressure of Necessity, the Duty of Obedience to Government is put aside—Cases of Resistance to Governors, and of Revolutions. Such cases have occurred, in the history of almost all nations; but they are usually defended, and can only be morally defended, as Cases of Necessity. Under all common circumstances, the Duty of Obedience to the Government historically established in the Community, is incumbent upon every Citizen. There may occur circumstances, in which the preservation of the Constitution of the Country, or the Welfare of the People, may make Resistance and Revolution necessary. But the Moralist must say, in such, as in other Cases of Necessity, that the Necessity must be extreme, before a violation of the Rules of Duty is allowable. All common means must be tried, all the resources of the Constitution exhausted, all other courses explored, before Resistance becomes moral. And we cannot define beforehand, at least, except in a very general way, what are those marks of Necessity which thus justify Resistance to Government. The Moralist abstains from doing this, in these, for the same reasons as in other Cases of Necessity. It would not answer the purposes of Morality, to draw lines, and mark points, to which discontented citizens might look forwards, in order to see when they had acquired the privileges of a condition free from the Rule of Obedience. We are not to class Resistance and Revolution among ordinary conditions of Society. On the contrary, they are to be looked forward to as dire calamities, whenever they come; with which the |304| mind is never to be familiarized, any more than with any other great transgressions of Rules, which, in Cases of Necessity, may occur.
  When the Case of Necessity occurs, the Necessity will be expressed in the language of historical facts and current opinions. Both the Necessity and the expression of it, will depend upon the Moral and Political Culture which the Community has attained. If, according to the historical Constitution, and actual condition of the Community, the Necessity be really extreme; and if all Constitutional courses having been exhausted, the operation of Moral Principle in the Community has produced Resistance, and led to Revolution, the Revolution may be necessary, and even glorious. But even in this case, it is conducive to Morality that the deviation from the common Rules of the Constitution should be, and should appear to be, as small as is consistent with the object to be secured. There may be occasions, on which the Moralist may have to dwell with satisfaction upon such Revolutions; and on the heroic acts by which they were brought about; but in general, it will be his province to speak of the ordinary Rules of Duty, and of their application, rather than of the difficult and disquieting questions of Exceptions to Ordinary Rules.

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Chapter XVII. Of Things Allowable

  §425. We have been led, by our reasonings, to state that, in Cases of Necessity, certain courses of action may be declared Allowable or Permitted, even though we may not be able to pronounce them absolutely right; as to tell a lie to save one’s own life, or |305| the life of a friend. There is a prevalent inclination among men to extend this notion of things which are permitted or allowable, though not rigorously right, to many other cases. It is often asked, with a latent persuasion that the Moralist cannot fail to return an affirmative answer. Whether it be not allowable to utter a falsehood, in order to preserve an important secret: Whether, under very provoking circumstances, anger on our own account be not allowable: Whether, in deciding a question of merit, we may not allowably lean a little to a member of our own family: Whether, a slight occasional excess of moderation, in eating and drinking, be not allowable. These, and many questions of the like kind, are often propounded: and it may be proper to consider what reply the Moralist must make to them.
  The notion of what is allowable, is admitted in Cases of Necessity, as expressing our acquiescence in certain actions as exceptions to General Moral Rules; so that, though the general Maxims of Morality will not authorize us to pronounce them right, our regard for the condition of human nature will not permit us to pronounce them wrong. But to extend this notion of allowable to Cases of common occurrence, when there is no necessity, and only such a temptation as is often arising; is to annihilate all Rule. The meaning of every Moral Rule is, that it is to be obeyed, in spite of temptation to transgress. If, professing to accept the Rule as our Rule, we still deviate from it, whenever any considerable temptation occurs; the Rule is not our Rule. It is no part of the habitual conduct of our thoughts; no part of our moral culture.

  §426. Further: the merely propounding such questions as the above, whether deviations from the Rules of Truth, and Benevolence, and Justice, and Temperance, be allowable, of itself shows that the Moral Culture is very imperfect. It shows that the Love of |306| Truth, of Benevolence, of Justice, of Temperance, is not established in the mind; that the Moral Rules which express these Virtues are received as an extraneous constraint, which we would gladly escape from; not accepted as desirable means to a wished-for end. To enquire whether, under specified circumstances, violation of Moral Rules be not allowable, is to show that our thoughts are seeking not the way to conform to the Rule, but the way to evade it. To make a Class of Allowable Things, would be to sanction and confirm this disposition. We should place an insurmountable impediment in the way of the Moral Culture of men, if we taught them to classify actions as Good, Bad, and Allowable. For they might be led to fill their lives with Allowable actions, to the neglect of those which are Good: and it is evident that to do this, would be to remove all moral progress and all moral aim.

  §427. But it may be said, there must be a class of actions which are merely Allowable: those which are not either good or bad; where a person may take one course or the other without blame: as for instance, to choose Law or Medicine for his profession: to spend more or less upon his dress and table, within the limits which his fortune prescribes: to eat more or less: to study more or less; or to study one branch of literature or another. In these, and an infinite number of others, the like matters, it may be urged that it is allowable to adopt either side. Good men constantly do both the one and the other of the things, thus put as alternatives. There is no necessary character of good or bad on either side; and either side is allowable.
  Upon this we remark, that if, in such alternatives, there be not on either side any necessary character of good or bad, a man is permitted by morality to choose one side or the other according to other considerations. If this be so, the things may be described as |307| Things Indifferent, rather than as things allowable. And undoubtedly, there are, at every period of our lives, many things about us, which are, so far as we can discern, morally indifferent. We cannot see that Moral Rules are applicable to them. We cannot see that either alternative will effect our Moral Culture.

  §428. But we may further remark, that in many cases, in which no moral result appears at first sight, a moral result exists: and may even, by us, be discerned as probable. The choice of a profession, for instance, can hardly be a matter of indifference, in a moral point of view. We have already seen that there are wide moral questions, inseparably connected with the profession of an Advocate. Questions of the like kind might be stated, belonging to the profession of a Physician. How far either of the professions is, for each person, a moral one, must depend upon those solutions of such questions which are accepted by him. Moreover, each of these professions must, in a many ways, produce a very great effect upon the moral culture of the person who exercises it. A man’s profession determines the sphere and kind of his actions; and it is in the doing of these actions, that the man’s moral character is to be formed. The choice of a profession, therefore, must be very far from indifferent, in its moral results, for each man.

  §429. But, though the choice of a profession be important in it moral bearings, it by no means follows from this, that it must be governed by any uniform Rule for all. What is good for one man, may be bad for another, according to the difference of native character and previous circumstances. The effect of a profession, as influencing the man’s moral culture, will depend upon the moral culture which has taken place already. In a man’s moral and intellectual progress, all the steps are connected: and his moral and intellectual Education, which has |308| preceded his entrance upon his profession, may have made his Profession the best Sequel to his Education. We have said that, in the extraordinary exertions of moral principles, the energy of the principle stimulates the mind to select and follow out appropriate trains of thought. The same is the case, also, in the ordinary operation of the principles by which the general course of a man’s life is determined. The Operative Principles which are the strongest in his character, decide him to take one course or another; and if these Operative Principles are Moral Principles, they will tend to continue his Moral Culture in the scheme of life to which they have impelled him. And thus, though we do not, in such cases, pretend to lay down Rules of choice which shall be applicable to all men alike; yet we see that the choice is, for each man, very far from a matter of indifference; that on the contrary, the congruity of his social position, with his character, and moral and intellectual condition, may influence, very favourably, or very unfavourably, his moral culture throughout his life. To decide our choice in such alternatives, is one of the great offices of Prudence and Wisdom; of Prudence, if we consider the decision with reference to any object short of the highest Moral Progress: of Wisdom, if we decide so as most to further that highest object.

  §430. But there are other ways in which actions, at first sight seemingly indifferent, have really a character of good or bad. They may form or foster Habits, which are often plainly not indifferent, though the single acts may appear so. Slight changes, daily repeated, may produce an evident modification. To exaggerate a little the events of the stories which we tell in conversation; to overpoint the antithesis of our remarks; to eat or drink to the full gratification of appetite; to give way to slight impulses of impatience or anger; may, on each single occasion, appear so |309| small a matter as to be allowable; and yet, in this way may be generated Habits of violating truth, justice, temperance and kindness, at least in some degree. And such Habits, existing in any degree, are necessarily very adverse to our moral culture. Habits are generated by successive acts; and, in their turn, produce a continuation of the acts; and every act in which we trifle with the suggestions of truth, justice, temperance, kindness, or any other virtue, may, and more or less must, extend its consequences to the subsequent tenor of our lives. And in the same manner, acts in which we act with a strict and special regard to truth, to justice, to temperance, to kindness, in spite of minute temptations to the contrary, in matters however apparently small and unimportant, may, by the habits which they tend to form, or to uphold, be of service to us in our moral culture.

  §431. Acts which are thus performed, rather from a regard to their influence in the formation of habits, than from their own value, are practised as a Discipline. Many of the seemingly trivial acts, which make up the tissue of our common lives, require to be regarded in this view, in order that they may be duly regulated by moral considerations. The indulgence of selfish desires in small matters; ill-humour; sharp expressions; obstinacy in trifles; must be avoided; because the contrary habits,—self-denial in small matters for the sake of others; cheerful and kind words used to them; the habit of yielding to the wishes of others in trifles;—are not only manifestations of a benevolent disposition, where it does exist; but are a discipline of benevolence, by which its growth is fostered. We must avoid colouring a story in order to produce an effect; arguing for the sake of victory only; depreciating the characters and actions of men in order to show our wit and genius; because such habits are inconsistent with the disposition of an earnest and sincere love of |310| truth and justice; and because such habits tend to make those who practise them, indifferent to truth and justice, in comparison of the gratification of vanity and pride. The opposite practices;—a strict fidelity in narration; a moderation in maintaining our opinion, even when we are confident we are right; an abstinence from speaking evil of any;—are a Discipline of truth and fairness. In like manner, the gratifications of the Table, even if they be not carried so far as to interfere immediately with moral action, by overloading the body, or clouding the mind, may interfere with our moral culture, by fostering a habit of self-indulgence, rather than of self-denial. Rules of living, which make the satisfaction of the bodily appetites a discipline of moderation, are the proper mode of making that part of our nature subservient to our moral culture. And as we have already said, our bodily appetites have in themselves no moral character. It is only by being thus made to contribute to our moral Discipline, that they can cease to be obstacles in the way of our moral progress.

  §432. In a character morally disciplined, the bodily Desires do not operate upon the actions in a direct and unmingled manner, but through the Habits. The direct operation of the desires is controlled; they are wrapped up and put out of sight, in the round of events by which the needs of the body are supplied. The more rigorous moralists have spoken of the bodily desires, as being killed, or mortified; and have taught that this Mortification of the Desires of the body is necessary for the full completion of our moral culture.

The Discipline, which consists in limiting or rejecting the indulgence of the Desires of the body, has been carried very far by some, with the view of mortifying such desires. With these persons, Discipline, Askesis, has been made a direct object; and they have adopted many practices to attain their object, which have hence been termed Ascetic Practices.

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  §433. But it does not appear that this ascetic course, in which the mortification of the desires of the body is made a direct and primary object, is really well suited to the moral culture of men in general. The object of Discipline is not Discipline itself, but the unconscious Habits which Discipline generates. Discipline is not complete, till we do spontaneously the actions in which we have been disciplined. A man has not completed the discipline by which he learns to swim, till he can swim with no more effort or thought than he requires to walk. An accomplished swimmer swims spontaneously, when he finds himself in the water. A man has not completed his discipline in a foreign language, till he can understand and use it without recalling his rules of grammar; till, as it is often expressed, he thinks in the language. And such is the object, in this, and in other courses of bodily or mental discipline. The like is the case in our moral culture. Spontaneous, not Ascetic Virtue, is that which the Moralist desires to see among men. So far as ascetic practices may be requisite to generate habits of self-denial and self-control, they may be rightly employed: but we are not to forget that ascetic practices have, in themselves, no moral value. If they are good at all, they are good only as means to something else. Discipline is good as Discipline: but Discipline is completed, only by reaching the end of the ascetic struggle with inclination. In our moral culture, we are to aim, not at the means but at the end: not at the Ascetic Struggle, but at the Disciplined Spontaneity.

  §434. What has been said of the Discipline by which moral virtues are fostered, applies likewise to the Discipline of the Intellect. Many employments of the mind, apparently unimportant and indifferent, are important parts of our intellectual and moral formation. Intellectual employments, which are generally pursued for the mere pleasure of the pursuit; |312| favourite studies; books of our own choice, and the like; can hardly fail to have a great influence upon the intellectual habits, and thus may promote or impede the development of the intellectual virtues. Studies and reading, which have in them no direct immoral tendency, may yet dissipate and distract the mind. The love of mere intellectual amusement may destroy the habit of solid thought, and interfere with those Duties of Consideration, and of acting rationally, of which we have spoken; indulgence in the literature of mere imagination, humour, wit and the like, may destroy the love of truth; the exclusive cultivation of the material and mathematical sciences may make the mind dull and captious in dealing with moral conceptions. Any course of intellectual employment, if allowed too much to absorb the mind, may check and pervert that balanced and complete intellectual culture, which is most conducive to the progress of the whole man.

  §435. Thus actions of all kinds, otherwise unimportant, become important as parts of a Discipline. Scarcely anything can be said to be indifferent, when considered with reference to the effect which it may produce upon our lives, through corporeal, intellectual, and moral habits. Every act, however slight, may be good or bad, when considered as an indication of good moral discipline, or of the want of it; as, in the eyes of those who are judges of manners, every act is an indication of good or of ill Breeding.

  §436. For this reason, the Moralist does not readily class any act as Indifferent; or pronounce any act Allowable, which is no more than allowable. It may be difficult, or impossible, to see the bearing of a single trifling act, on the actor’s moral condition; and it would be unwise to lay down general rules for such acts. But the act may, nevertheless, have such an influence; and each man has it for a duty, to |313| exercise a careful guidance and control over even trifling acts; recollecting how trifling Acts grow into Habits; and how important a part of a man’s moral condition his Habits are. The more entirely a man’s whole being is governed and directed by Moral Principles, and the more does the circle of Things Indifferent narrow and dwindle. As the moral light grows stronger, everything assumes a colour of good or bad, between which he has to choose. Everything, however trivial or mean, affords aliment and occasions to virtue. And as all things thus become good or bad, nothing is merely allowable. If it be allowable, it is right; and is what must be done because it is right, not what may be done because it is allowable.

  §437. It is true, that thus to estimate every act, however trivial, as having a moral value from its influence upon our character, implies a clearness of view, as to the operation of such influences, which we can never fully attain to. This condition of mind, in which all acts are good or are bad, and none indifferent, is one which we may approximate to, but can never arrive at. When we have exercised all our sagacity and diligence, in determining what acts are right, and what are wrong; there will still remain a residue, at every period of our lives, which will have the aspect of being indifferent. Nor need we be disturbed that this is so. If, habitually referring things to a moral standard, and exercising such care and thought as a serious conduct of the business of life requires, we keep our eyes open to the good and the bad of the actions which come before us, in order to choose the good and shun the bad; we carry on our moral culture, according to the stage at which we have arrived. But in order to do this, we must, at each step, ask, not what is allowable, but what is right; not what we may do, but what we ought to do. If to these questions we can obtain, on any particular subject, no definite response from our |314| consciences, we may guide our course by the best lights of prudence which we can obtain; always recollecting, however, that our not being able to see that there is one course which we ought to take, rather than another, is an imperfection of vision, which arises from the defect of our intellectual and moral faculties; and which we may hope to see removed, when our minds are further enlightened, in a more advanced stage of our moral progress.

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Chapter XVIII. Of Ignorance and Error

  §438. Ignorance and Error are often referred to, among the causes which make Actions excusable. It will be proper to consider how far Actions which are generally wrong, are, by Ignorance and Error, rendered excusable in the Agent.
  We have already spoken of Intellectual Duties; and the existence of such Duties leads to some Maxims which bear upon the question now before us. We have mentioned (§336-§342) the Duty of Consideration; the Duty of acting according to Rule; and the Duty of acting rationally. We have further spoken of the Duty of our own Intellectual Culture; and also (§366) of the Duty of constantly enlightening and instructing our Conscience. These Duties cannot be neglected or omitted, without a transgression of that Duty of Moral Culture, which is our highest and most comprehensive Duty.

  §439. But Ignorance and Error may arise from other Causes, besides the neglect of these Intellectual Duties; for example, they may arise from our want of information, which we have not any means of |315| obtaining; or from our receiving false information, which we have no reason to suspect of falsehood. In such cases Ignorance and Error are unavoidable: or, in the language sometimes used by Moralists, they are invincible Ignorance and invincible Error. They cannot be avoided or overcome by any obvious exertions of ours. We have performed, it is supposed, the Duty of Inquiry and Consideration (§336) which is incumbent upon us, and still we remain in Ignorance or in Error On this supposition, the actions which we ignorantly and erroneously perform are blameless. We have no way of avoiding or removing Ignorance or Error, but by Inquiry and Consideration. If we have done all that is in our power to free our actions from these defects; the defects may be considered as no longer belonging to us. If I purchase a horse, and have a suspicion that he has been stolen from a previous owner, I must inquire for the evidence of such a fact, and weigh it carefully. But if the result of my inquiry and deliberation is, to remove entirely the suspicion, I may blamelessly buy him, though he should afterwards be found to be a stolen horse. And in the same manner, I am blameless, if the circumstances of the sale are such as to banish suspicion; as for example, if he is sold in open market, it may be that this circumstance is, in consequence of the habits of the country, sufficient to remove the necessity of inquiry. In this case, Error, when it occurs, may be considered as unavoidable; and the erroneous action is still blameless.

  §440. But it is requisite, to the moral character of the act, that we should direct ourselves by the real inward belief to which we are led, and not merely by any external result. A mere formal inquiry, for the sake of saving appearances, or of complying with the letter of our maxims, cannot make the act moral. Such a pretended conformity to the Duty of Inquiry, is insincere and dishonest.

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  It will often be difficult for us to determine, whether we have been sufficiently persevering and minute in the Inquiries, which we have made, into the facts which guide our actions; and when we have been deceived, and have thus been led to do what we wished to avoid; as soon as the deceit is discovered, we may perhaps wonder that we did not detect it sooner; and may regret that we did not carry our inquiry further. Thus, when I have bought a horse, and afterwards find him to have been stolen; I may regret that I did not inquire more carefully into the Seller’s story. This regret includes some condemnation of the act which I have committed under the influence of the deceit, and approaches to the character of repentance. And such sentiments of self-condemnation and repentance are well founded, when we have been negligent in our inquiries. It is very difficult to know when we have done all in our power to ascertain the truth of facts; and therefore, difficult to know when we are quite free from the blame of such negligence.
  Hence we are led to this Maxim; that Unavoidable Ignorance or Error removes the blame of the actions which it causes; but that we are to be very careful of not too easily supposing our ignorance to be unavoidable.

  §441. Of course, as soon as we discover that, through ignorance or error, we have done a wrong to any one, it is our Duty to remedy the wrong. If we have bought what was stolen from him, we must restore the thing to him; and the like. Any resistance in our minds to this step, is immoral. When our ignorance ends, the excuse which it supplies to us ends. We may avoid blame, in virtue of our Ignorance or Error, but we may not receive advantage from it. We regret our Error; but if we retain the benefits of it, we shall have to repent of our Fault. There is dishonesty in resisting the consequences of |317| the detection of our error; as there is dishonesty in willingly abstaining from detecting our error

  §442. When Ignorance and Error are of such a kind that they may be avoided by Inquiry and Consideration, the actions to which they give occasion are not freed from blame by the ignorance and the error Yet Ignorance and Error, even when they are the consequence of a neglect of the Duties of Inquiry and Consideration, may exist for a time, without producing any external action which violates Moral Rules. So long as this is the case, the fault which we have committed is the general Neglect of that Intellectual Culture which is requisite to our moral progress. But when Ignorance and Error, thus produced, give rise to special violations of Moral Rules, such transgressions are not excusable on account of the Ignorance and Error If a man remain, through Negligence, ignorant, or mistaken, as to the amount of his income, and in consequence, contract debts greater than he can pay, he is not blameless; though Ignorance and Error are the occasion of the wrong which he does to his creditors. He is culpable for not ascertaining what he could afford to spend, before he incurred his debts. If, with the same ignorance, incurred such debts, he might still be blamed for Negligence in not ascertaining the conditions under which he had to act. But when his Negligence inflicts loss on other persons, it becomes a carelessness of Justice and Honesty embodied in act; and therefore a transgression of a graver kind.

  §443. Still, there is a difference between Carelessness of Justice and Honesty, and intentional Injustice and Dishonesty. Debts contracted through negligent ignorance of our income, are not so culpable as Debts contracted with fraudulent intentions. In one case, the Duty of Consideration is, for the time, omitted; but it may be resumed. In the other case, the Duty of Justice or of Honesty is intentionally violated; |318| and the Violation must be repented of. In one case, the moral progress is suspended; in the other, it is reversed. And thus, Ignorance and Error arising from negligence, though they cannot excuse, may palliate our transgressions, by excluding intentional wrong.

  §444. But besides Ignorance and Error with regard to the Facts on which the direction of our actions must depend; there may, also, be Ignorance and Error with regard to the Rules by which the moral character of actions is determined. And it may be made a Question, how far such Ignorance and Error render actions excusable, which are contrary to Moral Rules. If a man be ignorant that theft is a crime, is he guilty when he steals? If a man believe slavery to be consistent with morality, is he excusable in buying and selling men? If a man think that property is an immoral institution, is he justified in disregarding the Rights of Property in other men?
  To such questions, we reply, in the first place, that a person labouring under Ignorance and Error, such as are here described;—ignorant that theft is a crime; that buying and selling men is immoral; that property is an institution necessary for moral action among men;—must be in a very imperfect state of moral culture. We have shown that, in virtue of man’s moral nature, property is a necessary institution, and theft necessarily a crime; and we shall be able to show, in like manner, that buying and selling men is immoral.
  These Moral Truths spring from the moral nature of man and are unfolded in an explicit form, by our moral and intellectual culture. They are virtually included in the Express Principles of Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose, which we formerly stated (§269). Such general moral truths, thus derived from the Fundamental Principles of Morality, may themselves be termed Moral Principles. And as the denial of the Express |319| Principles of Morality implies a defect in the Operative Principles, namely, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Wisdom; so a denial of the Derivative Principles, which result from the Fundamental Principles, also implies a defect in the same Operative Principles. A person who denies the necessity of Property, the criminality of theft, and the like, must either be a person in whom the power and habit of intellectual deduction are feeble and confused; or he must be a person who denies the express Fundamental Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. Denying these express Principles, he cannot possess, except in a very imperfect and obscure form, the Operative Principles which form the Cardinal Virtues of men. Hence a person who is in Ignorance and Error on such points as have been mentioned, the necessity of Property, the criminality of Theft, and the like, may be said to be wanting in the Common Moral Principles of men.

  §445. Putting off for a moment the Question how far this condition—the Want of the Common Moral Principles—may be said to excuse or exculpate actions arising from such a condition; we cannot hesitate to say that such a condition implies a low stage of moral culture. The man who is in this condition, has made a very small advance in that Moral Progress, at which, as Moral Agents, we must constantly aim. When Ignorance and Error take the form of a Want of the Common Moral Principles, they may easily suspend or reverse the Moral Progress of the Man, as much as many kinds of Transgression would do. And hence, they must produce upon the Man’s Moral Being, the effects which the Suspension and Inversion of the Moral Progress does produce.
  We shall not now attempt to determine what is the result of a suspended and inverted Moral Culture, when not retrieved by any subsequent progress. Perhaps Morality alone cannot decide this question; perhaps |320| she must refer us to Religion, in order that we may learn what consequences such a final suspension and inversion of moral progress produces, upon man’s destination and condition. But we must necessarily conceive thus of the result: that the condition of the man whose moral progress is finally suspended and inverted is, in some way, opposite to that of the virtuous man; and this, equally, whether the want of progress arise from transgression of moral principles, or the want of them. If Virtue lead to Happiness, as we have said it must (§304), the Want of the Common Moral Principles must lead to an unhappy condition. The man who, wanting the Common Moral Principles, transgresses them, cannot be placed, by his Ignorance and Error, on a like footing with the man who knows these Principles, and conforms to them in his actions. If such Ignorance and Error be not faults, they must at least be considered as great moral misfortunes. Such Ignorance and Error belong to a Conscience dark and erroneous; and a dark and erroneous Conscience is a great moral calamity.

  §446. But the general judgment of mankind regards the Want of the Common Moral Principles, not only as a Misfortune and a Calamity, but as a Fault. The man who shows this Want of Moral Principles by the declarations which he makes, incurs the disapprobation and repugnance which we give to moral wrong. We abhor a man who asserts that no affection is due from a child to a parent. We do not hear with patience men asserting that they have a Right to buy and sell their brother men as if they were cattle. We condemn, as immoral, a man who refuses to acknowledge any Duty of Kindness, or Justice, or Truth, towards other men. These are Errors which we do not hold to be innocent or excusable. We think they might have been avoided, and ought to have been avoided. Each man’s Reason, and the Instruction which each man receives, in the general course of Society, might, we hold, have taught him better than this. And this, our conviction, agrees with what we have said of Intellectual Duties. We require of men that they should be rational; we have seen (§338) that there is a Duty of acting rationally. And as there is a Duty of acting rationally, there is a Duty of thinking rationally; for rational thinking is a condition of |321| rational acting. And to deny, or to be ignorant of, the Common Moral Principles of Man, is to be, to a certain extent, irrational. It is to neglect or pervert the use of the human Reason, by which all men are capable of arriving at such Principles. And thus Ignorance or Error, in the form of the Want of the Common Moral Principles of Man, are blameable.

  §447. Hence, as a general distinction, Moralists pronounce Errors of Fact, when not accompanied with negligence, to be exculpations of the actions which they occasion; but Errors of Principle, not to he exculpations. And in this distinction, they agree with the Jurists: who lay down these two cardinal maxims: Ignorantia facti excusat: Ignorantia juris non excusat. Ignorance of the Fact is an excuse; Ignorance of the Law is no excuse. A man is not criminal for not directing his actions by a Fact, which he did not know from observation or testimony; and which he could not know any other way. On the other hand, ignorance of the Law cannot be accepted by the Law as an excuse. The Law is requisite for the guidance of each citizen in his social transactions, and it is his business to make himself acquainted with it so far as it concerns him. The Law is Natural Justice, with such additional regulations, as are requisite to define its application; the Law, therefore, is requisite for each man’s moral guidance. It is his duty, as well as his obligation, to guide himself by it, and, therefore, to make himself acquainted with it. And the Law, in assuming a knowledge of the actual Laws, assumes |322| only a knowledge of that Rational Law which is the basis of Actual Laws, and of its special consequences in our own country. Such assumptions are requisite for the administration of Laws. If a man might plead ignorance of the Law, in excuse of a crime, it would be impossible to convict criminals; for men would remain willfully ignorant of the Law, in order to avail themselves of this excuse; and even if they were not ignorant, it would be difficult, or impossible, to prove their knowledge. Hence, it is everywhere presumed that the citizen is acquainted with the Law of the State; and in like manner, it is presumed, by the Moralist, that man, as a moral being, is acquainted with the Laws to which his Moral Nature directs him: and if he transgresses these Laws, or pleads ignorance, as his excuse, the excuse is generally not to be accepted.

  §448. But though the Moralist pronounces Ignorance and Error, when they appear as the Want of common Principles, to be blameable; and rejects such a Want, when offered as an exculpation of immoral actions, because it implies a neglect or perversion of Reason; it is still proper for him to recollect, that it is by no means easy to avoid all imperfection and confusion in the use of the Reason. It is our Duty to act and think rationally, as it is our privilege to be rational; but it is by no means easy to think in a manner perfectly rational. The original Endowments, internal Habits, and external Circumstances of men, make Ignorance and Error, even with regard to the Common Moral Principles of men, very difficult to avoid. Few persons are able to see, all that the light of Reason is capable of showing. Men may miss their way at many a point, in the path to and from the Fundamental Principles of Morality. We have been led to such Fundamental Principles (Express Principles, see 268) by the examination of several abstract and general Conceptions. And we |323| deduce from these Fundamental Principles, special Duties, also by means of abstract and general Conceptions. But in forming these abstract and general Conceptions, which are thus the objects of our thoughts, and the guides of our reasonings, we may perform these intellectual processes very imperfectly; and in attempting them, we may fall into confusion, ambiguity, inconsistency; and thus into Error Abstraction and Generalization are intellectual processes which are very inexactly and obscurely performed by most persons: and in the confusion and obscurity of the general and abstract Conceptions thus formed, there is a source of a great deal of irrationality and incoherence, which thus infuses itself into the Moral Principles held by men; even when they have not been negligent, nor intentionally perverse, in their moral reasonings. Thus, if a person maintain theft to be no crime, his Error may arise from a very confused apprehension of that abstract conception, the Right of Property; or from a very imperfect notion of that balanced jural Condition of Society, in which Rights are necessary. If a person deny the necessity of Property, perhaps his Error arises from some confused notion of equality, applied to the quantities of men’s possessions, instead of the Rights of the possessors. If a man assert that buying and selling men is not immoral, his Error may arise from a very defective conception of Humanity, the brotherhood of man to man; as we shall afterwards endeavour to show. In these and the like cases, it may be difficult for some men to avoid those imperfect and confused notions which thus lead to Errors, that are, in themselves, contrary to Reason.

  §449. And this imperfection and confusion of moral notions is, in some measure, augmented and extended by the use of Moral Terms, as it prevails among men. For while many men’s notions are thus defective and obscure, and on that account, as well |324| as on others, different, under the same name; men reason as if the same Term always meant the same Conception, and thus fall into Error Abstract and general Terms are not only marks of our Conceptions, and thus, helps to the memory in reasoning; they are also our instruments of Reasoning. Without the names of Conceptions, we cannot reason at all; and hence, if the names are applied in a confused and variable manner, we are led to false and inconsistent Principles. Principles are established and assented to, in one sense of their Terms; and then, they are applied and urged upon our assent, in another sense. And this cause may make a man inconsistent, even with himself; for we often remember and refer to Principles expressed in words, when we do not clearly retain in our minds the meaning of the Terms which they involve. This confused use of Terms, by ourselves and those around us, leads to many Moral Errors We live in an atmosphere of Language, by which we see Moral Truths obscured and distorted. But still we must recollect, that without the use of Language, we should not be able to see Moral Truths at all; as without an atmosphere we should have no daylight.

  §450. Language is not only thus a source of moral obscurity and inconsistency difficult to be avoided; but also, a source of Prejudices; for it subjects our minds to the influences of those with whom we share the habitual use of language; our families, our educators, our class, our nation. These Influences are Causes of Error difficult to avoid.

  §451. It will be well to recollect this, in order that we may abstain from applying to men, on account of the Express Principles which they assert, and which are contrary to true Moral Principles, that condemnation, which properly belongs to immoral Operative Principles. If, indeed, men carry out immoral Principles into immoral actions, we cannot |325| be mistaken in condemning them. In that case, there must be something worthy of condemnation. But if, while they assert Principles which, in their expression, are immoral, the acts which they bring forth, as examples of their Principles, are kind, just, true, pure and orderly; we may rather suppose that there is, not so much any distinct immorality in their Principles, as understood by themselves; but rather some confusion in their language, or some incoherence in their generalizations.
  For, though opinion leads to practice, and false opinion seems to be the first step to wrong action; there is, in the nature of man, a very general inconsistency, which prevents this connexion from being at all certain or universal. Men who hold false general opinions, compensate an error of belief, by another error, of reasoning; and derive, from false speculations, blameless or moral Rules of Practice. The recollection that this may be so, should temper, not the promptitude of our rejection of false opinions, but the vehemence of our condemnation of those who hold these opinions.

  §452. So to abstain from condemning seemingly wrong Principles, is to tolerate them; and this Duty of Toleration is incumbent upon us, as we have just seen, in virtue of the imperfection of the human Faculties, and their general insufficiency for the task of constructing, in each man’s mind, a perfect connected system of Moral Truth. And thus, we are led to pronounce that Ignorance and Error, especially with regard to very general and abstract Principles, are to be tolerated.

  §453. Further: Ignorance and Error, on moral subjects, may arise, not only from the imperfection of the human Faculties, but also from external Circumstances, as Education, and the defects of the National Standard of Morality. These exert an influence upon our minds, through the use of language, |326| as we have said (§450); and in other ways. The Ignorance and Error thus arising are not absolutely unavoidable; for every man may raise, by moral self-culture, his standard of Morality above that of his Education, or of his Nation; but they are difficult to avoid; for the very power of self-culture is affected by the Habits of youth, and by the national customs. Hence, we may consider the Ignorance and Error, which arise from such causes, as difficultly vincible: and as in some measure, involuntary. Hence, such Ignorance and Error excuse, in some degree, the transgression of Moral Rule, which they occasion. They do not remove altogether, but they diminish the blame. A youth of a savage nation, who has been bred up to look upon theft as innocent or meritorious, does not incur the same moral stain by praising an act of theft, as a boy who has been brought up amid a strict respect for property. But then, on the other hand, the moral culture of the former is very imperfect. His moral nature is very scantily unfolded; his conscience is very dark. This, as we have said, is a calamity, if it be not a fault.

  §454. A further reason why Ignorance and Error, when they arise from external Causes, and are hardly avoidable, may be deemed to diminish the amount of the transgression, is, that in such cases, the moral defects of the character may often admit of. remedy. The defective Moral Culture may afterwards be carried further onwards, by the help of external circumstances more favourable. A bad Education may be succeeded by a better. A low standard of Morality may be superseded by a higher, when this latter is brought before the mind. The dark conscience may be enlightened; and thus, the Ignorance and the Error may be in some measure removed. Hence, the interruption or inversion of the moral progress, produced or indicated by transgressions, |327| which take place in such a condition of Ignorance or Error, are not so great, nor their remedy so hopeless, as when the transgressions proceed more entirely from the internal character, without this influence of external causes. And thus, according to what was said respecting the amount of transgressions (§353), offenses, arising from such hardly avoidable Ignorance or Error, are diminished in their heinousness, by their being so occasioned.

  §455. Ignorance and Error may be considered under one other aspect, which it is important to attend to; namely, when they are willful, or as it is sometimes termed by moralists, affected. Such would be, for instance, these cases: A man who will not examine the Title-deeds of his estate; because he fears to find that it is not his by Right: A man who will not enquire into the amount of his income; because he fears that, when he does so, he will discover the necessity of diminishing his expenses: A man who will not attend to the proofs of the immorality of a practice which he follows; for instance, slave-dealing; A man who, really believing that negros have human faculties, pretends to believe that they have not, in order to justify his making slaves of them: and generally, A man who either refuses to attend to the proofs of his duties, because he does not intend to perform them; or who denies some proposition, merely because it would tend to establish the proof of such duties. Such willful and affected Ignorance does not, in any degree, excuse or exculpate the transgressions which it accompanies. Indeed, it seems rather to aggravate them: for it adds to the moral regression which the offense implies, a perversion of the intellect, adopted with a view to a consistency in immorality.
  It may be thought, perhaps, that assumed or affected Ignorance or Error should be spoken of as an Offense against Truth; that is, against Truthfulness: and in |328| many cases it may be so. But in moral doctrines, and especially in those of an abstract and general kind, there is, as we have just said, room for considerable vagueness and incoherency, in the obscure region of transition from particular to general propositions: and hence, it may often be difficult to say whether or not a man really holds the opinion which he asserts. Some of those who assert property to be an immoral institution, have probably rather confused than immoral minds. Those who assert the negros not to have human faculties, and yet make laws against their human faculties being educated, may perhaps not quite disbelieve their own assertion; though it is inconsistent with their conduct. There is room for some self-deceit on such subjects; and this may, to some extent, liberate a man from the blame of Falsehood. But even if there be not Falsehood, there is often, in such eases as we have described, and in many others, Ignorance and Error which may be called wilful: and such Ignorance and Error are no excuses for transgression.

  §456. Thus the general result of our view of this subject is, that Ignorance and Error, when unavoidable, are excuses for offenses: when difficultly vincible, they diminish the offense; when wilful, they do not at all diminish it. We have seen, too, that on very general and abstract moral doctrines. Ignorance and Error are to be tolerated, out of regard for the imperfection of man’s faculties.

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Chapter XIX. Progressive Standards of Morality

  §457. National Standards of Morality. Nations and Communities, as well as individuals, have their Standards of right and wrong, |329| which assume the reality of a Universal Standard of right and wrong. They have not only Laws, which determine Rights and Obligations, but also current moral Precepts and Rules, which express the conceptions of Duties and Virtues. The assumed existence of a Standard of right and wrong shows itself in the sentiments which are associated with the conceptions and names of Virtues and Vices. Vices are, in all ages and countries, named only to be condemned. Violence, Fraud, Falsehood, Indecency, are objects of aversion at all times and places. There is no nation or language, which has not the means of expressing this; and none, which does not express it.
  It is true, the actions, to which this aversion and condemnation are applied, are different in different ages and countries. In some countries, plunder of strangers, slavery, polygamy, have been regarded as blameless; to us, they are offenses and vices. This difference arises from the diversity of the Definitions of Rights in different times and places: for, as we have seen. Rights are defined by Law, and Virtues and Duties depend upon Rights. Yet the variety of Laws, in various nations, does not prevent Rights from being a necessary element of man’s condition; and in like manner, the diversity of Standards of Morality does not prevent Virtue from being a necessary object of man’s approval; nor hinder Conscience, which recognizes Virtue, from being a universal attribute of mankind.

  §458. Are connected with National Laws. There must be, in all cases, a great connexion between the National Laws and the National Standard of Morality. Both the one and the other express that which is deemed right. Laws are enacted, or upheld, because it is considered right that they should be so. Actions also are approved or disapproved according as they are looked upon as right or wrong. And the consciences of individuals accommodate themselves, in a great measure, to the |330| law. If the national law allow polygamy, or slavery, the individual commonly practises it without self-condemnation. The exhortation of the National Moralist is, in the first place. To obey the Law. The National Moral Precepts take for granted the National Laws. The national conceptions of the various relations of society, as Property, Marriage, the Family, the State, and the like, which are the basis of the Laws, are also the basis of the Morals, of the Nation.

  §459. Moral Precepts are exemplary and relative. But though, in every Nation, Law and Morality are connected, they are, for the most part, not identical. The difference of Law and Morality, which we have noticed (§105), is that which is generally understood: Law refers to definite external acts absolutely commanded or prohibited; Morality refers to internal springs of action; and as results of these, to acts of a less definite kind. The Precepts of Law are positive and absolute. The Precepts of Morality respecting actions, are exemplary and relative;—that is, they only exemplify the disposition from which the actions proceed; and they refer to the legal conditions of Society. The Precepts of Law, Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not break thy promise;—must be considered, in the first place, as fixed and absolute (§105). The injunctions of Morality are to be understood as recognizing the authority of these commands; but as carrying the signification of them much further.

  §460. Morality rests upon Law. Law deals with matters external and visible, such as Objects of desire, (Things,) and Actions, and thus creates Rights. Morality has to do with matters internal and invisible; with Desires and Intentions, as well as with Laws and Rights. Desires and Intentions cannot be defined or described in any way, without some reference to Things and Actions; and therefore, cannot supply a basis of Morality independent of Law: and thus Morality, in the first place, is dependent upon Law. Rights afford the fixed |331| points by which moral positions are determined. Rights also supply some of the principal forces by which the moral sentiments produce their effect. Law affords a support to the framework of society; but Law does not suffice for the social life of man, without Morality. Law and Morality coincide in their general form and outlines; but Law is stiff and hard; Morality of a more flexible, yet more pervadingly active nature. Law is the rigid skeleton, which Morality clothes with living flesh and acting muscles. Law supplies the fixed positions, on which the Machinery of Duty can rest, so as to move the world.

  §461. Law is subject to the Authority of Morality. But though Morality rests upon Law, Law is subject to the Authority of Morality: Law is the Basis of Morality, but yet Morality is the Standard of Law. Law is fixed for the moment, and Morality supposes its fixity: but Morality is a supreme and eternal Rule, which Law must recognize. Law must always attempt to conform to Morality. Thus, though the Law is, in the first instance, assumed to be fixed, and though its commands are accepted as absolute and peremptory; it is not to be considered as entirely and finally unchangeable. The commands of Law are themselves liable to be judged of, as good or bad. They, and their application in particular cases, may be morally wrong, as well as right.
  The Law itself acknowledges this. It puts forward its Rules and Definitions of Rights, as not absolutely fixed and universal. They admit of exceptions in extreme cases. In many such cases, there are special moral considerations, which counteract the general Reasons of the Rule, and suspend its operation. The Law, Thou shalt not kill, admits of exception in cases of self-defense, burglary, and the like (§117): the Right of Property gives way in cases of necessity (§156): and, in its general administration, the National Law either itself aspires to be the voice of Natural Justice, as the Roman Law did; or has, as in England, a |332| jurisdiction of Equity combined with it, and proceeding by Rules of natural justice. Thus Law herself recognizes Justice, as a Standard to which she must conform her commands, and which her definitions cannot alter.
  And thus, again, as Rights are to be used as instruments of Morality by individuals, so also are they by communities. Rights are built upon Law, but Law is to be subservient to Morality. Morality sanctions Law, but Law must perpetually seek the sanction of Morality. Moral Rules at first agree with Laws; but if the Moral Rules are improved, the Laws ought to follow the improvement.

  §462. Moral Rules improved by precision of Conception. We must consider some of the steps by which Moral Rules are improved. We have already stated, that among these steps, is the more exact Definition of some of the Conceptions, in terms of which Moral Rules are expressed. We shall now therefore proceed to consider, with a view to such a more exact determination of their import as our subject may require, some of the Conceptions of this kind; such, for instance, as The State, Justice, Humanity, Liberty, and the like.
  Such Conceptions, in the progress of nations, gradually become clearer and clearer among men. We may suppose that, at first, man’s social and moral faculties are very imperfectly developed. His notions are mainly fastened upon objects of sense; his language refers, for the most part, to such objects. His moral conceptions are dim and vague; and the words by which they are indicated, are employed in a loose and wavering manner. Such is usually the case with all terms of moral import, in the earliest history of a language and of a nation. As the intellectual culture of the nation proceeds, abstract words are used with more precision; and in consequence, the conceptions, designated by such words, grow clearer in men’s minds. Wide and general, as well as limited and narrow terms, are employed, in expressing those moral |333| truths upon which moral precepts rest; and by which the characters of nations are unfolded and fashioned: nor can we say to what extent this intellectual and moral progress may proceed.

  §463. In nations and in individuals. The intellectual progress of individuals follows nearly the same course, in these respects, as that of nations; although the steps of the progress may succeed each other with far greater rapidity. In consequence of the influence of the opinions of past generations upon the views of the present, through the working of literature, language, institutions, and traditions, each man’s mind may pass in a short time, through successive modes of thought which, in the course of history, have been slowly unfolded one out of another. The intellectual revolutions of centuries are compressed into a few years of a man’s youth; a man’s moral conceptions, as they are in our time, are affected by those of the Greeks, of the Latins, and of the earlier times of our own country; not to speak here of the influence of Religion, greater than all the rest.
  But though the intellectual progress of the individual is thus a compendium, and a very brief compendium, of the intellectual progress of man, the two careers are of the same kind;—a constant advance from the material to the abstract; from the particular to the general; but, in what is abstract and general, an advance from the dim and vague to the distinct and precise. And we now proceed to trace, in several instances, what the steps of this advance have been, in order to determine what they necessarily must be, and at what point we may consider ourselves as having arrived.

  §464. Conceptions of Person ; Property ; Right. Among these steps, one of the first is the formation of a conception of a Person, as something having active and conscious Will and Thought, as we ourselves have: and differing, thus, from Things, which are unconscious and merely passive. We |334| have already remarked that this distinction of Persons and Things is one of the foundation-stones of man’s moral nature (§45).
  Again; another important fundamental step in Morals, is the recognition of Things as belonging to Persons; to ourselves and others; the distinction of meum and tuum (§129). This relation is at first indicated only by grammatical modifications denoting possession; such as the pronouns which have been mentioned. But Things, viewed under this aspect, are soon denoted by a general abstract Term, and are called Property.
  Property is assigned to different persons by general Rules, and each man’s Property is his Right. And in like manner, other abstract Conceptions, vested as possessions in particular persons by general Rules, are Rights; as we have already said. This Conception of Rights is established among men, wherever there is settled and tranquil society.
  Some of the succeeding steps in the progress of Moral Conceptions we must consider more in detail.

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Chapter XX. The State

  §465. In order to proceed in a distinct manner with our reasonings, we must have a Conception of The State; a conception which is one of the foundations of Morality (§94). By the State, we mean the Community, as the Source of the reality of Rights. The State implies a collection or aggregation of men: but it is not a mere Collection, like a herd of cattle, in which there are no Rights. The State implies Society: but not a voluntary association; for the State |335| is a necessary Society: man cannot exist out of such a Society. The State implies Rulers and Government: but the Rulers and the Government are not the State: for the State may change its Rulers and its mode of Government, and yet remain the same State. The State implies Laws; but the State is not the Laws; it is the Origin and Enforcer of the Laws: it is the Being whose mind and voice the Laws are. It may be said that the State, thus understood, is a mere Abstraction: but as we have all along seen, Moral Truths cannot be expressed but by Abstractions, and human life is governed by Abstractions. Law itself is an abstraction: Property, Power, Security, Life, the objects of human desire, are Abstractions: even Home, Food, Raiment, when we speak of them in the general way which moral reasonings require, are Abstractions. In like manner, the Family, the Tribe, are Abstractions; and the State is an extension of these Abstractions; including in the conception, some special attributes which belong to our subject; as for instance, that already mentioned; that the State gives reality to Rights, delivers and executes the Laws.

  §466. This conception prevailed from an early period. In the Jewish People, indeed, the Laws were God’s Laws, supported by his sanction; and the conception of the State, as the origin of Law, was, among them, not brought into clear view. But the conception of the State as the origin of Rights and Obligations, was familiar among the Greeks. “It is manifest,” says Aristotle, (1 Politics I. i.) “that the State (ἡ πόλις) is one of the Things which exist by nature: and that man is by nature an animal living in States (πολιτικὸν ζῶον, a political animal). A man belonging to no State, is less than man, or more. And thus we find in Homer, a savage man reviled as |336| ‘ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστιος, ἀνέστιος.’ ‘A Tribeless, Lawless, Homeless Wretch.’” (Il. ix. 62.)
  He further adds, “The State exists before the family or the individual, as the body exists before the members; for if the body do not exist, the hand or the foot is not really a hand or a foot.” Where, as we find by the context, he means, that the State exists before the Individual, in the order of reasoning. The Conditions of the Individual’s being, are to be derived from the Conditions of the State, and not reversely. The variety of forms of Government which prevailed among the Greek cities, and the changes of form which often succeeded each other in the same city, prevented the philosophers of that nation from confounding the State with the Governors, as was often done in long-enduring monarchies; while the strong constraint which the Laws, in many Grecian States, exercised over individual inclinations, made it unlikely that men should then view the State as a voluntary association; a doctrine which was adopted at a later period. That the State, notwithstanding this constraint, was an object of great reverence, not only as the Origin of Law, but the Teacher of Justice and Virtue, the reader of the Greek authors of the Republican time, will recollect abundant proofs. I may mention, for the sake of example, the expostulation which Socrates, in his dialogue with Crito, makes the State address to himself, on the supposition that he had attempted to escape from prison. (1 Plato, Crito. §.11.)

  §467. The Romans were, in like manner, familiar with the conception of the State, as the condition of a society in which Rights exist. In Cicero’s work De Republica he says, (2 Lib. i. 25. The State, or the Commonwealth, is the Community: but a Community is not every assemblage of men, anyhow gathered together: but an assemblage connected by agreement respecting Rights, and common participation of Advantage.) “Est igitur Res publica res |337| populi: populus autem, non omnis hominum coetus, quoquo modo congregatus: sed coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.”

  §468. The Conception of the State became, in later times, less clear and steady. The creation and destruction of Kingdoms and States which took place between the epochs of Alexander and Augustus; the concentration of all the powers of the Roman Commonwealth in the Emperor: the separation of the Roman Empire into new kingdoms; the further subdivision of the powers of government which prevailed under the Feudal System; the nearly absolute power of Kings in most European countries;—all tended to unsettle and confuse in men’s minds the Conception of the State. On the one side, men confounded the King with the State, and conceived that in him was the source of Law and Authority. And in opposition to this, there grew up, in modern times, opinions in which the doctrine of the State, as the source of Rights, was rejected; and Society was represented as a mere Concourse of Individuals. According to this doctrine, individuals compose a State by contributing, to a common stock, the Rights which they naturally possess; sharing the aggregate of such Rights among themselves by common consent; and establishing officers, to carry their agreement into effect.

  §469. This latter doctrine is quite untenable. Without the existence of a State, we have no Rights; nor can the Rights of the State be at all explained, by any aggregation of the Rights of Individuals. Has the State of England its Right to the National Territory by summing up in itself the Rights of individual Landholders? Or does not, rather, each Landholder derive his Right to his Property from the State? It is plain that the latter, not the former, is the case. The Right to Land is derived from the Law of the Land; that is the Law of the State. Independently of the Law of the Land, no man has a |338| Right to land in England. The National Right is not the result, but the origin of the Right of individuals. And in like manner, of other National Rights. England, as a State, may make war upon France; and in the course of war, may kill Frenchmen, and seize French possessions. But an individual Englishman has no fraction of such a Right. Even if he declares that he will withdraw himself from a share in the national compact, and will act for himself, he is not allowed to do, on a small scale, what the nation does upon a large one. The Right of the State to make War, depends on its being the State; not on its being a Collection of Individuals.

  §470. The State is conceived as one; the Individuals of which it is composed being many: the State is conceived as permanent, while the individuals are born and die. Individuals derive, from the State, their Possessions, Privileges, and Condition, in the community; either directly, or by the State determining the Possessions, Privileges, and Condition of the Family, and the Laws of their derivation. The State, as a single permanent agent, in its proper functions, acts for the many constantly changing individuals, of which it consists. States have, with each other, intercourse of various kinds; making Treaties of Peace, Commerce, or Alliance with each other; and making War on each other, if the necessity arises. The State bounds the legal relations of the individual: the citizens of different states have no legal relations with each other, except through their States.

  §471. The State is, thus, the necessary Origin of all the Rights which exist within itself. It is an Authority, superior to all other Authorities; and from which they are all derived. This Supreme and Original Authority, thus residing in the State, is its Sovereignty. A state which is, in all its internal relations, independent of all other States, is a Sovereign |339| State. In the monarchies of modem Europe, the Supreme Power has been conceived as vested in the Monarch; and he has been looked upon as the origin of all other power. In such cases, the Monarch is termed the Sovereign: but in Republics, such as the United States of North America, no person is Sovereign. The term Sovereign has also been applied to the People; but a people, deprived of that organization which makes them a State, are not sovereign. They cannot exercise or impart authority. We can with no propriety speak of the Sovereign People of England; except we mean the State of England; and thus include King, Lords, and Commons, in the term People: if People denote individuals, without governors and magistrates, we can with no more propriety speak of the Sovereign People of England, than of the Sovereign People of Yorkshire. If the People of Yorkshire be not sovereign, because they are under the authority of England; the People of England are not sovereign, because, by the same rule, they are under the authority of King, Lords and Commons. If there be any established Authority, the rule of such Authority determines where the Sovereignty resides. If we suppose all established authority annihilated, no body of men is sovereign over any individual; and each man is sovereign, with as good a Right as any other man or any collection of men.

  §472. If it be said that the People is really the Sovereign Authority, and the Source of Rights, because it is by the common consent of the People that the Supreme Authority is conferred upon the sovereign governors of the State: we reply, that such a transfer of sovereign power to governors, by the common consent of the members of a society, has very rarely taken place; and if in a few societies it have ever occurred, such uncommon and extraordinary events afford no grounds for the existence of Rights, |340| in communities in which nothing of the kind has ever taken place. And in the next place, we remark, that whenever a society have thus conferred supreme authority upon their governors by common consent, they have, in their actions, presupposed the existence of Rights derived from States. If a body of men, for instance, by common consent frame a government for the country in which they live; or for another country, which they have purchased, and into which they are migrating: they suppose, in the first instance, that the country is theirs as their native land; and in the second instance, as a purchase. But yet mere individuals alone cannot have such Property: for Property in land, as we have seen, and purchase of Land, for the like reasons, are creations of the Law.

  §473. Thus the Conception of a Sovereign State, as the origin and guardian of Rights, is necessary, in order that we may conceive Rights as realities. We may add, that the State is necessarily conceived as a Moral Agent; since it makes war and peace, which it may do justly or unjustly; keeps Treaties, or breaks them; educates its children, or neglects them. What are the Rules of Justice in the actions of States, we must afterwards consider: but it is plain that we must consider the State as an Agent, to whose conduct such Rules are applicable.

  §474. Since the State is thus a Moral Agent, we may apply to it the Rules of Duty, and the doctrines of Morality, which we have already established. The State has its Duties; Duties of Truth and Justice, as all agree; for all hold it to be the Duty of a State to observe its Treaties, to abstain from the Possessions of another State; and the like. A State has also Duties of Benevolence; To relieve its poor, to liberate its slaves, are often urged upon a State, as manifest Duties of this kind.
  And, as the condition of other Duties being performed, the moral Education of its citizens, and consequently |341| of itself, is a Duty of the State. It is its Duty to establish in the minds of its children, and to unfold more and more into constant and progressive operation, the Moral Ideas of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order.

  §475. Thus Moral Progress is the Duty of States, as well as of individuals. States, like individuals, have a continuous existence; a series of purposes and actions; a connected course of being; a Life. During this Life, it is their Duty to conform their being more and more to the Moral Ideas; and this Duty extends to all their actions, and all times of their action.

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Chapter XXI. Justice

  §476. Rights are, as we have formerly said, necessary conditions of man’s action as man; and the State is the necessary origin and basis of Rights: the State defines them and realizes them. But though Rights are thus, in each case, what, by the State, they are defined to be; there is yet, in men’s minds, a fundamental conviction, that Rights are not arbitrary. It is conceived that there is a higher Rule, to which Rights ought to conform; that they should be, not only ordered, but just; that there are not only positive Laws, enacted by special bodies of men, but a Natural Law, depending upon the nature of man.
  This conception of Natural Law, appears among the Greek philosophers. “There are,” says Aristotle, (1 Rhetoric, 1. 13.) “two kinds of Law; that which is proper to each community; and that which is common to all. For there is, as all men perceive more or less clearly, |342| a Natural Justice and Injustice, which men in common recognize, even if they have no society nor compact with each other. Thus the Antigone of Sophocles is made to say, that it was right for her, in spite of the tyrant’s command, to bury her brother Polynices, as a part of a Natural Law:
    ‘For this is no command of yesterday.
    But everliving Law, its source unknown.’

  The Books of the Laws of Plato proceed upon the same supposition; and are an attempt to draw out, in detail, the Code of Natural Law which was thus assumed to exist.

  §477. This Conception of a Natural Law, derived from Reason, and universally valid for all men, was still more distinctly entertained by the Romans. This appears in Cicero’s Dialogues on the Laws in several places, (1 Legg. i. 6; ii. 4.) and still more emphatically in a passage in the work De Republica: (2 De Rep. iii. 22. quoted Lactant. Inst. vi. 8.) “Law is right Reason, congruous to Nature, pervading all minds, constant, eternal; which calls to Duty by its commands, and repels from wrong doing by its prohibitions; and to the good, does not command or forbid in vain; while the wicked are unmoved by its exhortations and warnings. This Law cannot be annulled, superseded, or overruled. No Senate, no People can loose us from it; no Jurist, no Interpreter, can explain it away. It is not one Law at Rome, another at Athens; one, at present, another at some future time; but one Law, perpetual and immutable, includes all Nations and all times.” (3 I have omitted the concluding clause of the paragraph, “Of this Law the Author and Giver is God,” as belonging to another part of my subject.)
  The Law, thus described by Cicero, includes Justice, as well as Law. In the notion of Natural Law, |343| the distinction of Obligations and Duties is not recognized.

  §478. But it may be said that the Natural Law, thus described by Cicero, nowhere exists. The actual Law is different at Rome and at Athens, and in every different State. And since the Natural Law, of which we speak, cannot be the same as all these Codes, it cannot be the same with any; and is actually nothing.
  The reply to this difficulty is contained in what we have already said (§95, §96); That the Conceptions of the Fundamental Rights, which Law establishes, are necessary and universal for all men; but that the Definitions of these Rights are Facts, which grow out of the History of each Community, and may be different in different times and places. The Second Book of this Work contains a view of this Natural Law; the Laws of Rome and of England being there employed, as exemplification, not as the necessary form, of Natural Law. We there saw, that in many instances, the Commentators on these Laws have announced Maxims of Natural Law, as the basis of the actual Law.

  §479. The Roman term, Jus (in its sense of a body of Laws, and of Doctrines on which Laws depend), is especially adapted to denote this Natural Law; for it implies, at the same time, Law and Justice (§90). The consistency of the Law with Justice, is assumed throughout the Roman Jurisprudence. Thus in the commencement of the Institutes we read: “Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi. Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum scientia, justi atque injusti cognitio.” (1 Inst. 1. 1. Justice is the constant and perpetual intention of giving to each his own Right. Jurisprudence is the knowledge of divine and human things, (as required for that intention: the science of what is just and unjust.) But Justice, thus assumed as identical with |344| Jus in its results, is a conception which requires to be more exactly defined and developed than we have yet done, before we can so apply it. This we must now attempt to do.

  §480. As we have said, Law, in every form in which it exists, must involve actual Definitions, as well as the general Conception of Natural Law or Justice. These Definitions will depend upon past events. Thus, the tenure of land in each country depends upon past conquests, and migrations of the races which inhabit the country; upon many inheritances, many contracts of buying and selling, and the like, which have taken place among individuals: upon Laws which have been made, relative to such property, and such transfers; and upon various other circumstances. Justice gives to each his own; but the actual Law must define what is each person’s own, according to all these circumstances. And the like may be said of all other branches of Natural Law.

  §481. According to our idea of Rights, as assigned by Natural Law, each person must have those Rights which it is just he should have. A person cannot have Rights which it is unjust he should have. If the actual Laws of any State give him such Rights, those Rights are unjust; and that they are so, is a reason for altering the Law, or its application. If a man has acquired a seeming Right, in violation of Justice, Natural Law rejects such Rights. According to Natural Law, Rights cannot be founded on Injustice.

  §482. On the other hand, existing Rights, in each country, as we have seen, depend upon its History: and the History of every country contains many acts of injustice. It cannot be doubted that the present Rights of Property in Land, for instance, have, in every country, been brought into being by transactions, many of which have been unjust. Shall we |345|
say that Justice requires us to deprive persons of such Rights, when any Injustice can be discovered in their origin or transmission; however remote may be the blemish, and however blameless the present holders? If an estate were acquired by fraud centuries ago, and have since been possessed, without dispute, by generations of unconscious successors; or sold to a multitude of poor and honest purchasers; shall we say that it still, in Justice, belongs to the heirs of the defrauded person; and that, according to Natural Law, the present possessors ought to restore the property to those heirs? No one, probably, would assert it to be just to destroy supposed existing Rights on such grounds as these. All would allow that Justice is, in such a case, with the Possessors.

  §483. Indeed, to assert the contrary, would be to make that Law of Descent, by which the heirs of the defrauded person might claim the property, paramount over all other Laws. It would be to make that Rule of inheritance absolute and indestructible, while other Rules, as for instance, bona fide purchase, prescription, and the like, are comparatively rejected. There can be no reason, in Natural Law, for erecting any one Rule of Derivation of Rights into this absolute Supremacy over all others.

  §484. Thus the maxim, that Rights cannot be founded in Injustice, is not to be applied in such a way as to make every past Injustice overturn present possession. Injustice is an arbitrary act, done in disregard of Rule and Reason. Justice abhors all that is arbitrary; for it requires all things to be done according to Reason, and therefore, according to Rule. But then, the Law of Inheritance is an arbitrary thing, as well as the Act of Fraud. The Law of Inheritance is quite different in different countries; and might, in this country, have been different from what it is, if the Law had so ordered it. Justice accepts, in general, the Law of Inheritance, as her Rule; yet |346| not absolutely, as Supreme, but relatively, as a means to her end. Justice annuls, in general, the Effect of acts of Fraud; but still, not without limit in the contemplation of Effects; but only, so far as the condemnation of such effects is a means to her end. Justice cannot disregard the existing state of possessions, and turn her attention only to their origin. She cannot found her sentence on one particular past event, and take no account of the more recent events and the present conditions. On the contrary, it is the present with which she has especially to do. She has to pronounce upon existing Rights, as to whether they are valid or not; and she must look at them, as they exist. And hence, as a balance to our former maxim, we must lay down this: Justice assigns Rights according to existing conditions.

  §485. Thus Justice rejects that which is arbitrary, alike in the past and in the present. She condemns the ancient fraud, from which the present possession is derived: she limits the Rule of inheritance, on which the opposing present claim is founded. She pronounces that no Right can be founded in Injustice: but she pronounces the Right of the present holders to be founded, not on the ancient Injustice, but on the recent transactions; from the stain of Injustice, and by which the ancient stain may be diluted or obliterated. A thing unjustly acquired, may, by long undisturbed possession, and bona fide tenure, become a just property: and accordingly, so the Laws of States decide (§151).

  §486. Idea and Fact in Justice. The opposition of the two maxims respecting Justice, which have just been stated, is a result of the universal opposition of Ideas and Facts which exists in every subject of Thought (§97). In the Idea, Justice cannot admit of anything arbitrary; for what is arbitrary is unjust. In the Fact, every transaction must have in it something arbitrary, for it must depend upon external circumstances, which are not |347| governed by our Ideas. In Idea, Justice would assign Property without regard to previous possession; but in Fact, by rejecting the regard to previous possession it ceases to be Property.
  The same opposition may be remarked, in other parts of Natural Law. In Idea, for instance, Justice requires that all classes of men should have equal Rights: but in Fact, men form themselves into Classes, and by that very act make their Rights unequal. In Idea, men should make and perform their Contracts according to perfect Equality; but in Fact, the Terms of the Contract must be regarded by Justice, because Equality is too obscure and indefinite a foundation for a just decision. And the like may be said in other cases.

  §487. The Steps by which the Conception of Justice has been unfolded and defined among men, have involved a recognition of both the maxims which have been stated. The Laws of all Countries annul Rights acquired in violent and illegal ways; and the Laws of all Countries allow undisturbed Possession, in the sincere belief of Right, to give, at least in some eases, and after some lapse of time, a complete Right. To all men, when the origin of existing Rights is shewn to be some violent and unjust act, the Rights appear to be unjust. But when it is shown, on the other hand, that the traces of this arbitrary origin are only such as inevitably exist in all Rights, the Rights again seem just. When we consider how greatly the existing tenure of Land, in this country, depends upon the violent confiscations which took place in the Norman Conquest, the Rights of many of our landlords may appear to be unjust. But when we recollect that the Saxons, whom the Normans conquered, had themselves obtained possession of the land by a similar conquest; and that the transactions respecting property in England have, for nearly eight hundred years, assumed the validity |348| of the Rights acquired by the Norman Conquest; we see that it would be unjust to fix our attention on that particular event, as especially vitiating Rights.

  §488. The remoteness of an act of violence in point of time; the complexity of the events which have succeeded it; the degree in which it has faded into oblivion; the habit of disregarding it established in the community;—all these, are circumstances which make it just to disregard the bearing of the event upon existing Rights. Every circumstance, by which the effect of a past event upon men’s thoughts and actions is enfeebled, makes it less of a reality in the present condition of things; and therefore, less an element for consideration in the assignment of Rights according to justice.

  §489. What has now been said, agrees with what was said formerly (§218) in speaking of the Idea of Justice; namely, that though, in general. Justice is determined by Law, the Law must be framed in accordance with Justice. Justice is directly and positively determined by Law; for a man’s just Rights are those which the Law gives him. The Law must be framed in accordance with Justice; and must therefore reject all that is arbitrary and unequal, as soon as it is seen to be so. Hence the Law, in order that it may accord with Justice, may be changed from time to time, in proportion as different external facts are made objects of attention. For instance, if one State, (suppose Helos,) act with great violence and cruelty towards another; (suppose Sparta;) it may be just in Sparta, to punish Helos, by reducing its citizens to a condition of subjection, and depriving them of their property. But after several generations, when the transgression is fallen into oblivion, it would be unjust to make any Laws, on the ground of such transgression. When such a time has arrived, it may be just to make laws, in order |349| to render the condition of the Helots less subject; or in order to restore to them their territory.

  §490. On this imaginary case, we may make one or two further remarks. It may be objected to the above statement, that it cannot be just to punish a whole State for the offense of some of its citizens; still less to continue the punishment to succeeding unoffending generations. And this is true, so far as such a remark can be applied, consistently with the nature of Punishment, and of a State. But when one State is injured by another, it must deal with the offending State as a whole; and it cannot extend its regard to individuals, in such a manner as would render impossible the punishment of injuries done by the State. If individuals have offended against a foreign State; and if the State to which they belong, refuses to punish them, or to give them up; it makes itself a party to their wrong. And when, on this ground, a penal infliction takes place, this infliction must operate alike on the offenders and their fellow-citizens; alike on those citizens who were in being at the time of the wrong, and on succeeding generations. For the State, according to the conception of it, is a collective and perpetual body (§470); its condition is communicated to contemporary and to successive members of it, by their being Members. In this, there is no injustice; any more than there is in the transmission of the Possessions, or of the Rank of a Family, to its Members, and to successive generations. Nations derive their prosperous or adverse condition from their history, and from their transactions with other nations; and individuals, more or less, share in the prosperous or adverse condition of the nation.

  §491. States have not, nor can have, any way of punishing Injuries, or of asserting their Rights against other States, except War. They have no common Superior Tribunal to which they can appeal |350| (§214): and they can seek Justice in no other way. Also War would not answer its purpose, nor would it be War, if it did not produce some inconvenience to the vanquished State, and consequently to its citizens. Innocent citizens must be involved with the guilty, in the punishment; as the children of a guilty parent are necessarily involved in his punishment.
  With regard to the seizure of the Property of the vanquished by the victorious State; it may further be remarked, that the citizens of the vanquished State derived Rights from their State; and that, therefore, they necessarily lose their Rights, when their State loses its power of maintaining Rights. (1 Such maxims may be much mitigated in practice by International Law, as we shall see hereafter.)
  It is not therefore necessarily unjust that there should take place, between States, acts of violence, which affect, through succeeding generations, the distribution of property and the relation of classes. The possibility of such events, is a necessary condition of the existence of States. The Actions of States, as of individuals, produce permanent consequences. If they did not do so, questions of justice and injustice respecting such actions would be of little importance.

  §492. But if such violent events have at some time taken place, must their consequences remain unchanged? If calamities have been inflicted by one nation upon another, even as a just punishment; does justice require these inflictions to be perpetuated without limit? If a nation have been enslaved and despoiled, even for their wrongs, may not the time come when they may be restored to freedom and property? We reply, in accordance with what has been said, that in proportion as the traces of the wrong are obliterated in men’s minds. Justice will aim at obliterating them in their condition also. The privations and subjection of the subjugated class, so soon |351| as they cease to be looked upon as penal, appear as arbitrary, and therefore unjust. As soon as the inequality appears as an arbitrary one, Justice requires that it shall be removed.
  But then, no present inequality can be quite arbitrary, because every actual inequality depends upon the Laws and Habits by which the present is derived from the past; and such Laws and Habits are requisite, in order that there may be, between the present and the past, that connexion which the continuity of the Life of States (§475) requires. The Events of History have, at every step, led to present inequalities; to a difference of high and low, rich and poor. Justice does not require that we should abolish all such distinctions; for to do this, would be to abolish Rights, the necessary conditions of Justice. What then is the course which Justice prescribes?

  §493. We answer, that Justice requires us to aim constantly to remedy the inequalities which History produces.
  We do not say that Justice requires us to restore any previous condition which has been unjustly changed, but to remedy the effects of the change. For, in fact, a previous State of things never can be restored: and when a change takes place, then, after a short time has elapsed, there have grown up, under the new State of things, new Rights, which it would be unjust to annul. What has once happened, can never cease to have happened. In the course of a nation’s history, what has been done, cannot be undone. We may do something of an opposite tendency; and when what has been done was unjust, it is just to do something to remedy the injustice. If we are asked whether the consequences of events are to be perpetual; we may answer, that the consequences of events are perpetual; but that the consequence of a second event may counteract those of a former one. And we pronounce that such a second event ought to |352| take place, when there exist inequalities, originating in the injustice of a former event.

  §494. Such remedying of Injustice is a part of the general Duty of Moral Progress, which belongs to States as well as to individuals (§475). We have already said, that the Law must perpetually and slowly tend to the Idea of Justice. We now see further the import of this assertion. The Law must tend slowly towards Justice, because the influence of the Facts of History upon existing Rights must always be great: and it is not just to disregard this influence. The influence itself is, however, weakened by the lapse of time, and the intervention of new events. It is the Duty of men to act justly, in these new events: it is the Duty of States, to make just Laws, in reference to the new aspect which those new events give to history. And Justice, thus, and History as regulated by Duty, constantly, but slowly, mould each other.

  §495. Again, the Law must tend perpetually towards Justice: that is, its progress in that direction can never be looked upon as terminated. For the influence of the past Facts of History upon Law, though constantly wearing out, can never be quite obliterated. Even if, in all present events, men did act justly and legislate justly, still there would remain traces of the ancient order of things. For instance, the distribution of landed property at present, must always continue to depend upon the original and ancient migrations of mankind, by which each Nation became possessed of its present territory; and upon many succeeding events; some of which have been acts of Injustice. The administration of Law, and the progress of Legislation, can never obliterate the effect of these bygone arbitrary and unjust acts; while new arbitrary and unjust acts are constantly happening. Thus Law, who must constantly travel onwards towards Justice, must always have some part |353| of her journey still to perform. Or to use another image: the pure waters of Justice are constantly poured into the mingled stream of the Law, in order to purify it; but we cannot hope to see the time when all the impurities which the latter has collected, in its passage through the realms of History, shall have disappeared; and the clear united current shall flow on indistinguishable.
  And thus both the maxims which have been stated retain their truth and validity. Right cannot he founded on Injustice: such is the negative maxim which serves to define the Idea of Justice. Justice assigns Rights according to existing Conditions: such is the positive maxim which makes Justice applicable to Facts.
  We have taken the exemplification of the conditions of Justice from imaginary relations between States, because in such a case there is not, as in all transactions between individuals there is, a mixture of the considerations of Law, with the question of Justice. But still Justice, as distinguished from Law, is to be considered in questions between individuals. The term employed to designate Justice in this point of view, is Equity.

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Chapter XXII. Equity

  §496. Equity derives its Name from Equality; and in the Conception, also, is understood to imply, in some way, equal advantages assigned to the parties contemplated. In this sense, attempts have been made, at various periods, to introduce the Conception of Equity, as explanatory of or supplementary to, the Conception of Justice. It will be found that this mode |354| of conceiving Equity, has led to some Maxims which are worthy of notice.
  Aristotle (1 Eth. Nich. V. 2.) says that Inequality is one kind of Injustice; and that Injustice is to be remedied by Equality;—by Equality of Ratios, in Distributive Justice;—by equality of Shares, in Corrective Justice. Thus Distributive Justice makes A’s share be to B’s share as A’s right is to B’s right: Corrective Justice takes from A, the wrong doer, and gives to B, who is wronged. But this view of the equality which constitutes Justice is partial and fanciful: it cannot be extended to cases in general. Still, there is a notion of Equality, as a kind of Justice. Cicero says, 2 “Jus constat ex his partibus, Natura, Lege, Consuetudine, Judicato, Bono et Æquo, Pacto.” (2 Ad Herenn. ii. 13. Jus consists of these portions; Natural Law, Positive Law, Custom, Decisions, Equity, Contract.) This expression Bono et Æquo was familiarly used in this sense by the Roman Lawyers. Thus Ulpian, (3 Dig. 1. i. 1.) “Jus est Ars Boni et Æquo.” And this notion of equal justice has been carried into some detail. Thus Grotius makes Equality the Rule of Contracts; (4 §B. et P. ii. xii. 8.) they require equality of knowledge; equality of liberty; and, within certain limits, equality of advantage.

  §497. Justice and Equity, originally conceived as identical, in the course of time were separated; for Justice, in its administration, was necessarily fixed and limited by Laws and Rules; while Equity was conceived as not so limited. And as Laws and Rules, however much meant to be just, and however carefully constructed, will yet press upon individual cases in a way which seems hard; Equity was conceived as that kind of Justice which was not thus bound by Laws and Rules, and which was disposed to relieve such hardships. The Virtue which exists |355| in such a disposition, is termed by Aristotle, (1 Eth. Nich. v. 10.) ͗Επιεικέια; and he defines it to be, The Correction of the Law, where it is defective by reason of its universality. The Law, he says, is necessarily universal in its expressions: but some things cannot rightly be expressed universally. There is a defect, not in the Law, nor in the Lawgivers; but in the nature of things. And the ἐπιέικες, or equitable, is opposed to the ἀκριβοδικάιον, or rigidly Just. The same opposition is repeatedly recognized in the Roman Law. Thus, “Placuit in omnibus rebus praecipuam esse justitiae aequitatisque, quam stricti juris rationem.” (2 Codex, iii. 1. 8. It has been thought good that regard be had to Justice and Equity, rather than to strict Rights.) And in another place, “Haec Æquitas suggerit, etsi jure deficiamur.” (3 Dig. xxx. iii. 2. 6. This is suggested by Equity, although Law fails us.) And the Praetor’s judicial office was sometimes described, as if its object were to administer Equity in this sense: “Jus Praetorium est quod Praetores introduxerunt, adjuvandi, vel supplendi, vel corrigendi juris civilis gratia, propter utilitatem publicam.” (4 Dig. i. 1. 7. Praetors’ Law is that which the Praetors have introduced, for the public good, for the sake of helping out, supplementing, and correcting the Civil Law.) Similar functions have often been ascribed to the Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in England. Thus Bacon, occasion of assuming the office of Chancellor, says, (5 Bacon’s Works, iv. 488.) “Chancery is ordained to supply the Law, not to subvert the Law”: and Chancellor Finch says, that the nature of Equity is to amplify, enlarge, and add to the letter of the Law. This has sometimes been stated by saying, that Equity decides “de rebus quas Lex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni viri permittit.” (6 Grotius, De Æquitate. Concerning things which the Law does not exactly define, but leaves to the discretion of a good man.) |356|
  §498. But this description of Equity is too vague to be applicable; and has not been really accepted and acted upon in the administration of Justice, either in Rome or in England. For a Justice, administered, not according to Rules, but according to the immediate aspect of each case, would be deficient in the first requisite of Justice, that of being consistent with itself. We have already said (§339), that Rules are necessary in Morality, to subdue the temptations of special cases; they are especially necessary as regards Justice, to correct the delusive aspect of particular cases. To leave the decision of cases to the conscience of the Judge, however wise and good, would lead to those arbitrary decisions which Justice especially abhors. In this view, Selden’s condemnation of Equity is deserved; (1 Table Talk.) “For Law we have a measure, and we know what to trust to. Equity is according to the Conscience of him who is Chancellor; and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. ’Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure the Chancellor’s foot. What an uncertain measure would this be!” Since Morality is governed by fixed Rules, Equity, which is a part of Morality, must also have its fixed Rules. And as the Rules of Law are the foundations of Justice, the Rules of Equity cannot be in general inconsistent with those of Law.

  §499. Accordingly, the Praetor’s power did not extend to the overthrow or disregard of the written Law. When the law was applicable, the Praetor was to stand by it; (2 Story. Commentaries on Equity, p. 6.) and we find such remarks as this: “Quod quidem perquam durum est; sed ita lex scripta est.” (3 Dig. xl. ix. 12. 1. This is very hard: but this is the written law.) Nor does a Court of Equity in England decide differently from a Court of Law, except |357| in cases which involve circumstances to which a Court of Law cannot advert. Equity, as we have said, has its Maxims; and one of the first of these Maxims is, (1 Story. Eq.) Æquitas sequitur Legem; Equity follows the Law.

  §500. Nor does Jurisprudential Equity fill up the measure of the description of Moral Equity, that it abates the rigour of the Law. Blackstone has shown how far this is from being a description of the Equity of English Courts. No such power of abating the rigour of Law, he says, is contended for by the Court of Chancery. (2 Comm. in. 430.) The Law is rigorous, which declares that land which a man bequeaths to a legatee shall not, after his death, be liable to simple contract debts, even if the debt be for money employed in purchasing this very land. The Law is rigorous which commands that the father shall never immediately succeed as heir to the land of the son: yet in these cases, a Court of Equity can give no relief. Jurisprudential Equity, therefore, does not extend to Cases of legal hardship in general.

  §501. In a certain sense, however, and to a certain extent. Equity does supply defects in the Law. Equity, as a branch of Jurisprudence, must, like all branches of Jurisprudence, act by definite Processes, and according to fixed Rules. But the Processes and the Rules of Equity Jurisprudence, came into being, at first, as remedies to the defects of Law: and though, by being reduced to a fixed form and settled maxims, they can no longer be appealed to as remedies for all hardships and defects of Law, they have still a remedial and suppletory character.
  This agrees with the account which the best authorities give of the origin of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in England. In the Common or traditional Law of England, the process of an action began by certain writs or documents of |358| prescribed form, which were issued from the King’s Chancery, on application made there; and which brought the action into the Courts of Common Law. The Chancellor, therefore, (according to Lord Hardwicke,) when any petition for such a writ was referred to him, was the most proper judge, whether such a writ could be framed and issued, as might furnish an adequate relief to the party; and if he found the Common Law remedies deficient, he might proceed according to the extraordinary power committed to him by the reference, “Ne Curia Regis deficeret in justitia exercenda.” (1 Lest the King’s Court should be deficient in administering justice.) Thus the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction by the Chancellor, arose from his being the Officer to whom applications were made, for writs on which to ground actions at the Common Law. Where that Law afforded no remedy, he was led to extend a discretionary remedy; and thus, the forum of Common Law and the forum of Equity were separated in England. (2 Story. Eq. 44.)

  §502. Equity; since our business is rather with Moral Equity. And by tracing the course of the development of this Conception, as we have now stated it, we are able to give a connected account of this moral quality. We may accept, as a starting point, Aristotle’s Definition: Equity is a Correction of Law where it is defective by reason of its universality. But Equity itself must proceed by fixed Laws, otherwise it would be defective in consistency. As the Rules of Equity thus become fixed, Equity ceases to be able to correct all the defects of Law; and becomes itself, as Law was at first, an imperfect expression of Justice; and thus we have, in the notion of Equity, a recognition of two Maxims to a certain extent opposite to each |359| other; that Fixed Rules are requisite for the expression of Justice; and that No Fixed Rules can so completely express Justice, but that the conception of Justice will, in some particular cases, seem to require exceptions to the Rules.

  §503. The administration of Equity has led to the currency of many Maxims, which may be considered Maxims of Moral, as well as Jurisprudential Equity; since their acceptance in the Courts of Law has been due to their presumed agreement with Justice. We may notice some of these Maxims; not as being always universally true, or free from doubt and difficulty in their application; but as bringing forwards some of the points on which Equity must principally depend; and as showing, by examples, the kind of Equality in which it consists. Among such maxims are the following.

  §504. “Equity follows the Law.” And this may be understood in two senses; either that Equity is based upon the Relations which the Law establishes; or that Equity follows the Analogy of the Law. We have already said, that Justice assumes the Definitions of Rights which Law gives. Hence Equity supposes that to be a man’s Property, that to be a Marriage, that to be a Contract, which the Law makes such. Yet if there be merely some formal defect in a Contract, moral Equity will still hold it valid. Again, Equity follows the Analogy of Law; thus in England, where the Law gives the whole landed property to the eldest son, that would not be an equitable decision which should divide the property amongst the children equally.

  §505. “Where Rights are equal, Possession is a ground of preference.” As if two persons have been equally innocent and equally diligent, the one in trying to recover a property lost by fraud; the other |360| in transacting a bona fide purchase of the property; he who is in possession is preferred.
  But there are other maxims, which throw the task of judging of deficiencies in the property on one side especially: for instance, in matters which are apparent on due examination, the Rule is Caveat emptor. Let the buyer take care of himself (§172).

  §506. Qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum; qui sennit commodum, sentire debet et onus; “He who bears the burden ought to receive the profit; he who reaps the profit ought to bear the burden.” Thus, if a man, dying, leaves his wife pregnant, so that it is uncertain who will be heir to his lands; if the next presumptive heir, in the mean time, sow the land, it is equitable that the harvest also shall be his. And on the other hand, they who enjoy the benefit of any improvement of land arising from public works; as, for instance, from a general drainage; ought to contribute to the expense of the works.

  §507. There are other maxims which refer to the general responsibility of actions, as for instance, Necessitas non habet legem; “Necessity has no law”; which we have referred to in speaking of cases of necessity (§418). And again: Qui facit per alium facit per se; “What a man does through the agency of others is his act.” Others refer to the mode of interpreting Laws or Contracts, and administering Justice: as, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius; “The mention of one person is the exclusion of another.” Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa; “A man is not to be judge in his own cause.” All these maxims may be looked upon as indications and fragments of a supposed Natural Law; which can never be expressed except by indications and fragments; since, as we have said, no Rules can express Equity, so as not to require exceptions.

  §508. Other Indications of the assumed existence of a Natural Law, the necessary result of |361| Justice and Equity, may be traced in expressions, which are often used in moral and political discussions. Thus, we hear of the Natural Rights of man; and as examples of these, of the Right to Subsistence, the Right to Freedom, and the like. In speaking of these Rights as Natural, it is not meant that they are universally recognized by the Laws of States. In truth. Rights of the citizens to Subsistence and to Freedom, are so far limited and modified by the Laws of most States, that they can hardly be said to exist as general Rights. By speaking of such Rights, and describing them as the dictates of Natural Justice, as is often done, it is meant that the Laws ought to recognize and establish them. But something more than this seems to be meant, by speaking of the Natural Right to Subsistence, and the like; for to say that such a Right is what the Law ought to establish, is merely to class the recognition of this Right with all the other prudential improvements, of which the Laws of any State are susceptible. The Laws ought to aim at securing the Purity and Rationality, as well as the Subsistence, of the people. By speaking of the Claim of men to Subsistence as a Right, it appears to be meant that it is not only conformable to the Duty of States, in the general sense in which it is their Duty to make their laws constantly better; but that it is conformable to Justice in some more special sense, in which Justice is expressed by definite and universal Principles.

  §509. Yet the Principles of Justice which have been propounded as the basis of the Natural Rights of Men, are such as it is difficult to establish, in a definite and universal form. It has, for instance, been said, that All men are born equal. But it is evident that this is not true as a fact. For not only are children, for a long time after birth, necessarily in the power of parents and others; but the external conditions of the society in which a man is born, as |362| the laws of property and the like, determine his relation to other men, during life. If it be said that these are extraneous and accidental circumstances, not bomb with the man; we answer, that if we reject from our consideration, as extraneous and accidental, all such conditions, there remains nothing which we can call intrinsic and necessary, but the material conditions of man’s existence; and if we were to adopt this view, the principle might more properly be stated, All men are equally born. The relations of Family, Property, and the like, are as essential to man’s moral being, as Language, without which his mind cannot be unfolded to the apprehension of Rules, and the distinction of right and wrong. If therefore our assumed equality rejects the former circumstances, it must reject the latter.

  §510. But though in Fact men are not born equal, they are all born with a capacity for being moral agents: and this Idea is the basis of all Morality. And we may lay it down as a universal Principle, from which we may hereafter reason, that All men are moral beings.
  This Principle may be perhaps considered as rather a Principle of Humanity, than a Principle of Justice. For this, and any other Principle from which we derive the claims of men to Subsistence, Freedom, etc., must involve a recognition of that Common Human Nature, by which all mankind are bound together. We shall therefore treat of such Rights in treating of the Conception of Humanity.

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Chapter XXIII. Humanity

  §511. It has already been stated, that a universal Benevolence towards all men, as partakers of the |363| same Common Human Nature with ourselves, is a part of the Supreme Law of human being. But the lapse of time, the growth of institutions, and the development of man’s moral nature, are requisite to bring this affection into its due prominence. The affections of men, in a rude condition, are confined within narrower limits; and have, for their main or sole objects, the persons who are bound to them by especial ties. The family affections which connect parent and child, husband and wife, brothers and sisters, have their force in every form of human society. The sympathies which bind together a kindred in a wider sense, the feelings of clanship, are powerful, in communities in which a more comprehensive kind of benevolence is unfelt. In rude and half-savage tribes, in which clansmen assist each other with unbounded zeal, the stranger is looked upon as naturally an object of enmity. The historians of Greece and Rome notice indications of this having been the early condition of man’s feelings in those countries. But the progress of the culture of those nations led to a more moral state of the affections. The Greeks had a name for the Love of man as man. This affection they termed φιλανθρωπία, and reckoned it a virtue. Aristotle expresses this by saying that all men have a feeling of kindred and good-will to all. (1 Anth. Eth. Nich. viii. l. ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἅνθρωπος ἀνθρὠπῳ καὶ φίλον.) And the Stoics called this tie of general good-will by a name borrowed from the word which Aristotle here uses (οἰκέιωσις), as kindness is connected with the word kin. The Romans in like manner, though at first they had but one word to designate a stranger and an enemy (hostis), came to be sensible of the universal bond of good-will which unites man to man. They received with applause the verse of Terence:

    Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto.
    A man am I, and feel for all mankind.

|364| And their philosophers followed the Greeks, in assuming the common social feeling of mankind as one of the foundations of their morality. Thus Cicero adopts, what he calls the Formula of the Stoics: “Detrahere aliquid alicui, et hominem hominis incommodo suum augere commodum, magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam caetera quae possunt aut corpori accidere, aut rebus externis; nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem.” (1 Off. III. 6. “For a man to abstract anything from another man, and to increase his own comfort by the discomfort of another, is more against Nature, than death, than poverty, than any other thing which can happen, either to his body or to his external havings. For in the first place it takes away human society and community of life.”) In the same strain Seneca says, “Societatem tolle, et unitatem generis humani qua vita continetur, scindes.” (2 De Benef. iv. 18. “Take away society, and you rend asunder the unity of the human race in which our life is bound up.”)

  §512. Advance of the notion in spite of obstacles. The Roman conception, of a Law, identical with Natural Law, and yet the benefits of which were the peculiar privilege of Roman citizens, for a time impeded the application of such maxims; for men who had no right to justice, could have little claim to kindness. The current conception of a true marriage, as being limited to the union of Roman citizens, and of domestic slavery as being a part of the order of society, were circumstances unfavourable to the development of a benevolence equally embracing all men. But these circumstances gradually lost their hold on men’s minds. The distinction of Roman and Provincial marriages faded away; and there grew up a feeling of horror towards the cruelty which slavery involved. We find a recognition of this view in the Roman Lawyers. Thus Ulpian says, (3 Dig. I. i. 4. “Manumission of Slaves had its origin not in natural but in positive Law. For by the Law of nature all are born free, and when there was no slavery there could be no manumission. But when by the positive Law of nations, slavery was introduced; the relief from this infliction by manumission was also introduced. And thus men, who by nature were all alike men, were divided into three kinds, freemen, slaves, and freed men, who had been slaves.”) |365| “Manumissio a jure gentium originem sumsit, utpote quum jure naturali omnes liberi nascerentur, nec esset nota manumissio, quum servitus esset incognita. Sed posteaquam jure gentium servitus invasit, secutum est beneficium manumissionis; ut quum uno naturali nomine homines appellarentur, jure gentium tria genera esse coeperunt, liberi, et his contrarium servi, et tertium genus, liberti, id est, qui desierant esse servi.” And with regard to marriage, the Roman lawyers sometimes appear to incline to extend the notion of it even to brute animals. “Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam jus istud non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur, avium quoque, commune est. Hinc descendit maris et foeminae conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellaraus, hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio: videmus enim caetera quoque animalia, feras etiam, istius juris peritia censeri.” (1 Dig, I. i. 1. “Natural Law is that which nature teaches all animals: such Law is not peculiar to the human race, but common also to beasts, fishes, and birds. Hence arises the union of male and female which we call marriage, hence the procreation and nurture of children; for we see that brutes, and even wild beasts, are acquainted with the Natural Law which regulates such matters.”) Attempts such as this, to extend the meaning of Jus, in any sense, to brute animals, can only perplex the subject. The word Rights has no meaning, as applied to animals, which cannot understand the word. Our Rights and our Obligations are necessarily limited by the limits of human nature. They all spring out of the recognition of our common Humanity. Our duties with |366| regard to brute animals depend upon no mutual Rights; but upon the Duty of Self-culture; to which our treatment of them, like our other actions, must be made subservient. Animals offer to us images of some of the lower parts of our nature; but except so far as these elements are directed and governed by the higher elements, they are not subjects of moral consideration. As far as the limits of humanity extend, however, there are mutual ties of Duty which bind together all men; and as the basis of all others, a Duty of Mutual Kindness; which, as we see, is acknowledged by the Jurists, as well as by the Moralists, of Rome, in spite of the originally narrow basis of their Jurisprudence.

  §513. The progress of the Conception of Humanity, as a universal bond which knits together the whole human race, and makes kindness to every member of it a Duty, was immeasurably promoted by the teaching and influence of Christianity. In the course of time, domestic slavery was abolished; and marriage received the sanction of the Church, and was alike honourable in all. The antipathies of nations, the jealousies of classes, the selfishness, fierceness, and coldness of men’s hearts; the narrowness and dimness of their understandings, have prevented their receiving cordially and fully, the comprehensive precepts of benevolence which Christianity delivers; but as these obstacles have been more and more overcome, the doctrine has been more and more assented to, and felt to be true, by all persons of moral culture; that there is a Duty of Universal Benevolence which we are to bear to all men as men; and which we are to fulfil, by dealing with them as men; as beings having the like affections and reason, rights and claims, which we ourselves have.

  §514. This conception of Humanity, as a Principle within us, requiring us to recognize in others the same Rights which we claim for ourselves, may be |367| further illustrated. Such a principle of Humanity, requiring us to recognize men as men, requires us more especially to recognize them as such, in their capacity of moral agents. They have not only like desires and affections with ourselves; but also, like faculties of Reason and Self-guidance; by which they discern the difference of right and wrong, and feel the duty of doing the right, and abstaining from the wrong. This view of their condition, as Moral Agents, is that by which we must entirely sympathize with them; as it is the view of our own condition in which we are fully conscious of ourselves. Humanity requires that we should feel satisfaction in the desires and means of enjoyment of our fellowmen; but Humanity requires, still more clearly, that we should feel a satisfaction in their having the desires and the means of doing their Duty. Now the fundamental Rights of which we have so often spoken, the Rights of the Person, of Property, and the like, are means, and necessary conditions, of Duty. It is necessary to moral action, that the agent should be free, not liable to unlimited and unregulated constraint and violence; that is, that he should have Rights of the Person. It is necessary to moral action, that the agent should have some command over external things; for this is implied in action; that is, it is necessary that he should have Rights of Property. And in like manner, in order that any class of persons may exist permanently in a community, as moral agents, it is requisite that they should possess the Right of Marriage; for without that Right, some of the strongest of man’s desires cannot be under moral control; nor can the sentiment of Rights be transmitted from one generation to another. The Right of Contract is a necessary accompaniment of the Right of Property; for if the person can possess, he may buy and sell. And thus, these Rights are means, and necessary conditions, of men’s being moral agents; and the |368| Humanity which makes us desire that all men should be able to regulate themselves by a Love of Duty, requires that all should be invested with these Rights.

  §515. These Rights, which Humanity requires that all men should possess, may be called Natural Rights; and in this sense, we may say that Man has Natural Rights of Personal Security from Violence, of Sustenance and Property so far as is implied in moral agency, and of Marriage. But we must distinguish these Natural Rights, which men ought to have, from the Rights of which we have hitherto spoken, which men really have in Civil Society, and which may be called Civil Rights.

  §516. As the Natural Rights, of which we speak, are those which are implied in Moral Agency; so, on the other hand, they imply Moral Agency, and consequently imply Duties, or Moral Obligations. As there is a Natural Right of Security against violence, there is a Natural Obligation to abstain from violence. As there is a Natural Right of Property for every man, to some extent or other; so there is a Natural Obligation to abstain from the Property of others, and to fulfil our Contracts. As there is a Natural Right of Marriage, so there is a Natural Obligation of Forethought, which directs men to make provision for the Sustenance of a Family, before they add to the existing numbers of the Community.

  §517. Humanity requires us to insist upon these Rights, and upon the corresponding Obligations, with equal force. We may declare such Rights to be natural, universal, necessary; but we must declare the Obligations to be equally natural, universal, necessary. Humanity requires that men should have the means of doing their Duty; she requires also no less that they should do it. She is solicitous about their welfare; in the first place, about their welfare in the subordinate sense, the means of enjoyment and of action; in the next place, about their |369| welfare in the superior sense, the pursuit of right ends by right means. To insist upon man’s Natural Rights, and to lose sight of the corresponding Obligations, is not the tendency of the Humanity of a moral man.

  §518. Such Natural Rights as we have mentioned, are sometimes spoken of as indefeasible, and inalienable. When, by such expressions, it is meant that no act, either of a man’s own or of other men, can make it cease to be an object of Humanity that he should possess such Rights, the expressions are just. No constraint and violence, actually exercised upon men, can prevent the humane man from desiring that they should have Rights which may protect them from such inflictions; and even if a man, for himself, renounce the Rights which are requisite to his being a moral agent, the humane man must still desire that they should be restored to him. If these Rights are taken away, or given away, it is right that they should be given back to every man; and in this sense, they are indefeasible and inalienable.
  But if it be meant, that when the Law takes away, or the act of the individual gives away, these Rights, the Law and the Act are not to be regarded, this application of the words is not admissible. The Laws of every State have their validity; and if these Laws are contrary to Humanity or to Justice, such vices of the Laws are to be remedied, not by the Moralist declaring such Laws null and void of themselves; but by the Legislator annulling them, or substituting better Laws in their room. And although it may be humane and right, that the Laws should not sanction Contracts by which a citizen renounces the fundamental Rights of man; yet if such a Contract is made according to Law, the Law enforces it, and the Moralist, as before, may say that the Law ought to be changed; but he may not say that, till changed, it ought not to be executed.

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  §519. Thus, those which we have called the Natural Rights of man, may be, for a time at least, superseded by their not being Civil Rights, They may be Rights in the eye of Humanity; that is, such as ought to be the Rights of all members of every community; but not Rights in the eye of Law, that is, such as are the Rights of all members of a given community. Natural Rights are the Ideal conditions of moral society; they may be suspended in Fact; the Idea being imperfectly realized. When this is so, it is the business of all good men constantly to make the Fact approach to the Idea; to make Law agree with Humanity: to make Civil Rights coincide with Natural Rights.
  In many communities, this task may at the present, or at any given time, be imperfectly fulfilled; and in such cases, there exist Classes of the Society which possess, in an imperfect degree, or in no degree, the Natural Rights of Man. It will be proper to examine more particularly some of these States of Society, with their characteristic Classes: and to consider the manner in which they exemplify the doctrine which we have been propounding.

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Chapter XXIV. Slavery

  §520. In ancient nations, we find the existence of Slaves everywhere familiar. Bondmen and Bondwomen, and the buying and selling of men, occur frequently in the Books of Moses. In Homer, and the Greek tragedians, domestic slavery is contemplated as the general lot of those conquered in war, their wives and children. The slaves, thus obtained, |371| were employed, both in the business of the house, in the labours of agriculture, and as workmen in various handicrafts. They were so universally thus employed, that they were considered as a necessary portion of society. A State, says Aristotle, (1 Polit. i. 2.) consists of Families; a Family, of Freemen and Slaves. And in like manner, the Roman Law lays this down as the primary division of persons, “Omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi.” (2 Inst. i. 3.) Slavery, thus derived from the ancient world, was, in the course of time, nearly extinguished in Christian States. But in modem times, a new form of slavery has grown up; the slavery of the negroes, who are carried from Africa to America; and employed there, they and their descendants, as domestic servants and agricultural labourers.

  §521. The character of complete Slavery is, that the Slave has no Rights. And this complete kind of Slavery has been recognized and ordained by the Laws of many nations. Gains, the Roman Jurist, says, “In potestate sunt servi dominorum. Quae quidem potestas juris gentium est; nam apud omnes peraeque gentes animadvertere possumus dominis in servos vitae necisque potestatem fuisse, et quodcunque per servum acquiritur id domino acquiri.” (3 Dig. I. 6. 1. Among the “things in our power” are the slaves of which we are masters. And this “power” is a general institution of nations; for we may observe that in all nations alike the master has the power of life and death over the slave; and whatever is acquired by the slave, is acquired for the master.) Thus the Slave had neither the Right of protection from extreme violence and death, inflicted by his master, nor the Right of property in anything which he might happen to produce or acquire. The Slave is the property of the Master, in the same manner as a horse or a cart is. And these maxims are promulgated in modern Laws. “A Slave,” says the |372| Louisiana Code, (1 Channing’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 17.) “is in the power of the Master to whom he belongs. The Master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, his labour; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but which must belong to his master.” The Laws of South Carolina say, “Slaves shall be deemed, taken, reported and adjudged, to be chattels personal in the hands of their Masters, and possessions to all intents and purposes whatsoever.” Accordingly, it is held in America that the cohabitation of slaves, being limited by the pleasure of the master, cannot be marriage; and that a slave cannot be guilty of theft; just as dogs and horses cannot marry and cannot steal. It is true, that in some countries, in which the most complete slavery prevails, the master is not allowed by the Laws to put his slave to death; and some punishment is inflicted if he does so. But such a Law does not invest the slave with any Rights. It is only a Law against what is shocking to the general feeling, like the English Laws against cruelty to animals. It is now penal in this country to torture a horse or a dog; but a horse or a dog are still only objects of possession, without any Rights or any acknowledged moral nature.

  §522. Slavery is contrary to the Fundamental Principles of Morality. It neglects the great primary distinction of Persons and Things (§45); converting a Person into a Thing, an object merely passive, without any recognized attributes of Human nature. A slave is, in the eye of the State which stamps him with that character, not acknowledged as a man. His pleasures and pains, his wishes and desires, his needs and springs of action, his thoughts and feelings, are of no value whatever in the eye of the community. He is reduced to the level of the brutes. Even his Crimes, as we have said, are not acknowledged as Wrongs; lest it should be supposed that, as he may |373| do a Wrong, he may suffer one. And as there are for him no Wrongs, because there are no Rights; so there is for him nothing morally right; that is, as we have seen, nothing conformable to the Supreme rule of Human Nature; for the Supreme Rule of his condition is the will of his master. He is thus divested of his moral nature, which is contrary to the great Principle we have already laid down; that all men are moral beings;—a Principle which, we have seen (§510, §514), is one of the universal Truths of Morality, whether it be taken as a Principle of Justice or of Humanity. It is a Principle of Justice, depending upon the participation of all in a common Humanity: it is a Principle of Humanity as authoritative and cogent as the fundamental Idea of Justice.

  §523. All men are moral beings, and cannot be treated as mere brutes and things, without an extreme violation of the Duties of Humanity. In some communities, the Conception of Humanity may be dimly and vaguely developed; and the guilt of this violation of Duty, in this as in other cases, may be modified by this circumstance. The offense of the defender and promoter of Slavery, may not be that of acting against Conscience, but of not enlightening his Conscience; of not raising his standard of morality. And this offense, again, may be modified by the circumstances in which a person is placed. In the ancient world, especially in the earlier periods, when the friendly intercourse of nations was rare, the feeling of Humanity very imperfectly unfolded, and the thoughts by which such feelings are fostered and supported not yet familiar among men; the opportunity of enlightening the conscience and raising the moral standard were wanting; and if, in such cases, virtuous men practised slavery without doubt or misgiving; and with the natural mercy, in their treatment of slaves, which benevolence cultivated in the other relations of life would usually produce in this; we |374| may pronounce them to have been excusable, on the ground of the defects of their national standard of morality (§453): though upon such men, and upon all men, there was a duty incumbent, of raising the national standard of Morality. But now, after morality and religion have so far raised the standard of morality in Christian nations, that among them, the Slavery which they inherited from the ancient world has been extinguished; Nations, which do not adopt the Standard of Morality thus elevated, are chargeable with a voluntary preference of inhumanity and injustice to humanity and justice (§455).

  §524. A very little progress in humanity, is sufficient to lead men to see the cruelty and immorality of making slaves, of men of our own race. Plato (1 Republic, V. 14.) notices it as a necessary result of an improved morality, that Greeks should not make slaves of Greeks. This injunction had already been given to the Jews: If thy brother (which in this place and others means thy fellow-countrymen) be sold unto thee, thou shalt not make him serve as a bondman. (2 Levit. xxv. 39.) No man can think it conformable to Justice and Humanity that he, or his Family, should be thrown into a state of slavery; and in considering his fellow-countrymen, he can readily sympathize with them, and identify his case with theirs; and thus, he acknowledges that to make them slaves, is inhuman and unjust. The Romans, as we have seen, extended this feeling to all the world; and their Jurists declared, that no man was a slave by nature. It is indeed plain that our Humanity, in order to be consistent, must extend to all men. To conceive slavery a cruel and unjust lot for our countrymen, but a reasonable and tolerable fate for foreigners, can arise only from dulness and narrowness of mind, and benevolence scantily cultivated. In the eye of Morality, all men are Brothers; and the crime of maintaining Slavery, |375| is the crime of making or keeping a Brother a Slave.

  §525. There is one defense of negro slavery, which represents the negro as a being inferior to the white man in his faculties. He is asserted to approach in his nature to the inferior animals; and hence it is inferred that he may be possessed as a Thing, like the animals. But this defense is manifestly quite baseless. The same faculties of mind have appeared in the negro, as in the white, so far as the condition of negro nations and negro classes has afforded opportunities for their development. The negroes do not appear to be duller, ruder or coarser, in mind or habits, than many savage white nations; or than nations, now highly cultured, were, in their early condition. The negro has a moral nature, and is therefore included in the consequences which follow from the Principle, that all men have a common nature. The negro has the same affections and springs of action as we ourselves. He loves his wife, his children, his home, and any security and stability which is granted him. He can buy and sell, promise and perform. He has, as much as any race of men, moral sentiments. He can admire and love what is good; he can condemn and hate what is bad. He has the Sentiment of Rights and Wrongs also. Though the Law allows him no Rights, he can feel bitterly the monstrous Wrong of the Law. His Reason is the Universal Reason of men. He understands the general and abstract Forms in which Language presents the objects and rules, with which Reason deals. He recognizes, as we do, a Supreme Rule of Human action and Human being; for, like us, he can direct his thoughts and acts to what is absolutely right. In short, there is no phrase which can be used, describing the moral and rational nature of man, which may not be used of the negro, as of the white. The assertion that there is, between the |376| white and the black race, any difference on which the one can found a Right to make slaves of the other, is utterly false.

  §526. If it be said, that the negro approaches in his external form to some kinds of monkeys; and if it be asked how we draw the line between man and such inferior animals; we reply, that all beings are men, who have a moral and rational nature, such as we have described: but if some plain and simple criterion of the difference between man and brutes be required; we can point at such a character at once, in the use of Language. A being who can understand and apply the general terms of which language consists, can apprehend Rules of action, Means and Ends, and hence, the Supreme Rule. He is a rational, and consequently a moral being. He is our brother.

  §527. It is difficult to believe that those who, in defense of their own practice of slavery, allege the inferiority of the negro race, do really think their assertion true. To such persons, negro women are objects of sexual desire. Upon their asserted view, they are thus guilty of an offense which men have everywhere looked upon as bestial and horrible. Moreover, the Laws of Nature contradict their assertion; for the offspring of such mixtures are marked with the physical and moral characters of both parents, as in other human unions. And when the slave-owner treats his own child, thus produced, as a slave; and works him, tortures him, or sells him, as he would a brute animal; (which it is said slave-owners do;) he tears out of his heart those affections which are the roots of all Morality, and the absence of which makes lust entirely brutal.

  §528. Especially in prohibiting negro education. Again, in States where negro Slaves are numerous, to teach them to write or to read is forbidden by Law, under the severest penalties. Such Laws suppose the capacity of negroes for intellectual |377| culture; and are an implicit confession that it is necessary to degrade their minds, in order to keep their bodies in slavery. When such practices and such Laws prevail, to defend negro slavery by asserting the inferiority of the negro race, can hardly be free from the guilt of wilful blindness of conscience, persisted in, in order to uphold conscious wrong.

  §529. The Moralist, then, must pronounce Slavery to be utterly inconsistent with Humanity; and with Principles, which, being derived from the universal nature of man, may be deemed fundamental Principles of Justice. Slavery is utterly abhorrent to the essence of Morality, and cannot be looked upon as a tolerable condition of Society, nor acquiesced in as what may allowably be. Whenever Slavery exists, its Abolition must be one of the great objects of every good man.

  §530. It will, of course, be understood, from what has already been said, that this Abolition is to be sought by legal and constitutional means only. When Slavery exists, its annihilation is an end which must be constantly kept in view; but to which we must sometimes be content to approach by degrees. It is an Idea to which we must endeavour to make the Fact conform; but the conformity may not be immediately brought to pass. The Laws of the State are to be observed, even when they enact Slavery; for the Moralist cannot authorize the citizen to choose what Laws he will obey, and what he will not. Natural Rights must yield to Civil Rights, in the hope that Civil Rights will be more and more made to harmonize with Natural Rights. Slavery is never to be acquiesced in, always to be condemned; but we may, and must, tolerate a gradual transition from Slavery to Emancipation, such as the conditions of Legislation and even the benefit of the slave, render inevitable. Still, on the other hand, we are to recollect, that delay is to be tolerated, only so far as it is inevitable: |378| and that to quicken the course of Emancipation is no less humane and just, than it is to give Legislation this direction, and to prepare both slaves and masters for the change.

  §531. It may be hoped, by the Moralist, that the emancipation of the negro race will go on with accelerated rapidity; for every State in which free negroes live, as moral and rational beings, is a refutation of the solitary argument in defense of negro slavery, drawn from the asserted unfitness of the negro for freedom. When the free negro population of cultured communities have, by the manifestation of their moral and rational nature, made themselves recognized as brethren by their white fellow-citizens, it cannot be that their black brethren will long be kept in slavery in neighbouring States professing a like reverence for freedom.

  §532. Slavery nowhere exists in Europe in a form so repugnant to Humanity as is negro slavery. But there are, in some parts, many vestiges of slavery, and classes intermediate between slaves and freemen. The Serfs, who have existed and still exist in different countries, may be considered as holding such an intermediate place; and in different countries in different degrees. In Russia, serfage is hardly distinguishable from slavery. The labourers are bound to the soil by the Law: they are proedial serfs (§128). By the general custom of the country, they are bound to work on the demesnes of the landowner three days in the week; and have land allotted to them from which they extract their own subsistence. But the peasant is, with all his family and descendants, at the disposal of the lord. In some parts, the Serfs have been allowed the privilege of acquiring and transmitting personal property; and in some, they may even purchase or inherit land. In other parts of Europe, Serfage has assumed a less slavish character. |379| In some parts of Germany, the peasant is no longer attached by the law to the soil: and his labour which he owes to his landlord is definite in kind and amount. Such peasants are called Leibeigener. In other parts this labour-rent is commuted for a corn-rent or a money-rent, though the tenant is still liable for some trifling services. Such tenants are called Meyer. (1 Jones On Rent.)

  §533. The social structure of England has gone through these several forms. For two centuries after the Norman Conquest, a large proportion of the body of cultivators was in the situation of the Russian serf; they were termed Villeins. During the next three hundred years the unlimited labour-rents paid by the Villeins were gradually commuted for definite services, still payable in kind; and they had a legal Right to their lands which they occupied, which legal Right was called Copyhold. It is only about two hundred years, since the personal bondage of the Villeins ceased to exist in England.

  §534. The contemplation of the change which has taken place in this country, and which appears to be taking place elsewhere, from a condition in which men are little better than Slaves, to one in which they are Freemen; and of the manifest and immense advance in moral and intellectual culture, which such a change has brought with it; must strongly stimulate the Moralist to recommend and promote the progress of social freedom and the removal of every law and custom that contains any trace of Slavery.

  §535. We distinguish social from political freedom; the former depending upon the domestic or praedial relation of Servant and Master (§128); the latter, upon the relation of Subject or Citizen, and Government. If men have Rights of the Person, of Property, and the like; they may be socially Freemen; however despotic the established government |380| be. They are politically free when each Class has such a share in the Government, as enables it to assert and secure its Rights. But Social Freedom can hardly exist, without Political Freedom: the Lowest Class can hardly have and retain Rights, without possessing some political power of maintaining them. In countries where Serfage prevails, the Serfs have no political power. The landlords form an Aristocracy; and the Sovereign and they, possess, between them, the powers of the State. When Serfage gives place to Social Freedom, there must be, in the Constitution, an Estate of the People, or some other Political Authority, representing and protecting the general body of free citizens. But the subject of Political Freedom must be considered hereafter.

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Chapter XXV. Pleasure, Interest, Happiness, Utility, Expediency

  §536. We may follow the subject of Humanity or Benevolence somewhat further. Humanity is, as we have said, a Principle, in virtue of which we represent to ourselves other men as of the same nature with ourselves, and enter into their feelings, hopes, and prospects, as if they were our own. We desire the good of others as we desire our own good.
  But the Good which we desire for ourselves is contemplated under various aspects. We may have, as the Object of our desires in a general form. Pleasure, Enjoyment, or Gratification; we may have Interest, or Advantage; we may have Happiness. And as our desires point to one or other of these general |381| Objects for ourselves, they may also aim at the like Objects for others. Our Benevolence may urge us to give pleasure to others, or to promote their interest, or to make them happy.
  In order to see how these views affect the Duties of Benevolence, we may examine further the Conceptions of Pleasure, Interest, and Happiness.

  §537. Pleasure arises from our attaining the objects of our Desires. It is what we feel, when our Desires are satisfied, or in some measure gratified. All actions which are not directed by the Reason, may be conceived as performed in order to obtain Pleasure, or to avoid its opposite, Pain. Actions directed by Reason, may also be directed to Pleasure. They may be directed to the objects of Mental Desires, which Reason presents to us under general abstract forms; as Wealth, Power, and the like: and to obtain such objects, may give us Pleasure. But Pleasure is more especially considered as the object of less abstract and reflective Desires, as Bodily Pleasure, and the like. Pleasure is sought simply and for itself; not as a means to an end, nor in obedience to a Rule. If we seek Wealth or Power as means to an end, we do not seek them merely as pleasure.

  §538. Since Pleasure is sought, not in obedience to a Rule, but simply for itself, to make Pleasure our object, is not consistent with the Supreme Rule of Human Action. To make Pleasure the object of human action, is to reject the supposition of a Supreme Rule, and a Supreme Object. For if Pleasure be the Highest Object, it is also the Lowest. If Pleasure be the Highest Object of Human Action, nothing can be absolutely right; nor can be right in any other sense, than as the right road to Pleasure. If Pleasure be the object of human action, we must reject Duty as the guide of Human Actions. The good man makes Pleasure his object, only so far as it is |382| consistent with the Supreme Rule of Duty. He does not desert Duty for Pleasure, but he finds his Pleasure in Duty.

  §539. Since we cannot rightly desire for ourselves Pleasure, as our ultimate object, we cannot rightly desire it for others, whom we love in some degree as ourselves. Merely to give Pleasure to men, without regarding whether the Pleasures be right or wrong, is not a moral kind of Humanity.
  But though we may not make it our business to promote the Pleasures of those around us, as an ultimate object, for them and for us; we may rightly make the promotion of their Pleasures, so far as they are not wrong Pleasures, one of our main objects; both as a manifestation of Benevolence, and as a means of cultivating that affection. The sympathy with other men, which Morality requires of us, is best fostered and strengthened, by an habitual participation in their efforts to obtain those objects which give them pleasure.

  §540. Though Pleasures are sought, as independent and ultimate objects of desire, they often involve references and consequences, and trains of feeling and thought, which connect them with higher objects, and with Moral Rules. The Desires of the Body point simply to Selfish Pleasures; but the Pleasures of the Affections imply a Sympathy with other persons, which is a kind of benevolence; and therefore, of the nature of virtue. The Pleasures to which the Love of Knowledge leads, involve a culture of the mind, which gives activity to the Reason; and which, thus, may aid the moral culture. And when the moral culture is so far advanced, that Conscience is heard clearly, and Virtue is beloved; the approval of Conscience, and the conscious activity of Virtue, may be sought, as the greatest Pleasures of which man’s nature is susceptible.
  But in general, Pleasure, as an object of action, is |383| distinguished from, and opposed to Duty, and so far as this is done, although we may aim at promoting the Pleasures of others, as a step in our moral culture, a due regard for the moral culture of others will not allow us to make their Pleasure a supreme and ultimate object.

  §541. Another general form under which the object of action presents itself to us, is Interest. We seek our own Interest: and hence we are bound, by the Duties of Benevolence, to seek the Interest of others also. Interest is conceived as an object of affection or desire, approved of, to some extent, by Reason. A prudent man seeks his own Interest. When Interest and Pleasure come in competition, Reason directs us to follow our Interest, and to resist the temptation of Pleasure. We may estimate our Interest according to various Standards; but in speaking of Interest, we suppose some Standard. We say that one thing is more for our Interest than another: for example, we may say that it is more for our Interest to be honest, than to be cunning. In stating such a maxim, we take, for our standard of Interest, the acquisition of wealth, or the establishment of our good name. The Standard of Interest is not an absolute, but an assumed Standard; just as the ends aimed at by Prudence are not absolute, but assumed ends (§258). But we sometimes suppose an absolute and supreme Standard of Interest; we speak of our true Interest, our highest Interest. We say that our true and highest Interest is, the elevation and purification of our moral being. Also, the Affection which we feel towards a person, or for a mental object, is spoken of, as an Interest which we take or feel: that is, the person or object is conceived as of considerable amount, according to our Standard of Interest. But we may estimate another man’s Interest differently from his own feeling respecting it. We may say, it was such a one’s Interest to improve his estate, |384| but he took no Interest in it. Again; different classes of objects of action imply different Standards of Interest. A man’s affections are employed on one set of objects, his thoughts on another. Hence we have the Interests of the Heart, and the Interests of the Intellect. The Interest of the Individual may point one way: the Interest of the State, another.

  §542. Of course. Benevolence directs us to promote the true and highest Interest of other men, as it directs us to seek our own. We may also seek to promote the Interest of others, in a lower and narrower sense; as we may seek to promote their Pleasures: and such a course may be a part of morality, either as a manifestation, or as a discipline, of Benevolence. But to promote any Interest of men, which is not the highest; or any seeming Interest, which is not a true one; cannot rightly be made our ultimate object.

  §543. It has sometimes been said, that men, in all their actions, necessarily seek their Interest, or what appears to them their Interest. The notion involved in this assertion appears to be, that every action may be considered as a tendency to some object, which may be included in the term Interest. The brave man, when he rushes into battle, seeks victory, or glory, which, for the time, he thinks are his Interest. The timid man, when he runs away from the enemy, seeks safety, which seems to him his Interest. But the assertion thus made, involves a confusion of thought and language, such as not only would prevent our being able to state any distinct doctrines of Morality, but such as even common usage may teach us to correct. The brave man is not impelled to seek victory or glory, nor the timid man, to seek safety, by any view of Interest, such as that with which the prudent man thoughtfully seeks his Interest. The springs of action in these cases are Courage, and Fear: not any seeking of an Abstract Object, which Interest is; still less, any. seeking of an Abstract Object involving |385| a Standard of value by which all things are compared, which Interest also is. If we say that the brave man rushes into the battle, and the timid man rushes out of it, each seeking his Interest, we must also say, that the bull-dog attacks his antagonist, and the frightened horse runs away from his master, seeking his Interest; which it would be reckoned absurd to say. The proposition, that all actions are prompted by the prospect of our own Interest, is, not asserted, in general, as anything more than an identical proposition. But to make it true, even in that character, the common usage of language must be violated.

  §544. Happiness is the object of human action in its most general form; as including all other objects, and approved by the Reason. As Pleasure is the aim of mere Desire, and Interest the aim of Prudence; so Happiness is the aim of Wisdom. Happiness is conceived as necessarily an ultimate object of action. To be happy, includes or supersedes all other gratifications. If we are happy, we do not miss that which we have not; if we are not happy, we want something more, whatever we have. The Desire of Happiness is the Supreme Desire. All other Desires, of Pleasure, Wealth, Power, Fame, are included in this, and are subordinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate objects; but we can do so, only by identifying them with this. Happiness is our being’s end and aim.

  §545. Since Happiness is necessarily the Supreme Object of our Desires, and Duty the Supreme Rule of our actions, there can be no harmony in our being, except our Happiness coincide with our Duty. That which we contemplate as the Ultimate and Universal Object of Desire, must be identical with that which we contemplate as the Ultimate and Supreme Guide of our Intentions. As moral beings, our Happiness must be found in our Moral |386| Progress, and in the consequences of our Moral Progress: we must be happy by being virtuous.

  §546. How this is to be, Religion alone can fully instruct us: but by the nature of our faculties, this must be. And as this is the nature of the Happiness which we are to seek for ourselves, so is it the nature of the Happiness which we are to endeavour to bestow upon others. We are directed by Benevolence, to seek to make them happy, by making them virtuous; to promote their Happiness, by promoting their moral Progress; to make them feel their Happiness to be coincident with their Duty.
  The identification of Happiness with Duty on merely philosophical grounds, is a question of great difficulty. It is difficult, even for the philosopher, to keep this Identity steadily fixed in his mind, as an Operative Principle; and it does not appear to be possible to make such an identity evident and effective in the minds of men in general. But Religion presents to us this Truth, of the identity of Happiness and Duty, in connexion with other Truths, by means of which it may be made fully evident and convincing, to minds of every degree of intellectual culture: and the minds of men, for the most part, receive the conviction of the Truth from their Religious Education.

  §547. We may also, as an exercise and discipline of Benevolence, seek to make them happy, in a more partial view; namely, by placing them in a condition in which they have no wants unsupplied; for, as we have said, this is part of the conception of happiness. If we make this our object, we shall have to supply those wants which are universal, and do not depend upon special mental culture; and we shall have to impart such mental culture, as may make them feel no wants which cannot be supplied. We shall have to minister to their human needs; and to moderate their wishes: in short, to make them content. Content is a necessary part of Happiness; and |387| men may be rendered content, by gratifying their desires in part, and limiting them in part, till none remain unsatisfied That men’s desires should be moderate and limited, is a condition very requisite to Content; and therefore, to Happiness: for except some moderating influence be exercised, the Desires, both bodily and mental, grow with indulgence. Hence, we promote the Happiness of men by moderating their Desires: and any influence of this kind, which we can exert upon them; as for instance, by teaching and discipline, may be a work of Benevolence. But on the other hand, we must recollect that the objects to which many of our Desires tend, are means of moral action; and that it is necessary to the moral activity and moral culture of a man, that he should desire and obtain such objects. We ought not to wish to reduce a man to a state of Content, by taking away the desire of the fundamental Rights of man. We ought not to wish the Slave to be contented in his Slavery; living like a brute animal in dependence upon his master, and looking to no law, higher than his Master’s Will. On the contrary, we ought to wish that he should both desire and have Liberty, in order that he may enter upon that course of moral agency and moral progress, which is the only proper occupation of his human faculties. In order to promote the Happiness of mankind, we must endeavour to promote their Liberty: both the Social Liberty, which invests them with the Fundamental Rights of man; and the Political Liberty, which is the guardian of such Rights, and the most favourable condition for moral and intellectual progress. We shall pursue this subject hereafter.

  §548. In some Systems of Morality, the Desire of our own Happiness, and of that of mankind, has been made to occupy a larger space than we assign to it. This Desire has, indeed, been made the basis of the whole of Morality, and the ground and measure |388| of all our Duties. It has been said, that our Principle of action, so far as we ourselves are concerned, must be to attain, as much as possible, our own Happiness; and that the Rule which is to guide us in actions which affect others, is to increase as much as possible their Happiness. This view of the subject has been so much insisted on, that we may make a few remarks upon it.
  We may remark, that according to the explanation which we have given above, of the Conception of Happiness, it is quite true, that we ought to act so as to increase as much as possible our own Happiness and the Happiness of others; but we must add, that this Truth cannot enable us to frame Rules of Duty, or to decide Questions of Morality. It is an identical Truth. Since Happiness is the ultimate object of our aims, and includes all other objects; whatever else we aim at, we identify with Happiness. Whatever other end we seek, we seek that as the far end. And with regard to other persons; Benevolence urges us to promote their Happiness; for in that, all good is included, and we wish to do them good. But these Maxims, though true, are, of themselves, altogether barren. The Questions still occur, What are the things which will increase our own Happiness? What will increase the Happiness of others? Of what elements does Happiness consist? According to our account of it, Happiness does not imply any special elements; but only a general conception of an ultimate and sufficing Object. How are we to measure Happiness, and thus to proceed to ascertain, by what acts it may be increased? If we can do this, then, indeed, we may extract Rules and Results, from the Maxim that we are to increase our own and others’ Happiness: but without this step, we can draw no consequences from the Maxim. If we take the Conception in its just aspect, how little does it help us in such questions as occur to us! I wish to |389| know whether I may seek sensual pleasure; whether I may tell a flattering lie. I ask, Will it increase or diminish the Sum of Human Happiness to do so? This mode of putting the question cannot help me. How can I know whether these acts will increase or diminish the Sum of Human Happiness? The immediate pleasures of gratified sense, or of gratified vanity, I may, perhaps, in some degree, estimate; but how am I to estimate the indirect and remote effects of the acts, on myself and others; and how am I to measure the total effect thus produced, on Human Happiness? By a sensual act, or by a lie, I weaken, it may be said, the habit of temperance and of truth in my own mind; and by my example, I produce a like effect on the minds of others. Suppose, then, that I regard this consequence, and see that the act thus leads to something of unhappiness; still, this effect is perhaps slight and precarious; how am I to balance this result, against those direct gratifications which are produced by the acts now spoken of? It does not appear that, under this form, the question admits of an answer.

  §549. The mode in which Moralists have been able to apply this Principle, of aiming at the greatest amount of Human Happiness, to the establishment of Moral Rules; has been, by assuming that man must act according to Rules. I say assuming, for it does not appear, that we can prove that the Principle of increasing as much as possible the Happiness of man requires us to act by general Rules. The man who is tempted to sensual pleasure, or mendacious flattery, may say, I do not intend that what I do now should be a Rule for myself, or for others. At present I seek to promote Human Happiness, by making an exception to Rules: in general I shall conform to the Rules. To this, the Moralist replies, that to speak and think thus, is to reject Rules altogether: that Rules are not recognized, except they be applied in |390| all cases, and relied upon as the antagonists of the temptations which particular cases offer. In short, he says, that man, by his nature, must act by Rules; and that he, the Moralist, who has to decide respecting the character of human action, has to establish Rules of human action. Thus he assumes, in addition to his Principle of the Greatest Amount of Human Happiness, another Principle, of the Universality of Rule; and it is this latter Principle, which really gives a Moral character to his results. If we are to have Rules of action, we must have Rules, that men are to be temperate and truthful; though special violations of temperance or of truth may seem to offer an increase of human happiness. Such Rules as, that we may lie to please a friend, or may seek bodily pleasure where we can find it, are inconsistent with man’s nature. But that they are so, is shown, by reasoning from the necessary conditions of Rules of action, not by considering the notion of Happiness; for the pursuit of Happiness does, really, often lead men to follow such immoral Rules as have just been mentioned. The Rules, to be temperate and to be truthful, are not established by showing that they lead to the greatest amount of Human Happiness; for we have no means of estimating the amount of Human Happiness which results from any given hypothesis. These Rules may, indeed, be said to be proved by a consideration of the intolerable unhappiness which would result from the absence of such Rules. We have already (§65) used this consideration in establishing Moral Rules in general. But this line of reasoning is quite a different course from employing the Conception of Happiness, as a means of comparing one particular Rule of Duty with another; an employment of the notion of Happiness for which it is, as I have said, quite unfit.

  §550. The Principle of aiming at the greatest amount of Human Happiness, has been strangely |391| dealt with by the Moralists who have principally employed it. As we have already said, in order to deduce Moral Rules from it, it seems to be necessary to find some measure of Happiness; or to resolve it into some more definite elements; and then, to estimate the moral value of actions, by means of this measure, or those elements. But this course has not been followed by such Moralists. Dr. Paley, who rests Moral Rules upon their tendency to promote Human Happiness, has, indeed, begun by giving some account of his view of Happiness. It does not, he says, consist in the pleasures of sense; nor in exemption from pain, labour, and care; nor in greatness and elevated station; it consists in the exercise of the social affections; in the exercise of the faculties of body or mind in the pursuit of some engaging end; in the prudent constitution of the habits; and in health: and, as he suggests in a note, perhaps in a certain condition of the nerves. Having given this analysis of Happiness, we naturally look to see how he next brings the word into use in his reasonings. We find the word occupying a very prominent place in the first sentence of his next chapter; in which he tells us, that “Virtue is the doing good to mankind for the sake of everlasting Happiness.” But it is plain that, in this use of the word, there is no reference to the analysis of Happiness contained in the preceding chapter; and we are therefore, so far as reasoning is concerned, here thrown back upon the general notion which the word Happiness, without any special explanation, suggests.

  §551. When Paley proceeds, a little further on, to establish Moral Doctrines, for instance the Right of Property, he rests the propriety of this Institution of Property upon its advantages;—that it increases the produce of the earth; preserves this produce to maturity; prevents contests; and increases the conveniency of living. Doubtless, all these results may |392| be understood, as additions to the Sum of Human Happiness; but there is no attempt made to show that these additions counterbalance the subtraction from Human Happiness arising from the wants of some persons, the superfluity of others, the contests and crimes of many, which Property produces. The Principle of the Greatest Human Happiness, thus loosely applied, leaves the Right of Property to stand upon a general apprehension of its advantages. The same is the case with the other Fundamental Rights of Man, and the Fundamental Rules of Morality. They are not proved, in Paley’s work, by showing, in any distinct manner, that they increase the Sum of Human Happiness; for no way is offered of measuring this Sum, or its Increase. But the Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Rules are asserted; and the student is told that they are necessary to Human Happiness. This all can readily assent to; for the end for which Rights and Rules exist, whatever other name it bear, may be considered as included in the term Happiness. And thus, Fundamental Rights and Rules, and the vague general notion of Human Happiness as their ultimate end, stand side by side in such systems of Morality, but have not really any logical connexion.

  §552. There is, however, one character of such Systems which is implied in this mode of employing the term Happiness. They seek to deduce the Rules of Action from a Supreme Object of Desire; whereas we have deduced them from a Supreme Rule of Action. They direct men to aim at Happiness; we direct them to aim at Acting Rightly. We deduce our Rules from the Constitution of man’s nature; they, from the Objects of his desires. As expressing this difference, the Terms and Reasonings employed in such systems may be worthy our consideration.

  §553. There is an expression often used by Moralists of this class, which may be noticed in this |393| point of view. They often declare Utility to be the Ground and Measure of the Morality of actions. Now Utility cannot be in itself an Ultimate End. That is useful, which is subservient to some further end. A wheel is useful as a portion of a carriage; a carriage is useful in order to take a journey; a journey is useful, in order to visit a friend; to see and talk with a friend is useful, if it makes us happy. All things which have a value for their utility, have a reference to some ulterior end; and if we assume some Ultimate End, such as Happiness is conceived to be, all things may be estimated by their Utility. Thus the estimate of actions by their Utility may be conceived as identical with the estimate of them as contributing to Human Happiness; and accordingly, the two phrases have been principally used by the same school of Moralists.

  §554. The judgment which we have to pronounce upon Utility, as a ground of estimating the character of actions, is implied in what has been already said. We cannot estimate the value of anything, as being useful to an End, except by assuming the value of the End. If a Coach be a thing of no value, a Coach-wheel must be a thing of no value. If travelling be of no use, a travelling carriage is of no use. The measure of the value of actions by their Utility, is liable to all the inconvenience and indefiniteness of the determination of the End for which they are useful; and besides, to the difficulty of determining how far they are useful to the end. A system in which actions are estimated by their Utility in promoting Human Happiness, will be liable to the objections already stated against the Principle of the Greatest Human Happiness; and will also require a just mode of measuring the value of Actions as Means, the End being given. We have all along been applying a very different method, in order to judge of actions. We ask, What is right? |394| not, What is useful? acknowledging, as we have said, a Supreme Rule, and not being content with seeking Means which derive their value from the assumed value of their Ends.

  §555. Another Term which has been much used by Moralists of this School is Expediency. “Whatever is expedient,” says Paley, “is right”. (1 Paley, B. i. c. 6.) Now we have to observe here, as before, that the main significance of such assertions is in the rejection, which they imply, of any independent and fundamental meaning in the term right. Those who make such assertions, intend to say, that Actions are right because they promote some object; Human Happiness, for instance; and that those who speak of acts, as absolutely right, are in error. In the common use of language, we speak of actions as expedient when they promote some end which we have selected, and which we do not intend to have questioned. If we are prepared to put forwards the end of our actions as the Proper End of action, we call them, not expedient, but right. It may be expedient for a man to lie, in order to free himself from captivity. He may stay in captivity, because he will not tell a lie; but in this case, we say, he does what is right, and rejects what is expedient. Expedient implies, according to its etymology, a way out of difficulties. But Morality places before us a higher object than merely to escape from difficulties. She teaches us to aim at what is right. What is expedient, may be expedient as a means to what is right. It may be expedient to tell the truth, in order to rescue an innocent person from death. But we do not describe such an action properly by calling it expedient. It is much more than expedient, it is right: it is recommended, not by Expediency, but by Duty. In such cases, we can speak approvingly, not only of the action, as a right means, but of the end, as a right end. Truth |395| is not properly commended, when it is described as a good way of getting out of a difficulty, or of gaining our ends.
  Those who use this term, Expediency, to describe the proper end of human action, are prompted to do so by a wish to reject Terms which imply a Supreme Rule of action; they wish to recognize none but subordinate Rules determined by the Objects at which men aim. And it is true, in this sense, that whatever is expedient with a view to an end, is the right way to the end: but this does not justify the Moralist in confounding what is relatively expedient with what is absolutely right: nor in speaking of things as expedient absolutely, without pointing out the purpose which they are expedient for.

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Chapter XXVI. Moral Education

  §556. The Laws of each Community lay down certain Rules of Action, commands or prohibitions, for the members of the Community. But they do more: they direct that certain Punishments shall be inflicted on those who transgress the Law; as Fine, Imprisonment, Bodily Pain, Mutilation, Infamy, Exile, Death. And the Community, by its officers, inflicts these Punishments. It is in this manner, that the Laws become real Rules of action; and that in the minds of all men, Law-keeping and Law-breaking become objects which are sought and avoided, with the same earnestness and care as the other objects of the most powerful desires and aversions of men. The Punishment which thus gives reality to the Law, is the Sanction of the Law.

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  §557. The Laws command what is in the community deemed right, and hence. Punishments are inflicted upon actions which are deemed wrong: although all wrong actions are not necessarily punished by Law. We have already explained (§457, §458) the relation between the National Law and the National Morality. The National Law expresses certain fixed and fundamental portions of the National Morality: but not the whole. Law deals with external and visible acts, such as affect men’s Rights; Morality deals, besides, with acts which are right or wrong, though they do not directly affect Rights; and with internal springs of action. The Law must always be just; but there may be many things which are just, and which yet cannot be enforced by Law. The Law must prohibit only what is wrong, though it may not prohibit all that is morally wrong.

  §558. Since the Law must always be just. Punishments must be inflicted only on what is morally wrong. It is sometimes said that the sole object of prevention of harm to the members of the community; but this is not the conception of Punishment. Punishment implies moral transgression. Crimes are violations of Law; but Crimes are universally understood to be offenses against Morality also. If, in enforcing any law, of which the sole object were the prevention of harm to the community, some individuals were subjected to pain, these individuals being morally blameless, the pain would not be conceived as Punishment; if the infliction were to take the character of Punishment, the proceeding would be considered as intolerable. When persons, afflicted with or suspected of contagious disorders, are put in constraint for the good of the community (as in quarantine), this constraint is not called Punishment. A Law that such persons should be put to death, even though the health of the community might be so best secured, would be rejected by all men as |397| monstrous. An object of Punishment is the prevention of Crime; but it is the prevention of Crime as Crime, and not merely as Harm.

  §559. Thus the Laws, with their Sanctions, express in some measure the moral judgment of the Community; and by expressing it, they impress it upon the minds of individual members of the Community. That which the Law condemns and punishes, is understood by all to be wrong; and thus, each person who lives under the Law, has a number of fixed points, which direct his mind in the determination of right and wrong. The Laws, with their Sanctions, are a part of the Moral Education of each citizen’s mind.

  §560. As we have said, there is a National Morality, which is of wider extent, and more deeply seated in men’s minds, than the written Law. The expressions of moral judgments respecting actions and characters, which are put forth in speeches upon public occasions, in the poetry and literature of the nation, and the like, take for granted a general agreement of men on points of Morality: and such expressions of moral judgments also produce their impression on individuals; they diffuse and perpetuate the judgment which they express; and form a part of the Moral Education of the citizens.
  This Moral Education of the members of a community, must be such as tends to bring the moral judgments of individuals into harmony with those of the community. In order that the business of any community may be carried on, the citizens must have their moral judgments, in a great measure at least, in harmony with the Laws, and with the general jural and moral maxims which prevail, and have prevailed, in the community. If Judges and Litigants, Governors and Subjects, Magistrates and Legislators, all believed the Laws, and the usual procedures of the State, to be unjust and wrong; they |398| would no longer go on executing and obeying them. They would no longer speak of them with respect: and magistrates who should speak disrespectfully of the Law, would not themselves be respected. The Laws being disregarded, the State would tend to dissolution. Thus, without some harmony between the moral judgments of the Community, as expressed in its Laws and Customs, and those of individuals, the continued and coherent existence of the State is impossible.

  §561. But though the Laws, with their Sanctions, and the public currency of moral sentiments and opinions in harmony with the Laws, form an important part of the moral education of the citizens, the moral judgments of each person are, for the most part, formed, in a still greater degree, by the influence of Parents, and other Friends, among whom childhood and youth are spent. This Domestic Teaching is the most effective portion of everyone’s moral education. The moral judgments respecting actions, characters, virtues, vices, objects and rules of action, which prevail in the domestic sphere, are so mingled with the moral conceptions, in every stage of their development, that they cannot be separated and dissevered by any subsequent operations; and thus, such moral judgments are imparted to each person in his earliest years, and transmitted from generation to generation.

  §562. In general, this Domestic Moral Education must be in harmony with the National Morality, and the National Law; for otherwise, as we have said, men would not perform their business as citizens in such a manner as to keep up the life of the State. But yet domestic education may often be something much more varied and peculiar, than it would be, if it were the mere echo of the Law, or the repetition of public formularies of morality, with explanations and commentaries. The Morality of different nations is very different in its Rules; and still more, in the doctrines and beliefs which form the foundation of the Rules. These |399| doctrines and beliefs are transmitted to successive generations, mainly by domestic teaching. But it may happen that a Family, belonging to one nation, dwells, even for several generations, in the country of another State; as the Jews dwell in the various states of Europe, and Christian merchants in China. In such cases, the domestic teaching may not agree with the morality of the nation among which the Family resides; but will rather be derived from the belief of the nation to which the Family belongs. Such a Family will commonly teach to its children obedience to the laws of the State of their abode; but it will instill such moral sentiments and opinions as are usual in the Nation of its origin. For such persons, the belief belonging to the scattered Nation, supersedes the doctrines locally prevalent in the State. In this case, the moral education of each person fits him, it may be, to be a peaceable resident in one nation; but it fits him to be a faithful member of a distant community.

  §563. But further: though each person’s moral judgments are much influenced by the moral judgments of the community to which he belongs, and still more, by those of the family of which he is a child, they are not entirely derived from those sources. Each person has, also, Something Individual in his moral sentiments and opinions. A person may accept the Standard of morality which is established among his neighbours; but each person may for himself improve and elevate this Standard. A person may accept the Doctrines and the Belief which prevail among his neighbours, but he may also employ his own thoughts in determining what is the true doctrine, and what he must believe as being true. Indeed, in a certain degree, a man is bound, as a moral and rational being, to do this. He is bound, as a moral being, continually to elevate his Standard of Morality (§366). If he |400| acquiesce passively in a National Standard, his moral progress must be small. Again: he is bound, as a rational being, to accept, as Truth, only what he sees as Truth. It may be, that he believes what his nation believes, with regard to the foundations of morality; but this his belief is an act of his own Reason; and if it be not so, it is not belief. Now each man’s own Reason presents to him the Truth under various aspects, depending upon his personal intellectual culture. The Truth, as he sees it, may not agree with what he has been taught by others. He obtains, by his own efforts, a more perfect view of the Truth, than the national formularies convey to him. He elevates his Standard of Truth above the National Standard; as he elevates his Standard of Morality above the National Standard. To do this, is Self-education; and this Education operates, in addition to the National Education, and Domestic Education, in forming a man’s moral character.

  §564. The Self-education by which a man arrives at his own view of Virtue and Truth, must be, finally and specially, his own act: but the mental processes and habits by which he is led on, from step to step, in his progress towards such views, may be determined or aided by the influence of other persons, especially by such influence exerted in his youth. Masters and Teachers, of various kinds, may discipline and instruct the mind, so that it shall be more or less ready and apt to seek a knowledge of Virtue and Truth; and to recognize them, in proportion as they present themselves. And the teaching which thus unfolds the Faculties of the pupil, as well as that which communicates to him Opinions and Beliefs, is Education. This Education is highly important to our moral being. For it especially fits us for that perpetual progress which is our highest moral duty, and which includes all our other Duties (§345).

  §565. A knowledge of Truth is requisite, as the |401| foundation of Morality. And although the aspect of the Truths which are the foundations of Morality may vary, according to the various intellectual culture which those who contemplate them have received, there is one general Truth which must always form a part of those foundations: namely, the Truth that Duty is the way to Happiness. But as we have already said (§546), the identification of Happiness with Duty, on merely philosophical grounds, is a line of thought and reasoning, full of difficulty; and this difficulty is effectually removed only by Religious Education.
  We are thus led to Religion, as the next step of our progress; and to that, we now proceed.

End of Volume I.

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The Elements of Morality, Volume II.

Book IV. Religion: Of Divine Laws and Their Sanction
Chapter I. Natural Religion

  §566. The Moral State and Moral Progress of each man are maintained by his conviction of certain Truths which are the foundations of Morality; and among these Truths, one of the most important is this: that the course of action which is his Duty, is also his Happiness, when considered with reference to the whole of his being (§546). This conviction, men for the most part derive from Religion; that is, from their belief respecting God, and his government of Man. We believe God to be the Governor of Man, as a moral being (§93). The Moral Law is his Command; Conscience is his voice; He sees and knows all the internal actions of which we ourselves are conscious; He possesses an unbounded power to determine the Happiness or Misery of every one of us; He exercises this power so as to give a sanction to his Laws; appointing misery as the punishment of transgressions, and making a conformity to his Laws lead us to Happiness; which Happiness will continue in another life when this life is past.
  This is Natural Religion; but further, as we have seen (§357), we require to be taught by Religion how, when we have transgressed. Repentance and Amendment can avail, |4| as a remedy for the sin committed; how they can restore the health of man’s moral life, and avert from man’s condition and destination the consequences of sin. We also (§367) require from Religion the hope of some power, in addition to the ordinary powers of our own minds, which is to be exercised upon us, in order to enlighten and instruct our conscience, and to carry on our moral progress. These requirements are responded to by Revealed Religion.

  §567. The belief which constitutes Natural Religion, takes possession of men’s minds, in the course of their intellectual and moral progress. The idea of God is unfolded and fixed, and the points of belief which we have stated, are established, by the intellectual and moral culture of the mind. The steps of thought, which lead to these points of belief, may be different in different minds, according to the course which their intellectual and moral culture takes. In the mode of arriving at a belief in God, and in his moral government, the procedure of one mind is not a rule for other minds. To some persons, the Truths of Natural Religion may seem to be self-evident; to other persons, they may become more evident, when connected by various steps of analogy and reasoning. We shall state some of the reasonings respecting God and his Government, which may prove the doctrines we have stated, to the satisfaction of those persons who require proofs of them.
  We proceed with these reasonings.

  §568. From the existence of the world, we necessarily infer the existence of a Supreme Being, who is the Cause of the world’s existence. The assemblage of things and events which we describe by the abstract term Nature, directs us to a belief in an Author of Nature. Everything and every event must have a Cause; that Cause again must have its Cause, and so on. But this Series must terminate: there must be a First Cause. This Supreme |5| Being, this Author of Nature, this First Cause, is God; the Creator of the World and of all that it contains, including Man.

  §569. But further; in many things which exist, and in many events which take place in the world, we see irresistible evidence, not only of a Cause, but of a Final Cause. We discern an End, an Intention, of the Creator of the world. Things are constructed so as to answer a Purpose, and we cannot help believing that they were intended to answer this Purpose. The eyes are made so that we can see; and on examining their structure, we are irresistibly led to believe that they were made in order that we might see. In the same way by an examination of the structure of man’s body, we are led to believe that the muscles were made in order to move the limbs; and that the nerves were made, among other purposes, in order to excite the muscles to action.
  That we see with our eyes; that the nerves excite the muscles, and the muscles move the limbs;—these are Laws of our Nature. But these Laws indicate the Intention of the Author of Nature. They are his Laws; the manifestation of his Purpose; the expression of his Will.

  §570. The Structure of our Minds, as well as of our bodies, is the work of God the Creator. Our Appetites, Desires, Affections, Reason, are given to us by him, as well as our Organs, Muscles, Nerves, Brain. And in the structure of our minds, as in that of our bodies, the faculties were assigned with intention and purpose. It was intended that Appetite should operate for the preservation of the individual; that the Affections should collect men into Families and Societies; that the Reason should direct and control both the Appetites and the Affections; that the Sentiments of Approbation and Disapprobation should aid the Reason in this office. It was intended, for instance, that Shame should prevent our doing shameful actions.

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  §571. Further; in virtue of his Reason, man seeks objects, as Means to Ends. We cannot believe otherwise than that it was intended, by his Creator, that he should do this; and should conform to Rules of action, derived from his doing this (§18). It was intended, therefore, that he should conform to the Supreme Rule of Action; which is a necessary condition of these subordinate Rules (§72). Consequently, this Supreme Rule of Action, namely the Moral Law, is the Law intended for him by his Creator. The Moral Law is the Law of God, and the Will of God.

  §572. The Moral Law is expressed by means of certain Moral Ideas, namely. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order (§232). These Ideas, therefore, express the Will of God, with regard to human actions. These Ideas were given to man, in order that he might, by them, direct his Actions. And when man frames his internal Standard of Action, his Conscience, in conformity with these Ideas, his internal Standard represents the Will of God; and his Conscience may be considered as the Voice of God (§371).

  §573. But again; human action may be contemplated, not only as governed by Rules, successively subordinate to each other, and ultimately, by a Supreme Rule; but also, as directed to objects successively subordinate to each other, and ultimately to a Supreme Object (§73).
  The Supreme Object of human action is Happiness. Happiness is the object of human action contemplated in its most general form, and approved by Reason (§544).
  The Subordinate Rules of human action are enforced and sanctioned by the belief of success or failure, in the pursuit of some corresponding object. Thus, the Rule, that the Appetites must be controlled by the Reason, is enforced by our expectation of obtaining health and comfort, if we obey the Rule, and of forfeiting these benefits if we disregard the Rule. In like manner, the Rule that we must respect the |7| Rights of all men, is enforced by the hope of Security and Tranquillity, which the general observance of such a Rule produces; by the prospect of the Turbulence and Insecurity which exist in rude states of Society; and by the fear of the condemnation and punishment which, in more settled Society, the violation of Rights produces to the offender.
  In like manner, the Supreme Rule of Human Action is enforced and sanctioned by a belief that it leads to the Supreme Object of Human Action. As the Rule of Temperance points to Health and Comfort; as the Rule of Respect for Rights points to Security and Tranquillity; so the Supreme Rule of Rightness points to Happiness, which includes all other objects; and which is an internal Comfort and Tranquillity requiring nothing beyond itself.

  §574. The Subordinate Rules are enforced and sanctioned by the belief that they lead to their respective objects; and this belief is confirmed and verified by the result. Temperance does, as a general Rule, lead to Health and Comfort. Respect for legal Obligation does maintain social Tranquillity and individual Security. By the analogy of these Cases, we are confirmed in our belief that Moral Rightness leads to Happiness.
  The Rules of Human Action, approved by the Reason, may be considered as Laws given to man by God; and the Objects of Human Action, which are foreseen and obtained by conforming to such Rules, may be considered as Promises to man made and fulfilled by God. The general declarations of God to men, made through his Reason, may be considered as conditional Promises. “If you are temperate, you shall be healthy.” “If you conform to the laws of Society, you shall enjoy the benefits of Society.” In like manner, there is a conditional Promise made to man through his Reason, that conformity to the Supreme Rule will be |8| attended with the Supreme Good of his Nature. “If you are virtuous, you shall be happy.” And as the Promises, thus made in the other cases, are verified by the result, we are led to believe, by analogy, that the Promise, in the last case, will also be verified by the result.
  Hence the results of obeying and violating Moral Rules of Action, made known to us by our Reason, may be considered as Rewards and Punishments appointed by God. And thus we are led to look upon Happiness as the appointed Reward of Virtue, and Unhappiness as the appointed Punishment of Vice.

  §575. We conceive not only Will and Purpose, as residing in God, but also Affections. His creation abounds in Contrivances, which have, for their objects, the health, comfort, and enjoyment, of his creatures; and nowhere exhibits Contrivances which have, for their object, pain or disease. Hence, we conceive God as benevolent towards his creatures. Moreover, being led, as we have just said, to believe him to exercise a Moral Government, in which he rewards Virtue and punishes Vice, we conceive him as loving virtuous men, and hating vicious men; and as loving Virtue and hating Vice, in the abstract. We conceive Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order, as the objects of his Love. And we are thus led to conceive these Ideas, as elements in our Idea of God. We conceive him as, in the most perfect degree, Benevolent, Just, True, Pure, and Wise. This Moral Perfection is Holiness.

  §576. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, are the proper objects of our Love (§233); and therefore God, in whom these Ideas are all comprehended, is the proper object of Love. With the Idea of God in our minds, the Love of God becomes a part of our Moral Progress. Our belief in the Holiness of God, and our Love of Him, confirm and uphold our expectation and belief that Happiness |9| is the appointed Reward of Virtue, and Unhappiness the appointed Punishment of Vice.

  §577. The expectation and belief which are supported by these reasonings and analogies, become constantly stronger, as our moral and intellectual culture proceed. But though men have such a general and settled expectation and belief, that Happiness is the appointed Reward of Virtue; it is a matter of great doubt and obscurity, to the eye of Reason, in what manner this is to be brought to pass. Some have taught that the virtuous man is always happy, by that condition of his mind which Virtue produces. Some have inferred that, since happiness is not always the Reward of Virtue in the life of men; this life must be succeeded by another life, in which the Promise is fulfilled, and the Reward bestowed. They have taught that man has a Soul, which is not destroyed by the accidents which happen to the body; and that the Soul, surviving the death of the mortal Body, is the subject of God’s Rewards and Punishments in another world.

  §578. The doctrine that man has a Soul, of which Consciousness, Will, Reason, Affections, Memory, Imagination, are Faculties, as Motion, Sensation, Nutrition, are Faculties of the Body, has been generally believed on other grounds also. I am conscious of remaining the same person; while my body is constantly changing by the process of nutrition. I will certain acts; in which the body is only the instrument of the will. I reason; and in doing so, refer to Ideas, or principles of Reasoning, common to me along with all mankind; these Ideas or principles cannot be conceived as residing in the body. I love my parents, my brothers, and sisters, my children; these affections do not belong to the body. By acts of duty, habits of duty and virtue are formed; which are not habits of mere bodily action. And by all these processes,—Will, Reason, Affection, Acts of |10| Duty,—permanent effects are produced upon our being, which can be understood most simply as effects produced on the Soul. It is the Soul, which is permanently affected by the intellectual and moral culture of which we have spoken (§293); as the body is permanently affected by bodily exercises. It is the Soul, which is tainted and distempered by transgression (§349); and it is the Soul which is to be restored by Repentance and Amendment, if restoration be possible (§357). It is the Soul, in which must take place the constant and unlimited moral progress, of which we have spoken (§300): which, as we have said, must go forwards to the very end of life. And it is very natural to suppose that by this Progress, the Soul is fitted for Another Life, in which its condition will correspond with the nature of its Moral Progress in this life. If the Soul have reached a high point of Moral Progress on this side of death, we may suppose that it will, on the other side of death, if not on this, find a corresponding state of Happiness. If, on the contrary, habits of virtue have been neglected, transgressions committed, and habits of vice formed here, the Soul must be unfitted for enjoying, hereafter, any Happiness, such as we can suppose God to give to men’s Souls.

  §579. Thus we are led to believe in a Future State of being, in which God’s Moral Government will be carried on to its completion. But even in this present State of being, we must conceive ourselves and the world to be under the Government of God. God must be the Governor, as he is the Creator, of the world; for as the Creator, he formed, and placed in it, those Springs of Progress by which its course is carried on and regulated. We cannot help believing that, like all other parts of the Creation, the course of the world of human doing and suffering must have a Purpose; and this Purpose must be in harmony with the Moral Government of God, to the belief of which we have |11| already been led (§574). The Course of this world, we cannot but believe, is directed by God’s Providence. It is a Divine Dispensation.

  §580. The doctrines of Natural Religion, as we have stated them, thus present to us these Ideas; the Moral Government of God and his Providence. So far as we borrow our Light from Natural Religion, we assume these Ideas, of Moral Government and Providence, to be realized in the World to Come; and we regard this world as the Prelude and Preparation to that. But we cannot reasonably be satisfied with a mere Idea of the Course of this World. We must attend to the Fact also, that is, to the History of the World: and thus we are led to Revealed Religion.

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Chapter II. Christian Revelation

  §581. The Idea of the Course of the World, according to Natural Religion, is, that it is directed by God’s Providence so as to be in harmony with his Moral Government. The Fact which corresponds to this Idea is supplied to us by the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament.
  We learn, from these Scriptures, that besides the transactions of men with men, the course of the world has also included transactions of God with men. There have taken place, in the History of the World, Revelations of the Commands and Promises of God, and of the Methods by which men are to be enabled to obey these Commands, and to receive the benefit of these Promises.
  The central point of these Revelations is the coming of Jesus Christ upon Earth. To this point, all ancient History converges, by means of Early Revelations; Prophecies; the |12| Selection of a special nation, the Jews, as the depositaries of Prophecy; and the successive failure of all attempts, made by moral and philosophical teachers, in other nations, to solve the perplexities of man’s condition, by the light of Reason, without the aid of Revelation. From this point, a new Dispensation begins.

  §582. A Revelation was made from God to man, through Jesus Christ. And this Revelation amply and entirely confirms the expectation and belief which Natural Religion offers to us (§574, §578), that Happiness is the appointed Reward of Virtue, Unhappiness the appointed Punishment of Sin; that there is a life, after this, in which this Promise and this Threatening are realized; that the Soul survives the death of the present Body, and is the subject of God’s Rewards and Punishments in another world.

  §583. Along with this confirmation of the expectation and belief which Natural Religion offers, the Revelation made to man, through Jesus Christ and his Disciples, conveys to us many Precepts of Duty, and Doctrines concerning the grounds of Duty, and concerning the best means of attaining Virtue. These Precepts and Doctrines confirm the Precepts and Doctrines of Morality which we have delivered, as far as these go: but the Christian Revelation offers to us many Truths concerning the grounds of Duty, and the means of attaining Virtue, which Morality alone cannot arrive at. These Precepts and Doctrines constitute Christian Morality.

  §584. The ground of our Duty, as presented to us by Religious Teaching, is, that it is the Will of God. The Will of God is the Supreme Rule of our Being.
  But we also conceive (§517) the Ideas which are contained in the Supreme Rule of our Being, namely. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, as parts of the Character of God. Hence, to conform our minds to those Ideas, is |13| to conform our character to the Character of God. To approach to this Character, is to approach to the Image of God; and our Moral Progress may be spoken of as an approach to the Image of God. But in using such language, we must ever bear in mind the Supreme Reverence which is due to God, as the Perfect and Central Source of those moral qualities, in which we very imperfectly and distantly participate.

  §585. The Character of Jesus Christ, while upon the earth, was a Human Character of the highest Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Obedience to Law. In his Character, we have the moral perfections, which we conceive in God, embodied and realized in man. Hence, the Image of God in Christ is the summit of the Moral Progress, which it is our Duty to pursue; and this object is presented to us by Christian teaching, as the aim and end of our moral career.

  §586. But Jesus Christ did not only teach the Will of God, and exemplify the highest moral excellence of man. He also suffered death upon the cross was buried; rose again the third day; and ascended into heaven. And we learn, from Christian teaching, that these events were most important and essential parts of the New Dispensation. We learn, that, through the efficacy of these events, we may be saved from the consequences of our sins.

  §587. This part of Christian doctrine contains an answer to the inquiries which, as we have already said, the Moralist is driven to make of the Religious teacher, respecting the efficacy of Repentance, and the provision made by God for saving man from the effects of sin (§357). The Christian Revelation speaks to us of God’s Pardon and Forgiveness of Sins, through which those who have transgressed and repented of their transgressions, may in some cases be saved from the punishment of sin, and restored to his favour. It |14| teaches us also (1 Butler, Analogy, B. II., c. 5.) that the Rules of God’s Government are such as not to admit of pardon directly and immediately upon Repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it. But it teaches, at the same time, what, without a Revelation, we could only have hoped, that the Moral Government of the world from the beginning was such as to admit of an interposition which might avert the fatal consequences of vice; and that vice, by that means, does admit of pardon. Christian Revelation teaches us, that the Laws of God’s Government are compassionate, as well as simply good; and that he has provided an interposition, to prevent the destruction of human kind by the infliction of merited punishment, whatever that destruction, if not prevented, would have been. It was a part of the teaching of Jesus Christ, that (John 3:15) God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, hut have everlasting life. God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved. He interposed by sending his son Jesus Christ, so as to prevent that execution of justice upon Sinners, which must have followed, if it had not been for such interposition.

  §588. Further: the Christian Revelation contains important teaching upon another of the difficulties of Morality (§367); namely, the means provided for carrying on our moral progress, in addition to the ordinary powers of our own minds.
  Natural Religion suggests to us (§578), that by this Progress the Soul is fitted for another Life; but we learn from Christian Revelation, that there are conditions of this Progress, of which Natural Religion and Morality cannot inform us. These means are described to be; a Belief in Jesus Christ, the Son of God; and a Participation in the |15| Spirit which God sent upon earth at his coming, and infused into the Souls of his Disciples. In the same portion of Christian teaching to which we have already referred, it is said (John 3:18 and 36), He that believeth on him is not condemned; hut he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God.…He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life: but the wrath of God abideth on him. Jesus Christ himself said (John 3:5): Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. He promised to his Disciples a Spirit which was to guide them into all truth (John 14:13). They were taught that it helped their infirmities (Rom. 8:26). Hence this Spirit was called the Comforter (John 14:16), and was to dwell in them (Rom. 8:9): and when Jesus Christ left the earth, his parting command was (Matt. 28:19), Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit: and, lo, I am with you always to the end of the world.

  §589. By the help of the means thus provided by God, and by the aid of this Spirit, a Christian man is led to approach to the Image of God in Christ (§524): he is in a special sense united with Christ, as the branch is united with the tree (John 15:5), or as the members are united with the body (1 Cor. 12:27; Eph. 5:30). His Soul receives nutriment from Christ; which is expressed by saying that he feeds upon Christ (John 6:51): and is symbolically expressed by eating bread and drinking wine in remembrance of him (Luke 22:19), and in obedience to his command.

  §590. Believers in Christ, thus united with him, are united with each other, as members of a living Body (Rom. 12:4; 1 Cor. 12:12; Eph. 4:25). This Body, of which Christ is the head, is the Church (Col. 1:18). He is the head of |16| the body of the Church. To this Body, thus united in Christ, belong unity in itself, perpetual existence, and the possession of religious Truth, through the guidance of the Holy Spirit. This Body is the Universal or Catholic Church of Christ.

  §591. The Association of Believers in Christ, of which we have spoken, the Church, is bound together by means of certain habitual formal social acts. There is one such act by which members of the Church are admitted into it, namely, Baptism. There is another such act by which they commemorate their union with Christ according to his Command, namely, the Lord’s Supper. There are acts by which they express their affections towards God, namely, acts of worship, Prayer and Praise. There are acts in which they express their Christian belief, or receive Christian Instruction from their Teachers; Profession of Faith, and Preaching. All these are Christian Ordinances.

  §592. The Souls of men are often also called their Spirits; especially when they are considered as the subjects of God’s government. His government extending over such subjects is his Spiritual Kingdom. Hence religious matters are called Spiritual: and to these, as the concerns of an eternal world, are opposed temporal or secular matters, which belong only to time or to this world (tempus, seculum).

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Chapter III. Christian Morality

  §593. We have now to treat of Christian Morality; not as being a different Morality from that Rational Morality of which we have hitherto treated; but as throwing new light upon the Morality of mere Reason, and giving it new supports. The Christian Religion recognizes the same |17| Duties, which we have put forward on grounds of Reason; Duties of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; and the general Duty of Moral and Intellectual Progress. But the Christian Religion invests all these Duties with new Sanctions; and carries our Progress much further, by making it not only a moral and intellectual, but a Religious Progress. The Religious Progress of our affections and thoughts carries us towards a condition, in which all Special Duties are the necessary development and manifestation of Religious Principles of Action. If we had, in this work, to treat of Religion as our primary and principal subject, it might be the more proper course to begin with Religious Principles of Action, and from them, to deduce Special Rules of Action. Such is the course often followed by Religious Teachers. But since our primary and principal subject is Morality, we shall adopt, in treating of Religious Morality, that order of matters which we have already found to be presented to us, by the nature of our subject.

  §594. We may add, that Christian Teaching nowhere presents to us any Authoritative Scheme or System of Duties and Principles, which we reject, in taking the guidance of our own. The indications of System, in the notices which we have on such subjects, in the New Testament, are vague and various. Christ, in his teaching, recognizes the division of Duties, into Duties towards God, and Duties towards our neighbours. Matt. 22:37: Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it: Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets. And in like manner, in Mark 12:30. This is said of the Law of Moses; but it is spoken of that Law as being, what in the apprehension of the Jews it was, a complete body of human Duties. We shall explain |18| our Duties towards God, when we come to speak of our Religious Culture. Taking the Ten Commandments as the summary of the Law of Moses, the first four refer to Duties towards God. The fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth commandments, declare Obligations, rather than Duties. We have already referred to the Rules, Thou shall obey thy Parents; Thou shall not kill; Thou shall not commit adultery; Thou shall not steal; Thou shall not utter a solemn falsehood; as expressions of the Rights of Obedience, Personal Security, Marriage, Property, Contract. The tenth commandment. Thou shall not covet, is, however, a Moral Precept, and not a Law, in the strict sense of the term.

  §595. The Christian teachers justly considered that Obligations are included in Duties, and do not need to be separately enjoined by the Moralist. They also conceived all Duties to be included in the Duty of Benevolence. Thus St. Paul says (Rom. 13:8), Owe no man anything (that is, reckon no Duty), but to love one another. He that loveth others hath fulfilled the Law. This, Thou shall not commit adultery, Thou shall not kill, Thou shall not steal, Thou shall not hear false witness, Thou shall not covet, and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself. When we come to treat of our religious progress, we shall have to speak of this Benevolence or Love, as a Christian Principle of action.

  §596. In following out the moral Principles of action into their results, in special Duties, the Relative Duties formerly mentioned (§278) are naturally arranged according to the Relations to which they belong. Accordingly, we have enumerations of the principal Relations, with their corresponding Duties, in various parts of the New Testament; especially in the two Epistles of St. Paul, to the Ephesians (chapter 6), and to the Colossians (chapters 2, 3). These |19| two enumerations agree very nearly: and state the Relative Duties of Wives and Husbands; Children and Parents; Servants and Masters. In the Epistle to the Romans (chapter 8), we have the relative Duties summarily enjoined; Render unto all their dues; with an especial notice of the Duty of Obedience to government.
  Duties, as enjoined upon us by Christian teaching, and on Christian grounds, are Christian Duties.

  §597. We shall now proceed to collect the principal Precepts with regard to Duties, which occur in the New Testament: arranging them according to the Heads of Duty which we have already found it convenient to adopt: namely; Duties of the Affections: Duties respecting Property and other objects of Desire: Duties connected with Truth; Duties connected with Purity: Duties of Obedience and Command. We had, besides these, to speak of Intellectual Duties, and in doing this we were led to speak of man’s Moral Education and of Religion, as a necessary part of this (§565). The Duties thus arising have, for their object, man’s Religious Progress.

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Chapter IV. Christian Precepts Concerning Duties of the Affections

  §598. The Christian Precepts concerning Duties of the Affections include the Moral Precepts formerly given (§273-§282); but carry the teaching farther, both as to its requirements and its motives. Beginning from the obligation to abstain from all violence, these precepts inculcate the duty of controlling and repressing all intention of violence, and the affections which give rise to such intentions: |20| they inculcate also the duty of fostering and exercising affections of good-will with corresponding intentions and actions. They enjoin the virtues which consist in the habits of such affections, intentions, and actions. These duties and these virtues are enforced by motives depending upon religious truths. Some of these Precepts are the following.

  §599. In Matthew 5:21, Christ says, Ye have heard it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill shall he in danger of the judgment. This is the command of law; but the precept of duty goes much further; Whosoever shall be angry with his brother man without a cause, or who shall use reviling and contemptuous words to him, shall he in danger of the judgment of God and the fire of hell. And again, verse 24, Leave thy gift before the altar, and go thy way: first he reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift, and hope for the favour of God. And these duties extend to adversaries as well as to friends. Thus, verse 25, Agree with thine adversary quickly whiles thou art in the way with him. Be ready to dismiss thine enmity, and to disclaim it on the first occasion. It is a duty to dismiss from our hearts all desires of revenge and retaliation. Thus, verse 38, Ye have heard that it hath been said (in the Law of Moses), An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you, that ye make not any such rule the measure of your affections. Instead of retaliating evil, be ready to submit to it. Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. Suppress all emotions of anger, even such as are excited by personal violence, so far as your personal resentments are concerned. Not only is anger to be thus suppressed, but the opposite affection of love is to be entertained instead. Thus, verse 43, Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies. |21| Bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust. These precepts are also recorded in St. Luke 6:29-35, where they are summed up with this (verse 36), Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful.

  §600. The like precepts against revenge and anger are given by the Apostles of Christ. Thus St. Paul says to the Romans (12:19), Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: (either, give way to the wrath of an adversary, or rather leave the punishment of wrong to God; according to what follows:) for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord. In like manner he writes to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. 5:14), Be patient toward all men: see that none render evil for evil to any man. And St. Peter (1 Pet. 3:9) says the same thing, Not rendering evil for evil, or railing for railing: but contrariwise, blessing; knowing that ye are thereunto called that ye should inherit a blessing. St. James (1:19) says, Let every man be slow to wrath: for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God. St. Paul says to the Ephesians (Eph. 4:31), Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour be put away from you, with all malice. He gives the same injunction in nearly the same words to the Colossians (Col. 3:8). To the Corinthians he says (1 Cor. 14:20), In malice be ye children, but in understanding be ye men. He calls the angry affections carnal (1 Cor. 3:3; so St. James 4:1); and speaks of the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:19), among which he mentions hatred, variance, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders. The forgiveness of injuries is inculcated. Christ taught his disciples |22| (Matt. 6:14), If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. And accordingly, St. Paul says (Col. 3:12), Put on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, longsuffering; forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any; even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye.

  §601. The opposite affection, Love, is inculcated by Christ, at first as including in its spirit our obligations towards men: as in Matt. 19:19, and 22:39. Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself: on these commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets. So Mark 12:31. Yet in referring to the nature and extent of the affection which he enjoined, he called it a new commandment. (John 13:34), A new commandment I give unto you. That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another: which again is repeated John 15:12, and again 15:17. Accordingly St. John often repeats such injunctions in his Epistles; as 1 John 3:11. This is the message that ye heard from the beginning, that we should love another. And so, 2 John 5, and 1 John 2:7. Though the commandment was old, the light which Christ had brought into the world made it new. 1 John 2:8, A new commandment I write unto you, because the darkness is fast and the true light now shineth. He that saith he is in the light, and hateth his brother, is in darkness even until now. He that loveth his brother abideth in the light. But he that hateth his brother is in darkness. Again, 1 John 4:7, Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love. And after referring: to the love of God for us as |23| shown in his sending his Son to be the propitiation for our sins, he adds, verse 11, Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another.
  St. John extends his injunctions to actions (1 John 3:18, 17, 16), My little children, let us not love in word,, neither in tongue, but in deed and in truth. Whoso hath this world’s goods, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him? We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. In the same manner, St. Paul says (Rom. 13:8-10, and Gal. 5:14), that all the commandments are comprehended in this one saying. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: that he that loveth another hath fulfilled the Law: for he adds (Rom. 13:10), Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilling of the law. To the Ephesians he says (Eph. 5:2), Walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us. To the Thessalonians (1 Thess. 3:12), The Lord make you to increase and abound in love one towards another: and in many other places St. James calls the precept above referred to a Royal Law, as governing all our duties. James 2:8, If ye fulfill the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, ye do well.

  §602. The affection here inculcated is described also by other names, as brotherly love (φιλαδελφία) (Heb. 13:1). The term particularly used by the Apostles, and especially by St. Paul, is that which we usually translate charity (ἀγάπη, translated in the Latin charitas, from charus or carus, whence charity). St. Paul (1 Corinthians 13:4) describes this affection; Charity suffereth long, and is kind; envieth not; vaunteth not itself; is not puffed up; doth not seek her own; is not easily provoked; thinketh no evil; [beareth all things πάντα στέγει]; hopeth all things; endureth all things. And this virtue he describes as a proper object of Christian pursuit (1 Cor. 14:1), |24| Follow after Charity. (Col. 3:14), Above all these things, put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness. So 1 Tim. 6:11, 2 Tim. 2:22, where the word is the same, though translated love in the former place. So Peter (2 Pet. 1:7), Add to brotherly kindness, charity (ἐπιχορηγήσατε…φιλαδελφία ἀγάπη) as an additional step in Christian virtue. And this is the word which is translated love in many of the passages above quoted, as 1 John 4:8, ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἔστὶν.
  Other terms are also used for the affections of this kind. Thus, Matt. 5:7, Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy (ἐλεήμονες: but in Luke 6:36, the Greek word is οἰκτίρμονες). Σπλαγχνα οἰκτίρμῶν, bowels of mercies, are enjoined (Col. 3:12). In 1 Pet. 3:8, we have a similar expression translated pitiful; but Eph. 4:32, tender-hearted. Compassionate, (1 Pet. 3:8), is a term also used.

  §603. The word for pity (ἐλεημοσύνη) came to signify the evidence of pity which is given by bounty to the poor. It had this signification among the Jews. So Matt. 1:1, Take heed that ye do not your alms before men to be seen of them. The word alms is contracted from eleemosyne; as is the case with the corresponding words in other European languages (Italian Elimosina, Limosina. Spanish Limosna. Old French Almosne, Aumosne, whence modern French Aumone. German Almosen. Anglo-Saxon Ælmesse, Ælmes). In Luke 11:41; 12:33, we have give alms. (So Acts 3:2; 9:36; 10:2, 4, 31; 24:17.) In like manner the word charity in English is often used in the sense of alms.

  §604. Meekness is a Christian virtue often enjoined. Thus Matt. 5:5, Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. And 11:29, Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. St. Paul (Gal. 5:23) enumerates meekness among the fruits |25| of the spirit, and enjoins it in many places (Gal. 6:1; Eph. 4:2; Col. 3:12; 1 Tim. 6:11; 2 Tim. 2:25; Titus 3:2; James 1:21, and 3:13; 1 Pet. 3:15).

  §605. We are to be meek as to our own claims, and attentive to the claims of others. (Phil. 2:4), Look not each man on his own things, but each on the things of others. (Eph. 5:21), Submitting yourselves one to another in the fear of God. (1 Pet. 5:5), Yea, all of you be subject one to another, and be clothed with humility. (Phil. 2:3), In lowliness of mind let each esteem other better than themselves. (Rom. 12:10), Be kindly affectioned one to another, with brotherly love, in honour preferring one another. So (Rom. 8:7), Render honour to whom honour is due. Which St. Peter (1 Pet. 2:17) puts more largely, Honour all men. The expression of this feeling is courtesy. (1 Pet. 3:8), Be courteous. Other marks of good will are inculcated; as to exercise hospitality (1 Pet. 4:9), Use hospitality one to another without grudging: to avoid quarrels. (Rom. 12:18), If it he possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men.

  §606. The above precepts condemn anger when it is caused by something which thwarts our desires. But religion, as well as morality, encourages virtuous indignation against what is wrong; and permits the expression of this affection by words and acts. Of this we have examples in Jesus Christ himself (Mark 3:5), He looked round about him on them with anger, being grieved at the hardness of their hearts. And the like feeling is expressed (Matt. 23:13-17) in words, where he says, Woe unto you. Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; Woe unto you blind guides; Ye fools and blind. And this language he uses even to his disciples (Luke 24:25), O fools and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken. St. Paul uses the like language (Gal. 3:1), O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, that ye should not |26| obey the truth. St. James’s expression is nearly equivalent (James 2:20), Wilt thou know, O vain man, that faith without works is dead. We have the like feeling expressed in act (John 2:15), When he had made a scourge of small cords, he drove them out of the temple, and poured out the changers’ money, and overthrew the tables. St. Paul recognizes blameless anger, and only limits its duration (Eph. 4:26), Be ye angry and sin not; let not the sun go down upon your wrath. And to the Corinthians (2 Cor. 7:11) he reckons certain feelings of this kind among the results of godly sorrow. What carefulness it wrought in you, yea, what clearing of yourselves, yea, what indignation, yea, what fear, yea, what vehement desire, yea, what zeal, yea, what revenge. And he rejoices that they had vindicated themselves with such feelings. Indignation, and carefulness, or earnestness, are here combined with zeal; which is often mentioned as a term of praise (Rom. 10:2), I bear them (the Jews) record, that they have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge. So (2 Cor. 9:2), Your zeal hath provoked many. And so in other places (Acts 12:3, Phil. 3:6), Zeal is spoken of approvingly, so far as it is Zeal, though condemned as Mistaken Zeal. The term is used with reference to special objects. Thus to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 14:12), Forasmuch as ye are zealous of spiritual gifts, seek that ye may excel to the edifying of your church. (Titus 2:14), He gave himself for us that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works.

  §607. Earnestness is enjoined in other expressions, as (2 Cor. 8:16), God put the same earnest care in the heart of Titus for you (Heb. 2:1). We ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest at any time we let them slip. (Jude 3), |27| Beloved, when I gave all diligence to write unto you of the common salvation, it was needful for me to write unto you and exhort you that ye should earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered unto the saints. Expressions including the notion of striving and contending are often used. As (Luke 13:24), Strive to enter in at the strait gate. So 1 Tim. 6:12, Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal life. And 2 Tim. 4:7, I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. (Col. 1:29), That we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus. Whereunto I also labour, striving according to his working, which worketh in me mightily. Also (2 Pet. 3:14), Be diligent that ye may be found of him in peace, without spot and blameless. (2 Cor. 8:7), Ye abound in everything, in faith, in utterance, in knowledge, in all diligence.

  §608. The injunctions not to return evil for evil, and rather (1 Cor. 6:7), to take wrong, and to submit to revilings and blows, do not prohibit Christians from protecting themselves by the aid of laws against violence and contumely. The Magistrate is described by St. Paul as a minister of God, appointed to execute wrath on the man that doeth evil (Rom. 13:1); and by St. Peter, as sent for the punishment of evil-doers (3 Pet. 2:13). Accordingly, we find St. Paul appealing to the existing laws, and expressing indignation at the violation of them. Thus when the magistrates who had put St. Paul and St. Peter in prison at Philippi, offered to release them (Acts 16:37), Paul said unto them, they have beaten us openly uncondemned, being Romans, and have cast us into prison: and now do they thrust us out privily? nay verily; but let them come themselves and fetch us out. When Ananias commanded those who stood near Paul to smite him on the mouth (Acts 23:3), |28| Paul said unto him, God shall smite thee, thou whited wall: for sittest thou to judge me after the law, and commandest me to be smitten contrary to the law? And when at Caesarea Paul was urged to go to Jerusalem, to be there tried on the charges which were brought against him by the Jews, he protected himself by his legal privilege, and said, I appeal unto Caesar.

  §609. These precepts which have been adduced are not to be received as positive and rigorous laws which are to be applied literally to external acts. When they make mention of external acts; as in the precept, Whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the left. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also: that these precepts are not to be thus literally interpreted, is evident from what has been said respecting the conduct of the Apostles themselves. The precepts are to be understood as Moral Precepts; that is, as enjoining internal acts, control of the will and intention, a discipline of the affections, and the promotion of a certain disposition. The precepts indicate the disposition at which Christians are to aim, as the opposite of that resentful unyielding temper, which would return a blow for a blow, and would insist on every particle of its right.

  §610. The reasons which in these precepts are connected with the injunction, must be accepted in several cases as imperfectly expressing the Christian ground of the duty. Thus, in the injunction, Matt. 5:25. Agree with thine adversary, it is added, lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison; verily I say unto thee. Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing. Such a suggestion must be considered as recommending a placable disposition for its external advantages, in the first place; in order that the acquisition of such a disposition |29| on grounds of prudence, might prepare the way for a true application of it on grounds of religion. In like manner, he who is angry with his brother without a cause, and who reviles him, is said to be in danger of the judgment and of the council, that is, of human tribunals; but from the context it appears, that the condemnation of God is implied, as the true ground of the warning, in these clauses, as well as where it is expressed by the fire of hell. The Benevolent Affections are enjoined as the command of God.

  §611. But further: Christians are urged to imitate their heavenly Father and their Saviour Christ. Do good to them that hate you, that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful. If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: forgiving one another, even as Christ also forgave you. So St. Peter (1 Pet. 2:23), Christ left us an example, who, when he was reviled, reviled not again: when he suffered, he threatened not. And Christ enjoins, as I have loved you, that ye also love one another. So St. John, if God so love us, we ought to love one another. Love is of God. God is love. Again, our love of our neighbour is the evidence of our love of God. Whoso shutteth up his compassion from his brother, how dwelleth the love of God in him? So (1 John 4:20), If a man say I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen? And this commandment have we from him. That he who loveth God love his brother also. Christians are also reminded that they are brothers, by being all children of one Father; and as brothers, bound to love one another. In opposition to the works of the Spirit (Gal. 5:22) which are required of Christians, and which are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance; all angry affections are called works of the flesh, as it is declared that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.

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Chapter V. Christian Precepts Concerning Property and other Objects of Desire

  §612. Such kindly affections towards our neighbours as have been above spoken of, show themselves in giving to them what they need: and Christian Precepts enjoining such duties are mixed with those just quoted. But the kindly affections were there urged upon us in opposition to the angry ones; we are now to consider the precepts in which they are urged in opposition to the love of property, which, when predominant, is covetousness. Thus in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:42), Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn thou not away. So (Luke 14:13), When thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind: and thou shalt be blessed, for they cannot recompense thee: for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just. (Acts 20:35), Paul says to the Ephesian elders, I have showed you all things, how that labouring ye ought to support the weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, that it is more blessed to give than to receive. So to the Corinthians (2 Cor. 9:6,9), He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also sparingly; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also bountifully. Everyman, according as he purposeth in his heart, so let him give; for God loveth a cheerful giver. And God is able to make all grace to abound toward you, that ye always having all sufficiency in all things may abound to every good work. So Paul commends the Philippians for their sending him assistance: and says (Phil. 4:17), Not because I desire a gift, but I desire fruit that may abound to your account. He calls it a sacrifice acceptable, well-pleasing to God: and adds, But my God shall supply all your need according to his riches in glory by Christ Jesus. So (1 Tim. 6:17-19), Charge them that are rich in |31| this world, that they be not high-minded, nor trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God, who giveth us richly all things to enjoy; that they do good; that they be rich in good works; ready to distribute, willing to communicate; laying up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life. (Heb. 8:16), To do good and to communicate forget not, for with such sacrifices God is well pleased. And St. James (Jam. 2:15-16), If a brother or sister be naked and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye warmed and filled (that is, express a good wish for them); notwithstanding ye give them not those things which are needful for the body, what doth it profit? So St. John (1 John 3:17), Whoso hath this world’s good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him; and St. Peter says (1 Pet. 4:10), As every man hath received the gift, even so let him minister the same, one to another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God.

  §613. The considerations by which these duties are urged upon Christians, are, that they are the means of obtaining God’s favour. In some of the passages, it might appear as if the act of giving money were represented as directly leading to a reward in heaven: as when Christ (Luke 16:9) exhorts his disciples, Make to yourselves friends of the unrighteous Mammon. So St. Paul (2 Cor. 9:6,9), He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also sparingly, and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also bountifully. (Heb. 6:10), God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love, which ye have showed toward his name, in that ye have ministered to the saints and do minister. But it is evident, by the general tendency of Scripture, that such acts are enjoined, as evidences of our love to men; and thus, of our love to God. St. Paul says, that when they are not the results of such affections they are valueless. (1 Cor. 13:3), Though |32| I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.

  §614. The first Christians were a small portion of the civil community in which they lived; and had it for a main object of their lives, to exhibit their abhorrence of the prevailing vices of the society, out of which they had been called. Among these vices, love of money and want of compassion for the poor had a prominent place. The Christians made their protest against these vices, by discarding all regard for money. Christ had said to the rich young man who asked what he should do to attain eternal life (Matt. 19:21; Mark 10:21; Luke xviii., 22), If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven. And in pursuance of such injunctions the early Christians had their property common (Acts 4:32), The multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul; neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common.

  §615. Still this was not carried so far as to put an end to difference of wealth. Peter said to Ananias, respecting his property: (Acts 5:4), Whiles it remained, was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power? For (Acts 11:29) The disciples (at Antioch), every man according to his ability (which was therefore various), determined to send relief unto the brethren which dwelt in Judaea. So (1 Cor. 16:2), Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him (for the collection for the saints); which expression implies that each person possessed the produce of his own employments. So (1 Tim. 6:17), Charge them that are rich in this world, implies that some Christians were rich.

  §616. It is evident that St. Paul did not approve of the poor living at the expense of the rich; for even though engaged in the labours of his ministry, he wrought for his own living, and repeatedly urges his example upon his |33| converts (Acts 20:34-35). Ye yourselves know that these hands have ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me. I have showed you all things, how that so labouring ye ought to support the weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive. So (1 Thess. 2:9), Labouring night and day, because we would not be chargeable unto any of you, we preached unto you the gospel of God. And (2 Thess. 3:8), Neither did we eat any man’s bread for nought, but wrought with labour and travail night and day, that we might not be chargeable to any of you: not because we have not power, but to make ourselves an ensample unto you to follow us. For even when we were with you,this we commanded you, that if any would not work, neither should he eat. And thus (Eph. 4:28), Let him that stole, steal no more, but rather let him labour, working with his hands, that he may have to give him that needeth. So (Tit. 3:14), Let our people learn honest works (or trades) that they be not unfruitful. The Corinthians are repeatedly reminded that he had not been burdensome to them (2 Cor. 11:9; 12:13). And he adds (14), Behold, the third time I am ready to come unto you; and I will not he burdensome to you: for the children ought not to lay up for the parents, hut the parents for the children.

  §617. As each person was thus exhorted to support himself, so was it urged as his duty to support the members of his family (1 Tim. 5:8). If any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he is worse than an infidel (16). If any man or woman that believeth have widows, let them relieve them, and let not the church be charged, that it may relieve them that are widows indeed; that is, that are destitute of natural supporters. And (4), If any widow have children or nephews, let them (the children) learn first to show piety at home, and to requite their parents; for that is good and acceptable before God.

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  §618. Hospitality is often recommended in such passages. Hospitality to our friends is a practice that does not need a religious sanction. Hospitality to strangers was urged upon the early Christians with some reference to their special circumstances, and those of the times. Thus (1 Pet. 4:9), Use hospitality one to another, without grudging. (Heb. 8:2), Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares. (Rom. 12:13), Distributing to the necessity of the saints; given to hospitality.

  §619. With regard to riches, Content is recommended. 1 Tim. 6:6, Godliness with contentment is great gain; for we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain that we can carry nothing out. And having food and raiment, let us be therewith content. St. Paul urges this by his own example (Phil. 4:11), I have learned, in whatever state I am, therewith to be content.

  §620. In connexion with such precepts, are the warnings to Christians not to set their hearts on riches. (Matt. 4:19), Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal…for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. And to this effect is the saying of Jesus after his answer to the rich young man (Matt. 19:23; Mark 10:23; Luke 18:24), How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God! which is more distinctly explained in (Mark 10:24), How hard is it for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God! This is further illustrated by St. Paul (1 Tim. 6:9), They that will be rich, fall into a temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition. For the love of money is the root of all evil; which while some have coveted after, they have erred from the faith, and pierced, themselves through |35| with many sorrows. So (Luke 12:15), Take heed, and beware of covetousness; for a man’s life consisteth. not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth. And covetousness is enumerated among the vices (Rom. 1:28; 1 Cor. 5:11; 6:10). And (Eph. 5:5; Col. 3:5), we are told, that a covetous man is an idolator, and that covetousness is idolatry; money being the idol.
  Christians are to be not greedy of filthy lucre; this is said of bishops (1 Tim. 3:2; Tit. 1:7), of deacons (1 Tim. 3:8), of elders (1 Pet. 5:2).

  §621. Christians are warned, not only against the love of money, but also against tenaciousness with regard to their rights. Thus (1 Cor. 10:24), Let no man seek his own, but every man another’s advantage. (13:5), Charity seeketh not her own.(6:7), Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law with one another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? Why do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?

  §622. When the desires and affections with regard to human possessions are thus controlled and subdued, it becomes easy to carry into effect the rules of justice relative to such matters. Accordingly St. Paul reproves the Corinthians for finding any difficulty in doing this. (1 Cor. 6:5,4), I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not a wise man among you? no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? If ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the church. The most eminent persons in the early church had higher offices than judging concerning property. The objects of Christian teaching, at that time, were not the reformation and pure administration of the laws, for which civil society itself provides; but the reformation and purification of men’s hearts. Hence, we do not find in the New Testament such earnest and frequent condemnation of injustice and false judgment as are common in |36| the Old Testament. These latter refer to a community, in which religion was the acknowledged basis of law; and where, therefore, the just administration of law was a high religious duty.

  §623. Justice, in the wider sense of Equity, is enjoined. (Col. 4:1), Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal: knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven. (Phil. 4:8), Things which are just are recommended along with things which are true, honest, lovely, of good report. And (Tit. 1:8), A bishop must be just, as well as a lover of hospitality, a lover of good men.

  §624. Perhaps to some readers, justice in matters of property may seem to be made light of, in the parable of the unjust steward, whom the lord (that is, his lord) commended (Luke 16:8), and of the unjust judge (Luke 18:6) of whom Christ said, Hear what the unjust judge saith. But it is to be recollected that a parable is a mode of illustrating some one truth; and is not to have its subordinate parts drawn into inferences. The parable of the unjust steward is put forward to illustrate the duty of foresight; the prudence of godliness. The steward’s lord commended him as having acted with foresight and prudence, which evidently he had, though not with honesty. The parable is intended, not to illustrate the relative value of prudence and honesty, but of prudence and that imprudence which disregards a future life. The unjust steward is put forward as an example of the children of this world, who are opposed to the children of light. They are the wiser of the two in their generation; but if we look beyond their generation, their wisdom is folly. In the same manner, the parable of the unjust judge is put forth to illustrate the efficacy of prayer, and not the character to which prayer is addressed, as it is stated (verse 1), He spake a parable to them to this end, that men ought always to pray, and not to faint.

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Chapter VI. Christian Precepts Concerning Truth

  §625. The same desires and affections which tend to the appropriation of the property of others, often lead to fraud and falsehood; and thus, the warnings to Christians already quoted, bear upon the subjects now under consideration. But there are many precepts more especially directed to these subjects; as (1 Thess. 4:6), This is the will of God: that no man go beyond and defraud his brother in any matter: because that the Lord is the avenger of all such, as we also have forewarned you and testified. And to the Corinthians he says reproachfully (1 Cor. 6:8), Ye do wrong, and defraud, and that your brethren. Know ye not that the unrighteous shall not inherit the Kingdom of God? To the Ephesians (Eph. 4:25), Putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour, for we are members one of another. And the Colossians (Col. 3:9), Lie not one to another, seeing ye have put off the old man with his deeds; and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him.

  §626. Such attributes as true; faithful as a promiser (Heb. 10:23; 11:11), faithful to him that appointed him (Heb. 3:2); sincere; are constantly used as praise. It is mentioned among the signs of the perilous times that shall come (2 Tim. 3:2), that men shall be truce-breakers, false accusers (ἄσπονδοι, διάβολοι). But such terms as faithful, sincere, and the like, are more commonly used with reference to the relation between God and man. The constant exhortations of Christian teachers to the love of our neighbour, and their warnings against those desires which lead to fraud, lying, breach of promise, and the like; make it almost unnecessary for them to condemn such offences expressly. |38| The words which are translated by honest in our version, are, for the most part, such as imply qualities respected and admired by men, like honestum in Latin; as καλὰ in (Rom. 12:17), Provide things honest in the sight of all men. (2 Cor. 8:21), Providing for honest things, not only in the sight of the Lord, but also in the sight of man. (8:7), I pray to God that ye do no evil…but that ye should do that which is honest. (1 Pet. 2:11), I beseech you, abstain from lusts…having your conversation honest among the Gentiles; that, whereas they speak against you as evil-doers, they may by your good works, which they shall behold, glorify God. So σεμνὰ (Phil. 4:8), Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things. (1 Tim. 2:2), Pray for kings, and for all that are in authority: that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty (σδμνότητι).

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Chapter VII. Christian Precepts Concerning Purity

  §627. The Christian is enjoined to be free from the dominion of sensual, as well as covetous, desires; pure, as well as honest. These epithets are joined (Phil. 4:8), Whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are pure (ὅσα ἁγνα). The same word is used (1 Tim. 5:22), Keep thyself pure. (1 John 3:3), Every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure.

  The same word is used to express conjugal chastity |39| (Titus 2:5; 1 Pet. 3:1). But much more than mere observance of legal obligation is required, in this as in other cases. (Matt. 5:27), Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time. Thou shalt not commit adultery: hut I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell. So by St. Paul lasciviousness (ἀσελγεία) is condemned, as well as the acts to which it leads. (Gal. 5:19). The works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness…of the which I tell you before, as I have told you in time past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God. So (1 Cor. 6:9-10). Also (Eph. 5:3), Fornication and all uncleanness…let it not be once named among you; as becometh saints; neither filthiness (αἰσχρότης) nor foolish talking and jesting, which are not convenient. (Col. 3:5), Mortify your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection (πάθος), evil concupiscence…for which things’ sake the wrath of God cometh on the children of disobedience.
  Other expressions are also used; as (1 Tim. 5:6), She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth (σπαταλῶσα). This word is also used by St. James in his denunciation of woe against luxurious and tyrannical men. (James 5:5), Ye have lived in pleasure in the earth, and been wanton (ἐτρυφήσατε καὶ ἐσπαταλήσατε).

  §628. Christian teaching urges an especial argument against fornication (1 Cor. 6:15-20), What! know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God; and ye are not your own? for ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your |40| body, and in your spirit, which are God’s. The same argument is used (1 Cor. 3:16), Know ye not that ye are the temple of God? If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy.

  §629. Other sins of lust are spoken of as the extremes of human depravity, when God gives men up unto vile affections (Rom. 1:20, and 1 Cor. 6:9).

  §630. The conjugal union is commended, and its duties sanctioned. (Hebrews 8:4), Marriage is honourable in all, and the bed undefiled. (1 Cor. 7:3), Let the husband render unto the wife due benevolence; and likewise also the wife unto the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband: and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife. (1 Thess. 4:3), This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that ye should abstain from fornication: that every one of you should know how to possess his own vessel in sanctification and honour; not in the lust of concupiscence, even as the Gentiles which know not God. (1 Tim. 5:14), I will that the younger women marry, bear children, guide the house.

  §631. There are passages in which St. Paul intimates it to be his private opinion, that, under the circumstances of the time, it was better then for Christians to abstain from marriage: but he does not deliver this as the Divine command. Thus (1 Cor. 7:25), Concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord; yet I give my judgment as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful. I suppose therefore that this is good for the present distress; I say, that it is good for a man so to be; namely, to be a virgin or unmarried. In verses 32-33, he explains further the reasons of this advice, which belong especially to the condition of his disciples as Christians, occupied by religious duties. I would have you without carefulness. He that is unmarried careth for the things that belong to the Lord, |41| how he may please the Lord. But he that is married careth for the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife. He adds (28), But and if thou marry, thou hast not sinned; and if a virgin marry, she hath not sinned. He had in the previous part of the chapter (6-9) given the same advice to unmarried and widows, with the same limitation: I speak this by permission, and not of commandment: and he repeats it again in like manner in the end of the chapter.

  §632. The conjugal union is further invested with a religious significance. (1 Cor. 11:11), Neither is the man without the woman, neither the woman without the mail, in the Lord. For as the woman is of the man, even so is the man also by the woman. (Eph. 5:23), The husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church…Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for it.…So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever yet hated his own flesh: but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church. For we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This passage (Gen. 2:24) had already been quoted by Christ (Matt. 19:4; Mark 10:5), He answered and said unto them. Have ye not read that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female; and said. For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh. Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

  §633. The precepts of the New Testament which speak of cases in which marriage may be annulled, have reference to the law of the Old Testament. Moses had commanded |42| (Deut. 24:1), That if a man marry, and his wife find no favour in his eyes, he should write her a bill of divorcement, and send her away. After this, she might be married to another man, but never to her former husband. The practices which, in virtue of this law, prevailed among the Jews at the time of Christ’s coming, led to a question which was proposed to him (Matt. 19:3; Mark 10:2), The Pharisees came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? He answered as in the passage just quoted, referring to the first institution of marriage by God, and ending, What therefore God hath joined together let not man put asunder. They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give her a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them; Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you. Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery, and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.

  §634. The part of this passage in which it is said that Moses gave the Jews his command because of the hardness of their hearts, appears to imply, like the rest of Christ’s teaching, that the Christian was to aim at a higher degree of moral purity than was placed before the Jew. The Jew was commanded or permitted to put away his wife if she found no favour in his eyes: the Christian was enjoined to aim at making the marriage union as complete as it was in the beginning, at its first institution. The latter part of the passage appears, to some commentators, to refer to a case in which the putting away the wife and the marrying another are part of the same design; such a design is declared to be adulterous. They urge, that if the passage be understood without this connexion, the Law of Moses permitted |43| or commanded adultery. They also urge, that a settled unfitness in the minds of two persons may be a greater obstacle to the ends of marriage, than the condemnation, mistrust, and grief occasioned by a bodily sin. But to this latter argument, it may be replied, that bodily sin may properly be made the ground of a judicial proceeding, because it is a thing capable of proof, and for the most part operating inevitably upon all persons’ minds in the same manner, in virtue of the universal affections and habits of mankind: but that the permanent unfitness of two minds to the conjugal union is not capable of proof, since the effects of transient passion, caprice, or design, are not distinguishable from permanent unfitness of mind; and further, that it does not appear that, in any case, such unfitness may not be overcome, by cultivating those affections which religion and morality enjoin us to cultivate; kindness, gentleness, meekness, patience, cheerfulness. It may also be remarked, that the cultivation of such affections, in such a case, will be prosecuted more resolutely and successfully, if the parties believe that the marriage cannot be dissolved, merely because this task of self-cultivation is imperfectly executed; and if they further believe that such an ordinance respecting marriage is sanctioned by the Divine command.

  §635. It was a question among the early Christians, whether religious disbelief in Christ, on the one side, annulled the marriage. St. Paul gives his opinion, not the Divine Command. (1 Cor. 7:12), To the rest speak I, not the Lord: If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And the woman which hath an husband that helieveth not, and if he he pleased to dwell with her, let her not leave him. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband: |44| else were your children unclean, but now are they holy. For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shall save thy husband? Or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shall save thy wife? It is to be observed, that the Greek word by which the consent is expressed (συνευδοκεῖ) implies mutual consent, according to the opinion of some.
  It would appear, however, that if the wife or the husband were deserted on this account, St. Paul held the marriage bond to be broken. Verse 15, But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart; a brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases; but God hath called us to peace.

  §636. Christian teaching exhorts us to moderate, and rightly direct, other bodily desires, as well as those which belong to the conjugal state. Christians are enjoined to be sober and temperate. Thus (1 Tim. 3:2, and Tit. 1:7), A bishop must be blameless as the steward of God; not self-willed, not soon angry, not given to wine, no striker, not given to filthy lucre, but a lover of hospitality, a lover of good men, sober, temperate. So (Tit. 2:2), Teach that the aged men be sober, grave, temperate.…The aged women likewise that they be in behaviour as becometh holiness,…not given to much wine, teachers of good things; that they teach the young women to be sober. (1 Tim. 3:8), Likewise must the deacons be grave, not double-tongued, not given to much wine, not greedy of filthy lucre. And (verse 11), Even so must their wives be grave, not slanderers, sober, faithful in all things. (Ephe. 5:18), Be not drunk with wine, wherein is excess (ἀσωτία, intemperance), but be filled with the Spirit.

  §637. But the exhortations to Sobriety imply generally Sobriety of Mind, as well as bodily temperance. We see that grave is joined with sober. So (Eph. 5:4), the Apostle forbids foolish talking and jesting (μωρολογία καὶ εὐτραπελία); though the latter disposition, in Aristotle’s Ethics |45| (there usually translated facetiousness, pleasantry, wit), is enumerated among the virtues, and described as intermediate between the opposite vices of βωμολοχία and ἀγροικία, buffoonery and churlishness.

  §638. The Christian condition affords special reasons for this sobriety of mind. Thus (1 Thess. 5:5), Ye are all the children of light, and the children of the day: we are not of the night nor of darkness. Therefore let us not sleep as do others, hut let tis watch and be sober. (1 Pet. 1:13), Gird up the loins of your mind, and he sober, (4:7), The end of all things is at hand: he ye therefore sober, and watch unto prayer. (5:8), Be sober, be vigilant; because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may devour. (Tit. 2:11-12), The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world.

  §639. Moderation in dress and ornaments is also enjoined. (1 Tim. 2:9), I will that women adorn themselves in modest apparel, with shamefacedness and sobriety: not with broidered hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array. (Pet. 3:3), Ye wives; your adorning let it not be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or of putting on of apparel.

  §640. In addition to this, are enjoined regard to domestic duties, and moderation in the enjoyment of company (Tit. 2:3), Teach the young women to be sober, to love their husbands, to love their children, to be discreet, chaste, keepers at home (οἰκουροὺς).

  §641. Among the duties thus enjoined upon women, is that of being obedient to their own husbands (Titus 2:3). So (1 Pet. 3:1), Likewise ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands. And St. Paul says (Eph. 5:22), Wives, submit |46| yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church. In (1 Cor. 11:7), St. Paul says, The man is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man.
  This duty, however, more properly belongs to the next chapter.

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Chapter VIII. Christian Precepts Concerning Obedience and Command

  §642. The duty of obedience of children towards their parents, which is recognized by the laws and customs of all countries, is sanctioned by Christian teaching. (Matt. 15:3), Christ said unto them. Why do ye transgress the commandment of God by your tradition? For God commanded, saying, honour thy father and mother, and. He that curseth father or mother, let him die the death: but ye say, that if a man refuse to his parents what they require on pretence that he has vowed it to sacred uses, and honour not his father or mother, he shall be free. Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition. And St. Paul, in the same manner, refers to this part of the law of Moses (Eph. 6:1), Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right. Honour thy father and mother; which is the first commandment with promise: that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live long on the earth. So (Col. 3:20), Children, obey your parents in all things, for this is well-pleasing unto the Lord. And disobedience is mentioned (2 Tim. 3:2) |47| among the signs of the perilous times that shall come. Men shall he lovers of their own selves, covetous, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection.

  §643. Natural affection, thus sanctioned by religion, is termed piety by the Christian teachers; as it was by the Roman and Greek writers. This piety must show itself in acts. (1 Tim. 5:4), If any widow have children, or nephews, let them learn first to show piety at home, and to requite their parents; for that is good and acceptable before God.

  §644. Along with the duty of obedience in children, is inculcated the duty of good and gentle government in parents. (Eph. 6:4), Ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath, but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. (Col. 3:21), Fathers, provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged.

  §645. There are other duties of the heads of families: as provision for bodily needs. (1 Tim. 5:8), If any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he is worse than an infidel. And (though said in the way of illustration) (2 Cor. 12:14), The children ought not to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children. Also government (1 Tim. 3:4), A bishop must be one that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity. A family contains servants, as well as children; and Christian teaching enjoins, between them and the masters, the duties of obedience on one side, and good government on the other. (Eph. 6:5), Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ: not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart: with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men…And, ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening: knowing that your |48| Master also is in heaven, neither is there respect of persons with him. Nearly the same precepts and reasons are given (Col. 3:22; 4:1). So (Tit. 2:9), Exhort servants to he obedient unto their own masters, and to please them well in all things, not answering again; nor purloining, hut showing all good, fidelity, that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things. Also (1 Pet. 2:18), Servants, he subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, hut also to the froward. For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience towards God endure grief, suffering wrongfully. For what glory is it, if, when ye be buffeted for your faults, ye shall take it patiently? but if, when ye do well and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God.
  In this passage in St. Peter, the word translated servant is οἰκετης, domestic; in the passage from St. Paul, it is δοῶλος, slave.

  §646. Some of the precepts respecting servants have an especial reference to their being bound to their masters as slaves; and also to the change which, it appears to have been expected by some, the acceptance of Christianity by masters and servants might produce in their domestic relation. (1 Tim. 6:1), Let as many servants as are under the yoke (slaves), count their own masters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and his doctrine he not blasphemed. And they that have believing masters, let them not despise them, because they are brethren (Christians), but rather do them service, because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of the benefit (of the Gospel). And (1 Cor. 7:21), Art thou called being a servant (a slave)? I care not for it: but if thou mayest be made free, use the opportunity, rather than omit to do so. For he that is called in the Lord, being a bondman, is the Lord’s freeman: likewise he that is called, being free, is Christ’s bondman. Ye are |49| bought with a price (by Christ); therefore, be not the servants of men, so that this shall interfere with your service of Christ.

  §647. As Christians were thus enjoined to observe, respect, and heartily conform to the relations in families which were at that time established by law or usage, so were they enjoined to do the same with respect to the relations established in the State. Thus, Christ paid tribute to the State (Matt. 17:24-27), saying to Peter, Lest we should offend them, go thou…thou shalt find a piece of money, that take, and give unto them for me and thee. And (22:21), he enjoined others to pay tribute: Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s. So St. Paul (Rom. 13:7), Render to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour. And this is joined with general injunctions of obedience to magistrates, (13:1-5), Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. For there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, hut to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shall have praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, he afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. And (Tit. 3:1), Put them in mind to be subject to governments (ἀρχαῖς) and powers, to obey magistrates. Also St. Peter (1 Pet. 2:13), Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord’s sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; |50| or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God, that with well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men, who speak of you as bad subjects. As free (in spirit), and not using your liberty for a cloke of wickedness (or sedition, κακίας) but as the servants of God. Honour all men. Love the Brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the King.

  §648. The early Christians are here enjoined submission to the magistrates, as a course not only prudent, but also right and religious; not only for wrath (by reason of the menace of punishment), but also for conscience sake: for the Lord’s sake. These powers, and the higher powers especially, are said to be of God; to be ordained of God; to be the ministers of God: to resist them is to resist the ordinance of God, and to incur danger of damnation.
  The powers to which this applied, as appears by the condition of the early Christians, and by the facts, are the powers of the established government; they are called by St. Paul the powers that be; and by St. Peter, every ordinance of man. The term King appears to be also used, only because it was the name of the supreme magistrate at that time in that country.

  §649. And thus, in general, it is a Duty to obey the government established in the land where the Christian resides. The passages just quoted do not restrict this Duty to any form of government; and from the history of the times, we may infer that it is not confined to cases in which the ancient constitution, or the ancient line of sovereigns, subsists. For the constitution of the Roman State had recently been altered by violence, from a republican to an imperial form; and the ancient line of kings no longer ruled in Judaea.

  Such passages, therefore, cannot afford any reason for |51| imagining a religious Duty to oppose or disturb the existing government, in order to restore an ancient Constitution or an ancient Dynasty.

  §650. On the other hand, these passages do not at all show that, in any State, it may not be the duty of the powers that be to alter the laws, to appoint new magistrates, new magistracies, and the like; and allowable in extreme cases, in cases of necessity (§424), to alter the Constitution of the country, or to depose the Sovereign. Whether this is the case, must depend upon considerations belonging to Polity; in which religious as well as civil Polity must be taken into the account.

  §651. In a constitutional form of government, in which the whole or a large part of the citizens possess more or less political power, the Constitution, as much as the person or family of the Sovereign, may be considered as the ordinance of man, to which all are commanded to commit themselves. And every citizen, who thus possesses by Law a share of political power, is one of the powers that be. Every Christian, in such a situation, may and ought to exert his constitutional Rights, so far as they extend, both to preserve the State and the Laws from all needless and hasty innovation, and to affect such improvements in both as time and circumstances require; using the light of Religion as well as of Morality and Polity, to determine what really is improvement (see §334).

  §652. It is the office of the State to make Laws regulating the details of its Institutions, and the Duty of the Citizen to obey them (§330). In like manner, in religious matters, it is the office of the Church to make laws respecting the detail of its Institutions; and it is the Duty of the Christian to conform to such Laws. Laws, Rules, and Customs on such subjects, are Christian Ordinances; and will be treated of hereafter.

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Chapter IX. The Christian Rule of Conscience

  §653. We have already spoken of Conscience; and have distinguished it into Conscience as Law, and Conscience as Witness (§361). We have further stated, that our Conscience as Law, is that view at which we have arrived, of the Supreme Law of our being; and is thus a stage in our Moral and Intellectual Progress (§336). We have added, that we can never rightly assume that we have reached an ultimate stage in this Progress; we must always continue to labour further to enlighten and to instruct our Conscience (§366). We have further added, in anticipation of the present part of our work, that in attempting constantly to carry on this process towards its completion, we find the need of light and power which we can only hope to obtain from Religion (§367).
  Religion presents to us the Supreme Law of our being as the Will of God; and hence, if we now inquire what is the Supreme Rule of Conscience, the answer can only be, that it is the Will of God. But the Will of God becomes the Rule of our Conscience, only by becoming known to us; and it is an important question, where we are to look for that knowledge of the Will of God, which is to be the Rule of our Conscience. Religion is to aid us to instruct and enlighten our Conscience; and we are led to inquire in what forms this instruction, and this light, are to be obtained.

  §654. The answer, in a general shape, can be no other than this: that the Will of God, so far as it is made known to man, in whatever manner, is the Rule of man’s Conscience. Conscience, as Law, is Morality, the Law of our being. But we have already seen, that we are led |53| to consider Morality under two main aspects; the Morality of Reason, and Christian Morality: both these give us a knowledge of the Will of God; and these are the two main portions of the Supreme Rule of Conscience.

  §655. Christian Morality is the Will of God as revealed to us by the coming of Christ; of which Revelation, the authoritative account is contained in the Scriptures. We here include the Scriptures of the Old, as well as the New Testament, for both are parts of the same revelation. The Christian Morality, thus revealed, includes and comprises rational Morality; carries its claims much deeper into our Spiritual being; and invests it with far more certain and more powerful sanctions. Hence it may perhaps be thought by some, that Christian Morality supersedes the Morality of Reason; and that the Scriptures alone may be declared to be the Supreme Rule of the Christian’s Conscience.
  But a little consideration will show us that we cannot look upon the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament as the Supreme Rule of Conscience; that is, as the sole and complete Rule of Human Action.

  §656. This will appear from the Scriptures themselves, as well as from the reason of the case. The Scriptures themselves take for granted the light of reason, and the natural knowledge of moral rules to which men are thus led. Thus St. Paul says (Rom. 2:14), When the Gentiles, which have not the law (of the Scriptures), do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves. They show the work of the law written in their hearts; their conscience also hearing licitness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another. The precepts of Scripture cannot be a rule to those who have not received the Scripture: and such persons have for their proper guide the suggestions of reason, the law |54| written in their hearts. The writings of heathen moralists, and the whole history of heathen life, show that the heathen were aware of a moral rule, and of the guilt incurred by its violation. The conception of sin implies the assumption of a law: as St. Paul says (Rom. 4:15), Where no law is, there is no transgression. As St. John also says (1 John 3:4), Sin is the transgression of the law. Since then we ascribe sin to heathens, we must suppose them to have a moral law; and this law cannot be the precepts of Scripture, which have not found the way to them. The precepts of Scripture are not the sole rule of action for mankind.

  §657. But further; even Christians are referred to the natural sense of right on many occasions. Thus Christ says (Luke 12:57), Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right? St. Paul says (1 Cor. 11:13-14), Judge in yourselves…doth not nature itself teach you? and again (1 Cor. 10:15), I speak as to wise men; judge ye what I say. And the same application of the light of the reason, to judge of right and wrong, is implied, whenever Christ and his Apostles express indignation at offences, not expressly forbidden in Scripture, but only necessarily condemned by inference from commands which are given. But it is to be remarked that, in Scripture, appeals to the natural conscience of man are very much mixed up with references to the revealed Divine commands. This results from the nature of the case; since the Divine commands contain a distinct promulgation of the main points of the natural moral law; and the law thus promulgated was appealed to, both as agreeable to reason, and enjoined by the will of God.
  The religious teacher, instead of looking upon the moral law as the dictates of man’s Reason, considers it as the law of God, who gave to man his Reason. But this does not prevent his recognizing the law written on the heart of man, |55| as well as the law inscribed on the tables of the Mosaic covenant.

  §658. There is another reason why we should not look upon the precepts of Scripture as the sole and complete rule of human action. Namely this: it was not the main object of the Scriptures to promulgate laws of human action, but to publish the mode by which men were to find favour with God. St. Paul describes this very distinctly when he speaks to Timothy (2 Tim. 3:15) of the Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise to salvation. For this purpose. Scripture has to teach us Doctrines, such as have already been spoken of, which the light of human reason could not discover. And the rules of human duty are there set forth, rather in proportion as their connexion with those Doctrines requires, than in such manner as to produce a complete body of moral rules, requiring nothing besides itself for the guidance of human life.

  §659. Further: if we consider the form, character, and spirit of the books of Scripture, it will appear that we cannot expect to find in them a complete and systematic body of moral rules. For the precepts which the Scriptures contain are of various kinds; some refer to moral conduct, others to ceremonies: some apply to all men, others to particular persons; some are temporary, others perpetual commands. Some precepts are delivered by opinion, or by permission. 1 Cor. 7:6, I speak this by permission: and verse 40, After my judgment, as counsels directed to particular times and conditions; other precepts are delivered by commandment (1 Cor. 7:6), as to be observed by all at all times. We must distinguish these kinds of precepts from each other; the particular from the general, the temporary from the perpetual; and this must be done by the light of reason. |56|
  Scripture itself does not always separate these kinds of precepts. Thus (Lev. 19:18), we have the general precept, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself; and in the next verse we have, Thou shall not sow thy field with mingled seed, neither shall a garment mingled of linen and woollen come upon thee. No one will doubt that the former precept is a command for all men at all times, the latter a ceremonial command confined to the Jews. We allow the common reason of mankind to draw this distinction between the obligation imposed by these two successive verses; and we thus recognize the authority of human reason conjointly with that of Scripture, in defining the rules of human action.

  §660. Thus the precepts of Scripture are not the complete and sole Rule of human action for us, because they are evidently not intended by God to be so. The Will of God, in whatever manner made known to us, whether by Scripture, or by Reason, or by the joint light of the two, is our Rule of action. That by taking advantage of both, we may obtain a body of rules of action in harmony with the will of God as revealed in Scripture, we have endeavoured to show, in the Chapters on Christian Morality.

  §661. This body of morality is enjoined upon us as a part of man’s salvation. James 4:12, There is one lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy. And any part of the legislation which thus expresses the will of God, cannot be superseded by any other obligation. Thus St. Peter and the Apostles declared (Acts 5:29), We ought to obey God rather than men. And (4:19), Whether it he right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye.

  §662. Having thus taken a survey of the Christian Precepts which relate to special classes of Duties, we have still to speak of those religious Principles of action, of which |57| all Duties are manifestations and developments (§565). Our Progress towards the condition in which such Principles become operative in us, is our Religious Progress; as our progress towards the condition in which Moral Principles become operative in us, is our Moral Progress. It is a duty to aim at Religious Progress, as it is a Duty to aim at Moral Progress; for our Moral Progress is incomplete, except it go onwards so as to be also Religious Progress. A Belief in God is a part of our Moral and Intellectual Progress; and this Belief, once arrived at, gives a new aspect to our views of Duty and its foundations. We cannot stop short of this belief, and of its influence, without making the progress of thought with regard to the foundations of Duty come to a termination; and to acquiesce in such a termination, is contrary to the nature of the moral and intellectual progress at which we are bound to aim.
  Our endeavours to promote this religious Progress in ourselves, or in others, may be termed Religious Culture. Such Religious Culture is one of our Duties; and as was said before of the Duty of Moral Culture (§305), this Duty is of so fundamental and comprehensive a character as to include all other Duties. We must now attend to some of the parts of this Duty of Religious Culture of ourselves.

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Chapter X. Natural Piety

  §663. The belief in God, which most men possess, as a part of their mental habits, from the first dawn of thought; which is unfolded into a distinct form in the course of their moral and intellectual culture; and which is supported and confirmed by many reasonings, drawn both from the material |58| and the moral world, brings with it corresponding Duties of the affections. We have already said (§283) that man has, among his natural affections, a deference for something better, wiser, more stable, more permanent than himself. This feeling finds its employment in our regards towards human Authority, especially when this Authority is manifestly combined with Goodness and Justice; and makes Reverence and Obedience to such Authority to be Duties. But in order that our view of Duty may be consistent with itself, these Affections of Reverence and Justice must be conceived as equally due, wherever these conditions of Authority, combined with Goodness and Justice, are conceived to exist; and as due in a greater and greater degree, in proportion as the Authority, the Goodness, and the Justice, are more complete. In our Idea of God, we include Supreme Authority over his creatures, along with perfect Goodness and Justice. To him, therefore, in an eminent and especial manner. Reverence and Obedience are due.

  §664. This Duty has been acknowledged by the universal feelings of mankind in all nations and in all ages. Men have always and everywhere declared their belief in God. and have looked upon him as the proper object of the most profound Reverence. In rude nations, whose moral and intellectual nature was very imperfectly developed, the idea of God has been entertained in a coarse and confused manner, under the forms of Polytheism, Hero-Worship, and the like. In such cases, the Character ascribed to Deity has been Power, rather than Authority, Justice, and Goodness; and the Affection has corresponded to the conception of the Character, and has been Fear, rather than Reverence. But when the moral attributes of God are more steadily apprehended, the Fear receives a mixture of Love, and becomes Reverence. And in proportion as the Goodness of God becomes more and more fixed in man’s belief, Love |59| predominates over Fear in the feelings which they have respecting him.

  §665. In like manner. Obedience to God has everywhere been recognized as a Duty. That he has made us what we are, and given us the faculties which we have, makes it right that we should obey him; for the Supreme Rule of our being, according to which right things are right, is what He has made it by his Will. The Rule of human action has been, in all stages of man’s progress, commonly apprehended as identical with the Will of God. In proportion as the Rule of human action has been more completely conceived, and reduced to the Moral Principles of which we have spoken. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, those Principles have been conceived as attributes of God. And this identity, between the Will of God and the Supreme Rule of Human Action, being assumed, any special indications of the Will of God have been accepted, as having a supreme claim to our Obedience.

  §666. This is universally recognized with regard to those indications of the Will of God, which we discern in the constitution and circumstances of man. That man was intended by God, or by Providence, to follow this or that course, if the intention be allowed, is universally accepted as proving it right that he should follow such course. There are many indications of this kind, which all thoughtful men agree in acknowledging. We cannot doubt whether it was intended by the Creator that certain kinds of birds should do what they invariably do;—build nests, pair, feed their young, live in flocks, migrate. And when we look at man, as the naturalist looks at him, and find that property, marriage, civil society, trade, are habits of men quite as universal as the habits of birds just mentioned, we cannot doubt that the institutions are a part of the intention of Providence in the Creation of man, just as the habits of |60| birds are a part of the intention of Providence in the creation of birds. And this intention of Providence makes it right that man should conform himself to these institutions, and to the Rules which are necessary for the existence of the Institutions of each community. We do not say that it is right for mere animals to conform themselves to these intentions of Providence; because for animals there is no rightness. They act by Instinct, which feels, not by Reason, which sees, a Rule. They are driven forward by implanted impulses, men by conscious intention. But man, himself capable and conscious of intention, can apprehend the existence of intention in his Maker, and cannot help apprehending it as a paramount Rule for his own intention.

  §667. The acknowledgment of the intention of the Creator as the proper Rule of man’s actions, has sometimes been expressed by saying that man ought to live according to Nature; and that Virtue and Duty are according to Nature, Vice and moral Transgression contrary to Nature. For man’s nature is a Constitution, in which Reason and Desire are elements; but of these elements, it was plainly intended that Reason should control Desire, not that Desire should overmaster Reason. And in a like form might be presented some of the reasonings which we have employed. In order to establish the Duties of the Affections, for instance, we might have said, that it is plainly according to nature that men should be drawn together by Affection, and yet should possess distinct Rights;—that therefore those benevolent Affections are Duties, which draw men together, as family affection, and the like; and those defensive Affections are also Duties, which tend to the maintenance of Rights, as indignation at wrong.

  §668. The acknowledgment of the Intention of the Creator, as the proper Rule of our being, implies the acknowledgment of Obedience to his Will as our Duty, and as |61| the Source of Duties. When we include in our view the Idea of God, his Will, whether learnt from Revelation, or from reasoning, and from whatever course of reasoning, becomes the Supreme Rule of Human action, and that from which all other Rules are derived. He it is who makes our Duty and our Happiness coincide; and whether we say that Moral action will lead to Happiness because it is our Duty, or that it is our duty because it will lead to Happiness, we rest the reality and force of our Moral Rules upon the idea of God, who has established this coincidence of Duty and Happiness.

  §669. But we are not bound to God merely by the bonds of the Duty of Obedience. There are Affections which are naturally and necessarily due to him, and which further bind us to him. We are bound to him by the ties of Gratitude for innumerable and immeasurable benefits which we have received; for from him we have received all that we have or are. We are bound to him by relations of Order, as being, by the nature of things, our Sovereign Master and Lord. We are bound to him by Love and Admiration, as containing in his essence the perfection of that Goodness and Justice which are the proper objects of Love and Admiration.

  §670. This, our Connexion with God by ties of Dependence, Obedience, and Affection, is often and fitly expressed by speaking of him as our Father, and the Universal Father of mankind. We are his children, and he is the proper object of our Filial Affection; only, that our filial affection to Him may assume, and ought to assume, a character of entire and confiding Reverence, which has no reserve, doubt, or limit; as the affection to our human parents some¬ times may or must have.

  §671. Looking upon God as our Father, and the Father of all men, we are naturally led to look upon all |62| men as our Brethren. All mankind form one great Family; and as all the mutual Duties and Services between the Members of a Family become manifestations and results of the Family Affections, when these are fully and freely unfolded, so all Duties and Services between the members of the Great Human Family (§291) become results of the fraternal love which belongs to their condition as common children of one universal Father.

  §672. A sense of our Dependence, our Gratitude, our Reverence, when these feelings exist towards men, find their expression in various forms of language and other indications. God does not present himself to us as a Person to whom we can speak face to face. We conceive him as an Energy and Intelligence, producing, upholding, pervading, seeing, knowing, and judging all things. He created and unfolded, he continually preserves, continually observes us. In him we live and move. He is not far from every one of us. He is acquainted with our thoughts and feelings, as soon as they arise in our minds. Hence, when our feelings of Dependence, Gratitude, and Reverence, take any definite shape in our thoughts, and become clothed in Conceptions and Images, we may conceive that these forms of our affection become known to him of themselves, without the use of words on our parts. But in fact, our affections cannot be very definitely clothed in conceptions and images, without at least the mental use of words; and for the most part, these forms of feeling become more distinct by being uttered and heard by men among men. Besides, in the common participation of such feelings, and in the common contemplation of the conceptions and images in which they are clothed, there is an influence by which they become more intense in men’s minds, and are communicated from one mind to others. Hence, to mould our feelings of Gratitude and Reverence towards God into words, will tend to cultivate these feelings both |63| in our own minds and in the minds of other men. Such feelings are Natural Piety; and this Piety may be promoted, by being expressed both in solitude and in the company of men.

  §673. But we may not only express our feelings of Piety; we may direct these expressions to God. God is a Mind, in which are Intelligence, Purpose, Will, Thought, as in our own. We necessarily conceive him as a person, and we can address ourselves to him as a Person; this address must be made in our thoughts; for though God is near to each of us here, he is far off, or rather unapproachable, as an object of outward apprehension. And our internal addresses to God must necessarily be such as to imply that entire Dependence upon him, which is the first of the affections due to him. This may be implied, by humbly asking from him some of the benefits which he can give us. Such internal address of our thoughts to God, in which our dependence is expressed by words of Petition, are Prayers. Benefits, as they come from him, and express his Benevolence to us, are Blessings. And as we pray to God for future or continued Blessings, we express our gratitude for past Blessings in Thanksgivings. We express our admiration of God’s character in Praises. Such expressions of Natural Piety have been common in all ages; although, for the most part, mixed with vague or arbitrary images and conceptions, arising from the imperfection of men’s moral and intellectual, and still more of their religious culture.

  §674. Prayer, Thanksgiving and Praise, are properly and primarily the language of each man’s thoughts to God; when the feelings of Natural Piety have been duly unfolded. A man, in his Private Prayers, asks for Blessings for himself, and especially for such Blessings as may aid him in his moral progress; for strength to resist temptation, and to elevate and purify his mind. But also, since the affections |64| which are due to God, arise from the condition of human nature which is common to all men, men feel that a common expression of such feelings by assemblies of men is also suitable to their condition. Accordingly, Public Prayer, by assemblies of men, and other public expressions of religious feelings, have been employed in all ages and nations. Such acknowledgments of the dependence of man on God, and man’s reverence for God, expressed in words or by other indications, are Worship; and men have in all times and places worshipped God; although their notions of Deity have often been gross and fantastical, and their worship often inconsistent with moral and rational views.

  §675. Public Worship by assemblies of men necessarily implies Places and Times appointed for such Ceremonies: and these Places, Times, and Ceremonies themselves are naturally looked upon by men with a religious reverence: they are fixed by rule, and separated from all common uses; they are Sacred. Special Sacred Places, as Temples; fixed Sacred Times, as Festivals; appear to be universal dictates of Natural Piety. Religious Ceremonies are very various in various countries; but some, which may appear to our Reason to be arbitrary, prevailed very extensively among the ancient nations, and from the earliest times; as Sacrifices of Animals. These Sacrifices were understood as an acknowledgment of Sin on the part of the Worshippers, a Supplication for Forgiveness, and a Means of Propitiation.

  §676. The Natural Piety, of which we have spoken, is a part of our Duty; for it is a part of the Christian Piety, of which we shall have to speak. Paul spoke to the people of Lystra of God, as manifested to man’s natural reason by the works of nature. God, he said, even before the teaching of Revelation, left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness |65| (Acts 14:17). And when he preached to the Athenians, taking occasion from an altar with the inscription to the Unknown God, he said (Acts 17:23), Whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you. And he went on to deliver the views of Natural Piety: God that made the world and all things therein…hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell upon the face of the earth; and hath determined their appointed time, and the bounds of their habitation: that they might seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him till they found him. And yet he is not far from every one of us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said. For we are his offspring. So too the Psalms of David, which are adopted and confirmed by Christ and his disciples as a part of the Revelation of God, are full of the Recognition of God and his character, as manifested in the works of his creation. In these songs of Praise, God is constantly spoken of, as alike declared to us by the visible heavens and earth which surround us, and by the moral law which is within us; as in the nineteenth Psalm; The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy-work; and a few verses later, The Law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul. And Jesus Christ himself speaks to us of God who clothes the lilies of the field, and without whom not a sparrow falls to the ground. Thus the convictions of Natural Piety are adopted as a fundamental part of that belief which Christ and his Apostles taught.
  The dictates of Natural Piety, in so far as they direct us to fixed times, places, and forms of worship, are also adopted and carried into detail by Christian teachers, as we shall hereafter see.

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Chapter XI. Oaths

  §677. There is another expression of our feelings and convictions respecting God, which has found a place among the usages of all nations, and may therefore be considered as a result of Natural Piety. I speak of Oaths. As we have already said (§318), we may make, or may wish to make, a promise or a declaration in a manner more earnest, more considerate, more solemn, than ordinary. Natural Piety suggests, as the most solemn way in which this can be done, the doing it with express reference to our belief in God, in the presence of other men, in some form of this kind: I promise, or I declare, in the presence of God; as God is my Witness; as God is my Judge. We stated that, in the violation of a solemn promise or declaration, the transgression of morality is very great, because we have willingly and purposely rested a great share of our moral progress upon our truthfulness in this instance. It is consistent with this view to confirm a solemn promise by an Oath. For in the eye of the religious man, the end and aim of our moral progress is the happiness which God makes to be the consequence of moral progress rightly pursued. By acting as in his presence, by purposely referring to him as our Witness, and as our Judge, we involve in the consequences of our acts, so far as we can, our total future happiness in this world and the next. If we transgress, we renounce our claim to the happiness which God will give to Truthfulness, without which no character can be otherwise than depraved.

  §678. It may perhaps be objected to the use of such expressions as this, In the presence of God, and the like, we make a difference between one action and another, which we ought not to make; since a religious man will do all |67| things as in the presence of God. But to this the reply is obvious; that the use of such words brings the thought more home to us, for the moment, however familiar it may commonly be; and that such public references to the truths which we believe in common with other men, are among the means by which the belief becomes specially effective on our actions. We may add, that in those acts which especially consist of words, as promises and assertions, the religious thought, which ought to accompany our words, may very justly be also expressed in words. To avoid sins of thought, it may be enough that we think ourselves in the presence of God: but when we have to speak, we may utter this thought among the rest, and say that we speak as in the presence of God.

  §679. As an Oath implies hope of the happiness which God gives to virtue; it implies also fear of the unhappiness with which he will punish falsehood, and especially falsehood committed in a case in which he has been thus appealed to by an Oath. God is regarded as the avenger of Perjury. And this has sometimes been expressed in the Oath; God being spoken of, not only as the Judge of men, but as the Punisher of Falsehood. In some cases, there have been added Imprecations, that is, prayers for evils upon the swearer, if he break his Oath. But it is more suitable to the Reverence which we owe to God as our Judge, that we should leave the details and mode of his Justice to him. On the other hand, an oath seems to imply a prayer for Divine assistance to enable us to keep our Oath. Man’s command over his future actions, still more over his affections and wishes, is not absolute; and temptations may occur, when the assistance, which religious men seek to obtain by prayer, may be needed, in order that the sworn man may keep his Oath inviolate. This appears to be implied in the |68| phrase used in many Oaths, So help me God; ita me Deus adjuvet.

  §680. It has been said by some, that these phrases mean: On that condition alone, and no other, may God help me: If I break this oath, may he cease to help me, and leave me to misery. On this view, the Clause, So help me God, has been spoken of as a kind of Imprecation. But it is difficult to accept this view. If this were the sense intended, the more proper expression would be. So bless me God, So reward me God, or, So save me God; expressions which are not commonly used in Oaths. The expression, So help me God, agrees very well with the view which we have given of a solemn promise, that upon our truthfulness in this instance, we are willing to risk our whole moral progress; or, as the religious man rather views the matter, our favour in the eyes of God, and the happiness which he can give. For in incurring such a risk, a man may well say, “May God help me to escape this danger.” And the word So, in this formula, must then mean; “May God so truly strengthen me when I am weak, as I truly intend to use all my strength in order to keep my oath.”

  §681. It has sometimes been objected to the use of Oaths, that it is irreverent towards God, to employ his name, and invoke his agency, for the purpose of carrying on human affairs. But we reply to this, that an Oath is really an act of reverence. We do not doubt that God docs so far attend to human affairs, that he judges our actions, and will punish us if we commit willful and deliberate falsehood. We do not pretend to call in his agency; but to express our conviction that he will act as our judge. A falsehood, uttered with this thought brought before us, is really a more flagrant sin against him, and must be supposed to draw upon us heavier punishment than an offence done |69| thoughtlessly. In short, in an oath we do not pretend to direct the attention of God to man, but the attention of man to God.

  §682. We may add, that an Oath, by referring the matter to the Providence of God, secures us from all claim of regard to man. If we had, unsworn, to give evidence which would inflict loss or disgrace upon a very powerful man, or a very dear friend, the person might, if he were one who thought that some falsehoods are excusable, expect us to withhold or distort the truth, for his benefit or exculpation; but no one holds Perjury to be excusable; and the fact of our giving our evidence on Oath, at once destroys all expectation that we will violate or trifle with the truth. It destroys this expectation so completely, that even the person proved to be guilty, feels commonly no resentment against the Witnesses who prove him so. This could result from nothing but from the establishment of an absolute and supreme obligation to tell the truth, such as an Oath alone can establish.

  §683. Instead of using the name of God, the phrase, I solemnly affirm, and the like, have sometimes been used. The reason for this substitution would be intelligible, if the phrase were employed to avoid a recognition of the existence of God: but among men who believe that God will judge them, it does not appear what sense can be conveyed by the word solemnly, except that they recollect that there will be such a judgment. If the expression do not excite the same thought as if they had said, In the presence of God, it does not seem to have any meaning.

  §684. It is sometimes said, that if a man cannot be believed upon his word, he cannot be believed upon his oath; that if he will commit falsehood, he will commit perjury. And undoubtedly, a perfectly good man is as incapable of the one, as of the other. A person in whom |70| the operative principle of Truth is completely established and developed, will not tell a lie; and on him, an Oath would produce no effect which could not be produced without it. But the world is not composed of perfectly good men. The moral culture of many, we may say of most persons, is very imperfect, with regard to Truth. Besides that they often speak thoughtlessly, there are kinds and occasions of falsehood, which they deem allowable or excusable. We have noticed some of these, in speaking of Cases of Conscience respecting Truth. We have there stated that our moral culture requires entire truthfulness; or, as the religious man will express this, that God’s approval cannot be given to anything short of entire truthfulness. But men, in their common daily actions, do not think much of their moral culture, and of God’s approval. The object of an Oath is, to raise them from their common mood, in which they claim excuses and allowances for falsehood, into that state of mind which the thought of God’s judgments is fitted to call forth.

  And Oaths do produce this effect. Men’s minds are solemnized by this form of an engagement. Under this impression of an Oath, they no longer claim excuses and allowances for their falsehood. They speak with consideration and gravity. If they give testimony on Oath, they are careful in their recollection of the fact. If they promise on Oath, they are watchful over themselves for the future.

  §685. The Oaths commonly in use among men are principally of the two kinds just referred to; Oaths of Testimony or Assertion, and Oaths of Promise or Engagement for the future. Oaths of Testimony impose upon us an especial duty of careful recollection and exact narration. The formula used in the administration of English law expresses this; it requires men to speak the truth, the whole truth, and, nothing hut the truth, touching the matter in question. |71| But in the cases in which this is employed judicially, it is for the Tribunal, rather than for the Witness, to determine what is the whole truth touching the matter in question: and the English Courts of Law expect only that the Witness shall answer the questions put to him. They also excuse him from doing this, when the answer would criminate himself. These definitions of the Obligation of the Witness, are also the definitions of his Duty as a Witness. As a lover of Justice, it will often be right for a man to do much more than this.

  §686. In the same manner, Oaths of Assertion; as when we declare the value of our income, or of anything belonging to us; impose upon us a Duty of careful examination of the matter concerning which we assert; and an entire sincerity in asserting, without reserve, equivocation, or straining of the truth. Thus an Oath that we have not received or paid money, or reward (as in oaths against bribery at elections, sale of ecclesiastical offices, and the like), is violated not the less, if the money be received and paid by some contrivance which escapes detection, or evades the law.

  §687. Oaths of Promise with regard to special acts are not much in use among us. We do not require a man to swear that he will perform a contract, or resign an office, or the like. The law has other ways of enforcing its Will, on such points. Our Oaths of Engagement for the future are, for the most part, promises of a general course of action; and promises of certain dispositions as suitable to the condition to which we look forward. Thus we have Oaths of Office administered to Magistrates, Judges, Jurymen, Legislators, and to the sovereign himself; and Oaths of Allegiance, administered to the subject. In these Oaths, the swearer engages to conform to the Laws of the Land in the discharge of his office; and also, generally, to act |72| with care, impartiality, and equity. He promises to be faithful to the law, and the intention of the law; which intention is understood to be, the administration of justice. The subject promises Allegiance to the Sovereign; which was formerly further explained in the Oath itself; I promise to he true and faithful to the King, and not to know of any ill or damage intended him without defending him therefrom. These Oaths all engage the swearer to that conduct, and those dispositions, which morality would require without the Oath. For the Magistrate’s Duty is generally to administer the law, to regard the intention of the law, and to identify this intention with justice (§333). And the Subject’s Duty is generally, as we have already said (§309), a willing obedience to the laws, an affection for his country, a love of its institutions and of its constitution, a loyalty to its sovereign. There may be special cases of exception to these Duties; as when the Magistrate cannot look upon a particular law as other than unjust: or when the Duty of Allegiance is broken, under the pressure of a case of extreme necessity. Oaths such as we have just mentioned, which engage the Swearer to that course of action which forms the General Rule of Morality, are inconsistent with a contemplation of the cases of Exception, as prominent or frequent. A person cannot, without the guilt of Perjury, take an Oath to administer the laws faithfully and justly, if he believe that to administer the laws faithfully will be to commit habitual injustice. A Subject cannot swear allegiance to the reigning Sovereign, if he not only believe him to be an usurper, but if he also be ready to join in a scheme for deposing him, if a favourable occasion should arise. Oaths of Office, of Allegiance, and the like, are to be taken in such a manner, as to identify the citizen’s Duties with his Obligations: and by being Oaths, they further express his conviction that the discharge of Duties, |73| and therefore of legal Obligations, is the only way to obtain the approval of God, and the happiness which he bestows with his approval.

  §688. Besides the general moral engagements contained in Oaths of Office, such Oaths often include some specification of a particular subject, with a prescribed course of action relative to it; thus, the English Sovereign, at his Coronation, swears that he will maintain the Protestant Reformed Religion established by Law: Members of Parliament take a similar Oath: Officers of special bodies, as Colleges and Corporations, in many cases take Oaths to observe the Special Laws of their body, to maintain its privileges, and the like. Along with the Oath of Allegiance to the Sovereign, there has often been demanded an Oath of Allegiance also to his Heirs; or an Oath of Renunciation of the Obligation of Obedience to some rival Authority: as in this country, we have, in addition to the Oath of Allegiance, the Oath of Abjuration, in which we abjure the Authority of the Pope.

  §689. All such Oaths require of him, who takes them, a sincere and unchanging purpose to do what he thus engages to do.
  For instance. If an officer of a corporation, having sworn to maintain the Protestant Religion, should afterwards endeavour to overthrow it; it would be convinced that the Protestant Religion was erroneous. If a man has entered upon an office engaging himself to a certain course of conduct, and afterwards thinks such conduct wrong; he is bound by Justice and Truth to give up his office; and cannot honestly pursue any other course. In this case, as in others. Law supplies the definition, which is requisite to give form to Justice. The Oath of Office is the expression of a Contract between the Body and the individual. If he breaks |74| the Contract, and keeps his share of the advantage which it gave, he is guilty of fraud and falsehood, aggravated by Perjury.

  §690. An important question in many cases of this kind is, how the Oath is to be interpreted. Of course, a Promise so made, like other Promises, is to be interpreted according to the common intention of the two parties; or according to what is the intention of the party imposing the Oath, and is understood to be its intention by the party taking the Oath. And this is, accordingly, the Rule generally given. The Rule is stated by saying that the Oath is to be understood secundum animum imponentis. But here the question occurs, in the Oaths of office, and the like, Who are the Parties between whom the transaction takes place? Who is the Imposer of the Oath?

  §691. We reply, that in Oaths of Office, the Imposer is The State; which we have already described as a permanent Moral Agent; and which is, of course, capable of being Party to a Contract. The State is the Imposer of all such Oaths; for all Offices derive their Authority from the State, and all Special Corporations derive, from the State, their power of making Laws; and therefore, the Authority of their Laws. Hence these Oaths, which express the conditions on which the authority, or the advantages of the Office, are assigned to the individual, express the conditions imposed upon him by the State.

  §692. The State, as we have said (§470), is one and permanent, while the persons of whom it consists are many and transitory. The Intention of the State is expressed in the language of the Oath; and if there be, in this, anything which requires interpretation, the Laws and Legislative Proceedings which accompanied the enactment of the Oath may often aid in pointing out the right interpretation. But this is not the main source of interpretation. |75| The State continues to exist after each such act of Legislation: and the State which today imposes the Oath, is not identical with the Legislature which, many years, perhaps centuries ago, enacted it. The State may itself interpret the Oath, by a Declaratory Act; and may often prefer this course to the substitution of a new and clearer Oath; on the ground of many inconveniences which attend the change of ancient and usual forms. There are also other ways, in which the State may give its interpretations of the Oaths which it imposes; as in the decisions of Courts of Law, and the like. But yet, if these interpretations be in apparent contradiction with the most obvious meaning of the words of the Oath, religious men and lovers of truth, especially if they have not fully considered the difficulties of such legislation, will be shocked with the incongruity; and the offence thus given to them, may be a reason for the State changing the form of the Oath.

  §693. There are cases in which even the silence and inaction of the State may be looked upon as implying, in some measure, its view of the meaning of an Oath. If an Oath contain clauses which plainly imply usages or conditions notoriously obsolete, and if it be still enforced by Authority; it may be reasonably supposed that the State, the Imposer of the Oath, is aware of the practical omission of what is obsolete, and acquiesces in it. But here, also, when the discrepance between the words of the Oath and the practice becomes glaring, it is desirable, on that account, to alter the words, in order to avoid the shock which the incongruity causes to religious men and lovers of truth, who have not fully considered the difficulties of such legislation.

  §694. Yet there may be other reasons which may, for a time, balance this; and may reasonably prevent the change from taking place. The doctrine, that an implication of, and reference to, obsolete conditions, in the |76| words of an Oath, renders it desirable or right to alter the Oath, cannot be carried out rigorously. For such is the constant progress of human affairs, and such, in consequence, the constantly proceeding changes in the use of terms, that we cannot employ words which will not, after a time, imply something no longer existing in practice. And this implication of obsolete things does not necessarily make the words of an Oath unfit to be retained. When we swear Allegiance to our Sovereign Lord the King, the terms Allegiance, and Sovereign Lord, imply the relations of the feudal system; but the Oath has been still properly retained; it being understood, by the State and by the Swearer, that the fidelity which is thus denoted, is such as suits the altered relations of the Governor and the Governed; and this has been supposed, at every step of the gradual change, from the original to the present condition of the Constitution. The same implication would be involved in an Oath in which the terms fealty, loyalty, homage, should occur; but such an Oath would not, on that account, be a bad one. In like manner, if the term of an ancient form should engage us to worship a person, the sense being to show personal respect and regard (as in the English Marriage Service), we might still use the form with a safe conscience. And thus, when the terms of an Oath have gradually changed their meaning, or become obsolete, or inapplicable to the existing state of things, if the State continue to impose the Oath, it may be supposed that in imposing it, the State assents to the modification of meaning which is necessary, in order to make the declaration significant and applicable. And the person taking the Oath, if he intends to fulfill the engagement as nearly as the altered condition of things allows him to do, may be considered as taking it in the sense of the Imposer; and therefore may do so with a good conscience.

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  §695. If it be objected to this, that we thus make Custom the Interpreter of the Law, instead of making Law the Regulator of the Custom; we reply, that the Custom, which we take for this purpose, is Custom sanctioned by the State; that is, by the Giver and Guardian of the Law. We may add, that to a great extent we cannot avoid making Custom, or, more properly speaking. History, the Interpreter of the Law; for Custom and History determine the meaning of words and phrases; and often determine them to have a different sense, when used in official formulae, and when used in common speech; as we see in innumerable examples in laws and law proceedings. History modifies the relations of men, classes, offices, and occupations, from time to time; and must necessarily modify the meaning of the language in which such things are spoken of.

  §696. If we were to insist upon this;—that Laws and Oaths should always be interpreted according to the common usage of speech at the present day;— we should make it necessary to alter a great part of our present law language; and on such a supposition, no oaths could be employed, except their terms were either so general as to apply alike to all periods of history, which would deprive them of all special meaning, and of all effect; or else, except their terms were constantly changed, as fast as common Language and the relations of men change; and the changes thus requisite would need to be made every few years. This would defeat the purpose of many of our Oaths; which is, to produce a permanence, and continuity, in the general structure of our institutions (as, for instance. Colleges), in spite of the constantly proceeding historical changes. Such a course of public administration would require a perpetual interference of the Legislature, for the purpose of remodeling Oaths; which interference would, in fact, be a constant innovation. Those who wish for the |78| permanence of ancient Institutions, are aware of this; and are very reluctant to alter ancient forms; and Oaths among the rest.

  §697. If the person, taking an Oath, of which the object is plainly the permanence of the Institutions to which it refers, assent cordially to this purpose, this cordial agreement in purpose with the Imposer (for the State, by retaining the Oath, must be supposed to assent to the object of the Oath), will enable the Juror to interpret, also, in the sense of the Imposer, the parts of it which are obsolete and inapplicable. He will necessarily interpret such parts, so that they shall be in consistency with the main purpose. There are many cases, in which great changes have been gradually effected in the Institutions to which Oaths refer; changes, not produced at any period willfully, but brought in necessarily, in order to keep the Institutions in coherence with the general state of the nation, and to carry on the design and business of the Institution. It is evident, that in such cases, to revive, at the present day, the obsolete usages and conditions which the terms of such Oaths originally denoted, would be to defeat the main purpose of the Oaths; namely, the Stability of the Institutions. Such restoration of Antiquity would be a most perilous innovation. Such a literal fidelity would be a real treachery, or at least a practical hostility, to the purpose of the Founders.

  §698. Even if the predecessors of the present generation were to blame in admitting such changes (although in many cases they had no choice in the matter), still the present generation have inherited the changed state of the Institution, and cannot, however much they might wish and try to do so, recall the original condition of things. All they can do, so long as the State does not change the Oaths, is to observe them, interpreting them in good faith, according to existing conditions, notorious to the State as well as to the jurors. |79| But probably, in such cases, there may be no need to blame preceding generations, in order to exculpate the present. Probably each generation, in its turn, has had the same excuse. The changes were gradual; each generation interpreted the ancient Oath in good faith; and intended to fulfill it, as nearly as altered circumstances permitted, in the sense of the Founders: and, therefore, as we have said, truly in the sense of the Imposer. And if there have been this continued good faith, regulating the practice of succeeding generations, such practice may be taken as an Interpretation of the engagement, sanctioned by the Imposer.

  §699. It is, however, quite necessary to attend carefully to the condition, that the practice of each generation should be adopted in good faith: in order to give it authority as an Interpretation. If men deviate from the course which the terms of their engagement imply, wantonly, carelessly, or unnecessarily, they are, no doubt, guilty of breaking their engagement; and if an Oath have been taken as a confirmation of it, guilty of Perjury. If they have disregarded both the Purpose of the Founder and the Letter of the Oath which he framed, they are without any excuse. The changed circumstances of the times, which make literal observance of the engagement impossible, do not thereby make the Oath unmeaning. It must be carefully interpreted according to the intention of the Founder; admitting, into the Interpretation, only such changes of the meaning of terms and details as have been produced by the general progress of change; and not by any purposes different from those of the Founder. Each generation of the members of an Institution, endeavouring, in cafe and good faith, to conform to their engagements, may have authority as Interpreters of their own Rules, but not as Rivals of the Founder.

  §700. Moreover, in order thus to act in good faith, it is not sufficient that the existing members of the Institution |80| so conduct it, and so apply its Laws, that they do what they conceive the Founder would have unwished to be done, if he had lived in present times. This Supposition, of what the Founder would have wished, is far too vague to afford any good ground of action. To make such a Supposition the Interpretation of the engagements prescribed by the Founder, is contrary to the nature of an engagement. In a Contract, it is not sufficient to do what we suppose the other party would wish; we must do what we have contracted to do. The same is the case in an Institution with written Laws, which we have engaged to observe. The Founder has made his body of Laws, and his Oaths, because he was not content with a general statement of the purposes which he wished to promote; just as all Legislators prescribe detailed modes of action, and not merely general courses of action. The Founder has prescribed means, in subservience to his end. If some of these have been silently excluded by time, without any choice of ours, we may blamelessly acquiesce in the exclusion; and perhaps we may deem the Founder short-sighted; as, in truth, no Legislator is long-sighted and sagacious enough to provide for all the changes which arrive. But we may not, without blame, substitute other means for his, when we have a choice. We may not, after engaging to conform to his plan, reject it, and substitute one of our own.

  §701. What degree of particularity it is prudent to introduce into the special Laws of Institutions, with a view to their permanence, is a question of Polity, which we shall not here consider. But it is evident that if particular details and arrangements, which are judicious at first, are prescribed by Laws; and if the Laws are interpreted according to the Rules above laid down; such Laws will contribute greatly to the permanence of the Institutions, so regulated; and will tend to secure their consistent effectiveness in promoting |81| their original object, amid the external changes which the course of the national history brings.

  §702. But though we must thus allow to the State,—the Imposer of the Oaths, and other engagements, which we are now speaking of,—some range of power, in interpreting the terms of such engagements in a sense different from the original sense; and though we must hold that the Interpretation of the Imposer relieves the Conscience of the Juror; we must not carry this doctrine and its application too far. There are strong moral reasons for being careful on that side. The State may be regarded as having, for one of its objects, the moral Education of the people; and its Laws, and the administration of its Laws, are among the means by which it promotes this object. And it will fail in teaching lessons of Truthfulness by its Laws, if it lightly sanctions an interpretation of an Oath which differs from the obvious sense of the words. By the currency of such forced interpretations, so sanctioned, many persons will be led to carelessness and indifference about Truth, in taking such engagements; and thus the State becomes a Teacher of immorality.

  §703. And again, on the other part; though the Juror’s conscience may be relieved in such cases, it can hardly be quite satisfied; especially when the interpretation is only presumed, from the silent acquiescence of the State in notorious changes. For the notoriety may be imperfect, and the acquiescence must be more or less doubtful. The silence of the State may imply, not that it acquiesces in the existing practice, but that, though it disapproves of the practice, the time and the occasion for legislative interference have not yet arrived. In this case, the Juror does not swear according to the interpretation of the Imposer; and his conscience must be the more disturbed, according as this is more probably the case.

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  §704. Hence, in all cases in which there is a manifest contradiction between the words of an engagement, and the sense in which it is commonly performed; and especially if there has not been any authoritative sanction of the usual practice; it is desirable, on moral grounds, to alter the words, so as to remove the contradiction. The Legislators ought to endeavour to do this, as acting for the State, and being, on its behalf, desirous of promoting Truthfulness and Integrity. The Jurors ought to aim at the like alteration, as being desirous of having no grounds for dissatisfaction in their consciences. And since in England, every man has, by Petition or otherwise, the means of seeking a Legislative change; the persons who are required to take an Oath or an Engagement, under circumstances such as have been described, are bound in conscience, when the contradiction between the words and the practice is apparent, and still more, if all sanction of the practice be wanting, to aim, by constitutional means, at the removal of the contradiction.

  §705. In this discussion on the subject of the interpretation of Oaths and Engagements, we have had to touch upon questions which rather concern the Duties of Truth, than the subject of Natural Piety, with which we began. But this could not easily be avoided: for the Duties of Truth, though they belong to all our engagements, are never so carefully studied as when they depend upon our most solemn engagements; namely, those which are confirmed by Oaths. And though the breaking of an Oath is an offence against Piety, a transgression of the Reverence due to God, and a disregard of the Fear of his Punishment; it is so, because he is the God of Truth, and will punish Perjury as aggravated Falsehood.

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Chapter XII. Christian Piety

  §706. The Duties and Affections which belong to Natural Piety are also, as we have said (§676), a part of Christian Piety. The Duty of Obedience to God (§654) is the foundation and measure of all other Duties. That which is wrong, is so because it is contrary to his Will. Moral Transgression derives an especial depravity from its being Sin against God. Sin is the object of his condemnation; it is spoken of, in figures borrowed from the constitution of humanity, as the object of his Anger. Obedience to his Will, and the Dispositions which produce such Obedience, are the object of his Love. Sin will be the subject of his Punishment, Obedience of his Reward. There will be a Resurrection of the Dead to this end (John 5:28): The hour is coming, when all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and shall come forth: they that have done good unto the Resurrection of Life, and they that have done evil to the Resurrection of Damnation. And the life here spoken of is elsewhere called Eternal Life. Thus the Supreme Rule of Human Action, on which the final happiness or misery of each man depends, is identified with the Will of God, and receives its Sanction and its force from this identity.

  §707. The Will of God with regard to Human Actions is known to man, partly by Reason, and partly by Revelation. We have, in the preceding Book, given a view of that Morality which is supplied to us by our Reason; and in the present Book, we have added to it a view of Christian Morality, as it is supplied to us by the Scriptures of the New Testament. The Precepts there given point out the |84| Christian’s duties, as they are expressed by means of special Precepts.
  But the general views which the Christian Revelation discloses to us, also give us new light with regard to our Duties, and with regard to the Dispositions which are to lead us to perform them. We are taught. That our failures in Obedience to God’s Will, our Sins, are to be repented of; that our Repentance must necessarily be addressed to God, and must take the form of a Supplication for his Mercy and Forgiveness, to be extended to us, notwithstanding our Sins: that (§587) God has provided a means by which we may find Mercy and Forgiveness; namely, the sending of his Son Jesus Christ upon earth to suffer death for our sins, and to rise again for our Justification (Rom. 4:25). We are taught further (§588), that God has provided means not only for our Justification, but for our Sanctification; not only for the Remission of our sins, but also for elevation of our nature to that Holiness (§575) without which we cannot be admitted to his Blessedness.

  §708. These provisions for the Instruction, Pardon, and Sanctification of man, impose upon us a far larger Duty of Gratitude than the benefits which Natural Piety contemplates; inasmuch as the eternal life, and blessedness of the soul, thus provided for, are far greater benefits and evidences of God’s Love, than mere human life, with its accompaniments as discerned by reason. The Christian’s gratitude to God is founded mainly on his Christian blessings; and ought to be infinite as those blessings are infinite.

  §709. The Christian is especially taught to look upon God as his Father. Christ taught his disciples to begin their prayers with a recognition of this relation: Our Father, which art in Heaven. The special manner in which Christians become the sons of God, is often referred to. Thus 1 John 3:1, Behold, what manner of love the Father hath |85| bestowed upon us, that we should he called the sons of God.
  This privilege of being the sons of God implies, we are told, not only that we have had great benefits brought within our reach by his coming on earth, but that we may, as one of the greatest of these benefits, become like him. Thus in the passage just quoted, St. John adds: Therefore the world knoweth us not, because it knew him not. Beloved, now are we the sons of God: and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him. St. Paul carries this further (Rom. 8:14): As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear (ye are not in the condition of slaves, who obey through fear merely); but ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God; and if children, then heirs; heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may he also glorified together. And in the same way elsewhere (Gal. 4:5) we are told that God sent forth his Son…that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. Wherefore thou art no more a servant, but a son; and if a son, then an heir of God through Christ. And the Apostles naturally and forcibly urge this as a ground of the Love of God: as 1 John 4:9,19, In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him…And we love him, because he first loved us.

  §710. The Love of God, our heavenly Father, like the love of a Human Father, tends to produce an Obedience of the Heart (§284). So far as the Love of God is unfolded and |86| established in the Christian’s heart, it supersedes all other motives to obedience to the Moral Law, and becomes his constant and universal Principle of Action.

  §711. The relation of Christians to each other, as Children, in an especial manner, of God their common Father, is urged upon them by the Apostles, as a motive for a brotherly Love, which ought to exist between them, and out of which all Duties to men must spring. Thus St. John says, in a passage lately quoted (1 John 4:11), Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another. This mutual Love is constantly enjoined by the same Apostle as the evidence of our Love of God: (1 John 4:20), If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. The same is the general tenor of the whole of the Epistles of St. John. St. Paul, following the teaching of Christ, says (Gal. 5:14), that all the commandments are comprehended in this one saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

  §712. This Christian Love of men as our brethren includes, as St. Paul states in the passage just cited, all other duties; and includes them in a form more complete than mere Morality can give them. This love will necessarily exclude all thought of mutual injustice and falsehood. The Christian teacher says (Acts 7:26), Ye are brethren; why do ye wrong one to another? And (Eph. 4:2.5), Speak every man truth to his neighbour; for we are members one of another. Christianity taught men that they were to reject the tenacity of their own Rights, out of which opposition and unkindness rise, and were to seek each other’s good as members of one family. The effect of this teaching showed itself in the manner in which, at the first preaching of the Apostles, the converts threw their possessions into the common stock (Acts 4:34); and has constantly operated since, to make those who are Christians in spirit ready to give and glad to distribute, and specially careful of the |87| interests and comforts of their neighbours. In this respect Christian Morality has introduced into the world a standard much higher than the Morality of Reason.

  §713. The Duty of Prayer to God, which is suggested by the feelings belonging to Natural Piety, is confirmed and more strongly enjoined by Revealed Religion. The Old Testament contains the account of God’s more especial dealings with men, as shown in the History of the Jews, the nation selected to be the especial channel of his Dispensations. The passages in the Old Testament, which enjoin or take for granted this Duty, are too numerous, and too familiar to our minds, to require to be cited. In the New Testament, this duty is still more earnestly enjoined. Christ taught his disciples (Luke 18:1), That men ought always to pray, and not to faint in such exertions. And he himself taught his disciples how to pray; and spoke of many special occasions of prayer: thus (Matt. 5:44), Pray for them that despitefully use you. (Matt. 9:38), Pray ye the Lord of the harvest, that he will send forth labourers into his harvest. And he was himself frequently engaged in earnest prayer. (Matt. 14:23. Mark 6:46. Luke 6:12; 9:28. John 14:16; 16:26; 17:9. Matt. 26:36. Mark 14:32). The injunctions and examples of the Apostles on this subject are perpetual. The same is the case with Thanksgiving. Christ says (Matt. 11:25), I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth. And (John 11:41), I thank thee. Father, that thou hearest me. In Acts 16:25, Paul and Silas prayed, and sang praises to God: and so on, in innumerable other places. No duty is more frequently and strongly enjoined than these are.

  §714. It has been suggested, as a difficulty respecting the Duty of Prayer, that in prayer we desire God to alter the course of the world, in order to comply with our wishes, as if we mistrusted his goodness and wisdom. But to this |88| we reply, that the things which we desire of God in our prayers are, for the most part, spiritual blessings. Forgive us our trespasses. Lead us not into temptation. Deliver us from evil. The course of things to which these events belong is the Spiritual Government of God (§592), and to that Spiritual Government our prayers also belong. In the spiritual world, the prayers of believers are events as real as their temptations, their deliverance, their forgiveness; and the former events may very naturally be conceived to produce an effect upon the latter. There is, therefore, in such prayers, nothing inconsistent with our belief in God’s goodness and wisdom. And prayers for temporal blessings, as. Give us this day our daily bread, are rather to be understood as expressing our sense of our dependence upon God, than our desire that he should direct the course of the world according to our wishes. Such prayers are the expressions by which our mere natural desires show, that though submitted to the will of God, they are not annihilated. We know that, except through the goodness of God, we cannot receive even our daily bread; and the desire of life, and of the supports of life, which religion cannot and does not seek to extinguish, she converts into a desire that God would give us what we need.

  §715. We are taught to combine, with our prayers to God, a Resignation to his will, whatever it may be, and a belief that what he does is for the best; whether he grant or refuse our prayers, and whether he give or take away apparent benefits. In the Prayer which Christ taught his Disciples to offer, he bids them say. Thy will he done in earth as it is in heaven. And though this clause expresses our Hope of the religious progress of men on earth, it also expresses our Acquiescence and Submission to the Will of God, whatever it may be. And Jesus Christ himself used this language in prayer as an expression of Resignation |89| (Matt. 26:42). The same lesson is enforced by the Apostles in their teaching. Thus (1 Pet. 5:6), Humble yourselves under the mighty hand of God, that he may exalt you in due time; casting all your care upon him, for he careth for you. And so 4:19, Let them that suffer according to the Will of God, commit the keeping of their souls to him in well-doing, as unto a faithful Creator.

  §716. A main use of Prayer, however uttered, is to express and confirm a habit of Mental Worship. Christ himself said, when speaking of external forms of worship (John 4:24), God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth. And in comparison with the practice of ostentatious individual prayer which prevailed among the Jews, he enjoined Private Prayer (Matt. 6:5). Such Private Prayer is indeed the natural utterance of piety, as we have already said. And this utterance will be both more significant and more likely to confirm the affections of piety, if it form a part of the business of each day. Private Prayer every Morning and Evening may be so employed, as to tend to fix upon our minds the thought of God, of his blessings, his laws, and the hopes and encouragements which he sets before us; and thus may aid in giving a moral and religious turn to our disposition and will during the whole course of our days.
Public Prayer and the other acts of Public Worship, which, as we have said, are universally practised among nations through the impulse of Natural Piety, are also recommended by other considerations, so that they become Christian Duties. Of these however we shall speak, under the Head of Christian Ordinances.

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Chapter XIII. Religious Belief

  §717. In order that the Christian may have the benefit of God’s provisions for his justification, sanctification, and final blessedness, the relation between God and himself must be brought home to his mind. He must believe in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ his Son our Saviour, as we have already said (§587, §588). Such belief is so essential to the Christian’s condition, that the terms Believers and Unbelievers are employed to describe those who are truly Christians and those who are not. The Christian may say, as St. Paul says (Gal. 2:20), I live by faith in the Son of God.
  This Belief, or Faith, includes an act of the Intellect by which Truths regarding man’s relation to God are assented to and accepted: and thus such Assent and Belief are Duties of the Christian.
  We have already stated (§446), that a Belief in the Principles of Morality is requisite, in order that a man’s character may be moral. We have remarked, also, that this Belief must be, finally and specially, a man’s own internal act (§563), although he may be led to his belief by various external influences, which constitute his Education (§564).

  §718. The Effect of a man’s Education in the formation of his Belief is so great, that it sometimes appears to amount to an invincible cause of Error or Ignorance; and such causes, as we have said, (§440), render Ignorance and Error excusable. Hence it may appear that Christian Teaching, when it represents Belief in Christian Verities as necessary to a man’s salvation, is opposed to the Morality of Reason. |91|
  But we have already said (§446), that Ignorance and Error with regard to Moral Principles are not acknowledged, either by Moralists, or by men in general, to be invincible, and therefore excusable. We have stated that there is a Duty of thinking rationally; and that a man is not excusable who denies the Duties of Kindness, Justice, and Truth. We further remarked (§445), that if such Error were not an offence, it would be a calamity which must produce the same effect as an offence, upon man’s destination. It must exclude him from that consummation of a good man’s life, whatever it be, to which a continual moral progress leads; and to miss which is unhappiness

  §719. What was thus said of Moral Error, must be said also of Religious Unbelief. A man is not excusable who disbelieves the Existence of God, for this is to disbelieve the identity of Virtue with happiness (§565), and consequently the reality of Morality. A man is not excusable who disbelieves the Providential Government of the world; for we cannot believe God’s Government to be a Moral Government, and yet to have no influence on the course of the world which he has created.

  §720. And the same must be extended to Disbelief in Revealed Religion. For the Christian Religion is the necessary completion of Natural Religion. The History of Christ and of Christianity is the Fact, by which alone the Idea of the Providential Government of the world is realized (§581). Christian Morality is the necessary confirmation and purification of the Morality of Reason. And the Christian view of God’s Provisions, for the salvation of men’s souls, is necessary to give effect to men’s Repentance, and to their efforts at Continual Moral Progress. A person, therefore, to whom the Truths brought to light by the Christian Revelation have been fully presented, and who disbelieves them, is as blameable, or as unhappy, as a man would be, who should |92| deny the Government of Providence, the reality of Morality, the necessity of Repentance in Transgressors, and of moral Progress in all men.

  §721. It may be objected to this, that a large portion of the human race lived before the coming of Christ on earth; and a large portion of those who have lived since that event, have not had Christian Doctrine presented to them; that for the former, there was no Christian Revelation to believe; and for the latter, no means of coming to the belief of it: that belief in the Christian Religion could not be necessary for the moral progress and final happiness of those portions of mankind; and therefore, cannot be generally necessary for the moral progress and final happiness of man; that therefore. Belief in Christian Doctrine cannot be a Duty, nor Unbelief culpable.

  To this we reply, that those who have not had Christian Truths presented to them, are not blameable for their ignorance of them. Christianity is a Fact: the coming of Christ on earth is a Fact; and the Disclosures made by him and his Disciples, concerning God’s dealings with men, are Facts, which men could not know by the aid of Reason alone. Involuntary Ignorance of Facts is not culpable, as we have already said (§439). But this does not excuse those to whom these Facts have been presented with adequate evidence. Such persons fall under the blame which lies upon all persons who neglect or reject the evidence of Facts, which are of the highest importance in the right conduct of their lives.

  §722. When it is said, that—because the belief in Christian Religion was not necessary for the moral progress and final happiness of the ancients, or the heathen, who never heard of Christ—therefore it cannot be necessary for us; we reply, that our moral progress is checked and destroyed, if we willingly stop, when we might go further; and if we do not use means of advance which are presented to us. |93| Christianity affords to us means of moral progress, which the ancients and the heathen had not. If we refuse these, we are not in the condition in which they were, who never had them offered. If we reject the opportunity of becoming, in the especial Christian sense, the sons of God, we are in a very different condition from the pious heathen, who did all that their light enabled them to do, in order to approach to God. And this may be said, without our knowing, what perhaps the Christian revelation does not very distinctly teach; the nature of the advantage, in the condition of final happiness to which man’s moral and religious progress leads, which the man, who has lived in Christian light, has, over the devout heathen who lived in unavoidable darkness.

  §723. In stating that men are blameable in disbelieving truths, after they have been promulgated, though they are ignorant without blame, before the promulgation; we follow the judgment of mankind, as formed in other similar cases. We attribute to a man an intellectual fault, we despise him as ignorant and confused in his thoughts, who thinks the earth to be flat, now, that it has so long been ascertained to be globular. We regard him as blind and foolish, if now he is not satisfied that the earth moves round the sun: though for so many centuries, the wisest and most clear-sighted of men never doubted that the earth was at rest. When such truths are once indisputably established as facts, we cannot help condemning those who reject the evidence of them. They violate the Duty of rational thought, of which we have spoken (§446). And this is still more the case, in regard to moral truths. We excuse those who in early and rude stages of society practise or praise plunder of strangers, slavery, polygamy, concubinage; but when the progress of the Standard of Morality (§461) has shown that such things are immoral; if any one among us defends such practices, we no longer think him free from blame. We are indignant at |94| the low morality of his doctrines; or at least we lament his moral blindness as his calamity. And in like manner with regard to Religion, although we do not blame, for their religious ignorance, the ancients, who could not know the Revelation of Christ; and the heathen, to whom it has not been preached; we do not excuse the moderns, who, now that there has taken place this great Revelation, elevating the moral views and spiritual hopes of men, refuse to believe the Truths thus established. They who do this, reject a light which has come into the world; and the blindness in which they remain is not only their misfortune, but their fault.

  §724. This view of the Duty of accepting Christian Truth; namely, that the Duty is incumbent upon men according to the opportunities which belong to their condition; agrees with the lessons of the Christian teachers. The duty of Believing in Christ, of accepting Religious Truth in general, is strongly urged by Christ and his Apostles. Yet this is not urged without regard to difference of opportunities. Christ taught (Luke 12:48), Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall he much required. When St. Paul preached to the Athenians, after describing their past idolatry, he added (Acts 17:30), And the times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent. To the same effect, he preached at Lystra (14:15), The living God, which made heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein: in time past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways: nevertheless he left not himself without witness. This was joined with an exhortation to turn, now at length, to the living God. The whole scheme of the Christian Religion represented the Jewish Dispensation as an inferior and preparatory condition; in which men did not see the meaning and tendency of the commands which they obeyed, and were |95| to be judged according to the imperfect light which they thus possessed. The Epistle to the Hebrews states this. (Heb. 1:1), God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken to us by his Son; and then goes on to explain the superiority of Christ, in nature and office, to the ministers of the Old Testament. Again, St. Paul says (Rom. 2:12), As many as have sinned without law (the law of Moses), shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall he judged by the law. So in St. John (15:22), Christ says, If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin, but now have they no excuse (πρόφασιν) for their sin.

  §725. When the Truth of the Gospel is presented to men, those who do not accept it are charged with blindness and hardness of heart. Thus (Mark 6:52), They considered not the miracle of the loaves, for their heart was hardened. And when the Disciples referred his warnings to earthly matters, Christ said (Mark 8:17), Perceive ye not, neither understand? Have ye your heart yet hardened? Having eyes, see ye not? and having ears, hear ye not? So (Mark 3:5). And (John 12:40), the expressions of Isaiah are applied to the Jews who had seen the miracles of Christ, and did not believe: He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart: that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted. So (Acts 19:9), Divers were hardened, and believed not. And Christ (Mark 16:14) appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with their unbelief, and hardness of heart, because they believed not them which had seen him after he was risen. And to the two disciples on the way to Emmaus he said (Luke 24:25), O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken!

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  §726. As in these and many other passages, blame is imputed to men when they reject revealed truth, so is it represented as a merit to believe and accept such truth. Thus Acts 17:11. The Berean Jews were more noble (εὐγενέστεροι, of a better disposition) than those, in Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so. And this is implied in all the commendation bestowed upon faith; which, although it be not merely a speculative belief, includes belief of Christian truths. And as unbelief is threatened with punishment (Matt. 11:21; Luke 10:13), Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! so is belief represented as the occasion of God’s favour. (John 1:12), As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.

  §727. We have spoken (§723) of the Progress of Science, as illustrating the manner in which errors which are excusable at an earlier time, are inexcusable at a later period, when the truth has been more fully discovered and promulgated.
  There is one material difference, however, between the course of truth and knowledge, in Science and in Religion. In the knowledge of scientific truth, men go on from step to step, at every step advancing to the knowledge of a new truth; which new truth includes all that was true in previous knowledge, while it adds to it something more. Thus, the cycles and epicycles in which, according to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, the planets moved round the earth, explained their motions, for the most part. The step made by Copernicus consisted in adopting this explanation; adding to it the new truth, that the sun, not the earth, was the centre of the motions. Kepler still retained the same explanation of the motions; but added again the new truth, that the epicycloid motion, duly corrected, might be conceived |97| as elliptical motion. Such is ever the progress of human knowledge, retaining old truths, in spite of their mixture with error; and correcting them, where they are erroneous, by means of new truths. The last true doctrine contains all the previous true doctrines in the most general form; and contains, moreover, the new general truth.
  But in Revealed Truth, the case is necessarily different from this. There the Revelation contains all the Truth; and to this Truth, succeeding thoughts of men cannot add, though they may develop and methodize it. The Doctrine, as revealed, contains all the true Doctrines which can be unfolded out of it. The first form of the Truth is, here, the most comprehensive and fundamental. In Science, earlier views, so far as they are true, are summed up in the latest Discovery. In Religion, later views are true, so far as they are derived from the original Revelation. If Christianity were a Science, additions might be made to it from time to time; but as it is a Revelation, we can only have, from time to time, new expressions, arrangements, and combinations, of the same original fundamental Truths.

  §728. We may, however, observe further, that the progress of moral and intellectual culture among men, and the changes which philosophical opinions undergo, may make it necessary, for the sake of a due apprehension of the truth, and for the sake of a mutual understanding among men, that the original and fundamental Truths of the Christian religion should be expressed in various manners, on various occasions, and at various times. Abstract terms, and especially those which contain a reference to the powers of the mind, the operations of thought, and the most general relations of things, derive their significance and force, in a great measure, from the prevalent systems of philosophy. Such terms are necessarily employed, in expressing the relation of man to God, and the facts which affect the religious |98| condition of the human soul. Hence, it may be necessary to modify the expression of religious belief, in consequence of revolutions in philosophy, or other changes in the prevalent habits of thought. Statements, which, at one time, did not convey an erroneous meaning, may come to be assertions of error; if the significations of the terms which they involve be, in the course of years, so limited or enlarged, so defined and distinguished, that the statements declare more or less than the truth. In such cases the Creed, or formal Declaration of Religious Belief, may need to have some Articles added or altered. But it is to be remarked, that such additional Articles are not additions to the matter, but corrections of the form, of the Creed. They do not denote the acceptance of Truths hitherto unknown, but the exclusion of Errors hitherto unnoticed. The Truths of Revelation are always the same; but the means which man possesses, to express them without Error, vary, as the habits of thought and of language vary; and it has been possible, and being possible, it has been the Duty of the Church of Christ to make, from time to time, such alterations in her Creeds, that they might express, with more complete exclusion of Error, the Truth as revealed by God to man.

  §729. Our Religious Belief is a part of that Religious Culture, of which we have spoken (§565). A true apprehension of our relation to God, and of the conditions of his dealings with us, is the foundation and source of the Affections of Christian Piety, which we have already noticed.

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Chapter XIV. Christian Edification

  §730. As it is our business to seek a knowledge of Christian Truth, and to aim at Christian Dispositions for ourselves; so is it our Duty, also, to endeavour to impart these benefits to other persons. As it is (§346) a Moral Duty to promote the Moral Progress of other men, as well as our own; so is it a Christian duty to promote the Christian Progress of other men. Christian Love is a stronger motive for doing this than any other kind of benevolence can be; and the Christian Progress of the Soul is a so much higher object to aim at, than mere moral progress of the Mind, that it may very fitly excite men to more strenuous exertions. The Christian, who has made any progress in Christian knowledge and Christian dispositions, cannot help wishing that all other men should be as he is. He has received a Gospel of Good Tidings, which he must needs impart to all whom he loves; and this very Gospel has taught him to love all men. He would, if possible, communicate to every human creature the Call to Repentance, the Offer of Pardon, the Light, the Purification, the Hope, and the Joy, which he has, in a greater or less degree, found.

  §731. This Christian desire impels men to teach Christian truths and Christian precepts, to those who are under their more immediate influence; to their children, and their dependents. They bestow, on those who thus belong to them, Christian Education. They employ themselves in forming, in such persons, Christian Dispositions, and in unfolding their minds to the Truths of the Christian Revelation. But further; the Christian is naturally impelled by Christian love to endeavour to promote a Christian progress, not only in those whose Education in some measure especially belongs |100| to him, but also in all whom he has any occasion of influencing; his neighbours, his fellow-citizens, the whole world, so far as his opportunities extend. He is bound to aim at the Christian improvement of those with whom he has intercourse; to teach them, if by position or gifts he be especially qualified as a Christian Teacher: above all, to avoid doing or saying anything which may interfere with their Christian progress.
  This duty of mutual religious improvement and Christian culture is frequently enjoined in the Scripture. (Eph. 6:4), Parents are directed to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. The Colossians are exhorted (Col. 3:16), Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly…teaching and admonishing one another. And Heb. 3:13, Exhort one another daily; (10:24), Let us consider one another, to provoke unto love and good works. Thus the Christians were to exhort each other to what was good; to admonish and warn them who were in danger of transgression; and if need were, to rebuke transgressors (1 Tim. 5:20).

  §732. The notion of Mutual Instruction in Religion so familiarly occurs in the writings of the Apostles, that the metaphor by which it is expressed no longer suggests the figure from which it was originally derived. A Christian’s mind is edified, that is, literally, built up, by religious instruction: indeed the term instruction itself has, originally, nearly the same sense. Thus Acts 20:32, The word of his grace is able to build you up. Col. 2:7, Walk ye in Christ, rooted and built up in him. And in this sense, the term Edification (οἰκοδομὴ) is commonly used; as 1 Corinthians 14:3, He that prophesieth speaketh to edification. (1 In other cases, however, the metaphor is differently applied, when mention is made of building up a Church, as a body of Christians; as Rom. 15:20; and under this form of expression, the duty is often enjoined; as Eph. 4:29, Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the use of edifying. (προς οἰκοδομὴν της χρειας) So Rom. 14:19; 15:2. 1 Cor. 14:5. 1 Thess. 5:11.)

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  §733. As a necessary requisite of their common and mutual culture, it is the duty of Christians to preserve, unimpaired and pure, the Truth originally revealed through Christ. (Jude 3), It was needful for me to write unto you and exhort you that ye should earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints. St. Paul says to Timothy (2 Tim. 1:10), Hold fast the form of sound words which thou hast heard of me, in faith and love, which is in Christ Jesus. That good thing which was committed unto thee keep by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in us. It is plain that the good thing thus committed to Christian ministers was Christian Truth. So St. Paul again (1 Tim. 1:11, 18), The glorious gospel of the blessed God which was committed to my trust.…This charge commit I unto thee, son Timothy. And those who deviate from the truth of the Gospel, are spoken of with strong condemnation. Thus (Gal. 1:7), There are some that trouble you, and would prevent the gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel than that ye have received, let him be accursed: which condemnation he instantly and emphatically repeats (verse 9). St. Peter says (2 Pet. 2:1), There shall be false teachers among you who shall privily bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them. St. John (2 John 10), If there come any man to you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not in your house, neither bid him God speed.
  Thus, as unbelief and false doctrine are calamities to our own souls, and, in that sense at least, transgressions against ourselves; the promulgation of false doctrine, or of unbelief |102| among others, are evil done to them, and violations of Christian Duty.

  §734. To this condemnation of religious unbelief and false doctrine, objections are sometimes urged of the following kind: That thus to declare one selected form of Opinion to be the only form which men can blamelessly entertain, is hurtful to the Progress of Truth; for the Progress of Truth among men requires free Inquiry and Freedom of Opinion: that free Inquiry is a Right, and the Love of Truth a Duty; both of which are infringed by proscribing certain condemned Opinions, since these may be the very Opinions to which the Love of Truth and the pursuit of Inquiry lead some men: that our supposition that our Opinions are true, and the contrary ones false, is mere assumption, which may with equal Right be made on the other side; and that a condemnation of men, founded upon this assumption, is, therefore, unjust and unreasonable.

  §735. In reply we say, that, in other subjects than Religion, men do not proceed on the supposition that persons holding two opposite Opinions have each an equal Right to assume his Doctrine to be the true one: that on the contrary, we go upon the supposition that there is Truth and Falsehood, as well as mere Opinion; and we condemn the man who holds false opinions, when he has had the means of knowing the Truth. If a geographer reasons on the hypothesis that the earth is flat, not round; if a physician gives his direction on the supposition that a well-known poisonous drug is harmless: we do not say that he is blameless, and has a Right to his Opinion. We think him foolish and irrational; and if his error lead to mischief, we blame him as criminal. In like manner we go, and must go, upon the supposition that, in Morality and Religion, as well as Geography and Physiology, there is a Truth which it is the Duty of everyone to hold; or, at least, without which |103| his Progress towards Truth is altogether incomplete. If a man stop short of this point, or turn aside in any other direction, he must be in the wrong. Whether we call him culpable or unhappy, he is at least not moral and religious. And when he attempts to draw other people after him in his error, we cannot abstain from condemning him.

  §736. The belief in the coincidence of Virtue with Happiness, in the long run, depends upon the belief in God’s government of the world; and thus, this belief is the foundation of Morality. Without this belief, the Conceptions of Duty, and of right and wrong, have no reality and no force. When we say that the Love of Truth is a duty, we cannot so understand the word Truth, that there shall be no such thing as Duty. If the Love of Truth be a Duty, Truth must include the foundation of the reality of Duty; which is, as we have said, the belief in God. And so, of the Right of free Inquiry; there cannot be a Right of free Inquiry in such a sense, that Inquiry may lead to the result that nothing is right or wrong. If there be a Right of Inquiry, there must be some real basis of Rights; which, without the belief in God, there cannot be.

  §737. The general judgment of mankind has given its sanction to these views. As we have already said (§405), men do not consider those persons to be blameless who hold immoral Principles: and in like manner, they have always bestowed strong condemnation on those persons who have rejected or opposed that belief in God, which, in common apprehension, as in reality, is the necessary basis of Morality. Atheists have always been odious. The universal voice of human nature has pronounced condemnation on those who say, “There is no God.” The Right and the Duty of Inquiry have always been asserted in vain, when Inquiry has led to this result. Men have constantly, and everywhere, felt that the Right and Duty of Inquiry could not be things |104| more certain, than the being of God, who made them able to inquire and to conceive Duty. And the Atheist has been regarded as a man who broke a universal and fundamental tie, by which all mankind are held together; and hence has been looked upon as a common enemy.

  §738. The mere belief in God, on grounds of Reason, is too vague and incomplete a doctrine to satisfy men. If there be a Creator and Moral Governor of the world, there must be also a Providential Government of the world. The History of Man must bear traces of the Mind of God. The first origin of man on earth, for instance, cannot be an event in the common course of things; and we can easily conceive this origin of man to have been accompanied by something of the nature of a Revelation. Men have everywhere felt, thoughtful men still feel, the need of something more than our natural powers afford, to purify and elevate their minds. To carry on the Moral Progress of man, the Ancient World needed to be transformed into the Modern World; but this could not take place by natural means. The Christian sees the only consistent and possible solution of these difficulties, in the Christian Revelation; according to which the coming of Christ upon earth is the Central Point in the Providential History of the world; giving definiteness to the relations of God and man; and supplying the needs of man’s spiritual nature. Thus, he sees, in Revealed Religion, the necessary completion of Natural Religion; and is compelled to look upon the infidel, who does not believe in Christ, as believing in God to no purpose. The Christian judges, as we have already said, that such unbelief is either a violation of Duty, or a calamity which produces the same effect upon the person’s mind as a transgression of Duty; since, without a belief in Christ, a man cannot have the benefits which Christ’s coming brings to believers. And the promulgation of such infidel doctrines, |105| he deems to be a heavy calamity to those who fall under such influence. The tie of a common belief in God is, among Christians, identified with the tie of a common belief in Christ; and hence, he who denies the truth of the Christian Revelation, is necessarily looked upon in nearly the same light as the Atheist.

  §739. It by no means follows, that we check or limit the Progress of Speculative Truth among men, when we condemn the denial of certain fundamental Principles which are assumed in the very idea of Speculative Truth. Such Principles are these:—that there is a difference of true and false; a distinction of right and wrong; that there is a God who gives reality to that distinction; that there is a duty of unlimited progress towards what is right. These doctrines being assumed as steadfast and unquestionable, there is still abundant room for Inquiry; and for various views to which Inquiry may lead. The wide space between General Principles and Special Instances, is occupied by a region of obscurity and confusion, in which we need all the clearness which we can give to our intermediate chain of conceptions, in order that our reasonings may be coherent and conclusive. Different minds may form such chains of conceptions, various, yet each consistent with itself; and depending for their variety, only upon different kinds of intellect and of intellectual culture. It is our business to seek to establish such a clear and firm connexion among our thoughts. It is a part of the Duty of Intellectual Culture, of which we formerly spoke (§342). The pursuit of speculative Truth, under the conditions already stated, and in proportion to our powers and habits of speculation, is a part of the life of a good man. He must think, as well as feel. As we have said (§338 and §446), it is his duty to act and to think rationally; and what is rational thought, he can know only, by carefully unfolding his Reason. So far as he really arrives at Speculative Truth, he will see more distinctly the Supreme Law of |106| his Being, and will have increased means of conforming to it. It is his business constantly to aim at Truth; and his Progress towards Truth, like his Progress towards Moral Perfection, can never rightly have an end. Hence, if any one were to argue that the opinions to which he had been led must be blameless, since he had done all he could to arrive at truth; we should reply, that a man has never done all he can to arrive at Truth; that every man should go on to the end of his life, constantly endeavouring to obtain a clearer and clearer view of the Truths, on which his Duty depends; and that his renouncing this task, and making up his mind that he has done all which he needs to do, is itself a Transgression of Duty, which prevents his Error and Ignorance from being blameless.

  §740. The Inquiry after the Truths which are connected with Morality and Religion, must be conducted in a serious and earnest disposition. To bring to the task any spirit of levity, or of ready-made contempt for the doctrines whoso Truth we have to examine, is to trifle with or pervert our Duty. Such a spirit makes our inquiry worthless; and may make us both mischievous and culpable in the influence which we exert upon others. Levity or Ridicule, which has any tinge of impiety, is a most grave offence; implying the absence of all due appreciation of the importance of religion: and such behaviour is the more plainly culpable, inasmuch as the spirit of Levity and Ridicule is inconsistent with calm and candid Inquiry. As we have said (§247), Ridicule implies that the object ridiculed is compared with some standard, and is deemed so glaringly below the standard, as to make comparison absurd. To ridicule Religious Opinions, is to take for granted that they are unworthy of serious examination. To ridicule Religious Opinions, does not prove, but assumes their falsity. Ridicule is no test, either of truth, or falsehood, in the opinion ridiculed; but it is a test of assumption, combined with |107| levity, in the person who so uses it. Yet such assumption often carries away with it by sympathy the weaker kind of intellects, and puts them out of the frame of mind in which they can attend to serious inquiry. Ridicule often influences men more than argument; and is more difficult to reply to; because the replicant has first to overcome the feeling of Contempt, in the expression of which the force of Ridicule dwells. But this feeling of Contempt is not really any advance towards a discernment of Truth. It may be assumed on the side of Falsehood as well as of Truth. It may be communicated by sympathy, by the play of fancy, the ambiguities of language, and the fallacies of shallow thinking in favour of what is false, as well as of what is true. Hence, even those Moralists who allow an unlimited Freedom to the Inquiry after speculative Truth, still condemn the use of Ridicule with regard to religious Doctrines. To employ Jests and Grotesque images. Sarcasms and Sneers, on such subjects, is to intoxicate men, while we are leading them among the most difficult and dangerous paths.

  §741. As implying a degree of Levity, the familiar mention of the deeper matters which belong to Religion is not without evil. For the deeper matters of Religion cannot be properly apprehended and meditated upon, without a degree of reflection and abstraction which is inconsistent with familiar mention of them. This is especially the case with the Idea of God. The thought of God, the Author of Duty, the End of Hope, the ever-guiding Intelligence of the world, the ever-present Witness of our Thoughts, our Holy Lawgiver, our Righteous Judge; cannot fitly be called up in our minds, without being detained a moment, as the object of Reverence. To turn our thoughts towards God, is almost to address ourselves to him; and we are not thoughtlessly to use words which may make this demand upon us. |108|

  §742. Hence a good man will employ the Name of God cautiously and sparingly in his speech; and will never introduce it on any slight occasion, or in any trifling spirit. Still less will he employ it as an indication of some confused vehemence or reckless fierceness in his thoughts; as is done in common Profane Swearing. Such are the dictates of Natural Piety. They are confirmed by being enjoined by God himself, in one of the Ten Commandments given to the Israelites. Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain, for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain. And this is further indicated in the teaching of Christ (Matt. 5:35). For the Jews had apparently applied the commandment to the name Jehovah only: but Christ extends it to every expression, in which the thought of God is virtually referred to. I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by heaven, for it is God’s throne; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King.

  §743. All the Duties of which we have been speaking may be included in the term Christian Edification, of which we have already spoken. But it is the Christian’s duty to edify or communicate religious instruction to those around him, in a larger sense. The body of Christians who are in the world at every period, have it for their business to diffuse, to the whole world, the knowledge and the spirit of Christ; as the first Disciples, in their time, had this for their business. The true Disciples of Christ are always a Church, an Ecclesia, a Body called out of the great body of the world; not only to be themselves brought to God, but to bring all men to God. They are always the Salt of the earth; the element by which it is to be preserved from corruption. Every Christian is bound to labour to make other men truly Christians, as far as his influence extends;—first, as we have said, his family and neighbours; |109|next, his nation; and then the whole of mankind—the whole Human Family of his Brethren. Every Christian, and every Community of Christians, so far as they possess this Christian spirit, will be led to look upon themselves as Christian Missionaries, whose business it is to impart to all men Religious Truth.

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Chapter XV. Christian Ordinances in General

  §744. We have already (§591) spoken of Christian Ordinances; namely, certain habitual formal and social acts by which members of the Church acquire and express their Union with the Church, the Blessings and Privileges which this union produces, and the Emotions and Affections to which their Christian condition gives rise. As such Ordinances, we have mentioned Baptism, the Lord’s Supper, Prayer and Praise, Profession of Faith and Preaching. These Ordinances involve the appointment of sacred times, as the Lord’s Day, and other Christian Festivals, and of sacred Places and Forms. Besides these Ordinances, which belong to the universal course of Christian life, Christian doctrines give to Marriage, and to Death, a religious aspect which is expressed by Religious Acts accompanying each event and thus the Religious Solemnization of Marriages and Funerals may also be looked upon as Christian Ordinances. Oaths are necessarily, as we have seen. Religious Acts; and therefore, in a Christian community, are a Christian Ordinance. Finally, the appointment of an Order of men for the purposes of Religious Ministration and Religious Teaching, and the mode of Admission into this Order, are also Christian Ordinances.

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  §745. The use of Christian Ordinances is a Duty binding upon every Christian; for they are the means of a Christian’s finding in Religion that support which Morality needs, and those Blessings and Privileges which Christianity offers to Christians.

  §746. Hence it is proper to show separately, with regard to the Ordinances which have been mentioned, that they are Christian Ordinances,in the form in which they are appointed to be observed in this country. It belongs to the Religious Teacher to insist, in a more especial manner, upon the Spiritual Efficacy (§592) of these Ordinances. We consider them as a portion of the Rule of Christian Duty, in which they are necessarily included.

  §747. The Supreme Rule of Christian Duty, with regard to Ordinances, is the same as with regard to everything else:—the Will of God. This Will, however made known to Christians, is, as we have said (§654), the Christian Rule of Conscience. But the Rules of Christian Duty, with regard to Ordinances, cannot be collected from Scripture in the same manner as the Precepts of Christian Morality: for Rules for Christian Ordinances, as to their Form, are not given in the Scriptures. Hence we must collect the Will of God respecting Ordinances from other sources.
  Of such sources, there are four principal ones, which we shall term; Natural Piety; Early Revelation; Apostolic Institution; and Catholic Tradition.

§748. We have seen (§674) that Public Worship of the Deity is pointed out as a Duty by the Dictates of Natural Piety: and that Public Worship involves the establishment of Sacred Times, Sacred Places, and Religious Ceremonies. Hence it has been, by some Christian writers, reckoned as among the dictates of Natural Piety, that God should be worshipped in a special and marked manner, at the recurrence of certain fixed intervals of time; as, every morning, |111| every seventh day, every tenth day, every month. Certain it is, that such an usage has prevailed very extensively, we might almost say universally, among nations in all ages. So has also the celebration of annual festivals, having a reference to the annual phenomena of the seasons, or to some historical event. With regard to some of these observances, as the cycle of seven days, they are found to be so widely diffused in the remotest antiquity, that some persons have judged them to be traces of some Revelation made by God to man, in the early period of the world’s history; and before that dispersion of the human race by which they were separated into nations.

  §749. But of Revelations previous to the coming of Christ, we have no authoritative account except the Old Testament. The Law of Moses, delivered in the Old Testament, contains a very large and detailed body of Precepts, concerning Religious Observances; concerning Ceremonies and Sacrifices, Sacred Places and Times. These were delivered, to the Jews; and were observed by the Jews, with more or less modification, till the coming of Christ, It is proper to consider how far these Precepts may be regarded as guides for the Christian Church, in the regulation of its ordinances.

  §750. The Old Testament has a high claim upon the reverence of Christians. The Revelation of Christ is founded upon, and is the sequel to, the Revelations of which the Books of the Old Testament contain the record, Christ and his Apostles, in their teaching, recognize and confirm the authority of Moses and the prophets; and the precepts of Christian morality are often delivered in the way of a commentary upon the Law of Moses. The Jewish prophets predicted the coming of Christ, the promised Messiah; and by their predictions prepared men for the reception of his teaching. The connexion between the Jewish Laws and |112| the Christian Doctrines was so close, that at first, a great number of the Jewish Christians held the whole Law of Moses to be binding on Christians, even as to ceremonies; for instance, circumcision, meats, sabbath-days, new moons, and the like. This opinion was rejected by the teachers of genuine Christianity. St. Paul argues earnestly against it. The main tendency of his Epistle to the Galatians, for instance, is to prove (Gal. 2:16), That a man is not justified by the works of the Law of Moses, but by the faith of Jesus Christ. This he urges especially against the necessity of circumcision. But he applies it also to ceremonies in general, he tells the Colossians (2:14), that Christ blotted out the handwriting of ordinances; and in connexion with this, exhorts them: Let no man therefore judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a holy-day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbath-days, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ. Hence it is plain that even the Jews who became Christians, were not bound by the Mosaic ordinances: other nations were never bound by them, either before or after the coming of Christ.

  §751. But through the ordinances of Moses be not binding on us; yet, inasmuch as they were part of a divine revelation, they may serve, in some degree, as a guide to Christians; since they truly exhibit modes in which God, the Giver alike of the Mosaic and of the Christian dispensation, was willing to be worshipped. And this is especially applicable, in cases which the reason for the ordinance applies alike to Jews and Christians; as in the fixation of times and places of religious assemblies. To which we may add, that the existence of the Jewish Observances, in the time of Christ and the Apostles, exercised an influence in the determination of the Christian Ordinances, as we see in the cases of the Lord’s day, Easter, and Whitsuntide.

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  §752. In some instances, the Jewish ordinances were, as we learn from Christ and his Apostles, intended by God to prefigure the events of the Christian Revelation; and therefore ceased, by the reason of the case, when those events had occurred. This is implied by what is said of Jewish ordinances (Col. 2:17), that they are a shadow of things to come; hut the substance is of Christ. So also Heb. 10:1. In this Epistle to the Hebrews, we are taught that Christ was prefigured, both by the Jewish High priest, and by the sacrifices which the High priest offered; and especially, by the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb (1 Cor. 5:7): Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us.

  §753. This sacrifice, in the person of Jesus Christ, was offered at the time of the Jewish Passover; and hence, the annual commemoration of the death of Christ has continued the Paschal feast from the Jewish to the Christian Church; and it has from the first been observed by Christians. A consequence of this connexion of the Christian Easter with the Jewish Pascha is, that the time of Easter is made to depend upon the time of full moon, as that of the Jewish festival did; instead of being kept on a fixed day in the year, like other festivals of the Christian Church.

  §754. The Pentecost, another of the three great annual festivals of the Jews, the fiftieth day after the Passover, was also rendered memorable among Christians. On that day the Holy Ghost, promised by Jesus Christ to his disciples, as the Comforter who should come to them after his departure, descended in an especial manner upon them, when they were assembled together; and gave them the endowments which enabled them to diffuse the belief in Christ throughout the world. Hence this Jewish festival also is adopted into the Christian church; it bears the name of Whitsuntide.

  §755. The relation of the Lord’s Day of Christians to |114| the sabbath of the Jews will require a special consideration. Besides the Lord’s day, there are other Christian Ordinances which prevail among Christians, and of which we shall say a few words; namely, the Sacredness of Places, Forms of Worship, Baptism, the Lord’s Supper, Marriage, Funeral Rites, Oaths, the Character and Appointment of Ministers of Religion.

  §756. As the State, the Jural Community, is the proper Authority for regulating the forms of Civil Institutions, so the Church, the Religious Community, is the proper Authority for regulating the forms of Religious Ordinances. As we must find the determination of what is right, as to political institutions, in the history of the State, we must find the determination of what is right as to Christian Ordinances, in the history of the Christian Church. As, in the State, we refer to a certain fundamental and original scheme of our institutions, the Constitution, on which we look with reverence, and by whose spirit we seek to be guided; so in the Church, we refer to a certain fundamental and original scheme of ordinances, Apostolic Institutions; to which we look with reverence, and by which we wish to be guided, so far as the spirit of the times and the altered forms of life will allow us.
  The Evidence of Apostolic Institutions must be found in the New Testament; and this Evidence, so far as we find it, is a most important guide for the forms of Christian Ordinances.

  §757. But there is a very remarkable distinction to be noticed between Civil Institutions and Christian Ordinances, as to the Authority by which their form is determined. States are many: and each State has its separate Authority, for determining its own institutions; but the Church, in some senses at least, is one; it is a single body, of which Christ is the Head. There is a Universal or Catholic Church, composed |115| of the true Christians of all lands. Their separation of nationality is melted away by their spiritual union. There are Ordinances which belong to them in common, in virtue of this union. And these Ordinances, in spite of the separate channels in which their national histories have run, have been derived to them all, from the primitive times of the Christian Church, by Catholic Tradition, or Universal Christian Usage.
  What Ordinances can, and what cannot, be shown to be derived from Apostolical Institution by Catholic Tradition, is a question which has been disputed among Christians; but all have agreed that those Ordinances which are supported by Apostolical Institution and Catholic Tradition, are Ordinances established by the Authority of the Christian Church, and therefore Duties for all Christian men.

  §758. There are, in every community of Christians, forms and details of Ordinances which are not regulated by Catholic and Apostolic Usage, but by some special authority belonging to the community. Every Christian nation has such an authority belonging to it; and this Authority is the National Church.
  We must now consider certain Ordinances specially.

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Chapter XVI. The Lord’s Day

  §759. The observation of the First Day of the Week, as a day especially appropriated to worship and religious employments, is a Christian Ordinance which is supported by all the four grounds of which we have spoken; Natural Piety, Early Revelation, Apostolic Institution, and Catholic Usage. As we have already stated, it has been recognized as one of the dictates of Natural Piety that there should be stated times |116| for the public worship of God, and this has been manifested in the practice of all nations. The portion of time set apart in this manner, in the revelation of God’s will made to the Jews, was every seventh day; the Seventh Day being the Sabbath, or day of rest. In this case, the rule, by which revelation has fixed, what natural piety leaves undeterminate, has a special ground of authority for us, in that the reason given for the hebdomadal cycle is valid for all mankind, as well as for the Jews: namely, that God created the world in six days, and rested on the seventh day. The first Christians were in the practice of assembling for religious purposes, on the first day of the week, the day of Christ’s resurrection. We have various notices of assemblies of the disciples on that day; (John 20:19. Acts 2:1; 20:7. 1 Cor. 16:2). The day was called the Lord’s Day; thus (Rev. 1:10), I was in the Spirit on the Lord’s day (ἐν τῆ κυριακῇ ἡμερᾲ). The Lord’s Day gradually succeeded to the sacredness which the Jewish Sabbath had before possessed. When we pass from the New Testament to succeeding Christian writers, we find distinct notices of this universal Christian usage. Thus Justin Martyr, in the Second Century (Apol. ii., p. 98), On the day which is called Sunday (τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου λεγομένῃ ἡμερᾲ) there is an assembly of those who abide in the fields or in the city, and the narratives of the Apostles are read, and the writings of the prophets; and he states, as the reason of this observance, that they thus celebrate the day on which God divided the light from the darkness, and Christ rose from the dead. Tertullian recommends the observance of the day in times of persecution, after the manner of the Apostles, who were protected by their faith. From this period, there is no difficulty in tracing the Observance of the Lord’s day, as a Catholic usage of the Christian Church.

  §760. The Jewish Sabbath was an ordinance of Divine Authority, being appointed in the Fourth of the Ten Commandments. |117| Some Christian writers have identified the Lord’s Day with the Jewish Sabbath; and, asserting the Fourth Commandment to be binding on Christians, have claimed Divine authority for the Christian Sabbath; while other writers, denying that the Sabbath is thus commanded to Christians, have pronounced the Lord’s Day a mere human law. We have seen that the Lord’s Day is a Catholic and Apostolic Ordinance; resting in part also upon the Jewish Revelation. Such an Ordinance may be conceived as having something intermediate between an entirely divine and a merely human authority. We shall therefore make a few remarks upon the two extreme opinions just stated.

  §761. We have already said that Christ and his Apostles taught, clearly and emphatically, that the Jewish ordinances were blotted out by the Christian revelation. We may add that the Sabbath-days are expressly mentioned (Col. 2:16), in the enumeration of things in respect of which the Christians were not to be judged. Christ taught (Matt. 12:1. Mark 2:23. Luke 6:1), The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath; and that the Son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath. So (John 5:17) he claimed authority over the Sabbath, as being the Son of God. Some Christian writers think that when Christ (John 5) not only cured the sick man at the pool of Bethesda, on the Sabbath-day, but bade him carry his bed; and when (John 9) he not only restored the blind man to sight, but made clay on the Sabbath-day; he purposely violated the traditional rules of the Jewish Sabbath, thus asserting his Divine authority. But however this be, he appears to have especially chosen the Sabbath, as the occasion through which he was to show that the Spirit of Ordinances is of more importance than the Letter; and that he had the power to abolish mere Ordinances.

  §762. It is sometimes urged, that the Fourth of the |118| Ten Commandments must be binding upon Christians because the other Nine are so. But to this we reply, that the Ten Commandments are not binding upon Christians because they are parts of the Law of Moses, but because they are parts of the Moral Law. Thou shall not steal; thou shall not kill; thou shall not commit adultery; are precepts which do not derive their authority from any special command, but from the moral nature which God has given to man. There are parts of the Ten Commandments, which are merely arbitrary, or local, or temporary, and apply only to the ancient Jews. Such is the reason given for the Fifth Command; that thy days may he long in the land which the Lord thy God shall give thee; such is the command of absolute abstinence from labour on the Sabbath; such is the selection of the seventh day of the week for the day of rest, if that selection is really included in the Command.

  §763. I do not know that any Christian moralists hold that the Mosaical Form of the Sabbath Ordinance is binding upon Christians. From the first, and in all ages, the Lord’s Day of the Christian Church has been observed in a manner quite different from the Sabbatical Observances of the Jews. The sum of the Mosaic command is Rest from labour; and though Reading of the Scripture and Public Worship grew out of this, these are no part of the Law. The strictness with which this command of Rest was intended to be enforced, appears from the narration in the fifteenth chapter of the book of Numbers; respecting the man who, while the Israelites were in the wilderness, was put to death for gathering sticks on the Sabbath-day. In the Christian observance of the Lord’s Day, on the contrary. Assemblies for the purpose of Religious Instruction, Worship, Prayer, and Works of Benevolence, were, from the first, the main point. It is very improbable that the first |119| Christians, living constantly among the Jews, abstained from working and traveling on the first day of the week. We find (Acts 13:42; 16:13; 18:4) that St. Paul was in the habit of preaching on the seventh day of the week; thus conforming his habits of religious teaching to those of the Jews.

  §764. But if the Sabbath be not, for us, an ordinance resting on Divine Command, it is also not properly described as an ordinance peculiarly intended for the Jews. It is not only a Christian Ordinance of Catholic and Apostolic Authority, but is also recommended to the Christian Church by the manner in which it is spoken of in the Old Testament. The reason given for the religious observance of one day in seven; that God created the world in six days, and rested on the seventh day; equally concerns all nations. The institution of the Sabbath by Divine Authority, is mentioned in connexion with the account of the Creation; and long before the Jews as a separate people are spoken of. (Gen. 2:3), And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made. This notice must strongly recommend the religious observance of a seventh day to all, who receive the Old Testament as an authoritative account of God’s revealed will. And this remark would be applicable, even if we were to allow, as Dr. Paley contends, that the Sabbath was not observed by the Patriarchs before the time of Moses, and was instituted for the first time in the wilderness. But in reality this opinion appears to be untenable, as we shall endeavour to show.

  §765. In the sixteenth chapter of Exodus, we have the account referred to by Paley, which appears to him to contain the actual institution of the Sabbath. He quotes verse 23, in which Moses says to the rulers of Israel, who came and told him that the people gathered a double |120| quantity of manna on the sixth day, This is that, which the Lord hath said, Tomorrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord. Now it cannot escape notice, that this is very far from having the appearance of a Command to observe a new Ordinance. It is not a command, but a reason for what had happened, given by referring, as it would seem, to something known. Already, in verse 5, an indication had been given of a difference established between the seventh day and other days. The Lord said, It shall come to pass, that on the sixth day they shall prepare that which they bring in; and it shall be twice as much as they gather daily. And the observation of this difference, we are told, verse 22, began with the common people, and was remarked by the rulers. It came to pass that on the sixth day they gathered twice as much bread…And the rulers of the congregation came and told Moses.

  §766. In the Mosaic narrative itself, therefore, we seem to have evidence that the observance of the Sabbath by the Israelites in the wilderness, immediately after their departure from Egypt, was not a new thing. We have also, from other quarters, evidence strongly confirmatory of the opinion, that the observance of the seventh day must have been known to the Israelites in Egypt. A judicious ancient writer, Dio Cassius, in his History (xxxvii. 18), gives an account of the origin of the names of the days of the week. “The practice,” he says, “of referring the days of the week to the seven stars called Planets, arose among the Egyptians, and has already spread through every people, though it is not long, so to say, since it began.” He then proceeds to explain the reasons why the days are named respectively after the Sun, the Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus, Saturn. And the remark, that a week of seven days, named respectively after the Sun, Moon, and Planets, was very widely diffused in ancient times, is confirmed by what we |121| know from other countries. The week was in use, not only among the Arabians and Assyrians, but also in India, and in China. The Week is, say astronomers (as Bailly and Laplace), the most ancient monument of astronomical knowledge.

  §767. An usage thus common to Egypt, India, and China, may have been derived from the Patriarchs of the Jewish race; but, at any rate, it must be supposed to have originated before the historical periods of those nations; and therefore, must have existed in Egypt at the time of the residence of the Israelites in that country. When they departed out of Egypt, and began to traverse the wilderness, it is possible that the common people, as a matter of habit, reckoned upon a rest on the seventh day, and acted accordingly. If a conjecture may be here allowed, we might perhaps say, that the rulers of the congregation, who knew that their nation was under a general obligation to reject the superstitions of the Egyptians, conceived that this was one of them, knowing the day of rest to be dedicated to one of their deities. They referred the matter to Moses, who informed them that the true God had appointed this rest, though observed also among idolators; and his injunctions, to retain the observance, were confirmed and sanctioned by the mode in which the supply of the food from heaven was dispensed to the people.
The rest of the seventh day, then, has an origin earlier than the laws delivered to the Israelites through Moses, and may, with some probability, be considered a remnant of an earlier Revelation.

  §768. The religious observance of the Lord’s Day is, thus, not only of Catholic and Apostolic Authority, but is also recommended to us by its origin in an earlier Revelation. For the Form of such observance, the proper guide is, as we have said, the authority and usage of the Christian |122| Church. Christians are bound to conform to Rules established by the Church, as they are bound to conform to the Laws of the State. In the one case, as in the other, the positive historical Definition of the general duty is binding upon the Conscience.

§769. Hence, in points on which the evidence of Apostolic and Catholic usage is complete, a Christian, or a body of Christians, have no liberty to alter the mode of observance. As an example of this, it appears to be inconsistent with Christian duty for any community to alter the day of special religious observances, from the first, to any other day of the week; as Calvin is said to have suggested to the city of Geneva to do, in order that they might show their Christian liberty with regard to ordinances. If to do this were within the limits of Christian liberty, it would likewise be so, to alter the period of the recurrence of the day, and to observe every fifth day; or every tenth, as was appointed in France when Christianity was publicly rejected.

  §770. Christians are thus bound to observe the first day of the week; and by the universal and original usage of the Church, to observe it as a day of religious assembly, of religious instruction by reading and meditation, of common worship and prayer, and of works of benevolence. It does not appear that the usage of the universal Church gives us any more precise directions for the observance of the day.

  §771. But the Universal Christian Church assumes special modifications in each country; and the Regulations and Customs, by which such medications are established, have also their authority within their proper circle, although this authorities not to be confounded with that of the Universal church. The Gallican church may regulate the ordinances which its own members are required to observe: the Anglican church may do the same.
  To what degree of detail a National Church may fitly |123| proceed in prescribing observances for the Sunday, we shall not here consider. Our business at present is with the duties of individuals with reference to such observances,

  §772. A duty of individuals is, to practise a ready and full conformity to all Rules that are established by lawful Authority. This applies to such observances as are appointed by the National Church; even when they cannot be shown to be enjoined by the authority of the Universal Church, but are established by the National Church for the sake of order and edification, in the exercise of its own judgment. Such are, in this country, the customs of abstaining from work, closing shops, and attending public worship. These are observances directed by our civil and ecclesiastical law, and therefore they are Duties. And so far as such Observances provide for the practices which have always prevailed as usages of the Universal Church (as assemblies for religious instruction, worship, and prayer, with a more special direction of the thoughts to religious concerns), the observances are Religious Duties; they are included in the duty of conforming to Rules, which have more than a mere human sanction.

  §773. But the whole course of the teaching of Jesus Christ, with respect to the Sabbath, shows us that we are not to look upon the external observances of the Sunday as the essential point. We learn from him, that works of benevolence were no violation of the Sabbath; still less, can such works be a violation of the Lord’s day; of which, as we have said, rest is not a primary rule. And though at a period comparatively early, a law was made directing Christians to abstain from work on a Sunday; it was very fitly made liable to exception in cases of necessity; as, for instance, when harvest work needs to be done without loss of time.

  §774. Besides the observances which are directed by |124| law, civil or ecclesiastical, national or catholic, there are, in every country, many Sunday observances governed by Usage; such as in this country, the abstinence from games at other times not forbidden by law, and the abstinence from traveling, except in cases of necessity. These usages have grown up out of a regard for the religious authority of the day; and out of opinions concerning the best means, consistent with the national character and habits, of expressing and fostering seriousness and devotion. To conform to them, will, in most cases, confirm seriousness and devotion in each person, by the sympathy of his fellow-citizens; and to do so is therefore a duty of religious self-culture.

  §775. And even if there be any portion of those usages, in which we do not find this effect; it will still be a duty to conform to them, in such a manner as not to disturb their edifying influence on others. St. Paul has urged the duty of conformity very strongly, both by his example and by his precepts. After explaining the Christian’s freedom from Jewish formalities, he adds (1 Cor. 8:9), But take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumblingblock to them that are weak. For if any man see thee which hast knowledge do that which he deems irreligious, shall not the conscience of him that is weak be emboldened to do that which he himself deems irreligious? And through thy knowledge of the limited value of ordinances, shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? By no means let this be. It is a sin; and When ye sin so against the brethren, and wound their weak consciences, ye sin against Christ. Wherefore, he concludes, if any neglect of ordinances make my brother to offend, I will obey them in the most rigorous manner, lest I make my brother to offend.

  §776. But while we thus avoid offending weak brethren, it is no part of our duty to perpetuate their weakness. On the contrary, it is our duty to avoid any share |125| in proceedings which have this effect. Such a proceeding it would be, for instance, to exaggerate the authority of Observances, which we know to depend only upon our national usages, or upon the appointment of our National Church; speaking of them as if they were of Catholic and Apostolic, or even of Divine authority. And this consideration will lead us to abstain from censuring the Sunday customs of other countries, merely because they differ from our own; and the Sunday habits of our neighbours, merely because they are not directed by the maxims which we have adopted for ourselves. This appears to be one of the cases in which we may very properly apply the general Precept, To be very scrupulous in our own conduct, and very careful not to judge harshly of our neighbours.

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Chapter XVII. Consecrated Places

  §777. Under the Jewish dispensation, after the establishment of the Jews in Palestine, the Temple at Jerusalem was, in an especial manner, a Holy Place. Jesus Christ himself recognized the sacredness of this Temple, by driving out the traffickers, and quoting the Scripture, My house shall he called the house of prayer. But we have in this case, as in the case of the Sabbath, especial authority for the abolition of the peculiar privileges possessed under the old law. Christ says to the woman of Samaria (John 4:21): The hour cometh when ye shall neither m this mountain nor yet at Samaria worship the Father…when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeketh such to worship him. God is a Spirit; and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in |126| truth: not in a belief of the essential importance of this or that place of worship. Yet a degree of sacredness was ascribed by the Christians to their places of meeting, even in the Apostles’ time. St. Paul, expostulating with the Corinthians on certain unseemly practices which took place at their meetings, says (1 Cor. 11:22), Have ye not houses to eat and to drink in? Or despise ye the Church of God? The Consecration of Christian Churches is historically known to have prevailed from the time of Constantine, and is supposed to have been practised earlier. Since this practice has existed, Churches, and other Consecrated Places, have been considered, in all Christian countries, as peculiarly fitted for worship and other religious offices.

  §778. Thus the Consecration of places rests, in some measure, upon the same grounds as the consecration of times; Natural Piety, the Example of the Jewish Revelation, Catholic and Apostolic Usage. Though the grounds are not so plain and strong, in this instance, as in the case of the Lord’s Day, they are sufficient to impress a reverence for sacred places upon all Christians; especially, when these grounds are confirmed by the special views and rules of the particular Christian community in which we live. It is, therefore, a Duty, to give to consecrated places such reverence as Catholic and Apostolic usage assigns them; and to conform to any other observances indicative of such reverence, which the National Church enjoins. It is our duty also to cherish, in ourselves and in others, that seriousness and devotion which the consecration of places to religious uses is fitted to foster. It is, moreover, a duty to abstain from doing anything which may unnecessarily offend our scrupulous neighbours, on the one hand: and on the other, to abstain from urging, upon other men, any rules and any views with regard to such places, which have not Catholic and Apostolic authority. And finally, on such subjects, as was |127| said in the former case, we ought to be careful, both to avoid all irreverence in ourselves, and to abstain from hastily ascribing irreverence to others; because their views and usages differ from our own.

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Chapter XVIII. Forms of Prayer

  §779. Prayers to God, and other acts of devotion, proceeding from an assembly, have, in all ages and countries, been, in a considerable degree, expressed in stated Forms of words, determined by usage and authority. To a certain extent, indeed, this can hardly be otherwise. If any part of the devotional service be in verse, or accompanied by music, it must necessarily be previously arranged and prepared. And even when the devotional expressions are not so fettered in their rhythm, if they are not such as are known and expected by the congregation, they cannot generally carry with them that joint feeling and thought, which may prevail in religious assemblies when forms are used; and which may so operate as greatly to animate devotion.

  §780. In our worship, which ought to be reasonable as well as devout, we are led to use a fixed Form of prayers, thanksgivings, and praises, by such considerations as the following. Such a fixed Form prevents absurd, extravagant, and impious addresses to God, which the folly or enthusiasm of ministers uttering extemporaneous expressions might produce. It also prevents the confusion and indecision generated in the mind of the hearer during extemporary prayer. Prayer in which all can join, must be such as is foreseen, so that the mind can accompany it; not such as the mind |128| must wait for till it is uttered, before it can judge whether its sympathy is to be given.

  §781. We have abundant examples of set forms of devotion, in the Old Testament. Thus (Num. 6:22), we have a form of blessing the people, appointed by God himself. The Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto Aaron, and unto his sons, saying. On this wise ye shall bless the children of Israel, saying unto them; The Lord bless thee and keep thee: The Lord make his face to shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee: The Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, a7id give thee peace. And Moses wrote a song (Deut. 31:22), and taught it the children of Israel. This song is given in the thirty-second chapter of Deuteronomy. It was used in the Jewish services, and is said to be found also in several of the old liturgies of the Arabic Christians. (1 Hooker, E. P. B. v., ch. 26. Note by Keble.) The Psalms of David were constantly used in the devotional exercises of the Jews; and these, along with set forms of benedictions, thanksgivings, and supplications, were used in their synagogues.

  §782. It has been doubted by some, whether set forms of prayer are not unsuited to the worship m spirit and in truth which is demanded of Christians. But the practice of the Church, from the time of Christ himself, assures us that there is no such unfitness. When Christ’s disciples asked him (Luke 11:1), Teach us to pray, as John also taught his disciples: he gave them a brief form of prayer, which has ever since been in constant and universal use among Christians: it is also given in Matthew (6:9). When our Saviour had eaten the passover with his disciples, and delivered the cup to them (Matt. 26:30), they sung a hymn; probably the hymn which was sung by the Jews on such occasions; namely. Psalm 112, and what follows. And in that night |129| in the garden of Gethsemane, he prayed three times, saying the same words (Matt. 26:44). It is true, that Christ gives to his disciples a precept (Matt. 6:7), which our translators have rendered, use not vain repetitions, as the heathen do. But in the original word (μὴ βαττολογήσητε) there is nothing which specially implies repetition. The whole passage enjoins inward heartfelt prayer, instead of ostentatious worship of outward acts and words. Nor can it be doubted, that this inward worship is a Christian duty, both in private and in public devotions. To the same purpose is the passage in St. John (4:24) God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth. Public, as well as private prayer, is constantly referred to in the history of the Apostles. Thus (Acts 12:5), Peter was kept in prison; but prayer was made without ceasing of the church unto God for him. And (Acts 16:16), As we went to prayer…a certain damsel met us. (So 1 Cor. 7:5; 2 Cor. 1:11, and 9:14; Eph. 6:18; Phil. 1:19, and 4:6; James 5:15; 1 Pet. 4:7). In 1 Timothy 2, subjects of prayer are prescribed by the Apostle: I exhort therefore, that, first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for all men: for kings, and for all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour…I will therefore that men pray everywhere, lifting up holy hands, without wrath and doubting; where the last words seem to refer to some disputes which had taken place on the subject. Thanksgiving is enjoined to be combined with prayer; thus (Phil. 4:6), By prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known unto God. (So Col. 2:7, and 4:2; Eph. 5:20; Heb. 13:15). So also praises (Acts 16:25); Paul and Silas in prison prayed and sang praises unto God. (So Phil. 1:11; Heb. 2:12, and 13:15; 1 Pet. 4:11.)

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  §783. Set forms of worship, or Liturgies, have been in use in the Christian Church from its origin, and have been transmitted, with various modifications, to the present times. Many of the expressions still used, were employed in very early ages of the Church; as the phrase, Sursum corda, Lift up your hearts, at the beginning of the service of the Communion: the questions asked of godfathers in the office of Baptism; the form of baptism, in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, enjoined by Christ himself; the Doxology, borrowed from this. Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost; with the response afterwards added. As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. Amen. The Collects, Epistles, and Gospel, for the various festivals of the year, have been in use in England from the Saxon times; and many of the prayers of the present English Liturgy, are borrowed from the ancient ritual of the Church.

  §784. At the time of the English Reformation, changes were made in the forms of public worship. The services were made more suitable to that inward prayer, which we have spoken of as a Christian duty, by presenting them to the worshipper in his own language, instead of the previous Latin Liturgy. All that was conceived to imply idolatry and false doctrine was removed. The Liturgy was put into a form in which a considerable portion of it was derived from the worship of the Catholic and Apostolic Church; while the remainder was composed with a careful regard to scripture precepts, and to the condition and feelings of English Christians, by the authority of the National Church.
  Thus we are led to the conviction, that the use, both of a Liturgy in general, and of the English Liturgy in particular, is conformable to the condition of an English Christian. We see, also, that it is the duty of every Christian not to be satisfied with the mere form of the Liturgy; with lip-worship |131| and knee-worship; but to accompany the prayers, thanksgivings, and praises, with inward movements of his heart.

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Chapter XIX. Baptism

  §785. Baptism is not only a Catholic and Apostolic usage, but is recommended to us by the dictates Not only Baptism, but Infant Baptism in particular, is agreeable to the dictates of natural piety and reason. Men, living together in a Religious Society, into which they have been initiated by an especial and solemn Rite, and which they consider as the source of highly precious privileges, cannot but wish that their children, even from their earliest infancy, should be members of the same Religious Society. They are naturally led to admit them into the Religious Community, even before their religious feelings and convictions are unfolded; trusting that their education, under the influence of those who have thus admitted them, will bring them into a condition of sympathy with the community, such as their initiation presumes, or anticipates.

  §786. In the Jewish Church, children were admitted into the Covenant of God with the Nation, by Circumcision, at eight days old. Circumcision was abolished by the coming of Christ; and Baptism, the Rite of initiation into the New Covenant, superseded the former initiation. Baptism, that is, momentary immersion in water, had already been employed among the Jews, as a rite of purification: and hence, as a symbol of repentance; as it was employed by John the Baptist. But the Baptism of John was professedly only |132| preparatory to that of Jesus Christ (Matt. 3:11. Mark 1:8). Jesus Christ baptized through his Apostles (John 4:2); and when he finally parted with his disciples (Matt. 28:19), he commanded them to baptize all nations. We have abundant instances, in the history of the Acts of the Apostles, of the application of Baptism, as the Rite of initiation into the Christian Church. (Acts 2:41; 8:12 and 38; 9:18; 10:48; 18:8; 19:5; and numerous allusions in the Epistles. In several of these cases, we read of whole households being baptized; as that of Lydia (Acts 16:15); of the jailer at Philippi (Acts 16:33); of Stephanas (1 Cor. 1:16). In these cases, probably children were baptized; and we cannot doubt that, at any rate, the subordinate persons in the household were baptized on the responsibility of the principal convert.

  §787. In the Early Church, after the time of the Apostles, we have early indications of Infant Baptism having been practised, though it does not appear to have been universal. Justin Martyr, who lived about forty years after the death of St. John, discourses “of Baptism being unto us instead of Circumcision.” Irenaeus, near forty years later, mentions infants as “by Christ born again unto God.” This expression “born again,” is used by Christian writers as equivalent to “baptized.” Origen, about fifty years later still, speaks, in several places, of Infant Baptism, as a known and undoubted practice: and in one of these places, as having been according to a tradition ordered by the Apostles. (1 Wall, Infant Baptism, P. i., chap v., §3.) Augustin very frequently speaks of Infant Baptism; and says that he never heard of any Christian, Catholic, or Sectary, who taught any other doctrine than that infants are to be baptized for pardon of sin. The first Antipaedobaptist who formed a congregation was Peter Bruis, about AD 1100. Thus the main stream of Catholic and Apostolic authority is |133| strongly in favour of the baptism of infants, as the token of their admission into the Church of Christ. Soon after their natural birth, they are admitted to a new birth, as children of God through Christ, and heirs of eternal life.

  §788. The practice of Infant Baptism having thus prevailed in the Church, from the earliest times; we are further to take into account the strong expression of Christ and his Apostles, respecting the necessity of baptism as the first step to the benefits of Christ’s coming. Christ’s last command was (Matt. 28:19), Go and teach all nations, baptizing them. In the next Evangelist, the assertion is stronger (Mark 16:16), He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned. In Ephesians 4:5, Baptism is mentioned as one of the leading characters of the Church. There is one body and one spirit…one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism. And it is constantly referred to, as the necessary mode of introduction into the Christian Church (Acts 2:28, etc.); and as a symbol and means of a death to sin and a new life to God (Rom. 6:1). This introduction into the Christian Church, which was granted to the first Christians, in pursuance of their own belief, was, it appears, continued to their families, in the trust of the blessing of God; which, operating through a Christian education, was to prevent their becoming unfit members of the Church. Parents (Eph. 6:4) are commanded to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, which appears as if the children were, from the first, contemplated as belonging to the Church. So Acts ii., 39, The promise is unto you, and to your children.
  On these grounds we deem it a Christian Duty to accept Baptism in general, and Infant Baptism in particular, as a Catholic and Apostolic usage; and to promote its administration, under a due sense of its import, in all appropriate cases with which we have any concern.

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Chapter XX. The Lord’s Supper

  §789. At the last Supper of Jesus Christ with his disciples, he instituted an ordinance, which, in an especial manner, expresses the relation of Christians to him. He delivered to them Bread and Wine, saying. Take, eat; this is my body which is given for you. Drink ye all of this. This is my blood of the new testament which is shed for many for the remission of sins. Do this in remembrance of me (Matt. 26, Mark 14, Luke 22, 1 Cor. 11). And we read frequently in the history of the Apostles, of the celebration of this ordinance under the name of breaking of bread (Acts 2:42 and 46; 20:7).

  §790. This ordinance expresses the union of Christians with Christ, as the source of their spiritual life. St. Paul says (1 Cor. 10:16), The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? (κοινωνία participation). Hence this Ordinance is also called the Communion; as well as the Lord’s Supper, which name is given it 1 Cor. 11:20 (κυριακὸν δεῖπνον). In the account of the institution of the Lord’s Supper, and in many of the references to it just quoted, mention is made of giving of thanks before breaking the bread and imparting the cup: and hence, the ordinance is termed the Eucharist (εὐχαρισυια), or thanksgiving.

  §791. The Eucharist, Lord’s Supper, or Communion, thus instituted by Christ, and continued by his Apostles, has been constantly celebrated in the Church, from that time to the present day. From the distinctness and solemnity of the institution of this Ordinance, and from the habitual celebration of it in the Apostolic times, as well as ever since, it is unnecessary for us to look for analogies to illustrate |135| it in the Old Law. The circumstances of the command, and the doctrines combined with the ordinance, make it the duty of Christians to join in this ordinance. It has ever been held by all Christians the most solemn and formal Token and Act of their Participation in the Church of Christ.

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Chapter XXI. Marriages of Christians

  §792. Marriage is a Civil Contract; but there are strong reasons for making it also a religious union. It is in its complete form a union for the whole remaining period of life; a participation of almost all interests, large and small, external and internal. The engagement includes, not only constant companionship, but steady affection. A contract so important and extensive, may naturally be confirmed by a religious sanction; and engagements which concern the internal feelings, may naturally be supported by prayers and the hopes of a Divine blessing. In most cases. Marriage, in its highest form, has been accompanied by some Religious Rites; and has had something of a religious character given it. In the Roman Law, marriage is not only consortium omnis vitae, but divini ab humani juris communicatio. The laws of Moses concerning Marriage had led the Jews, in some cases, to treat its obligations lightly, as we have already seen (§633). Christ taught, that in the eyes of God, it is a union of the most complete and essential kind, not arbitrarily to be disturbed. We have also seen that the teaching of St. Paul gives to Marriage a religious significance (§632).

  §793. In like manner, the earliest successors of the Apostles also ascribe a sacred character to marriage; speaking of the consent and participation of the Christian community as |136| conditions of the blessedness of Christian Marriages. St. Ignatius writing to Polycarp says (ii., 5): “It becomes those who marry, and those that are given in marriage, to take this yoke upon them, with the consent or direction of the Bishop; that their marriage may be according to the will of God, and not their own lusts;” and Tertullian exclaims (ad Ux. ii. 8), “How shall I sufficiently set forth the happiness of the marriage which the Church brings about by her procurement; which the Eucharist confirms; which Angels report when done; and the Father ratifies!” At that time, marriage by the law of the land was a Civil Contract; but the Christian Teachers spoke of it as being, under due conditions, also a Divine Ordinance. At a later period, it was made law, throughout the Christian world, that marriages should be celebrated in no other way than by the sacerdotal blessing and prayers. This continued to be the case in England, till the usurpation of Cromwell; when Marriage was declared to be merely a civil contract. At the restoration of Charles the Second, marriage was again regarded as a religious ordinance. By a recent act of Parliament, Marriages contracted with certain civil formalities, are valid. But the Church of England retains in use her Form of Solemnization of Matrimony; and in this she declares that “so many as are coupled together otherwise than God’s word doth allow, are not coupled together by God, neither is their matrimony lawful.”

  §794. Taking into consideration the declarations of Christ and his Apostles, respecting the sacredness of the institution of Marriage, it appears conformable to the duty of Christians to connect, with the contract, a religious sanction, and prayers for the Divine blessing. When the man and woman belong to a Church which has made matrimony a religious ordinance, there can be no doubt of the duty of celebrating the union in the ecclesiastical form. To |137| do otherwise, would be, in significance, to deny the sacredness of Marriage; and to reject the prospect of the Divine aid and blessing in the married condition. Where the two parties do not both belong to the same church, there is a difficulty in determining what religious form of solemnization of the union ought to be adopted. To employ the forms belonging to both the churches, appears to be a course free from any valid objection; for it cannot be supposed that one of the parties shuns, as impious, the religious service to which the other assents. If the incongruity of sentiment on religious subjects go so far as this, the marriage cannot take place between religious persons.

  §795. If it be asked, whether the Church sanctions the marriages of her children with aliens from the church, we may reply, that when they are once contracted she does not disallow them. St. Paul, as we have seen (§635), gives his judgment (1 Cor. 7:12) that the believing husband was not to put away the unbelieving wife; the believing wife not to separate from the unbelieving husband; and that the children were not “unclean” (ἀκαθαρτᾶ). Thus, the Early Church did not annul or disallow mixed marriages; nor did she solemnize them again, when the unbelieving party was converted.

  §796. Whether and under what circumstances the Church would give her sanction to the celebration of Mixed Marriages, is another question. A marriage with an unbeliever is forbidden by Apostolic authority (2 Cor. 6:14), Be ye not unequally yoked with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness? and what concord hath Christ with Belial? or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel?…Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord. And again (1 Cor. vii., 23), If the husband be dead, the wife is at liberty to be married to whom she will; only in the Lord.

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Chapter XXII. Funeral Rites of Christians

  §797. A Funeral is necessarily a religious service among a religious people. The change which takes place at death, is a transition from this life to a future life, which religion discloses to us; and no occasion can be so appropriate, or so impressive, for the utterance of religious views and feelings, respecting the past, the present, and the future; respecting man’s life in general, and the condition of the dead man in particular. Accordingly, in all times and places, the funeral rites have been of a religious kind, the corpse, the bier, the grave-clothes, the grave, have been looked upon with awe.

  §798. The Christian religion did not remove this feeling: but by presenting to believers the resurrection of the dead, as a sure truth, constantly insisted upon, it removed much of the fear which belonged to such occasions. Its language was, O death, where is thy sting! O grave, where is thy victory! It spoke of dying, as falling asleep; of the dead, as those who sleep. On the tombs of the early Christians were represented, as symbols of their hopes, a Crown, a Phoenix, a Pelican, a Palm-tree, a Ship sailing out of the Harbour, or the like. It was at a much later period that Death began to be represented as a skeleton, or a meagre spectre; a usage which is supposed to have arisen in part from the familiarity with bones which the use of Relics produced; and in part from the ascetic spirit, which sought to subdue man’s levity and love of enjoyment; and aimed, not at evading, but at overcoming, the fear of death.

  §799. Christian Funeral Service. From the earliest times of the Church, the funeral of a Christian was, not a private, but a public business; the concern of the Christian community. Psalms and Hymns were sung containing such passages as these: (Psalm 116:15), Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death |139| of his saints: (verse 7), Return, O my soul, to thy rest, for the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee. (Prov. 10:7), The memory of the just is blessed. (Wisdom 3:1), The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God. In later ages, other hymns were used; as, for example, the noted one referring to the day of Judgment, which begins Dies Irae, dies illa Solvet saeclum in favilla. The greater part of the Burial Service of the English Church was in use in this country (in Latin), long before the Reformation.

  §800. Both the Jewish and the Roman customs directed that burial-places should be outside the city. (Luke 7:12. John 11:30). Cic. de Leg. ii. 23, quotes the law of the Twelve Tables: Hominem mortuum in urbe ne sepelito neve urito. The Christians gave to their burial-grounds the name of sleeping places, Cemeteries (κοιμιητήρια); implying the hope of the resurrection. But they also buried their dead in the Church-yards; and this was understood as a recognition of the Communion of Saints; a community of interest, or sympathy, between dead and living believers; the place where the departed were gathered together being thus brought near the place, where those who remained in life assembled for purposes of religion.
  It is to be remarked that the purpose of the Christian funeral solemnities was, in early times, understood to be, not any advantage to the dead, but the edification of the living.

  §801. The due religious celebration of funeral solemnities being plainly capable of being made to further such purposes; and being supported by the constant practice of Christian communities; cannot be disregarded by a Christian in any instance which belongs to his charge, without showing irreverence and levity in religious matters; besides the blame of want of affection, and want of decency, which such a neglect naturally and deservedly incurs, even without referring to religious considerations.

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Chapter XXIII. Oaths of Christians

  §802. We have already spoken of Oaths in general, as a custom arising from the dictates of natural Piety; we have now to speak of Christian Oaths as a Christian Ordinance. The Oaths commonly used in this country contain a reference to Christianity. The ancient form of the Oath was that the Juror touched the Gospels, and said, Ita me Deus adjuvet et hoec Sancta Dei Evangelia; and the present form is, that in taking the Oath he holds the Gospel in his hand, and kisses the book after saying So help me God.

  §803. Christian Oaths have been taken in various forms. As to its general character, the Ordinance is supported by all the four grounds of Ordinances which we have enumerated; Natural Piety, Early Revelation, Apostolic Practice, and Catholic Usage. But the two latter reasons have not given the Ordinance a new form and a new authority, to the same extent to which they have done in other Ordinances. Natural Piety has made the use of Oaths universal. In the Jewish Revelation we find them abundantly used, and approved and enjoined by God. Christ and his Apostles sanctioned the use of Oaths by their practice, but nowhere clearly enjoined them. There are even some passages in the New Testament which have been understood as forbidding Oaths, but without good ground for such an interpretation. And the Universal Usage of Christian Communities, down to modern times, has given its authority to that interpretation of the Christian Precepts, which allows the use of Oaths on solemn occasions. We shall further illustrate some of these assertions.

  §804. Among the Israelites, the custom of swearing on solemn occasions existed, and is constantly taken for |141| granted in the Old Testament. Oaths are there commanded as a part of the usual judicial procedure: Thus, Exod. 22:11, if a man deliver unto his neighbour an ox, etc., and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no man seeing it, Then shall an oath of the Lord he between them both. And Psalm 15:4, it is mentioned among the characters of a good man, that he sweareth to his neighbour, and disappointeth him not, though it be to his own hindrance. The denunciation of God’s anger against false swearing, imply a sanction of swearing when truly employed; and we cannot suppose God to disapprove of the practice, when he is repeatedly represented as himself having sworn an oath to Abraham (Gen. 22:16), to David (Psalm 89:3), and to the people of Israel on various occasions (Isa. 45:23. Jer. 49:13; 51:14. Amos 6:8). The command. Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain, implies that the name might be used on important and fit occasions; and the command appears fitted to keep up the solemn reverence for the thought of God, which an Oath implies.

  §805. When Jesus Christ taught the true import of the law of Moses, he noticed, among other things, the Jewish practice of Oaths. His injunctions, on this subject,were to the same effect as with regard to other parts of the Jewish usages. As with regard to retaliation, to divorce, to honouring of parents, to angry expressions, the Jewish teachers had made subtle distinctions as to what was and was not a transgression of the law, while they had neglected the spirit of the law; so with regard to swearing. The trivial and thoughtless use of forms of swearing had become common, and the teachers had laid down rules as to which of these forms were binding, and which were not so. In this, as in the other cases, Christ rejects these distinctions, and says of such cases (Matt. 5:34), I say unto you, Swear not at all. That this is the import of his words, is plain from the course of teaching |142| in this place. Christ begins by saying (5:17), Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets; and then goes on to various points, with the expressions, Ye have heard it hath been said by them of old tune…But I say unto you (5:21-22, 27-28, 31-32, 38-39). And the same form he uses here: Ye have heard that it hath been said (5:33), Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: but I say unto you. Swear not at all. If, in this instance, he had forbidden judicial Oaths, it is plain that he would have been destroying the law and the prophets. For the Law enjoined judicial Oaths, as we have seen; and if a hearer of Christ, thinking to obey him, had refused to answer upon his Oath before a judge, he would have been violating the law of Moses, and of his country, as we have seen. We do not find that Christ was ever accused of having violated the law of Moses in this part of his teaching. And when we consider how different the Oaths he spoke of were in form from the judicial Oaths of the Jews, it seems impossible to suppose that his hearers would understand him to speak of these.

  §806. In this passage, Christ refers to what had been said, namely. Thou shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths. But we learn from another passage that this had been said, with various distinctions. In Matt. 23:16, Christ reproaches the Scribes and Pharisees on this subject: Woe unto you, ye blind guides, which say, Whosoever shall swear by the temple, it is nothing; but whosoever shall swear by the gold of the temple, he is a debtor!…And whosoever shall swear by the altar, it is nothing; but whosoever sweareth by the gift that is upon the altar, he is guilty. And he then explains, that all these distinctions, which were used to show Oaths to be no Oaths, were futile, (5:17, 19-22), The temple sanctifieth the gold…the altar sanctifieth the gift. Whosoever shall swear by the altar, sweareth by it, and by all things thereon. Whoso |143| shall swear by the temple, sweareth by it, and him that dwelleth therein. He that shall swear by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by him that sitteth thereon. These are very forcible considerations against the light or familiar use of Oaths; but of no apparent force to overthrow the Jewish law which, given by God himself, had till then permitted and enjoined Oaths. Indeed, the precept by Christ, Swear not at all, cannot be considered as having reference to judicial Oaths. The forms mentioned of swearing, by heaven, by Jerusalem, etc., were not judicial forms, and the precept is combined with other precepts which would put an end to all judicial contests: Resist not evil…And if any man will sue thee at law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also (Matt. 5:40). When Christ says (verse 37), Let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil, we may readily apply this to judicial Oaths, for these come as lawsuits come, from the cupidity and anger, the falsehood and levity of man. Oaths come of evil sources, and judicial Oaths among others; but there is in the precepts now referred to, nothing which denies them, so far as they are evils, to be necessary evils, as all judicial proceedings may be said to be, if we look at their origin.

  §807. Accordingly, it is related that Christ (Matt. 26:73) held his peace when he was accused till the high priest said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell me whether thou he the Christ, the Son of God. He then answered. Thou hast said; or, as St. Mark gives the answer (14:62), I am. This is conceived by commentators to be a submission to an Oath imposed in a judicial procedure. An Oath for judicial purposes is mentioned with apparent approval in the Epistle to the Hebrews (6:16), An oath for confirmation is the end of all strife; and this is stated, in order to explain God’s condescension, in accommodating himself to the customs |144| of men, as when he swore to Abraham; thus adding to one immutable thing, God’s promise, another immutable thing, his oath. It cannot be supposed that such illustrations and expressions would have been used by the writer, if he had held the oaths of men to be sinful.

  §808. For the like reasons, we cannot understand the precept given by St. James as applicable to Judicial Oaths. It is almost a verbal repetition of the words of Christ (James 5:12), But above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath; hut let your yea be yea; arid your nay, nay; lest ye fall into condemnation. This precept occurs in an Epistle in which the government of the tongue is especially dwelt on (chapter 3). It does not occur along with precepts for the conduct of Christians in their intercourse with the world; but is connected with injunctions of the feelings which were to be excited by the approaching coming of the Lord. Thus chapter 5:8, Be patient…for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh; verse 9, Grudge not one against another…behold, the judge standeth before the door. verse 10, Take the prophets for an example of patience, verse 12, Above all things, swear not. verse 13. Is any afflicted? let him pray. Is any merry? let him sing psalms. It is plain that we have here a train of injunctions respecting the seriousness of thought and demeanour which were suited to the near coming of the Lord; and it is evident that any light or trivial mention of sacred things, such as familiar swearing involves, was grossly at variance with this seriousness: but we have here no ground for concluding anything against the serious and faithful discharge of an important task, like that of giving to our solemn declarations a religious sanction.

  §809. Besides the allowance given to judicial Oaths by the above passages, we find countenance given to religious asseverations in other cases by the example of St. Paul (Rom. 1:9), God is my witness…that I make mention of |145| you always in my prayers. (2 Cor. 1:23), I call God as a witness on my own soul, that to spare you I came not to Corinth. These expressions so far assume the form of an Oath as to show us that in that form there was nothing repugnant to the religious views of St. Paul.

  §810. The examples of swearing which are given in the precepts above quoted are all of the same form: by heaven, by earth, by the altar, by the temple. The forms of asseveration used by St. Paul are different; God is my witness; I call God as a witness. The forms used in other cases are still different: God do so to me, and more also, if ought but death part thee and me (Ruth 1:17). As I shall answer to God at the day of judgment (which is the form of Oath in Scotland); So help me God, which is the usual form in England.

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Chapter XXIV. Christian Ministers

  §811. Not only Times and Places, but also Persons, are specially appropriated to religious offices. This practice has been so universal in the world, that it must be considered a consequence of Natural Piety. In the case of our religion, the reasons for such a practice, on grounds of mere reason, are evident. To give religious instruction to Christians, the teacher must be acquainted with the Scriptures of the Old and of the New Testament; and in order to understand them, he must have an acquaintance with the history and manners of those times. He must also be acquainted with the history of the Christian Church; and with the doctrines which have prevailed in it; especially with those doctrines which the condition of his own National |146| Church requires him particularly to inculcate. This cannot be done, without selecting from the community the ministers of religion; making them a Clergy; educating them for their profession; combining with it the means of their being supported without being compelled to engage in other labours; and thus giving them both the means, and the obligation, to devote all their powers to their ministry.

  §812. The establishment of a Clergy, recommended by these reasons, is in agreement with the Jewish polity; according to which a body of priests was set apart, to perform the religious offices; and the tribe of Levi in general was appointed to assist these priests in their ministrations. The Priests and Levites had an ample provision made for them, out of the tithes, first-fruits, and offerings of the people; and had also forty-eight cities appointed for their residence (Num. 35:1). They were trained, by hereditary instruction and tradition, in the offices of the temple-worship, and in the knowledge of the law and the prophets.

§813. The Apostles, the first teachers of the revelation of Jesus Christ, were selected and fitted for their office, in an especial and supernatural manner, by God himself. But when the Apostles made converts on an extensive scale (Acts 14:23), they ordained them certain officers in every church whom they called presbyters or elders (so Tit. 1:5). These Presbyters are joined with the Apostles in office (Acts 15:2, 4, 6, 22-23; 16:4), and are spoken of as the usual governors of the church (Acts 20:17; 21:18). They prayed with the sick (James 5:14). They are thus exhorted by St. Peter (1 Pet. 5:1), The presbyters among you I exhort, who am also a presbyter…Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof (ἐπισκοποῦντες) not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind: neither as being lords over God’s heritage, but being ensamples to the flock. It is evident, from this passage, that the office |147| of presbyter was, at this time, assimilated to that of a pastor or shepherd; and that it was one of authority, since the presbyters are exhorted not to exercise their authority in an imperious manner (κατακυριέυοντες). So (Matt. 20:25; Mark 10:42), The princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, where the same verb is used.

  §814. The warning, not to make gain the object, implies that the minister commonly received something from his flock. And St. Paul asserts the reasonableness of this claim (1 Cor. 9:7): Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges? who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?…If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we reap your carnal things?…Do ye not know that they which minister about holy things live of the things of the temple? and they which wait at the altar are partakers with the altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel. And though he refused to avail himself of this reasonable claim in the case of the Corinthians (2 Cor. 11:9; 12:13), and of the Thessalonians (1 Thess. 2:9; 2 Thess. 3:8); still he asserts it (1 Cor. 9:12), If others be partakers of this power over you, are not we rather? Nevertheless we have not used this power. And (2 Thess. 3:9); Not because we have not power, hut to make ourselves an ensample unto you to follow us.

  §815. The establishment of an ordained ministry of religion, provided by their condition with means of support, is, as we have seen, recommended by the reason of the case and the analogy of the Jewish polity: and the inference in its favour is, in the above and other passages, so distinctly drawn and confirmed by Apostolical authority, that it is needless to dwell longer upon the subject. To promote or uphold the establishment of a paid ministry of religion; and to act as minister of such an establishment, are plainly proceedings in entire conformity with Christian duty.

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  §816. Besides teachers, religious ministers for other offices were very early appointed in the Christian Church. The Apostles had, at first, the office of distributing to the poor what the benevolence of the converts provided for them; but they soon found it convenient to appoint a special body of persons for this ministration. The Apostles said (Acts 6:1), It is not reason that we should leave the word of God, and serve tables…We will give ourselves continually to prayer and to the ministry of the word. And the Christians accordingly appointed seven Deacons or ministers, whom the Apostles ordained by praying and laying their hands upon them (verse 6). And this office continued to exist in the Church from that time. St. Paul in his directions to Timothy says (1 Tim. 3:8), The deacons must be grave, not double-tongued, not given to much wine, not greedy of filthy lucre: holding the mystery of the faith in pure conscience. And let these first be proved; then being found blameless, let them use the office of a deacon. And the office has come down uninterruptedly to our own time, as the first stage of the Christian ministry; although the different condition of the Christian community has materially altered its business in most places. Such an alteration has, however, taken place gradually, under the guidance of due ecclesiastical authority.

  §817. We also find in the New Testament Bishops mentioned, as the governors and teachers of Christian churches. They are joined with Deacons. (Phil. 1:1.), Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons. The term means Overseers; and in Acts 20:28, is so translated: where St. Paul applies it to the Presbyters of Miletus: Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers (ἐπισκόπους) to feed the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood. He appears also to apply the term to presbyters in writing to Titus. (Tit. 1:5), I left thee in Crete, that |149| thou shouldest set in order the things that are waiting, and ordain presbyters in every city, as I had appointed thee: if any be blameless…For a bishop must be blameless. Here the qualities requisite in a Bishop are also demanded for a Presbyter. Nearly the same requisites for a Bishop are enumerated 1 Timothy 3:1; where it is also said, This is a true saying, If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work. But in a short time this name, Bishop, became a fixed title of those who, after the Apostles, exercised the chief power in the Church; and the authority of each Bishop was limited to a special district or Diocese (διοίκησις, παροικία). “We are able to number up them,” says Irenaeus (lib. iii. c. 3), “who by the Apostles were made bishops.” James, “the brother of our Lord,” was bishop of Jerusalem; Timothy, of Ephesus; Titus, of Crete. Irenaeus says that the Apostles made Linus the first bishop of Rome, and Polycarp of Smyrna. Ignatius testifies that the Apostles made Evodius bishop of Antioch. “Nulla ecclesia sine Episcopo, has been,” says Gibbon (c. xv. §5, note), “a fact as well as a maxim, since the time of Tertullian and Irenaeus.” “After we have passed the difficulties of the first century,” he adds, “we find the Episcopal government universally established till it was interrupted by the republican genius of the Swiss and German reformers.” This being the case, it appears to be not too much to assert the Authority of Bishops, and the necessity of the office in the Church, to be a Catholic and Apostolic Institution.

  §818. Since we thus accept Episcopal Authority, as necessary by Catholic and Apostolic tradition, we are bound to the Duty of establishing and upholding it in our own Church. We are also bound to the Duty of obeying and reverencing the persons who are invested with this Dignity; and of spiritually profiting by their ministrations, according to their place and ours in the Church.

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Ordination.
  §819. It has already been shown that the selection of a special body of persons, for the ministry of Christian worship and instruction, is an institution of primitive authority and uninterrupted usage in the Church. It is proper to make some remarks on the character which belonged to persons thus selected, and the Ordinances by which they were invested with it.
  According to the religious views of many nations, the Priest does not merely pray with, but also in an especial sense for, the People. He not merely directs and gives form and utterance to the devotional emotions of the Laity, but he is an intermediate person between them and the Deity whom they address. Through him prayers find a more ready access; and by him, religious ministrations are performed, which the laity cannot perform without an offence against religion. This was the case also in the Jewish Church. The Priests and Levites alone were allowed to perform the sacrifices and other rites of religion. But the High Priest was in a more especial manner the intercessor for the People. (Heb. 5:1), The High Priest is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer the gifts and sacrifices to God…He ought, as for the people, so also for himself, to offer for sins. And no man taketh this honour to himself, except he that is called of God, as was Aaron.

  §820. But from this same Epistle to the Hebrews, we learn that the Jewish High Priest is, in the Christian dispensation, represented, not by the Christian Priest, but by Jesus Christ himself—who (Heb. 10:14) by one offering hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified. The Christian minister is never called ἱερεὺς, sacerdos, the proper designation of a priest who offers sacrifices; but πρεσβύτερος, presbyter (elder), which has been, in the progress |151| of modern languages, abbreviated. The Spanish word is presbitero, the Old French prestre, the German priester, the Anglo-Saxon preost, from whence the English priest. Christians in general, indeed, without distinction of Laity and Clergy, are called (1 Pet. 2:5 and 9), a holy priesthood (ἱεράτευμα), to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God by Jesus Christ; and a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a peculiar people. But this contradicts, rather than confirms, the notion of an anology between the Jewish priesthood and the Christian ministry. The Christian ministers are, by learned writers, considered as corresponding rather to the ministers of the Jewish Synagogues, than to the Levitical order.

  §821. Christian ministers derive their special character and authority from the presumed Commission of Christ and of the Church which he established. He himself chose of his disciples twelve, called them Apostles, and gave them extraordinary powers, as well as a special Mission (Matt. 10:1. Mark 3:13. Luke 6:12). After his Resurrection, and shortly before his Ascension, he repeated his Commission to them, and his promises of Divine Assistance. (Matt. 28:16. Mark 16:15. Luke 24:44. John 20:22). He breathed on them, and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted: and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained. And in parting with them, he lifted up his hands and blessed them. But in the time of the Apostles, others also had special Divine gifts. The persons who had special religious functions in the early Church are described by St. Paul (1 Cor. 12:28), as, first, Apostles; second. Prophets; third, Teachers; fourth, Workers of Miracles; fifth, those who had gifts of healing; sixth, those who spoke with tongues; seventh, those who interpret. In these cases, the Divine gift at once marked the appointment of the person, and his special office; but these cannot be considered as |152| examples of the manner in which it was intended that Christian ministers should be, in all ages of the Church, invested with the ministry, and directed to their proper business.

  §822. The first example of the appointment, or Ordination of persons to a religious office, in a manner which can be followed by succeeding ages, is the selection and ordination of the seven Deacons described Acts 6:6: They were set before the Apostles; and when they had prayed, they laid their hands upon them. In Acts 14:23, it is said of Paul and Barnabas that they ordained presbyters in every Church, and prayed with fasting, and commended them to the Lord, on whom they believed. The word here and elsewhere translated “ordained,” is χειροτονήσαντες, which is Understood to imply the laying on of hands, as in the case of the deacons. The laying on of hands as a mark of blessing was a very ancient Jewish custom. Jacob laid his hands upon Ephraim and Manasseh, when he blessed them (Gen. 48:14). Which custom Jesus Christ followed, when he blessed the little children (Matt. 19:15). It was also the action used when the Holy Ghost was communicated to persons baptized (Acts viii., 17, and 19:6). Timothy was ordained to the ministry in an especial manner by St. Paul laying his hands upon him (2 Tim. 1:6): Stir up the gift of God which is in thee by the putting on of my hands (διὰ τῆς ἐπιθεσέως τῶν χεῖρων μοῦ). But the presbyters also laid on their hands. (1 Tim. 4:14), Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery (διὰ προφητείας μετὰ ἐπιθεσέως τῶν χειρωῶν τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου). Accordingly, St. Paul, after giving directions to Timothy concerning Elders, adds (1 Tim. 5:22), Lay hands suddenly on no man. To Titus he gave commission to ordain presbyters in every city; but here, the word translated ordain, is καταστήσης, appoint. The practice of laying |153| on hands, in the Ordination of Presbyters, continued in the early Church. Not only the Bishop, who was the principal person in the performance of the ordinance, but the other Presbyters who were present, laid their hands on the head of the person to be ordained. But the term χειροτονια was applied to the bishop only (Constit. Apostol. viii. 28, πρεσβυτέρπς χειροθετεῖ, οὐ χειροτονεῖ).

  §823. From the early times of the Church to the time of the Reformation, Bishops alone had a right to ordain Priests. In England, Sweden, Denmark, Ordination is only performed by Bishops. And even some of the protestants, who have rejected episcopal government, give the right of ordination to the Superintendent, and commonly only to the General Superintendent, or higher officers of their Ecclesiastical Polity. Those protestants who are specially called the Reformed (the followers of Calvin), hold that every minister may ordain. But in the larger churches of this kind, in Switzerland, Holland, and Scotland, there is a certain Order of Ordination by the Seniors, Class-leaders, Synodal Superintendents, or the like. Only the Presbyterians, Independents, and other Dissenters in England, reject the imposition of hands, and allow every minister to ordain others (1 Augusti. Christ. Arch. B. xi. c. 3).

  §824. It is an ancient requirement of the Church that every minister must be ordained to a special local Ministry. The priest was ordained as the Pastor of a particular Place. The appointment to the special place was called a Title:—and the Rule was, Neminem absolute et sine titulo esse ordinandum.

  §825. The appointment of a minister to any particular place or Parish, was often in the hands of the principal owner of the land. He was the Patron of the Living. His was the Advowson (Advocatio). Of course the Patron could |154| not appoint to the living anyone except a person already in Holy Orders. The Right of Patronage became often an appendage of private property; and was bought and sold, like other appendages of property.

  §826. It was forbidden in the Church to obtain any spiritual office by purchase, gifts, or promises; and this offence was called Simonia, Simony, from its supposed resemblance to the offence of Simon Magus; who (Acts 8:18) offered the apostles money, saying, Give me also this power, that on whosoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost. In the Apostolical Canons, which, though not what they pretend to be, are Christian precepts of an early date, it is said (Canon Apost. xxviii.), “If any Bishop shall obtain this dignity by means of money, or any Priest or Deacon, let both him and the person who ordained him be utterly excommunicated, as Simon Magus was by me Peter.” The condemnation of Simony has been continued to modern times, and adopted in our own Laws; and it is plain that not merely the sacredness of spiritual things, but justice and decency, are violated by the sale of spiritual offices.

  §827. The Sale of Advowsons, of which we have just spoken, may appear to be at variance with the prohibition of the Sale of Spiritual Offices. But this is not so: for the spiritual office, the Order of Priest or Deacon, is not bought or sold. The Right of Private Patronage implies rather a sacred aspect in Property, than a secular aspect in the Ministry. The principal Lord of the land had originally a religious, as well as a civil Duty, to his tenants. And when the Advowson is separated from the local property, it still implies a religious Duty in those who hold it.
  Yet the Laws against Simony, and the Right of Private Patronage, sometimes appear to be in conflict. Thus a clergyman may, as well as any other person, purchase the |155| Advowson of a Living. But he may not purchase it so as to secure himself the next turn only.

  §828. The manner in which Religious Ministers, and the Property by which they are supported, are protected and regulated by the State, is one of the most important features in the different Polity of different Nations. It is their Ecclesiastical Polity. Of this subject we shall have to treat in the next Book.

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Book V. Polity: The Duties of the State

Chapter I. The Rights of the State

  §829. We have already (§465-§475) spoken of The State, as a Conception applicable to every Community of Men, among whom Rights and Obligations really exist. The State is the Origin of the Law, and of the powers which execute the Law and hence, is the Source of the reality of Rights. The State is Supreme, or Sovereign over all persons and authorities within it. The State is single and permanent, while its subjects are many and mutable. We have also seen that the State so conceived is a Moral Agent: it has Duties; and among these Duties, we have been led to notice especially the Duty of Educating the people (§474). We have now to consider more fully the Duties of the State in general, and this Duty of Education in particular.

  §830. In the case of individuals. Duties are extensions of Obligations, and Obligations imply Rights. The same is true of States; and therefore we have to consider in the first place the Rights and Obligations of States.
  We have already spoken of the rights of Government, and the Obligation of Obedience on the part of the governed (§206). These Rights are Rights of the State. It is from the |160| State, that all persons placed in Magistracies and Offices of Command derive their Right to the obedience of subordinate persons. It is as representing or possessing the Authority of the State, that they are Persons in Authority. The Obedience which is rendered to the Magistrate, is rendered to the Law, and to the State, which is the Source of the Law. The State is the origin of Rights in general, as we have said; but it is the origin of other Rights, by having the Rights of Government. Other Rights, as Rights of Property, it assigns to its subjects, the Rights of Government, it asserts to itself.

  §831. The relation between the Rights of individuals and the Rights of the State, has been variously presented by different Moralists. Some, as we have said (§469), have considered the Rights of the State as formed by the addition of the Rights of Individuals. According to this doctrine, individuals constitute a State, by uniting themselves, and contributing to a common stock the rights which they naturally possess; sharing this stock of Rights among themselves by common consent, and establishing Officers and Laws to carry their agreement into effect.
  We have already (§469) pointed out the untenable character of this Doctrine. Rights cannot exist without the State. Individual Rights cannot be supposed anterior to the State; and thus. State Rights cannot be hypothetically constructed out of Individual Rights. But further; there are some State Rights in particular, which are more evidently, from special considerations, not aggregates of individual Rights. These peculiar State Rights we shall proceed to describe.

  §832. The State has a Right to the National Territory. Individuals derive their Rights to their special Property in Land, from the State, according to the Law of the Land; but they could not derive those Special Rights from the State, except the State had a general Right to the whole. |161| An Englishman has a Right to his landed Property in England, because the Law of England gives it him. A Frenchman has a Right to his landed Property in France, because the Law of France gives it him. But this assumes that the English State, which speaks its Will in the English Law, has a Right to the Soil of England; and in like manner, the French State is assumed to have a Right to the Soil of France. An Englishman may possess land in France; but this is, still, by the Law of France; and implies the Right of the French State to the French Territory. There can be no property in Land, except what is derived from the State in which the Land belongs.

  §833. We may illustrate this further. Suppose any County of England were conceived as detached from the State; as no longer owing obedience to the English State, or deriving Rights from it. What Right, on this supposition, have the inhabitants of the County to the land on which they live? It may be said, that they have the Right of Possession. But Present Possession can confer no Right, on such a supposition. Present Possession is a fact, which may be succeeded, at any moment, by the opposite fact of Dispossession; and then the Right is gone. Suppose the inhabitants of this County to be dispossessed violently by a body of new settlers from any place, at home or abroad; of what wrong can they complain? When dispossessed, they have no longer the Right of present Possession. If they urge the Right of past Possession, how is this a Right, and by what laws regulated,when the Law of the Land is rejected? How have they themselves acknowledged the Right, either of present or past Possession? Their ancestors, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, seized the Land by violence, disregarding both present or past Possession. This historical event is a good foundation for the Right of Property, if we assume as men, in thinking of Rights, always do assume, that a population, |162| organized as a State, have a Right to the territory which they occupy: for the imperfect and undecided organization of the English State, which, in the times of the struggles of the Saxons, Danes, and Normans, might leave questions of Right doubtful, has long since passed away. But if men reject this foundation of Rights, the ancient Wrongs, from which they derive their claims, will prevent them from consistently complaining of Wrongs, if, in modern times, acts of violence be done to their damage, like the ancient acts of violence of which they now enjoy the profit. The only good ground of the complaint of Wrong, when the Right of landed Property is violated, is the Right of the State to the Soil of the Country, and the Will of the State expressed by the Law of the Land.

  §834. The Principle just referred to; that a Community, organized as a State, has a Right to possess their Territory; and the Individuals cannot acquire Property in Land, except by derivation from a State, is often carried further; thus showing how entirely the Principle is accepted. It is maintained, for instance, that a Civilized State, on discovering a country of Savages, may take possession of it; and that the possession of the Savages must be regulated according to the Laws of the Civilized State. But these are questions of International Law, which we shall not here discuss.

  §835. Another Right of the State is the Right of making War on other States. This Right is necessary to the existence of the State, as a distinct and independent agent, which is sovereign over all its subjects within it, and protects them against all harm from without. If its subjects be injured, or its independence assailed, by a foreign State, it has no resource but remonstrance, which may inevitably lead to War; since States have no common tribunal before which injury done by one to the other can be inquired into, and redress given.

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  §836. This Right of making War is not a Right arising from the combination of the Rights of individuals. England has a right to make war on France, on due grounds; but no one or more Englishmen have a Right to make war on any selected number of Frenchmen. In the case of a National War, individuals commit acts, which would be murder and robbery, if they were not committed under the Authority of the State. It is true, there have been rude times in Europe (and there may still exist such in other countries), when the Right of Private War subsisted. But even in these times, this Right did not exist as an original Right of individuals; but as a Right given by the Law, and limited by the Law; and if anyone used violence out of the limits of the Law, he was treated as a malefactor. The Right of Private War was especially subordinate to, and limited by, the Right of National War. So far as sovereignty had its power, the Sovereign, when he made War upon another Sovereign, forbade Private Wars among his Subjects and forbade Private Treaties of Peace with the Subjects of the enemy. Thus, even in the times of Private War, the Right of the State to make National War was the Fundamental and Paramount Right. But we must further add, that a State, which recognizes Private War, is very imperfectly organized. Under such a State, men possess in a very incomplete degree, the Rights, of Protection from Violence, Security in their Property, and the like. As the Nation more entirely assumes the genuine attributes of a State, the right of Private War declines, till it is extinct. But the Right of National War, during this progress of improvement, undergoes no diminution. The most completely organized State possesses this Right at least as fully as the Sovereign of a body of Feudal Lords ever did. And thus, this Right belongs to the State, as a State; and not in virtue of any mode of composition, by which the State may be supposed to have assumed its existence.

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  §837. We may remark further, that the Right of the State to the National Territory, of which we have already spoken, necessarily carries with it the Right of making War, when the National Territory is infringed, if no redress or defence can be had in any other Way. The Right of each man to his Property, is realized and enforced by the power of the State; but the Right of each State to its Territory, if contest arise, can be realized and enforced only by Treaty; or if that fail, by the power of the Sword. And thus, a State has, as one of its characteristic attributes, the Right of making War on Other States, on due occasions.

  §838. Another Right peculiarly a State Right, not derivable from any supposable Rights of individuals, is the Right of Bodily Punishment, and especially the Right of Capital Punishment. In exercising the Right of War, the State necessarily assumes a Right to put in peril, and to expose to destruction, the lives of its subjects, who serve it as soldiers. But in that case, it is not that the State inflicts the blow, but that it cannot avert it, under the circumstances. In the case of Capital Punishment, the State itself takes away the Life of its subject, inflicting a sudden and violent death. The Right of doing this is universally assumed in States. And it is assumed necessarily. Without the exercise of this Right, the State could not discharge its office. Its business is, to give reality to the Rights of men in Society. But Rights cannot have reality, except they be as real as the other springs of human action. In order that Rights may be real for me, the Rights of another man must be as real in my eyes as the Objects of Desire. To each man, the Obligations of other men must be realities, as well as his own Appetite, Anger, Avarice, or Ambition; the former must influence his hopes and fears in the same manner, stimulate and restrain him in the same manner, as the latter. But the highest and most real of the objects of men’s hopes and fears are Life and Death, accompanied with |165| Honour and Shame. A violent and ignominious Death fills the full measure of the object of man’s fear. The force of Desire, Appetite, Anger, and the like, is fully expressed, when a man loves objects as his life, and dreads them as such a death; but it is not fully expressed by anything short of this. Hence, Rights and Obligations will not be real in Society, to the same extent as other objects of action are real, if they be not sanctioned by the prospect of Life and Death, as depending upon the observance or violation of Obligations. If the sanctions of Rights stop short of this, there will be some region of human action, in which the lawless springs of action are not balanced: some province of human nature, in which the extreme forms of passion, appetite, anger, and the like, are not governed by any efficient authority.

  §839. The necessity of the Right of Capital Punishment being vested in the State, will also appear from the following considerations. If the State do not possess this Right, such a Right may be assumed by another body of persons, who by that very assumption become more powerful than the State, and may seize all the powers of the State. If there were no Capital Punishment for Treason, and the like crimes; an association of men might arm themselves, and, making death the punishment for opposing them, might compel the citizens to obey them, and to disobey the legal authorities. For what would other inferior punishments avail, to avert such a result? Who will be found ready, unarmed, to inflict imprisonment or exile on a body of armed and resolute men? It is plain, therefore, that, in extreme cases at least. Capital Punishments are necessary to the existence of the State; and therefore, the right of inflicting such Punishments must belong to the State.

  §840. The Right of Capital Punishment is a special and original State Right, and does not arise from any combination |166| of individual Rights. This Right cannot be conceived to be a Right arising from a common consent, and given to the State by an understood compact between it and individuals; each person conveying to the State a Right over his own life, in case of his committing a capital crime. For, in the first place, the assumption that man, as an individual, has such a Right, is contrary to common Morality. If a man have a Right over his own life, he may cast off life when he pleases, and Suicide is no sin. And even if it were allowed that a man has a Right over his own life; the further assumption, that he has transferred this Right to the State, by a transaction of which he was unconscious, and in which he had no choice, is so extravagant, that it cannot afford a satisfactory basis for Rights. Thus, we reject the notion of this Right arising from consent or compact, and consider it as a special and original State Right.

  §841. Again, there is another Right which is exercised by all States; the Right of imposing Oaths; for instance, Oaths of Testimony, and Oaths of Office. This Right, also, is necessarily exercised by States. Such Oaths identify the Citizen’s Obligations with his Duties. As a Witness, to give true testimony; as a Judge, to administer justice; are always Duties. By means of Oaths, these Duties become Obligations imposed by a distinct Contract, and accepted by a solemn Engagement. And if there be not this identity of Duty and Obligation in general, the State cannot subsist. For the State consists of men, who are moral beings; and who cannot, without an intolerable violation of their nature, go on continually discharging Obligations, which have no connexion with their Duties. The essential part of the business of the State must be regarded with the solemnity which belongs to moral acts; otherwise, the State itself cannot be a permanent reality, in the minds of moral men. And, as we have already said |167| (§677), the natural way of acknowledging and marking this moral solemnity, among religious men, is by acting, and declaring that we will act, as in the presence of God; that is, by taking an Oath to act rightly. The thoughtlessness of men, and the excuses which, in common life, they make for falsehood, deceit, injustice, partiality, inconsistency, passion, and the like, are such, that it is requisite, for the essential business of a State, to demand of them another frame of mind than that which is usual in their common intercourse. If the Witness were to give his Evidence, the Jury, their Verdict, the Judge, his Sentence, with the carelessness and perversion of truth and right, which men often allow themselves in common conversation; the administration of justice would be impossible. If the Witness told his tale, and the Judge gave his opinion, with the levity which prevails at a convivial meeting, how could a moral citizen bear a part in a court of Justice? On such occasions, then, men must be grave, must be thoughtful, and must engage to be so. The occasion and the acts must be marked as solemn j and this, as we have said, is necessarily done, among religious men, by the Witness narrating, and the Judge deciding, as in the presence of God. And the occasion is marked as solemn, by each person declaring that he does this; that is, by the Oaths of the Witness, and of the Jurymen, taken at the time of the trial; and by the Oath of Office, which the Judge has previously taken.

  §842. The necessity of the Right of administering Oaths being vested in the State, will also appear from the following considerations. If the State do not exercise this Right, a body of the Citizens, bound together by their common belief in God and in his Judgments, may administer, to each other, Oaths to cooperate in their common purposes; and may thus, when their purposes become inconsistent with, or hostile to, the existing Government, overthrow the |168| Government, and take the Authority of the State into their own hands. For a State, not claiming a moral reality for its acts, by means of religious solemnities, could not stand against a great body of citizens bound together by religion. If such citizens be brought before the tribunals for hostility to the government; the witnesses, the jury, the judge, may be of the religious party; and, not being bound to their official act by religion, they will act so as not to be the effective agents of laws which they deem unjust and cruel. And if the laws be still enforced, by the agency of citizens acting without any acknowledged tie of religion, the laws must soon cease to be regarded as just; for morality cannot long subsist in men’s minds without religion. When this has taken place, and the laws are no longer supported by an opinion of their general justice, the empire of the law becomes the empire of mere force, which the moral nature of man will not allow to continue long among men.
  Thus the ground of the necessity of Oaths in a State is, that Morality cannot long subsist in men’s minds without Religion; that for the efficacy of religion, a recognition of it by the State is requisite; and that this recognition is especially requisite on certain solemn occasions, such as judicial proceedings, the assumption of important State offices, and the like.

  §843. If it be said that Religion may be efficacious in making men true and just on solemn occasions, without being publicly recognized and referred to; we reply, that though this may be so with some persons, the State can never know which persons are, and which are not, of this number, without the use of some Formula referring to Religion: nor can it be known, without the use of some such Formula, whether any particular person considers the occasion a solemn one or not.

  §844. The State, therefore, necessarily has the Right |169| of administering Oaths of Testimony, of Office, and the like. And this State Right, like the others, is a special and original Right of the State, not derived from any Combination of individual Rights. For though men, in a Contract or other transaction, may be willing to accept Oaths from one another; no one man can be conceived as having any Right to impose an Oath upon another man. If there be any difficulty in ascribing to the State a Right to question or limit a man’s actions on account of his religious belief or religious sentiments, there must be a much greater difficulty in ascribing such a Right to any individual. And as no individual could have any portion of such a Right, no collection of Individuals could have the Right: and the State Right to impose Oaths cannot arise from the combination of the Rights of the Individuals, of whom the State consists.

  §845. It may perhaps be said, that an assemblage of religious individuals, associating themselves for their mutual advantage, might exclude from their body, all who would not, upon due occasions, make certain religious declarations. And this might be so; but we cannot conceive this as the origin of the Right of the State to impose Oaths. For to imagine this, would be to suppose the State to be, not only a voluntary association of individuals; but of individuals in whose minds religious belief and religious sentiments were already established, and who were drawn together by their religious sympathies. But this is an impossible supposition: for we cannot conceive Religion without Morality, or Morality without Society already established. We know that the State does not derive its religious belief from the spontaneous religious sympathies of individuals; but that individuals derive their religious sentiments, in a great measure, from the Society in which they are born and live. Men bind themselves by Oaths, under the direction of the State, not |170| as if it were part of a social contract that they should do so; but looking upon the State as a Divine appointment, and a channel through which the forms of the most solemn engagements must necessarily be derived.

  §846. We are thus led to reckon, as Rights of States, besides the general Rights of Government, these four: the Right to the National Territory; the Right of War and Peace; the Right of Capital Punishment; and the Right of imposing Oaths. These Rights are all necessary to the continued existence of States; and, as we have seen, they are not derivative or cumulative attributes, but original and peculiar. We have called them State Rights, in order to distinguish them from Individual Rights.
To Individual Rights correspond Obligations; and it may be asked whether the State has any Obligations corresponding to its Rights. The answer to this Question will occupy the next Chapter.

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Chapter II. The Obligations of the State

  §847. The State is, as we have said, the Source of Law and of Authority, and the Realizer of individual Rights. The State Rights exist, in order that the State may discharge this its office. And hence, the Obligation corresponding to the State Rights is, that the State shall he the State; that it shall deliver and administer Laws, and thus realize Rights. And this it must do, not for a short time merely; not for one generation only; but permanently, and with a prospect of permanence. Hence, to provide for this permanence is an Obligation of the State. This we may describe as the Obligation of Self-preservation. |171|

  §848. We more frequently bear the Duty of Self-preservation ascribed to the State: but we shall, in general, use the term Obligation in speaking of this subject: not only because Obligation is the term corresponding to Right; but also, because this Obligation is enforced by a real Sanction, as individual obligations are: for if the State do not fulfill this Obligation of Self-preservation, it will not be preserved, but will be dissolved, and will cease to be a State. If, however, we wish to retain the term Duty in this case, we may speak of the Duty of Self-preservation as the Lower Duty of a State, in comparison with other Duties, such as the Duty of rendering its subjects moral and intelligent, which are its Higher Duties.

  §849. This State Obligation of Self-preservation divides itself into several branches; related in some measure to the different State Rights of which we have spoken. Those Rights are assigned to the State for certain purposes; and the State is under Obligations to employ them for those purposes.
  The Right of making War is a necessary appendage to the Right to the National Territory; and is to be used, when necessary, for the purpose of defending the Nation from every intrusion of an enemy upon its soil; and also, for the purpose of protecting the citizens from all other violence and injustice, inflicted by strangers. The State is obliged to take measures which may have such an effect; and this is the Obligation of National Defence. All individual Rights stand within the fence of the National Right; and the State is bound to keep this fence entire and substantial. For this purpose, the State is bound to provide an Army, or the means of raising an Army, when the need arises; and to provide the means also of supplying its Army with Officers, and with Munitions of War. The State is bound, also, to keep a watchful eye |172| upon the movements of other States; and if it sees them preparing any evil for itself, to avert the danger by timely precautions. For this purpose. Negotiations with other States may be requisite; and hence. Embassies, Treaties, and the like. Such negotiations, in the discussions to which they lead, necessarily assume the existence of Rights and Obligations between Nations; and thus, we are referred to an International Jus, of which we shall hereafter have to speak. The Obligation of National Defence is the first Obligation of a Nation, for it is necessary to the existence of a Nation. Without the fulfillment of this Obligation, a State cannot exist, even in the most imperfect form. A State which used no means of defending itself, would soon be blotted out of the Map, by the pressure of surrounding States.

  §850. The next branch of the State’s Obligation of Self-preservation is the Obligation of upholding Law. The last-mentioned obligation regarded foes without the nation; this regards citizens within it. In the former case, we spoke of maintaining the external fence which protects the National Existence; we now speak of keeping up the internal barriers of individual Rights. These Rights are to be realized by the Law; and except they are made real by the enforcement of the Law, they cease to exist, and the citizens cease to be citizens. In this case, the State is destroyed by the dissolution of its internal organization, as completely as if it were obliterated by external violence.

  §851. There are, however, various degrees of such Disorganization, according as the Laws are enforced with more or less vigour and steadiness. Looking merely to the Self-preservation of the State, if the Rights of the more Powerful Class of the Citizens be upheld for them, the State may long subsist, although there are other Classes whose Rights are neglected, or gradually encroached upon. That to do |173| this, is a violation of the Duty of a State, we shall hereafter see. But that the long-continued existence of a State is not inconsistent with the continued prevalence of illegal oppression of some classes of the community, the history of many nations abundantly shows. Still, so far as such practices prevail, the organization of a State is imperfect; its functions do not proceed in a healthy manner. The imperfect or unequal administration of the laws may not be the immediate Death of the State, but it is a grievous Disease, however long it may be protracted. A State, in order to preserve its full vitality, must make the laws to be respected; and respected alike by all classes, high and low; rich and poor. So far as power and wealth can shield their possessors from the hand of the law, such men are placed above the law; and the State has a tendency to fall to pieces, and to cease to be a living State.

  §852. Another branch of the Obligation of Self-preservation belonging to States is the Obligation of repressing Sedition. By Sedition, is meant any course of action separating the citizens from the State, and transferring to a Rival Body the obedience due to the State. When this Rival Body places its strength in external force, it is an Armed Sedition; when it rests its pretensions upon defects in the Right of the Governor, it is a Political Sedition; when it draws men together by their religious sympathies, it is a Religious Sedition. Of whatever kind the Sedition be, it tends, so far as it attains its object, to a destruction of the State. The establishment of a Rival Body, whose officers and laws are obeyed, rather than those of the State, necessarily interferes with and disturbs, and in its natural result, puts a stop to, the functions of government. In this case, as in the others just mentioned, the Life of the State, the body politic, is destroyed; and as its destruction, from defect of national defence, may be represented as |174| death by External Violence, and its destruction from defective administration of the laws, as death by Internal Disease; so the destruction of the State by sedition, may be compared to the fatal effect of an Excrescence which grows in the body, and draws to itself the nutriment which should supply the vital powers.

  §853. It is a part of the Obligation of Self-preservation belonging to a State, to suppress Sedition, so as to avert this tendency. And this Obligation has always been acknowledged and acted on by all States. The highest form of Sedition is Treason. This, in the English Monarchy, is defined to be an offence committed against the security of the king or kingdom; as to compass the death of the king, or to levy war against him, or to adhere to his enemies, or give them aid, within the realm or without. In all monarchies, such crimes have been visited with the severest punishments. But in other forms of government, no less than in monarchies, attempts to overthrow the existing Government have universally been treated as Crimes of the highest order. In free States, attempts to crush the Freedom of the People, have been commonly considered as no less atrocious crimes, than attacks upon the Sovereign Authorities: and where the usual course of law has been insufficient to resist and punish such attempts, extraordinary acts, on the part of some members of the State, have been often and generally looked upon as necessary results of the State’s obligation to preserve its free condition; such acts were Tyrannicide, and the putting to Death, or sending into Exile ambitious men in ancient times; such acts have been the Impeachment of statesmen in England for attempting to render the royal power absolute.

  §854. The word Treason (trahison, proditio) implies not only hostile intentions, but fraud, and breach of trust and generally, treachery, a word of the same origin. These |175| notions are, in this general manner, combined with the notion of hostility to the State, or the Sovereign; because Fidelity to the State, and to the Sovereign, are reckoned among the duties of all citizens. A man who joins with strangers, in harming his own Country, is considered as breaking those bands of national duty and affection which, in their hold upon good men, come next after the ties of family duty and affection; and hence, is looked upon with the same kind of sentiments with which we look upon a man who joins with strangers in harming his father or his mother. A man who is hostile to his country may, it would seem, be treated as a public enemy; he deserves not to receive the benefit of his country’s laws, or to be protected in his property or other rights. And hence, the existing Government, which, in order to justify and protect its own existence, must identify itself with the Country, treats its own enemies as the enemies of their country, and punishes them as Traitors.
  This view shows itself in the distinction made between domestic and foreign enemies; for foreigners coming into the country in a hostile manner are to be dealt with as an enemy; and if taken, executed by martial law. A foreigner cannot be executed for Treason, say the English Lawyers, for he owes no allegiance to the King.

  §855. Sedition aims at its objects by Conspiracy, the mutual understanding established as to the Plot, or Plan of proceeding; and by Rebellion, the open use of armed force against the Government. If a Government do not put down Conspirators and Rebels, it must soon cease to be a Government; the State, as represented by the Government, must perish. And thus, as we have said, the repression of Armed Sedition is an Obligation incumbent upon the Government, as essential to its Self-preservation.

  §856. The repression of Political Sedition is, in some of its forms, generally acknowledged as a part of the State’s |176| Obligation of Self-preservation. For instance, if a man declare and maintain that the king is an usurper, and has no title to the crown, such discourse must be conceived to have a tendency to incite the king’s subjects to rebellion, and is criminal. The English law makes it a grave misdemeanour to print or publish Seditious Libels against the King or his Government. But the genius of free governments, which tolerates a considerable difference of opinions with regard to the justice and wisdom of the acts of the Government, will not allow everything said against the Government and its acts to be treated as Seditious. Accordingly, the English Law permits a man to discuss the measures adopted by the King and his Ministers; but requires this discussion to be conducted fairly, temperately, and with decency, without attributing corrupt motives.

  §857. The repression of Religious Sedition is, under some of its forms, evidently necessary, as the only means of Self-preservation which the Government can find; for instance, where the Seditious Party teaches, on Religious grounds, obedience to a Supremacy, the rival of the Sovereign Power in the State; or where the Party teaches, on religious grounds, resistance to the Laws. The rival Supremacy may be claimed for a religious Body or Person residing within the nation; in which case it is more plainly of a seditious character. If, within the boundary of the State, there be claimed for a foreign potentate, or other person, a Supremacy rivaling that of the Sovereign, the offence has much of the character of Treason. But still, since the obedience claimed for the religious Supremacy will, it may be supposed, be demanded through the means of a religious organization existing in the country itself, a Religious, will not differ much from a Political Sedition; except that the opinions by which the Seditious are bound together, will exercise their influence upon men’s minds in a different way in the |177| one case and in the other. The amount of the necessity for repressing a Religious Sedition of this kind, will depend much upon the nature of the rival Supremacy which is claimed. If what is asserted by the Party be merely a Supremacy in spiritual matters. Self-preservation will not require the State to suppress the Party; provided the State have such a control over the organization of the Party, as to confine the authority of the religious ministers to its proper spiritual province. This stipulation is necessary; for the influence of religious ministers is, in the course of human events, almost inevitably extended from spiritual to temporal concerns. And if, in consequence of the State having too little control over the religious authorities subordinate to the rival Supremacy, the spiritual Supremacy which is asserted, interfere with and overpower the temporal Sovereignty; the State must perish. We have spoken of a Sedition in general, as an Excrescence, which diseases the body politic by drawing to it the nutriment which should support the bodily life. Retaining the same image, we may say that a Seditious Religious Party in the Social Body, is a Spiritual Excrescence; which, though not immediately visible in a material form, may destroy the health; as a vehement and ungoverned train of thoughts may affect the texture of the brain, and produce the most fatal disease.

  §858. If it be questioned whether the State have the Right to take measures in order to repress a dangerous Religious Party, the question may be easily answered, on the principles already laid down. The State is the only Authority by which the Rights of citizens are realized and upheld. It may make this, its support of the Rights of its subjects, dependent upon any conditions which its own preservation requires. If there be a rival Spiritual Authority, the State may very reasonably demand from a citizen a renunciation of the rival Spiritual Power’s temporal Authority within the |178| national territory. If the citizen refuse to make such a renunciation, he has no in justice done him, if he be not allowed either the Right of property in land, or any other Right. For all these Rights exist only through that temporal Sovereignty which he refuses to acknowledge. If he will not give his Allegiance, he cannot justly complain that he does not receive Protection.
  There is therefore no valid jural objection to the repression of a dangerous Religious Sedition. Whether there be, in any case, moral objections to measures of repression, arising from the harmlessness of the party; or practical difficulties arising from the extent to which the Sedition has gone; are questions to be decided by the circumstances of each particular case.

  §859. If the Religious Sedition take the form of teaching Resistance to the Laws simply, without setting up any definite rival authority, its repression is included in the common administration of the Law, and in the punishment of those who resist the law. But the possibility of such religious teaching, and the examples of it which have appeared, make it, if not an Obligation, at least a Duty of that State, to give to its citizens a religious teaching which may tend to prevent the prevalence of an opinion of the opposition of Religion and Law; rather than to depend entirely on the measures which may be employed to repress the Seditions arising out of such an opinion. But the consideration of the Duties of States, and of the Duty of religious Education among the rest, will come under our notice hereafter.

  §860. One form of Error respecting Religion has been made punishable by most States, on the ground of its being an opinion dangerous to all government: namely, Atheism; the Denial of the truth of all Religion, and therefore of all religious Sanctions of Morality. We have |179| already shown (§841) that all States have claimed, and must claim, the Right of exacting from men declarations in the most solemn form in which they can be given; and the form employed has always contained a reference to the existence and providence of God. A man who denies, and teaches men to deny, the existence of God, may be considered, so far as he is successful, as setting up a Sedition which makes all continued Government impossible. But whether this Sedition is so dangerous as to require the Laws to make such opinions criminal; or whether their prevalence and danger may not better be prevented by Religious teaching, of which we have spoken, as a Duty of the State; will be better examined hereafter.

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Chapter III. The Moral Character of the State

  §861. We have spoken of the State, as having Obligations; and we have also referred to its Duties (§473). The questions naturally occur; since the Actions and Thoughts of States are necessarily compounded of the Actions and Thoughts of individual Persons, upon what Persons these Obligations and Duties fall, and in what manner? We may make a few remarks on this subject.

  §862. The Governors of the State act for the State; and upon them the Obligations of the State fall; they fall upon the Sovereign ultimately; but, in the first instance, upon the Officers and Magistrates of the State, who receive their Authority from the Sovereign, and are held by him to the discharge of their Official Duties. The Obligations of National Defence, of upholding the Laws, and of suppressing Sedition, all belong, in a general form, to the Executive Department |180| of the Government (§210). But the first of these Obligations, in its details, is devolved upon the Army and its Commanders; the second, upon the Magistrates and Judges; as is also the third; and in some measure, so far as the prevention of Religious Sedition is concerned, upon the Religious Teachers of the Nation. The State Obligations fall upon the persons, who occupy these offices respectively, as Obligations, and therefore, as Duties. It is the Duty of the Sovereign to provide for the defence of the country; it is the Duty of his Ministers, and of the Estates of the Realm, to advise and aid him in this purpose. It is the Duty of the Commander of the Forces to use, for this purpose, with his best ability, all the means which are placed in his hands: it is the Duty of every military Officer and Soldier, according to his condition, to exert zeal, skill, and courage, in this cause. And the like may be said of the other departments of the State. It is the Duty of all Persons in Judicial positions, according to their position, to join in administering the laws; and of all Magistrates and their Officers, to do their part in carrying judicial decisions into effect, and by other appropriate means preserving the Order of the Community. We have already said (§278) that each man has the Duties of his Station; and among the most distinct of such Duties, are those which fall upon each man, as his share in the fulfillment of the Obligations of the State.

  §863. The State has Duties as well as Obligations (§474). Thus all States have Duties of Truthfulness and Honesty: they ought to observe their Treaties and pay their Debts. They have Duties of Justice and Humanity: they ought not to oppress or enslave the unoffending inhabitants of other countries. They have Duties of Self-culture: they ought to learn and to adopt true Moral and Political Doctrines. Some of these Duties will be acknowledged by all Moralists as Duties of States; and thus, the |181| moral character of the State as an agent capable of Duties, cannot be denied. States may act rightly or wrongly; and hence their actions are subject to the Supreme Rule of Action, the distinction of right and wrong.
The Question then occurs, as we have said, Upon whom do the Duties of the State fall, and in what manner?

  §864. It is evident that they must fall upon the Governors and Administrators of the State, for these act for the State. They fall upon these persons as Duties. It is the Duty of the Governors of the State to be truthful, honest, just, humane, rational, on the part of the State. But it must be observed, that this is something different from the Duty of being truthful, honest, just, humane, rational, as individuals. The actions, by which these qualities are exerted, on the part of the State, must be the acts of the State, and not merely of the individual. The Governor of a State, in order that, on the part of the State, he may be faithful to the Treaties which the State has made, must be able to direct its armies and navies, to shape its commercial and fiscal regulations, as the terms of the Treaties stipulate, in order to be honest on the part of the State, he must be able to obtain, from the citizens, money to pay the State debts. In order to be able to put an end to acts of violence or oppression on the part of the State, he must be able to persuade, or to force those citizens to desist, who are concerned in such acts. In order that he may, on the part of the State, learn and adopt true Doctrines, he must be able to induce the other Members of the Government, or other Representatives of the Will and Thought of the State (if there be such Representatives), to join with him in the adoption of such Doctrines. The individual disposition, intentions, and convictions, of any man or set of men, whatever be their position in the State, are not necessarily those of the State itself. There is and must be a difference between what |182| Statesmen feel and think, in their private capacity, and their sentiments and opinions as Statesmen. Their designs, as virtuous Statesmen, may be very different from their wishes, as virtuous individuals. For as virtuous Statesmen, they can design only such things as the State can perform with safety, consistency, and a due regard to the claims of its own subjects. A man who is truthful, honest, just, humane, and reasonable as an individual, will endeavour, if he be a Statesman, to be also truthful, honest, just, humane, and reasonable on the part of the State. But he will often find many impediments, which will prevent his directing the acts of the State, in such a manner as to conform to the Duties of Truth, Justice, and Benevolence, and to the dictates of Reason. He has to overcome rooted habits, vested interests, ancient prejudices, and natural diversities of opinion, among those whose consent is necessary to action. He has to guide himself by a due regard to the past actions of the State, and the nature of its moral agency, as distinct from that of individuals. These are difficulties, not arising merely from accident, or from something wrong, but necessarily belonging to the nature of the case. For instance, if the humane Statesman finds that the citizens of his State hold in cruel captivity a population of predial slaves; he will wish and endeavour to abolish this slavery. But however absolute his power, he cannot do this by a word of his mouth, or a stroke of his pen; by a command, or a law. He must provide, for the owners of the slaves, compensation for the loss which they suffer by their emancipation. He must prepare the slaves for the safe exercise of their liberty. If he do not do this, he obeys the impulse of his humanity at the expense of justice, and in neglect of that prudence which is requisite for the right direction of his humanity. For to emancipate slaves, on grounds of humanity, by a law which should throw all the loss upon |183| the owners, would be unjust: since the inhumanity of the previous law, which protected such property, was the sin of the State, and not of the owners. Moreover, slavery, as we have already seen (§520), has existed, pure or modified, in many countries; and the perception of the inhumanity of the practice has been very slowly unfolded in men’s minds. Where slavery exists, it is, by a large part of the community, regarded with favour, or with indifference. And this prejudice the Statesman has to overcome, so as to carry with him, in his views, the Representatives of the State, if the constitution of the Country require that he should have their cooperation in his acts. And thus, the humanity of the Statesman, acting for the State, may often take a very different course, and especially, must often work in a more slow and gradual manner, than the humanity which belongs to him as an individual; and the same must be the case with other moral qualities.

  §865. And this is the case with those acts of a State which indicate a Moral Progress; so is it, also, the case with those acts which mark an Intellectual Progress. In these also, though the Statesman thinks, and reasons, and discovers, and adopts truths, for the State, he will often be compelled to adopt truths, on the part of the State, much more slowly, and much more imperfectly, than he himself acquires and professes them in his own mind. He may, in his own thoughts, see the truth clearly, and follow it rapidly; but the State, although in a great degree represented by him, will seem to lag behind him in the intellectual race; and cannot, in its public acts, display the intellectual clearness and quickness which may be shown by an individual. The State, from its nature, cannot do this; for the acts of the State are those in which the Members of the State, according to their respective positions, share, at least, |184| by assent and sympathy, if not by joint action. And a number of persons can rarely, or never, participate in the clearness of mental vision, and agility of mental action, by which one man may pass on to new truths. However certain, and however demonstrable may be the new truths, they must require some time for their communication to the minds of many men. Repeated explanation, discussion, proof, may convey to the minds of many, that conviction, which was at first confined to one, or a few; but it can only be by degrees, that the conviction can take such hold of the members of the community, that it can be properly expressed by any act of the State, as its conviction.

  §866. Thus the judgment of the State as to what Doctrines are true, may differ very widely from the judgment of those who are, for the time, its Governors; and yet the Governors will rightly make their convictions of truth (so far as it concerns matters of State) become the judgment of the State, as soon as they can make it take this form by constitutional means. A Statesman, who has obtained a clear view of new and important truths, deeply affecting the morality and wisdom of public acts, cannot fail to wish to make these truths take their place, as grounds of the State’s acts; he can hardly fail to introduce, into the acts which he has to perform on the part of the State, an assertion of or reference to these truths; and, if he acts in conjunction with colleagues, he will endeavour to convince them of these truths. But he knows that new Truths cannot, in one instant, become the principles of action of a Nation, nor even of a Body of men; and therefore, he is content to introduce the new Truths by degrees, into the conduct of public affairs. He is content that the State should act, in a great degree, upon principles which it has long recognized and assumed. He knows that the existence |185| of a State is continuous; and that its Moral Character is, in like manner, continuous. Its acts must have a coherence. Its life is its History; and in its present acts, it must have a regard to its past history; so as not to interrupt the vital connexion of one period with another. The State may reform its conduct, and improve its views; and it may do this rapidly, and even suddenly; but it must preserve some identity through the change; else the State’s moral agency vanishes in the supposed reformation. If each person, who successively occupied the place of Governor, might at once proclaim his own views, as the doctrines of the State, the act would be of little or no value; since the proclamation of today might be superseded by a contrary one tomorrow.
  Thus there is, for States, as there is for individuals, a Duty both of Moral Progress and of Intellectual Progress: and these Duties, belonging to the State, fall upon the persons who administer the Government, as Duties belonging to them. But they do not fall upon them, in such a manner, that the Moral Progress and the Intellectual Progress of the State are to be identified with those of the individual. The Governors are to aim at a Virtue and a Wisdom on the part of the State, which are not merely their own personal Virtue and Wisdom; which are shown in the Acts and Declarations of the State; which belong to its agency, not merely to theirs; which are parts of a national life, regulated by Moral Principles, directed to Moral Objects, begun before they had any share in State acts, and to be continued, on the same Principles, when they have ceased to live.

  §867. The Moral Character of the State has been generally recognized by Moralists, and has been expressed in various forms of language. In one of these forms, the State is described as having not only a Moral Character, |186| but a Conscience. (1 Vattel, Law of Nations, Prelim., §21.) On this phrase we may take the liberty to remark, that it is not at all necessary in order to express any moral Truths belonging to Polity. We can speak intelligibly and fully upon all the Duties of the State, including the Duty of adopting and maintaining moral and religious Truths, without speaking of the Conscience of the State. And this expression is, in some respects, unsatisfactory; for it appears to imply a false relation between the Duties of the State, and those of the individual on whom they fall. The individual takes his share of the Duties of the State, as we have seen, knowing historically what the State has done; and trying to make the State, for the present, act morally, so far as the coherency of its being will allow. And all the individuals who share in the acts of the State, have to act thus, with historical knowledge and moral intention. But there is nothing in this process which can with propriety be called the Conscience of the State. Statesmen are not conscious of the past history of their country, however they may be cognisant of it. The Statesmen of today are not conscious of the purposes and convictions of the State at the time of the Revolution. Men, contemporaries and successors of each other, may add together their knowledge, and may correct it by their discussions; they may combine their intentions, and may thus carry out a common plan: but they cannot properly be said to add together their Consciences, and thus make a Common Conscience. We have indeed (§368) spoken of the Common Conscience of mankind; namely, the Supreme Law of Man’s Being, which each man contemplates in his own Conscience: but we have also said (§370), that we may more properly render the moral reasons for actions by referring them to the moral Ideas of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, than by speaking of Conscience. The Conscience |187| of a Nation, if it be spoken of at all, must be conceived to be, like the Conscience of an Individual, the stage at which it has arrived in its advance towards a full possession of the Fundamental Moral Ideas. But the stages at which different individuals have arrived, in such an advance, must be very various; and it does not appear that we gain anything by calling the result the National Conscience.
  But in whatever way we express it, the State undoubtedly possesses a Moral Character; and has Duties, as we have intimated, of the same description as those of individuals:—Duties of Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; the Duties of Moral and Intellectual Progress. These latter Duties, in the case of individuals, include, as we have seen (§720), the Duty of Religious Belief. We shall have to consider, hereafter, whether the same be true with regard to the State. But we must first consider some of the other Duties of the State.

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Chapter IV. The Social Contract

  §868. We have spoken of the manner in which the Nature of the State imposes Duties upon the Governors; we must now speak of the manner in which it imposes Duties upon the Governed. Of some of the Duties of the Governed, we also formerly spoke (§333); namely, willing obedience to the Laws, an affection for the country, a love of its institutions and of its constitution; a loyalty to its Sovereign. That men shall possess such feelings as these towards the Government of their country, is a general Moral Rule, of great extent and great importance. But |188| we have already stated (§462), that in the course of the intellectual progress of mankind. Moral Rules require to be improved by a fuller development and elucidation of the import of the terms which they contain. We have already endeavoured (§465, §486, §513) to unfold, for this reason, the conceptions of the State, Justice and Humanity: we must now do the same for the conception of Government; and for this purpose, must explain some of the views which have been successively taken by writers, of the Moral Nature of Government, and the grounds of men’s Duties towards it.
  The view which we have already given of the foundation on which Government rests is this (§94): that Government is a necessary condition of man’s Moral Nature; for Government is necessary to the existence of Rights; and Rights are requisite to the existence of Duties and Virtues. Or as we have otherwise expressed it, that our Idea of Moral Perfection involves an Idea of Order (§269): and that this Idea of Order cannot be realized, without fixed permanent external Laws, or Rules for human Actions. The Rules which the Idea of Order thus implies, are Facts external to the human Agent; but they are Facts requisite in order to mould his acts into a definite moral form.

  §869. But though the external Facts which embody the Idea of Order are thus requisite, in order that man’s actions may have a moral form; there is something also requisite, in order that they may be Moral Actions: namely, an internal Principle of activity, Freedom to act (§534). Without the Combination of these two elements. Order and Freedom, Moral Action cannot take place. And Government, which has it for its office to supply the element. Order, in this combination, must do so in such a manner as not to expel or destroy the element, Freedom. The external |189| fact must not annihilate the internal act. The internal act must modify the external fact. Public Order and Individual Freedom must subsist together.
  Thus Government, in order to be what it essentially is, a necessary Condition of man’s moral agency, must include a Principle of Order, and also a Principle of Freedom. These two Principles are in some respects opposed to each other, and have been so considered, in the course of man’s intellectual progress. We shall first observe some of the consequences of this opposition, before we attempt to trace especially the development of the Ideas themselves.
  These abstract Ideas, Order and Freedom, have been the Objects of sentiments in men which are described as the Love of Order and the Love of Freedom. Under the influence of these Sentiments, the affairs of various nations have been variously conducted; and the Conception of Government itself has been presented under various points of view. We must consider how these are related to each other.

  §870. Since Government, as we have seen, includes an external Fact independent of man’s Will, and an internal Will modifying the external Fact, it may be regarded mainly in the one or the other of these two lights: and thus have arisen two different, and in some respect opposite views, of the nature of Government, and of the Duties which relate to it.
  One view represents civil Government as an External Fact, which men must take as they find it, and conform their actions to it, without having anything else to do with it. We are under a Government; we are to obey it; this is our Duty, and this is the whole of our business as subjects. The claims of Government upon our Obedience are universal and irresistible.

  §871. This view borrows one of its main illustrations from a kind of Government which is undoubtedly an External |190| Fact independent of our Will: which all men find, and must take as they find it; which is a universal condition of human nature, and claims obedience with irresistible power; namely, the Paternal Government. The child is placed by nature in the power of the parent. He obeys him, and must obey him, at least for some portion of life; and no one questions that he ought to obey him. The obedience, thus begun, is naturally continued through life, and extended to successive generations, as we know was the case in the early periods of society; and thus was produced a Patriarchal Government. This, the natural and original form of Government, presents to us the true nature of Government: and other kinds of Government are to be explained and justified by their derivation from the Patriarchal System.

  §872. This view, or one nearly resembling it, is sometimes expressed in a different manner. Government, being an External Fact which we find universally annexed to our condition, by no agency of our own, is to be accepted as a part of the scheme of Providence, which we must not think of altering. It is a portion of the Divine Order of things, to which men must conform. Men’s Duty of Obedience to their Civil Governors is their Duty of Obedience to the Will of God; and hence. Governors have a Divine Right.  §873. The opposite view to this looks not to the External Fact, but to the Internal Fact, the Will; as that which must determine man’s condition. His moral position must depend upon himself. He makes Government what it is; and obeys it because he Wills to do so.

  §874. This view, again, borrows one of its main illustrations from a class of transactions in which a man does determine the circumstances of his condition by the acts of his Will; and in which the External Facts which regulate his actions, do so because he chooses, and as far as he chooses, |191| that they should do so; namely. Contracts. A man may, by a Contract with other men, unite with them and bind himself to obey certain Rules mutually agreed upon; and so long as the Contract stands, the Rules are binding. It is held, that Government may be likened to such a Contract, and that the Laws which the Government upholds, are binding in virtue of this likeness. Government is a special kind of Contract, the Social Contract; and it is a Duty of men to conform to the Rules of this Social Contract, because it is a Duty to fulfill the Covenants of all Contracts.

  §875. This view looks to the Rights of Man as Man; it recognizes the Rights of Government, not as anything Divine, or in any way different from any other Rights; but simply as a necessary condition for the establishment of other kinds of Rights.

  §876. The adherents of these opposite views of Government—the Patriarchal System, and the Social Contract—have attempted to apply their respective Theories to existing forms of Government. But both the one Theory and the other require to be much modified, before they can be made to agree with the circumstances of most of the States which history exhibits to us

  §877. In scarcely any age or nation, have men accepted their Government as an Existing Fact, with regard to which they had nothing to do but to obey. The most absolute Governments of ancient and modern times, have, in some degree, approximated to such a condition; but even in these cases, there occur, from time to time, attempts to improve the Laws, revolutions which overthrow the Governors, and other manifestations that men cannot be prevented from exerting their own judgment, and their own will, in shaping their own circumstances.

  §878. Indeed, the image, which, as we have said, is the standard illustration of this view of the nature of Government, |192| itself suggests that Obedience cannot be unlimited and interminable. For the child, when grown to manhood, though he may continue to treat with deference the commands of his parent, will yet have a will of his own; and will claim a right of acting for himself, in a large portion of his actions. The Patriarchal view itself leads us to ask, when the children of the State arrive at the independence of manhood.

  §879. Again: if we attempt to derive National Government from a supposed Original Patriarchal Government, we fall upon other questions, which show how impossible it is to apply this Theory in its simple form. When the Patriarch dies, upon whom does his power devolve? Upon the eldest son? or all the sons alike? or sons and daughters? or according to which of numerous other obvious Rules? The choice among these Rules cannot be determined by the Patriarchal Theory, in its simple form. Obedience to an elder brother, and that, continued through life, is not at all a part of the natural and necessary order of a family, as obedience to a parent is. Nor does any Rule, on this subject, naturally and necessarily flow from the Theory itself. If, on the other hand, we say that the Rule of Succession is determined by tacit or express Agreement among the members of the Society, we thus admit, to a certain extent, the opposite Theory of the Social Contract.

  §880. Again: in the ease of Usurpations and Revolutions, such as have happened in every country, when the family line of the Governors is broken through; are we to reject all the subsequent actual Government, as not rightly derived from the Patriarchal System, and therefore wrongful? Or are we to allow that long undisturbed Possession may obliterate the wrong of Usurpation? If we take the former side of the alternative, the Patriarchal Theory is not applicable to any existing case of Government: for in all countries |193| there have been Usurpations and Revolutions. If we take the latter side, we acknowledge a new element in the Right of Government, namely, long Possession, or Prescription; and we shall have to make this, in almost every case, the predominating element.

  §881. Thus, the Patriarchal Theory cannot be applied to actual Governments, without such modifications as render the Patriarchal Condition by no means the most important part of the Theory. And the same may be said of the Doctrine of the Divine Right of Government. For if we grant that the Rights of the Governors are Divine, as resting upon the Will of God; we may still ask what Rights are included in the Rights of Governors, and in what persons these Rights reside. These questions are in no degree answered, by calling these Rights, Divine Rights. To which we may add, that there appears to be the same reason for calling the Rights of the Subjects, as those of the Governors, Divine.

  §882. But the opposite Theory, that of the Social Contract, offers no less difficulty, when we attempt to apply it to the greater part of actual Governments. For it is not true that, in any actual social condition, the circumstances of men, and the Rules which they obey, are those which have been determined by their own Will. In some of the cases, in which men have freely combined to found a new and independent Colony, some approximation to this condition may have occurred; but even in those cases, the relations among the Colonists, and the Laws b, which they are bound, are determined, in a considerable degree, by their position in the States of which they were previously subjects; and take their course independently of the Will of individuals in the Colony. And in the usual conduct of nations, it is not true that a man, by his own acts, determines all the circumstances of his social condition. Man is really, as |194| those assert who borrow their illustration from the Family, born, fostered, taught, and governed, with little or no regard to his own will. And even in respect to Civil Government, the greater part of the circumstances of a man’s condition exist before him, and independently of him: for example, the institutions, the laws, the customs, the character of the nation, in which he must share, and by which his own habits and actions are mainly regulated. And his Relation to the Government being determined by these External Facts, and not by himself, it seems to be a groundless and inapplicable fiction, to speak of that Relation as founded upon a Contract, to which he is a party.

  §883. The Assertors of the Theory of a Social Contract have sometimes replied to this objection, by a further assertion; that a man, by continuing to live under a Government, after he arrives at manhood, gives his tacit consent to the Contract by which the Government is established; and is, therefore, bound by its Laws. But this answer leaves abundant room for other questions; as to whether such a tacit consent may reasonably be assumed; and if so, at what period, and under what conditions; and further and especially, what are the terms of the asserted Contract? And, upon the answers to these questions, will depend all the important Doctrines which concern the Rights of the Governors, and of the Governed; and, the theory of the Social Contract, if it be retained in discussing these questions, is little more than a form of expression which leads to no peculiar results.

  §884. The same may be said of the other forms of expression, which are used to convey the same views. Thus if it be said that the Rights of Government must be regulated by the Natural Rights of Man; the question still recurs. What are the Natural Rights of Man? We have already (§508) stated, that all which have been called Natural Rights |195| are so far limited and modified by the Laws of State, that they cannot be treated as universally Natural Rights. The Rights of Man, in each State, are determined by the Laws of the State; and although, as we have also attempted to show (§514), Humanity requires that States and men should constantly endeavour to extend to all men the Cardinal or Primary Rights of Man: this Principle will, in a very small degree, aid us in determining the Duties of Subjects towards Governments.

  §885. Thus the Theory of the Patriarchal nature of Government is, both by the analogy of the Family itself, and by the universal course of human action, compelled to admit a Principle of Freedom; and the Theory of the Social Contract must include family ties, established institutions, tradition, and assumed consent, as Principles of Order. Each of these Theories is drawn towards the other, in the attempt to make it correspond with the actual condition of nations.

  §886. But though the doctrine of the Social Contract has no advantage over the rival Doctrine, as a Historical Theory, it may be a convenient form for the expression of Moral Truths. And this it may be, if we can answer satisfactorily the questions, which convey the objections to the Theory; namely, What are the terms of the Social Contract? under what conditions the consent of men to this Contract may be assumed? and the like.

  §887. We must, however, recollect, that though we may find convenient modes of stating and discussing Moral Truths, by speaking of the Social Contract, as the ground of the Rights of Government; yet that, in fact. Government has Rights which no Contract among the subjects could give. We have already (§846) described these Rights as State Rights; and have shown that they cannot be bestowed upon the Government by any agreement among the individuals of which the nation consists; namely, the Right to the National |196| Territory; the Right of Making War; the Right of Capital Punishment; the Right of Imposing Oaths. These Rights are Articles in the Social Contract; but they are Articles such as no Contract among individuals could contain. It is not because it is A Contract, but because it is The Social Contract, that the Foundation Deed of Human Societies contains these Covenants.
  We may now proceed to consider the Questions above stated: What are the Terms of the Social Contract? and the like. We may observe that English Writers very generally speak of the Social Compact instead of Contract, but in exactly the same sense.

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Chapter V. The Social Contract is the Constitution

  §888. Before we attempt to determine what are the terms of the Social Contract, since we are to use the expression for the purpose of expressing moral and political Doctrines, let us consider what Doctrines it has commonly served to express.
  The most noted instance in which this Contract was referred to, was in the Vote of the Houses of Lords and Commons of England, which deposed James the Second, declaring that he had “broken the Original Contract between king and people.” And this case exemplifies the purpose for which the phrase has generally been used in this Country; namely, to express that there are cases in which the subject’s Duty of Obedience is annulled, and resistance to the Governors becomes justifiable. When this is alleged to have happened in consequence of some violation of liberty |197| or justice by the Governor, he is said to have “broken the Original Contract.” And this phrase serves well to express, in a plain and forcible manner, the condemnation of the transgression, and the steps which it is held to justify.

  §889. For the breach of a Contract is an offence when a Contract is broken, in a fundamental manner, by one of the parties, the Obligation of the other party to perform his share of it ceases. Those who have to speak for the People, want to say, that the King’s crimes have made Obedience cease to be a Duty of the People; and they cannot say this, in any more intelligible or plausible way, than by saying, that the King has broken the Original Contract of King and People.

  §890. But this language, when used as a justification of Resistance to the Governors by their subjects, has this disadvantage; that while it refers to general Rules of Law, it makes one Party the Judge in their own case, which is against all Rules of Law. For if the People allege, against the King, a Charge of Breach of Contract, they ought to bring the case before some Tribunal where justice may be done to both Parties. And if, before this is done, they resist the King’s authority, he may, with at least equal plausibility, charge the offence of Breach of Contract upon them. They may charge him with Tyranny, and he may charge them with Rebellion; and these charges are not made more intelligible by calling them Breaches of the Original Contract.

  §891. It may be of use to recollect here what was formerly said (§414) of Cases of Necessity; of which Rebellion, justified by Tyranny, is one. We cannot lay down beforehand any exact moral Rules for such cases, nor is it desirable to do |198| so. We have already said (§413), that we cannot define the circumstances of Cases of Necessity, because they must be those in which a good man does not violate the general Rule without great struggle and reluctance. For (to repeat the arguments there used), if we were to define beforehand the conditions under which Resistance to Governors, and Rebellion, are proper, and were to give Rules for such cases; those who accepted our Rules would, when the occasion arrived, take the course of Resistance and Rebellion without reluctance or compunction; and even before the time came, would be inquiring whether they had arrived at a point where they might cast off the Duty of Obedience and the Affection of Loyalty. And further, when these Cases of Necessity arrive, men are not calm and tranquil enough to apply Rules of action; and would, in practice, pervert any Rules which we would give. We cannot pretend to give a Formula for the justification of Rebellion; and the phrase of the King having broken the Original Contract, so far as it is merely a Formula, cannot be a justification; although, if there really be a justifying necessity, this phrase may serve to express it.

  §892. Since we are thus compelled to abstain from laying down Rules for Cases of Political Necessity which justify Resistance, it may be allowable to illustrate, by example, the manner in which such cases are to be regarded. I will take, as my example, the writings of a very able man who considered himself compelled, by the necessity of the case, to join in the Resistance to Charles the First, namely, Philip Hunton. He wrote a Book “On Monarchy in General; and the Monarchy of England in particular,” and in this, among other points, he treats of the question of Resistance to the Monarch rendered necessary by his transgressions. He does not employ the phraseology of the |199| Original Contract Theory, which at that time had not become familiar. But he discusses the Question, which, in that or any other form, is one of extreme difficulty: Who is to be Judge when the Contract is broken? As he states the question, it is, “Who shall be Judge of the excesses of the Sovereign Lord in Monarchies of this composure?” that is, in Mixed and Limited Monarchies. In reply, he says, that this cannot be the Monarch himself, for then you destroy the frame of the State, and make it absolute; since to bind a Prince to a Law, and to make him the Judge of his deviation from that Law, is to absolve him from all Law, Nor can the Community and their Deputies be the Judges in such a case; for then we put the Supreme Power in that body, and destroy the essence of the Monarchy: for the Ruler is the immediate Minister of that Power to which he is accountable for his actions. “So that,” he says, “I conceive in a limited legal Monarchy, there can be no stated Judge of the Monarch’s actions, if there grow a fundamental difference between him and the community. But you will say,” he adds, “it is all one way to absoluteness to assign him no Judge, as to make him his own Judge.” Hunton answers, “I say not simply in this case there is no Judge: but that there can be no Judge legal and constituted within that frame of Government: it is a transcendent case beyond the provision of the Government, and must have an extraordinary Judge.”

  §893. He then proceeds to deliver his own judgment on such a case; which is this: “that if the transgression of the Sovereign be of lesser moment, it is to be borne by public patience, rather than endanger the being of the State by a contention between the Head and Body politic.” But if it be mortal, and such as, suffered, dissolves the frame and life of the Government, and Public Liberty; then the illegality and destructive nature is to be set open, and |200| redress sought by Petition; which failing, the author pronounces that “prevention by Resistance ought to be.” But yet he once more repeats his cautions and preliminaries: “First, that the case is such, must be made apparent: and if it be apparent, and an appeal be made ad conscientiam generis humani, especially of those of that community, then the fundamental Laws of that Monarchy must judge, and pronounce the Sentence in every man’s Conscience; and every man, as far as concerns him, must follow the evidence of truth in his own soul, to oppose or not to oppose.” This power of judging in such a case, he adds, implies no civil superiority in those who judge; being, not authoritative and civil, but moral; belonging to us, not as citizens, but as reasonable creatures.

  §894. I have made these quotations from Hunton, because it is desirable to show how far the struggles of mind of a conscientious man, in a particular case in which resistance to the Government seemed to become necessary, are removed from the familiarity and positiveness with which Rules of such cases, in the general form, are sometimes laid down, by writers of Morals. Hunton’s judgment, that, under the English Constitution, resistance to the Sovereign might become necessary, has the more weight, because it is combined with a strong admiration of the “Architecture” of the English Constitution; “whereof,” he says, “I must declare myself to be so great an admirer, that, whatever more than human wisdom had the contriving of it, whether done at once, or by degrees found out and perfected, I conceive it unparalleled for exactness of true policy in the world.” His grief at the necessity of discussing such questions is strongly expressed. “O let no Son of this State,” he says, “account it presumption in me, for putting in my judgment, and speaking that which I conceive might, if not remove, yet mitigate this fatal distemperature of our |201| common Mother: at another time, perhaps, it might be censurable, but in this exigence, laudable.”

  §895. We conceive, then, that Cases of Resistance to Government are Cases of Necessity; and as such, Cases for which no Rule can be given. The use of the phrase “Original Contract” does not enable us to give any special Maxims on this subject. Still, as we have seen that the object of the Social Contract was to secure Order and Freedom, we may say that the Resistance may be used when it is necessary to preserve the Order and the Freedom which are guaranteed by the Social Contract.
  This leads us again to inquire what the terms of the Social Contract are: but before we answer this question, we shall consider another purpose for which this, or equivalent phrases, are employed.

  §896. Such phrases have, in modern times, been used in the Preambles of various Codes of National Law; and especially in the Prefaces to the Constitutions of the States of North America. Thus, the Constitution of New Jersey begins by declaring that “All the Constitutional Authority ever possessed by the kings of Great Britain over their dominions was by Compact derived from the people, and held of them for the common interest of the whole Society.” The Constitution of Connecticut declares that “all men, when they form a social Compact, are equal in Rights”; and the Constitutions of some of the other States have like expressions. Now here it is plain, that the word “Compact” is employed in order to conciliate to the Law the regard of men fond of Freedom. The Lovers of Liberty can readily obey a Law which is a Compact among themselves; though they would resist with indignation a Law imposed by another. And accordingly, the Laws, which are thus prefaced, are rigourously enforced, without exciting any discontent among the freemen of North America.

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  §897. Now if, in these instances, we inquire what are the terms of the Compact which is thus spoken of, the answer will evidently be, that the Compact is the Constitution itself, of which we have quoted the introductory phrases. The written Constitutions of the respective United States, which thus begin by speaking of a Compact, by which Civil Society is held together, do themselves contain the Articles of this Compact, In these Cases, we have the Social Contract in a distinct, manifest, and compendious form.

  §898. Further; it is plain, that in these cases the Social Contract is not merely, like the Original Contract of the Act which deposed James the Second, a Contract between the King and People. Nor is it a Contract between the Governors and Governed; for the Governors, in such Constitutions, cannot be looked upon as a separate party. The Contract is a Compact among the Citizens in general, expressing the political relations of each to each. It is a Contract between every man and all others within its compass. And accordingly, this is expressed in the Constitution of Massachusetts: “The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a Social Compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain Laws for the common good.” The Social Compact, that is, the Constitution, determines the Rights and Obligations, not merely of the Governors, but of all persons and all Classes: at least so far as the Fundamental Rules and Maxims of Rights are concerned.

  §899. But since, in these States, the Terms of the Social Contract, concerning which we were inquiring, are to be found in the Constitution, we must, for the like reasons, look for the Terms of the Social Contract of any other State in its Constitution, that is, in the Collection of the Fundamental Rules and Maxims of Rights, and especially of |203| Political Rights (§210). For that the Constitution of any Country has not been authoritatively promulgated in a compendious written form, but is to be gathered from various Sources, in various forms, does not alter the nature of its obligation. If the Social Compact of New England be its Constitution, the Social Compact of Old England must be its Constitution. The Constitution is, in each case, the Collection of Fundamental Rules and Maxims of Rights, and especially Political Rights: in each case, it is the Common Understanding by which the Laws of Order and Freedom are bound together.

  §900. Thus the Social Contract, being the Constitution of the Country, is different in different Countries, and in all, contains a great number of Articles and Clauses. The Social Contract is not merely some one or two Maxims, respecting Protection, or Property, or Personal Liberty, or the like. It is a wide and complex collection of Arrangements and Provisions for defining and securing to men their Rights. The security of the Rights is the object of the Contract; the Contract itself is the Collection of Arrangements and Provisions.

  §901. Moreover, if some one of these Articles or Clauses be violated by any party, the Contract is not thereby annulled. For all the other parties, it is not even disturbed; and the party who is guilty of the breach of Contract is not necessarily to be punished by declaring the Contract void for him; but is to be judged by the rest of the community; and visited with penalties provided by the Constitution itself; or else, with inflictions devised for the exigence of the occasion.

§902. And this is the manner in which the Social Contract has been understood in this Country, even when it has been referred to in seasons of Resistance and Revolution. In the deposition of James the Second, though he was deposed |204| as having broken the Original Contract of King and People, still the Original Contract, which gave the Houses of Parliament, and the Magistrates of the Land, their Authority, was looked upon as undisturbed; and all parties, except the King, retained and exercised the powers of their Stations. The English Constitution, like that of Massachusetts, of which we have quoted the description (§898), was held to be a Compact by which each citizen covenants with the whole people, and the whole people with each citizen; and those who had adhered to their Covenants were still entitled to all the benefit of the Compact.

  §903. This view of the Constitution of each Country, as a Compact among the citizens, by no means tends to diminish the reverence and affection towards it, which we have stated to be one of the Duties of a citizen (§329). Even a common Contract is, to a moral man, an object of most careful fidelity and respect; and to a religious man, an object of religious reverence; it is sacred. But the Social Contract is not a common Contract. It is a Fundamental Contract, by which all the Rights of men are defined and secured, all the most important and dearest social relations protected. It is a Contract with the whole body of our Community, dictated by the universal voice, devised or assented to by all the wisest and best of our Countrymen. Whether it be the result of the wisdom of man, or of the wisdom of ages, that is, of the good guidance of Providence, it has made our Country, and all that we value in it, what they are. Whatever were its origin therefore, the Constitution of our Country is a worthy object of our fidelity, reverence, and affection.

  §904. This also is recognized in the States of North America. Thus the Constitution of Rhode Island says: “In the words of the Father of his Country (Washington), we declare that the basis of our political Systems is the |205| Right of the People to make and alter their Constitutions of Government: but that the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole People, is sacredly obligatory upon all.” And in accordance with this feeling, the Members of the General Legislatures, and of the respective State Legislatures, and all Executive and Judicial Officers, swear to support the Constitution of the United States, and also the Constitution of their respective States. With what reverence and love the Constitution of England has been looked upon by Englishmen, in general, it is not necessary to say.

  §905. Thus, the description of the Constitution of the Country as its Social Contract, serves to express the Doctrine that all Members of the State have mutual obligations which they may incur heavy penalties by violating. It expresses this in such a manner as to conciliate the good-will and assent, both of the Lovers of Order and of the Lovers of Freedom; and without any tendency to diminish the reverence and affection with which the Constitution is regarded.
  Before we quit this subject, it may be proper to notice some of the objections which are sometimes urged against the Doctrine of the Social Contract.

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Chapter VI. Objections Considered

  §906. It is proper to consider the arguments which Paley has urged against the Doctrine of the Social Contract in his Moral and Political Philosophy, both on account of the currency and authority which that work possesses; and also, in order that we may thereby further explain the effect of the Doctrine: and may compare it with the Doctrine |206| which he propounds as fit to supersede it, namely, the Doctrine that the foundation of Government, and of the Duty of Obedience to it, is Expediency.

  §907. Paley’s principal arguments against the Doctrine of an original Compact are: that such a Compact is not a Fact; and that if not a Fact, it is nothing: that if it were a Fact, yet that the Compact, as it affects the generations after the origin, can be. of no force, because the subjects of States in our generation are not conscious of such a Compact, and have had no liberty of assent or refusal with regard to it.

  §908. To the first objection, we reply, that even if the Original Compact of Society be not a Pact, it by no means follows that the conception of such a Compact, as the Result of Facts, and the Source of Duties, is of no value. There are several such conceptions which, though not historical facts, are appealed to by moral and political writers, as valuable moral realities. When we say that the Governors are Trustees for the benefit of the Governed, or that all Property is a Trust for the benefit of the Community, it might in like manner be objected, that no Deed of Trust was ever executed in such cases, and that Kings reigned, and Proprietors held their possessions, before any such views were taken of their tenure. But still, the doctrine that Sovereignty and Property are Trusts, is held by Moralists to be highly important; and is the source of Moral Maxims which cannot be so distinctly conceived, or so clearly expressed, in any other way. And in like manner, the Doctrine that men are held together in Society by a Compact, even if we cannot point to any event, recorded or conjectural, as the Original Transaction by which the Compact was made, may be a very important and necessary moral and political Reality. And it is so; since it expresses, in one phrase, the mutual relations of the Governors and the |207| Governed, and of all classes one with another; the reciprocal Character of their Rights; the possibility of the obligations of one party ceasing, in consequence of some act done by another party; the Duty of fidelity and respect to the Constitution; and the condemnation of those who violate or disregard such Duties.

  §909. But we reply further: that the Original Compact is a Fact, if we accept, as the terms of the Compact, those Principles of Polity, those fundamental Political Laws and Maxims, which have been generally accepted and approved in all ages of the history of the Country; and which, though occasionally forgotten or transgressed, have constantly resumed their authority, when the influence of force or party interest was removed. The aggregate of such Laws and Maxims, in other words, the Constitution of the Country, is a Fact; and has always been so regarded; not by theoretical writers only, but by men accustomed to deal with Facts; by lawyers, statesmen, and Englishmen of all classes. Whatever doubts may exist, with regard to some of the Rules and Maxims so asserted, it is plain that such a set of Principles have, as a Fact, existed in the Collective Mind of the Country; as appears by the Constitution having grown out of them. And if it be urged, as an objection, that the Maxims which make up the Constitution have been adopted in succession, as the result of struggles between conflicting parties, and different Classes in the State; we reply, that this is so far from showing that there is no Social Contract, that it gives to the result still more the character of a Contract; for in other Contracts, also, it constantly happens, that each party to the Contract recedes from its original claims; and the conditions of the Contract are different from the pretensions put forward on either side, in the course of the negotiations. |208|
  The Social Contract therefore, which we assert as a moral Doctrine, is not to be rejected because it is not a Fact in the sense in which the objector requires it to be so, namely, a single Historical Fact; and it is a Fact, so far as is requisite for the purpose of its being a true Moral Doctrine.

  §910. But it is further objected by Paley, that the Doctrine of a Contract is false and useless, because men in general have not actually given their consent to the fundamental Rules of the Government under which they live, and have had no opportunity of giving or refusing such consent.

  §911. In order to determine how far this objection is valid, we must consider what the analogy of Contracts in general teaches us, with regard to consent which may be supposed or implied, though not actually given. Now on this subject, we have not the smallest need to follow any other teaching than that of Paley himself, in order to assert an Original Contract. In speaking of the Administration of Justice, he says, “The law of nature, founded in the very constitution of human society, which is formed to endure through a series of perishing generations, requires that the just engagements a man enters into should continue in force beyond his own life; it follows that the private Rights of persons frequently depend upon what has been transacted in times remote from the present, by their ancestors or predecessors, or by those under whom they claim, or to whose obligations they have succeeded.” But this, which he here asserts of private Rights, may, with exactly the same reason, be asserted public Rights. Public Rights and Obligations, no less than private, may depend upon what was done by our predecessors, and upon their Rights and Obligations. And the examples which he offers, further show this. They are such as these: the questions which arise between |209| Lords of the Manor and their Tenants; between the King and those who claim Royal Franchises; questions of Tithes; and the like; which, as he says, depend upon ancient Grants and Agreements. “The appeal,” he adds, “to those grants and agreements is dictated by natural equity, as well as by the municipal law.” This is asserting, in the most decided and extensive manner, that the present generation are bound by Contracts to which they have given no actual consent. But further: he asserts this, even of mere hypothetical Contracts. “Concerning the existence,” he says, “or the conditions of such Old Covenants, doubts will perpetually occur, which give employment to the Courts of Law.” (1 Paley is, in this part of his work, speaking of the necessity of Courts of Law. Book vi., chap. 8.) But having taken the case in which the present generation are required to allow themselves bound by ancient Contracts, of which the existence or the meaning are doubtful, does he declare the supposition of such Contracts to be absurd or useless? By no means. On the contrary, he assigns this as a reason (among others), why the general precepts of Morality are not sufficient guides for the business of life, without our having Courts of Justice besides. And for the like reasons, and in the same manner, we maintain that the general Principles of Political Morality, whether we state them as Order, Liberty, and Justice, and the like, or with Paley, as Expediency, are insufficient to point out the boundaries and the force of Political Rights and Obligations, without referring to a Court of Natural Jurisprudence, which deals with these as the Conditions of an Ancient Covenant, to be made out by a calm estimate of the evidence which Law and History offer us.

  §912. We have stated it, as among the advantages of the Doctrine of a Social Contract, of which the terms are the Articles of the Constitution, that this Doctrine harmonizes |210| well with the love and reverence for the Constitution which are among our Duties. And accordingly Paley, while he is rejecting the Doctrine, rejects also these Duties. He says, truly, that the original conditions of the Social Compact are understood to be the fundamental laws of the Constitution. He rejects the notion of such fundamental laws, as having any peculiar force; and speaks with slight of those who “ascribe a kind of transcendental authority or mysterious sanctity to the Constitution, as if it were founded on some higher original than that which gives force and obligation to the ordinary Statutes of the realm, or were inviolable on any other account than its intrinsic utility.” Now the persons who have ascribed an exalted authority to the English Constitution, have spoken of it with reverence, and have defended it as inviolable, are all the greatest statesmen, lawyers, and patriots, who have adorned this country; and in proportion to their ability, their legal knowledge, and their patriotism, they have been copious, earnest, and pointed, in appealing to the principles of the Constitution as something of paramount authority and value. They have ascribed to the Constitution, not so properly a “mysterious sanctity” which Paley speaks of, as a moral sacredness: and we have seen the Americans, in the midst of their most emphatic assertions of their liberty, have done the same thing. When a writer is thus led by his doctrines to speak contemptuously of the emotions of moral reverence and affection which have thus prevailed for generations, in the nation and the race, he cannot be, to them, a moral teacher; and as far as he gains their attention, he can only perplex them. If we are to accept a doctrine which tells us that no special reverence and authority belong to the Constitution, we must suppose all our public Jurists, from Fortescue and Coke to Blackstone and Burke, to have had confused and superstitious notions of the English |211| Government. And if the study of English Law and History leaves so wide a space for practical error in its most diligent students, we can have little trust in the permanence of any new doctrine on such subjects.

  §913. There are two other objections urged by Paley against the Doctrine of an Original Compact;—That if such be the ground of Government, despotic Governments can never be changed or mitigated, because Despotism is in the Compact, and the Subject is bound by it; and thus in this Theory, recourse to arms for the sake of a better constitution cannot be justified:—and again. That since every violation of the Compact destroys it, this Theory offers ready arguments for reposing obedience to Government, and “has in fact always supplied the factious with a topic of seditious declamation.”

  §914. To the first of these objections, we reply, that the laws of no State allow the citizens to have recourse to arms for the sake of bettering the Constitution; that our Morality does not give Precepts for such armed attempts at improvements; and that a system of Morality which lays down, for the citizens of States in general, rules contradicting the Laws, cannot be fit for the general guidance of mankind. If an English Moralist might go into any State which he deems Despotic, and preach to the citizens the duty of bettering the Constitution by an armed insurrection, English morality would be rejected by the Moralists of all other countries, as inconsistent with Order and Humanity. Not that we allow that despotic Governments are never to be improved; but they are not, as a general Rule, to be improved by armed insurrections, but by improving the condition of the people; by promoting the moral and intellectual culture of the Governed and of the Governors; by strengthening all the elements of the Constitution which contains a germ of Liberty; (for almost all Governments, |212| however despotic, have such elements). By such courses, despotic Governments, and all Governments, may be improved, without any contradiction of the Social Compact. For the Social Compact, according to all moderate interpretations of it, is not an unchangeable Rule; but is capable of modification from age to age, by constitutional proceedings; changes so produced being understood as changes in the terms of the Compact, made with the consent of the parties. In the progress of improvement, violence and resistance may occur; yet violence and resistance can never be justified as results of general Moral Rules, but only as the resource in a case of necessity which forms an exception to general Rules.

  §915. As to the objection that the Doctrine of a Social Contract offers, and has supplied, ready arguments for Sedition, this is no more than inevitably belongs to every doctrine which recognizes Civil Liberty as an important object. If every obnoxious proceeding of the Governors of a State may be re¬ presented as a violation of the Social Contract, it may also be represented as a violation of Natural Justice; and in whatever manner the consequences of Natural Justice are described, the description may be used as a means of inflaming seditious dispositions.

  §916. It is by no means true, that the Doctrine of the Social Contract has been especially used for purposes of sedition or rebellion. When it was brought into prominence at the Revolution in 1688, it was used to justify resistance to the Sovereign in a case of necessity, and not as a general Rule. Those who, in modern times, have most freely urged the Right of Resistance to the Government, though they may have occasionally spoken of a Social Contract, have not really applied the Doctrine. They have not usually dwelt upon any special transgression of the Governor, as a violation of the Compact dissolving its tie; but have commonly |213| denied and derided the Authority of those ancient Laws and Maxims in which we read the Contract.

  §917. How far the Doctrine of an Original Contract is from being “captious and unsafe,” as Paley calls it, may be seen by the mode in which its adherents in this country have employed it since 1688. One of the most prominent of the occasions on which this was done, was the prosecution of Dr. Sacheverell for seditious doctrines in 1710, the prosecution being managed by the leaders of the House of Commons. These Managers all took occasion to speak of the Foundations of Government; and they all agreed in putting forward, in the most distinct and emphatic manner, the doctrine of an Original Contract. It may suffice to quote one of them. “The nature of our Constitution,” said Mr. Lechmere, “is that of a limited Monarchy, wherein the supreme power is communicated and divided between Queen, Lords, and Commons, though the Executive power and administration be wholly in the crown. The terms of such a Constitution do not only suppose, but express, an Original Contract between the Crown and the People; by which that supreme power was, by mutual consent, and not by accident, limited and lodged in more hands than one. And the uniform preservation of such a Constitution for so many ages without any fundamental change, demonstrates the continuance of the same Contract. The consequences,” it is added, “of such a form of Government are obvious. The Laws are the rule for both; the common measure of the power of the Crown and the obedience of the Subject.” It was added, that “if the executive part endeavours the subversion and total destruction of the Government, the Original Compact is broken, and the Right of Allegiance ceases: that part of the Government thus fundamentally injured hath a right to save or recover that Constitution in which |214| it had an original interest.” But such a breach of Contract is not contemplated as a general or ordinary case; but as an extreme case; a case of necessity; a case about which no rules can be laid down, and which can never be drawn into precedent, except in a case of the like necessity. The doctrine of the Original Compact, put forwards in this case by Lord Somers and all the most zealous lovers of liberty of the time, showed no traces of the seditious tendency which Paley ascribes to it.

  §918. Burke quoted these passages at a later period, in his “Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,” in order to show that the lovers of freedom in England had always asserted the cause of freedom in this measured and balanced manner, and thus to justify his own consistency in doing the same. And he himself, also, refers to the Social Contract as the Foundation of Government. Thus he describes the succession of the crown as “derived from an authority emanating from the Common Agreement and Original Compact of the State, communi sponsione reipublicoe; and as such, binding on the king and people too, so long as the terms are observed.”

  §919. The absence of any tendency to foment sedition or rebellion, in the Doctrine of the Social Contract, will further appear if we compare it, as Burke did, with other Doctrines which prevailed at the time of the French Revolution; and which represented the People as the source of Political Power. To this representation, Burke replied, that if by “The People” be understood the mere assemblage of individuals without any social organization, laws, or magistrates, the term describes something so vague, obscure, and arbitrary, that no intelligible proposition can be asserted concerning it. “The People,” so understood, has no means of collecting or delivering its convictions and intentions: |215| it has no Rights, not even a Right to the soil on which the individuals happens to be living. An assumption is commonly made, by those who thus put forwards “the People,” that the numerical majority of the People are to act for the whole: but the assumption that a numerical majority of an assemblage shall decide or choose anything, is altogether arbitrary. The Rule of a majority governing a minority, is a creature of civil society, not the origin of it. The Rule is entirely artificial; is learnt only by early training; and when applied, is applied with arbitrary limitations; for instance, with the exclusion of women and children. A far more natural mode, for a rude nation to act and decide, is to follow their Natural Aristocracy;—those whom their character, and property, and history, and habits, and education, have made most fit to lead, and have disposed others to follow them.

  §920. Thus the doctrine, that Political Power is bestowed by the People, cannot be realized without assuming some organization natural or arbitrary. In order to bestow power, the People must have some mode of assembling, debating, and voting; and this is, to have, to some extent, a Government, for the form of which we still have to find reasons. If we resolve the nation into its counties, or its parishes, we shall still have to give reasons for the boundaries which we thus draw, and for the officers whom we assume to exist: and our reasons will necessarily be drawn from history and usage, not from the choice and will of the existing individuals. And thus we are brought, in the partial elements of any possible national act, to conventions which must govern men, though not made by themselves, but transmitted from previous generations. And thus, if we reject a National Social Contract, such as we have spoken of, namely, an historical Contract into which we are born; we are driven to a Provincial or Parochial Contract |216| of the same description. And if we were to reject these conceptions as artificial, we should resolve society into Families, in which men unavoidably exist under relations into which they are born, and which they have not selected by their Will; and which yet imply both obligation and duty. And thus the Conception of “the People” as the Source of Government, in order that it may be in any degree distinct and applicable, must be moulded into form by means of the two Principles which we have stated as the grounds of Rights and Obligations; the Relations arising from circumstances of Birth; and Relations which are of the nature of Contract.

  §921. Having considered the objections commonly urged against the Doctrine of a Social Contract, I shall make a few Remarks on the assertion that the sole foundation of Government is Expediency. or Utility: that it is to be upheld solely on the ground of the Benefits and Advantages which it produces to men. In reference to the latter statement, we may assent to it, with this explanation, that if we are to support Civil Government on account of the Benefits it confers, the nature of our support must correspond with the nature of the Benefits: as the Benefits are moral Benefits, the support must include moral Affections. The Benefits which Civil Government confers upon men (if that expression is to be used) are, that it is the Source of Order, Freedom, Justice; the necessary condition of Rights, and therefore of Duties and Virtues. That anything is the source of these Benefits, is certainly abundant reason for supporting it; and so long as the nature of the Benefits which Civil Government produces is borne in mind, we may be content to say that it depends for its claims upon these. We have endeavoured to show that it produces these Benefits by being of the Nature of a Contract among men; but whether this be assented to or not, it may suffice for |217| our moral reasoning, if Government be regarded as the necessary Condition of all Duty and all Virtues.

  §922. In this sense, we might also allow that the foundation of Government is its Expediency, or its Utility. But as we have already said (§555), when men rest their approval of any general rule or principle on its Expediency, or its Utility, they commonly mean to put out of sight all differences in the value of the objects for which things are expedient or useful. When a man says that it is expedient to speak the truth, we suppose that he considers truth and lying to differ only in being more or less expedient. Now this mode of speech cannot satisfy the purposes of Morality. We cannot be content to say that we support Civil Government for its Expediency, when we mean that we reverence it as the necessary condition of man’s moral being. We cannot be satisfied to talk of the Utility which results from the existence of Government, when we must include, in our notion of Utility, Order, Freedom and Justice.

  §923. The unsatisfactory effect of the language applied to this subject by Paley is, I think, generally felt. For instance, when he discusses the question of the Right of Resistance to Government, he expresses himself in a mode which has startled most of his readers. On this question, his sentence is: “That the established government is to be obeyed so long as it cannot be resisted or changed without public inconvenience, and no longer.” And he adds, that, to the question, “Who shall judge?” on this subject, “The answer is, Every man for himself.”

  §924. This decision must be understood to reject, as mistaken feeling, all affection towards the existing Constitution of the Country. All loyalty to the Sovereign, and affection towards the other governing bodies, can only be impediments in the way of forming this judgment, which every one is called upon to form, whether the Government may not |218| be resisted or changed without public inconvenience. The condemnation with which both law and common opinion regard Faction, Sedition, and Treason, can have no place in the bosom of a consistent Moralist of this school. Such a one would rather be led by his views to deny that there was any harm in Sedition and Treason; since these might be necessary means of attempting improvements. There may be always ground to hope advantage from change; and those forms of attempting it, which the law calls Sedition and Treason, may be natural results of a wish to promote the public convenience; and therefore, even if errors, are no proper objects of indignation.

  §925. It is true, that Paley and his followers do not really draw, from their doctrines, such conclusions as these. They assert Expediency as the sole basis of the Rights of the State, and of the Obligations of the Citizen; but then, they assume Expediency to be a sufficient ground of strong love for existing expedient things: and of strong condemnation of those who attempt to change them for things less expedient. Though professedly so open to proposals of change, they really cling with affection to the claims of usage. And though deriding the value set upon the Constitution by others, Paley is often led to refer to it himself as an important subject of consideration.

  §926. Thus, he says, in speaking of his doctrine of Resistance to Government, “Not every invasion of the Subject’s rights or liberty, or of the constitution; not every breach of promise or of oath; not every stretch of prerogative, abuse of power, or neglect of duty by the chief magistrate, or by the whole, or any branch of the legislative body, justifies resistance, unless these crimes draw after them public consequences of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the evils of civil disturbance.” And again, as a reason for especially resenting and punishing violations of the Constitution, he |219| urges that “a well-known and settled usage of governing affords the only security against the enormities of uncontrolled dominion.” Here, the Constitution is become a valuable reality. In the same manner Paley, after he has said that “an act of parliament can never be unconstitutional, in the strict and proper acceptation of the term,” as if startled by the hardihood of his own assertion, adds, ”that in a lower sense it may; viz., when it militates with the spirit, contradicts the analogy, or defeats the provisions of the laws made to regulate this form of government.” This spirit and this analogy form a large part of what has always been understood by the Constitution.

  §927. The same thing may be noticed in other passages. Thus Paley asks, “Why is a Frenchman bound, both in law and in conscience, to submit to many things to which an Englishman is not obliged to submit?” He replies, “Because the same act is not the same grievance, where it is agreeable to the constitution, and where it infringes it.” “And this,” he adds, “is sufficiently intelligible without a Social Compact.” But when he thus explains the case by reference to the Constitution, and to the wrong inflicted by its violation, he approaches very near to the meaning and the language of those who hold the Doctrine of a Social Compact expressed in the Constitution of the Country.

  §928. Indeed, we may remark in general, that in Paley’s mode of treating moral questions, although Expediency is proclaimed as the basis of all Duties, Obligations, and Rights, yet that when these asserted results of Expediency have assumed the forms of Duty, Obligation, and Right, they are forthwith represented as the occasion of affections and sentiments which it would, by most persons, be reckoned absurd to found upon Expediency alone. The earnest love of what is right, and indignation at what is |220| wrong, are professed by the disciples of Paley, as feelings in which they, no less than any other men, have a share. Yet how strange does the description of these feelings sound, when translated into the proper phraseology of the school;—when they are called the “earnest love of what is expedient,” and the “indignation at what is inexpedient.” The insufficiency of the notion of Expediency, as a basis for moral affections and moral sentiments, proves that it is not the true basis of Morality. And this further appears, by the mode in which it is employed by its assertors. While we read Paley’s pages, we find, that when he comes to particulars, the things which he treats as Realities, and by reference to which he discusses special cases, are the things which he has rejected in his general discussions;—Constitution, Supposed Ancient Covenants, Established Usage, National Rights; while the Expediency, which is asserted in general as containing the essence of moral and political philosophy, is put out of sight as an element of discussion, and becomes merely an occasional form of expression.

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Chapter VII. Natural Progress of Government

  §929. Civil Government exists as the necessary condition of man’s moral being. It combines the conditions of Order and Freedom; and corresponds to its Idea the more completely, in proportion as it more completely realizes those conditions. In the history of different nations, we may discern various successive steps towards these combined conditions of Order and Freedom; and some of these steps it will be proper here to notice.
  In the earlier kinds of Government which prevailed |221| in human Society, Order was the leading character, and was regarded as their main purpose. Man had to learn and practise Obedience to Rules, before he could learn to use his Freedom. The first form of Obedience, is Obedience to parents; the first kind of Government, is the Government of the Family. When, by the growth of succeeding generations, the Government of the original Family became the Government of many Families, there came into existence the Patriarchal State, in which the Supreme Authority resided in the Patriarch, the Head of the Original Family. And when the Original Patriarch died, the habit of filial obedience was retained, and the obedience transferred to the new Head of the complex family, however selected. In this kind of Government, we hardly see Freedom as a distinct element; for Freedom of thought is so subdued by Filial Reverence, that it hardly appears as a Principle of action opposed to Rule. Yet under the Patriarchal Rule, we may suppose the members of the Family to have their distinct Rights of Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage. And if any wrong were done by one member to another, the Patriarch would be the natural Judge; he would determine who was the wrong doer, and pronounce the sentence of redress or punishment, according to his judgment of the equity of the case; or it might be, according to express Rules, which he had promulgated among his children for their guidance.

  §930. By the migrations of men in the earliest times, the original families of mankind were separated, and settled in various parts of the earth’s surface they were divided into races; the races were again separated into nations, tribes, clans. These nations acquired a property in the territory which they occupied; it may be, according to the appointment of the Patriarchs of the race, dividing the land among their descendants; or it may be, by a series |222| of mutual agreement between the heads of neighbouring tribes, like what is recorded of Abraham and Lot (Gen. 8:9): If thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left The heads of tribes and clans, and other persons also, might, in such a state of things, acquire wealth in cattle, and food, and raiment, and ornaments, and other objects of desire; and might have many followers and servants, obedient to them, because dependent upon them for subsistence or enjoyment. The Natural Rulers of men, in such a state, would be those in whom the remnants of the Patriarchal authority were supported by the inheritance of a large portion of the Patriarchal possessions. An Aristocracy of Birth and Wealth combined, would be the Government of Nations in such a Condition.

  §931. In such a kind of Government, however little Freedom poor and common men may possess, the Chiefs have considerable Freedom to act, and means of manifesting the difference of character and purpose which prevail among men. The chief of one tribe may make war upon the chief of another; they may lead their followers to battle; may show courage, skill, energy, sagacity, perseverance in war. One Chief may be a Conqueror of many others. He may, by his actions, excite fear, admiration, and enthusiasm. He may be regarded as a Hero; and the empire over men’s minds which he thus acquires, may make them submit to him, and obey his Commands. In this case, the Government may be termed Hero Sway. And this Sway may be acquired, not merely by success in war, but by any of that superiority in overcoming great difficulties and executing great designs which subjugates the minds of other men. Those who are subject to such Government are not free; they are, as it were, fascinated, and their obedience is a kind of Worship.

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  §932. Such Government therefore cannot unfold the moral nature of man. For this purpose the opposite Principle must be called into action. In order that man may be a moral agent, he must not be subjugated and fascinated, but freed and enlightened: he must be governed and directed by something, not because he does not understand it, but because he does. He must be directed not by mere external Will, but by intelligible Rule. He must obey, not a creature of superhuman power, but the dictates of our common Human Reason. The Reverence for Ideas must take the place of the Worship of Heroes.

  §933. It is only when Government assumes this character, that it becomes fitted for man. Man, when his moral faculties are awakened, requires that his Government be just; and submits to it willingly, in proportion as he sees embodied in it this Idea of Justice. He is not satisfied to be ruled by a Hero, except he be also a just Judge. He must have not merely Commands which all obey, but Laws which all observe.

  §934. But neither is men’s Conception of Government satisfied by the abstract Idea of Justice, administered so far as its Rules are universal. In the actual world, we never can have the Idea liberated from the Fact. The History of man, as a series of Facts, must be combined with this conception of Justice, as the rule of his moral being. There will still remain the traces of the original tribes of men, and of the actions of the Heroes who conquered their lands, or founded their cities, or ordained their mode of life. Their Languages will bear the marks of the distinctions thus introduced among them. Men are divided into Nations; each Nation has its Speech, its History, its Usages, its Laws, its National Character.

  §935. A nation requires not merely to have Justice administered, but also to act as a Nation. It must have |224| a Governor to act for it; to foresee, design, execute, on the part of all; as well as to keep each from wronging each. If it be governed by Judges only, it will ask for a King.
  The King represents the Nation, both as to Facts and Ideas. He exercises the Will and Power of the Nation, and acts its part in History; and he is also the Source of Justice, the Preserver of Order, the Assertor of Rights, the Punisher of Wrongs.

  §936. But within the nation also there may remain traces of ancient actual distinctions; which, the national union, though it has comprehended and superseded, has not obliterated. Ancient conquerors and heroes, and rich and historical families may have their successors; who continue to retain a portion of the ascendancy over men’s minds which belonged to Patriarchs and Heroes at earlier periods; and may also have power from their present wealth. These Nobles form a Natural Aristocracy in the Nation. There may be several Ranks and Conditions of persons. The individuals of a Nation are thus distinguished as Noblemen and Common men, Patricians and Plebeians, Rich and Poor, High and Low. But in almost every Nation, there is to some extent or other this Difference of Conditions, or Classes.

  §937. This Difference of Conditions will enter into the consideration of questions of Right between the members of the Nation. For the Definitions of Rights of all the Citizens are necessarily historical facts: namely, the historical facts which have established the differences of which we have just spoken. The same series of facts which has made one field belong: to Caius and the next to Titius. has made Caius a Patrician and Titius a Plebeian.

  §938. This difference of Ranks is accompanied with a difference of Political Rights. The history which has produced |225| Patricians and Nobles, has also, in general left them some portion of the power of Aristocracy. They have some share in the Government. The Government is compounded, variously in various countries, of Aristocracy and Monarchy.

  §939. Although the King is, as we have said, conceived as the representative of Justice and Order, and the assertor of Rights, the person who is at any time King, becomes so by the course of historical facts, and not by any process which makes him necessarily conformable to the Idea of a King. As a matter of fact, he may be unjust in his judgments between his Subjects, and in his actions towards them. He may take advantage of their habit of obedience, for his own personal gratification. Or he may act, on the part of the nation, in a way which does not at all represent the will of the nation. He may wish to use its power for war, when all his subjects wish for peace; or may neglect the defence of the Country, or the administration of the Laws, or any other National Obligation.

  §940. In the Cases in which any portion of the government remains in the hands of any other part of the nation, as the Elders, or the Nobles, this portion may be used by them, on the part of the Nation, for the purpose of preventing that neglect of the National Obligations, or Violation of Personal Duties, which the King would otherwise have committed. If, for instance, there be a Senate, without whose consent the King cannot make war or peace; or by which unjust Judges can be punished; such a Senate will be a Check upon the power of the King. It will balance, in some measure, his authority j and may thus prevent the results of unjust intention or perverse will in him.

  §941. The Senate are in the Condition, both of Governors, and Governed: they are Subjects of the King, and Rulers of the People. For them, the Government |226| combines the conditions of Order and Freedom, at least to some extent; for they are, in some respects, not only free to act for themselves, but also to act for others, and to exercise a share of command over others. They are not irresistibly controlled by the will of the King, for they have the power of resisting it, and even, in some degree, of controlling it.

  §942. But the People, who are thus subject to the King and the Senate combined, are they free agents, such as their moral nature requires them to be?—If the sway possessed by the King and the Senate be exercised mildly and temperately, the People may be, for a long time, free, so far as almost all the purposes of Morality require. Under the paternal sway of good and kind men, acting without check, as King and Senators, the subjects have the means of acting as good children. But such a sway cannot answer all the purposes of Morality. Men cannot feel themselves free, when their freedom depends upon the arbitrary will of others. They are not free, if their freedom may be taken from them tomorrow, without their having any power of resistance. They are not free, if they have no security for their freedom; no means of asserting and defending it, should it be assailed or infringed; in short, they are not free, if they have not some Political Rights; some Rights in relation to the Government. And not being free, their moral career cannot be complete. They cannot carry on their moral and intellectual culture, in the hope of bringing into intelligible harmony with themselves all the circumstances of their condition; for there is one element of their condition, the Government, on which they have no power of acting, and which does not allow itself to be scrutinized and understood. They cannot go on constantly and indefinitely in the realization of their moral ideas; for when |227| they would extend this realization from private to public life, they find themselves stopped by the impassable barrier which separates them from the ruling classes.

  §943. Thus, without Political Rights securing the Liberty of the people at large. Government incompletely attains that Combination of Order and Freedom which is requisite as the Condition of man’s moral being. For this purpose, besides the Checks and Balances which a Senate may offer to the injustice or imprudence of a King, there must be some security of Popular Rights, some protection of the Liberty of the Subject. The Monarchy must not only be balanced by an Aristocracy, but must also recognize a Democracy.

  §944. Thus the State, in order to answer its purposes completely, must contain a combination of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy. The Aristocracy stands for order, and the Democracy for Freedom in the Combination: the Monarchy gives unity to the Combination. The Aristocracy stands for Order; for the Sovereign Power cannot subsist except it be supported by the natural Aristocracy of the Community; if not by the Aristocracy of Birth and Wealth, by the Aristocracy of Prudence and Force. The Aristocracy represents the actual Past; the events which have taken place and left their effects: the Democracy represents the actual Present; the events which the powers of men, acting freely, are bringing into being. Monarchy is an Ideal Power which binds together these elements; acts for the State in present history, and is the source of the Order and Justice which the State must realize.

  §945. Thus, these three kinds of Government must be combined in the Idea of a State; and they have, in general, been mixed together, in the States which have best answered their moral purposes. But yet, from various circumstances, one or another of these elements may become |228| so obscure, as to seem to lose its nature; and still, the Government may have a long and tranquil existence. If a State be established by actual contract among a number of men meeting as equals, it has no past, and need have no Aristocracy. For the moment, the Aristocracy and the Democracy are identified. Every man is at the same time Governor and Subject, bound to Order, and possessed of Freedom. And if the Constitution be wisely framed, such a condition of things may long continue. The natural tendency of the progress of time is to generate an Aristocracy; but this tendency may be counteracted by the activity of the Democracy. Again, the Democratic element may be so feeble that the nation may be entirely governed by the past;—by an ancient Aristocracy, or an ancient line of Monarchs. Where Freedom is thus extinguished, the State as we have already said, answers its moral ends imperfectly. Again; the Monarchical element may be enfeebled in various ways: as by dividing the executive from the judicial character; by presenting the State itself, not the King, as the source of Justice, and by distributing the Sovereign Executive Power. The Executive Power may be held but for a short time, as by Consuls or Presidents for a year, or a few years. By such means. Democracy may be established, with very small evident mixture, either of Monarchy or Aristocracy.

  §946. In nations which have subsisted for many centuries, the Aristocratic element is generally conspicuous and powerful, having on its side accumulated property, the habit of command, superiority of culture; and in its favour on the other side, the habit of respect for historical families, and of obedience to existing authority. But on the other hand, where there is a germ of freedom to begin with, there are strong influences on the Democratic side. For the influence of the past becomes constantly weaker by the lapse of lime; and the balance, which at first was kept steady by the weight |229| of old families, is disturbed by the rise of new men, who grow in wealth, or in some other form of power. And as the love of power on the one side, so the love of freedom on the other, may become a craving for more. Thus there are tendencies which may produce a struggle between Aristocracy and Democracy; such a struggle has taken place in most old countries, and has occupied many centuries.

  §947. In the contest between Aristocracy and Democracy, the Aristocracy represents the Principle of Order; for the authority of the existing laws is the inheritance of the past, and belongs to the heirs of the past. But the Principle of Order may also be embodied in a line of Kings, as well as in families of Nobles; or in the two conjointly. In this case, the Monarchy derives its force from the actual past, as well as from the Idea of a National Will and a National Justice. On the other hand, where the people have already acquired Political Rights, the Democracy represents, not only the Principle of Liberty, but the Principle of Order also; for they assert their Rights, as fixed by existing Laws. Hence we do not find in the History of Nations, the Cause of mere Order and of mere Liberty opposed to each other. The Democratical party assert the necessity both of Order and of Liberty: the opposite party, whether Monarchical or Aristocratical, respect Liberty, so far as it is established by Law. Yet still there is an opposition; the One party make a stand for Order combined with Liberty, as it is by Law established; the other party contend for an extension of Liberty, which they hold to be reconcilable with Order. The one is the Cause of Authority, the other of Relaxation. The one Party are a Conservative Party, who contend for the position of equilibrium of Order and Liberty, which already exists: the other are a Movement Party, who seek a new position, in which a larger share of Liberty enters.

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  §948. The forms which such struggles take, and the means which are employed in them, are very various. Popular Rights are embodied and protected by Laws, which give to the people security of person and of property; by a share in the election of Magistrates; by Magistrates who are the special defenders of such Rights (as the Roman Tribunes of the Plebeians); by men of the People holding Magistracies; by the People having a share in making the Laws; and the like. The Assemblies, whether Senates or General Assemblies, in which such questions are discussed and decided;—in which Laws are passed, Magistrates elected, the National Acts determined upon;—are the especial scenes of the struggles of Parties: either of the Conservative and the Movement party, which universally exist in such cases; or of Parties, which, without being guided by any fundamental Principle, have for their object Power; namely, the Power of directing the national acts. If such Assemblies be moderately numerous, and if the citizens who take part in them, really aim at Order, Liberty and Justice, the balance of the Constitution may long subsist. And if, on the increase of wealth and intelligence in the People, a large share of Popular Rights is pressed for, the Conservative Party may, by yielding slowly and yet holding steadily,find the new position of equilibrium which is suited to the new condition of the community.

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Chapter VIII. The Representative System of Government

  §949. When a nation becomes very large, such a balanced Constitution, as we have just spoken of, in its simple form, becomes difficult or impracticable. The General Assemblies of the citizens become too numerous and too mixed, to deliberate and act with order, freedom, and virtue. When freedom has existed in large nations, it has existed under more complex Constitutions; and the struggle between Established Authority and the demands for Enlarged Liberty have assumed corresponding forms. Sometimes the struggle has been between the King and the Nobles, the Nobles contending for Liberty for themselves; while the question of Liberty between their dependents and them is left to be settled afterwards. Thus the Barons of England, as the assertors of English Liberty, obtained Magna Charta. Or the struggle may be between the King, and certain Classes of the Community, collected (they or the principal persons of them) in Assemblies, Class by Class. Such Assemblies are the Estates of the Realm: thus in England the three Estates were anciently, the Spiritual Body, the Temporal Lords, and the Commons. The Members of the Estate of the Commons, the Third Estate, may be appointed by the People in various ways; but in all its modifications, this Estate is a Representative Assembly. And in nations where Classes of Society with broad historical distinctions have never existed, or where the distinctions have been abolished, the whole body of the people may be divided into Electoral Districts; and the Representatives of these Districts may form assemblies by which free government may be exercised for a territory, perhaps, of unlimited extent.

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  §950. The Principle of Representation in Government is entirely of modern origin. In the ancient world we nowhere find it brought into play. As we have just said, it is a necessary condition of the freedom of a great nation; for the whole body of the citizens could not, in any other way have their share in the Government. But the conduct of national business by Representative Assemblies, has advantages much beyond its making freedom merely possible for an extensive and populous country. It prevents the tumultuous meetings and rash proceedings of large popular assemblies. It also, by reducing the number of the deliberative assembly, increases the calmness and reasonableness of their discussions and decisions. The members of the assembly, not having found their place into it by chance, but being chosen for their real or supposed merits, act with a greater sense of responsibility; and will be, really, a wiser and more trustworthy set of men, than the citizens taken at hazard. Their being few in number, selected for merit, the object of public notice, makes them more likely to act for right ends, and less likely to be seduced by the prospect of personal advantage to oblique and selfish courses. The Members of such an assembly also attend to their public business more regularly and carefully than the people at large would do or could do. The Members of the Assembly become statesmen by profession, and attend to their work with a professional care and skill. They guard both order and liberty, the Rights of the State and of all citizens, more watchfully and better than the citizens would guard their own Rights.

  §951. On the other hand, in the Representative System, the people at large are liberated from the task of managing the Government, which they could not execute well; and are charged only with a business to which they are fully competent, that of electing those who are to govern. The citizens who would be wholly unfit to be trusted with the |233| decision of a question of foreign polity, or domestic economy, or jurisprudence, may be qualified to choose a person as their Representative. In this manner, the whole people have a share in the government: both the masses of population in the towns, too numerous and too ignorant to rule directly; and the people of the country, too scattered otherwise to act at all in public business. For these two may be brought together without difficulty on such occasions as the choice of a Representative.

  §952. We see, then, that this Modern Step in Polity, the introduction of the Representative System, makes a combination of Liberty and Order possible upon any scale however large, and brings with it other vast advantages. But for this purpose, the Representative must not be merely a Delegate, who reports to the Central Assembly what his constituents have directed him to say; nor must be a Senator for life, who, once elected, is no further responsible to the electors; nor must be a Patron, who has the people whom he represents, not for his Electors, but for his Clients; and finally, he must be a Representative in an Assembly which acts for the Nation; for it is of national Government that we are speaking. Hence it has been rightly stated (1 Lord Brougham, Political Philosophy Part, iii. 33) as essential to Representation, that in electing him the power of the People must be parted with, and given over, for a limited time, to Deputies chosen by the People; the Deputies fully and freely exercising Power instead of the People.

  §953. After the Representative System is fully established, the Struggles of Parties, and especially the Struggles of the Conservative and the Movement Party in each Country, are mainly carried on by means of Debates in the Representative Body. The leading Ideas of these two opposite Parties are, as we have seen, Order and Freedom. |234| In the historical course of the struggle, these Ideas are exemplified and embodied in special forms; in Coercive Laws on the one side, and Popular Rights on the other; and the Struggle is carried on with reference to a series of special and subordinate objects of this kind.

  §954. When men begin to direct their thoughts and actions, not towards a Practical Order and a Practical Freedom, to be attained by the removal of Special Disorders and Special Grievances, but towards a general Notional Order and Notional Freedom; these Notions are too vague to direct their actions safely, while the very largeness of the Notions makes them disturb the tranquil progress of men’s thoughts. And thus, the enthusiasts of both sides strain after a Visionary Polity, in which they think they could realize their Notional Order or their Notional Freedom; but without making any real progress towards the Object. In Polity, as in the Inductive Sciences, every large ascent towards Truth consists of a number of small ascents; and is to be forwarded only by struggling with the difficulty at which we have arrived; not by tracing in our minds a visionary scheme of the Science, which conducts us to some complete body of knowledge. Bacon has remarked that though the human Intellect naturally tries to reach the ultimate Truth at a single flight, yet that the only way in which Truth can really be attained is by a gradual progress through many intermediate steps. (1 Novum Organon, i. Ax. xix. xx.) The same is the case, for the most part, in the historical progress of nations towards a realization of the combined Ideas of Order and Freedom.

  §955. By means of the Representative System, Freedom has been established in some of the Monarchies of Europe, in the Democracy of the United States, and in some of the British Colonies. In all these cases, however, there has |235| been, in addition to the Assembly directly representing the People, another Assembly, a Senate, or a House of Peers, consisting of persons, either not at all, or not so directly, elected by the people. The joint assent of this Upper House and of the Lower Assembly has been made requisite for the validity of the measures of the State. And there appears to be strong reason to believe, that without such an Upper House, the balance between Order and Liberty in a State could not long be preserved. For an Assembly, chosen by the People, and brought directly into conflict with the Established Authority in its highest form; if it be strong enough to struggle at all, will be inflamed by the struggle, and will act hastily, angrily, and immoderately. The assent of another Assembly in its proceedings, if required for their validity, secures a deliberate and calm survey of the question, by men not heated and blinded by the same contagious passions and interests. With three bodies in the State; the Sovereign, the Senate, and the Representative Body, it is probable that two will be against the one which would disturb the balance of the Constitution.

  §956. Yet the balance is sometimes disturbed in most States. It is only by a rare felicity, that the struggle between the Conservative and the Movement party is carried on from age to age without producing such oscillations as overturn the balance. To yield slowly and firmly, to advance steadily and moderately, are rare virtues in Political Parties. Moreover, as we have said, besides the struggles of Parties from Principle, there are struggles of Parties for Power. It may happen that the Established Authority uses its Power to crush Established Liberty; and that the forms of the Constitution fail in providing adequate means of resistance. It may happen that Established Authority refuses all concessions, till the sense of practical grievances becomes intolerable, and leads to popular violence. It may |236| happen that when the popular Party is strong, men’s minds are inflamed with a Love of Notional Liberty, which no practical concessions can satiate; and then, the popular Party itself violates the Constitution. In these and many other cases, we may have Revolutions, or violent and anomalous Changes in the Constitution. They are, as we have said, cases of necessity; to be justified only by their necessity.

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Chapter IX. Actual Progress of Government in Ancient Rome and in England

  §957. The history of ancient Rome is an example of a long-continued struggle between an aristocracy and a democracy. According to the views of the most philosophical historians, the Patricians alone had a place in the original constitution of the Roman State. The Senate was the Administrative Council, with the King, and afterwards, with the Consuls, at its head; the Senate and the People (Senatus Populusque Romanus) had the Legislative Authority, exercised in the Comitia Curiata, the Assemblies of the Curies or Wards of the Patrician Houses (Gentes). The Plebs was a populace occupying a portion of the city, but not admitted to any place in the Senate, the Magistracy, or the Comitia, although forming a considerable portion of the army. Servius Tullius, the sixth King, gave a legal organization to the Plebs, by dividing it into thirty Tribes; and gave it a place in the Constitution, by the institution of Classes divided into Centuries, including, as the army included. Patricians and Plebeians together; and by the introduction of an Assembly of these, Comitia Centuriata, with authority for certain purposes. But it was long |237| before the Plebeians obtained the advantages which such a Constitution seemed to promise them. They were still oppressed and kept under by the Patricians. They were excluded from the Consulship, the Senate, and most Magistracies, and from intermarriage with Patricians. The Patricians had the profitable occupancy of the land (ager publicus), which nominally belonged to the State; and in many cases, lending money to the Impoverished Plebeians, acquired personal power over them, in virtue of the severe Roman Laws respecting Debtors.

  §958. This inequality of Rights and Advantages led to a Sedition, in which the Plebeians began, in a body, to separate themselves from the Roman State. They were brought back by concessions, that the debts of insolvents should be cancelled, and that they should have two magistrates appointed as their protectors; Tribunes of the Plebeians; whose persons should be inviolable, and who should have the power of interposing, so as to arrest any legal proceeding. From this time, the Plebeians, by struggles of various kinds, obtained many of the Rights from which they had at first been excluded. The practice of voting according to Tribes, in the Comitia Tributa, was employed: and by this means the power of the Plebeians was very greatly increased. Connubium, the intermarriage of Patricians and Plebeians was allowed; the Senate was thrown open to the Plebeians; afterwards it was ordained that of the two Consuls, always one should be a Plebeian. They succeeded in their attempts to carry Agrarian Laws, for an equal division of the public land. At length the remaining Magistracies were thrown open to Plebeians; the decrees of their assemblies (Plebiscita) were invested with the force of Laws; and the distinction of Patricians and Plebeians ceased to have any political value. The Polity of Rome had been changed by these struggles, from a rigorous Aristocracy, to a combination |238| of Aristocracy and Democracy. This may be looked upon as the golden period of the Roman Constitution. It is at this period that it obtained the admiration of Polybius: who describes the Constitution as exhibiting, in the combined institutions of Consuls, Senate, and Commons, a happy mixture of Regal Power, Aristocracy, and Democracy.

  §959. When Rome had become Mistress of the whole of Italy, new struggles arose, in consequence of the demands of the Italians claiming to be admitted into the privileges of the Roman Constitution. If the practice of modern times had been introduced, according to which the Citizens of Free States act their political part by their Representatives, it is possible that Italy might have long flourished under the mixt [sic] Roman Constitution. But the attempt to make all Italy one City, in a political sense, soon led to confusion. The Democratic portion of the State was too numerous for orderly action; and mobs of armed men, and armies, soon took its place. The evils of this state of things were so intolerable, that after a few transient changes, the Romans, in order to obtain tranquillity and security, were willing to resign their Liberty. They acquiesced in the sway of the successful General, bestowed upon him all their Constitutional Magistracies, and acknowledged him as their Emperor (Imperator.)

  §960. The Imperium from which this designation was especially borrowed, was the military power which the Commander of the Army has assigned to him over his troops in the field. It was of the most absolute kind, and was made obligatory upon each person by an oath (Sacramentum militare), that he would be faithful and obedient to his General, saving the fidelity he owed to the Roman Senate and People. On the destruction of Public Liberty, this Oath was taken to the Emperor, as Commander-in-Chief; but the Clause in favour of the Senate and People was |239| omitted. Instead of being limited to the Soldiers, the oath was extended to all magistrates and citizens, and ultimately to the provincials. And thus, the Roman Emperors had unlimited power, both by the accumulation of all civil authority in their persons, and by the military authority thus declared.

  §961. Accordingly, the Emperor had legislative as well as executive power. The Roman Jurists say, “Quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem, utpote quum Lege Regia quae de Imperio ejus lata est, Populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat.” (1 Dig. I. 4. Inst. I. 2, §6. Gaius, i. §7. The Command of the Emperor has the force of Law; for by the Royal Law respecting his authority, the People gives to him and confers upon him all its authority and power.) Religious as well as Civil authority was given to the Emperor; a sacredness and a kind of divinity were ascribed to him. After Christianity became the Religion of the Roman State, high religious dignity was still attributed to the imperial condition. In imitation of the Jewish kings, he was anointed with oil, and consecrated by a priest; he was declared to hold his crown by the Grace of God, and was spoken of as the Vicar of Christ over Christian people. And thus, the monarchical office was elevated to a transcendent supremacy and ideal perfection; it was the Source of Order, Justice, and Right; and absorbed and superseded all other powers and Rights which had existed in the Constitution.

  §962. Very different from this view of the chief ruler of the State, was that which prevailed among the northern nations who gradually took possession of the provinces of the Roman Empire. In the most considerable of the Germanic tribes, the form of Government was republican. Some of these had a Chief, to whom the Romans gave the name of King; but his authority was very limited. The Supreme Authority of the nation resided in the Freemen of whom |240| it was composed. When a national war was undertaken, one of the Chiefs was selected to command the army, but his authority expired with the return of peace. But when these tribes settled as conquerors in the Roman provinces, they adopted, in many respects, the customs and the legal language of those whom they subjugated. The superiority of the Romans over the Barbarians in intellectual and literary culture, the advantages attendant upon fixed laws, and laws already fixed, strongly promoted this result. And after a time, the servility of men’s language infected their thoughts; and the subjects of the kingdoms which arose out of the empire not only spoke, but in some measure thought of their King, as the Romans had been accustomed to do of their Emperor.

  §963. But there was another especially Germanic element, which modified the feelings of men towards their Chief. Every German Chief had a band of Followers, who had voluntarily attached themselves to him. From him they had received their recognized place as warriors; at his table they feasted; to his service they were devoted. In war, he fought for victory, they for their chief. From an ancient Teutonic word signifying their trustiness to him, they were called Antrustiones. They were also called the Chief’s Vassi, his young men, or his men: as the act of a person declaring himself a superior’s man was afterwards called homage, by a derivative from the Latin. This connexion was regarded as the most sacred which could subsist between one man and another. The usage of this connexion the Germans carried with them into the countries which they subdued, and it became one of the chief bonds of political union in the governments which they established. It was commonly confirmed by an oath, promising fidelity, fealty or allegiance, on the part of the inferior, and sometimes, by an oath promising protection and justice on the part of the superior. |241| The feelings connected with this ancient relation of superior and inferior have given a peculiar character to loyalty towards a Sovereign, as conceived in modern times.

  §964. The Feudal System, which was established in Europe after the separation of the Roman Empire, borrowed much of its language from this relation of the Chief and his men: it became that of the Seignior and his Vassals. But the Feudal System borrowed its more substantial element, the tenure of land by military service, from the Roman Empire. Even while the empire was only commencing, Sylla and Augustus assigned lands to their Veterans; and a little later, lands were granted to the Limitanean or Ripuarian Soldiery, on condition of defending the boundaries of the empire. These were commanded by the Dukes and Counts of the Provinces. Under Constantine, the Count of the Saxon Shore ruled from Norfolk to Sussex, while the Duke of Britain governed the remainder of Britain. These military Counts and Dukes were the Magistrates, as well as the Commanders of the Soldiery. The Military, so organized, constituted a distinct and ruling Class, both in consequence of their privileges, and of the right which they exercised of electing an Emperor upon some occasions. They were, in short, a Military Aristocracy. The lands thus possessed by military service were termed Benefices (beneficia); and afterwards Fiefs (feuda), by the Barbarians, who received land from the Roman rulers on the like conditions. Afterwards the Seigniors or Lords held their Fiefs as the grants of the Kings of the separate kingdoms. In turn, they themselves granted portions of them to inferior. Vassals, on the like condition of military Service; and this Subinfeudation of Vassals and Arriere of Vassals was continued through several degrees. The subordinate holders of feudal benefices possessed some of the privileges of feudal Lords. In the course of time. Fiefs became hereditary.

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  §965. Thus the Feudal System was established; and gave to the relation between the Governors and the Governed a new form. Instead of the single transcendental authority of the Roman Empire, before which all Liberty was annihilated, there was, along with Monarchy, a Military Aristocracy, in which the Superiors and Inferiors, from the Sovereign downwards, had mutual Rights and Obligations, of Protection and Service; and in which there were, therefore, for them. Elements both of Order and of Liberty.

  §966. It is true that this Order and this Liberty were very imperfect, being only such as are maintained in a state of peace which is looked upon as subordinate to a state of war. The lowest members of the Feudal System were liable to great oppression. Moreover, the peaceable part of the community, the inhabitants of towns, and generally, those who had no place in the army, were not provided for in this System. So far as they were concerned, there was no Security and no Liberty. Hence, from this time, the struggle between Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, takes a new form. We have the Feudal Aristocracy in conflict with the Imperial Doctrine of absolute Regal Power; and we have the Burgher Democracy in conflict with the Feudal Aristocracy and the Monarchy.

  §967. Our own country exhibits to us an exemplification of these conflicts. The Feudal System was fully established in England by the Norman Conquest; but the Conqueror gave to it a more monarchical character than it elsewhere had, by requiring, not only those who held in chief of the crown, but also their tenants, to swear personal fealty to the King. On the other hand, the exorbitance of the royal authority was resisted, not only by the rights of feudal tenancy, but also by a spirit of Freedom which the Anglo-Saxons had derived from their German ancestors, and by the Anglo-Saxon Laws and Institutions, which embodied this Freedom. The |243| Anglo-Saxon Kings were guided, in the main acts of their government, by the great Council of the nation, which bore the title of Wittenagemote, or the assembly of wise men. All the Laws expressed the assent of this Council. It was composed of Prelates and Abbots, of the Aldermen of the Shires, and, as it is expressed in the Laws themselves, of the Noble and Wise of the kingdom.

  §968. After the Norman Conquest, when the Anglo-Saxons were for a time, not only subjected to rigorous feudal servitudes, but reduced to the condition of a subjugated race, they looked back with an affectionate regret to the Laws of Edward the Confessor. William the Conqueror was induced to relax the rigour of his rule, so far as to grant his subjects a charter, in which he professed to restore the Laws of the Confessor, and to relieve, or at least to limit, the feudal burthens. Similar Charters were obtained by the subjects from succeeding kings; and after various struggles, there was won, from the crown, the Great Charter of King John, which determines the character of the English Constitution. This Charter, from the time of its being granted, was always considered as a primary and fundamental law of the nation. Mr. Hallam says, “This is still the key-stone of English Liberty. All that has since been obtained is little more than as confirmation or commentary: and if every subsequent Law were to be swept away, there would still remain the bold features which distinguish a free from a despotic monarchy” (1 Hallam, Middle Ages, iii. 417). Like preceding Charters, this redresses the worst grievances of the military tenants; but its more important clauses are those which protect the personal security and Rights of Property of all freemen. “No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free-customs; or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed. Nor |244| will we pass upon him but by the lawful judgment of his peers and the Law of the land. We will sell to no man justice and right; we will not deny or delay them to any man.” Other clauses restrain excessive and arbitrary demands of those pecuniary aids which the Feudal System authorized the Lord to claim of his vassals.

  §969. But the great Council of the Nation, as well as the Charters of the Kings, became a bulwark of Liberty. In the Saxon and in the Norman period, the King legislated with the advice of his Great Council or Parliament. It was a principle of the Feudal System that within the limits of his fief, a Vassal could not be bound by a law made without his consent (1 Hallam, Middle Ages, i. 247). New taxes, like other new laws, required the sanction of this Assembly; but the King had many old established claims upon his vassals, as Escuage, a commutation for the personal military service of his tenants; Tallage, a tax on his demesne lands and royal towns; Customs, on certain imports and exports. The Great Charter restrained escuage imposed without consent of Parliament; and the successors of John never pretended to a general right of taxation without this consent. This part of the Constitution attained a more definite form under Edward the First. His Confirmatio Chartarum not only gave to previous Charters most solemn sanctions, and universal circulation; but gave to private property that security against the aggressions of the crown, which Magna Charta had given to personal liberty. By this Statute the “aids, tasks, and prizes,” previously taken, are removed as precedents; and the King grants to his Clergy, Peers, and to all the Commonalty of the land, “that for no business from henceforth we shall take such manner of aids, tasks, or prizes, but by the common assent of the realm, and for the common profit thereof.”

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  §970. But here the progress of the Constitution towards a balance is further marked by the appearance of the Commonalty as well as the Nobles in Parliament. There is a House of Commons as well as a House of Peers.
  The earliest known writs of summons to cities and boroughs to send members to Parliament, are those issued by Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, acting as Sovereign of the kingdom; after he, at the head of a confederation of Barons, had defeated Henry the Third at the battle of Lewes. The deputies of such places were finally and permanently engrafted upon Parliament by Edward the First. These formed a Council, in addition to that of the Barons and higher Peers; and Knights, sent by the Shires, were associated with the Burgesses, at least from the time of Edward the Second. In the course of that and the following reign, the efforts of Parliament established upon a firmer footing three essential principles of the Constitution: the illegality of raising money without consent of Parliament; the necessity that the two Houses should concur for any alterations of the Law; and the Right of the Commons to inquire into public abuses, and to impeach the King’s Counsellors.

  §971. From this time, the importance of Parliament was shown by its becoming the battle-field of conflicting Parties in the State. In the reign of Edward the Second, it was not Parliament, but the Barons, who had the principal share in opposing the Government. But in the end of Edward the Third’s reign, an opposition, headed by the Prince of Wales, urged their grievances by means of the Petitions and proceedings of Parliament. And Richard the Second, the son of this Prince of Wales, after a reign of contests with his Parliaments, in which he repeatedly promised redress of grievances in return for Subsidies which they |246| voted him, was compelled to abdicate the throne, and Henry the Fourth was acknowledged King in 1399.

  §972. In the reigns of the three kings of the House of Lancaster (Henry IV., V., and VI.) the powers of the Parliament to protect the Liberty of the Nation were more fully unfolded. The exclusive Right of taxation by Parliament was maintained, and their Right also to direct and check the public expenditure. They exercised the Right of making their supplies depend upon the redress of grievances; they secured the people against illegal ordinances and interpolations of Statutes; they controlled the royal administration in matters of peace and war; they punished bad ministers; and finally, they established immunity of person, and liberty of speech, for themselves in their parliamentary capacity. Some of the most eminent maxims of parliamentary law were established in this period: for instance, that the Commons possess the exclusive Right of originating Money Bills; and that the King ought not to take notice of matters pending in Parliament.

  §973. Under these circumstances, the election of Members of Parliament became a very important Duty and Privilege of Englishmen. It was in the eighth year of Henry VI. that the Elective Franchise of Voters for Counties was determined to belong to freeholders of lands or tenements of the value of forty shillings. The proper Constituents of the Citizens and Burgesses sent to Parliament appear to have been Chartered Boroughs, and Towns belonging to the demesne of the Crown, and all places of eminent wealth and importance, even though not incorporated. But probably no Parliament ever perfectly corresponded with this Rule.

  §974. Thus, many centuries ago, a Constitution was established in England, in which Monarchy, Aristocracy, |247| and Democracy, balanced and controlled each other. There were many Institutions, Laws, and Customs, which were a security against arbitrary power; protecting both the rights of the Commons and of the Nobility; while yet the Government, in its whole tone and character, was Monarchical. In the language of the Law, all seems to grow out of the King, and is referred to his advantage and benefit. The voice of the Commons towards the Crown was, in its form, humble and deferential. The royal prerogative was always named in large and pompous expressions. This monarchical tone still more pervades our law-books. Hence, perhaps, it is, that some writers, as Hume, have fallen into the mistake of believing that the limitations of royal power in this country, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were unsettled, both in law and in public opinion. But the gradual development of the constitutional practices of parliament, in the way we have described, shows that there was nothing unsettled or ambiguous in their general character, as real securities of the National Liberty.

  §975. Accordingly, the English Constitution is described as free, and is put in contrast to despotic governments, by intelligent writers of those times. Sir John Fortescue, who was Chief Justice of the King’s Bench under Henry VI., and afterwards Governor to the young Prince of Wales, wrote a Treatise, entitled “Of the Difference between Absolute and Limited Monarchy,” in which the English Government is his example of a Limited Monarchy. He also wrote a Treatise, “De Laudibus Legum Anglise,” in which he inculcates this doctrine upon his royal pupil: “A King of England cannot at his pleasure make any alteration in the Laws of the Land: for the nature of his government is not regal, but political [or, in more modern phrase, not absolute, but constitutional]. Had it been merely regal, he would have had a power to make |248| what innovations and alterations he pleased in the laws of the Kingdom, impose tallages and other hardships upon the people, whether they would or no, without their consent; which sort of Government the Civil Laws point out, when they declare Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem. But it is otherwise with a king whose government is constitutional; because he can neither make any alteration or change in the laws of the realm without the consent of the subjects; nor burthen [sic] them against their will with strange impositions; so that a people governed by such Laws as are made by their own consent and approbation enjoy their properties securely, and without the hazard of being deprived of them, either by the king or any other.”

  §976. To the same effect speaks Philip de Comines in the reign of Edward the Fourth. “The King of England is not able to undertake things of great importance without calling his Parliament, which is in the nature of our Three Estates; and consisting for the most part of sober and pious men, is very serviceable, and a great strengthening to the King. At the meeting of this Parliament, the King declares his intention, and desires aid of his subjects, and they supply him very liberally.” (1 B, IV., c. 1.) And elsewhere he says, “In my opinion, of all the countries of Europe where I was ever acquainted, the Government is nowhere so well managed; the people nowhere less obnoxious to violence and oppression, nor their houses liable to the desolations of war, than in England; for there those calamities fall only on their authors.” (2 B. V., c. 18.)

  §977. The expressions exalting the King’s authority to absolute power, though borrowed, as we have seen, from the Law of the Roman Empire, and inconsistent with English history, yet being retained by lawyers and others, perhaps stimulated the Kings of England to arbitrary conduct |249| and imperious language, such as often proceeded from the Tudor princes. In opposition to this, the House of Commons did not fail from time to time to make declarations, and to take measures, in favour of the liberty and laws of the land: and though often overborne by power, they never surrendered the Cause of constitutional government. Even in the Act passed in the 28th of Henry VIII., which gave to the King’s proclamations the force of law, this was limited, “So that they should not be prejudicial to anyone’s inheritance, offices, liberties, goods and chattels, or infringe the established laws": and the very passing the Act, implied the recognition of Parliament as the legislative Authority. Even in this reign, in 1532, the Commons refused to pass a bill recommended by the Crown. (1 Hallam, Eng. Const. i. 59.) In the following reigns of Edward VI. and Mary, the House of Commons recovered its independent powers: and the course which the Court took, in order to strengthen itself, was, to conciliate the assembly. Queen Elizabeth frequently spoke to her Parliaments in an imperious manner; but they, too, had members who spoke boldly on the other side; and though she exercised a large power in some instances, she yielded in others. The voice of English freedom was never silenced in the Houses of Parliament, nor the voice of English law in the Courts of Justice. In this period, the House of Commons established some of their most important privileges; the exemption of their members from arrest during their Session; the right of determining contested elections of their own members: the right of punishing offences against themselves by imprisonment of the offenders. The Government of England was still, as it had long been, recognized as a Monarchy limited by law.

  §978. In opposition to Hume, who, to show the despotic character of the English Government, has quoted from |250| Raleigh a passage of servile flattery addressed to the Queen, Mr. Hallam quotes Aylmer, who wrote a Reply to John Knox’s “Blast of the Trumpet against the monstrous Regiment of Women.” In this work (in 1559), it is stated, as an undoubted doctrine, that “the regiment of England is not a mere monarchy, as some for lack of consideration think, nor a mere oligarchy nor democracy; but a rule mixed of all these, wherein each one of them hath or should have like authority. The image whereof, and not the image, but the thing indeed, is to be seen in the Parliament house, wherein you find these three Estates: the King or Queen, which represent the monarchy; the noblemen, which be the aristocracy; and the burgesses and knights, the democracy. If the parliament use their privileges, the King can ordain nothing without them: if he do, it is his fault, and their fault in permitting it.”

  §979. There were, no doubt, persons who held that the Sovereign of England possessed, in a sense more or less strict. Absolute Power; and the opposition between these persons, and the asserters of constitutional government, became more and more marked under the Stuarts. James I. had dissensions with his parliaments, which lasted during his reign: and these led to the famous Protestation of the Commons of December 10th, 1621, which is to the following effect; its various clauses referring to controversies with the crown which had occurred at various times: “That the liberties, franchises, privileges, and jurisdictions of parliament, are the undoubted birthright and inheritance of the subjects of England”—(this was in opposition to the doctrine asserted by the King, that they proceeded from the royal grace:) “That the arduous and urgent affairs concerning the King, State, and defence of the realm, and of the Church of England; the making and maintenance of laws, and redress of mischief and grievances, are proper subjects and |251| matters of counsel and debate in parliament; That in the handling and proceeding of those businesses, every member of the house hath, and of right ought to have, freedom of speech, to propound, treat, reason, and bring to conclusion, the same”: with other clauses of the like nature (1 Hallam, Eng. Const. i. 501).

  §980. Charles I was in conflict with his parliament from the beginning of his reign; but in 1628, he gave his assent to the Petition of Right, which embodies many of the most important parts of the Constitution. This Statute recites the various laws which had established certain essential privileges of the Subject, and enumerates violations of them which had recently occurred in the points of illegal exactions, arbitrary commitments, quartering of soldiers or sailors, and infliction of punishment by martial law; and then prays the King, “That no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by Act of Parliament; and that no freeman in such manner as is before-mentioned be imprisoned or detained; and that your majesty would be pleased to remove the said soldiers and marines; and that your people may not be so burthened [sic] in time to come; and that the aforesaid Commissions for proceeding by martial law may be revoked and annulled; and that hereafter no Commission of the like nature may issue forth to any person or persons to be executed as aforesaid, lest by colour of them any of your majesty’s subjects be destroyed or put to death contrary to the laws and franchises of the land.” Proceedings inconsistent with this law were resisted; as in the Case of Ship-money, in which Hampden refused payment of the illegal exaction. And though the decision of the majority of the judges was against him, this judgment was annulled by the Parliament as soon as it was allowed to meet.

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  §981. But the Parliament, which had so long been the defender, now became the assailant of the Constitution; and from this time, through the diseased and troubled period of the Civil War and the Usurpation of Cromwell, the public acts, both of Government and of Parliament, no longer express the national judgment of what was just, right, and constitutional; and have been repudiated by subsequent acts of the nation. Yet even in this time of conflict, we see the reverence with which the forms of the Constitution were retained. The parliament employed the name of the King, even in acting against him; and the King assembled a Parliament at Oxford, denying the name to that which sat at Westminster. Even when Cromwell had, by the aid of the army, usurped the power of the Government, he retained the general forms of the constitution; a Parliament elected by and representing the nation; and a House of Lords. And he was constantly told by the lawyers,—that his authority could never be truly valid till he assumed the Title of King; which was, to use their words, a wheel on which the whole body of the law was carried; which stood not on the top, but ran through the whole veins and life of the law;—That the nation had ever been a lover of monarchy, and of monarchy under the title of a King:—That, in short, this title of King was the title of the supreme magistrate which the law could take notice of, and no other.

  §982. The restoration of the Stuart line in Charles II., introduced no change in the principles of the Constitution: for Charles assumed the throne as King of England by law; and therefore, as bound by all the laws which preceding Parliaments had made, till they were repealed. The Convention Parliament which restored him, not having been called together by royal authority, the validity of its acts was doubtful, till they were confirmed by the succeeding parliament; but from this time, the monarchy resumed |253| its ancient course. The frequent session of parliament, and its high estimate of its own privileges, furnished a security against illegal taxation; and from this time we have no more of that grievance, hitherto so common. The power of the Commons to impeach a minister, even for acts performed by the King’s command, was established in the case of the Treasurer Danby; and this led to the decision of several important points, respecting the effect of such impeachment. In this reign, also, the ancient Right to a writ of Habeas Corpus, by which Englishmen are protected from illegal or arbitrary imprisonment, was invested with new securities and facilities. The encroachments on the legislative supremacy of parliament, and on the personal right of the subject, by means of Proclamations issued from the Privy Council, which had been frequent under former princes both of the Tudor and of the Stuart families, fell with the odious tribunal, the Star Chamber, by which they had been enforced.

  §983. It is true, that some persons still held that the Royal Power was absolute, and could not be limited by opposite acts or length of usage. But these doctrines were not those of the Parliament; the attempts to exclude James II. from the throne, showed how large a portion of the sovereign power was held to reside in other branches of the government. And the Revolution, which placed William the Third on the throne, involved a complete repudiation, on the part of the nation, of the doctrines of the Absolute Power, and the indefeasible and imprescriptible Rights, of the King of England. Yet the asserters of the liberty of England, even in this extreme case, attempted to divest their act, as much as possible, of the aspect of violence. The great vote of Jan. 28, 1689, was to the effect that King James II. had “abdicated the government, and that the throne was vacant.” In this, it was not pretended that the word “abdicated” was used in its ordinary sense, to |254| denote a voluntary resignation of the crown. It was a somewhat gentler term than “forfeited,” which was the notion really intended. But the national act, in this case, went beyond even the meaning of forfeiture; for it disregarded the rights of James’s Heirs, and appointed another Sovereign. The modern constitutional writer whom we have mainly followed in our historical survey, says, on this occasion, “It was only by recurring to a kind of paramount, and what I may call hyper-constitutional law; a mixture of force, and regard to the national good, which is the best sanction of what is done in revolutions; that the vote of the Commons could be defended. They proceeded, not by the stated rules of the English Government, but the general rights of mankind. They looked not so much to Magna Charta, as the original compact of society, and rejected Coke and Hall for Hooker and Grotius” (1 Hallam, Eng. Const. iii. 134). As we have said (§895), Revolutions cannot be justified by stated Rules of Government, but must be defended as Cases of Necessity. The defence of the Revolution of 1688 was, that the constitutional liberty and rational independence in matters of religion, which by the historical education of Englishmen were become necessary to their moral agency and moral progress, could not subsist under princes whose views of the national constitution and national religion were those of the Stuarts: and the proof of this incompatibility, which had been gaining strength ever since the accession of James I., was completed by the last acts of James II. A Revolution of which this is the true defence, conducted calmly, resolutely, and peaceably to its object, may very fitly be called Glorious.

  §984. This great occasion of the assertion of the liberty of England was signalized by the Declaration of Rights, which gave judgment on the past, and maxims for the future acts of the crown. It contains a recital of the |255| arbitrary acts which James had committed, and a condemnation of them as illegal. In this important act, it is declared: “That the pretended power of suspending laws, and the execution of laws, by royal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal: That the pretended power of dispensing with laws by royal authority, without consent of parliament is illegal: That the Commission for creating the late Court of Commissioners for ecclesiastical causes, and all other commissions and courts of the like kind, are illegal and pernicious: That levying of money for or to the use of the crown by pretence of prerogative without grant of parliament, or for longer time, or in other manner than the same is granted, is illegal: That it is the right of the Subjects to petition the King, and that all commitments or persecutions for such petitions are illegal: That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is illegal: That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their condition, and as allowed by law: That elections of members of parliament ought to be free: That the freedom of speech, or debates in parliament, ought not to be impeached, or questioned in any court out of parliament: That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted: That juries ought to be duly empaneled and returned, and that jurors which pass upon men in trials of high treason ought to be freeholders: and That for the redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently.” This Declaration was by the Bill of Rights.

  §985. After the Revolution, the Constitutional Liberty of England seemed to be sufficiently secured; and was so: yet the care of parliament was still employed in devising and |256| enacting further Securities. The appropriation of the revenue by Parliament was carried into further detail, by the separation of the Civil List, and of the Navy, Army, and Ordnance Department, from each other. “This measure has given the House of Commons so effectual a control over the executive power, or more truly speaking, has rendered it so much a participator in that power, that no administration can possibly subsist without its concurrence; nor can the session of parliament be intermitted for an entire year, without leaving both the naval and military force of the kingdom unprovided for” (1 Hallam, Eng. Const. iii., 159). The Mutiny Bill also, by which alone martial law can be administered in the army, was from this time passed only from year to year.

  §986. The Act of Settlement, by which the Electress Sophia, after the death of Queen Anne, was declared to be the stock of the Royal line, contained further provisions, intended to secure the nation against arbitrary acts of the Court: especially the exclusion of pensioners, and many of the officers of the Crown, from parliament; and the protection of the independence of the Judges, by making their commissions continue quamdiu se bene gesserint, during life or good behaviour, instead of durante bene placito, as long as the crown chose, which had been the practice.

  §987. Thus, so far as Parliament was the guardian of the National Liberty, the cause of liberty was fully vindicated; and the doubt might occur, whether, according to the Constitution so modified. Parliament might not sometimes be led, by some special object, to interpose its power so as to obstruct the acts of the crown, and to make government impossible. Order seemed to have been sacrificed to Liberty. But this was not the case. The balance between Order and Liberty was preserved by the struggle which took place within the boundary of Parliament itself. The Influence of |257| the Crown and of the Aristocracy was in that field exerted in favour of Order; and with more steadiness and care, than can be expected, on that side, from the Democracy. The efforts of the Democracy soon began to be directed to diminish or extinguish this Influence. One of the points, which thus came into conflict, was the mode of electing the Members of the House of Commons. By the theory of the Constitution, as it had been commonly stated, these Members were the Representatives of the Common People; but the Advocates of popular Rights asserted that in fact, they were not so; and that the House of Commons ought to be reformed, so as to bring the fact into nearer accordance with the theory of Representation.

  §988. By the ancient Constitution, the House of Commons was supposed to contain representatives of all the parts of the Empire which were subject to English laws and parliamentary burthens. Henry VIII. extended the right of election to the whole of Wales, the counties of Chester and Monmouth, and even the towns of Berwick and Calais; and thus added thirty-three members to the Commons (1 Hallam, Eng. Const. iii. 50). Edward VI. created fourteen boroughs, and restored ten, that had disused their privilege. Mary added twenty-one, Elizabeth sixty, and James twenty-seven members. But the design of the great influx of new members from petty boroughs, in these latter reigns, seems to have been to secure the authority of government, which such members were likely to support, rather than to follow out a democratic principle of the Constitution.

  §989. Four different kind of Electors of the Representatives of Boroughs appear in our Constitutional History. (1) Members of Corporations: the municipal magistracy or governing body of the incorporated place; (2) Freemen of Corporations, to whom the elective franchise was given by |258| charters of incorporation; (3) Electors by Burgage Tenure; where the right was annexed to certain freehold lands or burgages, and did not belong to any persons but such tenants; (4) The inhabitant householders paying scot and lot, which include local and general taxes. This was the original form of the right as enjoyed by Boroughs in the time of Edward I., and was applied to all of a later date, where a franchise of a different nature was not expressed in the charter.

  §990. These varieties in the elective franchise, the various growth and decay of ancient Boroughs, and in some cases the rise of insignificant hamlets into great and wealthy towns, have at all periods produced great deviations from regularity and consistency, in the representative structure of the House of Commons. So long as the struggle of the House with the Crown was an external war, these irregularities were not considered as very prejudicial to the cause of Liberty. Taking the House altogether, the various classes of the Community were virtually, if not actually, represented, as to their interests, arguments, and purposes. But when the battle between Authority and the claims of a larger Liberty was to be fought within the body of the Commons, the mode of electing the individual members became a matter of great moment in the struggle. Those who wished to enlarge the Liberty of the People demanded a Reform of the Parliament, a correction of the Anomalies of its composition, and a more faithful application of the Principle of Representation. Such reforms in special cases would have been consistent with previous history; but the establishment of a new Rule for all cases, was giving a new basis to the House of Commons, and was resisted as a perilous experiment, by the adherents of the ancient forms of Authority. The act for such a new basis of the House of Commons was, however, carried in 1831. In the preamble it is stated to have for its objects “to deprive many inconsiderable |259| places of the right of returning members, to grant such privilege to large, populous, and wealthy towns, to extend the elective franchise to many of His Majesty’s subjects who have not heretofore enjoyed the same.” By this Act, the voters for Knights of the Shire were to be, in addition to the old electors, the forty-shilling freeholders, copyholders to the extent of ten pounds a year, and other tenants to the extent of fifty pounds. The voters for Boroughs were to be persons occupying a house in the borough of the value of ten pounds a year. A number of boroughs (sixty) were disfranchised as inconsiderable places; the criterion adopted being, that the population was less than 2000. A number of other boroughs were allowed only one member, the population being less than 4000. Instead of two members to each county, there were assigned to some of the more populous counties three, to some, four, according to their importance. To towns containing more than 10,000 inhabitants, one representative was given; and two to places which had 20,000 inhabitants or more.

  §991. This is now the condition of the electoral franchise. The passing of the Act by which it was established is perhaps the largest attempt ever made at once to bring the Constitution nearer to a theoretical symmetry; but it is to be recollected, on the other hand, that the deviations of the composition of the representative body from the representative principle had become enormous. One caution, however, is suggested to the admirer of the English Constitution by this circumstance; In proportion to the largeness of the step made in the Reform Bill, should be the length of time which is allowed to elapse before any new Movement of an extensive nature is attempted. The New Part of the Constitution must have time to incorporate itself with the Old, before the body politic can bear with safety any new experiments. It may be that the Constitution has in this |260| case drawn in a new life by a deep draught of the cup of liberty; but it is requisite for the health of the nation that this strong potion be allowed time to assimilate with the system, before the draught be repeated.

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Chapter X. Duties of the State in General

  §992. We have stated (§473) that the State is a moral Agent: it has Duties: as Duties of Justice, Truth, Humanity, and the like. It has also a more general Duty; the Duty of the Moral Education of its citizens. We must now consider further these Duties, and the means of performing them.
  Some persons may be disposed to say, that the only Duties of the State are the Duty of protecting the Persons, the Property, and the other material interests of its citizens. And it is true, that all these Duties are Duties in a more vigorous sense than the Duties of Humanity, and the like; they are Obligations of the State, and are included in the Obligation of upholding the Laws (§850). But the practice of States, in all tranquil and cultured times, has pointed out other Duties of another kind, as belonging to them. If the protection of Person and Property be the stricter, they are also the lower Duties of States: and States in general have recognized higher Duties, in addition to these. They have recognized the Duty of paying their debts, a Duty of Justice: they have recognized the Duty of keeping their Treaties, a Duty of Truth: they have recognized the Duty of preventing Cruelty and Oppression, as in the prohibition of the Slave-trade, a Duty of Humanity: they have recognized the Duty of prohibiting obscene and indecent acts |261| and publications, a Duty of Purity: they have recognized the Duty of assisting and rewarding the progress of science and literature, as for instance, by means of Universities, Observatories, Voyages, and the like, a Duty of Intellectual Culture: finally, they have very generally recognized the Duty of morally Educating the young, of punishing and suppressing immoral books, and of uniting the citizens in general by the ties which common moral instruction produces; and this is a Duty of Moral Culture. I purposely abstain now from speaking of Religious Culture.

  §993. If anyone were to assert the protection of Person and Property to be the sole duties of States, we should ask, whether he asserts the States to have done wrong, which have recognized the Duties above enumerated. Perhaps some would answer that some of the above Duties, as paying National Debts and keeping National Treaties, are necessary to a good understanding with other Nations, and therefore, necessary to the Duty of national Self-defence, which is a duty of the State in the strictest sense. To this we must reply, that to pay debts and observe contracts, without any love for Justice and Truth, and merely for the purpose of being trusted, is to have a lower standard of Morality than can satisfy most men, even when applied to the State. But we add, that the answer does not apply at all to the instance of Duties of Humanity performed by States, as in the prohibition of the Slave-trade; nor to the other Duties mentioned. If the only Duties of the States are the protection of the Persons and Property of the Citizens; then the suppression of cruelty towards defenceless foreigners, the suppression of profligacy and mere vice at home, the encouragement of art, science, and literature, in all their higher forms, the education of children, and of all, except so far as teaching them the Law, must be proceedings with which the State has nothing to do; |262| and those States which have employed themselves in aiming at such objects by Laws, or by the expenditure of the national wealth, have been altogether in error.

  §994. The necessity of the State undertaking such duties, in addition to the Obligations of protecting person and property, may be further illustrated. If we suppose a State which undertakes to protect the persons and property of its members, but disclaims all higher Duties of Humanity, Purity, and the like; the members, when they have attained to a moderate degree of moral culture, will not be satisfied with the range of action of the State; and will not acquiesce in the State, as the highest representative of their common action. They will form themselves into Associations for purposes of Justice, Humanity, and other similar objects. These Associations may become so numerous and united, as to elect the magistrates, control the national acts, change the laws, or defeat their execution, and the like; and thus, may be something exercising higher powers than the State, and reducing that which is formally the State, to a mere mode of action of these Associations. Moreover it is probable that Associations thus bound together voluntarily by a sympathy in Justice and Humanity, will become so powerful as to control or direct the acts of the State, if their Standard of Morality is much higher than that by which the State acts; and if they, consequently, look upon the formal course of action of the State with no approval or sympathy. For instance, the State may give its members property in slaves; but if the general body of individuals have arrived at a point of Moral Culture in which they look upon Slavery as unjust and inhuman; when a man seeks to obtain possession of a slave by course of law, witnesses, judge, and jury (or some of these), will probably act so as to evade, or even to contradict the law; or the law will soon be altered. Perhaps even the Association |263| may be powerful enough to compel the nation to interfere in behalf of slaves of other countries; and thus, in such a case, the voluntary Association, and not the Body which is formally the State, acts as the Nation. And in the same manner, if the State do not attempt to give to the young a moral education, there may be Associations which undertake to do this; and such Associations, as part of their teaching, may inculcate the injustice or inhumanity of the existing laws. Thus, so far as their teaching is effective, these Associations may produce fundamental changes in the laws, and may direct the National Action in some of the most important points.
  But further: Moral Education must necessarily depend upon Religion, and will always take the form of Religious Education. Men cannot think much of their Duties, and their Destination, without being led to think of, and to adopt Religion. Religion binds them into Associations, in which they have common convictions, and common privileges, which they earnestly wish to transmit to their children, and to others whom they love. If Classes and Bodies, charged with such objects, be not involved in the composition of the State itself, Societies will be formed, as an addition to the State; and these will exercise such power that the State will be subordinate to them, or will be destroyed by them. In the history of States we have many instances of a Religion, independent of the State, displacing the Religion previously adopted by the State; though the latter has exerted the formal powers of the State in its defence. In several such cases, the struggle between the old and the new Religion has been long and obstinate. But then, the main strength of the defence of the old Religion lay in its being a Religion, satisfying in some degree men’s religious needs, and binding them to its cause by religious ties. If the struggle were between a new Religion and no Religion in the State, the |264| success of the Religious Association in obtaining its ascendancy over the State would be, we cannot but suppose, much more rapid. It may, indeed, happen, that in consequence of the existence of several rival Religious Associations in the State, no one of them obtains a complete Ascendancy over it. In this case, the power, which the Religious Associations in every State possess, is not extinguished, but divided and balanced. But even in this case. Statesmen will find it necessary to recognize, on the part of the State, those Duties, which all the kinds of Religion agree in enjoining. And thus, the State cannot omit to recognize its higher Duties, without putting in the hands of those who do recognize such Duties, the means of combining men into Associations more powerful than the State; the means of converting the State organization into their instrument; the means of acting for the Nation in spite of the State.

  §995. The necessity of a State recognizing its higher Duties, and especially the Duty of imparting or confirming the religious instruction of its members, appears also by considering the Right of imposing Oaths, which, as we have said, is exercised by all States (§841). By the imposition of Oaths, the citizen’s Obligations are identified with his religious Duties; and the State relies upon this identity, as necessary to give it a real hold upon men, and to make them do its business in a sincere, serious, and solemn spirit. If the State cannot obtain this result, it will necessarily tend to dissolution. But religious Duties can have no force for men who have no Religion. The State therefore, in order to provide for its own preservation, must maintain the Religion of the citizens in such modes as it can; for instance, by the religious education of the young, and by arrangements for keeping up the religious convictions and religious sympathies of all. If the State do not, by such means, or by some means, keep alive the religious |265| convictions to which it appeals in the Oaths which it imposes, the Oaths will be rejected, or regarded as unmeaning. In such a Case, men, thinking lightly of Oaths, will think lightly also of Duties and Obligations; and the State will be dissolved by the destruction of all the ties which bind its members to it. Or else, such Oaths will be looked upon as a sinful profanation of true Religion; religious men will refuse to take them, and will give all their efforts to the support of their own Religious Association, which is opposed to the Religion of the State; and thus the actions of such men will tend to destroy the Religion of the State, and perhaps the State itself. It may, indeed, happen, as we have just said, that there are several rival Religions in the State; and in this case, there are especial difficulties in employing Oaths for the purposes of the State, and in keeping up the religious convictions which give Oaths their force. In this case, if all the Religions allow that obedience to the Civil Authorities is a religious Duty, Oaths may still be employed, to promote the lower aim of the State, its own preservation; but the higher aim of the State, the moral and intellectual culture of its members, will necessarily be pursued under great disadvantages; for the moral and intellectual culture of men cannot be prosecuted without employing Religion; and Religion can be employed for such purposes, only by accepting it as true. The State therefore cannot employ, for its higher purposes, Religions which contradict each other; and in such a case as we have spoken of, the State may be prevented from pursuing its higher purposes at all; or may be much impeded in doing so. But even in such cases, the State has those Duties which all the rival Religions agree in recognizing; and has, besides, the Duty of promoting moral and intellectual culture, in conjunction with the true Religion, as far as circumstances permit.

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  §996. Thus, in all cases. States have Duties. The Duties of States may be arranged under the same heads which we have already had before us. Besides the Duties of Order, by which, especially, the State is the State, there are Duties of Justice, Truth, Humanity, Purity; and there is also the higher and more comprehensive Duty of moral and intellectual Self-culture. The State obtains moral and intellectual Culture for itself, by obtaining it for its members. And thus, the highest and most comprehensive Duty of the State is the moral and intellectual Education of its members. This Duty, as belonging to the State, modifies, in an especial manner, its other Duties; and must be considered in conjunction with all of them, as we shall have occasion to see.

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Chapter XI. Duties of the State: Justice and Truth

  §997. The Duties of Justice and Truth, as belonging to States, point out the same course of action which they point out for individuals: they direct the State to abstain from infringing the Property or Rights of other States; to pay its Debts; to observe its Treaties; and the like. In these instances, the Duties have analogy with the Legal Obligations, rather than with the Moral Duties of individuals; and accordingly, these Duties are the subject of an especial branch of Law or Jus; which we may term International Law, or International Jus, and which we shall treat of afterwards.

§998. But the Duties of Justice and Truth, as belonging to the State, have also their Sphere of Action |267| within the State; they require, for instance, that both the Laws, and the Administration of the Laws, be conformable to Justice and Truth. We have already stated (§493) a general Maxim of Justice, which applies especially to Legislation: namely, that Justice requires us to aim constantly to remedy the inequalities which History produces. And this maxim applies to all the matters with which Law deals; to personal Rights, to Property, to Education. In these matters. Justice does not require Equality. Any Attempt to establish Equality would tend to destroy all Property, all Law, and all Right; for if Rights be permanent, their permanent subsistence will produce Inequality. But Justice aims constantly to remedy Inequality. Hence Laws should aim continually to enrich the poor, to strengthen the weak, to elevate the low, to instruct the ignorant. But they should do this, in such a manner, as not to shake at all the permanence of Rights. They should enable the poor to enrich themselves, the low to rise, the ignorant to learn, by the use of their own Rights, and without trespassing upon the Rights of any other Class. Just Laws will not transfer Property from one Class to another, merely in order to restore equality. Just laws will not direct the poorest to be educated in the same degree as the richest. But Just Laws will not allow a condition of the community, in which any Class is condemned to a degradation, or poverty, or ignorance, from which they cannot escape. Just Laws will provide openings for the rise of the lower ranks into the place of the higher, as soon as they become fit for such a rise; and will assist such an event, by promoting, among the higher ranks also, such views as will make them regard this event, not as an evil, but as a good.

  §999. The regard of the State for the Duty of Truth will be shown both by the simplicity and sincerity of its |268| own proceedings, and by its encouraging and promoting this Duty in individuals. For instances of the former kind, we may take the abolition of legal fictions and the removal of forced constructions of old laws by means of improved laws. Such steps make the language spoken by the State more true. Yet in the case of States, much more than in the case of individuals, we must take account of the Conventions (§394) by which words, phrases, and processes, acquire a meaning different from their obvious meaning. This is more necessary in the case of States, because it is impossible for States to accommodate their language to each case, as individuals may do. States must act by stated forms of procedure and language, in which forms a complex multitude of interests are implied; and any alteration of the forms, since it will require a consideration of all these interests, and an agreement upon the alteration by the legislating bodies, cannot take place frequently and lightly, nor ought it to do so. Legal fictions, and forced constructions of the language of old laws, cannot be altogether avoided. They have existed in all countries in which laws have long subsisted; and to attempt to avoid them entirely would be to make the legislator instantly conform to all changes, however capricious, of language and practice. Law Language, and Law Forms, must have an antiquated cast, for this reason; that they must have in them a principle of steadiness and permanence beyond our daily speech and common manners.

  §1000. The State promotes and inculcates the Duty of Truth in individuals, by requiring from them a punctual and faithful performance of Contracts and other engagements. Yet here also, the consideration of other Duties comes in; and limits, in some degree, the extent to which the State insists upon the performance of Engagements. We have seen that the Roman Law did not compel the |269| performance of a nudum pactum, a mere promise made for no reasonable consideration; and that the English Law takes the same course. The Law will not, for instance, sanction or enforce an engagement to win and lose money according to the events of a game of chance. To insist upon the performance of such engagements, would be to encourage a reckless spirit, which loves to depend upon casual superiority, or upon mere accident, rather than on rational foresight and self-guidance. The State, in such cases, teaches its citizens that Property is a Trust of more value than the Veracity of such rash and reckless promisers. The State, in doing this, does not slight the Duty of Truth; on the contrary, it sometimes condemns the whole proceeding, by making such Gambling a crime. Besides; such engagements are so frequently and so naturally connected with Fraud, as well as Folly, that Honesty, as well as the rational use of Property, would be damaged by the legal recognition of such Engagements.

  §1001. In another kind of Engagements, Promises of Marriage, the Law teaches the Duty of Truth, by punishing the violation of the Promise; and sometimes, even when it has not been made in express words, but only implied in the general course of the language used between the parties. And though, here also, there may be room for Mistake or Delusion; to punish the Levity or Duplicity which can trifle with so serious a matter, is a moral lesson which it becomes the State to give.

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Chapter XII. Duties of the State: Humanity

  §1002. The Duty of Justice on the part of the State is universally allowed: that the State has a Duty of Humanity, is perhaps not so generally understood. But we have seen (§508 and §514), in speaking of Justice and of Humanity in general, how near the Duties belonging to the two approach each other, and how difficult it is to draw the boundary line. It is a Principle of Humanity, and, in an extended sense of Justice, a Principle of Justice also, that all men should possess the Natural Rights of man; namely (§514), the Rights of Personal Security from violence; of Sustenance and Property so far as is requisite for moral agency; and of Marriage. Such Rights, in every State, are actually possessed by the citizens only so far as the Law allows them; but the question now before us is, what the Laws ought to be; what Civil Rights it is the State’s Duty to give to its citizens.

  §1003. We have already seen (§522) that the existence of Slavery is contrary to Morality. Such a condition of the community is a violation of the Duty of Humanity which belongs to the State; and wherever it exists. Humanity requires that the State should take steps towards its abolition. But we have also said (§530) that the abolition ought to proceed by legal and constitutional means; and must often be attained only by many steps, and by slow degrees. Still, it must be again repeated: delay in this course can be tolerated by the Moralist, only so far as it is inevitable. Every State which acquiesces in the existence of Slavery among its members, as a permanent and stable condition of things, neglects the great Duty of Humanity, which is incumbent upon States as upon individuals. A State cannot |271| neglect such Duties, without divesting itself, to an extent shocking to all good men, of its moral character, and renouncing its hope of that moral progress which is its highest purpose.

  §1004. Slavery involves the denial of all Rights to the man, and especially of the Right of security from arbitrary personal violence, and the Right of Property. But even in States where these Rights are allowed by the Law to all, it often happens that there are Classes of persons who do not practically enjoy them. With regard to the Right of Sustenance, and such Property as is requisite to make the man a moral agent, there are large bodies of the people, even in States conspicuous for their general freedom, who hold these necessary means of moral being very precariously, and occasionally lose them altogether. Men perish of hunger in opulent cities. Many are mendicants, who are supposed to have nothing of their own, and depend for sustenance upon the casual bounty of their fellow-citizens. Many, belonging to the industrious classes, are frequently destitute; though willing to work, they can find no one to hire them, and they have expended all their previous earnings. Does the Duty of Humanity in the State admit of its tolerating the existence of such things? To pass by the Right to sustenance, in cases of extremity, which, as we have seen, the Humanity of the old law of England allowed, is it possible for the State to put an end to Mendicancy and Destitution? and if this be possible, is this the Duty of the State?

§1005. We find, in this case also, other Duties of the State which may interfere with the Duty of Humanity, and may limit or prevent its operation. It is the Duty of the State to leave room for the exercise of the Humanity of individuals; for this is an important part of their Moral Culture. If the Beggar obtains alms on which he can live; if the poor Labourer be supported through his seasons of destitution |272| by the benevolence of his richer neighbours; the men so provided for are not degraded from the rank of moral beings; and the givers are probably morally improved by what they do. Such dependence of the poor upon the rich, has existed in all communities; and it is not necessarily contrary to the Duty of the State to tolerate such a condition of things, which includes the means of a valuable Moral Culture of Benevolence. Moreover, it is the Duty of the State to teach Foresight and Thrift to the poor, as well as Benevolence to the rich. Beggary, destitution, and want of work, may arise from improvidence, carelessness, prodigality, idleness, and perverseness. By letting the consequences of these bad habits fall upon those who are guilty of them, the State teaches useful lessons. If the State were to maintain in comfort all who chose to beg, or all labourers who remained unhired, the produce of the labour of the industrious and provident would be given to the idle and improvident; and this might proceed to such an extent, as to destroy the rewards of labour and the value of property.

  §1006. But if it appear that the destitute are not provided for sufficiently by the benevolence of individuals, what then is the Duty of the State? If, when room is thus left for the Humanity of the rich to act, it appears that there is still a large class of starving poor, what is the course to be taken? If benevolent individuals do much, but still not enough to prevent the existence of extreme distress among numbers of men, is it the Duty of the State to do the rest? And if so, how is this Duty to be limited, so as not to interfere fatally with the other Duties of the State which we have mentioned? Ought there to be a State Provision for the poor? and if so, upon what Principles?

  §1007. To the first of these questions the Moralists must needs reply, that taking the case as here supposed, the spontaneous bounty of the rich being insufficient |273| to keep the poor from starvation, it is the Duty of the State to interpose, and to make, by taxation, or in some other way, a provision which shall save them from the extreme of want. This is a Duty of Humanity on the part of the State in any case. If the deficiency of private bounty arises from the want of benevolence towards their poor neighbours on the part of the rich, it is the business of the State to be humane for the rich, both in order to discharge its own Duty, and to teach them theirs. If the prevalence of distress arise, not so much from men’s wanting the benevolence to relieve the distress which is brought before them, as from the multitude, density, and variety of the population, which conceals large classes of sufferers from the eyes of their fellow-citizens; it is then proper that the State should be humane for all and towards all, in order to supply, for the benevolent citizens, that which they cannot do for themselves: for the State has the means of reaching all classes; and can diffuse relief more widely than private givers can.

  §1008. With regard to the Principles on which such public Relief is to be given, we may remark; First, that the Relief ought always to be contemplated as temporary. For the object of humanity is, that the man be preserved as a moral agent; but man, in a state of unlimited and hopeless destitution, is not capable of moral agency. He has not the means of self-guidance and advancement, which are requisite to his moral being. If a man, by accepting public relief, is placed in a condition in which there is a permanent bar to his becoming again an independent and thriving labourer, the object of humanity is defeated, and the man is reduced to a kind of servitude. Hence, it would be a mistake to require a man to sell or part with the tools of his trade, or the furniture of his house, before he receives public relief: for the want of these things will be a most serious obstacle to his resuming his character as an independent workman. |274| On the other hand, in order that the State may not teach lessons of improvidence and idleness, it is necessary that the public relief be given on harder terms than the wages of independent labour. For the poor must be taught to earn their subsistence independently, as long as it is possible; and to recur to public charity, only in cases of necessity. These conditions appear to be satisfied if we make public relief come to the labourer, in the shape of wages for labour at some public work; the wages being smaller than those of the independent labourer, and yet sufficient for subsistence. In such a system, it may be supposed that men would claim public relief, only so long as it was necessary; and would gladly return to independent labour, as soon as it was possible; while at the same time, relief to the extent of necessary subsistence, would always be within their power.

  §1009. There can hardly be much difficulty in devising works which might be so conducted; especially if it be recollected that the question is not, whether such works will pay for the labour, but whether they will pay better than supporting the labourers in idleness. As instances of such works, we may mention making and repairing roads, harbours, canals, leveling obstacles, reclaiming wild land, draining morasses, building public edifices, ships, and the like.

  §1010. It may be a question whether the relief of Paupers (as poor persons relieved by the State may be termed, for the sake of distinction) should be administered by the general Government: or whether the paupers belonging to districts, as Parishes, should have relief administered each by his own Parish. The latter scheme appears, at first sight, better suited to make the relief—both a lesson of humanity to the givers, since it is bestowed on their neighbours, whose distress they know—and a lesson of |275| industry and economy to the receivers, since, if they are idle and improvident, their neighbours, who know their conduct, will be disposed to show them less favour, in the public relief which they give them. If indeed there be a Poor Law, which gives the unhired labourer a Right to a sufficient relief, whatever be the judgment which the Parish Officers form of his willingness to work, the relief may be considered by the givers as an unmerited boon, and by the receivers as an undeniable right; and thus, may produce unkindly feelings on both sides, while it encourages improvidence and idleness as much as the most ineffective benevolence would do. On the other hand, humanity rejects the notion that the destitute should have no right to a subsistence. A mode of avoiding these opposite inconveniences, retaining the administration by Districts, appears to be that already mentioned; the employment of the unhired labourers upon a public work, at wages below those of the independent labourer, and yet sufficient for subsistence. But here an inconvenience of another kind may come in. If the administrators of the poor-laws be also the employers of labour, they may agree to employ the unhired labourers upon their private work, instead of public work; and may, thus, bring them into competition with the independent labourer; they may thus lower the wages of all, while they pay a part of the wages of their private work out of public funds. This might be remedied, if there were in each parish, or in each district, a work really public, and if the independent labourer were always at liberty to seek work there. For then the employers of labour would always be compelled to give to labour the wages which it deserved.

  §1011. But this plan is applicable, only when the number of persons to be provided for out of public charity is small, compared with the whole number of labourers. If |276| a large portion of the labouring population were to ask for public relief, the condition of the community must be considered diseased: for by our supposition, public relief supplies only a bare subsistence: and, while it lasts, takes away a man’s free agency, and suspends his moral advancement; besides which, it might be difficult to find in every district an unlimited supply of public work. In such a case, when great numbers of the poor are unemployed, what is the State to do?

  §1012. We may remark, that there appears, at least at first sight, to be a tendency to such a state of things, in consequence of the improvements constantly going on in the productive powers of labour, and especially of agricultural labour. Our rural districts employed more labourers in ancient time, when a rude husbandry raised a scanty produce, than they do now. The produce of the land is much greater, but the portion of it assigned as wages to the agricultural labourer is smaller. The surplus goes to the Farmer as Profit, and to the Landlord as Rent. And this arises, generally, not from any want of humanity in the Landlord or in the Farmer, but from the progress of agricultural improvement. If the Landlord diminish his Rent, the Farmer puts the allowance in his pocket. If one Farmer pay his labourers higher wages, or employ a greater number, the Relief to the general body is small: for the general rate of wages will be determined, not by considerations of Humanity, but by the operation of the Demand and the Supply of Labour. We cannot expect a universal agreement among the Employers of Labour to increase the amount paid in Wages. A great number of them could not do this, without annihilating their profits, and subjecting themselves to positive expense; and if partially done, it would produce little effect beyond a rush of labour from one employment to another. Hence, the State cannot |277| require that men should show their Humanity by lowering their Rents, or their Profits, or increasing the Wages which they pay. It may be well that individuals should do this; both as an exercise of humanity, and of moderation with regard to wealth. But the nature of such self-discipline requires that it should be spontaneous, and enforced by external control. The State must leave Rents, Profits, and Wages, to be regulated by their appropriate influences.

  §1013. What, then, is to be done with regard to the numbers who may be expected to be thrown out of agricultural employment by the improvements in agriculture? If we consider what form of society would be ideally the best under such circumstances, the system which we should picture to ourselves would seem to be something of this kind. We should conceive that, while the poor portion of mere labourers, actually required, was constantly diminishing, the structure of society, both with respect to the conduct of the powers of labour, and the habits of domestic life, should change, so as to provide many new ranks and stages in the community, on which men might stand; and many new employments, by means of which they might obtain their share in the increased sustenance and comfort produced by the improvements in labour. Instead of merely the Landlord cultivating his own acres, with his Hinds and Labourers under him, in home-made clothing amid home-made tools and instruments; we may have many classes arising between these two, each living in some degree of comfort, and even ease. The Farmer steps in between the Landlord and the Labourer. He employs the Wheelwright and other makers of agricultural implements; the Corn-dealer; the Carrier. His attire is furnished by Growers, Spinners, Weavers, Clothiers of various kinds. His house is furnished with implements of wood, iron, brass, silver, gold, glass, porcelain. The manufacturer or tradesman, |278| who supplies each article, has many men working under him, and is himself surrounded by the like luxuries. There are many gradations of tradesmen of each kind; many manufacturers subordinate to each tradesman, many tradesmen to each manufacturer. Classes so complex require many persons to facilitate and regulate their intercourse: Brokers; Factors; Notaries; Men of Law; Commercial Travelers; and all these classes, thus introduced, are, in gains and habits, much above the mere labourer. And thus, so far as the growth of these employments goes, there is a constant opening for those who are no longer needed as labourers. When the proportion of mere labourers in a community diminishes, in consequence of improvements in the art of labour, it is not that any are extinguished or extruded; a portion, who, if the state of the community had continued unchanged, would have been labourers, are elevated into something more. There is a constant current upwards, in a thriving society; and the multiplication of intermediate classes provides for the increasing distance between the highest and the lowest. The agricultural classes produce food for an increased number of persons in addition to themselves; and the multiplied occupations bring forward persons who receive their share with advantage to all.

  §1014. We have evidence that in England the advance of which we hear speak has gone very far, in comparison with most countries. In all other countries, the agricultural classes are the largest share of the population. In France, for instance, they are two-thirds of the whole. Two agriculturists support one non-agriculturist, besides themselves. But in England, the non-agricultural is twice the agricultural population. Two agriculturists support four non-agriculturists. (1 Jones, On Rent, p. 230) And these four receive their support, as members of some or other of the various trades and occupations |279| which have gradually grown up, amid the increased activity and multiplied bearings of our industry.

  §1015. I have spoken of the increase of the productive powers in agricultural labour, because that labour belongs to the earliest condition of mankind, and is always the most indispensable. But improvements may be made in other kinds of labour also, by which its powers may be increased, and at least for a time, a number of persons may be thrown out of work. And this is more likely to happen in manufactures than in agriculture; because improvements are always slowly and gradually introduced in agriculture, but in manufactures often suddenly and rapidly. But on the other hand, the desire for manufactured goods may be extended much further than the desire for food, which is confined within moderate limits; and therefore, it may often happen, that when a body of labourers have been at first thrown out of work, by some improvement in manufactures, which dispensed with their labour, they may have been again absorbed by the manufactories, in order to provide for the increased sale of manufactures to which the diminished prices had given occasion.

  §1016. But we can hardly venture to assert that the multiplication of trades, and the extended use of manufactures taken together, will always provide an adequate employment and subsistence for the numbers thrown out of work by the improvements in agriculture and manufactures. And even if agriculture be unprogre1016.ssive, and manufactures of small amount, the numbers of the people may multiply so that it is difficult for them to procure subsistence. If this happen, under a Government in which the sense of Duty is not unfolded, or in one in which it is rejected, the people will be left to struggle with their needs for themselves; and the hard discipline of want or famine will limit their increase, or dispose of the superfluous numbers.

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  §1017. It has been sometimes said, that when the number of the labouring population are too great, it is the consequence of their own improvidence; that they ought not to marry and produce children except they have a reasonable prospect of being able to support them; that they have the remedy in their own hands; since, by abstinence from marriage, they may limit their numbers, and reduce them to that amount for which the condition of society has need, and which it will willingly support.

  §1018. But this, though sometimes said by very humane persons, appears to be contrary to all consistent humanity. To expect that the labouring classes shall, by general consent, take the course thus recommended, is to expect that they, the most ignorant and helpless class, shall act for the State; and shall act with more foresight, combination, and self-denial, than any State has even yet acted. And if it be merely meant that each poor man should, for himself, act thus; it may be true, that such Forecast is a Duty; but to this may be opposed, in many or most cases, other Duties; the Duty of Chastity, and the Duty of promoting the happiness of those we love. For it can hardly be meant that a poor man shall never love. We may add, too, that when a man looks to little more than a subsistence for himself and his family, he may, under the influence of love and hope, frequently reckon upon so much when he does not find it; and often his destitution may come by some change which no forecast could have divined. But supposing there be a great number of unemployed poor who are there because they have neglected such duties as these; still the question recurs, What is the State to do respecting them? To say that they have neglected their Duty, besides being of no use in pointing out the remedy for the evil, has the fault of being a one-sided censure. For it is equally probable that their richer neighbours also have neglected their Duty; in |281| not employing them for humanity’s sake, as well as for the sake of gain; in not warning and superintending the poor; in not helping them at an earlier period; and the like. And both parties being thus to blame, there appears a kind of cruelty in applying the censure to the party who are already suffering the consequences of their fault, in the bitterness of want and destitution, and with no power of deriving present relief from the course suggested to them.

  §1019. To the question, What is the State to do in such a case? we reply, that if the number of the destitute be so great that they cannot be employed upon public works at home, as we have suggested, it appears to be well worth consideration whether a number of them might not be encouraged to emigrate to some foreign country, uninhabited or slightly cultivated, in which their labour might procure them an abundant subsistence. Such Colonies have, in all ages, been frequently established as a vent for the overflowing population of a State; and in most instances, with mutual benefits to the Mother Country and to the Colony. Such lands are easily found, and may be occupied for such purposes, with a just regard to the claims and interests of the original inhabitants.

  §1020. But though the Emigration of labourers may thus be a highly beneficial resource, if there be a temporary superabundance of that class, and no vacant occupation for them at home; it appears very doubtful whether the State ought to reckon upon Emigration as an habitual resource against the evils of a too rapidly growing population. So far, indeed, as Emigration is the spontaneous act of individuals, it belongs to the habits of the people and is taken into account by families, and heads of families, in forming their scheme of life. But an Emigration on a large scale, conducted by the State, and composed mainly of destitute persons, |282| makes too abrupt a change in the community to be entirely wholesome, and must needs be an expensive mode of providing for the emigrants. For they must be supported, not only on the voyage, but till they can support themselves in the Colony. A policy more generally wise, appears to be, to facilitate as much as possible that rise of men from the lower to the higher classes of society by which the lowest are prevented from being too numerous; and to encourage that increased use of manufactures of all kinds, which, as we have said, is the most general resource against the temporary inconveniences arising from increased manufacturing power.

  §1021. I have discussed the question of poor-laws so far, with reference to able-bodied labourers, because if it be allowed to be the Duty of the State to make provision for them, it will hardly be denied with regard to the aged and infirm. Yet even with regard to these, there are not wanting important considerations which may modify this Duty. It is desirable, as an exercise of prudence and forethought, that labourers, as well as others, should save in the season of health and manhood something on which they may subsist in sickness and in age. It is desirable, as an exercise of family Affection, that aged and infirm persons should be supported and nursed by their children and near relatives. If the State be too ready to take upon itself the burthen [sic] of aged and infirm persons, children may feel less responsible for the comfort of their aged parents; parents, for that of their sick children; and other members of families, in like manner, with respect to each other: and thus, the family affections may be chilled, and family claims disregarded. And this danger is so far worth attention, that if a parent, or child, or wife, or husband, of persons who have enough and to spare, apply for public |283| charity, the officers may properly reject the claim, and cast the applicant upon the care of his relatives; not relieving him except when his necessities have stamped his relatives with the disgrace of want of natural affection. And the lesson of the Duty of natural affection, and love of independence for our relatives as well as ourselves, which the State thus teaches, is to be extended as far as may be, even among the poorer classes. If, however, at last there remain aged and infirm persons not duly cared for by their relatives, they are proper objects of the care of the State.

  §1022. We have been proceeding, all through the argument, upon the supposition that voluntary charity is insufficient to relieve the distress which exists: but in every community, the question may be asked. Is this so? Is legal provision for the poor necessary, because voluntary charity is insufficient? And it has been urged that the connexion may happen to be in the reverse order; that voluntary charity may be insufficient, because legal provision is established. For men, it is said, if they are compelled by law to contribute to the support of the poor, think their Duty towards them quite fulfilled; and will not exercise voluntary, as well as involuntary bounty; but if they be left to the workings of their own hearts, and to the influence of the distress which they witness among their neighbours, they will give kindly, the poor will receive gratefully, and the effects will be better than any which a compulsory provision, a Poor-law, could produce. And this real charity to neighbours, which is exercised in the absence of a Poor-law, will not be confined to the rich; even the poor will give to those who are still poorer than themselves, and all ranks will be bound together by ties of kindness.

  §1023. Whether the State provision for the poor shall or shall not freeze the spontaneous charity of individuals, as here asserted, will depend much upon whether those who are |284| taxed, on this account, look upon the State as acting towards the poor for them, or for the poor against them. If the former be the case, which is what we have supposed; if the State be looked upon as executing the benevolent intentions of the citizens, and thus, as supplying the inevitable deficiencies which must occur in the practical working of the charity of private persons, however benevolent and however vigilant, there appears to be no reason to fear that the public stream will stop the private sources. We do not find that the State’s taking into its hand the enforcement of Ownership or of Contracts weakens men’s habits of Justice and Truth; except that in cases where the Government is hated, men are willing to defeat the administration of the Law. Where men look upon the Laws as conformable to Justice, they readily help to enforce them; and in cases which the Law does not reach, they are the more likely to act justly, on account of their having promoted the administration of justice by the Law. In like manner, if men look upon a poor-law as humane, and approve it on that account; they are likely both to make the law effective for the purposes of humanity; and when the law falls short of the measure of their humanity, to supply its defects by their own voluntary acts. They are the Nation; the law is their law; it is one part of their dealings towards their poorer friends and fellow-citizens, but necessarily one part only.

  §1024. The example of England appears to show that a legal provision for the poor does not extinguish the disposition to spontaneous charity. In this country, all lands and houses are taxed for the relief of the poor; and this tax may be considered as a condition of the tenure of property. And yet there is, perhaps, no country in which there is more spontaneous charity; especially if we include, in this expression, the relief of the poor in the various forms |285| in which it is undertaken by Charitable Societies. These Associations are something intermediate, in their nature, between the State and an individual; and they show, that the humanity of Englishmen does, as we have intimated, look upon the relief given to the poor by the State, as insufficient; and seeks to supply the deficiency, by supplementary bodies. These Associations, again, do not supersede the Duty and the necessity of individual Charity. The Charity of each person to his immediate neighbours is especially a Duty; for of their distresses, he sees something, and gives to them because he feels for them. Not only no act of the State, but no participation in associations, can supersede this Duty, as a necessary part of our Moral Culture. We may add also, that it does not seem likely that individual charity, in addition to the operation of Societies, will ever cease to be needed, or will ever be less needed, in order to relieve the distress which prevails in various forms. The forms of misery multiply so fast, and the number of the distressed is so great, that charity is never entirely victorious in her struggle with them. Or rather, all the exertions which we make are quite insufficient to bring the distressed part of the people into a condition which our humanity can contemplate with any satisfaction. All that we do, serves to show us, among other things, this; that both the State and individuals must cultivate the Principle of Humanity within them to a far higher degree than they have yet done, in order that their moral condition may correspond to the actual condition of things, and in order that the continued moral and intellectual progress of the nation may be possible.

  §1025. If we can see, even by the light of rational morality alone, the necessity of thus cultivating our Humanity by acts of Kindness and bounty to the poor, this is still more strongly brought to our Conviction when we take into our account Christian Morality. The teaching of Christ |286| and his Apostles accepts all the precepts of this kind which prevailed among the Jews, and carries them further. Yet in the Jewish law, bounty to the poor was largely enjoined. The Jews were forbidden to glean their vineyards, and commanded to leave something for the poor and the stranger (Lev. 19:10). They were directed to lend to their poorer neighbours, even when likely to lose what they lent (Deut. 15:9). And almsgiving was among them one of the most necessary practices of a good man. Christ exhorted his disciples to carry this practice still further (Matt. 5:42): Give to him that asketh thee. He himself was in the habit of giving money to the poor (John 13:29). The early Christian congregations made frequent contributions for the poor (Rom. 15:26. Gal. 2:10, etc). And this was often urged as a duty in Apostolic injunctions. The Christians were recommended to lay aside something for this purpose on the first day of the week, according as God had prospered them (1 Cor. 16:2). And such a collection on the Lord’s day has continued to be a very general practice of Christian congregations, up to our own time. In England, indeed, it has been discontinued; perhaps in a great measure in consequence of the absolute right to relief which the laws gave to the poor. But there appears to be no reason why the Humanity of the State should supersede the Christian Charity of the Congregation. There is, as we have said, abundant room for the exercise of both. We have already seen (§602, §614) how strongly benevolence to the poor is urged upon us as a part of Christian Morality.

  §1026. There is another way in which the Laws of some States, and of England among the number, express the humanity of the humane citizens, and teach a lesson of that virtue to those that need it: namely, by forbidding cruelty to animals, and making it penal. This is a remarkable kind of Law, as being a very distinct instance of Laws |287| dealing with manners, as evidence of vicious dispositions, where no Rights are violated. For animals can have no Rights. And if it be said that humane men have a Right not to bo shocked by the sight of wanton cruelty, it may be said on the same ground that truth-loving men have a Right not to be shocked by wanton lying; and the like; which probably no one would assert as a ground of legislation.

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  §1027. The Duties of the State connected with Purity are principally those which concern the Institution of Marriage, which is the foundation of the notion of Purity, so far as regards the Intercourse of the Sexes. The State takes the course which the Duty of Purity prescribes for it, when it establishes and sanctions the Marriage Union, punishes Offences against it, makes it a source of Rights to the married Persons and to their children. But a regard for Purity imposes still other Duties on the State with respect to this Institution. It is the business of the State, aiming at moral purposes, not only to sanction Marriages such as belong to the manners of any stage of society, but also to purify and elevate the conception of the Marriage Union itself. Marriage must be, for instance, a union of the married persons upon equal terms, so far as the conditions of the two sexes allow; with an identification of their interests, and an engagement of permanent and obligatory community of life. The Law teaches this, by prohibiting Polygamy; and by denying the Rights of children to the offspring of mere Concubines.

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  §1028. The closeness of the jural and moral union between two married persons may still further be taught by the Law, in its provisions concerning Divorce, the release of married persons from the marriage tie. The entire union of interests, affections, and life, which forms the highest conception of marriage, is expressed in Law, by making marriages indissoluble, and prohibiting Divorce altogether. It may perhaps be said, that this is legislating upon a standard of Morality too high for any existing state of society. It may be said, that the man and the woman may, after marriage, find themselves mistaken with regard to the union of hearts, and harmony of dispositions, which they supposed. They may come to hate each other, as much as they ought to love. Can it answer the purposes of Marriage to prohibit such persons from separating?

  §1029. It may perhaps be further urged, that to shape Laws by this scheme of teaching a pure morality, is visionary and mischievous: visionary, because it will not succeed; mischievous, because the law deprives some persons of Rights, or makes them miserable, in its attempts to teach others. It may be added, that the true way to legislate concerning Marriage, is to treat it as a Contract, which it is; to make such provisions as shall most promote the benefit of the Contracting Parties: and among others, what more obvious than this: than when both the Contracting Parties, who must know best, find the engagement a source of unhappiness, they shall be at liberty to dissolve it?

  §1030. To this we reply, that if we take this Principle simply, that the union of the Sexes is a matter of Contract, and that the Contract may at any time be dissolved by the joint agreement of the parties, we must abolish the Laws against Polygamy, and place illegitimate and legitimate children upon the same footing. For this Principle leaves no distinction possible between Marriage and |289| Concubinage. If any voluntary engagement of cohabitation, for any time, be Marriage, there is no need for any Law respecting Marriage. The Law, which requires an engagement of permanency, in order that the Marriage may have legal consequences, limits the freedom of such Contracts; and does so, in order that the Marriage Contract may be more nearly what it ought to be. Concubinage and Marriage are distinguished, in order that an entire union of two persons, for social and moral, and not merely sensual purposes, may be honoured and practised. No union is acknowledged as Marriage, which does not profess to be for life. It has been said, that if men and women were left free to settle the terms of the Marriage Contract, they would, in most cases, be led to make it a Contract for life. The number of cases of Concubinage show that this is true only in a very limited sense. But even if this were true, why does the Legislator reject the cases in which the parties do not wish this? If persons wish to make such a Contract for a limited time, why does he not sanction and enforce it? Why does he, on the contrary, make rules which stamp it with a character of degradation and disgrace? Manifestly, because he wishes to impress upon the citizens the great social and moral dignity of a complete union for life, and its superiority over a temporary or capricious cohabitation. Every Law, then, which establishes Marriage, must have for its object to teach what Marriage ought to be.

  §1031. But Marriage ought to be, not only an engagement of mutual affection for life, but also a provision for rearing a family of children; and this is a further reason against allowing a Marriage, once made, to be dissolved. While the children are young, the continued union of the parents is necessary for the support, protection, and education of the woman and the children. And the necessary offices of mutual service among the members of the Family, |290| cannot be effectually performed, except they arise, not from the terms of a Contract, but from the family affections: and such affections must want the very nature of love, if they can look forward to the time when they can terminate. The ties of Family and Society are not commonly looked upon as the Obligations of a Contract, which may be dissolved at the Will of the parties. The Law of Marriage would be at variance with the general feeling of mankind, if it so treated them. Men do not think those excusable who desert their children, or their parents, in their need, even if it had been previously agreed between the parties that they should be nothing to each other. And further: as we consider it a Duty and even an Obligation of the parents to support and educate the children, it is also a Duty to give them that Family Education which the permanent union of the parents alone can give.

  §1032. In order to show that the divorce of the parents would not deprive the children of necessary support, care, and connexion, it has been urged that marriages are constantly dissolved by the death of the parties, at all ages of the children; and that this event does not prevent the proper education of the children. And undoubtedly, if the parents be separated, by whatever event, the children may still be brought up, and even excellently brought up. But among the beneficial influences which operate to form their hearts and moral principles, their regard towards their parents must have an important place. And it must make a very material difference in this regard, whether they have to look upon their parents as united by an affection which lasted through life, though one be now taken away: or as separated by a voluntary act, and perhaps living in wedlock with new spouses. If the Law lend its aid to the distribution of the children in such cases, as readily and as approvingly as to the arrangements of an unbroken family: it presents |291| to us a Conception of Marriage much lower and less pure than that to which a moderate moral culture directs us.

  §1033. It is said that an engagement to retain our affection through life is absurd, since we cannot command our affections; and that to bind two persons together, who have come to hate, instead of love each other, is to inflict upon them an useless torment. But though we cannot command our affections, we can examine our hearts before we make the engagement: when this is faithfully done, married life itself, well-conducted, tends to give permanency to affection; and nothing can more impress upon us the necessity of being faithful to our hearts in the choice we make, than the knowledge that the step, once taken, is taken for life. Again, this same knowledge, that the union cannot be dissolved, tends to control the impulses of caprice, ill-temper, and weariness, in married life; and to keep two people together, and on the whole, very tolerably happy, who might have separated on some transient provocation, if Divorce had been easily attainable. And thus, the exclusion of Divorce tends both ways to the promotion of conjugal love and conjugal happiness.

  §1034. All that we have hitherto said, tends to this: not that, in any given state of society. Divorce should be absolutely prohibited; but that the highest Conception of Marriage is expressed by making Marriage indissoluble; that the Duty of the State, which is, among other Duties, to establish such Laws as may maintain and elevate the Moral Culture of the citizens, requires the Lawgiver constantly to tend towards this Conception of Marriage, and this condition. Whether, at the existing point of the moral progress of this Country, the moral teaching of the Law is made most effectual by prohibiting Divorce in general (allowing it only as the consequence of adultery on one |292| side, and then with great difficulty), I shall not attempt to decide.

  §1035. So far, we have considered the subject in the light in which it is presented to us by Rational Morality. If we now take into account Christian Morality, we find that in it the highest view which we can form of the entireness and permanence of the marriage union is confirmed. We have already noticed (633) the condemnation delivered by Jesus Christ against the practice of Divorce, as it then existed among the Jews. It has been most commonly understood, that these expressions contain a condemnation of Divorce under all circumstances, except in the case of adultery. But there have not been wanting those who have explained these passages otherwise. They say that when it said, Those whom God hath joined together, let not man put asunder, we are to recollect that God has not joined together those between whom there is a settled unfitness for the marriage union, though man may have done so. When it is said that Moses allowed Divorce to the Jews for the hardness of their heart, it cannot be meant that he allowed a sin which, according to that interpretation, is equivalent to adultery. Divorce was allowed for the hardness of men’s hearts, as all law exists in consequence of the hardness of men’s hearts, that is, in consequence of their tendency to do wrong. Divorce was given especially for the hardness of heart of those who abused the privilege at the time of our Saviour, for it was the means of their showing the hardness of their hearts. And when it is said. Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, it is to be understood that these acts were part of the same design: such a design is adulterous. Such are the arguments for the less strict interpretation of this passage. But even with this interpretation, the leading point of Christ’s teaching is plain; |293| that the Christian was not to be content with such an imperfect view of the marriage union as was placed before the Jew, but was to aim at that higher view which was shown, when in the beginning God made them male and female.

  §1036. It may be said, the view we have been taking, that marriage is an entire and interminable union of the pair, would lead us to reject all second marriages; and that the law, in order to express the highest Conception of Marriage, ought to prohibit these. And undoubtedly, a very high view of the sacredness and entireness of the marriage union may easily lead to a disapprobation of second marriages; and among Christians, in every age, there have been those who have condemned them. But yet, when the life of one of the parties is prolonged beyond that of the other, and when after the sorrow of the separation has subsided into calm, the survivor sees before him or her, perhaps at an early age, and after a brief married life, an indefinite remainder of life; the same causes which impel persons to marriage at first, must often operate again with equal power, and supply the same reasons why there should be marriage. And the law, in sanctioning such marriages, divests the union of none of its entireness and permanence; for the engagement is stilt for life on both sides. When the act of God has dissolved the first engagement, the law does not make that which is past and gone, a fetter upon the present and future; but allows a new origin of conjugal life, making what remains of the person’s life, as if it were the whole; which, as to all engagements, it is.

  §1037. Most States have, in some way or other, punished Adultery, at least on the part of the wife, let the Law of England, placing Rights as much as possible on the basis of property, gives the injured husband pecuniary |294| damages from the adulterer; and leaves the public crime to the cognizance of the spiritual courts.

  §1038. There is another subject, on which it is necessary to say a few words; namely, the degrees of relationship within which Marriage is to be permitted by Law. In framing a system of Morality, the Moralist is often compelled to dwell upon subjects from which, on other accounts, he would wish always to turn the thoughts of men away: Incest is one of these subjects. But it will suffice us to treat it in a very brief and general manner.

  §1039. Without attempting to exhibit, in a more definite shape, the reasons and feelings which have made men look with horror upon any connexion of a conjugal nature, between the nearest family relatives; it may suffice to say, that all such relations make the man the natural Guardian of the woman’s purity. This feeling of Guardianship on this subject, commonly infused into the affections, from their earliest origin, extinguishes the very seeds of desire, and leaves only Fraternal Love. On the other hand, when no such relation exists, desiring love may grow up; and in societies where men are free to choose their partners, there is a constant and universal feeling of courtship between the sexes, which tinges their manners towards each other. This feeling of courtship, in however many folds it may involve the spark of desire, is yet inconsistent with the chaste guardianship of Fraternal Love. Hence, the necessity of separating the cases in which persons may not marry, because they are relatives, from those in which they may marry.

  §1040. Where the separation line is to be drawn, in any given state of Society, is a question difficult of solution, and necessarily in some degree arbitrary. The Rule may be different in different states of Society; for it must depend, in a great measure, upon the Structure |295| of Families, and the kind of the early intercourse of their members with each other, and with other Families. Hence, although the primary family relations must always have the same consequences, more remote relationships may be subjected to different Rules of intermarriage in different countries; and one Country or Age is no absolute Rule for another: except only, that the long-continued past existence of a Rule, on this subject, is a very strong reason for retaining and observing the Rule; since the separation of the two classes of cases, so necessary to the purity of families, produces its effect by being familiar to men’s minds.

  §1041. Some persons have sought a ground for the prohibition of marriages between near relatives in physiological reasons, and in the supposed degeneracy of the offspring when such a practice is continued. But if this result were far more certain than it is, we could not consistently make it a ground of legislation, except we were also prepared to prohibit unions which are far more certainly the cause of physiological evil; as for instance, when there is a great disparity of years; or hereditary disease, or insanity, on either side.

  §1042. A question of prohibited degrees of kindred, which has been much discussed, is this: Whether a man may marry his deceased wife’s sister. On this we may observe, that though much argument on the subject has been drawn from the law of Moses, such argument is of no direct force; since, as we have said, one Nation is no Rule for another; and the habits of society, and the relations of families, on which the Rule ought to depend, were very different among the ancient Jews, and in our own country at present. So far as the Jewish law has been the basis of the Rule hitherto received, it has weighty since, as we have also said, an existing Rule is entitled to great respect. As to the grounds of decision belonging; to our own state of Society, we have mainly to consider, whether, by marrying |296| one sister, men in general are placed upon the footing of Fraternal Love with the other sisters; and whether it is requisite to the purity of this Fraternal Love (on both sides) that there should be no possibility of its being succeeded by the love which courtship implies. On these two questions, different opinions will be entertained by different persons. To the first, the manners generally prevalent in this country seem to direct us to return an affirmative answer. Whether Fraternal, may, in the course of a life, alternate with Conjugal, Love, it is more difficult to say. In one order, at least, this appears not to be unusual; since it often happens that a person courts first one sister and then another: but this is before the conjugal relation is established: and perhaps tends rather to show that the fraternal condition ought to supersede all other affections.

  §1043. On both sides of this question, arguments may be drawn from the probable consequences. On the one hand, if the brother-in-law is never allowed to become the husband, the sister of the deceased wife may, without incurring reproach, live with him as a brother, and may thus give to the children a mother’s care. On the other hand, if the brother-in-law may become the husband, both he and the children may often find, in such a union, a valuable consolation and resource, after the loss of the mother. But the purity which is the object of such Rules, is in danger of some tarnish from the contemplation of consequences; and we shall not attempt to decide the question.

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|297| Chapter XIV. Duties of the State: Order

Of Punishments

  §1044. All Legislation in a State may be considered as resulting from the Duty of Order; for all Laws are means of Order. We have considered Laws, according to their purpose, as directed by Humanity, Justice, and the like; and we shall not attempt here to make a separate class of those which have Order more especially for their object. But we may consider, as particularly resulting from the Duty of Order, the Office of the State in giving reality to the Laws by Sanctions, that is, by Punishments (§501). If transgressions of the Laws are not punished, the Laws are merely nominal; and, if such a course be continued, will soon be as if they did not exist. There must, then, be Punishments provided, to meet transgressions of the Laws; and we have to consider by what Principles this part of the business of the State is to be regulated.

  §1045. An object of Punishment is to prevent the classes of acts to which it is affixed; but this does not fully express the object; the object is to prevent such acts, as being wrong (§558). And the Laws which affix Punishments to Crimes, prevent them (so far as they do prevent them) by making men look upon them as wrong; or at least by making each man regard them as something which the community deems wrong, and will punish because it so deems. And thus, Punishments, while they have it for their object to prevent certain kinds of acts, aim to obtain this object by making men look upon these acts as wrong. The Object of Punishment, even when it threatens most roughly, is not merely to deter men, but to teach them; not merely to tell them that transgression of the Law is dangerous, but also that it is |298| immoral. Punishment is, as we have already said (§502), a means of the Moral Education of the Citizens. We will trace some of the applications of this view.

  §1046. In Laws respecting Wrongs, we see very evident traces of the moral teaching which the Lawgiver, consciously or unconsciously, has had in view. Thus, with regard to Wrongs against the Person, one of the most ancient and general Rules is the lex talionis, retaliation; a degree of suffering and harm inflicted upon the wrong-doer, equal to that which he had himself occasioned. Such was the Mosaic Rule (Exod. 21), Strife for strife, wound for wound, burning for burning, foot for foot, hand for hand, tooth for tooth, eye for eye, life for life: and still earlier (Gen. 9:6), Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed. Such an Ordinance, by making man feel that which he inflicts, plainly tends to teach him that all men are bound together as partakers of a common nature, and are required to act with a recollection of this community. Such is the mode in which children are still often taught, so as to have unfolded in them the feeling of humanity, both towards other children, and towards animals. And thus, in the earliest measure of punishment, we see a disposition to proportion it to the degree of guilt, as measured by the violence done to the common nature of all men.

  §1047. But it may he said, that the maxims of punishment admitted in later times deviate from this view, and are regulated by the principle that the object of punishment is simply the prevention of crime, and not the moral education of the people. And as examples of such maxims, may be adduced such as these: that Crimes are to be punished with greater severity in proportion to the difficulty and necessity of preventing them; or the facility of perpetrating them; or their being committed by combinations of men. These circumstances, it is said, do not increase the guilt; and yet, |299| in the common judgment of Legislators, they have been made to increase the Punishment.

  §1048. But there is, in this judgment of Legislators, nothing at variance with the doctrine, that the purpose of Punishment is the Moral Education of the people; and that it ought to be regulated by this purpose. For such circumstances as we have mentioned, if they do not increase the guilt of the transgression, at least augment the need which men have of the lesson which the Law gives, and interpose difficulties in the way of making the lesson impressive. If stealing privately in a shop, or stealing from a bleaching-ground, or any other offence, can be committed with special facility; those who are placed in temptation require to be taught the criminal character of the act with special emphasis; which the Law can do only by annexing to it a severer punishment. And on the other hand, if the crime, though one of great moral depravity, be one which is easily provided against, the Law may express its condemnation by a lighter penalty than would otherwise be necessary. Thus a Breach of Confidence, though it must be looked upon as more guilty than a Fraud where no trust has been reposed, is visited with a smaller punishment. And this is quite consistent with the character of the Law as a moral teacher. The forbearance of the Law in punishing Breach of Trust, is a significant lesson to the Trustor; inculcating the circumspection, care, and precaution, with which he ought to select and control the depositary of his confidence. And accordingly, when the trust is unavoidable, the punishment is not limited by this double bearing of the lesson; as in the case of a theft committed by a servant in the shop or dwelling-house of his master (1 Paley, vi. 9. Crimes and Punishments); for there it is in vain to preach to the Master a vigilance which could not be effectually exercised.

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  §1049. In like manner with regard to crimes committed by Combinations of men, there are strong reasons why the Law should teach the criminality of such acts with a more emphatic voice, that is, by a heavier punishment. For this lesson has to contend against strong influences on the other side; the countenance and encouragement, perhaps it may be, the confidence and enthusiasm, which men engaged in a criminal act derive from their combination. A solitary criminal must feel as if he had all the world against him; but a band of conspirators are a public to one another; and the voice of this public, overbearing or misleading that of the conscience, requires to be itself overpowered by the voice of the Law, teaching with the authority of the whole community. Hence, conspiracies and combinations to do illegal acts, are very properly punished with greater severity than the like acts done by individuals.

  §1050. In order that the Moral Teaching of the Law may be effectual, it must be in a great measure in harmony with the general opinion of the members of the community. An attempt to throw the strong condemnation of the community upon an act by an extreme punishment, when the community do not sympathize with the severity, will make the criminals objects of pity, and alienate men’s minds from the Law. But this is not to be understood, as if the Law could produce no effect, in exciting, or keeping up a greater horror of certain crimes, than would prevail if the law were relaxed. If the law be not very strongly at variance with the moral judgments of individuals, there are many citizens who, looking upon the law as being, in general, the support and expression of morality, will have their sentiments, with regard to special crimes, drawn towards an agreement with the law; and will look upon such crimes with especial abhorrence, so long as they are the objects of extreme punishment. In such cases, the |301| relaxation of the punishment may diminish the prevalent abhorrence of the act. Thus, it is possible that the removal of the punishment of death from the crime of incendiarism may make the common people look upon such acts as less atrocious than heretofore. The recklessness and malignity of the crime made men continue to sympathize with the extreme of punishment in this case, so long as the law awarded it; but the mitigation of the punishment may possibly weaken the feeling.

  §1051. The law of retaliation, which we have mentioned as the oldest measure of punishment, is one to which men’s feelings still very generally as¬ sent. That punishment of Death should be inflicted upon murderers, shocks few persons, compared with those who are shocked at the infliction of death in most other cases. Yet Capital Punishment has often been assigned to crimes of mere fraud, as forging bank-notes, coining money, and the like. It may be asked, whether this is consistent with the Principles we have laid down. Without pretending to justify any particular law, we may reply, that laws of this kind teach, and are intended to teach, a very important lesson; namely, the value and dignity of that established order and mutual confidence under which alone coined and paper currency can circulate. With the prevalence of such order and such mutual confidence, a nation may be populous, and its inhabitants may live in peace, ease, and comfort. Without such order and confidence, the land must be full of violence and mistrust; the inhabitants few, and comparatively wretched. He who destroys the order and confidence of society, may be considered as destroying those lives, which, if such crimes as his had been common, could never have existed. The Law of ancient times treats the Coiner as guilty of treason against the Sovereign; but the Law, at any time, may treat the coiner and the forger of money as a traitor |302| against the Sovereign Rule of Mutual Confidence, which is, to a prosperous and wealthy Nation, the breath of life.

  §1052. This Lesson, however, applies only to the State currency; which necessarily circulates rapidly, and is taken and given with slight examination. Private bills are to be protected on other principles. And even with regard to State currency, if it can by any means be made impossible, or difficult, to forge or coin imitations of it; it is the business of the State to employ such means, rather than, by means of extreme punishments, to claim, for the existing form of the currency, an importance which does not really belong to it.

  §1053. We may observe, further, that as the consideration of the high value and dignity of the established order of society, and of the security, confidence, and tranquillity which result from it, will justify the Law in asserting the claims of such order in the strong language of capital punishments, if it cannot be made intelligible in any other: so this part of the Law, no less than any other, requires the assent of a good citizen; and, in his proper place, has a moral claim to his cooperation.

  §1054. It may be that sometimes the long duration of an orderly and tranquil state of society, and the comparatively rare occurrence of capital punishments, may lead men to forget that a disorderly and violent state of society is possible, and that the danger of it is kept off, only by the existence, that is, by the enforcement, of laws. This forgetfulness, and the repugnance of the thought of the death and pain of anyone, which a life spent in tranquil society commonly produces, may lead men to think with dislike of the punishment of death, and of other severe bodily punishments. But if this dislike operate so as to make citizens neglect, or violate, their duty of cooperating to enforce the Law, the result will be the growth of crime, |303| and the recurrence of a disordered and violent condition of society. Judge, Jury, Prosecutor, Witnesses, are alike bound by this Duty; and alike chargeable with the consequences of its neglect.

  §1055. The degree of cooperation which the State has required of its citizens in the enforcement of criminal Law, has been different in different times. Among the ancient Jews, capital punishment, death by stoning, was inflicted by the hands of the assembled people themselves. In modern Europe, and in the world in general, the infliction of death, or mutilation for great crimes, has usually taken place in public; and has been regarded with sympathy, or at least with acquiescing awe, as a natural act of justice, necessary to the safety of good citizens. The freedom and diversity of opinions which have prevailed on political matters in England, have rendered men less generally ready to sympathize with acts of the State against individuals; and thus, the sympathy for necessary justice has been dull, while a sympathy for the individual is lively. But this disproportionate progress of sympathy, for the good and the bad members of society, is a defect in our national moral culture. The humanity is of a partial and perverted kind, which is attracted most by the necessary consequence of criminality.

  §1056. The prevalent detestation of criminals has been, in most states, one of the holding points of the general avoidance of crime; and consequently, one of the means of a general moral culture. Some punishments so far take this prevalent feeling for granted, as to make it the instrument of punishment; as when the criminal is declared infamous; or when he is put in the Pillory, which is infamy added to bodily pain. These punishments are, undoubtedly, very unequal in the weight with which they fall upon different persons, according to the public opinion respecting them; and this is a defect in such punishments. But it does not |304| appear that orderly society can subsist without assuming, in a great measure, that agreement between public opinion and judicial proceedings which such punishments assume. If acts, which are great crimes by the law, cease to be infamous, or to shock men’s minds, the law ought to be altered: if for no other reason, yet for this; that the evils attending the frequency of such acts, being really felt, may excite general anger against such crimes and such criminals, and thus bring men’s feelings into harmony with the law which condemns them. If the law, as a means of moral discipline, lose its hold upon men, from being too rigorous, it may regain its hold by being relaxed: but it is to be recollected that the hold thus gained consists in the suffering, alarm, and indignation which crime produces.

  §1057. Many attempts have been made to render punishment a moral Discipline, not only for society in general, but also for the criminal himself; to reform him, while we punish. And so far as this is compatible with the reality of punishment, it is a Duty to aim at such an object: not only as a matter of humanity towards the individual, but also as a step in the moral improvement of the community: for the persons who are punished by imprisonment, or otherwise, are, after a longer or shorter time, liberated; and these form a part, and in populous States, not a small or unimportant part, of those whose collective moral character is the moral character of the community. How the reformation of criminals is to be aimed at, whether by solitary confinement, by making the prisoner’s subsistence or comfort depend upon his industry, or in what other way, is a question, rather of Prison Discipline than of morality.

  §1058. The punishments besides death and bodily suffering, as Fine, Imprisonment, Exile, Deportation to a convict colony, and the like, differ much in the severity with which they fall upon different persons, according to their |305| previous circumstances, and the circumstances of the community. Through the feeling of the repugnance which the infliction of death excites in bystanders, many persons have been led to think that capital punishments ought to be abolished altogether. If other punishments could come to assume such a character as to give to men’s Rights their reality, capital punishments might cease. But such an increase in the efficacy of lower punishments, such as exile, imprisonment, and the like, must depend, in a great measure, upon the value of those benefits of social life from which the exile and the prisoner are excluded. If the general lot of man in society could be made so delightful, that it would be comparative misery to lose it. Banishment or Imprisonment for offenders might suffice to keep up such a condition. But then, it is to be recollected, that one requisite for our advancing towards a state of society so generally satisfactory, is the establishment of Moral Rules as realities: and to this, at present, there appears to be no way, except by making Ignominious Death the climax of our scale of Punishments.

  §1059. We have said that there are two kinds of Laws, Laws against Wrongs and Laws against Vice. What we have hitherto said respecting Punishments, applies mainly to the former kind. The general Principle which we have laid down respecting Punishment in such cases, namely, that it is to be regarded as an Instrument of Moral Education, is still more evident with regard to Punishments appointed for acts, which, though vicious, violate no man’s Right. Such are Laws against cruelty to animals; as we have said (1026); Laws against Indecency and Profligacy; against Profaneness and Blasphemy; and the like. Punishments assigned to such Offences, evidently have it for their purpose to mark the judgment of the State as to what is right, and what is wrong; and to call upon the citizens |306| to agree in this judgment. Such Laws are intended, not to protect the Rights, but to mould the Manners of the citizens; not so much to prevent the acts which they forbid, as to foster in the community a disposition the opposite of that which such acts betray. The State forbids cruelty to animals, because it approves, and would cherish, the feeling of humanity. It puts down indecency and profligacy, as far as a regard for freedom will allow it to do so, because it respects, and would diffuse, chastity and purity. It condemns profaneness and blasphemy, because it reverences God, and would lead all its members to share in this reverence. Such Laws are manifestly Moral Lessons. The State, in promulgating such ordinances, plainly comes forward in the character of a Teacher of the Citizens.

  §1060. But yet, this office of teaching must needs be very imperfectly discharged, if the means which the State can employ for this purpose are only those which we have mentioned. Punishments, when viewed as Instruments of the Moral Education of the citizens, may have a significance which they cannot have under any other point of view; but still, they are Instruments which can carry the work but a little way. We must have something different from the Axe, the Scourge, the Chain, the Branding Iron, in order to raise the minds of men to any elevated standard of morals. The use that is made of them, may show that Moral Education is a Duty which the State acknowledges, and must needs acknowledge; but we must look in another quarter for the only effectual means by which this Duty can be performed.

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|307| Chapter XV. How can the State Educate the People?

  §1061. As we have seen, the State is necessarily driven to aim at the Moral Education of its members, and yet has no prospect of effectually promoting this object by its ordinary means of action. Law and Punishment. For Law (§460) deals with external acts; Morality, and therefore Moral Education, with internal motives and intentions; and how is the State to penetrate to and to mould these? Education unfolds the Faculties and imparts Belief (§561). How can the State impart Belief? The foundation of Morality is a Knowledge of Truth, and especially of Religious Truth (§565). How can the State give such a Knowledge? Religious Truth is kept present to men’s minds, and effective in their lives, by means of Religious Sympathies and Religious Ordinances. How can the State reach such Sympathies or direct such Ordinances?

  §1062. It is plain that the State cannot do these things of itself; and cannot do them at all, except it can for that purpose obtain the aid of the Religious Teachers of its people. If it can induce them to act in conjunction with it, the State may, by means of Religious Education, impart a Moral Education. Using the term Church in a general sense, as implying the Teaching Body in every Religion, the State can educate the people by the aid of the Church, and in no other way.

§1063. But if the Religion be the Christian Religion, it would seem that there are especial facilities in the State obtaining this assistance. For the Christian Teacher, and every Christian, so far as his power of Religious teaching goes, is bound, and is desirous to communicate his religious knowledge, hopes, and aids, to those around him (§730). He is zealous in imparting to all within his sphere of influence a Christian Education, which is necessarily also a Moral Education. Hence the State will be especially enabled to promote its object, the Moral Education of the people, if it can employ for that purpose the assistance of the Christian Church.

  §1064. Being thus led to look at the relation between the State and the Church, a number of questions rise up before us, which we must consider; especially the question of the Terms on which the Church can give, and the State receive, this assistance. But before we proceed to such questions, we may illustrate somewhat further the assertions already made: that the Moral Education of the People is necessarily an object of the State’s activity; and that the State of itself can act effectively in promoting this object.

  §1065. Even with regard to its lower object. Self-preservation, the State cannot avoid aiming at the moral and religious education of the people. The infliction of punishment requires in some cases the cooperation, in all the acquiescence, of the people; and cannot be effective except when it is supported by some popular sympathy (§1054). Hence the State, in order to give force to its punishments, must desire a corresponding moral education of the minds of its subjects. Again, the State must necessarily have a Right (§841) of requiring from its citizens Oaths of Testimony, Oaths of Office, and the like, as means of securing a coincidence between men’s Obligations and their Duties, without which Government would not be possible. But oaths cannot produce their effect, if men’s minds be not religiously educated; the State therefore must desire the religious education of its citizens. Again: the State, in prohibiting offences against Person and Property, aims at producing not only quiet, but security. It seeks not only to prevent battery and robbery, which may, in particular cases, be effected by mere force; but also, to make men feel secure that they shall not be beaten or robbed; which can only be done by making the citizens in general peaceable and honest, instead of being pugnacious and rapacious. Even in this part of its office, therefore, the State aims at a moral Education of its citizens. And thus, even while it looks to its lower objects, the mere existence of Law, Judicial Process, and Individual Security, the State cannot avoid aiming at or requiring a moral and religious education of its subjects.

  §1066. But the State has higher Duties than the mere protection of Person and Property, as we have already seen (§992). The existence of Laws concerning Marriage necessarily supposes that the State not only desires the continuance and comfort of its population, but aims also at the encouragement of chastity and virtue (§1027). Such Laws are Lessons, as well as Laws. And with regard to he higher objects of men’s actions, their moral and intellectual culture; including, in this, their religious culture also; many modes of conducting this culture and gratifying the moral, intellectual, and religious sympathies, are such as naturally draw men into Associations, which exercise a great sway over their actions. In some respects, the convictions and feelings which bind together such Associations may be said to exercise the supreme sway over men’s actions: for so far as men do act, their actions are, in the long run, determined by their conviction of what is right on moral and religious grounds; and a Government which is wrong on such grounds, will be destroyed, if the subjects are free to act. And though men may, for a long time, be subjugated by a Government which they think contrary to morality and religion, this condition of things cannot be looked upon as one in which the State attains its objects. The State, the Supreme Authority, must have, on its side, the convictions and feelings which exercise the Supreme Sway. It must therefore have, on its side, the convictions and feelings which bind men into associations for moral, intellectual, and religious purposes. If this be not so, the State has objects in which it fails, and which are higher than those in which it succeeds; and a portion of its Sovereignty passes, from it, into the hands of those who wield the authority of Moral, Intellectual, and Religious Associations. It must, then, be an object of the State, so to direct the education of its subjects, that men’s moral, intellectual, and religious convictions may be on its side; and that Moral, Intellectual, and Religious Associations may be duly subordinate to its Sovereignty. Besides which, the Government, if it be conducted by intelligent, moral, and religious men, will itself desire the intellectual, moral, and religious progress of the nation; and will wish to educate the people in such a manner that this progress may constantly go on.

  §1067. Thus the State, both by its lower and by its higher objects, is necessarily led to aim at educating, or directing the education of, its people. But it may be asked, whether the State is not competent to discharge this office for itself. For, it may be said. Education must be conducted by means of Masters which the State can appoint, of Lessons which it can prescribe, and of Rewards and Punishments which it can assign. And examples may be pointed out, especially in the ancient world, where the State, as the State, has educated its people, and educated them, in a most effective and marked manner; modifying their characters and moulding their wills into a conformity with the general purposes and will of the State. Such was the case at Sparta, under the constitution Lycurgus. The individual citizens, in virtue of the Education which they received from the State, were in the habit of controlling all the natural impulses of men, in obedience to the Laws; and were even ready to lay down their lives when the State directed them to do so. Here, then, it appears plain that the State does not need a Church, to enable it to educate its citizens; and has, in fact, powers of education as efficacious as any Religious Teachers ever had.

  §1068. To this we reply, that in this, and in all cases in which the State has been an effective Educator, it has united the Influence of Religion with the influence of Reward and Punishment. The Legislator has either himself been also a Religious Teacher; or he has taken to his assistance Religious Teachers, and has joined their authority with his own. There has been, in such instances, an identification or fusion of Law with Religion; of the State with the Church. The Precepts of Religion have been enforced by State Punishments; the Laws have been supported by Religious Sanctions. But this condition of things belongs to a very early stage of Society. The State, and the Religious Body, have now long been separated, and exist in distinct forms, with different powers in various hands. We can no longer, even if it were desirable, expect to see an identification of Church and State of this kind. The two seats of power are now distinct; and we must consider, not how they may again become one, but in what manner, and under what conditions, they can best combine their influence.

  §1069. Moreover, even if we could wield the united powers of the State and of Religion, in moulding men’s minds to such a frame as we have described, this would not satisfy us; for this would not be the Education which we contemplate. Such a Discipline does indeed answer the direct purposes of the State, but it does not answer the purposes of Morality or Religion. It may make the citizen an effective instrument for the purposes of the State, but it does not make him fully a man. In order that a man’s being may have fully a moral character, he must not be merely shaped by laws from without, but also by a principle of spontaneity within. He must not merely accept the national morality, but must elevate his own standard above what he begins with. He must not merely repeat the National Creed, but he must accept as Truth what he sees as Truth (§563). The State may prescribe its lessons, but they are no lessons for him, except they become a part of his conviction. He is not educated by repeating words, or by forming outward habits. Education has to do with the development of the faculties, and the culture of mental powers; with Belief and Knowledge; with Speculative Truth and Falsehood; and with these, the State, as a State, can have nothing to do; for the State has no powers, no organs for judging of Truth or Falsehood, except the men of whom it consists; considered, not as political elements, but as moral, intellectual, and religious beings. The State, therefore, as the State, cannot educate the people; and can do this, only by calling in the Church to its assistance.
  This being established, we have several questions brought before us: Whether the Church can accept this office from the State: If accepted on Terms, What terms the State, what terms the Church, can agree to; and the like. These questions we shall briefly examine.

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Chapter XVI. The Relations of the Church to the State

  §1070. Man is a political animal. Wherever he exists, he lives under a Government, ruling by Laws, enforcing the Laws by Punishments; the Government being administered by Magistrates and Officers, subordinate to each other in various degrees. Man is also a religious creature. He everywhere believes in and looks to a Divine, as well as a human Government. He has religious hopes and fears which are the sanctions of his morality; he receives with reverence and submission the lessons of his religious Teacher; he seeks comfort, guidance, and encouragement in his earthly career from religious sympathies and ordinances; he has, here on earth, a religious Government conducted by Laws and Punishments, Rulers and Ministers, appointed according to the directions of his Religious Teachers. He is a member of a Religious Community, as well as of a Civil Community.

  §1071. Since man is everywhere a member of these two Communities, it becomes necessary for us to consider in what relation they stand to each other. Using the term Church in a large sense, so as to include all religious Communities, whatever their belief, we may term this the Relation of Church and State. But the term Church especially denotes the Christian Community; and when applied to other Religions, might seem to imply a closer analogy to the Christian Church than we can always find, or need assume. The Relation of the Civil and the Religious Community is a point which concerns all Communities. It is a universal question of Polity, and must at first be treated of with reference to all cases; though the Relation of the State to the Christian Church is a point of more especial |314| interest and importance to us. We shall consider the various modes in which the State may deal with the Religious Community.

  §1072. First, the State may treat the Religious Community with Indifference. This supposes that the State does not think it necessary to treat the Religious Community with hostility. It supposes, therefore, that the Religious Teacher does not inculcate disobedience to the Civil Laws; for if he do, the State must silence him, in virtue of its Obligation to repress Sedition (§857). When this is not the case, the State may abstain altogether from recognizing the Religious Community. It may act as if ignorant of the existence of the Religion and the Body; just as it may abstain from recognizing an association for the cultivation of Science or Art.

  §1073. When there is but one Religious Community within the boundaries of the State, there can be little temptation for the State to take this course: for the State has, as we have seen, very strong reasons for desiring to have the influence of Religion on its side, and in its service; and in such a case, the State will generally form, with the Religious Community, an Alliance with one or other of the kinds which we shall have to mention. But there may be great obstacles or impossibilities in the way of the State doing this. There may be several Religious Communities within the State; and it may not be possible to form an Alliance with all. The Governors of the State may have conquered the Nation without having adopted its Religion, and without being willing to adopt it, to the extent which an Alliance implies. Or in consequence of a series of historical events, several Religions, each embodied in a Religious Community, may exist in the country. Or there may be several Religions, not in consequence of external events, but of the internal working of men’s minds. A part of |315| the people may have made such a movement in religious thought, that they have cast off the old Religion, and established a new Belief, with a corresponding Religious Body. Or finally, there may be more than one Religion in the country, by the more express working of Providence; as when it introduces the true Religion into a land previously occupied by a false one; and the true Religion may not yet have reached the minds of the Governors. In all such Cases, the State may be prevented from making an Alliance with any Religious Community. It may, if the Governors be not incited to persecution by Religious feelings or political fears, treat all religion with neutrality. The State and the Church may be altogether unconnected. Men may be allowed to preach and to teach, to worship and to pray, as they are allowed to do any other indifferent acts. They may be allowed to assemble for such purposes, provided they do not create disturbance or inconvenience by their assemblies or practices. They may have Temples, by the same Right by which they have houses; they may celebrate religious Festivals, as a Family may celebrate its Birthdays. They may perform their religious Observances on occasions of Birth and Marriage, and Death, in addition to the Forms which the State requires. They may settle their disputes by the Arbitration of their own Officers, in all cases where the State does not find it necessary to compel them to its own Tribunals.

  §1074. Such a condition of things may last for a considerable time: but from what has already been said, we see how incomplete a State is, which is on these terms with the Religious Communities existing within it. In such a case, there is a provision for the lower object of the State, its preservation, in the absence of all religious teaching of disobedience to the Laws. The State is left to protect itself by its Punishments. But in doing this, it works upon |316| men’s outward fears alone. The people have no sympathy with it. If the Government is attacked, the people are obedient, so long as it can defend itself; but they are neutral. There is no zeal, no affection, on its side. All men’s warmer and stronger feelings,—their loves, their hopes, their reverence,—are directed to their Religious Community. It is to that, that their higher nature, their moral being, clings. If the Government perish, they care not; for some other Government will succeed, which, so long as they obey it, will hardly fail to be at least indifferent to them, as the existing one is. But this is not all the danger. The Government may think it good policy to treat Religious Communities with Indifference: but the Religious Communities, or some of them, may not think this good policy. They may think that Religion ought to be considered in the conduct of a State; and that true Religion ought not to be put on the same footing as false. They may think that a State ought to aim at those higher objects, which it can promote only by the aid of Religion; at a morality, beyond mere legality; at a moral, intellectual, and religious progress. They may look eagerly, though tranquilly, for the opportunity of carrying these views into effect. Or again: the existing state of religious division, and the Polity of Indifference, may have been preceded by a state of things in which such religious views were carried into effect; by a Polity in which the State was allied with their Religious Body. In this case, the supporters of religious Polity look upon the Polity of Indifference, not only as a National Calamity, but as a heinous Wrong to themselves. They regard the Government as an irreligious usurpation. They look to some extruded Dynasty, some superseded Constitution, as the Instrument by which their Rights are to be restored, and the National sin and misery wiped out. Their hearts are always ready to take up again the good |317| old Cause of Church and State. The Government has a most dangerous foe within the bosom of the nation;—a body of the people united by conscious sympathy and familiar organization; ready to act against the Government with a courage, enthusiasm, and devotion, such as a Religious Cause can inspire, and to which a Government, whose Policy is Indifference to all enthusiasm, can oppose no corresponding feeling. This is a serious danger; and one which, in the course of a prolonged national history, can hardly fail to show itself in great national misfortunes. And still further: there is, as we have seen, a just ground for discontents of this kind. A State which thus treats Religion with indifference, is really prevented from promoting all the higher objects of the existence of a State. It has no means of educating the people, or of promoting the moral, intellectual, and religious progress of the nation. It cannot promote the moral progress, because, in Education at least, morality can only be taught by inculcating its religious foundation. Nor can the State, in the case supposed, promote the intellectual progress of the nation. For man’s Duties and his Destiny, the Ends of Government, the Precepts of Religion, have so much more interest for the Intellects of men in general, than any other subjects; that any intellectual teaching which excludes these subjects, would, on that account, fetter and narrow the mind, far more than enlarge and elevate it. Moreover, the intellect could not be much exercised on mere material subjects, to the exclusion of moral and religious ones, without giving both an undue estimate of the comparative value of the former, and a false view of their bearing and connexion.
  Since then the Polity of Indifference towards Religion is accompanied with such serious evils, let us consider other modes of dealing with that subject. |318|

  §1075. The Second Form of Polity which we shall consider is, when the State takes the Religious Community under its Protection, securing to it certain Rights, and receiving from it, in return, certain services. In this form I do not include those cases in which Religion is established by the State, as being true; but only those in which it is protected as being useful. Such is the condition of the Religion of the natives in India under the English sway. Such is the condition of all forms of Religion, in the United States: all are protected; none is established. Such also is the condition of Religion in all those nations of Europe in which there is no State Religion; although these nations may differ much from each other, in the amount of Protection which they may afford to Religious Communities, and also in the degree in which the Governors of the nation show, to one Religion or another, in their personal acts, a favour which the Constitution excludes in their political acts. Accordingly, the Rights, Privileges, Encouragement, and Influence of Religion, are very different in the different nations which live under this Polity.

  §1076. In all such States, the Religious Communities which are thus protected have the Right of holding the property, which is bestowed upon them by their members; in some, the Ministers or Clergy of all or some selected Religions, receive pecuniary support from the State itself. In return, they are expected to inculcate the Duty of Obedience to the Civil Authority, which indeed is almost a necessary condition of the Religion being permitted to exist: and they are also expected to teach their members the religious Duty of a scrupulous conformity to Truth in declarations, confirmed by Oath, or by some equivalent solemnity. Sometimes the members of the religious community have additional privileges and offices; as when their religious forms of |319| marriage are accepted as constituting a legal marriage; and when their Ministers have a definite part assigned them by the State, in the education of the people. In this case, there is expected, from the ministers of Religion, a large but indefinite Operation in promoting that object which the State, thus protecting one or more Religious Communities, may be supposed to have in view; namely, the general Moral, Intellectual, and Religious Progress of the Nation; for the Statesman probably conceives that this Progress may be understood in so comprehensive a sense, that the Progress made by means of anyone Religion, may be conceived as a part of it; and such a Progress he expects to result, not merely from the education of the young, but from the attention bestowed, at all times of life, upon a subject, so wide, pure, and lofty, as Religion; and from the existence of a Body of Clergy, who must be persons of a Moral and intellectual culture, superior to the common herd of mankind. These views may induce the Statesman not only to protect, but to support the Clergy from the national fund; and to support the Clergy of several different Religions, which prevail among the people; although he himself is convinced that one of these Religions is true, and that all the others are false.

  §1077. But on the other hand, there are very serious inconveniences in the State thus confining itself to the Protection of Religion; and still more, in its Protecting several different coexistent Religions. For the State cannot do this, without appearing to be indifferent to the Truth or Falsehood of Religion: and this very Indifference implied, will neutralize the effect of the Protection bestowed, and will much diminish the Influence of Religion. For if any Religion be true, why should not the State adopt it, profess it, and act upon its Precepts; since they will contain Rules of Action for States, as well as for Individuals? And if several Religions |320| be thus protected, the Indifference to Truth and Falsehood is more manifest; and the Government is likely to incur the suspicion of deeming all Religions equally false; and thus the State really teaches, as its especial Lesson, Disbelief in all Religion. It is true, that the Governors themselves may, by their manifest piety in their own personal Religion, diminish the evil of this lesson, and make it appear that the Neutrality of their Polity is a consequence of the Divisions of the nation, and not of their own want of religious earnestness. But then, so far as this effect is produced, there will be excited, in the other Sects, a suspicion of a latent hostility on the part of the Government, and a fear of having the State Protection withdrawn from them.

  §1078. There are also other evils, arising from the share which, under this Polity, the Clergy take in Civil business. If the Clergy are allowed to legalize the Marriages which they celebrate, they may, by imposing their own Rules, and their own conditions upon Marriage, exercise upon the citizens a constraint which the State strongly disapproves. The Clergy of one Sect may refuse to celebrate Mixed Marriages, that is. Marriages of their Members with those of other Sects; and thus, the freedom of the Marriage choice may be much narrowed, and in special cases, great unhappiness produced. The Clergy may exercise great severity, at least great spiritual severity, in cases of Conversion of persons from one Sect to another; may interfere in the management and disposal of children; and the like. Thus, collision between the State and the Clergy may easily exist.

  §1079. Education is another matter of great difficulty, under the Polity now spoken of. For, as we have said, intellectual, moral, and religious education are so closely connected, that they cannot be kept permanently separate. If we take the Higher Degrees of Education, we find it impossible to carry them on, without teaching either religion |321| or irreligion. In the ancient world, Philosophy was, for the most part, the adversary of the received religious belief, in the Christian world the higher education is resolved into the three Faculties, Theology, Jurisprudence, and Medicine: of which, the first conducts our mental culture with reference to Religion; the second, with reference to the State and its business; the third, with reference to the Material World, and the properties of its component parts. For Medicine, in its original and comprehensive sense, as one of the great divisions of human culture, must be considered as taking in the whole of physical science. But a person cultivated to the highest degree in a knowledge of physical science, without any moral or religious education, would be rather a powerful intellectual machine, than an educated man. Again, the most exact knowledge of the positive Laws of States, if not combined with some cultured judgment of what laws ought to be, would not fit a man to be a statesman; still less would it do justice to his being, as a man. And when we come to consider what laws ought to be, we are led to contemplate the Ends of law, and of human being; which cannot be rightly done without the aid of Religion. Thus Education cannot go on, so as to answer its purpose, without including in it Religion as a leading element. Hence, the Universities, the seats of the Highest National Education, must combine Theology, or at least its regulating and elevating influences, with the rest of their studies. If, in the Universities, the “Faculties” are altogether disconnected; if the Highest Education consist merely of Jurisprudence and Physics, Theology being excluded; this Education cannot fail to have an atheistic tendency; which, in the course of time, will produce a decided effect upon practical morality.

  §1080. If on the other hand, the Education of each Sect is made more complete, by including in it the Theology of the Sect, or its elevating influence, then the Highest Education |322| must be divided according to Sects, and each Sect must have its University, or at least, its Theological Professors in the national Universities. In such a state of things, we may suppose the influence of theological teaching to be so far combined with other teaching, as to remove all general tendency to atheism. But Statesmen, who must be formed by such an education as this, since it is the highest kind of Education, cannot derive from it an intellectual and moral progress, which they may manifest in their national acts; except we suppose that Statesmen learn, from this coexistence of theologies, a more comprehensive religious philosophy, which includes the regulating and elevating tendencies common to all the sects; and that they conduct the affairs of the State according to this philosophy. But to suppose this, is to suppose that Statesmen frame a Religion of their own, in which they reject the peculiar doctrines of each sect, as not essential to their purpose. And in this mode of proceeding, again, there appears to be a tendency to atheism. For if we reject all peculiar doctrines of Sects, there remains nothing which we believe; since there is no doctrine which is not rejected by some Sect. Thus the Unitarian rejects the Divinity of Jesus Christ, the Jew rejects his Divine Mission; the Sadducee rejects a future life. This tendency may operate slowly, especially if, at the outset of such a Polity, the various Sects have been led, by an experience of evils residing in other courses, to accept willingly a Polity which protects them all; but yet it seems probable that the time will come, when either the superior value of one Religion will be acknowledged, and that form will be accepted as the national guide; or those who are formed by the Higher Education will be led, by its tendencies, to reject successive doctrines, till they are left without religious belief.

  §1081. But under this Polity, there are also great |323| and especial difficulties in the Education of the People; which must necessarily be one of the main objects of enlightened Governors. For if this Education be left to the voluntary exertions of the several Sects, there is no security, nor even probability, that it will extend to the whole population; or that it will grow with the growth of the population. Those indeed who are themselves religious, will cause themselves and their children, and perhaps some of their neighbours, to be religiously taught; but when people have become careless about religion, they are, under this Polity, in a condition without hope. Those who have a sense of religion, will perhaps maintain among them, by voluntary efforts. Religious Teachers of their own Sect. But those who have no Religion, have also, for the most part, no consciousness of their need of Religion; and will not expend money and trouble, on a matter for which they have no care. Hence the Voluntary System of teaching religion, both with reference to adults and to children, is insufficient for the purposes of the State, which cannot be content to leave large bodies of its population altogether uneducated. And if the State stimulate and assist various Sects to carry on the Education of the People, beyond the bounds of the voluntary demand, there will be great difficulty in portioning out its assistance in a satisfactory manner. Even if any general maxim be adopted, as, that All Sects are equal in the eye of the State, the application of this maxim can hardly fail to produce frequent dissensions and complaints. And besides, this equal treatment, or simultaneous support, of several Religions, will, as we have said above, seem to imply an indifference to religious Truth and Falsehood, which will tend to diminish the popular respect, both for Religion, and for the State.

  §1082. If, in order to avoid these evils, the State leave the religious education of children to the voluntary |324| efforts of Sects; but try to provide for all of them a secular education, so that they may not he entirely uneducated; we are again led to the difficulties of which we have spoken, as necessarily resulting when we attempt to separate intellectual, and moral, from religious education. These difficulties belong to popular, no less than to the higher education. There can he no Education of the People, which excludes Religion, and the traditionary influence of Religion upon other studies. If reading and writing, and history, and natural history, and languages, and poetry, are commonly considered as important parts of education; they are so considered, only because these studies have hitherto been pursued in a moral and religious spirit; so that everything which the pursuit of them brought in the learner’s way, cooperated with the influence of religion. If this were to cease to be the case; if the attempt were made, to exclude implied morality and religion from such studies; either the studies would become unfit for moral creatures; or moral and religious implications would still be found latently retained, and would be matter of controversy to rival Sects. And at the same time, the National Education, thus given, would be very ineffective, compared with the Voluntary Sectarian Education; and therefore would not tend to that National Spirit of Union, which must be one of the enlightened statesman’s objects.

  §1083. If the Government, thus aiming at establishing a Secular Education, place, at the head of this Education, a Minister of State, or a Council of State, or a Secular University; it will he difficult to avoid Collisions between this Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of the Church. For the Ministers of the Church cannot ever cease to look upon the Education of their flocks, both children and adults, as a matter which is of the highest importance to them, and in which they ought to be concerned. Religion, at least, |325| they must teach to young and old; and with the teaching of Religion, how easily is all other teaching combined! If the Ministers of Religion are required to abstain from teaching the young altogether, they purchase the Protection which they receive, at too dear a rate. They are placed in a condition of intolerable hardship, and dire fear for the future. For how can the rising generation fail to grow up irreligious, if they do not receive religious instruction? It is not probable that the Ministers of Religion will accept pecuniary maintenance or nominal protection from the State, on condition of their being excluded from all share in the education of the young. If the Government were to make an attempt to force such conditions upon the Ministers of any Religion, the attempt must be looked upon as changing the Protection into Persecution. Such a course of Policy could be justified only by its being known that the Minsters of Religion, thus dealt with, were in the practice of teaching disobedience to the Laws, or of upholding the Authority of a Rival Government.

  §1084. Thus the Polity of mere Protection, as the Relation of the State to the Church, implies Indifference to Religious Truth, leads to Collisions between the State and the Clergy, is inconsistent with the Higher Education of Universities, and the general Education of the People; and if such Education be attempted, leads to Collisions between the Ministry of Public Education and the Clergy.

  §1085. The third form of Polity which we have to consider, is that in which the State recognizes an Established Church; that is, a Church accepted as the Teacher of the True Religion; and therefore admitted to a Share in the administration of the country; as took place when Constantine established the Christian Church in the Roman Empire. When the Religion of the Church is thus accepted as true, since Religion is the best of guides for human conduct, |326| and religious influences the deepest and most powerful grounds of human action, it is very natural that the Governors should not only take the Church for their Ally, but acknowledge it as their Supreme Ruler; and in this case we have, not merely an Established Church, but an Ecclesiastical Supremacy; not merely Temporal Power given to the Church, but Spiritual Domination introduced into the State. But this latter kind of Polity must be considered afterwards; and, without going to this length, the State may acknowledge the Church as the Teacher of Religious Truth; and may, on that account, assign to it many Offices, which no Agent but such a Teacher can discharge, and much Authority, which such Offices necessarily imply.

  §1086. The first, and perhaps the greatest advantage, which naturally results from the acknowledgment of the Church, as the Teacher of Religious Truth, is, that, this being done, the State can thenceforth give a religious character to all its solemn Acts. The Officers of the State, from the highest downwards, can, as its Representatives, assign religious, as well as political reasons, as the grounds of their actions. They can speak with reverence and earnestness of the views involved in such reasons: they can, in their official capacity, join in religious worship; and can combine expressions of religious seriousness, and of the hope of the Divine blessing, with the great occasions of State; such as the accession of the highest magistrates to their office, the business of legislation, the administration of the law; and with all their efforts towards the intellectual, moral, and religious progress of the nation. The State is then a religious State. It may hope to receive, in its acts, that respect which men cannot give to anything short of religious action. It may hope for that affection, and sympathy, and devotion to its ends, which men do not bestow on any Agent, which they regard as devoid of religious principles. The |327| members of the Established Church look upon the State no longer with indifference, as an Institution to which they owe nothing; or with a limited gratitude, as a return for a limited Protection; they identify it with themselves. It acts for them, not only as being lovers of justice, or of humanity, but as being lovers of Religion, and of that deeper and purer and loftier morality, to which Religion alone can effectually direct us. They look upon the State, not only as an Ordinance of man, to which Religion enjoins them to submit themselves, but as an Appointment of Providence, for the support of the Truth, and the improvement of mankind.

  §1087. The highest objects of the Church and of the State being thus identified, it becomes possible to make many arrangements in the political structure of the nation, which may be at the same time subservient to these higher objects, and beneficial instruments for the lower ones. The Church must desire to have Religious Teachers, Places of Worship, Schools, diffused over the land; so that all persons may receive the benefits of these means of religious education and direction. For this purpose, no better way can be devised than that the land shall be divided into small districts, and one or more religious Teachers placed in each; that there shall be Parishes, and Parish Congregations, and Parish Ministers. But these Parishes may also form a highly beneficial organization of the State. For all the great events of life. Birth, and Marriage, and Death, of which the state must take note, are, by the Church, invested with religious Ordinances. And as the Association of the members of a Parish serves for religious teaching, and for the united action of the Congregation when that is necessary; it may serve also for the promulgation of laws and acts of the State, and for the proceedings of local bodies of the citizens, when the Constitution requires such proceedings. And though, for some purposes, there may be little |328| apparent advantage in the coincidence of the political with the ecclesiastical subdivisions; for some purposes the benefit of such coincidence is manifest: as for instance, for the relief of the poor. For it may be supposed that in the case of a duty so strongly enjoined by religion, as well as required by humane State policy, associations of men will act with more mutual understanding, sympathy, and charity, if they are the same associations who meet to hear their religious duties inculcated, and to join in acts of worship which remind them that rich and poor are brothers. And in all the acts of the members of a Parish as such, since the guidance and example of their religious teacher may be supposed to have some influence over them, we may expect more kindness, moderation, and thoughtfulness, than if they were not thus connected; since the Minister, educated for his Office, and entrusted with weighty responsibilities both by the Church and the State, is less likely than other men to act with harshness, passion, or levity.

  §1088. But the Parish Ministers will, by the organization of the Church, be placed under spiritual Governors and Directors. In all ages of the Christian Church, they have been under Bishops. And this Institution affords to the State additional advantages, if the Bishops, or Ecclesiastical Rulers, are earnest in furthering the purposes of the State;for these Bishops or Rulers may control and direct the inferior clergy, so as to promote beneficial civil, as well as religious, objects. But in order that the Bishops may thus participate zealously in the purposes of the State, they must be connected with the State, and associated in the Government. They must, for instance, possess places in the Executive or the Legislative Councils; they must have the aid of the civil power, in enforcing the sentences which they, or others acting for them, pronounce as Ecclesiastical Judges; they must have a maintenance and rank, suitable to |329| the place thus assigned them in the business of the State. The Parochial Clergy, too, must have, not only a maintenance, which may enable them to give their time and thoughts to their religious duties (including the cost of a corresponding education); but must also have such other kinds of right and authority, in their Parish, as the good order of the Parish requires; for instance, rights relative to the Edifice of the Church, the Burial-ground, and the like.

  §1089. The Established Churches in the nations of Europe have possessed such Rights as we here speak of; not as Rights granted at any special time by the State; but as Rights which have grown up in the course of historical changes; just as the Rights of the other classes of Society, which belong to the Constitution of each country, have grown up. At an early period, the Clergy possessed much land, given to them by pious donors; and the Tithe, or tenth part of the annual produce, was assigned to ecclesiastical uses. The Clergy, thus invested with property and authority, asserted their Rights as a Class, in the same manner as other Classes at other periods did; they obtained the privilege of exercising political power in their assemblies, and thus they became one of the Estates of the Realm. For instance, in this country, they claimed the right of taxing themselves; and in many cases, they claimed an exemption from the jurisdiction of civil tribunals.

  §1090. The demands of the Spiritual Estate may be pushed so far, that to concede them would produce, not an Established Church, but an Ecclesiastical Supremacy. In order to counteract this tendency, an Established Church must be placed under Royal Supremacy, or in some other way subjected to the Sovereignty of the State. The Sovereign, who is the Head of the State, must also be the Head of the Church, so far as its Government on Earth is concerned. He must convoke and dissolve the Legislative Assemblies of the |330| Church, as of the State. He must be the Supreme Judge of Appeals; and must, in other ways, be recognized as Sovereign. In the practice of States, it has generally been assumed also that the Sovereign must have a large share of power in the appointment of persons to the higher offices of the Church, as Bishops: although the judgment of the Church is rather that such appointments should be by election in the Church itself. The Church, by acquiescing in the appointments made by the Sovereign, avoids conflicts concerning the political authority of the Bishops, which can hardly fail to arise, if persons are placed in that office by an authority independent of the State, and therefore possibly hostile to it. The appointment of the parochial clergy, also, may be modified by the alliance of the Church with the State. The Bishop alone can bestow upon any man the sacred ministry (§823); but from among persons so ordained, the choice of a Minister for any particular Parish, may be in the hands either of the people themselves, or of the lord of the land (§825), whose predecessor probably gave to the Church the endowment which it there holds; and who, in that as in many other ways, may be considered as summing up in himself the Rights and functions of the tenants of the land. This lay-patronage is not a desecration of the ministry (for the sacred character is bestowed by the Church alone); it is rather a consecration of property; for it invests the holder of property with a inunction in the Christian Church, which ought to be performed in the spirit of religion.

  §1091. But as the State, for its own purposes, associates the Church in its Polity, this Association makes it necessary to give a certain character to the Polity for the sake of the Church. The State accepts the Church as the Teacher of Religious Truth; and upon this ground, joins with the Church, in Ecclesiastical Legislation, and Ecclesiastical Appointments. This makes it necessary for the Church |331| to demand that there shall be some Test of religious Truth agreed upon, which may be applied so as to prevent such legislation and such appointments as would be hurtful to religious Truth. If the State is to legislate for the Established Church, the Legislators must be of the Established Church; or at least, must be friendly to it. If the State is to place persons in offices in the Church, there must be some means of ascertaining that they are of the Church.

  §1092. The various branches of the Christian Church (among which the question lies, in the cases with which we are here concerned) differ from each other in Liturgies belonging to their Ordinances, and in the Articles in which they have summed up the leading points of their Theology. And these are the Tests which must be applied by the State, if it will have an Established Church. The Articles and Liturgies must be assented to, by all who are to hold Ecclesiastical offices; and these also, or at least those portions of them which exclude Sects hostile to the Established Church, must be assented to by Legislators, and other persons holding prominent offices in the State. If this is not done; if persons avowedly hostile to the Established Church are placed in weighty official situations, without any effective tie to prevent their using their official power against the Church; the Ecclesiastical Polity of the State no longer consists of an Established Church simply; but of an Established Church, along with a provision for disestablishing it.

  §1093. This brings us to a weighty disadvantage of the Polity of an Established Church, which it possesses, along with all the great advantages which we have noticed: namely, the difficulty of dealing with Dissenters from the Church. When we reject the System of Spiritual Domination, the very energy and freedom of mind which are requisite for this purpose, lead to differences in the Doctrine and Discipline of different Religious Communities. The aim and |332| plan of the Reformation, which established the Church of England was to reject, both the Polity of Ecclesiastical Supremacy, and the various doctrinal Corruptions and Errors, which the Church of later times taught, along with that Polity. The Church of England retained Liturgies, and an organized Church Government by Bishops. But other Reformers, the Presbyterians, rejected Bishops; others, the Independents, rejected Church Government; and both, for the most part, rejected Liturgies. These Sects, however, did not professedly differ in essential points from the ancient Belief of the Christian Church, and are termed in England Orthodox Dissenters. Other Sects have arisen, rejecting more and more of the ancient belief.

  §1094. The Polity of an Established Church puts no difficulty in the way of the most complete Toleration of Dissenters. They may be freely allowed, under such a Polity, to worship according to their own rules, and to teach their own opinions without restriction, so long as they keep their teaching clear of sedition. But if the State wish to compel the whole of the population to be educated, then, indeed, the question of Dissent becomes a very difficult one. For to compel Dissenters to have their children taught by the teaching of the Established Church, would be a violation of toleration; and to accept the teaching of Dissenters as answering the purposes of the State, equally with the teaching of the Church, is to repudiate the view of the Church which its Establishment implies. To give the Church the means of educating all; and to leave those who reject its education to their own teachers; appears to be the nearest approximation to a Universal Education of the People, which can be made under the Polity of an Established Church.

  §1095. With regard to the political position of Dissenters, there are also considerable difficulties. Among |333| Dissenters in England, are found a great number of persons hostile to the Church of England, and to the Polity of an Established Church in general. The State, having adopted the Established Church, cannot consistently arm with its power, those who would destroy that Church. The most simple mode of avoiding such a danger is to exclude Dissenters from all offices of Trust or Power, whether general or local. But the temper of the English Constitution, both makes such exclusions with every possible reserve, and leaves, to the persons excluded, many years of labouring to get their exclusion mitigated; as Petitions, public writing and speaking, and the like. Hence, whatever the excluding boundary is, it is always a matter of contest between the Friends of the Church and the Champions of the Dissenters. If the Dissenters were only a small part of the population, the frontier of the Church might be defended with comparative ease and success; and for this purpose, it was desirable, at the first, to make the terms of Communion with the Church as comprehensive as possible. Whether this was done as fully as it might have been, we need not discuss: but the barrier being once pitched, has become the line of angry conflict, and probably could not be shifted with safety.

  §1096. An Established Church is the Church of the Nation; and must retain that character, by acting for the Nation. She must, as far as possible, consider all the inhabitants of the land as belonging to her; and must exclude none who will allow themselves to be included. She ought especially to make provision of religious teaching for the rising generations; and her parochial system, if complete, and made always commensurate with the national domain, and with the population, enables her to discharge this duty, if the State duly support her in doing so.

  §1097. Not only has an Established Church a peculiar power, or rather the only full power, of educating an expanding |334| population, if she be supplied with adequate means for doing this; but the Idea of an Established Church is imperfectly carried into effect, if such means be not provided. For the State has adopted the Church, as the teacher of Religious Truth; and is desirous of having Religious Truth taught to all its subjects. The religious teaching of the Established Church is not by permission, or under protection of the State, as is that of other Sects: it is on the part of the State. The State, desirous of teaching Religious Truth to its growing population, and having the means of doing this by the machinery of the Established Church, is inconsistent, if it do not provide for an extension of this machinery in proportion to the extension of the population. The State should make the teaching of the Established Church keep pace with the advancing numbers of the nation. If it do not do this, it incurs, so far as its neglect operates, the evils of ignorance, immorality, disaffection, and Religious Sedition, which it ought to escape in adopting the Polity of an Established Church; and which it might escape, or mitigate, by adopting that Polity more cordially.

  §1098. It is, of course, not meant that such education should be forced upon the people; but that Education, according to the Doctrine of the Established Church, should be offered to all who are willing to receive it. Without some provision for doing this, the National Church is, as we have said, incompletely established. The existence of a large Body of Dissenters, by no means diminishes the importance of making such a provision. The State, regarding the Church as the Teacher of Truth, will naturally, by means of the Church, encourage and facilitate the passage of men from Error to Truth. In the eyes of the friends of the Established Church, it must be a national benefit, when men are converted from Dissent to the Church. Every |335| Community of Christians has, by its Christian Principles, a Missionary character (§743). It must endeavour to extend true Religion to those whom it can reach. And the State, if it fully adopts and establishes the Church, must also partake in this Missionary character; and must look upon the Teachers of the Church, not only as the Religious Ministers for those who do belong to it: but as Home Missionaries to those who do not.

  §1099. But though the consistency of the State, which has adopted the Established Church as the Teacher of the Truth, requires this; it may often be difficult for the Government to pursue this course. For this adoption of the Established Church, which we suppose to take place on the part of the Nation, may have been dissented from by a part of the Nation; as has been the case in England. And this being the case, any public measures which are requisite, in order to carry into effect the complete Polity of an Established Church, under the successive circumstances of an empire growing in population and extent, may be thwarted by the imperfect national unity of sentiment on the subject. In the English Constitution, the Government cannot carry into effect any course of policy, without having with it, in a large degree, the concurrence of the Nation. And the enemies of the Established Church, acting through the forms of the Constitution, may be powerful enough to prevent the organization of the Church from growing and expanding, so as to continue commensurable with the growth of the nation and of the empire.

  §1100. The success of such a course of opposition may be looked upon as, to a certain extent, tending to disestablish the Church. If the Governors are really friends of and believers in the Established Church, they will oppose themselves to such a course of action. They will, of course, follow, with cordial reverence, the guidance of the Constitution, when |336| it forbids them to act for the nation without the assent of the nation; but thinking the Established Church to be no less a blessing to the Country than the Political Constitution is, they will never, through indifference or ignorance, estimate too low or represent too feebly that portion of the National Sentiment which is on the side of the Established Church. The Polity of an Established Church requires to be administered in a different spirit from the Polity of the mere Protection of Religious Communities. Every State act which is conceived in the spirit of protecting all religions alike, is a step from Establishment to mere Protection. It is not that, in the Polity of an Established Church, nothing is to be done for Dissenters, by the State. They may receive from it, not only full Protection, but even such Assistance, as may make their influence upon the population more beneficial than it would otherwise be. But such assistance is given as an act of Prudence: the assistance given to the Established Church is given as an act of Wisdom; for it is given for the support of the Truth. The policy of Government ought not to consist entirely of acts of prudence, with no acts of wisdom. If the Polity of an Established Church is to be upheld, there ought to be, corresponding with every State act of bounty or favour to Dissenters, some State act recognizing the Rights, and protecting the means of action, of the Church.

  §1101. It may happen that the Governors of a Country are led, by their views of religious Truth and sound Policy, to establish, in it, the Church to which belongs the smaller part of the population. If they find that they and those who are of their Church, though few in number, are, by the possession of property in the country, and by their social and jural superiority, as well as by their possession of religious Truth, the natural and inevitable directors and leaders of the country, it does not appear how they can |337| rightly shrink from the Duty of establishing and promoting true Religion. They must consider themselves as the natural instructors of the Country. They see that they are appointed to introduce into it Order and Law; and they may naturally think themselves appointed to introduce into it true Religion also. They may very properly trust to the superiority of Truth over Falsehood; and may hope to see the Established Church draw into its fold the extraneous population, in proportion as civilisation and knowledge extend among them.

  §1102. When the Governors of a State have established, in any portion of it, the Church of the Minority, in the belief of its being the best form of Religion; their Polity is very incomplete, if they do not constantly aim, by education and otherwise, at such an extension of the Church. The neglect of this Duty will bring its own punishment. For instance: if some rival sect obtain a lasting hold upon the population, and convert the greater part of them into Dissenters; the position of the Established Church is full of difficulty: for the general discontent at the exclusions which the preservation of the Established Church requires, and at its imperfect nationality, will grow with the growth of the national intelligence and activity. The difficulty is much increased if the Dissenters be adherents of a Polity of Spiritual Domination; and hence, subject to an extra-national Head. This circumstance, however, does not diminish, but rather increases the value of the Established Church in such a Country; as an anchor both of religious truth, and of national government.

  §1103. A State has, in some cases, different Churches established in different parts of its Empire; as the Anglican Church is established in England and the Presbyterian Church is established in Scotland. This is not inconsistent with the principle of an Established Church, if there |338| be no fundamental Error held by any of such Churches; for then, they may be considered by the State as teaching the Truth under different forms, and in different ways. But in cases in which a State maintains a Religion which it believes to be false, its Polity is no longer Establishment, it is mere Protection.

  §1104. If it be asked, who is to judge for the State, what is true in Religion, and what is false; we have already answered this question, in speaking of the Moral Character of the State (§865). We have there stated that the Governors of the State, who act for it, also judge for it, in the manner and degree which the Constitution directs. They have their own convictions of religious Truth; and to these they must wish the expressions of belief, on the part of the State to conform, but still, in such a manner that they shall express belief on the part of the State, and not merely the belief of an individual. The expressions of the belief of the State must be the acts of a continued existence. For instance; if the Governors of the State, and of the Established Church, find that the Church has fallen into grave religious and political Errors; as for instance, has been led to assert the lawfulness of false oaths; or the authority of an extra-national Sovereign: the Governors may undertake a Reformation of the Church. But they must, if possible, effect the Reformation by constitutional means. The Articles which are to define the Belief, and the Rules which are to determine the Organization, of the Reformed Church, must be decreed by the proper legislative Authorities, in the Church, and in the State. Hence the Governors of the State may often be compelled to make their public acts hang far behind their private convictions. The belief of the nation may change; but it cannot change all at once; and the Governors must not make the nation adopt a change of belief, merely because they themselves |339| have changed. The Governors, in order to be able to make any great change for the nation, must put themselves in the condition of being able to make it with the nation.

  §1105. When Dissent has a hold upon any considerable portion of the population, the struggle between Churchmen and Dissenters will make its way into all parts of the nation; and will combine with any other political contests which may be going on; for instance, with the great and constant struggle between the Conservative and the Movement Party, of which we have already spoken (§947). And it is a misfortune for the Established Church, that the cause of Freedom and Self-government, always very attractive and powerful names, appears, to a common glance, to he the cause of the Dissenters. Dissenters are naturally of the. Movement party, in all measures in which the Church is concerned; and these measures, even if this be all, are no small part of the Polity of the State. And hence, again. the Established Church has for its opponents, not the Dissenters merely, but for the most part, the whole of the Movement party. This party, speaking generally, have a constant disposition to destroy the Established Church; to reduce the Ecclesiastical Polity of the Nation to a system of mere Protection of Religious Communities, and Equality of Religious Sects; and thus, to throw away all the advantages which we have stated as resulting from an Established Church.

  §1106. Besides the Duty of acting at Home in a Missionary character towards the dissenting Population, which Duty, as we have said (§1098), belongs to a State in which there is an Established Church; there is also a Duty of carrying the National Church into the Colonies, if there be Colonies belonging to the State. For the same conviction of what is true in Religion, and beneficial in Polity, ought to direct the Governors in the administration of the Colonies, and of the mother Country. Yet in this, as in other cases, |340| the previous History of the Colony may sometimes make it necessary to establish or protect a different Church from that of the Mother Country, But in proportion to the estrangement of the two Churches, the benefits diminish, which would arise from a National Sympathy between the two Countries, fostered by the love of a Common National Church.

  §1107. We have already said that the public measures which are requisite to carry into effect the complete Polity of an Established Church may often be thwarted by the want of national unity of sentiment with regard to the Church. On this account, it may be impossible for the Government to extend the teaching of the Church to the young in general, and to the growing population. They may not be able to direct the action of the State by constitutional means, so that it shall adopt the Missionary Character of the Church, at Home and in the Colonies. Such exertions as this Character implies, require the appropriation of large sums of money. And the existence of a large Body of Dissenters, invested with considerable Political Power, may prevent the State from employing the public treasure for this purpose. But in proportion as the consistent support of the Established Church is thus omitted by the State, it falls, as an individual Duty, upon the friends of the Church. If the Polity of an Established Church is imperfectly carried out in public acts, it is the business of its members, by their private exertions, to supply the deficiency. They are, of course, fully persuaded of the immense benefits which an Established Church confers upon the Country, and of the superiority of that Form of Ecclesiastical Polity over the Polity of mere Protection; they are therefore impelled, by their love of their Country, to give to its collective Acts the character which a complete Established Church would give. What the State omits in its public Acts, they can, in many respects, |341| supply by private labours and sacrifices, and by voluntary Associations. If the State will not act in a Missionary Character for the Church, they can form themselves into societies which act in a Missionary way, in behalf of Christian Truth, sound Doctrine and Apostolic Institutions.

  §1108. The friends of the Church have much reason to feel the force of this Duty. Because they are convinced of the value, and grateful for the blessings, of their Church, they mu§t be ready to give, with their own hands, that which the State, if all the citizens were of their mind, would take from them and give for them. They are thankful to Providence for the endowments of the Church, which pious men, in former times, have bestowed upon it; and through which it has been, for ages, a blessing to the Nation; they may show their gratitude, by being themselves the founders and benefactors of new Schools, new Parish-Churches, new Bishoprics, an Established Church in the Colonies, Missions by which men shall be brought to be Christians, and the like. These are ways in which Churchmen may make the Church act more like a National Church than the State can do, however well disposed. Societies and Associations for such purposes may be considered as Institutions supplemental to those which exist in the Established Church; and indeed such Associations, when they have taken root, may be recognized by the State as National Institutions. And those Dissenters who are satisfied with their condition as Dissenters, and do not wish to overturn the Established Church, may, by similar Societies, with objects somewhat differently defined, take a share in the National work of diffusing Religion at home and abroad.
  Objections are sometimes urged against an Established Church on religious grounds: but these we will treat of in the next Chapter.

  §1109. We now proceed to consider a fourth form |342| of Polity, which we have already spoken of as Ecclesiastical Supremacy, or Spiritual Domination. In this Polity, the Church has, here upon earth, a Head to which the Head of the State is subordinate. The pretended Head of the Church on earth claims his Authority on religious grounds; and if, as we conceive may be shown, these grounds are utterly delusive, this is an irreligious usurpation, whether it be a good or bad form of Polity. But the former question, that of the religious authority of the Spiritual Domination, will be treated hereafter. At present we consider the question as a political one; and we have to point out the advantages and disadvantages of this Polity.

  §1110. The System of the Ecclesiastical Supremacy possesses many of the advantages which we have noted as belonging to an Established Church; namely, the religious character which can be given to all the solemn acts of the State; a love of the country combining pious with patriotic feelings: the parochial division of the country with ministers and schools in each parish: the distribution of these parishes into dioceses, under the ecclesiastical rule of their Bishops. Indeed, in some respects, the system of Ecclesiastical Supremacy, supposing it cordially adopted by the State, would contribute, more powerfully than an Established Church, to an orderly condition in the Nation, and a moral conduct of the affairs of the State. For in this case, the State-authorities are sanctioned by the Divine Authority of the Church; and the Ecclesiastical Power authoritatively directs the Temporal by the best of lights, that of Christian Morality.

  §1111. Moreover, in this Polity, the visible Plead of the Church, whatever it be, the Pope or a General Council of Bishops, will naturally have authority to settle disputes among the Temporal Sovereigns who are sons of the Church; and thus wars and national quarrels will be superseded by the reign of Christian peace and concord.

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  §1112. Such is the Ideal Aspect of this Polity. But when we look at the attempts which have been made to carry such a Polity into effect, we see a very different spectacle. Probably a complete System of Spiritual Domination has nowhere existed, except in cases where the Religious Teachers have been, on temporal grounds, the natural rulers of the Laity; for instance, when the Laity have been ignorant and unorganized savages, or a feeble and childlike race. Whenever attempts have been made to establish a system of Spiritual Domination in nations of energetic character, already swayed by their political Governors, these attempts have led to fierce conflicts between the Ecclesiastical and Civil Power; and the Ecclesiastical Supremacy has nowhere been completely established. The Sovereigns of every Nation in Europe have succeeded in possessing themselves, practically at least, of the greater part of the temporal Authority which the Popes, in the day of the full manifestation of their system, claimed as belonged to the Head of the Church: such as the Appointment of Bishops, the Control of Ecclesiastical Revenues, the Authority of Supreme Judge, and the like. No Nation is completely subjected to the Ecclesiastical Supremacy. Those Nations which recognize the Pope as the Plead of the Church on earth, have still, in various degrees, asserted the Liberties of their own Church, and thus made it a National Church.

  §1113. But yet, in the degree in which Spiritual Domination has been exercised, we see how little fit men are to be entrusted with Authority of such a character. The Dignitaries of the Church, thus placed upon a footing of equal negotiations, or rivalry, with Statesmen, have by no means carried into action that better Morality in which we might expect religious men to excel politicians. In their political acts, they have been, like other statesmen, selfish, ambitious, false, violent. Indeed it might |344| seem as if the absence of superior control, which belongs to unquestioned Ecclesiastical Sovereigns, tended to make men rather bad than good. Some of the most flagrantly wicked characters which history presents to our view, are the Church Dignitaries, and especially the Popes, just before the Protestant Reformation. It has been made apparent that the notion of a Christian world, governed in a Christian spirit, by an Ecclesiastical Body, under an Earthly Head, is one which, from the habitual conduct of men, must always be a mere dream.

  §1114. In National Churches, acknowledging the Papacy, in modern times, the influence of Religion has been very different, according as there has been a cordial understanding between the Church and State, or not. Where such an understanding exists, as in Austria, the Romish Religion produces some of the good effects of which we have spoken. She adds to the reverence for authority, and softens the exercise of unquestioned power. She there appears the natural Ally of Despotism. But the Romish Religion can assume a very different aspect. Those who, in various countries of Europe, looking upon themselves as Members of the Church of Rome, are not satisfied with the manner in which the Church is protected or established in their own State, are very far from inculcating an unbounded submission to civil authorities. On the contrary, their discontent with the State, and their ecclesiastical organization, make them the natural leaders of an opposition to the course which the Government follows. In such instances, the Romish Religion appears as the natural Ally of Democracy.

  §1115. The Polity, of which the result is, that Religion assumes one or the other of the characters, is evil. In either case. Religion strengthens the side which is already too strong. She binds faster the fetters which the Despot imposes: she tears off the bands of Civil Society |345| when they are already too weak. The two great and permanent Parties, the Conservative and the Movement Party, so long as they have temporal interests to deal with, preserve a sort of progressive equilibrium, and tend towards that mixture of Order and Freedom, for which the nation is fitted: but when Religion is thrown into one scale or the other, the balance is destroyed, and some violent revolution may easily take place. The Zeal for Order, the Love of Liberty, are calm impulses of themselves, when compared with the fire and vehemence which the contract of Religious Enthusiasm can communicate to them.

  §1116. If, as we conceive may be shown, the claim of the Roman See to be the visible Head of all Christian Nations, be a false view of the designs of Providence; it is naturally to be expected, that the attempt to carry this view into practice, will distort and disturb the political relations of nations. By a survey of the political principles of action among men, we are led to conceive that nations were intended by Providence to work out their political Constitution by a combined operation of the Love of Freedom and the Love of Order, in the manner which we have already attempted to show (§929, etc.). The influence of an Extra-national Power, acting by means of Religious Enthusiasm, is a needless and dangerous addition to these principles of Political Power.

  §1117. Thus by a survey of the various forms of the relation of Church and State, we are led to believe, that if>a Nation, in virtue of its historical circumstances, can obtain and preserve the blessing of an Established Church, it is in by far the happiest condition which the Nature of Man and of Human Society allows. If, in consequence of the unfortunate circumstances of the country, such an Establishment is, for the time, impracticable; the State may be driven to a mere Protection of Sects, on the one side; |346| or to a recognition of Ecclesiastical Supremacy on the other. In the one case, great detriment is inflicted upon the National Influence of Religion; in the other case, the National Independency is damaged, if the Supremacy be established; and the balance of Order and Freedom is disturbed, so long as the struggle is still going on.

  We have spoken of the religious falsity involved in the assumption of a visible Head of the Church on Earth; and of the consistency of an Established Church with religious truth. These religious views of the relation of Church and State, we must very briefly discuss.

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  §1118. We have seen that it is only by availing itself of the aid of the Church, that the State can pursue its higher object; the moral, intellectual, and religious progress of the nation. We have seen also, that in order to derive the full advantage of this aid. the State must not only protect, but establish the Church; must accept it as the true Church; must secure to its Ministers a maintenance, with the means of teaching and directing the people; must invest them with rights and authority of a civil kind; must assign to their Bishops, or other Ecclesiastical Governors, a place in the Government of the State; and must invest them with rank and dignity. The State has the strongest reasons to offer to the Church wealth and power, in order to obtain her cooperation.

  §1119. But here, the question occurs. Whether the Church can properly accept these offers? The Church must |347| direct her conduct by the commands of Christ and his Apostles, and by the Spirit of their teaching. And there are texts which express, or seem to imply, directions to the Christian Minister, not to mix himself with the business of the State. His concern is with men’s Souls, not with their bodies or worldly condition. Christ says. My kingdom is not of this world. He commands his disciples, when they go forth to preach his Gospel (Matt. 10:9. Mark 6:8. Luke 9:3), To provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass, nor scrip, nor two coats. He warns them against taking authority upon themselves (Matt. 20:25. Mark 10:42). Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them, hut it shall not he so among you. So Matthew 23:10, Be not ye called masters. And the general tendency of the teaching of Christ and of the Apostles is, to inculcate, both an indifference to human riches and possessions, and a humility, which shrinks from human honours and political power. It may therefore seem to be inconsistent with the Christian temper of the Church, to accept such offers of maintenance and authority, as we have shown reason for the State making to her.

  §1120. But we may remark, in the first place, that the injunctions, to disregard earthly possessions and earthly honours, are given, not to Christian ministers in particular, but to Christians in general. We have already (§620) considered the importance of these warnings against covetousness; but we have shown (§615) that these warnings do not prohibit, and did not in the first ages prevent, distinction of property, and differences of wealth among the Christians. Nor did they prevent property being held in a permanent form. The injunction to take no thought for the morrow, was always understood of such thought as might interfere with religious care about spiritual things. There is no religious |348| reason why Christians, and the Clergy as well as the rest, should not possess property on which they may depend for their subsistence and power of action, while they devote their time and labour to their own spiritual progress, and to the teaching and assisting of others.

  §1121. That the Christian Teachers ought to be supported by their flocks, was a rule which prevailed from the earliest times of the Church. St. Paul says expressly (1 Cor. 9:14), The Lord hath ordained that they which preach the Gospel shall live by the Gospel; and he then quotes Christ’s expressions, used when the Apostles were sent forth (Luke 10:7), The Labourer is worthy of his hire. He further urges, as proof of the reasonableness of this Rule, both the ordinances of the Mosaic Law, and the general practice of mankind; according to which, the soldier, the wine-grower, the grazier, live by their respective employments. This he urges, entirely for the sake of establishing the Rule; for, as he says, here and elsewhere, he rejects the benefit of it in his own case (1 Cor. 9:7 and 15. 2 Cor. 11:9. Gal. 6:6. 2 Thess. 3:9. Acts 20:33).

  In the earliest times of Christianity, the Ministers received their maintenance from the Hospitality of the Christians, dispersed through all parts of the Empire: but when the Empire itself became Christian, Churches and religious bodies were invested with the right of holding property. And it has been shown that such a maintenance of the Clergy in the form of permanent property, free from the uncertainty and distraction of casual contribution, is opposed to no dictate of Religion: if offered by the State, it may be accepted by the Church.

  §1122. In the next place, as to the Dignity and Power conferred upon the Christian Clergy, it is evident that the injunctions above referred to, containing warnings against ambition and rivalry among Christians, do not apply to cases |349| in which the Christian Minister is requested by his Christian brethren to exercise authority in worldly matters, in virtue of the confidence they have in his ministerial character, and in authority exercised according to Christian principles. St. Paul rebukes the Corinthians (1 Cor. 6:1), while they were but a small part of the Community, for going to law before unbelievers. If, then, he had lived in a Community altogether Christian, it may be inferred, that he would have invested Christians as such with judicial powers, in the name of the State. The Bishops and Presbyters were Judges and Legislators for Christians then; why should they be less so now, when all persons profess Christianity? If the State, on the part of the Christian Community, offer, to the Bishops and Presbyters, such dignity and authority as may make them valuable helpers in the business of the State, there appears to be no ground, nor valid excuse, for their rejecting the offer; especially when it also tends so much to forward that religious Duty, of bringing men to the knowledge of Christ, which is the highest object of their lives.